The Rise of Risk Management in Financial Institutions and a Potential Unintended Consequence – The Diminution of the Legal Function

I. Introduction[1] 

After the global financial crisis, a highly respected group of financial supervisors from the industrialized world convened to consider what might have caused the worst financial crisis experienced since the Great Depression.  This group – aptly named the “Senior Supervisors Group” – concluded that a material contributing cause was what they characterized as a “colossal failure of risk management.”[2]  The Senior Supervisors Group was not alone.  Many other bodies have taken up the same topic and reached a similar conclusion.[3]

In the 10 years since the global financial crisis ended, the financial community has responded to the identified causes of the financial crisis, adopting lessons learned and significantly reforming the financial system.  This work has resulted in a financial system with individual institutions that are demonstrably more safe and more sound than before, and a much more resilient banking system overall.  In contrast to what existed on the eve of the crisis – early 2007 – today’s financial system has considerably higher capital and liquidity, as government officials and other commentators have observed.  In addition, and perhaps even more importantly if we accept the conclusion of the Senior Supervisors Group, there has been a revolution in the discipline of risk management and in the “build-out” of processes and procedures for identifying, measuring, monitoring, and controlling risk.  In the United States, for example, one may witness the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which President Obama signed into law on July 21, 2010 (the “Dodd-Frank Act”).  The Dodd-Frank Act introduced varied and different requirements for risk management, including a series of “enhanced prudential standards,” as well as governance directed at risk management requirements, like the requirement for a risk committee of the board of directors.

In implementing these and other measures, financial institutions in the United States have overhauled their risk management functions from top to bottom.  Now, after implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, a financial institution will commonly have a risk committee at the board of directors’ level, a chief risk officer who is a powerful member of senior management, and a risk function populated by experienced risk professionals with expertise in credit, operational, interest-rate, market, compliance, and other types of risk.  The risk professionals will carry out their risk activities in a “three lines of defense” framework, where they will inhabit the so-called “second line.”  This is the line of defense that is empowered to challenge the decisions of the front-line business units, namely those units engaged in generating revenue or those who support the revenue generators.[4]  Perhaps most importantly, the risk professionals now have status and power, so their challenges can no longer be ignored by the front-line units.

In my view, all of this change is very positive.  Like higher capital and more liquidity, the changes in risk management have transformed the post-Dodd-Frank financial institution, and the financial industry.  But in reflecting on any change, particularly one of such scale and size, it is also important to contemplate whether the change has brought with it other, unintended consequences.  This article will discuss whether the rise of the risk management function has had one very specific unintended consequence – the diminution of the legal function.  To place such an important question in a proper context, this article will focus on the potential inverse relationship – it is not only that the legal function has declined in importance, but it is also that the decline has come as the direct result of the rise in risk.

II. The Importance of the Legal Function

Before turning to analyze whether the rise of risk has resulted in a fall of legal, it is useful to take up two preliminary matters.  The first preliminary matter relates to whether any decline in the importance of the legal function might be attributable to something other than the ascendancy of risk – say a decline in the importance of what lawyers do for financial institutions.  If the importance of the work itself has diminished, then the rise of risk might be correlated to the decline of legal but not causative of legal’s decline.  Second, the ascendancy of risk needs to be viewed in a historical perspective.  Risk may be getting so much attention nowadays simply because it is new and not because it is noteworthy.

We begin with the question of whether any potential decline in the legal function is attributable to a decline in the importance of what banking lawyers do.  I do not find any evidence supporting the proposition that the work itself has become less consequential.  Now, as before, legal issues touch every facet of the activities of a financial institution.  While it is true that some legal subjects are less important than before, other legal subjects have taken their place.  For example, when I started my banking law career nearly 40 years ago, the law relating to the collection of checks was a significant subject for banking lawyers.  It is not any longer.  But other areas of substantive law have taken its place, like the law related to privacy and cybersecurity.  These substantive areas are at least as complex as check law, and perhaps much more so. 

The output of the legal function is also just as impactful as it was in earlier times.  A persuasive case can be made that the work of lawyers in a financial institution is even more impactful than before, given the measurable enforcement consequences of a violation of law.  The stakes, at least with respect to penalties, are higher now than they have ever been.[5]  In addition, a material violation will also ordinarily be accompanied by significant reputational damage.

Another topic deserving a brief preliminary discussion relates not to the importance of legal but to the “newness” of risk.  There is a significant difference in longevity between risk, on the one hand, and the legal function, on the other.  The legal function has enjoyed a much longer life in financial institutions than has the risk management function.  Consequently, what is perceived as ascendancy may simply be the attention that something “new” can attract.  If you are in a family that has two cars, you can see this effect in the attention that the new car gets over the old car.  The new car looks different, probably has better technology, and will stimulate olfactory senses with that magical “new car smell.”  The risk function may be like that new car;  it is not overtaking the legal function in importance, it is only the latest and the shiniest new object. 

If you were to examine the financial institution of 20 years ago, you might not find any risk management function whatsoever.  And, if you did find a risk management function, it would likely be much smaller in size, and with rudimentary capabilities.  Most such functions had little in the way of power and even less in terms of sophistication.  If someone from that period were to be magically transported from then to now, he or she would not recognize today’s risk management function.  The financial institution risk management function of today, unlike 20 years ago, is both new and “cutting edge.”

How did such consequential change occur in such a short period of time?  From my vantage point, the financial crisis changed the playing field for risk management.  It highlighted in vivid detail a clear and present need for financial institutions to manage risk better.  And the law reform that turned into the Dodd-Frank Act also transformed risk management into a legal requirement.  That said, this author has the sense that financial institutions were ready, independently of the Dodd-Frank Act, to make real change in the way risk would be managed.  In bank board rooms across the country, there seemed to be a generalized agreement with what the Senior Supervisors Group concluded – we experienced a colossal failure in managing risk and everyone was resolved not to permit it to happen again.

In comparison to the risk management function, which is now in its youth, the legal function is in a very mature state.  Legal functions in financial institutions have been present since they were first chartered.  For example, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York obtained a charter from the Comptroller of the Currency in 1913, and had internal counsel when it opened for business.  The risk function at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York did not arrive until 2008, ninety-five years later.  I use this example to underscore the point that the risk function has become very important in a very short time.  The legal function, in contrast, established itself early and has experienced a lasting legacy.  When we compare one function to the other, we should keep these characteristics in mind. 

Of course, the fact that legal has been a long-time player does not, in itself, make the legal function important.  What is the role of the legal function?  While we will discuss that question throughout this article, the continuous role of the legal function has been to exercise legal judgment, and in the most effective legal functions, the people providing such judgment are made up of experienced and mature lawyers who have the trust of senior management.  In many financial institutions, the chief legal officer is in the “C” suite and in regular contact with the chief executive officer and the board of directors.  

But it is not the position and longevity of the legal function that makes the work of lawyers so important.  It is the nature of the subject matter – legal judgment – that has so much consequence for the way financial institutions carry out their activities.[6]  Shortly before the global financial crisis started, I had the occasion to make the following observation about the work done by banking lawyers:  “Generally, lawyers acquitted themselves with distinction in assisting their financial institution clients in the management of legal, compliance, and reputational risk.”[7]  Nothing since 2007 has altered my view on the role of banking lawyers or the capability of the class as a whole.

The mismanagement of the risks that resulted in the global financial crisis were largely not legal, compliance and reputational risks, the risks typically associated with the legal function.  The problems that caused difficulties at Bear Stearns, AIG, Lehman Brothers, WAMU, Citigroup, and Bank of America arose out of other types of risk.  No federal judge during the global financial crisis felt the need, as Judge Sporkin did almost 30 years ago with respect to the failed Lincoln Savings and Loan, to inquire, “[w]here were the lawyers?”[8]  In the vast literature about the global financial crisis, there is plenty of blame with respect to how risk was managed, but very little is cast on financial institution lawyers. 

Take, as one useful example, the change in the business model for bank lending.  The industry transformed from an industry that originated and held the loans that banks made, to an industry that originated and distributed these loans to other industry participants.  This change in business model resulted in less discipline among banks, and across the financial industry, with respect to credit risk.  Because there was no longer the same incentive for the bank originating the loan to identify, measure, monitor, and control credit risk (because the risk would soon thereafter be transferred to someone else), there was a significant increase in bad loans.  This contributed to the financial crisis.  Note that this was credit risk and not legal risk.  The blame rightly rests with the business people in the front lines who ignored (or did not understand) the implications of a change in business model and what it might mean for managing credit risk across the financial industry. 

While some lawyers could have done a better job cautioning their clients about the implications of the change in business model, and how it had affected credit risk, there is no case to single out lawyers, and even less of a case for blaming the legal professionals for mistaken legal judgments that resulted in the global financial crisis.  While there may have been a colossal failure of risk management, the mismanaged risks were not the responsibility of the legal function.

With all of that said, let me make an observation about shared responsibility.  Financial institutions exist in a highly regulated ecosystem, and lawyers are an indispensable part of the functioning of a modern financial institution.  Virtually every decision – from the smallest to the largest – has a legal component.  In view of this, there is a shared accountability on the part of the lawyers, and on the part of other people who perform within the ecosystem (regulators, business people, academics, members of Congress, etc.), because they all play a part in shaping the ecosystem.

III. Factors that Might Be Prompting a Diminution in the Legal Function

In this section, I will discuss the factors that might be working in concert with the rise of risk to diminish the legal function.  I begin with the terminology used to speak about risk today.  One major development is that we now categorize risk by type.

Risk Typology

A lesson learned during the financial crisis is that there are different types of risk.  AIG, for example, learned a powerful lesson with respect to liquidity risk in September and October of 2008.  At that time, AIG was the world’s largest insurance company,[9] and did not anticipate that a downgrade by the rating agencies would result in a situation where it could not repay its debts as they came due.  It then learned a very hard lesson about liquidity risk, a risk that is distinguishable from insolvency risk[10] – where the liability side of the balance sheet exceeds the asset side.  In September of 2008, AIG was not balance sheet insolvent but it was illiquid, and the governmental rescue of AIG succeeded because AIG and the United States Government acted together to solve AIG’s liquidity problems.

To return for the moment to the observations that I made in early 2007, I spoke about the role of lawyers with respect to legal, compliance, and reputational risk.  Let’s consider how the OCC currently treats these forms of risks in its Part 30,[11] a set of regulatory measures designed in the post-crisis period to foster better risk management in OCC-regulated financial institutions.  In Part 30, the OCC covers a range of risk types, including compliance and reputational risk.  It does not address legal risk,[12] because the OCC wisely did not want to be challenged as trying to regulate the practice of law.   Instead, the OCC could, and has, monitored how well institutions are handling compliance and reputational risk by reviewing the adequacy of their compliance function.

Another problem relates to how the regulatory community defines legal risk, on the one hand, and compliance risk, on the other.  The definitions are not mutually exclusive.  In fact, the definitions substantially cover the same subject matter.  Let’s consider the Federal Reserve’s SR 16-11, which defines “legal risk” as follows: “the potential that actions against the institution result in unenforceable contracts, lawsuits, legal sanctions, or adverse judgments can disrupt or otherwise negatively affect the operation or condition of a financial institution.”[13]  This risk, as it is cast by the Federal Reserve supervisory staff, is the risk that arises from a contract that is unenforceable or from the institution being subject to a legal sanction.  Now consider how the Federal Reserve defines “compliance risk” in SR 16-11, as “the risk of regulatory sanctions, fines, penalties or losses resulting from failure to comply with laws, rules, regulations, or other supervisory requirements applicable to a financial institution.”[14]   The definitions of legal risk, on the one hand, and compliance risk, on the other, are not mutually exclusive; to the contrary there is considerable overlap between them.

Defining different concepts to mean much of the same thing might not be harmful, depending on how the definitions are used.  However, if the definitions are used to define roles and responsibilities, this can cause considerable mischief.  One might also say that using the definitions to define roles and responsibilities is using the definitions inappropriately.  In my view, an inappropriate use of the defined risk types would be to say, as many do, that the compliance function is responsible for compliance risk and the legal function is responsible for legal risk.  If there is substantial overlap between the two risk types, and there is, this could lead to compliance encroaching onto the functioning of legal.

Encroachment by the compliance function onto the legal function is worrisome because of the core competency of lawyers.  Lawyers are special because of the nature of the judgment entrusted to them.  Lawyers make legal judgments. Under the current definitions of these risk types used by the regulators, compliance risk and legal risk are both, directly and materially, affected by legal judgments. 

Why are legal judgments entrusted to lawyers?  In most financial institutions, legal judgments are entrusted to the lawyers who inhabit the legal function (or, in the case of outside counsel, participate in the work of the legal function)[15] because of their special competency.  In the United States, our respective state laws require that the people exercising such judgment be licensed members of the bar because “it protects the public against rendition of services by unqualified persons.”[16]  Consequently, to assign compliance risk to the compliance function without consideration of the types of judgment that are needed to identify, measure, monitor, and control compliance risk is a mistake.  When compliance risk depends, as it often does, on a legal judgment, you need assistance from a qualified professional and that is a lawyer.  The manner in which the regulators have defined legal and compliance risks has ignored this core concept – that a qualified licensed lawyer needs to provide the necessary legal judgment.

Let me use my own past experience as General Counsel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to demonstrate the overlap in the definitions.[17]  In the rescue of AIG, a question arose as to whether a so-called “equity participation or kicker” could be offered as partial consideration for the revolving credit facility that rescued AIG from bankruptcy.  This question called for a legal judgment, and I made the judgment that the governing law permitted the Federal Reserve (my client) to receive such consideration.  This legal judgment was challenged in headline-grabbing litigation brought by AIG’s largest private shareholder, who was diluted by the equity participation (hereafter referenced as the “AIG Shareholder Litigation”).[18]  This AIG shareholder claimed that the governing law did not permit such consideration, and that the contractual provisions in the rescue deal relating to the equity participation were not enforceable.  In the Court of Federal Claims, Judge Wheeler ruled for the plaintiff-shareholder on the legal question (contrary to my legal opinion), a ruling that was not sustained on appeal. 

Note that, as the AIG example reveals, a legal judgment can create both legal and compliance risk.  In the AIG Shareholder Litigation, the plaintiff claimed that the Federal Reserve Act did not permit the Federal Reserve to receive an equity participation, which meant that (under plaintiff’s theory) the Federal Reserve had violated its authorizing statute.  This created the risk that an important component of the revolving credit agreement could not be enforced as written, the provision that AIG had to contribute nearly 80% of its equity to a trust for the benefit of the United States Treasury.  A judgment in favor of the plaintiff clearly represented a legal risk but it also created a compliance risk.  At least in theory, an enforcement action could be brought against the Federal Reserve to hold it accountable for the claimed statutory violation.  In simple terms, when there is an error in a legal judgment, or as in the AIG Shareholder Litigation, an alleged error in a legal judgment, it typically creates both legal and compliance risk.  The example also illustrates why the definitions are not fit for the purpose of assigning roles and responsibilities as between legal and compliance.  The question whether the Federal Reserve Act permitted an equity kicker called for a legal judgment.

Another problem with the overlapping definitions of legal and compliance risk is that they obscure what, in many situations, is the key determinant of the risk in a financial transaction or activity.  This key determinant – legal judgment – is a central thesis of this article.  These legal judgments must be made with respect to fuzzy and ambiguous concepts or texts, and take into account interpretations by judges and regulators that morph over time and with changing facts.  The simplistic notion that compliance risk is for compliance and legal risk is for legal does not withstand analysis.  The province and responsibility of the legal function is making legal judgments on behalf of the financial institution.  This is what makes the legal function important.  To the extent that legal judgments are made by another group of professionals, let’s say the compliance professionals, then the importance of the legal function is diminished and a specific type of decision-making gets done by those who are not properly qualified.

With respect to legal risk, there is another development that has occurred among the supervisory community which is relevant to this analysis.  The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has determined legal risk to be a subcategory of operational risk.  In its seminal manuscript titled Principles for the Sound Management of Operational Risk, the Committee said this plainly:  “Operational risk is defined as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events.  This definition includes legal risk, but excludes strategic and reputational risk.”[19]  Of course, the problem with this bold statement is that operational risk describes almost everything.  Every calamity will be caused either by an externality or by a failure on the part of a process, person, or system.   The inherent credit risk in the sale of a portfolio of bad loans fits the definition, and so does the liquidity risk that AIG experienced in September of 2008.

 Of course, if operational risk covers nearly all risks, and the risk management function has responsibility for operational risk, then the risk management function owns nearly all risks.  This would include legal and compliance risks.  Consequently, the BCBS declaration that legal risk is a component of operational risk is a problem.

Returning to the AIG Shareholder Litigation, let us assume for purposes of argument that the court concluded the Federal Reserve Act prohibited receipt of an equity kicker, and the United States had to pay a judgment of more than $20 billion.  An application of the quoted conclusory statement by the BCBS would result in a conclusion that an operational risk had produced this result, attributable most directly and immediately to a bad selection decision with respect to the General Counsel.  Alternatively, one might say the risk arose from the externality of litigation by AIG’s largest shareholder.  In either variant, we have a risk that would qualify as an operational risk fitting the Basel definition. 

If you categorize risk in this fashion, it might lead you to conclude that managing all these risks is within the role and responsibility of the chief risk officer, because the chief risk officer is charged with identifying, measuring, monitoring, and controlling operational risks (and legal risk, according to the BCBS, is operational risk).[20]  But, in my view, that puts this kind of risk into the hands of an unqualified professional because the key determinant is a legal judgment.  Consequently, the BCBS framework turns us in the wrong direction. 

Legal judgments should be made by those who are qualified, namely the lawyers in the legal function.  Legal risk is not operational risk.  Neither is compliance risk when it depends on legal judgment (it can be operational risk when it is determined by technology, such as when compliance is designing a suspicious activity monitoring system).  The BCBS just got this one wrong.

With respect to the AIG Shareholder Litigation, had I concluded that the Federal Reserve Act did not permit the Federal Reserve Bank to receive an equity participation, this legal judgment would have been binding on the policy makers because they are bound by the common internal-affairs constraint that all corporate officers must follow the law.  No Federal Reserve official has the authority, on behalf of the organization, to violate the law.  This is true in nearly all financial institutions (many would say that a deliberate decision by a corporate officer to violate the law constitutes a breach of the officer’s fiduciary duty). 

The General Counsel is, under the rules governing the organization’s internal affairs, the person who gets to say what the law is.  Senior Federal Reserve officials could resort to other external counsel in an effort to obtain a different legal judgment, but they would nonetheless need a competent opinion from a qualified lawyer.  As a result, this theoretical possibility for the “front line” policy makers  – to go to outside counsel for a different legal judgment – is not usually practicable.  The important point is that a properly licensed lawyer – either the General Counsel or outside counsel – gets to say what the law is.  This is not subject matter for a layperson.  In the end, when it comes to legal judgment, the legal function holds the decisional responsibility.  At issue in the AIG Shareholder Litigation was the legal judgment that the Federal Reserve Act permitted the equity kicker.  If the legal judgment were that the Federal Reserve Act prohibited the equity kicker, then no equity kicker would have been a part of the rescue, and there would have been no AIG Shareholder Litigation.

For purposes of this particular discussion, the imprecision in the definitions of legal and compliance risk is a highly consequential factor that may be empowering the risk and compliance functions to the detriment of the legal function.  I look at this as a kind of “original sin” by the regulatory community, which has caused many successive problems.  The problems with the definitions of risk types are compounded further by the mistaken belief of supervisors that legal risk is a form of operational risk

Three Lines of Defense

Another potentially contributing factor to the diminution of legal is the three lines of defense framework, which has become the accepted framework for managing risk in a financial institution.[21]  Under this framework, the front-line business owns the risk and is the first line of defense.  In the second line of defense are the risk professionals who are empowered to identify risks for the front line and help them to manage and control their risks.  The third line is audit, which will ascertain how well the framework is working.[22]

With respect to the second line, the risk function is intended to operate on an enterprise-wide basis across all risk types.  The risk types would include operational and compliance risks.  While legal risk is not usually referenced, the discussion of the overlapping definitions in the preceding section means legal risk can be reached indirectly, as compliance risk or operational risk.  Being outside the framework could have caused the regulators a problem, if some critical risk management function were to fall outside of regulatory purview.  But the regulators found a way to avoid that result, using the loose definitions of compliance and operational risk.

The OCC has adopted the three-lines-of-defense framework in Appendix D to Part 30.  During the notice-and-comment phase that preceded adopting of Part 30, there was a significant clamor over the OCC’s preliminary attempt to force legal into the three-lines-of-defense framework.  In the final guidance, the OCC withdrew from covering legal, and this was the right regulatory response in the view of the author.  Regrettably, however, there has been too little attention to a view expressed by this author that legal stands in its own right.[23]  Instead, legal is too often forgotten when it comes to the risk management framework.  Alternatively, the legal function is subsumed in the risk taxonomy, and placed under the broader category of operational risk.  In a certain respect, it is “as if” the legal function disappeared.[24]

Again, if this factor were alone, it would not likely result in a diminution in the role of the legal function.  But it is not alone, and the absence of legal is amplified considerably by a trend in the way compliance reports within today’s financial institutions.

