Tucker Ellis LLP
950 Main Avenue, Suite 1100
Cleveland, OH 44113
Seyfarth Shaw LLP
560 Mission Street, Suite 3100
San Francisco, CA 94105
§ 1.1 Introduction
Trial lawyers eagerly anticipate the day they begin opening statements in the courtroom and get to take their client’s matter to trial. With a trial comes a lot of hard work, preparation, and navigation of the civil rules and local rules of the jurisdiction. This chapter provides a general overview of issues that a lawyer will face in a courtroom, either civil or criminal. The authors have selected cases of note from the present United States Supreme Court docket, the federal Circuit Courts of Appeals, and selected federal District Courts, that provide a general overview, raise unique issues, expand or provide particularly instructive explanations or rationales, or are likely to be of interest to a broad cross section of the bar. It is imperative, however, that prior to starting trial, the rules of the applicable jurisdiction are reviewed.
§ 1.2 Pretrial Matters
§ 1.2.1 Pretrial Conference and Pretrial Order
Virtually all courts require a pretrial conference at least several weeks before the start of trial. A pretrial conference requires careful preparation because it sets the tone for the trial itself. There are no uniform rules across all courts, so practitioners must be fully familiar with those that affect the particular courtroom they are in and the specific judge before whom they will appear.
According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, the main purpose of a pretrial conference is for the court to establish control over the proceedings such that neither party can achieve significant delay or engage in wasteful pretrial activities. An additional goal is facilitating settlement before trial commencement. Following the pretrial conference, the judge will issue a scheduling order, which “must limit the time to join other parties, amend the pleadings, complete discovery, and file [pre-trial] motions.”
A proposed pretrial conference order should be submitted to the court for review at the conference. Once the judge accepts the pre-trial conference order, the order will supersede all pleadings in the case. The final pretrial conference order is separate from pretrial disclosures, which include all information and documents required to be disclosed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.
§ 1.2.2 Motions in Limine
A motion in limine, which means “at the threshold,” is a pre-trial motion for a preliminary decision on an objection or offer of proof. Motions in limine are important because they ensure that the jury is not exposed to unfairly prejudicial, confusing, or irrelevant evidence, even if doing so limits a party’s defenses. Thus, a motion in limine is designed to narrow the evidentiary issues for trial and to eliminate unnecessary trial interruptions by excluding the document before it is entered into evidence.
In ruling on a motion in limine, the trial judge has discretion to either rule on the motion definitively or postpone a ruling until trial. Alternatively, the trial judge may make a tentative or qualified ruling. While definitive rulings do not require a renewed offer of proof at trial, a tentative or qualified ruling might well require an offer of evidence at trial to preserve the issue on appeal. A trial court’s discretion in ruling on a motion in limine extends not only to the substantive evidentiary ruling, but also the threshold question of whether a motion in limine presents an evidentiary issue that is appropriate for ruling in advance of trial. Where the court reserves its ruling on a motion in limine at the outset of trial and later grants the motion, counsel should remember to move to strike any testimony that was provided prior to the ruling.
Motions in limine are not favored and many courts consider it a better practice to deal with questions as to the admissibility of evidence as they arise at trial.
§ 1.3 Opening Statements
One of the most important components of any trial is the opening statement—it can set the roadmap for the jury of how they can find in favor of your client. The purpose of an opening statement is to:
“acquaint the jury with the nature of the case they have been selected to consider, advise them briefly regarding the testimony which it is expected will be introduced to establish the issues involved, and generally give them an understanding of the case from the viewpoint of counsel making a statement, so that they will be better able to comprehend the case as the trial proceeds.”
It is important that any opening statement has a theme or presents the central theory of your case. As a general rule, a lawyer presents facts and evidence, and not argument, during opening statements. Being argumentative and introducing statements that are not evidence can be grounds for a mistrial. It is also important that counsel keep in mind any rulings on motions in limine prohibiting the use of certain evidence. Failure to raise an objection to matters subject to a motion in limine or other prejudicial arguments can result in the waiver of those rights on appeal. And the “golden rule” for opening statements is that the jurors should not be asked to place themselves in the position of the party to the case.
Defense counsel may decide to reserve their opening until their case in chief — this is a strategic decision and is typically disfavored in jury trials.
§ 1.4 Selection of Jury
§ 1.4.1 Right to Fair and Impartial Jury
The right to a fair and impartial jury is an important part of the American legal system. The right originates in the Sixth Amendment, which grants all criminal defendants the right to an impartial jury. However, today, this foundational right applies in both criminal and civil cases. This is because the Seventh Amendment preserves “the right of trial by jury” in civil cases, and an inherent part of the right to trial by jury is that the jury must be impartial. Additionally, Congress cemented this right when it passed legislation requiring “that federal juries in both civil and criminal cases be ‘selected at random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or division where the court convenes.’”
Examples of ways that jurors may not be impartial include: predispositions about the proper outcome of a case, financial interests in the outcome of a case, general biases against the race or gender of a party, or general biases for or against certain punishments to be imposed.
Over the years, impartiality has become more and more difficult to achieve. This is due mainly to citizens’ (potential jurors) readily available access to news, and the news media’s increased publicity of defendants and trials. In Harris, the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether pre‑trial publicity of a murder trial biased prospective jurors and prejudiced the defendant’s ability to receive a fair trial. The court recognized that “[p]rejudice is presumed when the record demonstrates that the community where the trial was held was saturated with prejudicial and inflammatory media publicity about the crime.” However, the court found that despite immense publicity prior to trial, because the publicity was not inflammatory but rather factual, there was no evidence of prejudice in the case.
§ 1.4.2 Right to Trial by Jury
All criminal defendants are entitled to a trial by jury and must waive this right if they elect a bench trial instead. However, a criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to a bench trial if he or she decides to waive the right to trial by jury. In civil cases, the party must expressly demand a jury trial. Failure to make such a demand constitutes a waiver by that party of a trial by jury. For example, in Hopkins, the Eleventh Circuit explained that a plaintiff waived his right to trial by jury in an employment discrimination case when he made no demand for a jury trial in his Complaint and did not file a separate demand for jury trial within 14 days after filing his complaint. Some jurisdictions require payment of jury fees to reserve the right to a jury trial.
Additionally, not all civil cases are entitled to a trial by jury. First, the Seventh Amendment expressly requires that the amount in controversy exceed $20. Additionally, only those civil cases involving legal, rather than equitable, issues are entitled to the right of trial by jury. Equitable issues often arise in employment discrimination cases where the plaintiff seeks backpay or another sort of compensation under the ADA, ERISA, or FMLA.
