During the Clinton administration the U.S. Congress passed the Helms-Burton Act, also referred to as the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996. Title III of the Act permits U.S. citizens and corporations whose property was confiscated by the Cuban revolutionary government that took power in early 1959 to sue defendants profiting from their property. Title III did not go into effect immediately; its terms gave the president the discretion to suspend or activate it. In May 2019, President Donald Trump activated Title III for the first time in its history. An Eleventh Circuit decision in North American Sugar Industries, Inc., v. Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co. (No. 23-10126, slip op. (11th Cir. Jan. 2, 2025)) is one of a number of notable decisions in the lawsuits that have ensued since.
North American Sugar Industries, Inc. sued five defendants under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, accusing them of “trafficking” their confiscated property. Three of the five defendants are corporations from East Asia—a Chinese wind-energy company and one of its subsidiaries (collectively, “Goldwind”), and BBC Chartering Singapore Pte Ltd.; DSV Air & Sea, Inc., is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey; and BBC Chartering USA, LLC, is a Texas corporation with its principal place of business in Texas.
None of the defendants are Florida corporations. However, North American Sugar began this action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida because, allegedly, the defendants participated in a conspiracy that “involved Helms-Burton trafficking from China, through Miami, Florida, and then to Puerto Carupano, Cuba.” The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, which was granted. North American Sugar appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed and remanded on January 2, 2025.
When the revolutionaries seized control of the Cuban government on January 1, 1959, North American Sugar was one of the largest sugar producers in the world, with a large commercial shipping port in Puerto Carupano, Cuba. On July 20, 1960, the Cuban government confiscated the port and other properties. The Cuban government uses Puerto Carupano for its own activities.
North American Sugar is a New Jersey corporation. It filed a claim for its losses from the confiscation with the Cuba Claims Program of the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (“FCSC”). In 1969, the FCSC certified a loss of over $97 million from the confiscation. Under the Helms-Burton Act, the FCSC’s certification of a claim is “conclusive” as to ownership and presumed correct as to value.
In order to ship certain products to Cuba that contained parts made by a U.S. company, the defendant East Asian companies Goldwind needed U.S. government export licenses. They concocted a plan to ship from Asia to Miami and then to Cuba. By transshipping the products through Miami, they received the U.S. government licenses—and, North American Sugar argued, triggered personal jurisdiction in Florida.
North American Sugar presented evidence that at least one defendant, DSV, engaged in trafficking activities in Florida, as follows: DSV’s Miami office was involved in planning the stops of two ships in Miami. DSV sent many emails about the Miami stops to Carol Scheid, DSV’s Miami-based customs broker. DSV documents related to the Goldwind companies shipments listed DSV’s Miami office as the source of the documents, with the DSV Miami office address and telephone number.
The Court of Appeals wrote that to the extent “the plaintiff’s complaint and supporting evidence conflict with the defendant’s affidavits,” the district court was required to “construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff,” which it did not.
In addition, because North American Sugar alleged all the defendants participated in a conspiracy, Florida’s long-arm statute conferred personal jurisdiction over the BBC and Goldwind defendants even if none of them personally acted in Florida. Quoting an earlier case, the Court of Appeals noted, “Florida’s long-arm statute can support personal jurisdiction over any alleged conspirator where any other co-conspirator commits an act in Florida in furtherance of the conspiracy, even if the defendant over whom personal jurisdiction is sought individually committed no act in, or had no relevant contact with, Florida.”
Defendants in this case needed the merchandise to be transported through Miami on the way to Cuba in order to obtain the necessary U.S. government permits. However, by putting Florida into the picture they made themselves subject to the Helms-Burton Act inasmuch as part of the “trafficking” occurred on U.S. soil and subject to U.S. courts.