The Modern Trend for Compliance Reporting – From Legal to Risk

The modern trend for financial institutions is for compliance to report up to the chief risk officer rather than to the chief legal officer.  This is not a trend that has been fostered by regulatory requirements, although there are many bank examiners who mistakenly believe it is.  A financial institution can, if it wishes, have compliance report up to the chief legal officer.[25] 

There is a rich literature articulating the benefits and challenges with respect to either form of structural reporting, and there are also some other options, like having the chief compliance officer report to the chief operating officer or even the chief executive officer.[26]  The considerations that lead financial institutions to select one reporting relationship over another are beyond the scope of this article.  Here, I will address two considerations that may explain some of the modern trend, and state why I think both are mistaken.  Then, with respect to the modern trend, I will explain what I perceive to be an organizational dynamic inherent in any structure where compliance reports to risk.  The organizational dynamic could result in the diminution of the legal function.

One widely offered explanation for the movement of compliance to risk relates to independence.  The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has declared as a core principle that “[t]he bank’s compliance function should be independent.”[27] Many disciples of independence believe that this means the chief compliance officer must be independent of management, although the BCBS never actually said this.  In fact, the BCBS said that “[t]he concept of independence does not mean that the compliance function cannot work closely with management and staff in the various business units.”[28] 

Further, it is simply erroneous to conclude that the risk function is independent of management while the legal function is not.  In my opinion, the erroneous view rests upon a mistaken notion as to what a financial institution’s legal counsel does.  The mistaken notion is that counsel is the advocate for management, most often the so-called “C” suite or even the chief executive officer.  But bank counsel do not act as the advocate for any particular business person or organizational constituent.  A financial institution’s lawyer represents the organization.[29]  Her obligation is to exercise “independent professional judgment and render candid advice”[30] on behalf of the organization, and this necessarily means that counsel can be “independent” of management.  If compliance reports to counsel who are themselves independent, there is no independence problem.  Of course, this is not a structural independence as we often see with respect to audit (many independent auditors report to the Chair of the Audit Committee of the board of directors, rather than to a member of management).  It is judgment independence, and judgment independence is precisely what is needed for compliance.  In sum, there is no independence problem when compliance reports to the chief legal officer.

Another often unspoken reason why some chief legal officers have not objected to the reassignment of compliance to risk relates to a different kind of risk calculus.  Some chief legal officers look at the roles and responsibilities of compliance as roles and responsibilities likely to lead to problems and to the assignment of blame.  Consequently, when a discussion arises with respect to the appropriate reporting relationship, some chief legal officers see this in terms of a way to limit their own personal responsibility.  In my view, this is the wrong reason to move compliance.  It is not a reason grounded in organizational interest; it is a reason grounded in the chief legal officer’s personal interest.[31]

Putting to the side the reasons underlying the modern trend to have compliance report to risk, it is clearly the trend for banking organizations in the post-crisis period.  And when that organizational move is made, there is a very clear organizational dynamic that follows at the time when compliance moves from legal to risk.  Once compliance moves, the chief compliance officer will naturally realign with the chief risk officer, the officer to whom the chief compliance officer now reports.  If a particular risk issue occupies the sometimes mercurial border between legal, compliance, and operational risk, then the lawyers should anticipate that risk and compliance will form a new coalition.  Remember that a reporting relationship usually entails some other components in the typical financial institution – the chief risk officer will now probably be appraising the chief compliance officer’s performance and determining the chief compliance officer’s compensation.

If there is to be a “turf fight” between risk and legal, once the chief compliance officer starts reporting to the chief risk officer, there will be little daylight between compliance and risk. 

Attorney-Client Privilege

Many of those who are familiar with the examinations process would say that there is a generalized antipathy on the part of examinations staff toward lawyers and the legal function.  I wish that this were not true, and I know that it is not universal.  Yet it is my generalized view that this bias exists.  Why?

One factor is the attorney-client privilege.  Financial institution lawyers will raise privilege with examination staff and examination staff will often see it as an obstructionist tactic.  With respect to compliance staff, who are not functioning in the same capacity as legal counsel, and who typically do not interpose privilege objections (and when they do, they assign, appropriately, responsibility to legal), the examination staff have much more agreeable dealings.  As a result, examiners routinely see compliance staff as more cooperative than the legal function.  Further, there is a symbiotic relationship that often occurs between examination staff and compliance staff. 

For example, when compliance needs more resources, often compliance will receive external support from the examiners.  When a compliance professional is having difficulty with a particular business executive, a hushed hallway conversation with the examiner-in-charge can sometimes work a miracle.  Finally, on an interpersonal level, there will typically be a close working relationship between the examiners and the compliance staff; they will see each other as colleagues.  In contrast, the relationship between examiners and lawyers is generally at arm’s length.

With respect to the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, there is a special provision of federal law that is intended to facilitate the communication of privileged information between the financial institution and its prudential supervisor.[32]  Some look at this provision as evidence of an attempt by government to erode privilege.  As one of the proponents of the provision, which was added by the Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, I can state that this provision was supported by the Federal Reserve and the OCC, but that support was not designed to erode privilege.  The  provision was drafted and enacted to reinforce, and not disable, the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. 

Of course, the operative hypothesis underlying Section 1828 (x) is that sharing with a supervisory authority would be considered as fostering the interests of the financial institution.  If, on the other hand, the financial institution wishes to block the supervisor from seeing the legal advice, an assertion of privilege affords a way to accomplish this objective.[33]  When the privilege is asserted, it is asserted on behalf of the bank by bank counsel.  The examination staff will commonly experience the privilege assertion as a hostile act by bank counsel.  Over time, if the examination staff is regularly confronted with privilege assertions from the legal function, the examiners may come to regard the legal function as obstructionist and obdurate, and contrast that perception with what they experience from compliance and risk.

Examiner antipathy toward the legal function is never a good thing.  But it can be especially destructive when there is a conflict between risk/compliance and legal.  The examiners will likely side with risk/compliance and the conflict may be resolved with a legal loss.  Again, this can contribute to a diminution of the legal function. 

Legal “Meremanship” as an Advocacy Tool

One of the most surprising factors contributing to the diminution of the legal function may relate to the arguments that financial institution lawyers make about their own roles.  There are many examples, but perhaps the clearest and the most obvious occurred recently in the United Kingdom with respect to the Senior Managers Regime.

The Senior Managers Regime is designed by regulatory authorities in the United Kingdom to encourage senior managers in covered financial institutions to manage the risks that they are responsible for.  Consequently, the regime is designed to elucidate for senior managers what they are responsible for, that there is a proper focus on skills, capability and conduct within the firm, that a set of conduct rules provide a foundation for behavior, that practices and policies within covered firms provide for a necessary sense of accountability, and that the Financial Conduct Authority can hold the senior officials accountable if they should fail. 

A question arose under the Senior Managers Regime as to how to treat the senior staff of the legal function.  Were the lawyers to be considered within the scope of the Senior Managers Regime and held accountable as officials who had significant responsibility for risk management?  In the comments that were received, “[m]ost respondents argued that the [legal] function was purely advisory” and that a determination otherwise might be compromising to privilege.[34]  Accordingly, the Financial Conduct Authority has now proposed “to exclude the Head of Legal from the requirement to be approved as a Senior Manager.”[35]  Of course, the chief risk officer and the chief compliance officer are included.  What does this contrasting position say about the relative importance of risk/compliance vis-à-vis the legal function?  I believe the answer is obvious.

The argument made in the United Kingdom is an argument that is often heard from counsel in the United States.  It is the “meremanship” argument – to the effect that all lawyers do is give legal advice.  The purpose of this result-oriented argument is to deemphasize lawyer importance.  It is a variation on the argument that “don’t worry about us, we do not really matter.”  One problem with the argument is that it is not really true.  For the reasons stated above, the lawyers within a financial institution do matter, because they are the group that renders legal judgments that have a material effect on how the financial institution carries out its activities.  Returning to the AIG Shareholder Litigation example, when I opined that the Federal Reserve Bank could receive an equity participation as consideration for a rescue loan, that legal judgment enabled the deal to go forward with that particular component which turned out to be worth more than $20 billion.  A decision otherwise would have resulted in a different deal, with considerably less upside for the taxpayer.  As the AIG Shareholder Litigation example demonstrates, legal judgment matters.  Legal judgment can determine the consideration for a material transaction, or the contours of a permitted activity.  The legal function does much more than just whisper advice.

Another problem is that such advocacy becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.  The essence of the argument is that “lawyers don’t matter.”  More problematic is that the argument is occurring in a context where the role of lawyers is juxtaposed against the role of risk and compliance professionals, who are covered by the Senior Managers Regime.  And, with respect to the risk and compliance professionals, the conclusion reached with those professionals speaks to the following conclusion, that “these people really do matter.”  This returns us to the overall purpose of the Senior Managers’ Regime – to hold those who have material decision making authority responsible for their decisions.  Risk and compliance professionals need to be responsible.  Why not senior personnel exercising legal judgments?

Risk Governance

In the new, post-financial-crisis world, financial institutions are expected to identify, measure, monitor, and control all of the risks they face.  The supervisors of such institutions expect that there will be processes and procedures for governing these risk functions across all of the risk types, and that these governance procedures will encompass risk-appetite statements and a risk-governance framework.

The processes and procedures will be developed under the supervision and control of the risk committee of the board of directors.  The risk committee will be the body that typically approves the risk appetite and the risk-governance framework.  Ordinarily, the senior management will create an internal management committee to perform these tasks, before these kinds of determinations reach the risk committee of the board (or to the full board).

Note that risk governance will typically encompass the following risk types: credit risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk, price risk, operational risk, compliance risk, strategic risk, and reputational risk.[36]  Once again, the absence of legal risk and the legal function may be problematic, if this absence gives rise to an inference that legal risk and the legal function are not important (or are subsumed under the umbrella of other risk professionals).  The concern is a variant on the concern that I have expressed about meremanship advocacy, except here it is that an inference might be drawn – legal risk and lawyers do not need a framework because they are not important.

This does not mean that we should invite regulators to make legal judgment a part of the risk governance that they are reviewing as a component of enterprise risk management.  An alternative possibility is for the legal function to create its own risk governance framework for matters requiring legal judgment.  This framework would require that lawyers be the core professional staff, and not the risk function.  But, for anyone who has engaged in this exercise, it is not facile and will often be met with a healthy skepticism as to why legal is different from all other risk types. 

If a risk-appetite statement is prepared for legal risk, it will look decidedly different from the appetite statements for other risk types.  Let us hypothesize that we are creating a risk appetite statement for violations of the Volcker Rule.[37]  Having gone through such an exercise, it is likely to result in the only practicable conclusion – that there is a zero appetite for such a violation.  Would the answer be different for sexual harassment, a Truth-in-Lending Act violation, and so on?  No.  Every financial institution will seek to conduct its activities within the bounds of the law, meaning that it has zero risk appetite for violations of law.  Having no appetite for legal violations will be consistent with what most banking organizations practice; it is a permutation on the internal affairs policy referenced earlier that no corporate officer has the authority to violate the law.  When a bank official intentionally violates a legal prohibition, nearly all banks will take disciplinary action against the official.[38]  The goal of such disciplinary action will, of course, be aspirational and designed to send a message that the bank conforms its activities to the bounds of the law.  With that said, in nearly every financial institution, including the  most carefully controlled and the best governed, the goal will not be attained and there will be episodic violations.

Those with experience in these matters will know that legal and compliance risks are different in nature from risks like credit risk and liquidity risk.  Governance practices that work for the later risk types are not easily adapted to the former.  Perhaps what is needed is for the legal profession to intervene with regulators and make sure there is awareness that the legal function is sui generis in its risk management endeavors.

The alternative course – remaining silent with respect to the legal function – has its own potentially destructive consequence.[39]  In a world where risk governance is seen as exceptionally important to the health of the financial institution and the stability of economic ecosystem, being marginalized is a form of diminishment.

Risk Reporting

The final factor leading to a potential diminution in the role of the legal function concerns risk reporting.  In today’s financial institution, it is typical for a bank’s highest legal authority, the board of directors, to also have a risk committee either because it is legally required or because it is considered to be a better governance practice.  The risk committee’s principal task will be risk oversight.  To perform its risk-oversight function in a competent manner, the risk committee will need information from the management about risk in the organization.  This ordinarily leads the board’s risk committee to turn to the chief risk officer and request a risk report, or a risk “dashboard,” that will enable the risk committee to perform its risk-oversight functions.  In its IRM Guidance, the Federal Reserve proposes the principle that independent risk management “should provide the board and senior management with risk reports that accurately and concisely convey relevant, material risk data and assessments in a timely manner.”[40]

An effective risk-reporting mechanism will typically show the risk committee the different types of risk that the organization faces, and will try to gauge trend lines.  The trend lines will show whether risk of a particular type is increasing, decreasing, or remaining constant.  Often, when presented in dashboard form, the risk report will highlight risk trends in colors, where green is good, red is bad, and yellow is a warning sign.  A good risk report will identify “emerging risks” and provide “forward-looking perspectives.”[41]

In most organizations, the risk committee will look to the chief risk officer to provide this kind of information.  The risk committee typically will not want to receive information from many different people.  It will want to hold accountable for risk reporting a key senior officer, and usually that officer is the chief risk officer.  This can place the chief legal officer in an uncomfortable position, particularly with respect to legal and compliance risks.  Often, compliance risk reports will reference legal judgments, and, again, legal judgments are the province of the legal function.  For example, compliance may believe that there has been a violation of the Truth in Lending Act, which involves a legal determination and a legal judgment.  If this view should be written into a risk report, this encroaches on the legal function because it is the province and duty of the legal function to say what the law is and whether the law has been violated.

If there is a legal memorandum from the legal function stating this judgment, it could be appended to the risk report and the problem is solved.  But often these reports do not follow this  practice, and that has consequence.  For example, if a legal conclusion is stated in a report from the chief risk officer or the chief compliance officer, it will not be privileged.[42]  There will likely be significant pressure to get the board books done timely, and not to distinguish this “legal” matter from all the other risk issues that warrant the attention of the risk committee.  In addition, if the legal function should demand special treatment, there may be a perception that legal is “too defensive” or that legal is “causing trouble.”  All of these considerations may create pressure on the legal function to acquiesce, and permit the chief risk officer to follow the path of least resistance and treat a legal risk issue just as it would treat say an information technology risk.  If this should occur, it is another encroachment by risk on what should be legal’s territory.

IV. Diagnostic: Is the Legal Function Being Diminished?

In the preceding section, I summarized seven risk management conditions that might be causing a diminution in the role performed by the legal function.  Is it actually happening?  I try to answer that question in this section. 

Turning to one of the tools used in the discipline of risk management, we need to confront a measurement problem.  How can we measure an amorphous concept like diminution?  Without spending much time on the question, the short answer is we have no quantitative measure of the power and effect within financial institutions of the legal function.[43]  We have identified the risk of diminution, but we have no good quantitative measure of whether it is actually occurring.

Is there qualitative or anecdotal evidence that the power and effect of the legal function is in decline?  I believe that there is evidence this is happening, but it is very early in the process to be drawing firm conclusions.  This is a current topic of conversation among senior internal lawyers within financial institutions.  The degree of concern varies from person to person and from institution to institution, but the topic is often front of mind.  There is also considerable interest among legal and compliance professionals in defining roles and responsibilities, largely driven by concerns about who does what, but especially influenced by structure wherever compliance reports to risk. 

For purposes of this article, my personal perspective is the legal function has, in fact, been diminished by the ascendancy of the risk management function.  I have a sense that this has started to occur, and I hope this article will foster vigorous discussion of that question by the banking bar.

One can also ask, if the legal function has started to decline, how far has it declined?   

Assuming that my perspective of decline is accurate, and further assuming that some impairment has already occurred, can we reverse the trend and repair the damage?  I think the answer is yes.  

V. Taking Affirmative Actions to Reverse the Decline and Repair the Damage

If a conclusion is reached that the legal function in financial institutions is being diminished and that this is a negative trend that needs correction, what remedial actions are needed?  If I have correctly identified the conditions that are causing the diminution, then the future remedial action becomes clear.  We need to focus on the seven conditions that are working in concert to diminish legal.

The first condition concerns risk typology.  The legal function is certainly focused on legal risk.  But this does not mean that this is the exclusive interest of the legal function.  The legal function should be interested in any risk type that is affected by the exercise of legal judgment.  At a minimum, that would include compliance and reputational risk, but we should not stop there.  Legal judgment affects other types of risk, including credit risk.  In fact, when you consider various risk types, legal judgment likely impacts the majority of them (misconduct risk, for example, is heavily influenced by legal factors whereas model risk is probably not).  Lawyers need to be much more assertive about their expertise and their expertise is legal judgment.  But lawyers also should not be shy when rendering judgment and advice.  As the Model Rules frame it, lawyers should feel free to “refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social, psychological, and political factors that may be relevant” to the financial institution’s situation.[44]  In this regard, the legal function brings to the table not only depth of knowledge with respect to legal judgment, but a breadth of knowledge that can be meaningful with respect to managing other risk types.  As legal professionals, we do more than merely give legal advice.  In the best-in-class legal functions, the senior members of the function are typically considered as business partners who are valued for their legal judgment and business acumen.

The next condition is the three-lines-of-defense framework.  This framework is fine for creating a conceptual model for the work of risk professionals, but it should not be either a model or a constraint on lawyers.  We have to continue functioning as we always have, and, as I said in the article in the Business Law Today, the legal function within banking organizations has worked well for more than a century.  With respect to the three lines of defense, the lawyers may move from line to line, depending on the function performed.  If a lawyer is drafting transactional documents at the direction of a front-line business person, the lawyer (as an agent) will be in the first line (assuming that the lawyer is not exercising legal judgment but simply codifying the intention of the business personnel).  If the lawyer is assisting in identifying the risks in a potential new product, to inform a senior management committee that is deciding whether to greenlight or redlight the new product, and authorize it to be offered by the financial institution, the lawyer will be in the second line.  The lawyer is performing a second-line function by informing the decision-makers about risk.  There may also be times when lawyers are assisting internal audit – let’s say they are auditing some kind of human resource practice or procedure.  When acting in this capacity, the lawyers may be in the third line.  The important point is the three lines of defense mode does not neatly fit the work of a legal function; it does not matter where the lawyers are found, so long as they are performing their historical role and making the necessary legal judgments.  And, perhaps most importantly, the lawyers often perform a hugely consequential function that does not fit into any one of the three lines of defense.  Consider the role performed by a senior lawyer who is handling “bet the company” litigation.  Such a lawyer is not in any line of defense but is performing a classic function in managing and controlling the legal risk presented in the litigation.  To avoid a diminution of legal, we must become more assertive about the role of lawyers in risk management, and how they stand apart from the three lines of defense.

Moving to reporting relationships, we need to develop a more realistic understanding that organizational dynamics will change when (and if) compliance moves from legal to risk.  In a certain respect, this is like stating rain is wet.  When the reporting line of the chief compliance officer changes from the chief legal officer to the chief risk officer, who but a fool would ignore the change in organizational dynamics?  Yet this point is hardly mentioned in the literature.  Further, because the distinction between legal, compliance, and operational risks is often obscure, there will be inevitable conflict as to roles and responsibilities.  Having sensitivity to the organizational dynamics is important, because it permits those who are on the playing field to discuss the subject matter and do what is required – namely, work it out.  Alternatively, if they cannot work it out, then they can escalate the dispute to a higher authority who must likewise be sensitive to organizational dynamics.  These dynamics should also be considered when senior officials resolve the inevitable conflicts that come with an escalated matter.

The next condition is privilege.  Financial institution lawyers should closely examine privilege assertions that withhold information that would otherwise be seen by their regulators.  This action has real consequence, and it can and does breed examiner resentment directed toward lawyers.  When privileged matter is solicited by a regulator who is performing prudential oversight (and not acting in an enforcement capacity),[45] sharing privileged information with an appropriate legend will not result in a waiver and likely will not have any negative consequence.  In fact, it might reveal to the examiners just how well the legal function has helped the organization to function in a safe and sound manner.  Providing such material to a prudential supervisor, certainly in a context where there is no likelihood of enforcement action, might be one small, additional step.  While inevitably there will be certain occasions that warrant a privilege assertion, the assertion of privilege in response to a regulator’s request should not be reflexive; if privilege is not asserted, the hidden benefit could be the avoidance of examiner enmity. 

As for legal “meremanship,” I am reminded of what President Obama said “[T]he first thing we do is stop doing stupid things.”  We should stop arguing that the legal function is not important.  We are important – we make legal judgments and, almost every day, those judgments directly and materially affect the way in which banks conduct their activities.  Arguing we merely give legal advice now threatens to turn us into advisors about nothingness.  If it were true that we are unimportant, then I would have no objection.  But it is not true and we know it.  This could, of course, mean that we will be held accountable for our legal judgements, perhaps even to regulators.  Is that necessarily a “bad” outcome?

With respect to a risk governance framework, lawyers should work to fashion our own unique framework with respect to the exercise of legal judgment.  We should not remain in a kind of twilight zone, because this is not in the interest of the financial community and diminishes the rule of law in society.  And when we finally start to analyze our framework, we will likely discover that we actually have one.  We just have never codified it or conformed our practice to a written policy and procedure. 

With respect to risk reporting, I am reminded of the situation in 2006 that needed to be remedied with Section 1828 (x).  Having the chief risk officer recite a legal judgment in a risk report creates a non-privileged record that could be subject to discovery in third-party litigation against the financial institution.  This is a problem that needs attention.  It is also a problem that perhaps needs some creativity and initiative.  What about a risk report from both the chief risk officer and chief legal officer?  What about a risk report that contains an addendum with legal memoranda?  The problem can be addressed if it receives proper attention.