Another issue that arises in civil cases is contractual jury trial waivers. Most circuits permit parties to waive the right to a jury trial through prior contractual agreement. Generally, the party seeking enforcement of the waiver “must show that consent to the waiver was both voluntary and informed.”
§ 1.4.3 Voir Dire
Voir dire is a process of questioning prospective jurors by the judge and/or attorneys who remove jurors who are biased, prejudiced, or otherwise unfit to serve on the jury. The Supreme Court has explained that “voir dire examination serves the dual purposes of enabling the court to select an impartial jury and assisting counsel in exercising peremptory challenges.”
Generally, an oath should be administered to prospective jurors before they are asked questions during voir dire. “While the administration of an oath is not necessary, it is a formality that tends to impress upon the jurors the gravity with which the court views its admonition and is also reassuring to the litigants.” Moreover, jurors under oath are presumed to have faithfully performed their official duties.
Federal trial judges have great discretion in deciding what questions are asked to prospective jurors during voir dire. District judges may permit the parties’ lawyers to conduct voir dire, or the court may conduct the jurors’ examination itself. Although trial attorneys often prefer to conduct voir dire themselves, many judges believe that counsel’s involvement “results in undue expenditure of time in the jury selection process,” and that “the district court is the most efficient and effective way to assure an impartial jury and evenhanded administration of justice.”
“[I]f the court conducts the examination it must either permit the parties or their attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as the court deems proper or itself submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions of the parties or their attorneys as the court deems proper.” However, a judge still has much leeway in determining what questions an attorney may ask. For example, in Lawes, a firearm possession case, the Second Circuit found that it was proper for a trial judge to refuse to ask jurors questions about their attitudes towards police. If, on appeal, a party challenges a judge’s ruling from voir dire, the party must demonstrate that trial judge’s decision constituted an abuse of discretion. Thus, it is extremely difficult to win an appeal regarding voir dire questioning.
§ 1.4.4 Jury Selection Methods
Each court has its own proceeds for jury selection. The two basic methods are the struck jury method and the jury box method (also known as strike-and-replace). At a high level, the methods differ with respect to how many prospective jurors are subject to voir dire and the order in which jurors can be challenged or struck from the jury panel. For example, the jury box method seats the exact number of jurors in the jury box needed to form a viable jury, and allows voir dire and challenges to those jurors.. The stuck method allows voir dire of a larger number of prospective jurors, usually the number of jurors needed to form a viable jury, plus enough prospective jurors to cover all preemptory challenges. Counsel should review local and judge rules to determine which method will be applied. Where there is no set rule or judicial preference, counsel may stipulate with opposing counsel as to the method.
§ 1.4.5 Challenge For Cause
A challenge “for cause” is a request to dismiss a prospective juror because the juror is unqualified to serve, or because of demonstrated bias, an inability to follow the law, or if the juror is unable to perform the duties of a juror. 18 U.S.C. § 1865 sets forth juror qualifications and lists five reasons a judge may strike a juror: (1) if the juror is not a citizen of the United States at least 18 years old, who has resided within the judicial district at least one year; (2) is unable to read, write, or understand English enough to fill out the juror qualification form; (3) is unable to speak English; (4) is incapable, by reason of mental or physical infirmity, to render jury service; or (5) has a criminal charge pending against him, or has been convicted of a state or federal crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.
In addition to striking a juror for these reasons, an attorney may also request to strike a juror “for cause” under 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c)(2) “on the ground that such person may be unable to render impartial jury service or that his service as a juror would be likely to disrupt the proceedings.”
A challenge “for cause” is proper where the court finds the juror has a bias that is so strong as to interfere with his or her ability to properly consider evidence or follow the law. Bias can be shown either by the juror’s own admission of bias or by proof of specific facts that show the juror has such a close connection to the parties, or the facts at trial, that bias can be presumed. The following cases illustrate examples of challenges for cause:
- U.S. v. Price: The Fifth Circuit explained that prior jury service during the same term of court is not by itself sufficient to support a challenge for cause. A juror may only be dismissed for cause because of prior service if it can be shown by specific evidence that the juror has been biased by the prior service.
- Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co.: The Fourth Circuit held that the failure to sustain a challenge to a juror owning 100 shares of stock in defendant Ford Motor Company (worth about $5000) was reversible error.
- United States v. Chapdelaine: The First Circuit found that it was permissible for trial court not to exclude for cause jurors who had read a newspaper that indicated co‑defendants had pled guilty before trial.
- Leibstein v. LaFarge N. Am., Inc.: Prospective juror’s alleged failure to disclose during voir dire that he had once been defendant in civil case did not constitute misconduct sufficient to warrant new trial in products liability action.
- Cravens v. Smith: The Eighth Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking a juror for cause based on that juror’s “strong responses regarding his disfavor of insurance companies.”
§ 1.4.6 Peremptory Challenge
In addition to challenges for cause, each party also has a right to peremptory challenges. A peremptory challenge permits parties to strike a prospective juror without stating a reason or cause. “In civil cases, each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges. Several defendants or several plaintiffs may be considered as a single party for the purposes of making challenges, or the court may allow additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly.”
Parties can move for additional peremptory challenges. This is common in cases where there are multiple defendants. For example, in Stephens, two civil codefendants moved for additional peremptory challenges so that each defendant could have three challenges (totaling six peremptory challenges for the defense). In deciding whether to grant the defendants’ motion, the court recognized that trial judges have great discretion in awarding additional peremptory challenges, and that additional challenges may be especially warranted when co-defendants have asserted claims against each other. The court in Stephens ultimately granted the defendants’ motion for additional challenges.
Parties may not use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of their race, gender, or national origin. Although “[a]n individual does not have a right to sit on any particular petit jury, . . . he or she does possess the right not to be excluded from one on account of race.” When one party asserts that another’s peremptory challenges seek to exclude jurors on inappropriate grounds under Batson, the party challenged must demonstrate a legitimate explanation for its strikes, after which the challenging party has the burden to show that the legitimate explanation was pre-textual. The ultimate determination of the propriety of a challenge is within the discretion of the trial court, and appellate courts review Batson challenges under harmless error analysis.
Finally, some courts have found that it is reversible error for a trial judge to require an attorney to use peremptory challenges when the juror should have been excused for cause. “The district court is compelled to excuse a potential juror when bias is discovered during voir dire, as the failure to do so may require the litigant to exhaust peremptory challenges on persons who should have been excused for cause. This result, of course, extinguishes the very purpose behind the right to exercise peremptory challenges.” However, courts also acknowledge that an appeal is not the best way to deal with biased jurors. The Eighth Circuit recognized that “challenges for cause and rulings upon them . . . are fast paced, made on the spot and under pressure. Counsel as well as court, in that setting, must be prepared to decide, often between shades of gray, by the minute.”
§ 1.5 Examination of Witnesses
§ 1.5.1 Direct Examination
Direct examination is the first questioning of a witness in a case by the party on whose behalf the witness has been called to testify. Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 611(c), leading questions, i.e., those suggesting the answer, are not permitted on direct examination unless necessary to develop the witness’ testimony. Leading questions are permitted as “necessary to develop testimony” in the following circumstances:
- To establish undisputed preliminary or inconsequential matters.
- If the witness is hostile or unwilling.
- If the witness is a child, or an adult with communication problems due to a mental or physical disability.
- If the witness’s recollection is exhausted.
- If the witness is being impeached by the party calling him or her.
- If the witness is frightened, nervous, or upset while testifying.
- If the witness is unresponsive or shows a lack of understanding.
Additionally, it is improper for a lawyer to bolster the credibility of a witness during direct examination by evidence of specific instances of conduct or otherwise. Bolstering occurs either when (1) a lawyer suggests that the witness’s testimony is corroborated by evidence known to the lawyer, but not the jury, or (2) when a lawyer asks a witness a question about specific instances of truthfulness or honesty to establish credibility. For instance, in Raysor, the Second Circuit found that it was improper for a witness to bolster herself on direct examination by testifying about her religion or faithful marriage.
When a party calls an adverse party, or someone associated with an adverse party, the attorney has more leeway during direct examination. This is because adverse parties may be predisposed against the party direct-examining him. Because of this, the attorney may ask leading questions, and impeach or contradict the adverse witness. Courts have broadened who they consider to be “associated with” or “identified with” an adverse party. Employees, significant others, and informants have all constituted adverse parties for purposes of direct examination. Further, even if the witness is not adverse, an attorney may also ask leading questions to a witness who is hostile. In order to ask such leading questions, the direct examiner must demonstrate that the witness will be resistant to suggestion. This often involves first asking the witness non-leading questions in order to show that the witness is biased against the direct examiner.
When a witness cannot recall a fact or event, the lawyer is permitted to help refresh that witness’s memory. The lawyer may do so by providing the witness with an item to help the witness recall the fact or event. Proper foundation before such refreshment requires that:
the witness’s recollection to be exhausted, and that the time, place and person to whom the statement was given be identified. When the court is satisfied that the memorandum on its face reflects the witness’s statement or one the witness acknowledges, and in his discretion the court is further satisfied that it may be of help in refreshing the person’s memory, the witness should be allowed to refer to the document.
However, the item/memorandum does not come into evidence. In Rush, the Sixth Circuit found that although the trial judge properly permitted defense counsel to refresh a witness’s memory with the transcript of a previously recorded statement, the trial judge erred in allowing another witness to read that transcript aloud to the jury.
Further, sometimes the party calling a witness wishes to impeach that witness. Generally, courts are hesitant to permit parties to impeach their own witnesses because the party who calls a witness is vouching for the trustworthiness of that witness, and allowing impeachment may confuse the jury or be unfairly prejudicial. Prior to adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a party could impeach its own witness only when the witness’s testimony both surprised and affirmatively damaged the calling party.
However, Federal Rule of Evidence 607 states that “the credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness.” The Advisory Committee Notes of Rule 607 indicate that this rule repudiates the surprise and injury requirement from common law. A party can impeach a witness through prior inconsistent statements, cross-examination, or prior evidence from other sources. However, a party may not use Rule 607 to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence to the jury. Additionally, a party may not call a witness with the sole purpose of impeaching him. Further, even courts that do not permit a party to impeach its own witness still permit parties to contradict their own witnesses through another part of that witness’s testimony.
§ 1.5.2 Cross-Examination
Cross-examination provides the opposing party an opportunity to challenge what a witness said on direct examination, discredit the witness’s truthfulness, and bring out any other testimony that may be favorable to the opposing party’s case. Generally under the federal rules, cross-examination is limited to the “subject matter” of the direct examination and any matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The purpose of limiting the scope of cross-examination is to promote regularity and logic in jury trials, and ensure that each party has the opportunity to present its case in chief. However, courts tend to liberally construe what falls within the “subject matter” of direct examination. For example, in Perez-Solis, the Fifth Circuit found that a witness’s brief reference to collecting money from a friend permitted opposing counsel to cross-examine him on all of his finances. Additionally, the language of Fed. R. Evid. 611(b) states that although cross-examination “should not” go beyond the scope of direct examination, the court may exercise its discretion to “allow inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.” However, if the questioning goes beyond the subject matter, it generally should not include leading questions.
One of the main goals of cross-examination is impeachment. The Federal Rules of Evidence explain three different methods of impeachment: (1) impeachment by prior bad acts or character for untruthfulness, (2) impeachment by prior conviction of a qualifying crime, and (3) impeachment by prior inconsistent statement. Additionally, courts still apply common law principles and permit impeachment through three additional methods as well: (1) impeachment by demonstrating the witness’s bias, prejudice, or interest in the litigation or in testifying, (2) impeachment by demonstrating the witness’s incapacity to accurately perceive the facts, and (3) impeachment by showing contradictory evidence to the witness’s testimony in court. The following present case examples of each of the six methods of impeachment:
- Prior bad act or dishonesty: In O’Connor v. Venore Transp. Co., the First Circuit found that trial judge did not abuse discretion when he allowed defense counsel to cross-examine plaintiff with his prior tax returns with the purpose of demonstrating dishonesty.
- Conviction of qualifying crime: In Smith v. Tidewater Marine Towing, Inc., the Fifth Circuit found that, in Jones Act action arising from injuries plaintiff received while working on a tugboat, defense counsel permissibly crossed the plaintiff about his prior convictions.
- Prior inconsistent statement: In Wilson v. Bradlees of New England, Inc., a product liability case, the First Circuit found that defense counsel appropriately crossed plaintiff with an inconsistent statement made in a complaint filed in a different case against a different defendant.