Finally, the whole of these seven conditions is more than the sum of its parts.  Yet, if we address each one individually, we can reverse the potential diminution and start to repair the damage.  The legal, compliance and risk functions can work together seamlessly, with each being cognizant of their unique roles and responsibilities, and each regarding the other with mutual respect.

VI. Conclusion

The ascendancy of risk management and the chief risk officer is one of the truly noteworthy changes in financial institutions since the end of the global financial crisis.  In the view of the author, the change has materially contributed to the safety and soundness of banks and banking.  There is anecdotal evidence that this change has produced an unintended consequence, and the unintended consequence is a relative diminution in the role of the legal function.  This unintended consequence is dangerous, particularly if the diminution becomes material.  The legal function performs a hugely consequential role in the functioning of financial institutions.  The role needs to be better understood and appreciated.  The rise of the risk function should not mean there will be a decline in the legal function. 


[1] I gratefully acknowledge the invaluable assistance of my Sullivan & Cromwell colleagues, Camille Orme and Cristina Liebolt.  The views, thoughts, and opinions expressed in this article belong solely to the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Sullivan & Cromwell, or anyone affiliated with the firm.

[2] Senior Supervisors Group, Risk Management Lessons from the Global Banking Crisis of 2008 (October 21, 2009).

[3] See, e.g., David Moss, “An Ounce of Prevention: The Power of Public Risk Management in Stabilizing the Financial System,” Harvard Business School (working paper) (Jan. 5, 2009); Tobias Adrian, Risk Management and Regulation, International Monetary Fund: Monetary and Capital Markets Development (2018); Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc., “The 2008 Financial Crisis:  A Wake-Up Call for Enterprise Risk Management,” (2008); Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Economic Policy Review: Special Issue: Behavioral Risk Management in the Financial Services Industry The Role of Culture, Governance, and Financial Reporting,” August 2016, Vol 22:1; Society of Actuaries, the Casualty Actuarial Society and the Canadian Institute of Actuaries, “Risk Management: The Current Financial Crisis, Lessons Learned and Future Implications,”  The Financial Crisis Inquiry Edition, Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States, submitted pursuant to Public Law 111-21, January 2011; Anil K Kashyap, Lessons from the Financial Crisis of Risk Management, University of Chicago, Booth School of Business and NBER (paper prepared for the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission) (February 27, 2010); Daniel Zéghal and Meriem El Aoun, Enterprise Risk Management in the US Banking Sector Following the Financial Crisis, Modern Economy, 7, 494-513 (April 29, 2016); OECD, Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Key Findings And Main Messages, June 2009; Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, United States Senate, Wall Street And The Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse (April 13, 2011); Philippe Jorion, Risk Management Lessons from the Credit Crisis, European Financial Management (2009).

[4] See, e.g., the definition used by the OCC for a “front-line unit.”  12 C.F.R. Part 30, App. D, at I(E)(6).  The Federal Reserve has recently used the expression “business line management” to refer to “the core group of individuals responsible for the prudent day-to-day management of the business line and who report directly to senior management.”  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Proposed Supervisory Guidance – Independent Risk Management and Effective Senior Management, 83 Fed. Reg. 1351 (Jan. 11, 2018) (hereafter “IRM Guidance”).

[5] A recent report by the Group of Thirty notes that, since the financial crisis, the “banking industry has paid an estimated US$350 billion to US$470 billion in penalties (including fines and litigation/settlement charges) for conduct-related matters . . . .”  Banking Conduct and Culture – A Permanent Mindset Change at 3 (November 2018).

[6] See E. Norman Veasey & C. DiGuglielmo, Indispensable Counsel:  The Chief Legal Officer in the New Reality (2012).

[7] Thomas C. Baxter, Jr. and Brian Baxter, The Financial Institution Lawyer:  Four Flavors of Failure, Bus. Law Today vol. 16, no. 4 (March/April 2007).

[8] Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990).

[9] See, e.g., Emilios Avgouleas, A New Framework for the Global Regulation of Short Sales:  Why Prohibition is Inefficient and Disclosure is Insufficient, 15 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 376, 380; Lila Zuil, “AIG’s Title as World’s Largest Insurer Gone Forever,” April 29, 2009, available at https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2009/04/29/100066.htm

[10] Today, AIG is a publicly traded company which has no continuing dependence on the United States Government.

[11] See 12 C.F.R. § 30.

[12] In Appendix D to Part 30, the regulation expressly provides that a “[f]ront line unit does not ordinarily include an organizational unit or function thereof within a covered bank that provides legal services to the covered bank.”

[13] Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Supervisory Guidance for Assessing Risk Management at Supervised Institutions With Total Consolidated Assets Less Than $50 Billion, SR 16-11 (June 8, 2016).

[14] Id.  In the more recent IRM Guidance, the Federal Reserve uses the terms compliance risk and legal risk, but does not define those terms.  IRM Guidance, supra n. 4.

[15] I am mindful that there are some financial institutions that are very small in asset size, and do not have lawyers.  For these institutions, whose official staff are charged with knowledge of the law’s restrictions and requirements, the official staff must do the best that they can.  But in the vast majority of financial institutions, the chief legal officer or General Counsel is the official charged with making legal judgments.  Other officials are authorized to take action within the scope of their authority; ordinarily, no official has authority to violate the law, which empowers the chief legal officer because she is the person who gets to say what the law is.

[16] See New York Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.5, Comment 1 (January 1, 2017).

[17] This example is not protected by the attorney-client privilege because the Court of Federal Claims determined that privilege was waived.  Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, Order of Jan. 6, 2015 (Court of Federal Claims, Doc. No. 417) (filed Jan. 6, 2015).  All of the legal judgments are from the public record in the litigation.

[18] Starr Int’l Co., Inc. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 428, 430 (2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 856 F.3d 953 (Fed. Cir. 2017).

[19] Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Principles for the Sound Management of Operational Risk at 3n.5 (2011).

[20] In the Federal Reserve IRM Guidance proposal, the text provides that “Business line management should incorporate appropriate feedback from [independent risk management] on business line risk positions, implementation of the risk tolerance, and risk management practices, including risk mitigation.”  IRM Guidance, supra n. 4 at 1358.  The IRM Guidance says nothing about the legal function.

[21] The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) announced that it will seek public comment from May 28 to July 30, 2019 on an updated model of the Three Lines of Defense.  See IIA, “IIA Sets Exposure Period for ‘Three Lines of Defense’ Update,” (Jan. 29, 2019), available at https://na.theiia.org/news/press-releases/Pages/IIA-Sets-Exposure-Period-for-Three-Lines-of-Defense-Update.aspx; see also IIA, “IIA Launches Global Review of ‘Three Lines of Defense’”, (Dec. 5, 2018), available at https://na.theiia.org/news/press-releases/Pages/IIA-Launches-Global-Review-of-Three-Lines-of-Defense.aspx.  The IIA originally released a position paper on the model in 2013.  See IIA, IIA Position Paper:  The Three Lines of Defense in Effective Risk Management and Control, (Jan. 2013), available at https://na.theiia.org/standards-guidance/Public%20Documents/PP%20The%20Three%20Lines%20of%20Defense%20in%20Effective%20Risk%20Management%20and%20Control.pdf.

[22] Internal auditors would be quick to say that they have other responsibilities, and their role in the three lines of defense describes only one part of a multi-faceted audit function.

[23] Thomas C. Baxter, Jr. and Won B. Chai, Enterprise Risk Management:  Where is Legal and Compliance?, The Banking Law Journal, Volume 133, Number 1 (2016).

[24] In the Federal Reserve’s IRM Guidance, this is literally true.  There is no reference whatsoever to a General Counsel, a Chief Legal Officer, or any lawyer whatsoever.  The legal function is never mentioned, notwithstanding a repeated refrain that senior management should be attentive to “compliance with internal policies and procedures, laws, and regulations, including those related to consumer protection.”  IRM Guidance, supra n.4 at 1356.

[25] While every organization is different, I note that, at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the chief compliance officer reported to me when I was General Counsel.  This organizational fact should aid in rebutting the mistaken notion on the part of some supervisors that this structure is not permitted because of independence concerns.

[26] See M. DeStefano, Creating a Culture of Compliance: Why Departmentalization May Not Be The Answer,  10 Hastings Bus. L.J. 71 (Winter 2014); C. Bagley, M. Roellig, and G. Massameno, Who Let the Lawyers Out?:  Reconstructing the Role of the Chief Legal Officer and the Corporate Client in a Globalizing World, 18 Univ. of Penn. J. Bus. L. 419 (Winter 2016).

[27] Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Compliance and the Compliance Function in Banks at 10 (April 2005).

[28] Id. At 10.

[29] E.g., New York Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.13 (Jan. 2017) (“[T]he lawyer is the lawyer for the organization and not for any of the constituents.”).

[30] New York Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2.1 (Jan. 2017).

[31] In a prior position when the author served as General Counsel and Executive Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Chief Compliance Officer reported to me and not to the Chief Risk Officer.

[32] 12 U.S.C. §1828 (x).

[33] Last year, seven major law firms, including Sullivan & Cromwell, released a white paper relating to whether or not the federal financial regulators could compel the production of privileged information.  Bank Regulators’ Legal Authority to Compel the Production of Material that is Protected by Attorney-Client Privilege (May 16, 2018).  A potential collateral consequence of the assertion of that legal right is the effect that it might have on bank examiners.  In some respects, it is analogous to how a jury might consider a criminal defendant’s exercise of the right not to testify in her own defense. 

[34] Financial Conduct Authority, Optimizing the Senior Managers & Certification Regime at 9-12 (January 2019).

[35] Id. at 13.

[36] 12 C.F.R. Part 30, App. D, at II (B).  See also IRM Guidance, where the Federal Reserve identifies “credit, market, operational, liquidity, interest rate, legal and compliance” as risk types.  IRM Guidance, supra n.4 at 1361.

[37] See 12 U.S.C. § 1851.

[38] Where there is controversy, the controversy typically relates to the degree of discipline, contrasting the “slap on the wrist” to the so-called “capital offense.”

[39] It is noteworthy that in the Federal Reserve’s proposed IRM Guidance, the legal function is no where mentioned.  Further, there are extensive discussions of the Chief Risk Office and the Chief Audit Executive , but no reference whatsoever to the Chief Legal Officer or General Counsel.

[40] IRM Guidance, supra n.4 at 1311.

[41] Id. at 1361

[42] The privilege protects communications between an attorney and her client, not between a risk or compliance professional and its Risk Committee.

[43] Some might look at the number of people working in the risk function at various times over the last 10 years, and compare it to the number of people working in the legal function.

[44] New York Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2.1 (Jan. 2017).

[45] This is not always clear.  Regulators should be candid about the function they are performing, and if the information is going to be shared with enforcement or if enforcement staff are accompanying an examination team, this should be transparent to the financial institution.

The Power of Place: Geolocation Tracking and Privacy

Abstract[1]

Location data tracking is ubiquitous. The tension between privacy and innovation in this space is exacerbated by rapid developments in tracking technologies and data analytics methodologies, as well as the sheer volume of available consumer data. This article focuses on the privacy risks associated with these developments. To the extent that current and proposed privacy law protects location data, such protection is limited to location data that is identified (or in some cases identifiable) to an individual. Requirements generally apply only to the initial data collector; however, recent media accounts and enforcement actions describe a robust secondary market in which (1) identified location data is regularly acquired and used by third parties with whom the individual has no direct relationship, and (2) de-identified or anonymized location data is regularly combined with identified personal data and used by third parties with whom the individual has no direct relationship to compile comprehensive profiles of the individual. These secondary-market practices are not currently addressed by U.S. law. This article proposes that the risks posed by location tracking and profiling are sufficient to warrant consideration of regulatory intervention at the following points: collection from the individual; use by the original data collector; transfer to and among secondary-market participants; identification of anonymized data to a specific individual; profiling of the individual; and decision-making based on profiling.[2]

I. Location Data Tracking Generally

Consumer location is tracked regularly by multiple systems and devices.[3] Many mobile applications (apps) continuously track user location; Facebook, Google, Apple, Amazon, Microsoft, and Twitter all track and use location data.[4]

Individuals often opt into location tracking through personal devices and their apps, such as fitness monitors, smartphones, and GPS trackers, for the purposes of allowing the app to provide them with the underlying service, such as determining distance ran, providing the local weather forecast, and locating and obtaining directions to nearby restaurants.

Business use cases for identified individual location data include providing consumer goods or services (such as roadside assistance) and marketing and targeted advertising.[5] Aggregated location data (i.e., data that is identifiable by distinct data location points but not by individual) can help urban planners alleviate traffic problems, health officials identify patterns of epidemics, and governmental agencies monitor air quality. Commercial uses of aggregated location data include inventory and fleet control, retail location planning, and geofencing. Specified data points may be aggregated over a defined time period and then presented as an overlay to a geographic map. For example, a trucking company can view in real time the locations of its trucks and the demand for trucking services to more efficiently assign routes. Alternatively, the trucking company can geofence its trucks, which means that if a truck goes out of a designated geographical zone, the company will be alerted in real time. Location data is critical to certain types of commercial and public data analytics.

Recent journalistic investigations have revealed that location data is tracked by a wider variety of parties for a greater number of purposes in ways that exceed our understanding or control. The sheer volume of location data tracked, disclosed, and repurposed is tremendous. The widespread availability of location tracking technologies compounds this issue.[6] Furthermore, the use of multiple systems to track location, and the use of data analytics to combine location data with other personal data, enables the both the identification of anonymous data and the compilation of comprehensive and precise profiles of tracked individuals.

Are we at a point yet where place itself acts as a consumer identifier? Unique location tracking patterns can be used to identify the individual; and develop a profile of the individual. A person’s lifestyle, priorities, professional and personal endeavors, and crimes and peccadilloes can all be inferred from continuous location tracking.

The power of place: A person cannot be in more than one place at the same time.

     A. Justification for the Initial Collection of Location Data

Location data is regularly collected by devices, apps, and other online services.

Generally, the basic app model is as follows. An individual downloads a map app in order to get directions. As part of the map app download, the individual agrees that his or her location will be tracked in order to provide personalized directions via the app. The app must know where the individual’s starting point is in order to give accurate directions to the individual’s destination. The individual’s smart phone hardware and the app software use GPS and other tracking technologies to determine the individual’s geographical location: the more accurate and recent the location data, the more accurate the app service.[7]

The wireless carrier transmits this real-time location data to a third-party company (the aggregator), subject to a nondisclosure agreement. The aggregator transmits the location data to the app so that the app can generate the directions to provide to the individual. The location data is tracked and disclosed in order to provide the requested transaction (i.e., directions) to the individual. The sharing of information with third parties is limited to these purposes, and the parties are bound by written nondisclosure agreements not to otherwise use or disclose the individual’s location.

This can be referred to as the initial transaction between the individual and the data collector. The justification for this sharing is that (1) it is necessary to (a) honor the customer’s request for app services and (b) ensure consistency of app usage quality across carriers and devices, and (2) the customer has consented to location tracking as part of his or her enrollment in the app service.

II. The Pandora’s Box of Location Data: The Secondary Location-Data Market

     A. Monetization of Location Data in Secondary Market

The purpose of the initial collection of location data is to enable the data collector to provide a service to the individual; the secondary market purpose is to use that same location data to make conclusions and predictions about the tracked individual. The secondary location data market is used to monetize location data for unrelated purposes, such as enabling a subsequent buyer to compile a profile of the individual and sell access to the individual (whether the individual is identified by name or as part of a data category, like “engaged female retail shopper”). Location data analytics drive a variety of business strategies:

Business data usually contains geographical or location data which mostly goes unused. This data can be as broad as city and country or as specific as GPS location. When this data is placed within the context of big data dashboards and data science models, it allows companies to discover new trends and insights.[8]

The secondary consumer-data market is huge. IBM claims that 90 percent of all consumer data that is currently in circulation was created in the last two years. This industry is expected to generate $350 million dollars annually by 2020.[9] Location data is a big part of that business. The New York Times reported that:

At least 75 companies receive anonymous, precise location data from apps whose users enable location services to get local news and weather or other information, The Times found. Several of those businesses claim to track up to 200 million mobile devices in the United States—about half those in use last year. The database reviewed by The Times—a sample of information gathered in 2017 and held by one company—reveals people’s travels in startling detail, accurate to within a few yards and in some cases updated more than 14,000 times a day.

These companies sell, use or analyze the data to cater to advertisers, retail outlets and even hedge funds seeking insights into consumer behavior. It’s a hot market, with sales of location-targeted advertising reaching an estimated $21 billion this year.[10]

Location tracking data analytics support targeted advertising and marketing for retail and other business purposes. This profiling is intended to individualize the customer experience as much as possible to encourage purchases and loyalty:

[T]he scale of data collected by early adopters of [location tracking] technology is staggering. Location analytics firm RetailNext currently tracks more than 500 million shoppers per year by collecting data from more than 65,000 sensors installed in thousands of retail stores. A single customer visit alone can result over 10,000 unique data points, not including the data gathered at the point of sale.[11]

In addition, the potential combinations and re-use of location data is tremendous:

[B]y combining location data with existing customer data such as preferences, past purchases, and online behavioral data, companies gain a more complete understanding of customer needs, wants and behaviors than is achievable with online data only.[12]

In 2014, Shoshana Zuboff coined the term “surveillance capitalism” to describe how consumer data has become a business unto itself.[13] More recently, Zuboff explained how location data fits in this model:

[There] has been a learning curve for surveillance capitalists, driven by competition over prediction products. First they learned that the more surplus the better the prediction, which led to economies of scale in supply efforts. Then they learned that the more varied the surplus the higher its predictive value. This new drive toward economies of scope sent them from the desktop to mobile, out into the world: your drive, run, shopping, search for a parking space, your blood and face, and always … location, location, location.[14]

Data is generally sold on the secondary market as identified data (which is directly associated with a distinct individual) or as de-identified or anonymous data (which is aggregated and not associated with a distinct individual).

     B. Disclosure of Identified Location Data

          1. Disclosures by Aggregators 

Under the app model, the aggregators receive the individual’s location in order to send it to the app owner for purposes of furnishing the app service. Distribution of this data is much more widespread. Journalistic investigations reveal that aggregators routinely sell location data to a series of parties that are not intermediaries to the initial data transaction, leading to dissemination of location data beyond its intended purpose, and resulting in unrelated third-party access to the individual’s location data.[15]

One such aggregator, LocationSmart, regularly sold continuous cell tower location tracking to Securus Technologies, a prison contractor that provides and monitors calls to inmates. As an ancillary service, Securus “offers [a] location-finding service as an additional feature for law enforcement and corrections officials, [as] part of an effort to entice customers in a lucrative but competitive industry.” This service was used by a variety of law enforcement officials for a wide variety of purposes, including search-and-rescue operations, thwarting prison escapes and smuggling rings, and closing cases.[16]

The relationship between Securus and LocationSmart impacted almost all U.S. cell phone users, was unknown to them, and could not be opted out of:

So how was Securus getting all that data on the locations of mobile-phone users across the country? We learned more last week, when ZDNet confirmed that one key intermediary was a firm called LocationSmart. The big U.S. wireless carriers—AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, and T-Mobile—were all working with LocationSmart, sending their users’ location data to the firm so that it could triangulate their whereabouts more precisely using multiple providers’ cell towers. It seems no one can opt out of this form of tracking, because the carriers rely on it to provide their service.[17]

Another Motherboard investigation showed that wireless carriers also routinely sell assisted or augmented global positioning system (aGPS) location data. aGPS data is more precise location data that is collected for use with enhanced 9-1-1 services to allow first responders to pinpoint an individual’s location with greater accuracy. For example, a cellular call made to the 9-1-1 emergency service that relies solely on GPS satellites might indicate the caller’s location within a given area, such as a building, and it might take several minutes to determine that location. aGPS relies on other external and systems to provide a faster, more precise location, like a floor within a building.

Federal law expressly prohibits the sale of aGPS data.[18] The Federal Communications Commission issued an order in 2017 providing that data included in the National Emergency Address Database, which is collected using Wi-Fi and Bluetooth to locate 9-1-1 callers within a building, may not be used for any other purpose.[19] In addition, the Federal Trade Commission could enforce section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibiting deceptive and unfair trade practices against carriers whose privacy policies were inconsistent with this practice.[20]

          2. Privacy Leaks and Security Breaches

In addition to intentional disclosures, LocationSmart exposed this real-time location data through a bug in its website, which enabled users to track anyone without credentials or authorization using a free demo and a single cell phone number:

Anyone with a modicum of knowledge about how Web sites work could abuse the LocationSmart demo site to figure out how to conduct mobile number location lookups at will, all without ever having to supply a password or other credentials.

“I stumbled upon this almost by accident, and it wasn’t terribly hard to do,” Xiao [a security researcher] said. “This is something anyone could discover with minimal effort. And the gist of it is I can track most peoples’ cell phone without their consent.”

Xiao said his tests showed he could reliably query LocationSmart’s service to ping the cell phone tower closest to a subscriber’s mobile device. Xiao said he checked the mobile number of a friend several times over a few minutes while that friend was moving and found he was then able to plug the coordinates into Google Maps and track the friend’s directional movement.[21]

Further, the Securus database was the subject of a data hack that separately exposed personal data. A Motherboard reporter obtained data that had been hacked from Securus’s database:

“Location aggregators are—from the point of view of adversarial intelligence agencies—one of the juiciest hacking targets imaginable,” Thomas Rid, a professor of strategic studies at Johns Hopkins University, told Motherboard in an online chat.