- Bias or prejudice: In Udemba v. Nicoli, the First Circuit found that it was permissible for defense counsel to cross-examine the plaintiff’s wife about domestic abuse to show bias in a case involving excessive force claims against the police.
- Incapacity to accurately perceive: In Hargrave v. McKee, the Sixth Circuit found that the trial court should have permitted defense counsel to question a victim about how her ongoing psychiatric problems affected her perception and memory of events.
- Contradictory evidence: In Barrera v. E. R. DuPont De Nemours and Co., Inc., the Fifth Circuit held, in a personal-injury action, that the trial judge erred in denying the use of evidence showing that plaintiff received over $1000 per month in social security benefits because the evidence was admissible to contradict defendant’s volunteered testimony on cross-examination that he did not have a “penny in his pocket.”
Once the right of cross-examination has been fully and fairly exercised, it is within the trial court’s discretion as to whether further cross-examination should be allowed. In order to recall a witness, the party must show that the new cross-examination will shed additional light on the issues being tried or impeach the witness. Further, it is helpful if the party seeking recall demonstrates that it came into possession of additional evidence or information that it did not have when it previously crossed that witness. Further, it is difficult to succeed on an appeal of a trial court’s failure to permit recall for further cross‑examination. This is because courts review a trial judge’s decision for abuse of discretion, and often find that the lack of recall was a harmless error.
§ 1.5.3 Expert Witnesses
Experts are witnesses who offer opinion testimony on an aspect of the case that requires specialized knowledge or experience. Experts also include persons who do not testify, but who advise attorneys on a technical or specialized area to better help them prepare their cases. A few key criteria should be considered at the outset when choosing an expert. First is the level of relevant expertise and the ability to have the expert’s research, assumptions, methodologies, and practices stand up to the scrutiny of cross-examination. Many law firms, nonprofits, commercial services, and government agencies maintain lists of experts categorized by the expertise; those lists are a helpful place to begin. Alternatively, counsel may begin by researching persons who have spoken or written about the subject matter that requires expert testimony. An Internet search is, in many cases, the place to start when developing a list. Counsel also might consider using a legal search engine to identify persons who have provided expert testimony on the subject matter in the past. Westlaw and LexisNexis both maintain expert databases.
Any expert who is on counsel’s list of candidates should produce, in addition to his or her curriculum vitae (CV), a list of prior court and deposition appearances, as well as a list of publications over the last 10 years. In federal court, this information must be disclosed in the expert report, per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2).
Another consideration when retaining an expert is whether he or she will be a testifying expert, or whether the expert will only act in a consulting role in preparing the case for trial (non-testifying expert) because this will determine the discoverability of the expert’s opinions. Testifying experts’ opinion are always discoverable, while consulting experts’ opinions are nearly always protected from discovery.
A testifying expert must be qualified, and the proponent of an expert witness bears the burden of establishing the admissibility of the expert’s testimony by a preponderance of the evidence. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 sets forth a standard for admissibility, wherein a witness may be qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education and may testify in the form of an opinion if they meet certain criteria. Opposing counsel may challenge the qualifications of the expert before the expert’s opinions are presented; to do so, opposing counsel can ask to voir dire the expert (usually outside of the presence of the jury). It is for the trial court judge to determine whether or not “an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand,” thereby making it admissible.
§ 1.6 Evidence at Trial
§ 1.6.1 Authentication of Evidence
With the exception of exhibits as to which authenticity is acknowledged by stipulation, admission, judicial notice, or exhibits which are self-authenticating, no exhibit will be received in evidence unless it is first authenticated or identified as being what it purports to be. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the authentication requirement is satisfied when “the proponent . . . produce[s] evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”
When an item is offered into evidence, the court may permit counsel to conduct a limited cross-examination on the foundation offered. In reaching its determination, the court must view all the evidence introduced as to authentication or identification, including issues of credibility, most favorably to the proponent. Of course, the party who opposed introduction of the evidence may still offer contradictory evidence before the trier of fact or challenge the credibility of the supporting proof in the same way that he can dispute any other testimony. However, upon consideration of the evidence as a whole, if a sufficient foundation has been laid in support of introduction, contradictory evidence goes to the weight to be assigned by the trier of fact and not to admissibility. It is important to note that many courts have held that the mere production of a document in discovery waives any argument as to its authenticity.
While there are many topics to discuss regarding authentication of evidence, this section will focus on electronically stored information. Proper authentication of e-mails and other instant communications, as well as all computerized records, is of critical importance in an ever-increasing number of cases, not only because of the centrality of such data and communications to modern business and society in general, but also due to the ease in which such electronic materials can be created, altered, and manipulated. In the ordinary course of events, a witness who has seen the e-mail in question need only testify that the printout offered as an exhibit is an accurate reproduction.
- Web print out – Printouts of Internet website pages must first be authenticated as accurately reflecting the content of the page and the image of the page on the computer at which the printout was made before they can be introduced into evidence; then, to be relevant and material to the case at hand, the printouts often will need to be further authenticated as having been posted by a particular source.
- Text message – When there has been an objection to admissibility of a text message, the proponent of the evidence must explain the purpose for which the text message is being offered and provide sufficient direct or circumstantial corroborating evidence of authorship in order to authenticate the text message as a condition precedent to its admission; thus, authenticating a text message or e-mail may be done in much the same way as authenticating a telephone call.
- Social networking services – Proper inquiry for determining whether a proponent has properly authenticated evidence derived from social networking services was whether the proponent adduced sufficient evidence to support a finding by a reasonable jury that the proffered evidence was what the proponent claimed it to be.
§ 1.6.2 Objecting to Evidence
Objections must be specific. The party objecting to evidence must make known to the court and the parties the precise ground on which the objecting party is basing the objection. The objecting party must also be sure to indicate the particular portion of the evidence that is objectionable. However, a general objection may be permitted if the evidence is clearly inadmissible for any purpose or if the only possible grounds for objection is obvious.
The purpose of a specific objection to evidence is to preserve the issue on appeal. On appeal, the objecting party will be limited to the specific objections to evidence made at trial. However, an objection raised by a party in writing is sufficiently preserved for appeal, even if that same party subsequently failed to make an oral, on-the-record objection.
Objections to evidence must be timely so as to not allow a party to wait and see whether an answer is favorable before raising an objection. Failure to timely object results in the evidence being admitted. Once the evidence is admitted and becomes part of the trial record, it may be considered by the jury in deliberations, the trial court in ruling on motions, and a reviewing court determining the sufficiency of the evidence. In some instances, the trial judge may prohibit counsel from giving descriptions of the basis for his or her objections. However, the attorney must still attempt to get in the specific grounds for the objection on the record.
Counsel objecting the evidence should remember to strike the evidence from the record after their objection is sustained.
§ 1.6.3 Offer of Proof
If evidence is excluded by the trial court, the party offering the evidence must make an offer of proof to preserve the issue on appeal. For an offer of proof to be adequate to preserve an issue on appeal, counsel must state both the theory of admissibility and the content of the excluded evidence. Although best practice is to make an offer of proof at the time an objection is made, an offer of proof made later in time, even if it is made at a subsequent conference or hearing, may be acceptable. An offer of proof can take several different forms:
- A testimonial offer of evidence, whereby counsel summarizes what the proposed evidence is supposed to be. Attorneys using this method should be cautious, however, as the testimony may be considered inadequate.
- An examination of a witness, whereby a witness is examined and cross-examined outside of the presence of a jury.
- A written statement by the examining counsel, which describes the answers that the proposed witness would give if allowed to testify.
- An affidavit, taken under oath, which summarizes a witness’s expected testimony and is signed by the witness. However, this use of documentary evidence should be marked as an exhibit and introduced into the record for identification on appeal.
There are exceptions to the offer of proof requirement. First, an offer of proof is unnecessary when the content of the evidence is “apparent from the context.” Second, a cross-examiner who is conducting a proper cross-examination will be given more leeway by a court, since oftentimes the cross-examiner does not know what a witness will say if permitted to answer a question.
§ 1.7 Closing Argument
Different than an opening statement, closing argument is the time for advocacy and argument on behalf of your client. It is not an unfettered right, however, and there are certain rules to remember about closing argument. First, present only that which was presented in evidence and do not deviate from the record. You also do not want to comment on a witness that was unable to testify or suggest that a defendant’s failure to testify results in a guilty verdict. Further, an attack on the credibility or honesty of opposing counsel is considered unethical. But that does not mean lawyers cannot comment on the credibility of evidence and suggest reasonable inferences based on the evidence. And keep in mind, generally, courts are “reluctant to set aside a jury verdict because of an argument made by counsel during closing arguments.”
§ 1.8 Judgment as a Matter of Law
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 governs the standard for judgment as a matter oflLaw, sometimes referred to as a directed verdict in state court matters. A motion for judgment as a matter of law “may be made at any time before the case is submitted to the jury” and the motion “must specify the judgment sought and the law and facts that entitle the movant to the judgment.” But, “[a] motion under this Rule need not be stated with ‘technical precision,’” so long as “it clearly requested relief on the basis of insufficient evidence.” Although it may be “better practice,” there is no requirement that the motion be made in writing. The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals has even held that it is “clearly within the court’s power” to raise the motion “sua sponte.”
Importantly, Rule 50 uses permissive, not mandatory, language, which means “while a district court is permitted to enter judgment as a matter of law when it concludes that the evidence is legally insufficient, it is not required to do so.” The Supreme Court has gone as far as to say “the district courts are, if anything, encouraged to submit the case to the jury, rather than granting such motions.” There is a practical reason for this advice: if the motion is granted, then overturned on appeal, a whole new trial must be conveyed. Conversely, if the case is allowed to go to the jury, a post-verdict motion or appellate court can right any wrong with more ease.
In entertaining a motion for judgment as a matter of law, courts should review all of the evidence in the record, but, in doing so, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge. The question is not whether there is literally no evidence supporting the party against whom the motion is directed but whether there is evidence upon which the jury might reasonably find a verdict for that party. Since granting a judgment as a matter of law deprives the party opposing the motion of a determination of the facts by a jury, it is understandable that it is to be granted cautiously and sparingly by the trial judge.
§ 1.9 Jury Instructions
§ 1.9.1 General
The purpose of jury instructions is to advise the jury on the proper legal standards to be applied in determining issues of fact as to the case before them. The court may instruct the jury at any time before the jury is discharged. But the court must first inform the parties of its proposed instructions and give the parties an opportunity to respond. Although each party is entitled to have the jury charged with his theory of the case, the proposed instructions must be supported by the law and the evidence.
§ 1.9.2 Objections
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 provides counsel the ability to correct errors in jury instructions. The philosophy underlying the provisions of Rule 51 is to prevent unnecessary appeals of matters concerning jury instructions which should have been resolved at the trial level. An objection must be made on the record and state distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds for the objection. Off-the-record objections to jury instructions, regardless of how specific, cannot satisfy requirements of the rule governing preservation of such errors. A party may object to instructions outside of the presence of the jury before the instructions and arguments are delivered or promptly after learning that the instructions or request will be, or has been, given or refused.  Even if the initial request for an instruction is made in detail, the requesting party must object again after the instructions are given but before the jury retires for deliberations, in order to preserve the claimed error.
Whether a jury instruction is improper is a question of law reviewed de novo. Instructions are improper if, when viewed as a whole, they are confusing, misleading, and prejudicial. If an instruction is improper, the judgment will be reversed, unless the error is harmless. A motion for new trial is not appropriate where the omitted instructions are superfluous and potentially misleading.
Further, while some courts have been lenient on whether objections are made in accordance with Rule 51, many courts hold that one who does not object in accordance with Rule 51 is deemed to have waived the right to appeal. A patently erroneous instruction can be considered on appeal if the error is “fundamental” and involves a miscarriage of justice, but the movant claiming the error has the burden of demonstrating it is a fundamental error.
§ 1.10 Conduct of Jury
§ 1.10.1 Conduct During Deliberations
Jury deliberations must remain private and secret in order to protect the jury’s deliberations from improper, outside influence. Control over the jury during deliberations, including the decision whether to allow the jurors to separate before a verdict is reached, is in the sound discretion of the trial court. During this time, a judge may consider the fatigue of the jurors in determining whether the time of deliberations could preclude effective and impartial deliberation absent a break. Although admonition of the jury is not required, one should be given if the jury is to separate at night and could potentially interact with third parties.
The only individuals permitted in the jury room during deliberations are the jurors. However, in the case of a juror with a hearing or speech impediment, the court will appoint an appropriate professional to assist that individual and the presence of that professional is not grounds for reversal so long as the professional: (1) does not participate in deliberations; and (2) takes an oath to that effect.