The data hack, which was attributed to a weak password reset feature, revealed personal data of thousands of law enforcement users and inmates.[22]

This means that Securus, acting as an unregulated entity and outside of the scope of its nondisclosure agreements with the wireless carriers, was responsible for innumerable disclosures of identified location data.

Other privacy failures involving identified location data can result in exposure to threats of physical danger.  A  recent privacy failure by a family tracking app (React Apps “Family Locator”) that exposed children’s identified location data for weeks; the very app that parents obtained to protect their children arguably put them at great risk:

Family tracking apps can be very helpful if you’re worried about your kids or spouse, but they can be nightmarish if that data falls into the wrong hands. Security researcher Sanyam Jain has revealed to TechCrunch that React Apps’ Family Locator left real-time location data (plus other sensitive personal info) for over 238,000 people exposed for weeks in an insecure database. It showed positions within a few feet, and even showed the names for the geofenced areas used to provide alerts. You could tell if parents left home or a child arrived at school, for instance.[23]

          3. Access by Unauthorized Third Parties

The same Motherboard reporter was able to identify the exact location of a smartphone using only the phone number and a $300 payment to a bounty hunter in an attenuated process that apparently happens regularly and in violation of the apps’ posted privacy policies and the parties’ written nondisclosure agreements.[24] In the Motherboard scenario, a wireless carrier sold an individual’s location data to an aggregator, that sold it to a skip-tracing firm, that sold it to a bail-bond company, that sold it to an independent bounty hunter. The bounty hunter had no written agreement with anyone and no relationship with the wireless carrier or the individual customer, and neither did its source.[25]

The article’s aftermath included revelations that all of the major wireless carriers sold location data to aggregators that ultimately sold the data to hundreds of bounty hunters.[26] Multiple lawmakers sent the major carriers and aggregators letters requesting an explanation of these location data sharing practices.[27]

The ensuing furor prompted the wireless carriers to commit to stop selling location data to aggregators.[28] The Wall Street Journal reported that Verizon, Sprint, T-Mobile, and AT&T all committed to end agreements with downstream location aggregators, and Zumigo (the initial aggregator in the bounty hunter scandal) cut off access by the intermediary aggregator to whom it sold the location data.[29]

          4. Privacy and Security Risks

These investigations indicate that real-time location data that is identified to a particular individual is regularly monetized and sold to third parties in a manner that is arguably inconsistent with the individual’s consent, the apps’ stated privacy policies, the data collector’s third-party nondisclosure agreements, and applicable law.

In other words, location data identified to a specified individual is routinely collected and sold by a variety of parties for a variety of purposes unrelated to the original transaction that justified the initial location data collection. This results in a myriad of privacy and security risks to the individual. Consider a stalker who tracks his or her victim’s location either by signing up for a free Securus or similar trial or by paying a bounty hunter. The victim may be taking strict precautions to elude location tracking and would not even be aware of this risk. In addition, the more entities that possess the victim’s location data, the greater the likelihood of a privacy exposure or data breach.

     B. Sales of De-identified or Anonymous Location Data

          1. Sales by App Owners

Separately, apps that receive individual user location data from aggregators frequently sell location data to third-party buyers for their own commercial purposes. The data is provided in large sets that do not identify the specific individuals who are tracked.[30] The purpose of the data set is to enable the buyer to identify patterns in location data. Such business use cases may involve allowing buyers to spot trends for investment[31] or marketing purposes.[32]

In this context, the justification for the sale and reuse is that the individual’s personally identifiable information (like phone number or name) is deleted from the data and replaced instead with a unique identifier.

The model is basically as follows. A map app organizes location data for a specified commercial neighborhood over a defined time period to show the number of people who walk through the neighborhood during the time period. This foot traffic may show times of day when foot traffic is greatest and areas in the neighborhood that may attract more or less foot traffic. This data may be sold to a retailer for purposes of deciding whether the neighborhood, or any particular part of it, would be suitable for establishing a brick-and-mortar location. The retailer purchases the data for research and investment purposes. Its interest is in the number and patterns of individuals who walk through the neighborhood.

For these purposes, the identity of the individual is not relevant to the data buyer and is not included in the data set. It is the traffic patterns or trends and not the individual’s identity that gives this data set value.

         2. Re-identification by Unknown Third Parties

Data sets may be used to identify the individual through other means, however.

In order to verify the authenticity of the data points that comprise the data set and facilitate the tracking by the app/seller of the unique location data of an individual, the individual is assigned a unique identifier, and the individual’s unique identifier can remain the same. Presumably, then, buyers could use the unique identifier to track identifiers over time and combine them with other data to identify the individual subject.

Separately, using data analytics, location data can be combined with nonlocation data to ascertain an individual’s identity. For example, the retailer that buys the anonymous data set could note that a single data point or individual goes back and forth from a nearby residential address throughout the day. Matching the individual to his address enables identification of the individual.

A more sensational example of this is the use by law enforcement of DNA information combined with location data to identify suspects in cold cases.[33]

The New York Times, with permission from a school teacher, was able to accurately associate anonymous location data with the individual teacher solely by reviewing four months’ and more than a million phones’ worth of location data and combining that with their knowledge of where she worked and lived.[34] The report posits that:

[t]hose with access to the raw [anonymized] data—including employees or clients—could still identify a person without consent. They could follow someone they knew, by pinpointing a phone that regularly spent time at that person’s home address. Or, working in reverse, they could attach a name to an anonymous dot, by seeing where the device spent nights and using public records to figure out who lived there.[35]

In fact, location data alone may be used to identify consumers in large anonymized data sets.

In 2013, MIT and Belgian researchers: “analyzed data on 1.5 million cellphone users in a small European country over a span of 15 months and found that just four points of reference, with fairly low spatial and temporal resolution, was enough to uniquely identify 95 percent of them.”[36]

As technology has evolved and the use and dissemination of location data has proliferated, reidentification of individuals included in anonymized data sets has been greatly facilitated:

With an increasing number of service providers nowadays routinely collecting location traces of their users on unprecedented scales, there is a pronounced interest in the possibility of matching records and datasets based on spatial trajectories. Extending previous work on reidentifiability of spatial data and trajectory matching, we present the first large-scale analysis of user matchability in real mobility datasets on realistic scales, i.e. among two datasets that consist of several million people’s mobility traces, coming from a mobile network operator and transportation smart card usage. . . .We show that for individuals with typical activity in the transportation system (those making 3-4 trips per day on average), a matching algorithm based on the co-occurrence of their activities is expected to achieve a 16.8% success only after a one-week long observation of their mobility traces, and over 55% after four weeks. We show that the main determinant of matchability is the expected number of co-occurring records in the two datasets. Finally, we discuss different scenarios in terms of data collection frequency and give estimates of matchability over time. We show that with higher frequency data collection becoming more common, we can expect much higher success rates in even shorter intervals.[37]

          3. Privacy and Security Risks

As tracking technologies become further developed and more widely accessible and data analytics become more sophisticated, anonymous data points (particularly when tracked over time) can be used to facilitate identification of the individual.

Consider the private investigation of various retail robberies.[38] If the retailer did not have a suspect’s name, its private investigator could identify possible suspects by:

  1. purchasing from an aggregator anonymized cell phone location data for all individuals near each robbed location during the time of each robbery;
  2. pinpointing unique IDs or data points for all phones present at some or all of the robberies;
  3. requesting extended cell phone location data for the unique IDs or data points from the wireless carriers;
  4. purchasing larger pools of anonymized data from an aggregator and reidentify data points within a given area and timeframe; or
  5. hiring a bounty hunter to track the numbers and locations of the phones tied to the unique IDs or data points.[39]

The City of Los Angeles passed rules requiring scooter companies to provide the per-trip location data of each scooter to city officials within 24 hours of the end of the trip.  Although the rider’s identity is not disclosed to the city and the location data will be treated as confidential by the city, it will be accessible in aggregated form to various city agencies and accessible in per-trip form to law enforcement, subject to a warrant, and to third parties, in response to a subpoena.   Given the sensitivity of location data and the ability of using location data itself to identify individuals, consumer advocates have framed this not as a matter between the scooter companies and the city but as a matter of governmental surveillance and debate between individual citizens and the city:

“This data is incredibly, incredibly sensitive,” said Jeremy Gillula, the technology projects director for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a San Francisco-based digital rights group.

The vast trove of information could reveal many personal details of regular riders — such as whom they’re dating and where they worship — and could be misused if it fell into the wrong hands, the nonprofit Center for Democracy and Technology told the city in a letter.[i]

De-identified, real-time location data is regularly monetized and sold to third parties for a variety of purposes unrelated to the original transaction that justified the initial location data collection. Location tracking use cases include the following scenarios:

  1. location data point identified to a specific individual;[40]
  2. location data point identifiable to a specific individual;
  3. location data point not identified to the individual;
  4. continuous location tracking identified to a specific individual;
  5. continuous location tracking identifiable to a specific individual;
  6. continuous location tracking not identified to the individual;
  7. development of a profile based on location tracking identified to a specific individual;
  8. development of a profile based on location tracking that is identifiable to a specific individual; and
  9. location data used to compile a profile of an unidentified individual.

As described above, the distinctions among these categories become less relevant in practice, and the risks posed by transfers of anonymized location data may be as great as those posed by sales of identified location data.

III. Location Tracking: Profiling the Individual

Precise tracking of an individual’s location over time can be used to discover information about the individual that may not be otherwise available (consider repeat trips to a bar, the home of a person not the individual’s spouse, or to an oncologist), which when combined with other data, can be used to develop a fairly comprehensive profile of the individual. Even anonymized data profiles can pose these risks to the individual due to the relative ease of reidentifying an individual, as described above.

     A. Data Profiling and Decision-Making

Profiling is done for a variety of purposes; targeted advertising and marketing is the most well-known effort. For example, if an Apple customer is in geographical proximity to an Apple Store, his or her phone could provide ads for Apple TV. These ads may be more successful if the individual were located in a TV store near an Apple Store, or better yet, if the individual were located for several minutes in an Apple Store near the Apple TV demo.

Individual data profiling has become sophisticated and comprehensive, and location data is an integral part of profiling:

A profile is a combination of metrics, key performance indicators, scores, business rules, and analytic insights that combine to make up the tendencies, behaviors, and propensities of an individual entity (customer, device, partner, machine). The profile could include:

  • Key demographic data such as age, gender, education level, home location, marital status, income level, wealth level, make and model of car, age of car, age of children, gender of children, and other data. For a machine, it might include model type, physical location, manufacturer, manufacturer location, purchase date, last maintenance date, technician who performed the last maintenance, etc.
  • Key transactional metrics such as number of purchases, purchase amounts, returns, frequency of visits, recency of visits, payments, claims, calls, social posts, etc. For a machine, that might include miles and/or hours of usage, most recent usage time and date, type of usage, usage load, who operated the product, route of product usage (for something like a truck, car, airplane, or train)
  • Scores (combinations of multiple metrics) that measure customer satisfaction level, financial risk tolerance, retirement readiness, FICO, advocacy grade, likelihood to recommend (LTR), and other data. For a machine, that might include performance scores, reliability scores, availability scores, capacity utilization scores, and optimal performance ranges, among other things
  • Business rules inferred using association analysis; for example, if CUST_101 visits a certain Starbucks and a certain Walgreens, we can predict (with 90% confidence level) that there is an 85% likelihood that this customer will visit a certain Chipotle within 60 minutes
  • Group or network relationships (number, strength, direction, sequencing, and clustering of relationships) that capture interests, passions, associations and affiliations gained from using graphic analysis
  • Coefficients that predict certain outcomes or responses based upon certain independent variables found through regression analysis; for example, a machine’s likelihood to break down given a number of interrelated variables such as usage loads since last maintenance, the technician who performed the maintenance, the machine manufacturer, temperatures, humidity, elevation, traffic, idle time, etc.)
  • Behavioral groupings of like or similar machines or people based upon usage transactions (purchases, returns, payments, web clicks, call detail records, credit card payments, claims, etc.) using clustering, K-nearest neighbor (KNN), and segmentation analysis[41]

Location data analytics are used to make a variety of decisions that may impact the individual. One use case for data profiling is credit-risk analysis. Such data profiles may arguably be considered “consumer reports” governed by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). As the lines have blurred between online decision making and targeted advertising, and prescreening and marketing (the former are protected by FCRA and the latter are not), it certainly appears as if credit availability depends, in part, on secondary market data that the consumer reporting agencies do not treat as “consumer reports” under FCRA.[42]

Payment-card fraud management can also be enhanced by developing profiles of each cardholder. By combining device location data with transaction histories, fraud detection is more precise:

New technologies . . . merg[e] a broader range of financial data, mobile-phone data, and even social-networking data to better establish the likelihood it’s actually you behind the transactions racking up on your cards or mobile device. Nguyen says that Feedzai’s system can improve fraud detection rates from 47 percent to almost 80 percent. ­Chirag Bakshi, founder and CEO of Zumigo, a company in San Jose, California, that provides location-based mobile services, says his company’s data algorithms reduce fraud losses by at least 50 percent.

“When fraudsters steal your identity, what they can’t do is steal your behavior,” Nguyen says. That, in fact, has long been the principle behind credit card fraud alerts. But a conventional credit card company is relying on information from your past to guess whether each attempted transaction is genuine. Today’s new technologies tap into your mobile phone and its more up-to-date information to see if your current behavior matches your purchase.

“[We can use] a SIM card as a proxy for a person,” says Rodger Desai, CEO of Payfone, which works with banks, mobile operators, and fraud detection companies to assess the legitimacy of a given payment. Payfone builds a profile of a user and tracks more than 400 types of data to create what it calls a persistent identity. Change phone company? Noted. Someone steal your phone or clone it? The company will catch that, too. Even if you’ve canceled your cellular data plan, it has ways of flagging the activity of someone who then tries to use the phone’s Wi-Fi connection.[43]

Data analytics for decreasing fraud are likely welcome to the individual. Once a “persistent identity” is created by profiling the individual’s location and related data, however, there are few limits on how that profile may be used or sold:

Mobile location data firms interviewed for this story stressed their dedication to encrypting data to prevent direct connections to individuals, yet there are no industry-wide accepted practices or U.S. government regulations preventing the use of such data in ways that weren’t originally intended. For instance, data reflecting drinking or drug use arguably could find its way into data models for targeting ads for health insurance plans, or even find its way into formulas used to calculate health or auto insurance rates or job eligibility.[44]

     B. Behavioral Influencing

Use of predictive modelling has been extended to influence behavior:

It works like this: Ads press teenagers on Friday nights to buy pimple cream, triggered by predictive analyses that show their social anxieties peaking as the weekend approaches. “Pokémon Go” players are herded to nearby bars, fast-food joints and shops that pay to play in its prediction markets, where “footfall” is the real-life equivalent of online clicks.[45]

The intrusiveness of such profiles cannot be overstated. Facebook has shown advertisers:

how it has the capacity to identify when teenagers feel “insecure”, “worthless” and “need a confidence boost”, according to a leaked documents based on research quietly conducted by the social network[, which] states that the company can monitor posts and photos in real time to determine when young people feel “stressed”, “defeated”, “overwhelmed”, “anxious”, “nervous”, “stupid”, “silly”, “useless” and a “failure.”[46]

Location data is key to this type of influencing:[47]

The next step—”from flat, to fast, to deep, is psychic,” Friedman believes. “I now know your whole psychographic from your phone. I will just push you your groceries, push you the supplies you need, push you the information you need.”

The use of profiles for behavioral targeting is likely as limitless as the use of profiles for predictive behavior:

Imagine a not-so-distant future where you’re just driving on the highway. Your car is sending real-time data about your performance behind the wheel to your insurance company. And in return, the insurance company is sending real-time driver behavior modification punishments back—real-time rate hikes, curfews, even engine lockdowns. Or, if you behave in the way they like, you get an instant rate discount.

In other words, the insurance company is shaping your behavior right then and there. Would you like that? What does it mean for our entire understanding of free will?[48]

Once the individual’s “persistent identity” is created, however, its uses are not limited. Consider another Facebook scandal: Cambridge Analytica. Cambridge Analytica combined personal user data obtained from a Facebook app developer (in violation of its nondisclosure agreement) with data combined from other sources, including location data, to compile profiles of voters around the world for the purpose of influencing elections using propaganda and direct marketing.[49] Up to 87 million Facebook users worldwide were profiled with the intent of waging “psychological warfare” against and targeting “influence operations” to these users.[50] Cambridge Analytica’s parent company’s reach exceeded “100 election campaigns in over 30 countries spanning five continents.”[51] Cambridge Analytica was a secondary market user of the location data collected from Facebook profiles and from external sources. The Facebook users had no idea that the voter profiles were being compiled or that their location data was being used to identify them for specific political campaigns for the purposes of influencing their votes.

     C. Privacy and Security Risks

Use of location tracking data to create individual profiles is not addressed under current law and poses unique risks. The eventual data buyer that compiles the data profile or identifies an individual in relation to a profile may not be in privity with either the individual or the original data collector. Further, once a profile is created for a specific purpose, there are few limits on using the profile for other purposes:

The fact is that location data is flowing around the digital ecosystem with little control. Many of the firms that have built businesses on using mobile location data for ad targeting gather the data from ad calls made by programmatic ad systems. And audience segments like “frequent quick serve restaurant visitors” could be accessed for ad targeting as easily as they could be excluded from targeting parameters for health insurance ads, for instance.  “Even though data is used just for marketing, there’s no reason to think it will only be used just for that purpose,” said Dixon. “Those formulas—they are data hungry,” she said of data models used by insurance firms or other corporations.[52]

At this point, the uses and distribution of individual profiles based on location data appears limitless, even though the individual has no control over or knowledge of them and may not opt out of data profiling or access or correct data profiles. Moreover, use of such profiles has become increasingly intrusive as secondary market participants seek to monetize their value.

IV. United States Law and Location Tracking

Federal law does not directly regulate location tracking or the collection, sale, or use of personal location data.[53] Location tracking has, however, been the focus of recent significant actions.

     A. FTC Enforcement Actions and Issuances

The Federal Trade Commission (the FTC) has focused on location tracking for several years through reports and a series of enforcement actions under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act regarding unfair and deceptive trade practices (UDAP)[54] and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA).[55]

          1. Sensitivity of Location Data

In its 2013 FTC Staff Report, Mobile Privacy Disclosures: Building Trust Through Transparency, the FTC stated that location tracking should be preceded by just‐in‐time disclosures made to the individual and subject to the individual’s affirmative express consent. The disclosures should clearly explain how the location tracking is conducted (i.e., one‐time versus persistent collection practices) and for which purposes.[56] In its 2012 Privacy Report, the FTC asserted that the precise location data of an individual should be considered “sensitive” information (similar to children’s data, health, and financial information) and should not be stored beyond the time period necessary for providing the service to the individual that justified the location tracking in the first place. The FTC clarified that affirmative express consent is generally required for location data collection, except when appropriate in context (e.g., when the individual searches for nearby weather or locations).[57]

          2. Misuse by Data Collectors

Uber uses real-time location tracking for the purpose of locating drivers and riders schedule and administer rides. In 2017, the FTC pursued a UDAP enforcement action against Uber for its collection of location data even when the app was not in use and use of such data for purposes other than administering rides:

The FTC entered into a consent order with Uber Technologies, Inc. regarding its use of the so-called “God View” feature of the Uber application software (“Uber App”), which implemented continuous geolocation tracking of all users (drivers and riders) at all times and allowed employee access to such tracking information, regardless of whether or not the users were actively using the Uber App or the Uber ride service.[58] The FTC complaint alleged the following unfair and deceptive trade acts and practices: Uber employees improperly accessed the user geolocation information for purposes other than picking up riders, including allegations that employees accessed the geolocation information of certain riders who were journalists critical of Uber’s business practices for the purposes of conducting “opposition research” on such journalists.[59] Uber subsequently publicized action taken to limit and monitor employee access to such geolocation information but such limits and monitoring were ultimately abandoned by Uber.[60][61]

The name “God View” is apt; real-time location tracking compiles a precise and continuous location record of the individual’s whereabouts indefinitely. (Facebook’s BOLO list (“be on lookout”) recently came under scrutiny. Like God View, BOLO uses Facebook app and website activity to monitor the real-time location of users Facebook has determined pose a credible threat to the company or its officers.[62])

          3. Access to and Use of Location Data by Third Parties

The FTC entered into similar consent orders with other companies that collected personal location data:

  1. A cell phone provider whose Chinese security vendor uploaded firmware on the phones to collect user personal data, including cell phone tower location data (UDAP).[63]
  2. A marketing enterprise platform service provider whose targeted advertising software tracked app user location data (including that of children) and combined such data with aggregated wireless network data to identify an individual user’s precise location for purposes of ad targeting (UDAP and COPPA).[64]

The FTC described the variety of systems and methodologies used to develop the marketing platform at issue in the second action above. The InMobi SDK platform allowed app developers to integrate their apps in the platform for purposes of monetizing their users’ location data by allowing third-party advertisers to target ads to the app users:[65]

So how did InMobi circumvent these protections to track the consumer’s location without consent? By creating its own geocoder database. As explained in more detail in the complaint, InMobi collected information through consumers’ devices that allowed it to map out the real-world latitude and longitude coordinates of Wi-Fi networks. InMobi then monitored the Wi-Fi networks that a consumer’s device connected to (on both Android and iOS), and in many instances, the Wi-Fi networks that a consumer’s device was in-range of (on Android). By collecting the BSSID (i.e., a unique identifier) of the Wi-Fi networks that a consumer’s device connected to or was in-range of, and feeding this information into its geocoder database, InMobi could then infer the consumer’s location. Until December 2015, InMobi used this method to track the consumer’s location even if the application that had integrated the InMobi SDK had never asked the consumer for permission to access location, and even if the consumer had turned off all location services on the device.