Courts have broad discretion in determining what materials will be permitted in the jury room. Materials received into evidence are generally permitted, including real evidence, documents, audio recordings, charts and summaries admitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 1006, video recordings, written stipulations, depositions, drugs, and weapons. Additionally, jurors are typically permitted to use any notes he or she has taken over the course of trial. Pleadings, however, are ordinarily not allowed.
§ 1.10.2 Conduct During Trial
Traditionally, the trial judge has discretion to manage the jury during trial. To ensure the jurors are properly informed, the court may, at any time after the commencement of trial, instruct the jury regarding a matter related to the case or a principal of law. If a party wishes to present an exhibit to the jurors for examination over the course of trial, counsel should request that the court admonish the jury not to place undue emphasis on the evidence presented. Additionally, the trial court may, in its informed discretion, permit a jury view of the premises that is the subject of the litigation.
During trial, the court may allow the jury to take notes and dictate the procedure for doing so. The trial court may permit note-taking for all of the trial or restrict the practice to certain parts. A concern of permitting note-taking during trial is that jurors may place too much significance on their notes and too little significance on their recollection of the trial testimony. To mitigate this risk, a judge should give a jury instruction informing each juror that he or she should rely on his memory and only use notes to assist that process.
Allowing a juror to participate in examining a witness is within the discretion of the trial court, although some courts have strongly opposed the practice. If allowed, procedural protections should be encouraged to mitigate the risks of questions. Additionally, the court should permit counsel to re-question the witness after a juror question has been posed.
While trial is ongoing, jurors should not discuss the case among themselves or share notes prior to the case being submitted for deliberations. The same rule applies to communication between jurors and trial counsel or jurors and the parties, although accidental or unintentional contact may be excused.
§ 1.11 Relief from Judgment
§ 1.11.1 Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) a party may file a “renewed” motion for judgment as a matter of law, previously known as a “motion for directed verdict,” asserting that the jury erred in returning a verdict based on insufficient evidence. However, in order to file a renewed motion, a party must have filed a Rule 50(a) pre-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law before the case was submitted to the jury. The renewed motion is limited to issues that were raised in a “sufficiently substantial way” in the pre-verdict motion and failure to comply with this process often results in waiver. The renewed motion must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment.
The standard for granting a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law mirrors the standard for granting the pre-suit motion under Rule 50(a). A party is entitled to judgment only if a reasonable jury lacked a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to return the verdict that it did. In rendering this analysis, a court may not weigh conflicting evidence and inferences or determine the credibility of the witnesses. Upon review, the court must:
“(1) consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, (2) assume that all conflicts in the evidence were resolved in favor of the prevailing party, (3) assume as proved all facts that the prevailing party’s evidence tended to prove, and (4) give the prevailing party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the facts proved. That done, the court must then deny the motion if reasonable persons could differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.”
The analysis reflects courts’ general reluctance to interfere with a jury verdict.
§ 1.11.2 Motion for New Trial
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 permits a party to file a motion for new trial, either together with or as an alternative to a 50(b) renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. Like a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, a motion for new trial must be filed no later than 28 days after an entry of judgment.
Rule 59 does not specify or limit the grounds on which a new trial may be granted. A party may move for a new trial on the basis that “the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or that, for other reasons, the trial was not fair . . . and may raise questions of law arising out of alleged substantial errors in admission or rejection of evidence.” Other recognized grounds for new trial include newly discovered evidence, errors involving jury instruction, and conduct of counsel. Courts often grant motions for new trial on the issue of damages alone.
Unlike when reviewing a motion for judgment as a matter of law, courts may independently evaluate and weigh the evidence. Additionally, the Court, on its own initiative with notice to the parties and an opportunity to be heard, may order a new trial on grounds not stated in a party’s motion.
When faced with a renewed judgment as a matter of law or a motion for new trial, courts have three options. They may (1) allow judgment on the verdict, if the jury returned a verdict; (2) order a new trial; or (3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law.
§ 1.11.3 Clerical Mistake, Oversights and Omissions
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) provides that “the court may correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other part of the record. The court may do so on motion or on its own, with or without notice.” This rule applies in very specific and limited circumstances, when the record makes apparent that the court intended one thing but by mere clerical mistake or oversight did another; such mistake must not be one of judgment or even of misidentification, but merely of recitation, of the sort that clerk or amanuensis might commit, mechanical in nature. It is important to note that this rule can be applied even after a judgment is affirmed on appeal.
§ 1.11.4 Other Grounds for Relief
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides for several additional means for relief from a final judgment:
- mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
- newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
- fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
- the judgment is void;
- the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
- any other reason that justifies relief.
Courts typically require that the evidence in support of the motion for relief from a final judgement be “highly convincing.”
§ 1.12 Virtual Hearings and Trials
In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and numerous government shut downs, hearings and trials in both criminal and civil matters have been proceeding electronically. It may be necessary, now and in the future, to submit an application for a trial to proceed remotely. Courts have almost universally found that the COVID-19 pandemic constitutes “good cause” to permit a remote trial. We also know that courts have been challenged but have ultimately found that trials by zoom are not an abuse of discretion, and as such, they may be around for some time to come, or maybe even permanently.
And while trials always present unique and challenging issues, virtual trials present a new set of challenges, especially jury trials. It brings about a whole new set of factors—what makes for a successful trial in person can be very different from a successful trial over a virtual platform. There are new considerations for jury selection, opening statement demonstratives, testimony by witnesses who are no longer in the same room as counsel, presentation of evidence when counsel can no longer bring binders or large boards, jury selection, and a myriad of other issues. What remains the same, however, is that preparation and practice are key. Being familiar with the local court’s practice and working out any technology issues in advance are critical to ensuring a successful virtual trial.To date, the Courts have not created consistent rules for remote trials; every judge has their preferred procedures and technology. Accordingly, it is important to review judge and court rules regarding remote proceedings. For example, many judges have rules that prohibit the coaching of witnesses through off-screen methods, dictate courtroom behavior and appearance, limit public access and recording, and provide guidance on presentation of documents including documents that are filed under seal, These rules not only dictate how the trial proceeds day-to-day, but may provide a basis for motions in limine and should be discussed with your judge in the pre-trial conference.
So the question remains will remote trials remain a part of practice or not? Some would agree with the 1996 Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43 “the importance of presenting live testimony in court cannot be forgotten” and that “the opportunity to judge the demeanor of a witness face-to-face is accorded great value in our tradition.”
 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.
 See Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 85 (3d Cir. 1965)
 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.
 Luce v. United States, 429 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984).
 United States v. Romano, 849 F.2d 812, 815 (3d Cir. 1988).