          4. Notice-and-Choice Model

In all of these enforcement actions, the UDAP claims against the data collector were based on:

  1. the failure to give clear disclosures to the individual;
  2. the failure to obtain valid consent or failure to honor opt-out; and
  3. collection of location data in conflict with stated privacy policies.

Notice and choice are also key to COPPA compliance. The FTC sent COPPA warning letters in 2018 to two parental tracker manufacturers for failure to give direct notice of the real-time collection of precise location information and obtain verifiable parental consent in connection with the marketing and sale of children’s smart watches.[66] (Recent media scrutiny has focused on privacy vulnerabilities associated with children’s GPS tracking.)[67] The failure to give notice and obtain verifiable parental consent was also the crux of the COPPA claim in InMobi.[68]

This notice-and-choice model focuses on whether the individual understood the extent of the real-time location monitoring and consented to or did not opt-out of it. Based on the foregoing, location tracking that is clearly disclosed and subject to effective consent may be permissible under both UDAP and COPPA.

All of these actions were against the data collector and involved location data that was (1) identified to a particular individual and (2) collected over time. The FTC consistently expressed concerned about the pervasiveness and intrusiveness of the continuous location tracking of the individuals.

Although the enforcement action in InMobi was against the initial data collector, the FTC’s concerns about combining location data with other data for purposes of monetizing the data in ways unrelated to the initial transaction between the individual and the app would also apply to secondary market use of the data. As currently enacted, however, neither UDAP nor COPPA grants the FTC enforcement authority over secondary market participants that are not in privity with the individual.

     B. United States Supreme Court: Carpenter v. United States[69]

Last year, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that law enforcement must have a Fourth Amendment probable cause warrant to obtain an individual’s long-term, real-time location data from the individual’s wireless carrier.[70]

Like the FTC, albeit in a much different context, the Court was struck by (1) the intrusiveness and pervasiveness of continuous location tracking; and (2) the use of location data for purposes unrelated to the justification for the original collection.

The facts and background of Carpenter v. United States are as follows:[71]

This case involved a series of armed robberies and an order under the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”).[72] In 2011, a group of men robbed a series of Radio Shack and T-Mobile stores.[73] A suspect gave Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) agents the names and cellular phone numbers of several accomplices, including Carpenter. Based on that information, the FBI was able to obtain an SCA court order for Carpenter’s cellular phone records, including geolocation information, during the four-month period in which the robberies occurred. (The type of geolocation information at issue here is specifically cell-site location information, which is tied to the proximity of an individual phone to each of the wireless carrier’s radio antennae.[74])

The SCA prescribes limited circumstances under which the government can compel an electronic communications service provider (“SP”) to disclose user content or data.[75] The government must obtain a warrant, subpoena, or court order under the SCA (“SCA order”) requiring such disclosure without notice to the user.[76] The effect of these SCA requirements is to give the user an expectation of privacy in his SP records.[77]

In response to the SCA order, the FBI “obtained 12,898 location points cataloging Carpenter’s movements—an average of 101 data points per day.”[78] As a result, he was arrested for multiple counts of armed robbery and the federal crime of carrying a firearm. He argued that the FBI’s seizure of the geolocation records “violated the Fourth Amendment because they had been obtained without a warrant supported by probable cause.”[79]

At issue was whether Carpenter had a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in his personal location information, which was entitled to protection under the Fourth Amendment prohibition against “unreasonable search and seizure.” If the answer to the preceding question is “yes,” then access to such records would have required a “warrant supported by probable cause,” rather than the SCA order’s less stringent showing requiring the proffer of “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”[80]

In a precursor to Carpenter, the Court considered the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the use of a GPS tracking device on a suspect’s vehicle.[81] In that case, FBI agents tracked the vehicle movements continuously over a 28-day period. The majority opinion held that this tracking was subject to the Fourth Amendment and relied on a property-right theory in doing so; the suspect had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his vehicle, and the FBI’s intrusion in the undercarriage of the vehicle to place the GPS violated that right.

In his concurring opinion in Jones, Justice Alito focused more on the invasion of privacy resulting from the GPS tracking itself (rather than the placement of the tracker on the vehicle) and explained persistent GPS tracking surveillance as follows:

Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not do, and what he does ensemble. These types of information can each reveal more about a person than does any individual trip viewed in isolation. Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told by any single visit, as does one’s not visiting any of these places over the course of a month. The sequence of a person’s movements can reveal still more; a single trip to a gynecologist’s office tells little about a woman, but that trip followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store tells a different story. A person who knows all of another’s travels can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate of particular individuals or political groups – and not just one such fact about a person, but all such facts.[82]

The Court recognized its unique challenge in Carpenter:

The issue we confront today is how to apply the Fourth Amendment to a new phenomenon: the ability to chronicle a person’s past movements through the record of his cell phone signals. . . . [L]ike GPS tracking of a vehicle, cell phone location information is detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled.[83]

The Court focused on the pervasiveness of the information collected, the completeness of the individual profile that may be compiled using such information, and the retrospective use of data collected on an individual who had not been a suspect during the time period of collection.[84] The Court held that the “tireless surveillance” of location data collection and the collection of such data by using the individual’s smart phone, which is such a personal and intimate device as to be considered an extension of the self, “invaded Carpenter’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of his physical movements.”[85]

     C. Proposed Federal Law

There are competing views as to what federal data privacy legislation should look like.

Senator Rubio proposed a Senate bill requiring the FTC to promulgate regulations to impose privacy requirements on internet service providers that would allow individuals access to and the ability to dispute inaccuracies in records relating to the individual. This law would preempt state privacy laws and exempt certain entities covered by other federal privacy laws.[86]

Senator Markey proposed a Senate bill, the CONSENT Act, that would require the FTC to issue regulations requiring: consumer consent for the sale of “precise geolocation information”; disclosures regarding the collection, use, and sharing of such data; and preservation of the anonymity of such data that has been de-identified.[87] This act would protect such data upon collection and from sale in the secondary market.

Senator Wyden has introduced, for discussion purposes, a draft of a much more comprehensive Senate data privacy bill based on the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation.[88] This act would protect “any information, regardless of how the information is collected, inferred, or obtained that is reasonably linkable to a specific consumer or consumer device.” This definition appears to protect location data that is identified or identifiable. The act applies to “automated decision making” and disclosures to third parties, which may make it applicable to the secondary location data market.

In addition, big data companies and their industry associations have issued guidance on federal privacy legislation; Apple’s proposal is one of the few that recommends regulating data brokers and allowing individuals to access and delete data sold on the secondary market.[89]

Intel has proposed a draft “Innovative and Ethical Data Use Act of 2018,” which would be enforced by the FTC and focuses on “privacy risk” to individuals; this bill would require privacy notices to specify the intended uses of the data and limit the further use and dissemination of data. The collection and use of geolocation data (which the bill states creates “significant privacy risk” to the individual) would necessitate more explicit notice and heightened privacy protections.

This month the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing, “GDPR & CCPA: Opt-ins, Consumer Control, and the Impact on Competition and Innovation,” which squarely addressed location tracking, with Senator Josh Hawley questioning Google’s senior privacy counsel, Will DeVries, about Google’s location tracking practices:[90]

He wanted to know whether DeVries thought a user would expect that Google tracks “where she goes to work, where her boyfriend lives, where she goes to church” or to the doctor. “Do you think the user expects that? Do you think you’re communicating clearly when a user cannot turn off their location tracking?

DeVries said Google’s use of location tracking is to make its services more effective, not to make money.

It’s “necessary to make services work,” DeVries said. “If we turned those off, your phone wouldn’t work like you’d expect,” adding that the operational aspects of it are complicated

But Hawley wasn’t satisfied with that. 

“It’s not complicated,” he said. “What’s complicated is you don’t allow consumers to stop your tracking of them.”

He continued, “Here is my basic concern: Americans have not signed up for this, they think the products you’re offering are free; they’re not free. They think they can opt out; they can’t opt out. It’s kind of like that old Eagle’s song, ‘You can check out any time you like, but you can never leave.’ And that’s a problem for the American consumer; it’s a real problem. And for somebody who has two small kids at home, the idea that your company and others like it will sweep up information to build a user profile on them that will track every step, every movement and monetize that, and they can’t do anything about it, and I can’t do anything about it, that’s a big problem this Congress needs to address.”

V. State Law

State laws vary regarding whether a warrant must be obtained by law enforcement to obtain cell phone location information.[91] All 50 states have unfair and deceptive trade practices laws like the federal UDAP statute (state UDAP).[92] Recently, some state legislatures have begun to focus more specifically on the privacy of individual location data.

     A. Location Data Collection

California’s Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) (effective July 1, 2020) provides that protected “personal information” includes “geolocation data” that “identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.”[93] The effect of this protection would be to enable consumers to (1) find out what types of location data are being collected and how it is used, and (2) direct companies to (a) delete location data under certain circumstances, and (b) refrain from selling location data to third parties.[94]

     B. Secondary Location-Data Market

Only one state has acted to regulate the secondary data market generally. Vermont enacted the first U.S. law governing data brokers, which was effective January 1, 2019.[95] This statute applies to companies that collect or sell “brokered personal information” regarding an individual that is not a customer of the company (the data brokers). “Brokered personal information” includes: “other information that, alone or in combination with the other information sold or licensed, would allow a reasonable person to identify the consumer with reasonable security.”[96] Arguably, previously anonymous location information that is identified or identifiable to a specific individual would be protected by the statute. Data brokers are, among other requirements, required to maintain information security programs and to register annually with the state; annual registrations should describe the manner of opt-out for individuals if opt-outs of its database are offered.[97] There is no mandatory requirement for data brokers to make disclosures to individuals or provide database opt-outs.

Effective January 18, 2019, New York has regulated the use of secondary market data by life insurers in underwriting, particularly the use of data profiling as a “proxy for traditional medical underwriting.”[98] The Department of Financial Services explained the risk to the individual of external data analytics, including profiling:

First, the use of external data sources, algorithms, and predictive models has a significant potential negative impact on the availability and affordability of life insurance for protected classes of consumers. An insurer should not use an external data source, algorithm or predictive model for underwriting or rating purposes unless the insurer can establish that the data source does not use and is not based in any way on race, color, creed, national origin, status as a victim of domestic violence, past lawful travel, or sexual orientation in any manner, or any other protected class. . . . Second, the use of external data sources is often accompanied by a lack of transparency for consumers. Where an insurer is using external data sources or predictive models, the reason or reasons for any declination, limitation, rate differential or other adverse underwriting decision provided to the insured or potential insured should include details about all information upon which the insurer based such decision, including the specific source of the information upon which the insurer based its adverse underwriting decision

     C. Proposed State Law

Several states are in the process of considering various types of privacy legislation.

The proposed Washington Privacy Act expressly provides that specific location data is a personal identifier.[99] Like the California Act, the Washington Act would give consumers more access to and control over how their identifiable location data is used.

Other states are in the process of considering privacy legislation based on the CCPA, including Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Rhode Island.[100] These statutes would also protect location data that is identified or identifiable to an individual. Illinois, New Jersey, and New York are all considering statutes that apply to online services, which may cover location data tracked via app.[101]

New Jersey is considering legislation that would require operators of mobile device apps that collect GPS data to clearly disclose to the user what GPS data is collected, all third parties to whom GPS data is disclosed, and how long the GPS data is retained, and allow the user a meaningful opt-in to certain types of GPS data-sharing.[102]

Oregon is considering new legislation amending its UDAP (the Data Transparency and Privacy Protection Act, “DATPA”) to require “express written consent” from an individual prior to collecting or selling geolocation data.[103] A quick summary provides that:

Additional DATPA provisions require a business entity collecting, analyzing, deriving, selling, leasing, or otherwise transferring an Oregonian’s geolocation or audiovisual information to first disclose intent and methodology, and receive express consent from that individual. Geolocation refers to data displaying the location of a digital electronic device (cellular phone, tablet, etc.) on a map or similar depiction.[104]

The proposed DATPA would require an individual’s consent prior to “the collection, use, storage, analysis, derivation, sale, lease or other transfer” of geolocation information.[105] This would require both the initial data collector and each secondary market participant to obtain consent from an individual prior to using location data to profile the individual or transferring the location data to another party.

VI. Alternatives for Regulation of Location Data

Given the rapidly evolving and seeming limitlessness of location data tracking and usage, regulating specific technologies or types of use may not be practical.

Another regulatory model would require the default for location-based apps to limit collection, use, and disclosure to that which is necessary for the provision of app services. Individual consent could be obtained for marketing by the collector. Recipients of the location data could be directly regulated to limit use to facilitation of app services and to prohibit other use or disclosure. This would prevent sale of the individual’s location to unknown third parties for unknown purposes.

The following proposals are incomplete suggestions; one or more may act as a launchpad for regulatory discussion. A combination of approaches commensurate with the sensitivity of location data and the complexity of its uses may be appropriate.

     A. At the Point of Initial Collection or Use

          1. Ensuring That an Identified Individual Has Notice and Choice

Current laws and enforcement regulate the data collector and focus on location data that is identified to a particular individual. Pending and proposed laws may also protect location data that is personally identifiable.[106]

The current regulatory approach focuses on whether the individual has the right to know how his or her location data is collected, used, and shared, and whether he or she should have the right to opt out of or decline to consent to certain types of sharing. Heightened scrutiny is generally given to disclosures of location data by the data collector for commercial purposes unrelated to (1) the purposes of the initial collection, or (2) the relationship between the collector and the individual (i.e., secondary market usage). Several proposed laws follow this approach.

Enforcement and liability in this context may depend on the following issues: whether the privacy policy of the data collector and related settings are clear; whether the user consent is effective; whether the purpose of subsequent sharing by the data collector aligns with the disclosures or consents; and whether adequate nondisclosure agreements and security measures are in place to protect the location data from both disclosure and uses exceeding the data collector’s original notice.

Similarly, the digital marketing industry group “Data Marketing & Analytics” (DMA) has guidelines for direct, mobile location-based marketing that advise marketers to comply with the Telephone Consumer Protection Act[107] and “inform Individuals how location information will be used, disclosed and protected so that the Individual may make an informed decision about whether or not to use the service or consent to the receipt of such communications. Location-Based information must not be shared with third-party marketers unless the individual has given Prior Express Consent for the disclosure.”[108]

The consent model can be problematic in this context. Google’s consent practices for location tracking have come under recent scrutiny:

  1. If a user turns off “Location History” for Google services, this action does not stop location tracking, but only halts the user’s ability to view his or her location data going forward.[109]
  2. In order to stop location tracking by Google, the user must go to a separate setting, “Web & App Activity,” and opt out of tracking.[110]

The two settings are not in proximity to one another and do not cross-reference each other.

At issue is whether the following are deceptive: (1) the text of first setting (“Location History”); (2) the text and location of the second setting (“Web & App Activity”) (which is not in proximity to or cross-referenced with the first); and (3) the default setting for both is real-time location tracking. Google argues that its disclosures are clear and that user consents to location tracking are valid.[111]

France recently fined Google $57 million on the basis of this practice for violation of the General Data Protection Regulation’s requirements regarding clear disclosures and user consent.[112] In the United States, the FTC is under pressure to investigate Google for these practices under UDAP and an existing consent order with Google.[113] States attorneys general are beginning to consider pursuing state UDAP enforcement actions against Google.[114]

The City of Los Angeles recently sued The Weather Channel (TWC) app on the basis of “fraudulent and deceptive” trade practices. TWC app user location information was sold to advertisers and marketers for purposes of serving app users advertising targeted to their location.[115]

The TWC app location consent prompt states that location access will be used to provide personalized local weather. The consent does not reference marketing or that the location tracking would continue even when the app was not in use:

For years, TWC has deceptively used its Weather Channel app to amass its users’ private, personal geolocation data—tracking minute details about its users’ locations throughout the day and night.[116]

The notice-and-choice model may not be workable:[117]

The free and informed consent that today’s privacy regime imagines simply cannot be achieved. Collection and processing practices are too complicated. No company can reasonably tell a consumer what is really happening to his or her data. No consumer can reasonably understand it. And if companies can continue to have their way with user data as long as they tell users first, consumers will continue to accept the unacceptable: If they want to reap the benefits of these products, this is the price they will have to pay.

There are also deficiencies in the app development models espoused by several Big Tech companies in which app developers are required to provide notice and choice, but without actual oversight by the platforms making the apps available to individuals. An exhaustive study of pre-installed Andoid apps showed a lack of supervision by Google over the location data and other collection activities of apps that come automatically loaded on each Android device (which are often not susceptible to deletion by the individual).[118]  Instead, Google apparently relied on privacy and security requirements and tools provided to the app developers, much like Facebook apparently relied on disclosure limitations imposed on its app developers, all without actually overseeing the privacy practices of the app developers.

          2. Substantive Limits on Collection

One difficulty with consent in this context is that the data collector does not know what all possible uses of the location data might be. Indeed, collection of location data often seems excessive in comparison to the purpose of collection. The effect of over-collection of continuous location data has been to motivate alternate data usage and monetization.

As an alternative or complement to the notice-and-choice model, substantive limits could be placed on how much and what types of location data may be collected at the outset. This model would look toward the collector as a gatekeeper. For example, a collector could be limited to the collection of location data only as necessary to provide the service for which the location data is collected. That would limit the initial exhaustive volume of location data.

     B. At the Point of Transfer

          1. Ensuring That Individual Location Data Is Anonymous

If location data is identified or identifiable to a specific individual when collected, it may be entitled to protection under current and proposed privacy law. In order to transfer such data, the individual’s consent or failure to opt out may be required. Location data that is properly anonymized would generally be excludable from the definition of personal information under applicable law and not subject to the notice-and-choice model.

If rapidly evolving tracking technologies and data analytic methodologies enable an actual location to be used to identify a unique individual, however, then arguably unique location data is personal information. The key in this context would be identifiability, which would be dependent on the privacy and security measures taken to ensure the anonymity of the data and the likelihood of risk or reidentification of the location data to an individual.

Location tracking use cases include the following scenarios:

  1. location data point identified to a specific individual;
  2. location data point identifiable to a specific individual;
  3. location data point not identified to the individual;
  4. continuous location tracking identified to a specific individual;
  5. continuous location tracking identifiable to a specific individual;
  6. continuous location tracking not identified to the individual;
  7. development of a profile based on location tracking identified to a specific individual;
  8. development of a profile based on location tracking that is identifiable to a specific individual;
  9. location data used to compile a profile of an unidentified individual.

As described above, the distinctions between these categories become less relevant in practice.

Is regulation of data collectors sufficient to address these privacy risks? Can de-identified location data be rendered truly anonymous?

If the pervasiveness and intrusiveness of continuous location tracking indicates that location data should be subject to heightened privacy rights (as in the Jones concurring opinion, Carpenter, and the relevant FTC actions and guidance), should location tracking data be regulated regardless of whether the data is identified to a particular individual?

The analysis is even more complicated when reidentification is accomplished by a secondary market participant. In that event, who would be liable for privacy violations? Would liability rest with the data collector that did not ensure true anonymity, or with the secondary market user that was not in privity with the individual? Would it matter if data collection predated the specific technology or methodology that facilitated later identification, whether by the data collector or another party?

           2. Restricting and Prohibiting Transfer

The transfer of location data could be prohibited other than as necessary to provide the underlying service to the individual and/or for any secondary market purpose. The transferee’s use could be similarly limited. The goal would be to limit the monetization of location data in the secondary data market. As demonstrated in the wireless carrier aggregated data scenarios described above, this approach is susceptible to abuse by the parties.

     C. Upon Individual Profiling Based on Location Data

Creating individual profiles using location data poses unique risks to the individual. Precise tracking of an individual’s location over time can be used to discover information about the individual that may not be otherwise available (consider repeat visits to a casino, the home of a person not the individual’s spouse, a visit to Planned Parenthood, repeat visits to an oncologist), which when combined with other data, can be used to develop a fairly comprehensive profile of the individual.

Arguably, if a comprehensive profile is generated by the original data collector and is identified or identifiable to a specific individual, the combined data may be protected under applicable privacy law, but in the secondary market, the eventual data buyer is neither subject to current privacy regulation nor in privity with the individual or the original data collector. This includes:

  1. compilation of a data profile or adding data to the profile;
  2. identifying an individual in relation to a previously anonymous profile;
  3. resale of the profile;
  4. use of the profile to make decisions impacting the individual; and
  5. use of the profile to influence the individual’s behavior.

Very few of these activities are impacted by current U.S. privacy regulation, and none of them fit the current notice-and-choice model.

Consider again the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal. Although Facebook is subject to UDAP for its collection of the data, the app developer that accessed it and the profiler that purchased it were unregulated; the risks of resale and unauthorized use were not addressed by current U.S. law.

New York’s letter to life insurance companies (described above) highlights the risks to individuals posed by secondary market usage and profiling in insurance underwriting. These same risks are present in credit marketing and underwriting, and development of use cases for data profiling is likely to explode in the same manner that monetization of data has, meaning that we cannot determine all of the possible use cases at a given point in time.

Data profiles are used daily to make decisions regarding the individual, without regard to whether the individual knows that there is a profile or that the profile is being used to make a decision affecting the individual; this precludes regulation solely through individual choice or consent. In that event, data profiling decisioning and targeting based on profiles may be better regulated directly.

Regulators could prohibit profiling using location data altogether or by secondary-market participants. Like limiting collection, use, and transfer, this would have the impact of diminishing the separate value and monetization of location data.

     D. Imposing a Duty of Care on Market Participants

Collectors, users, profilers, and third parties could be regulated directly to owe the individual a duty of care in collecting, profiling, sharing, and using location data and to have other direct obligations to the individual. In this way, privity could be created between each individual and the market participants and the risk of loss or error could be shifted from the individual to the market participant that caused the harm.  This approach has precedent in the federal regulation of consumer reporting agencies and disclosers and users of consumer reports but would be much more comprehensive and complicated in scope.

VI. Conclusions

To the extent that current and proposed privacy laws protect location data, such protection is limited to location data that is identified (or in some cases identifiable) to an individual. Requirements generally apply only to the initial data collector.

As the technological lines blur between identified and identifiable, and identifiable and not identified or anonymized, the distinctions between the categories may become less relevant. This complicates the regulatory analysis.

Moreover, recent media accounts and enforcement actions reveal a robust secondary market:

  1. identified location data is regularly acquired and used by third parties with whom the individual has no direct relationship;
  2. de-identified or anonymized location data is regularly re-identified; and
  3. location data is routinely combined with other types of personal data and used by third parties with whom the individual has no direct relationship to compile comprehensive profiles of the individual and make decisions about the individual or attempt to influence behavior of the individual.

These secondary-market practices are not currently addressed by United States law.

Profile development and decisioning or influencing based on data analytics, whether relying solely on location data or combining location data with other data, is a distinct business from the initial transaction between the individual and the data collector, and poses unique risks to the individual not present during the initial collection. These secondary market uses are also complex.

If an individual can be identified by location and further characteristics or acts may be attributable directly to the individual by virtue of his or her geographical movements, then discussions of privacy regulation should include location tracking. If parties removed from the initial transaction between the individual and the data collector subsequently reidentify data to an individual or develop a profile of the individual, or make decisions regarding the individual, then consideration should also be given to whether regulation of the initial transaction and limitation of the use and disclosure by the data collector and its service providers adequately address the risks posed by the secondary location data market. The current notice-and-choice model alone is inadequate to close this Pandora’s Box.

The power of place: location tracking and location data profiling are big business. Each poses distinct privacy risks to the individual and remain largely unregulated in the United States.


[1] The author thanks Dr. Peter Alan Jezewski for his editing contributions.

[2] Although potentially applicable to a wider variety of personal data, this article focuses solely on location data. In addition, “data profiling” can refer to the process of reviewing source data to ensure its accuracy and integrity. In this article, the term is used to describe the process of characterizing an individual using data related to the individual.

[3] The presentation materials for the Future of Privacy Forum’s class, “Location Data: GPS, Wi-Fi, Spatial Analytics,” gives an excellent overview of the types of systems, hardware, and software that are involved in location tracking. Future of Privacy Forum, Sources of Data: Mobile Sensors, Wi-Fi Analytics (Nov. 27, 2018).

[4] Security Baron, The Data Big Tech Companies Have On You (Or, At Least, What They Admit To), Security Baron, Sept. 30, 2018.

[5] These types of services are often referred to as “location-based services.” See D. Oragui, 7 Examples of Location-Based Services Apps, The Manifest, Sept. 28, 2018.

[6] Consider that you are in a store; your real-time location can be collected via your smartphone using all of a combination of the following systems: GPS (via satellite); cell tower proximity; Wi-Fi networks; Bluetooth or beacons; LED; and audio. The smartphone has distinct hardware and software to facilitate location tracking through this variety of external systems. In addition, the apps on the smartphone have their own software to facilitate collection. This data can include your precise latitude, longitude, and altitude, including location within a building. These systems are ubiquitous, and much of the technologies are relatively inexpensive.

[7] Longitudinal data may show the individual’s movements during a specified timeframe, which would be helpful for a fitness tracker that calculates distance achieved and calories burned. Alternatively, the data tracked over time may be of a particular geographical location if a certain type of data traffic is more relevant than a single individual’s location; for example, understanding the number of measles cases with a month in a specific county allows public health planners to treat and prevent the spread of the disease.

[8] Y. Vilner, Location Analytics and Retail—Friends At Last, Hackernoon.com, Oct. 26, 2017.

[9] AlternativeData.org, Industry Stats, ALT. DATA.

[10] J. Valentino-DeVries, N. Singer, M. Keller, & A Krolik, Your Apps Know Where You Were Last Night and They’re Not Keeping It Secret, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 2018 [emphasis supplied].

[11] T. Costa, How Location Analytics Will Transform Retail, Harv. B. Rev. (Mar. 12, 2014).

[12] Id.

[13] S. Zuboff, A Digital Declaration, FAZ.net, Sept.9, 2014.

[14] J. Naughton, “The goal is to automate us”: welcome to the age of surveillance capitalism, The Guardian, Jan. 20, 2019.

[15] The secondary data market is not limited to location data and is a topic in its own right. Discussion of that market here focuses on the risks involved when location data is sold on the secondary market, although some of these concerns may be general to other types of secondary-market data.

[16] J. Valentino-DeVries, Service Meant to Monitor Inmates’ Calls Could Track You, Too, N.Y. Times, May 10, 2018.

[17] W. Oremus, The Privacy Scandal That Should Be Bigger Than Cambridge Analytica, Slate, May 21, 2018.

[18] K. Bode, What A-GPS Data Is (and Why Wireless Carriers Most Definitely Shouldn’t Be Selling It), Motherboard, Feb. 7, 2019.

[19] J. Brodkin, Selling 911 location data is illegal—US carriers reportedly did it anyway, ARS Tech., Feb. 13, 2019.

[20] Id.

[21] B. Krebs, Tracking Firm LocationSmart Leaked Location Data for Customers of All Major U.S. Mobile Carriers Without Consent in Real Time Via Its Web Site, Krebs on Security, May 17, 2018.

[22] J. Cox, Hacker Breaches Securus, the Company That Helps Cops Track Phones Across the US, Motherboard, May 16, 2018.

[23] J. Fingas, Family tracking app leaked real-time location data for weeks. It would have let intruders spy on a child’s whereabouts., ENGADGET, Mar. 24, 2019.

[24] J. Cox, I Gave a Bounty Hunter $300. Then He Located Our Phone, Motherboard, Jan. 8, 2019.

[25] Id.

[26] J. Cox, Hundreds of Bounty Hunters Had Access to AT&T, T-Mobile, and Sprint Customer Location Data for Years, Motherboard, Feb. 6, 2019.

[27] E&C Republicans, Letters to Zumingo, Microbilt, T-Mobile, AT&T, Sprint, and Verizon on Location Sharing Practices (Jan. 16, 2019).

[28] J. Cox, AT&T to Stop Selling Location Data to Third Parties After Motherboard Investigation, Motherboard, Jan. 10, 2019.

[29]             D. Fitzgerald & S. Krouse, T-Mobile, AT&T Pledge to Stop Location Sharing by End of March, Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 2019.

[30] For convenience’s sake, this data is referred to as “anonymous” and “anonymized,” although in practice there is an entire spectrum of de-identification, and the assumptions made in this article may vary depending on the level of de-identification technologies employed. See K. Finch, A Visual Guide to Practical Data De-Identification, Future of Privacy Forum, Apr. 25, 2016.

[31] R. Dezember, Your Smartphone’s Location Data is Worth Big Money to Wall Street, Wall St. J., Nov. 2, 2018.

[32] S. Ghosh, Location Data and The Growing Role in Marketing and Advertising Campaigns, Martech Series, June 8, 2018.

[33] S. Mervosh, Jerry Westrom Threw Away a Napkin Last Month. It Was Used to Charge Him in a 1993 Murder, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 2019.

[34] J. Valentino-DeVries, N. Singer, M. Keller & A Krolik, Your Apps Know Where You Were Last Night and They’re Not Keeping It Secret.

[35] Id. [emphasis supplied].

[36] L. Hardesty, How hard is it to “de-anonymize” cellphone data?, MIT News, Mar. 27, 2013.

[37] D. Kondor, B. Hashemian, Y. de Montjoye & C. Ratti, Towards matching user mobility traces in large-scale datasets, Ieee Trans. on Big Data (Abstract), Sept. 24, 2018.

[38] This fact set is based on the scenario in Carpenter v. U.S., discussed below.

[39] The focus of this article is on the privacy implications of commercial location data tracking. Many of these practices are used by law enforcement as well, but addressing the need for balance with public safety and law enforcement purposes is a topic in its own right and beyond the scope of this article.

[40] L. Nelson, L.A. wants to track your scooter trips. Is it a dangerous precedent?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2019.

[41] B. Schmarzo, Best Practices for Analytics Profiles, Infocus, July 8, 2014 [emphasis supplied].

[42] E. Mierzwinski & J. Chester, Selling Consumers Not Lists: The New World of Digital Decision-Making and the Role of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Suffolk U. L. Rev. 46 (2013).

[43] Laursen, Who Are You?, MIT Tech. Rev. (Jan. 2015) [emphasis supplied].

[44] K.Kaye, Why the Industry Needs a Gut-Check on Location Data Use, AD AGE, Apr. 26, 2017.

[45] S. Zuboff, Surveillance capitalism’ has gone rogue. We must curb its excesses., Wash. Post, Jan. 24, 2019.

[46] S. Levin, Facebook told advertisers it can identify teens feeling ‘insecure’ and ‘worthless’, The Guardian, May 1, 2017.

[47] J. McKendrick, Information Technology Enters A ‘Psychic’ Stage, Forbes, Mar. 12, 2019.

[48] NPR Interview with Shoshana Zuboff, ‘We Are No Longer The Customers’: Inside ‘The Age of Surveillance Capitalism’, WBUR, Jan. 15, 2019.

[49] A. Chang, The Facebook and Cambridge Analytica scandal, explained with a simple diagram, Vox, May 2, 2018.

[50] Id.

[51] D. Ghoshal, Mapped: The breathtaking global reach of Cambridge Analytica’s parent company, Quartz, Mar. 28, 2018.

[52] K. Kaye, Why the Industry Needs a Gut-Check on Location Data Use, Ad Age, Apr. 26, 2017.

[53] Wireless carriers must certify that they do not use assisted GPS information other than for enhanced 9-1-1 purposes. 80 FR 45897 (08/03/2015). 47 U.S.C. § 222 protects “customer proprietary network information” (CPNI), which includes location data when a wireless customer makes or receives a call; it does not currently protect location data tracked via phone when calls are not being made. See EPIC, CPNI: Mobile Location Data as CPNI.

[54]             Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (the FTC Act), 15 U.S.C. § 45, prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” The FTC regularly prosecutes enforcement actions in the privacy and cybersecurity context under the FTC Act.

[55] The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6505 and implementing regulation 16 C.F.R. pt. 312 (COPPA), generally require operators of website or online services that collect information from children under 13 years old to give parents clear notice of the collection practices and obtain “verifiable parental consent” to such collection.

[56] FTC Staff Report, Mobile Privacy Disclosures: Building Trust Through Transparency (Feb. 1, 2013).

[57] FTC Report, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change (Mar. 26, 2012).

[58] Complaint at 3, In re Uber Tech., Inc., File No. 1523054 (FTC Feb. 2017).

[59] Id. at 2.

[60] Id. at 2–3.

[61] P. Boshell, Survey of Developments in Federal Privacy Law, 74 Bus. Law. 1, 193 (Winter 2018/2019) [emphasis supplied].

[62] S. Roderiguez, Facebook uses its apps to track users it thinks could threaten employees and offices, CNBC, Feb. 14, 2019.

[63] In re BLU Products, Inc., File No.1723025, Decision and Order (FTC Apr. 2018).

[64] United States v. InMobi Pte Ltd, Case No. 3:16-cv-3474, Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Civil Penalty Judgment (ND Ca June 2016).

[65] N. Sannappa & L. Cranor, A deep dive into mobile app location privacy following the InMobi settlement, FTC, Aug. 9, 2016.

[66] FTC Letter to Gator Group Co., Ltd (Apr. 26, 2018); FTC Letter to Tinitell, Inc. (Apr. 26, 2018).

[67] L. Mathews, Your Child’s GPS Watch Could Be Exposing Their Location In Real-time, Forbes, Feb. 5, 2019.

[68] InMobi, at 2.

[69] Susan Freiwald & Stephen Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near-Perfect Surveillance, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 205 (Nov. 9, 2018) (providing a thorough history of federal legislative and judicial authorities regarding modern surveillance, including GPS and cell phones).

[70] Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. __­_­ (2018).

[71] P. Boshell, Survey of Developments in Federal Privacy Law, at 198.

[72] 18 U.S.C. § 2703.

[73] Carpenter, 585 U.S. at ___.

[74] Id. at ___.

[75] Id. at ___.

[76] Id.

[77] Warshak v. United States, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2007).

[78] Carpenter at ___.

[79] Id.

[80] 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2018).

[81] U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).

[82] Jones, 565 U.S. at 413 (Alito, J., concurring).

[83] Carpenter at ___.

[84] Id. at ___.

[85] Id. at ___ (emphasis supplied).

[86] S. ____, American Data Dissemination Act, 116th Cong. (2019).

[87] S. 2639, Customer Online Notification for Stopping Edge-provider Network Transgressions Act, 115th Cong. (2018).

[88] S._____, The Consumer Data Protection Act (2018).

[89] D. Abril, This Is What Tech Companies Want in Any Federal Data Privacy Legislation, Fortune, Feb. 21, 2019.

[90] A. Carson, At hearing, US Senate wants answers on location tracking, opt-in consent, The Priv. Advisor, Mar. 13, 2019.

[91] ACLU, Cell Phone Location Tracking Laws by State.

[92] National Consumer Law Center, Unfair & Deceptive Acts & Practices.

[93] Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.140(o)(1)(G) (2018).

[94] Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.100(a), (b); 1798.105(b); 1798.110; 1798.115; 1798.120(b); 1798.130; and 1798.135

[95] 9 V.S.A. § 2430 (2019).

[96] Id.

[97] 9 V.S.A. § 2447 (2019).

[98] NY Dept. Fin’l Servs. 2019 Circular Letter No. 1.

[99] Washington Privacy Act, S. 5376, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wa. 2019).

[100] J. Cedarbaum, D. Freeman & L. Lichlyter, States Consider Privacy Legislation in the Wake of California’s Consumer Privacy Act, Wilmer Hale, Feb. 20, 2019.

[101] Id.

[102] An Act concerning certain mobile device applications and global positioning system data, S. 4974, 218th Leg. (NJ 2019).

[103] Proposed H.B. 2866, Data Transparency and Privacy Protection Act, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019).

[104] S. Pastrick, CUB Protects Oregonians’ Digital Privacy By Way Of HB 2866, Or. Cub, Feb. 5, 2019.

[105] Proposed H.B. 2866 at § 1(2)(a).

[106] U.S. Senator Ron Wyden’s draft Consumer Data Protection Act includes a do-not-track provision that would allow the individual to opt out of “personal information” sharing. Wyden has said that the bill would allow individuals to know what location data is being collected and to opt out of collection. Senator calls for regulation that would force tech companies to offer “do not track” option, CBS News, Jan. 10, 2019.

[107] Data Marketing & Analytics, Mobile Marketing Guidelines for Ethical Business Practice.

[108] Id.

[109] R. Nakashima, Google clarifies location-tracking policy, AP News, Aug. 16, 2018.

[110] E. Dreyfuss, Google Tracks You Even if Location History’s Off. Here’s How to Stop It, Wired, Aug. 13, 2018.

[111] A. Griffin, Google stores location data “even when users have told it not to”, Independent, Aug.14, 2018.

[112] \M. Rosemain, France fines Google $57 million for European privacy rule breach, Reuters, Jan. 21, 2019.

[113] E. Birnbaum, Consumer groups urge FTC to investigate Google over location tracking, The Hill, Nov 27, 2018.

[114] T. Romm, Google’s location privacy practices are under investigation in Arizona, Wash. Post, Sept. 11, 2018.

[115] F. Navarro, Popular weather app may be selling your location data, Komondo, Jan. 7, 2019.

[116] M. Locklear, LA sues Weather Channel app owner over “fraudulent” data use, Engadget, Jan. 4, 2019.

[117] Editorial Board, Our privacy regime is broken. Congress needs to create new norms for a digital age, Wash. Post, Jan. 5, 2019.

[118] P. Day, P. Dave, Study shows limited control over privacy breaches by pre-installed Android apps, REUTERS, Mar. 25, 2019

Revised Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act

On December 23, 2018, after significant market turmoil, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin issued a statement that he had completed calls with the nation’s six largest banks and that those banks had reported that “markets continue to function properly,” and that they had sufficient liquidity to fund themselves.[1] This unexpected statement generated considerable commentary as to why the conversations had occurred in the first place[2] and was the first time since the dramatic events of the 2008–09 financial crisis that the government had focused on particular institutions and their liquidity. It thus seems appropriate to consider an important “weapon” in the U.S. government’s arsenal when responding to significant liquidity events in the financial sector, and what happened to that weapon in the Dodd-Frank Act.

The weapon is section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, which has permitted emergency lending to bank and nonbank companies by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Federal Reserve).[3] This article begins with consideration of section 13(3)’s enactment during the Great Depression and its history since, and then turns to some of its principal uses during the financial crisis. It concludes with a discussion of how the Dodd-Frank Act amended this provision and how, as amended, section 13(3) fits into the post-crisis regulatory scheme.

As an initial matter, section 13(3) was not part of a “banking bill” per se, and it was controversial even in 1932. It came about as part of the Hoover administration’s response to the Great Depression, which was focused primarily on a new government enterprise, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), created in early 1932.[4] The RFC responded to a series of bank failures in December 1931, and among other things, was a source of credit to banking institutions that were not members of the Federal Reserve as well as commercial enterprises like railroads.[5] Economic conditions continued to decline notwithstanding the RFC, and Congress continued to legislate, enacting the first Glass-Steagall Act: the Banking Act of 1932. This statute, inter alia, permitted the Federal Reserve, “in exceptional and exigent circumstances,” to authorize emergency “advances” to member banks at a penalty rate of interest when satisfactorily secured.[6] Even this measure, however, was considered a temporary measure, originally expiring after one year.[7]

As 1932 continued, President Hoover wished to expand financing by the RFC. His desires were surpassed by House Speaker John Nance Garner of Texas, who in May 1932 introduced legislation to expand the RFC’s lending authority “to any person.”[8] Despite President Hoover’s objections that this legislation authorized loans “on any conceivable security and for every purpose,” a bill containing expanded RFC authority passed the House and Senate on July 9, 1932.[9] The expanded authority of the RFC concerned not only President Hoover, but also Federal Reserve Board member Charles Hamlin and Senator Carter Glass, the father of the Federal Reserve System, likely because it introduced competition to the Federal Reserve’s lending powers.[10] Two days later, President Hoover vetoed the Garner bill, and Senator Glass introduced what became section 13(3) as an amendment to an appropriations bill that would ultimately become the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932.[11]

The amendment expanded Federal Reserve authority at the expense of the RFC. It drew heavily from the expanded Federal Reserve authority to make advances to member banks in “exceptional and exigent circumstances” contained in the first Glass-Steagall Act, but was still somewhat limited in scope:

In unusual and exigent circumstances the Federal Reserve Board, by the affirmative vote of five members, may authorize any Federal Reserve Bank . . . to discount for any individual, partnership or corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange of the kinds and maturities made eligible for discount under other provisions of this Act when such notes, drafts and bills of exchange are indorsed and otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve Bank.[12]

In other words, the amendment permitted lending by discount only on such paper that was eligible for discount under other sections of the Federal Reserve Act—at the time, short-term paper like commercial paper.[13] The amendment was satisfactory to President Hoover and became law as Federal Reserve Act section 13(3) on July 21, 1932.[14]

Section 13(3) immediately met with a narrow Federal Reserve interpretation; the Federal Reserve initially took the position that the term “corporation” in the statute did not include nonmember banks and trust companies.[15] Moreover, section 13(3) was essentially an orphan provision: Federal Reserve Banks extended very few section 13(3) loans during the Depression itself, and it was only with the FDICIA in 1991 that Congress removed (having considered the stock market crash of 1987 and the need for broker-dealer liquidity) the limitation in section 13(3) that paper to be discounted had to be the same type of paper that was otherwise eligible for discount at a Federal Reserve Bank.[16]

As is well known, section 13(3) saw great use during the financial crisis as a means of providing much-needed liquidity. Section 13(3) was the source of authority for Federal Reserve lending in connection with the JPMorgan-Bear Stearns acquisition and the support of American International Group (AIG), and it was the source of authority for such broader programs as the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), and Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF).[17] The Federal Reserve’s use of section 13(3) is now widely regarded as extremely successful in maintaining financial stability.

Congress responded to the Federal Reserve’s use of section 13(3) by narrowing that authority in the Dodd-Frank Act. Such lending must now be made in connection with a “program or facility with broad-based eligibility,” cannot “aid a failing financial company” or “borrowers that are insolvent,” and cannot have “a purpose of assisting a single and specific company avoid bankruptcy” or similar resolution.[18] In addition, the Federal Reserve cannot establish a section 13(3) program without the prior approval of the secretary of the Treasury.[19]

Revised section 13(3) could be used to create facilities like the alphabet facilities of the financial crisis mentioned above, but the intent of the revisions was to preclude loans like those to JPMorgan/Bear Stearns and AIG. The Dodd-Frank Act instead takes a prophylactic approach to single financial company issues or issues raised by a number of financial companies contemporaneously affected—the enhanced capital and liquidity prudential standards of section 165, resolution planning, limitations on the exercise of default rights in qualified financial contracts, and prepositioning of capital and liquidity where necessary to advance going-concern value at the operating subsidiary level. However, there is most certainly a significant limitation of the ability of the Federal Reserve—or any government agency for that matter—to inject emergency liquidity in a time of crisis: for example, liquidity available in the first instance under the Orderly Liquidation Fund authority in Title II of Dodd-Frank is limited to 10 percent of the total consolidated assets of a failing financial company.[20]

The result, then, although differing significantly in the details, is not different in character from the way that section 13(3) was originally conceived—emergency lending power must have restraints. Certainly, just as in 1932, a much less-constrained approach to Federal Reserve lending does raise policy concerns—among them the ability of the government to pick and choose among failing firms, damage to the credibility of the Federal Reserve should an emergency loan fail, and what open-ended emergency lending means for the taxpayer. It may be time, however, to take a fresh look at revised section 13(3) and determine how to balance those issues against the historical reality that financial panics and crises usually come unexpectedly, and often for reasons not considered threatening at the time. The prophylactic approach that the Dodd-Frank Act takes in guarding against and preparing for large-firm failure may be only as successful as the ability of future policymakers to anticipate a significant crisis. Nor has the issue of financial firm interconnectedness disappeared in the years after 2008. As in 1932–1933, Congress will not necessarily act with dispatch in a crisis. It was fortunate, after all, that before coming to Washington, former Chairman Bernanke had focused on the Great Depression in his academic life.


[1] Damien Paletta & Josh Dawsey, Treasury Secretary Startles Wall Street with Unusual pre-Christmas Calls to Top Bank CEOs, Washington Post, Dec. 23, 2018.

[2] Id.

[3] 12 U.S.C. § 343(3).

[4] See Parinitha Sastry, The Political Origins of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, FRBNY Economic Policy Rev., Sept. 2018, at 15.

[5] See id. at 16–17.

[6] This provision was contained in new section 10B of the Federal Reserve Act. See id. at 18.

[7] See id. at 18 n.144.

[8] See id. at 19.

[9] See id. at 20.

[10] See id.

[11] See id. at 20–21.

[12] See id. at 23.

[13] See id.

[14] See id.

[15] See id. at 25.

[16] Pub. L. 102-242, Title IV, § 473, 105 Stat. 2386.

[17] See Sastry, supra note 4, at 3.

[18] 12 U.S.C. § 343(3).

[19] Id.

[20] 12 U.S.C. § 5390(n)(6).

Examining Technology Bias: Do Algorithms Introduce Ethical & Legal Challenges?

An important feature of a learning machine is that its teacher will often be very largely ignorant of quite what is going on inside, although he may still be able to some extent to predict his pupil’s behavior. 

A.M. Turing (1950) Computing Machinery and Intelligence. Mind 49: 433-460.

Computer scientists have been experimenting with artificial intelligence for decades. In 1950, Professor Alan Turing predicted that by the year 2000, a computer would be able to win his Imitation Game 70% of the time—by sounding like a human to another human. At that early date, Professor Turing knew that the main roadblocks to AI were storage space and speed. Nearly 70 years later, we have had a significant increase in both, along with a significant increase in large data sets that permit a broad range of experimentation. And as he predicted we have indeed constructed machines that can play and win the Imitation Game—at least, until they trip up and sound like the bots they are.

While there are many definitions of artificial intelligence, a distinguishing feature is the type of instructions humans provide to the machine. When we type numbers and functions into a calculator, we are providing step-by-step instructions and we know precisely what was done to obtain each output. We can even double-check the calculator ourselves. When a machine “learns,” it takes actions with data that go beyond merely calculating or following explicit instructions. For example, one important task that computers perform is grouping or clustering words, numbers, documents, images or other objects in very large data sets. This clustering effort is somewhat similar to playing numerous simultaneous games of Sesame Street’s “One of These Things Is Not Like the Other.” Once these data points are clustered, we can then make much more powerful inferences about the data that would not be possible if we had to examine or chart or graph individual data points. This technology allows us to say that certain contract provisions are like other contract provisions, for example, by looking at similarities in words. It allows us to teach a computer about previously diagnosed CT scans in order to use those inferences to detect illnesses in new CT scans.

Machine learning, neural networks and other types of artificial intelligence undertake such complex computational tasks that we often must in turn undertake substantial work to evaluate the results. This is one of the many potential problems Professor Turing anticipated in 1950. So once we have given up on understanding “quite what is going on inside,” how can we evaluate whether the computer did what we wanted? This is the new problem presented by the burgeoning use of advanced technology both in the practice of law and in the products and services produced by clients of legal service providers: how do we examine advanced technology for compliance with legal rules? What standards do lawyers have to meet when using or advising on advanced technology?

Ethical Framework for Lawyer Use of Machine Learning Technology

A lawyer has a duty under Rule 1.1 of the ABA Model Rules to provide “competent representation to a client,” which means that the lawyer must demonstrate the requisite knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. The ABA and many states have recognized that a lawyer’s duty of competence extends to the lawyer’s substantive knowledge of the areas of law pertinent to the representation and the tools used to provide legal services to the client. The lawyer has a duty of technological competence to the extent that technology is used to represent the client. The lawyer can fulfill this duty if the lawyer possesses the requisite technological knowledge personally, acquires the knowledge, or associates with one or more persons who possess the technological knowledge. See New York County Ethics Op. 749 (2017); see also ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Report (“in order to keep abreast of changes in law practice in a digital age, lawyers necessarily need to understand basic features of relevant technology”).

In addition, lawyers must understand the benefits and risks associated with technology. ABA Model Rule 1.1, Cmt. 8. Lawyers have an affirmative duty (1) to be proficient in the technology they use in the representation of a client; and (2) to consider technology that may improve the professional services the lawyer provides to his or her clients. With respect to the first duty, lawyers must have sufficient proficiency with the technology they use in their practice to ensure that they are using the technology effectively to serve their clients’ interests, and they must supervise any nonlawyers who assist them in the use of this technology to ensure that they are acting consistent with the lawyer’s professional obligations. Id.; see also ABA Model Rule 5.3; see, e.g., In Re Seroquel Products Liability Litig., 244 F.R.D. 648 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (“Ultimate responsibility for ensuring the preservation, collection, processing, and production of electronically stored information rests with the party and its counsel, not with the nonparty consultant or vendor.”). With respect to the second duty, lawyers have an ethical responsibility to consider whether the client may be better served if assisted by emerging technology, including tools that rely on machine learning.

Lawyers should be aware of machine learning bias in their AI tools as part of their exercise of technological competence. AI tools based on machine learning rely on the assumptions that determine the algorithm’s decision-making. Incomplete inputs, inadequate training, incorrect programming – in addition to the machine’s own elaborations of the initial inputs – can create biases that render the tool an inaccurate and ineffective tool for the client’s purposes. In turn, the lawyer’s use of an inaccurate and ineffective tool could cause the lawyer to fail to fulfill his or her duty of competence. Indeed, where the AI tool produces results that are materially inaccurate or discriminatory, the lawyer risks not only violating the duty of competence under Rule 1.1, but may unwittingly engage in conduct that violates Rule 8.4 (d) (engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice) or Rule 8.49(g) (unlawfully discriminating in the practice of law).

Examples of Algorithmic Bias

With artificial intelligence, we are no longer programming algorithms ourselves. Instead, we are asking a machine to make inferences and conclusions for us. Generally, these processes require large data sets to “train” the computer. What happens when we use a data set that contains biases? What happens when we use a data set for a new purpose? What happens when we identify correlations that reinforce existing societal norms that we are actually trying to change? In these instances, we may inadvertently teach the computer to replicate existing deficiencies — or we may introduce new biases into the system. From this point of view, system design and testing needs to uncover problems that may be introduced with the use of new technology.

We have seen instances of algorithm bias arise in many places, including racially-disparate risk classification in software used by criminal judges to evaluate recidivism risks, in ads that are presented to different racial and gender groups and within so-called “differential” pricing that sometimes offers better pricing to certain people. Even when we don’t see potential evidence of discrimination based upon protected categories, we are jarred by events such as the recent revelation that a “glitch” in the software supporting Wells Fargo’s mortgage modification efforts improperly denied relief to hundreds of families and cost over 400 their homes.

Moving Toward Algorithmic Rules and Standards

As a result of the growing awareness of the possibility of bias in algorithms guiding AI, we are now seeing efforts to provide guidance to deal with the problem. The most important of these comes from the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in Article 22, which allows data subjects the right to object to the results of automated decision-making, to opt out of such systems, and to demand an explanation as to how the algorithms work. In fact, despite the opposition of privacy experts, the influential European Data Protection Board (formerly known as the Article 29 Working Party) has interpreted Article 22 as barring any automated decision-making that lacks a human review element. New York City, in an ordinance passed last year, has established a task force to examine the issue.

Meanwhile, industry groups, government entities and international organizations have articulated standards that may generate some consensus around audit standards and further legislation. The Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency in Machine Learning (FAT/ML) group’s principles are an excellent and brief example of the developments in this area. Their five principles – responsibility, explainability, accuracy, auditability and fairness – and the related social impact statement for these principles, provide a responsible structure for designing algorithmic systems.

Special Purpose National Banks: The New Frontier of Banking

Numerous fintech companies (i.e., those entities that (1) have nontraditional or limited business models, (2) do not take deposits, (3) are not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and (4) rely on funding sources different from those relied on by insured banks) are currently debating whether they want to go through the rigmarole of becoming a special purpose national bank (SPNB). Becoming a SPNB is an extraordinary undertaking, and on July 31, 2018, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) released its Supplement to the Comptroller’s Licensing Manual (the Supplement), which describes the key factors the OCC will consider in evaluating charter applications to become a SPNB.

Set forth below is a punch list of key points of which any fintech company should be cognizant prior to launching into the SPNB application process.

The OCC strongly encourages potential applicants to engage with the OCC well in advance of filing a charter application, and such potential applicant should contact the Office of Innovation. In fact, the OCC Licensing Department actually will determine whether an entity should even submit a draft application before filing a formal application.

In determining whether to file a formal application to become a SPNB, perhaps the most important factor for any fintech company to always bear in mind is that as a national bank (i.e., a SPNB), they will be subject to the laws, rules, regulations, and federal supervision that apply to all national banks. As such, the filing procedures for an SPNB will be substantially the same as those of any other national bank, including being made available for public comment.[1] Moreover, companies seeking a charter as an SPNB will be expected to (1) make a commitment to financial inclusion, and (2) develop and adhere to a contingency plan that includes options to sell, wind down, or merge with a nonbank affiliate, if necessary.

If a fintech company files a charter application, the OCC will consider the applicants (1) business model, (2) governance structure, and (3) risk profile.[2] In addition, potential applicants should be prepared to discuss: (1) its proposed activities, (2) the market analysis supporting its business plan, (3) its capital and liquidity needs, (4) its contingency plan for periods of financing stress, and (5) how it will demonstrate a commitment to financial inclusion.

Once an application is filed, the OCC seeks to make a decision on a complete and accurate application within 120 days after receipt. The OCC grants approval of a charter application in two steps: (1) preliminary conditional approval and (2) final approval. The OCC will issue a final approval once it determines all key phases of organizing the bank have been completed, all requirements and conditions for final approval have been met, and the organizers have received any other necessary regulatory approvals. The OCC will also impose assessments on a SPNB as a condition of approval. After final approval, the OCC will supervise the SPNB as it does all other national banks, and like all de novo institutions, newly chartered SPNBs will be subject to rigorous ongoing oversight to ensure that the bank’s management and board of directors are properly executing their business strategy, and the bank is meeting its performance goals.[3]

Although becoming a SPNB is indeed an extraordinary undertaking, for many it may be worth the effort, and there are law firms that can assist every step of the way.


[1] For details on filing an application, see 12 C.F.R. § 5 and the “Charters” booklet of the Comptroller’s Licensing Manual.

[2] For details on the review of applications, see 12 C.F.R. § 5 and the “Charters” booklet of the Comptroller’s Licensing Manual.

[3] Key supervisory considerations for SPNBs are highlighted in Appendix A to the Supplement.

The Parties Are Different, but the Song Remains the Same: Yet Another Attack on Real-Time Bidding

On January 28, 2019, the Panoptykon Foundation filed a complaint with the Polish Data Protection Authority against IAB Europe on behalf of an individual, alleging that OpenRTB, the widely-used real-time bidding (“RTB”) protocol promulgated by IAB Tech Lab,[1] violates numerous provisions of the General Data Protection Regulation (the “GDPR”). The complaint recycles many of the same arguments made to the Irish Data Protection Commission and the UK Information Commissioner’s Office in 2018; we analyzed these other arguments in a previous article.

The complaint argues that IAB should be considered a data “controller” under the GDPR for all processing activities undertaken through OpenRTB.  As discussed below, such a contention would dramatically (and improperly) expand the definition of “controller” and should be rejected by regulatory authorities.

Controller Framework

The GDPR regulates “processing activities” (i.e., discrete operations performed on personal data).  An entity is either a data “controller” or a data “processor” with respect to such processing activities. In other words, the determination of an entity as controller or processor must be analyzed in relation to whatever processing activities are in question.

All processing activities have at least one controller. A controller determines the “purposes” and “means” of such processing activities, either alone or jointly with other controllers.  The “purpose” is why a processing activity is being carried out and the “means” are how that processing activity will be carried out.

Although the definition of “controller” has been interpreted broadly, guidance and case law require that an entity, alone or with others, have a certain level of factual “influence” on the purpose and means of processing to be considered to have “control.” Indeed, the Article 29 Working Party (the “WP”) provides that “[b]eing a controller is primarily the consequence of the factual circumstance that an entity has chosen to process personal data for its own purposes.” (Emphasis added). 

The WP further explains that determination of the means “would imply control when the determination concerns the essential elements of the means.” (Emphasis added).

Determination of the “means” therefore includes both technical and organizational questions where the decision can be well delegated to processors (as e.g. “which hardware or software shall be used?”) and essential elements which are traditionally and inherently reserved to the determination of the controller, such as “which data shall be processed?”, “for how long shall they be processed?”, “who shall have access to them?”, and so on. (Emphasis added).

Thus, although determining the purpose of a processing activity automatically renders an entity a “controller,” an entity determining the means of processing is considered a controller only when such determination concerns the essential means.

The Jehovah’s Witnesses Case

The complaint relies primarily on one case from the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) to support its claim that IAB is a controller with respect to all processing activities undertaken through OpenRTB: Case C-25/17 (the “Jehovah’s Witnesses case”). The complaint also cites to Case C-210/16, which we discuss and distinguish in our previous article linked above.

In the Jehovah’s Witnesses case, Jehovah’s Witnesses members (i.e., preachers) went door-to-door to convert others to their faith.  The members wrote notes on their visits, such as the names of the people they visited, their addresses, and summaries of their conversations.  The Data Protection Supervisor claimed that the Jehovah’s Witnesses religious community (the “JWC”) was a controller in relation to the notes taken by their members during this door-to-door preaching.

The JWC contended that it was not a data controller because it did not determine the purposes and means of processing, alleging (1) the JWC did not formally require the collection of notes by its members and (2) the JWC did not have access to the members’ notes. 

The ECJ, along with the Advocate General, analyzed the JWC’s potential role as a data controller in relation to the specific processing activity in question: members’ note taking when door-to-door preaching. The ECJ held that the JWC “organized and coordinated” the preaching to such a level that it defined the purposes and means of processing in the context of that preaching jointly with its members.  The Advocate General emphasized that the JWC: (1) “gave very specific instructions for taking notes;” (2) allocated areas among the members to better organize the preaching and increase the chances of converting individuals; (3) kept records on how many publications the members disseminated and the amount of time they spent preaching; and (4) kept a register of individuals who did not want to be visited.

Analysis of the Complaint

First, the complaint alleges that “IAB is one of the two leading actors…in the market of behavioural advertising which organises, coordinates and develops the market by creating specifications of an API…that is utilised by companies that participate in [OpenRTB] auctions in ad markets…Those specifications are accompanied by the rules of their application [in the IAB Transparency and Consent Framework].[2]

The complaint does not claim that IAB is the controller of any specific processing activities. Instead, it claims that IAB is the controller of all processing activities undertaken through OpenRTB that relate to “behavioural advertising” because it is a “leading actor” that “organizes, develops and coordinates the market.” In other words, it is stating that IAB’s control over the market is similar to the JWC’s control over its preachers in that the IAB co-determines what personal data shall be processed and why for all participants within OpenRTB and, by extension, the multi-billion dollar behavioral advertising industry.

The complaint’s reliance on the “organized and coordinated” language within the Jehovah’s Witnesses case ignores all context in which it was used. “Organization and coordination” was only relevant because it resulted in determination of the purpose and means of processing within that particular fact pattern. In other words, the JWC’s “organization and coordination” of the members’ note-taking activity amounted to such tight control that it was viewed as instructing them to process personal data on its behalf for a discrete purpose and, thus, determining the “purpose and means of processing” as a joint controller.

However, the level of control in the Jehovah’s Witnesses case is readily distinguishable. The JWC instructed its members (i.e., its preachers) to go door-to-door for the discrete purpose of expanding the JWC’s membership (i.e., converting others to its faith). To ensure the effectiveness of the activity, the JWC “organized and coordinated” the activity by assigning members to different areas, keeping track of how long they preached and how many publications they distributed, and providing detailed instructions on what notes to take (i.e., what personal data to process).

Conversely, IAB’s promulgation of the OpenRTB standard does not result in the IAB instructing or direction another business as to what personal data it shall in fact process or transfer through the protocol, or for which purposes. Unlike preachers answering to a centralized authority, entities do not engage in processing activities over OpenRTB at the behest of, or for a shared purpose with, IAB.

A standard’s primary objective is to define technical requirements for interoperability among various systems. As such, it allows entities to carry out activities more efficiently through a common “language.” However, this development of a communication medium by which processing activities may be carried out must be differentiated from the processing activities themselves. The purpose for initiating processing and each subsequent operation relating thereto (e.g., collection, transmission to downstream partners) is determined at the business level. IAB’s defining of the protocol’s structure provides the technological capability for entities to carry out such activities, but it is not, in itself, a processing activity or “purpose.” The alternative would create a virtually unlimited definition of “controller.”  Likewise, IAB’s theoretical ability to lessen the processing capability of the protocol – such as eliminating the “device identifier” field – also cannot be a criterion by which control is decided in this context. If such ability were acted upon, it would only limit the range of processing activities capable within that technology (activities that organizations need not carry out in the first place). This attenuated “control by exclusion” leads to bizarre results and is not what the GDPR intended. For example, any provider that releases technology capable of a range of processing activities would become a controller of all such activities if it ever puts limits on that capability.

Second, the complaint also alleges that “IAB has full control of how the behavioural advertising market within…[OpenRTB] is designed and operates, so it decides at its own discretion how the processing of personal data is to be carried out, e.g., by determining the elements that must be included in the so-called bid request, i.e., a request for submission of bids in an ad market.”  In other words, the complaint argues that IAB, through OpenRTB, decides the essential means of all processing activities carried out under the technical protocol.  

When analyzed against the aforementioned elements highlighted by the WP, IAB does not determine the “essential means” of the processing activities carried out over OpenRTB:

  • Which data shall be processed?
    • IAB does not decide what data will be processed when entities carry out processing activities via OpenRTB. The complaint conflates the capability to allow entities to process personal data with deciding what data shall be processed for any given processing activity.
    • The Panoptykon Foundation and related parties argue that because almost all bid requests sent via OpenRTB contain at least a device identifier, and OpenRTB documentation recommends device identifiers be included in bid requests, IAB decides that entities shall process device identifiers. Such an argument is unavailing. Technology providers routinely recommend that personal data be processed for added business value (e.g., SaaS platforms). No one has seriously argued that these providers automatically become joint controllers by virtue of doing so. The decision to process such data is left to the autonomy of the user.
  • For how long shall the data be processed/when should the data be deleted?
    • IAB does not mandate retention periods. Such a decision is solely within the business’s own legal judgment for what satisfies the storage limitation principle for its particular processing activities.
  • Who shall have access to the data?
    • This decision is, again, controlled entirely by the entities using OpenRTB and differs dramatically depending on the context in which advertising may be transacted (e.g., open auction, private marketplace, programmatic, or direct).

Third, according to the complaint, IAB is a controller because it has general knowledge that processing is happening through OpenRTB:

[T]he JWC, which collects information on its members (as opposed to information on persons visited by its members), becomes, by creating guidelines and maps, a joint controller of personal data of persons visited by its members despite the fact that it does not establish any direct interaction with those persons and has no access to such data. This instance can be directly compared with IAB, as its role is also to provide guidelines and specifications to companies that participate in auctions in ad markets. Like the community analysed by the CJEU, IAB has a general knowledge of the fact that processing is carried out and knows its purposes (matching ads in RTB model), as well as it organizes and coordinates activities of its members by way of management of… [OpenRTB].

Although it is correct that an entity does not need direct access to data to be a controller, it still needs a level of control sufficient to determine the purposes and means of processing.  Much of the above quote is a restatement of the complaint’s previous arguments examined herein.

However, there is one slightly different argument presented: “IAB has a general knowledge of the fact that processing is carried out and knows its purposes…” and thus is a controller. This “general knowledge” standard that the complaint proposes further ignores all context and nuance from the Jehovah’s Witnesses case. Clearly, every company that has a general knowledge that processing is being carried out through its technology, and is aware of the purpose for which its carried out, cannot be a joint controller or else virtually every technology company (e.g., standards bodies, SaaS platforms, and software companies) would be a joint controller.

The CJEU’s mention that the JWC was aware of its members’ processing of personal data (i.e., note taking) was to demonstrate that excessive formalism (i.e., an express written statement telling individuals to process data) should not be required when an entity has such a level of control that it, practically speaking, instructs others to carry out processing of personal data for a defined purpose. As mentioned above, providing guidelines and technical specifications to companies, or simply knowing that personal data is being processed through OpenRTB, does not amount to the level of control contemplated by the GDPR or prior case law to become a joint controller.  

Finally, the complaint contends: “The argument that [OpenRTB] created by IAB is only a technical protocol which does not obligate particular companies to process data is ill-advised and not true. [OpenRTB] enables and facilitates the processing and dissemination of data as the protocols that are connected with [Open RTB] include certain fields that are so designed that they trigger transfers of data, including sensitive data….”

Notwithstanding such allegations, OpenRTB does not obligate companies to process personal data. None of the required fields to send a bid request per OpenRTB documentation contain personal data. Fields at issue in the complaint, such as the description of a URL’s content, geolocation, device identifier, and user agent string, are optional. This optionality makes sense because OpenRTB is used for activities outside of “behavioral advertising,” such as digital out-of-home and contextual advertising, and in such cases personal data is often irrelevant or not processed.

As mentioned above, the complaint conflates providing entities the capability to process personal data, or recommendations to process personal data (e.g., bid request examples and recommended fields within OpenRTB documentation) for added business value, with having the requisite control to decide what data shall be processed by a particular entity.  

Conclusion  

It seems evident that behavioral advertising critics desire IAB to amend OpenRTB so that no personal data is capable of being transmitted at all. In their singular focus to bring about this result, these parties advocate expanding the definition of controller so broadly as to render almost all companies in every industry as controllers.

If they succeed, although they may accomplish their own goals, they may also stop (or diminish) the willingness of technology providers and standards bodies to engage in the European market.  Here, we should heed the Advocate General’s warning in the FashionID opinion that excessively expanding the scope of what constitutes a controller will create such a lack of clarity that it “…crosses into the realm of actual impossibility for a potential joint controller to comply with valid legislation.”


[1] The Complaint is filed against IAB Europe; however, IAB Tech Lab, rather than IAB Europe, promulgates the OpenRTB standard. For convenience, we use the term “IAB” throughout this article.

[2] All quotes taken from the complaint have been translated from their original Polish.

Avoiding Monetary Penalties After OCC Enforcement Orders

In recent years, the OCC has aggressively used its cease and desist authority to address a variety of supervisory problems, including unfair or deceptive acts or practices, Bank Secrecy Act/anti-money laundering, and safety and soundness. As a result, there are a sizeable number of consent cease and desist orders that are in place against OCC-supervised institutions. Although the OCC has issued consent orders against banks of all sizes, the largest institutions have been disproportionately affected, and many of them remain under longstanding consent orders.

Unfortunately, the issuance of a consent order does not necessarily resolve a bank’s supervisory issues with the OCC. In a series of high-profile cases last year, the OCC assessed civil money penalties against banks that were already subject to consent orders of various durations. Civil money penalties (CMPs) levied against five major banks in 2018 approached $800 million. All of these actions are for compliance breakdowns, and most of them involve deficiencies with respect to BSA/AML compliance, which continues to be a perennial issue. The size of these penalties alone demonstrates that the OCC will act forcefully to ensure that timely corrective action is taken, and that compliance with existing consent orders will be vigorously enforced.

The assessment of a CMP following the issuance of a consent order is not unusual. In fact, it has long been a common practice for the OCC, especially in BSA/AML cases, to bifurcate its decision with respect to a penalty assessment from the remedial consent order. There can be various reasons for this, but two common reasons are to allow the OCC’s CMP process to be informed by the bank’s record of compliance with the consent order and the results of any “lookback” reviews, and to coordinate the OCC’s penalty action with any other agencies that are taking a concurrent action.

Action Plans

Consent orders typically require banks to develop a number of action plans to remedy the violation or unsafe or unsound practice that gave rise to the order. Although prepared by the bank, the action plans must be submitted to the agency for a determination of supervisory nonobjection. The plans should contain detailed action items that serve as a roadmap for bringing the bank back into compliance with the applicable legal and regulatory requirements. The OCC expects such plans to include specific deadlines for completion of each action item, and those deadlines effectively become the applicable deadlines under the consent order. Thus, a failure to achieve timely compliance with the action items in the plan will cause the bank to be deemed in noncompliance with the consent order itself. This is significant because not only is a violation of a consent order a basis for a CMP assessment in and of itself, but it starts the clock running for determining the number of applicable violation days for purposes of calculating the maximum penalty the agency can assess.

Consequently, banks must carefully consider the elements of their action plan and set realistic deadlines for completion of each action item. Banks that are subject to consent orders must have not only a project team in place that can execute the action plan, but governance over the entire process to ensure that it stays on track. Although the bank can request the extension of a deadline, such requests must be well supported and are not freely granted.

Although action plans can be amended if new problems are identified, this can result in the consent order remaining in place for an extensive period of time, especially if new violations or deficiencies are cited at subsequent examinations. In general, the longer a consent order is in place without the bank achieving compliance with all of its articles, the greater the chances that the agency will assess a CMP, in addition to the bank being subject to the restrictions and consequences of the consent order for a longer period of time.

Conclusion

The OCC’s 2018 CMP cases underscore the possibility that the agency may assess a CMP even after the bank stipulates to issuance of a consent order, and the likelihood of a CMP assessment is greater if the bank is deemed in noncompliance with the order. In order to mitigate the likelihood of a CMP, it is imperative that banks subject to a consent order make development of a remedial action plan a top priority, establish effective governance mechanisms to oversee implementation, and dedicate staff and resources to execute the plan and achieve compliance in a timely fashion.

Clash of the Titans: Federal Versus State Interests in Bank Partnerships

There is slow-moving, high drama happening in Colorado between the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the administrator of the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC). This refers, of course, to the litigation filed by the Colorado UCCC administrator against Avant and related parties, and Marlette Funding and related parties (the Partners) (Zavislan v. Avant of Colorado LLC, 2017cv30377 (District Court City & County of Denver, Mar. 9, 2017); Meade v. Marlette Funding LLC d/b/a Best Egg, 2017cv30376 (District Court City & County of Denver, Mar. 3, 2017)). This drama intensified last fall when the regulator amended its complaint, originally filed in March 2017, to add national bank defendants. In these cases, the national bank defendants—Wilmington Trust, N.A. and Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB—act as the trustee for trusts established to hold bank-originated loans or receivables that are sold by the banks after origination.

At the heart of the litigation is who the “true lender” is on the loans made by the banks. The Partners assert that the banks involved in the partnership are, in fact, the lender. Conversely, the Colorado administrator asserts that the alleged partnership is a mere sham—a way for nonbanks to avoid state laws by taking advantage of the powers of banks to export interest and interest fees from their home states or states where they have a branch. This power, or “rate exportation,” is extended to banks because banks are given special treatment under federal and state law. It takes more to become a bank than to simply be a licensed lender. Banks are subject to rigorous oversight not only by their state regulator if said bank is state-chartered, but also by a federal regulator, such as the FDIC, which it turns out has spent a great deal of time thinking about how its member banks work with the Partners. Additionally, state regulators, some more than others, despise that rate exportation exists because states would prefer to exercise control over all depository entities, sometimes asserting consumer protection as the ostensible basis for their desire to control the banks.

Although the FDIC is not named as a defendant in the Colorado litigation, the Colorado UCCC administrator is taking direct aim at the banking agency’s guidance to its member banks who engaged in the partnership space. The FDIC has discussed third-party involvement with its member banks in numerous publications, including the Winter 2015 issue of Supervisory Insights in which it offers guidance to participants in the bank partnership space. The FDIC notes that some marketplace lending companies operate though a cooperative arrangement with a partner bank. The FDIC describes the arrangement thusly:

In these cases, the bank-affiliated marketplace company collects borrower applications, assigns the credit grade, and solicits investor interest. However, from that point the bank-affiliated marketplace company refers the completed loan applications to the partner bank that makes the loan to the borrower. The partner bank typically holds the loan on its books for 2–3 days before selling it to the bank-affiliated marketplace company.

In July 2016, the FDIC went beyond the discussion in Supervisory Insights and issued proposed guidance for its member banks that work with the Partners to originate loans, including vendors involved in bank partnerships, supplementing the many financial institution letters the FDIC has issued on this topic. The FDIC requested comments on its proposed guidance that outlines the risks that may be associated with third-party lending, as well as the expectations for a risk-management program, supervisory considerations, and examination procedures related to third-party lending. The proposed guidance, which has never been finalized, describes third-party lending as an arrangement in which a bank relies on an outside source to perform a significant aspect of the lending process, such as originating loans for third parties, originating loans through third parties or jointly with third parties, and originating loans using platforms developed by third parties. The draft guidance supplements and expands on previously issued guidance and would apply to all FDIC-supervised institutions that engage in third-party lending programs.

In its publications on this topic, the FDIC has walked through factors a bank should examine before entering into a partnership with a nonbank entity. It directs its member banks to consider the partner’s compliance with applicable federal law, consumer protection requirements, anti-money laundering rules, and fair-credit obligations, as well as applicable state laws such as licensing or registrations necessary to engage in the partnership. The FDIC also asks its member banks to consider whether the partnership will meet the FDIC’s safety and soundness requirements. Specifically, member banks should consider the following questions:

  • What duties does the bank rely on the marketplace lending company to perform?
  • What are the direct and indirect costs associated with the program?
  • Is the bank exposed to possible loss, and are there any protections provided to the bank by the marketplace lending company?
  • What are the bank’s rights to deny credit or limit loan sales to the marketplace lending company?
  • How long will the bank hold the loan before sale?
  • Who bears primary responsibility for consumer compliance requirements, and how are efforts coordinated?
  • Is all appropriate and required product-related information effectively and accurately communicated to consumers?
  • What procedures are in place to prevent identity theft and satisfy other customer identification requirements?
  • What other risks is the bank exposed to through the marketplace arrangement?

In its complaints against Avant and Marlette Funding, the administrator trots out several facts as allegedly indicating that the bank is not the true lender in the partnership. Some questions fintech companies and their partner banks may ask themselves in light of the Colorado litigation include the following:

  • Did the partner pay an implementation fee? What was the amount of the implementation fee?
  • Does the partner pay the bank’s legal fees and expenses related to the partnership? Does the partner pay the expenses and legal fees that the bank incurs to negotiate the partnership? Does the partner pay the bank’s legal fees when the bank is sued over the partnership?
  • Does the partner bear all the expenses incurred in marketing the loans?
  • Does the partner pay all the costs of determining which loan applicants will obtain loans, including paying employees to evaluate loan applications, purchasing credit reports, and paying wire transfer and ACH costs for money transfers in connection with the loans?
  • Does the partner decide which applicants get loans, applying lending criteria agreed to by the partner and the bank?
  • Did the partner or the bank develop and implement the processes used by the partner to identify qualifying loan applicants?
  • Is the partner responsible for ensuring that the partnership complies with all applicable federal and state laws?
  • Who developed and implemented policies for the partnership, which were used to ensure compliance with laws such as the Bank Secrecy Act, the Truth in Lending Act, and others?
  • Who is responsible for all communications with loan applicants and borrowers, including providing adverse action notices or loan agreements?
  • Who is responsible for all servicing and administration of the loans, even before the bank sells the loans to the partner?
  • Who has the right to consumer information? If an applicant is denied credit, can the partner solicit the consumer for other credit products? Is the bank permitted to use the information from applicants or borrowers? If so, how?
  • Who bears the risk of loss of principal if a borrower defaults?
  • Is there a collateral account? Does it secure the purchase of the loans by the partner? Where is the collateral account held? How much money must be in the account?
  • What does the purchase price for the loans include? Does it only include the amount advanced to the borrower, or does it include other amounts?
  • How are the loans sold? With or without recourse?
  • Does the partner indemnify the bank from and against claims arising from the partnership?
  • How are the loans funded? Does the partner fund the loans? Does it raise money from institutional investors to fund the loans?
  • Who shares in the profit of a paid-off loan? What is the percentage of the distribution of profit?

The “rent-a-bank” or “true lender” theory advanced by the Colorado administrator does not derive from a statute or regulation. Rather, it derives from case law and brute disdain that rate exportation exists. The lawsuit represents a most serious affront to the power of banks to both export interest rates and to hire partners to help them do it. There is, in fact, no statute or regulation in Colorado that prohibits a bank from engaging the services of a partner to aid them in their lending activities.

Indeed, the FDIC noted in its Supervisory Insights that banks can manage the risks posed by potential partnerships through proper risk identification, appropriate risk-management practices, and effective oversight of the nonbank partner. Virtually all documents that memorialize partnerships will contemplate and address these questions and, importantly, the FDIC does not dictate what the answers should be; rather, the FDIC is concerned about the risks vendor relationships pose to its member banks that engage in third-party relationships as an exercise of their bank power.

As of this writing, there has yet to be any litigation that addresses the tension between the directives of the FDIC to its member banks and the concept of “true lender,” although the Colorado litigation certainly raises questions. The FDIC and its member banks should not shy away from this discussion, which raises significant public-policy issues over who gets to claim the mantle of consumer protection, and what consumer protection should look like. Many consumers in Colorado no doubt want loans originated by banks through partnerships because they are often both faster and less expensive than available alternatives. In addition, an argument can be made that a bank acts as a true lender when it exercises the authority granted to it by the FDIC, its primary federal regulator. In other words, a bank exercising its power to hire a partner does not magically stop being a bank by exercising this power. It is likely that as pressure continues to tighten on bank partnerships though litigation such as the Colorado lawsuits and legislative efforts to curtail bank powers, banks involved in such partnerships and their partners will assert their power to engage partners consistent with the FDIC’s guidance in response.

Canada Supreme Court Rules That Privacy is Not An “All-or-Nothing Concept”

While considering the specific criminal charge of voyeurism, Canada’s Supreme Court of Canada recently confirmed that privacy is not an ”all-or-nothing concept,” and being in a public or semi-public space does not automatically negate all expectations of privacy with respect to observation or recording.

This case involved Mr. Ryan Jarvis, an English teacher at a high school who used a camera concealed inside a pen to make surreptitious video recordings of female students (particularly focusing on their faces, upper bodies and breasts) while they were engaged in ordinary school-related activities in common areas of the school. The students were unaware they were being recorded, and a school board policy in effect at the relevant time expressly prohibited the type of conduct engaged in by the accused. Mr. Jarvis was charged with voyeurism under s. 162(1)(c) of the Canadian Criminal Code (where a person surreptitiously observes or makes a visual recording of another person who is in circumstances that give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy, if the observation or recording is done for a sexual purpose).

At trial, Mr. Jarvis admitted he had surreptitiously made the video recordings but the trial judge acquitted him because he was not satisfied the recordings were made for a sexual purpose. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge had erred in law in failing to find that the accused made the recordings for a sexual purpose, but upheld the accused’s acquittal on the basis that the students were not in circumstances that give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy since they were recorded in a “public” space (public areas of their high school which had security cameras recording them). 

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal (and entered the conviction) with the majority confirming that the students recorded by the accused were in circumstances that give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy for the purposes of s. 162(1) of the Criminal Code. The Court found that “circumstances that give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy” are circumstances in which a person would reasonably expect not to be the subject of the type of recording that had occurred, while considering the entire context in which the observation or recording took place. Significantly, the Court found that privacy is not an “all-or-nothing concept,” and whether an observation or recording would generally be regarded as an invasion of privacy depends on a variety of factors. The Court set out a non-exhaustive list of considerations, which include: (1) the location the person was in when she was observed or recorded, (2) the nature of the impugned conduct (whether it consisted of observation or recording), (3) awareness of or consent to potential observation or recording, (4) the manner in which the observation or recording was done, (5) the subject matter or content of the observation or recording, (6) any rules, regulations or policies that governed the observation or recording in question, (7) the relationship between the person who was observed or recorded and the person who did the observing or recording, (8) the purpose for which the observation or recording was done, and (9) the personal attributes of the person who was observed or recorded. 

Considering the overall context, the Court found that there can be no doubt that the students’ circumstances give rise to a reasonable expectation that they would not be recorded as they had been, especially considering that they were (i) teenage students at a high school; (ii) recorded by their teacher in breach of the relationship of trust; and (iii) in contravention of a formal school board policy that prohibited such recording. The Court confirmed that individuals “going about their day-to-day activities – whether attending school, going to work, taking public transit or engaging in leisure pursuits…reasonably expect not to be the subject of targeted recording focused on their intimate body parts (whether clothed or unclothed) without their consent.” In recording these videos, the accused acted contrary to the reasonable expectations of privacy that would be held by persons in the circumstances of the students when they were recorded.


Lisa R. Lifshitz

What To Do Next With Biometric Information in Illinois?

With the Illinois Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp., the floodgates have opened for class actions in Illinois against businesses that collect biometric information from employees or customers. In Rosenbach, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that alleged procedural violations of Illinois’s Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”) are enough, without alleging actual injury to an individual, to bring an action under the law. Although the details of that decision can be relevant to specific situations, —you need to know what to do now in light of this new ruling, particularly if your company currently is collecting biometric information from customers or employees, or considering doing so in the near future.

If your company has been collecting biometric data:

  • Initiate a rapid internal audit to determine how your company, or any agent or contractor you hire, is using biometric data for any reason (e.g., security for facilities or devices, time clock or other employment verification, or marketing to consumers).
  • Once you understand the scope of biometric data collection, implement BIPA’s requirements, which include: (1) informing an individual that his or her biometric information is being collected or stored; (2) informing the individual of the purpose of the collection, storage and/or its use, along with how long such information will be collected, stored, or used; and (3) receiving a written release from the individual to collect the information.

Since the Rosenbach ruling, we have seen a quick and significant increase in the number of BIPA class action lawsuits filed. If your company is currently facing a lawsuit over an alleged BIPA violation, consider taking the following steps: 

  • Remove the case to federal court, if possible. Based on Supreme Court precedent and a recent decision from an Illinois federal court, defendants facing these class actions may be able to challenge a plaintiff’s standing to bring suit based solely on a procedural violation of the statute where no actual harm has occurred.
  • Identify sources of either express or implied consent for the collection of biometric information. For example, employees may have received notice from an employee handbook about collection of their biometric data.  
  • Assert class action defenses related to typicality and commonality. Typicality is meant to ensure that the named plaintiff’s claims have the same essential characteristics as the claims of the entire class. If proof of the named plaintiff’s claims would not necessarily prove all of the proposed class members’ claims, the plaintiff fails the typicality requirement.  Commonality requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that the class members have suffered the same injury, meaning that they were affected by the same violation of the same statute. This emphasis on dissimilarities between plaintiffs will illustrate whether there are any class-wide commonalities.

Finally, companies considering biometric data collection in Illinois should:

  • Prepare explicit disclosures and documents for written consent as required by BIPA.
  • Determine whether the collection of biometric data is truly necessary for the business, given the strict requirements of BIPA and increase in the number of lawsuits. If this data is necessary, collect as little as possible and consider whether it can be captured and not retained.
  • Avoid collection of biometric data in Illinois. Some companies have begun altering their behavior in Illinois to adhere to the law. For example, Nest, a maker of smart thermostats and doorbells, sells a doorbell with a camera that can recognize visitors by their faces. However, Nest does not offer that feature in Illinois because of BIPA.
  • Keep an eye on legislative developments. Many other states have considered biometric privacy legislation over the years, but only Texas (in 2009) and Washington (in 2017) have passed such laws. But that may change soon. In the first few weeks of 2019 alone, legislators have already introduced new bills in Arizona, Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, and Washington. These initiatives have the potential to introduce a conflicting national patchwork of regulations.
  • In Illinois, there is currently a bill (SB3053) pending before the Illinois legislature to amend BIPA. The bill proposes to exempt private entities from BIPA’s requirements under a number of circumstances, including (1) if the biometric information is used “exclusively for employment, human resources, fraud prevention, or security purposes,” (2) if the company “does not sell, lease, trade or similarly profit” from the biometric information, or (3) if the company protects biometric information at least as securely as it secures other sensitive information.