 Frintner v. TruPosition, 892 F. Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
 United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001).
 Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 565-66 (7th Cir. 1999).
 Id. at 566 (“Definitive rulings, however, do not invite reconsideration.”).
 Fusco v. General Motors Corp., 11 F.3d 259, 262-63 (1st Cir. 1993).
 Flythe v. District of Columbia, 4 F. Supp. 3d 222 (D.D.C. 2014).
 U.S. v. Denton, 547 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Tenn. 1982).
 Henwood v. People, 57 Colo 544, 143 P. 373 (1914). An opening statement presents counsel with the opportunity to summarily outline to the trier of fact what counsel expects the evidence presented at trial will show. Lovell v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 397 Ill. App. 3d 890, 931 N.E.2d 246 (4th Dist. 2010).
 Testa v. Mundelein, 89 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 1996) (“being argumentative in an opening statement does not necessarily warrant a mistrial, but being argumentative and introducing something that should not be allowed into evidence may be a predicate for a mistrial.”).
 Krengiel v. Lissner Copr., Inc., 250 Ill App. 3d 288, 621 N.E.2d 91 (1st Dist. 1993) (“party whose motion in limine has been denied must object when the challenged evidence is presented at trial in order to preserve the issue for review, and the failure to raise such an objection constitutes a waiver of the issue on appeal.”).
 Forrestal v. Magendantz, 848 F.2d 303, 308 (1st Cir. 1988) (suggesting to jury to put itself in shoes of plaintiff to determine damages improper because it encourages the jury to depart from neutrality and to decide the case on the basis of personal interest and bias rather than on the evidence.).
 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
 See Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 778 (3d Cir. 1965); McCoy v. Goldston, 652 F.2d 654, 657 (6th Cir. 1981).
 U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Kiernan, 347 F.2d at 778.
 Fleming v. Chicago Transit Auth., 397 F. App’x 249, 249-50 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Jury Selection & Serv. Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-74 (2006)).
 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727 (1961).
 Zia Shadows, L.L.C. v. City of Las Cruces, 829 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2016).
 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
 Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985).
 Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354, 1361 (9th Cir. 1988).
 Id. at 1362.
 Id. at 1361.
 People v. Jordan, 2019 IL App (1st Dist.) 161848.
 Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965) (finding that it is constitutionally permissible to require prosecutor and judge to consent to bench trial, even if the defendant elects one); United States v. Talik, No. CRIM.A. 5:06CR51, 2007 WL 4570704, at *6 (N.D.W. Va. Dec. 26, 2007).
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 38; Hopkins v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, 618 F. App’x 959, 962 (11th Cir. 2015).
 Hopkins, 618 F. App’x at 962.
 U.S. Const. amend. VII.
 Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583 (1978).
 See Lutz v. Glendale Union High Sch., 403 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e hold that there is no right to have a jury determine the appropriate amount of back pay under Title VII, and thus the ADA, even after the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Instead, back pay remains an equitable remedy to be awarded by the district court in its discretion.”); see also Bledsoe v. Emery Worldwide Airlines, 635 F.3d. 836, 840-41 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding “statutory remedies available to aggrieved employees under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) act provide equitable restitutionary relief for which there is no constitutional right to a jury trial.”).
 K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Tr. Co., 757 F.2d 752, 758 (6th Cir. 1985); Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832 (4th Cir. 1986); Telum, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1988).
 Zaklit v. Glob. Linguist Sols., LLC, 53 F. Supp. 3d 835, 854 (E.D. Va. 2014); see also Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977).
 United States v. Steele, 298 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The fundamental purpose of voir dire is to ‘ferret out prejudices in the venire’ and ‘to remove partial jurors.’”) (quoting United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 627-28 (9th Cir. 2000)); Bristol Steel & Iron Works v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 41 F.3d 182, 189 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating that the purpose of voir dire is to ensure a fair and impartial jury, not to operate as a discovery tool by opposing counsel).
 Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431 (1991).
 United States v. Piancone, 506 F.2d 748, 751 (3d Cir. 1974).
 United States v. Delgado, 668 F.3d 219, 228 (5th Cir. 2012).
 Finks v. Longford Equip. Int’l, 208 F.3d 225, at *2 (10th Cir. February 25, 2000).
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 47(a).
 Hicks v. Mickelson, 835 F.2d 721, 726 (8th Cir. 1987).
 U.S. v. Lewin, 467 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1972) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(a)).
 U.S. v. Lawes, 292 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 2002); Hicks v. Mickelson, 835 F.2d 721, 723-26 (8th Cir. 1987).
 Lawes, 292 F.3d at 128 (noting that “federal trial judges are not required to ask every question that counsel—even all counsel—believes is appropriate”).
 Finks v. Longford Equip. Int’l, 208 F.3d 225, at *2 (10th Cir. 2000).
 Mayes v. Kollman, 560 Fed. Appx. 389, 395 n.13 (5th Cir. 2014); Richardson v. New York City, 370 Fed. Appx. 227 (2d Cir. 2010); c.f. Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 779 (3d Cir. 1965) (finding that judge’s refusal to ask prospective jurors questions about connection to insurance companies constituted reversible error).
 See 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b).
 28 U.S.C. § 1866.
 United States v. Bishop, 264 F.3d 535, 554-55 (5th Cir. 2001).
 United States v. Price, 573 F.2d 356, 389 (5th Cir. 1978).
 Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1971); c.f. United States v. Turner, 389 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding that district court was within its discretion in failing to disqualify jurors who banked with a different branch of the bank that was robbed).
 United States v. Chapdelaine, 989 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1993).
 Leibstein v. LaFarge N. Am., Inc., 767 F. Supp. 2d 373 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), as amended (Feb. 15, 2011).
 Cravens v. Smith, 610 F.3d 1019, 1032 (8th Cir. 2010).
 See 28 U.S.C. § 1866 (stating that a juror may be “excluded upon peremptory challenge as provided by law”).
 Davis v. United States, 374 F.2d 1, 5 (1967) (“The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court’s control.”).
 28 U.S.C. § 1870; see also Fedorchick v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 577 F.2d 856 (3d Cir. 1978).
 Stephens v. Koch Foods, LLC, No. 2:07-CV-175, 2009 WL 10674890, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 20, 2009).
 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (race); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (gender); Rivera v. Nibco, Inc., 372 F. App’x 757, 760 (9th Cir. 2010) (national origin).
 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991).
 Robinson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 86 F. App’x 73, 75 (6th Cir. 2004).
 Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148 (2009); see also King v. Peco Foods, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-00088, 2017 WL 2424574 (N.D. Miss. Jun. 5, 2017).
 Kirk v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 61 F.3d 147, 157 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding, in asbestos litigation, that trial court’s refusal to remove two panelists for cause was error, and the party’s subsequent use of peremptory challenges to remedy the judge’s mistake required per se reversal and a new trial) (citations omitted).
 Linden v. CNH Am., LLC, 673 F.3d 829, 840 (8th Cir. 2012).
 Black’s Law Dictionary 460 (6th ed. 1990).
 Fed. R. Evid. 611(c).
 McClard v. United States, 386 F.2d 495, 501 (8th Cir. 1967).
 Rodriguez v. Banco Cent. Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1993).
 United States v. Rojas, 520 F.3d 876, 881 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing U.S. v. Butler, 56 F.3d 941, 943 (8th Cir. 1995)).
 United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 891 (6th Cir. 2016), reversed and remanded on other grounds, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 201 L. Ed. 2d 507 (2018).
 U.S. v. Hernandez-Albino, 177 F.3d 33, 42 (1st Cir. 1999).
 United States v. Grassrope, 342 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 2003) (permitting leading questions when examining a sexual assault victim).
 U.S. v. Mulinelli-Navas, 111 F.3d 983, 990 (1st Cir. 1997).
 See United States v. Lin, 101 F.3d 760, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
 United States v. Jacobs, 215 Fed. Appx. 239, 241 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Lewis, 10 F.3d 1086, 1089 (4th Cir. 1993)).
 Raysor v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 768 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1985).
 Elgabri v. Lekas, 964 F.2d 1255, 1260 (1st Cir. 1992).
 See Rosa-Rivera v. Dorado Health, Inc., 787 F.3d 614, 617 (1st Cir. 2015) (employees); United States v. Bryant, 461 F.2d 912, 918-19 (6th Cir. 1972) (informants); United States v. Hicks, 748 F.2d 854, 859 (4th Cir. 1984) (girlfriend).
 See U.S. v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 762 (5th Cir. 2008).
 Fed. R. Evid. 612 authorizes a party to refresh a witness’s memory with a writing so long as the “adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those portions which relate to the testimony of the witness.”
 Rush v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 399 F.3d 705, 715-22 (6th Cir. 2005).
 Rush v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 399 F.3d 705, 715-22 (6th Cir. 2005).
 Id. at 718-19.
 United States v. Logan, 121 F.3d 1172, 1175 (8th Cir. 1997).
 United States v. Lemon, 497 F.2d 854, 857 (10th Cir. 1974).
 See Fed. R. Evid. 607.
 Util. Control Corp. v. Prince William Const. Co., 558 F.2d 716, 720 (4th Cir. 1977).
 United States v. Gilbert, 57 F.3d 709, 711 (9th Cir. 1995).
 United States v. Finley, 708 F. Supp. 906 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
 United States v. Finis P. Ernest, Inc., 509 F.2d 1256, 1263 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Prince, 491 F.2d 655, 659 (5th Cir. 1974).
 See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974) (“Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.”).
 See Fed. R. Evid. 611(b) (effective December 1, 2011) (“(b) Scope of Cross-Examination. Cross-examination should not go beyond the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the witness’s credibility. The court may allow inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.”).
 See United States v. Perez-Solis, 709 F.3d 453, 463-64 (5th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Arias-Villanueva, 998 F.2d 1491, 1508 (9th Cir. 1993) (cross-examination is within the scope of direct where it is “reasonably related” to the issues put in dispute by direct examination), overruled on other grounds; United States v. Moore, 917 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1990) (subject matter of direct examination under Rule 611(b) includes all inferences and implications arising from the direct); United States v. Arnott, 704 F.2d 322, 324 (6th Cir. 1983) (“The ‘subject matter of the direct examination,’ within the meaning of Rule 611(b), has been liberally construed to include all inferences and implications arising from such testimony.”).
 Perez-Solis, 709 F.3d at 464.
 Id; see also MDU Resources Group v. W.R. Grace and Co., 14 F.3d 1274, 1282 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 824, 115 S. Ct. 89, 130 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1994) (“When cross-examination goes beyond the scope of direct, as it did here, and is designed, as here, to establish an affirmative defense (that the statute of limitations had run), the examiner must be required to ask questions of non-hostile witnesses as if on direct.).
 Under Fed. R. Evid. 608, if the witness concedes the bad act, impeachment is accomplished. If the witness denies the bad act, Rule 608(b) precludes the introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove the act. In short, the cross-examining lawyer must live with the witness’s denial.
 To qualify, “the crime must have been a felony, or a misdemeanor that has some logical nexus with the character trait of truthfulness, such as when the elements of the offense involve dishonesty or false statement. The conviction must have occurred within ten years of the date of the witness’s testimony at trial, or his or her release from serving the sentence imposed under the conviction, whichever is later, unless the court permits an older conviction to be used, because its probative value substantially outweighs any prejudice, and it should, in the interest of justice, be admitted to impeach the witness. If the prior conviction is used to impeach a witness other than an accused in a criminal case, its admission is subject to exclusion under Rule 403 if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, delay, confusion or the introduction of unnecessarily cumulative evidence. If offered to impeach an accused in a criminal case, the court still may exclude the evidence, if its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.” Behler v. Hanlon, 199 F.R.D. 553, 559 (D. Md. 2001).
 Fed. R. Evid. 608 (bad acts or character of untruthfulness); Fed. R. Evid. 609 (qualifying crime); Fed. R. Evid. 613 (prior inconsistent statement).
 Behler, 199 F.R.D. at 556.
 353 F.2d 324, 325-26 (1st Cir. 1965).
 927 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1991).
 250 F.3d 10, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2001).
 237 F.3d 8, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2001).
 248 Fed. Appx. 718, 726 (6th Cir. 2007).
 653 F.2d 915, 920-21 (5th Cir. 1981).
 United States v. James, 510 F.2d 546, 551 (5th Cir. 1975).
 United States v. Blackwood, 456 F.2d 526, 529-30 (2d Cir. 1972).
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2).
 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
 Fed. R. Evid. 901.
 U.S. v. Goichman, 547 F.2d 778, 784 (3d Cir. 1976) (“[T]here need be only a prima facie showing, to the court, of authenticity, not a full argument on admissibility . . . . [I]t is the jury who will ultimately determine the authenticity of the evidence, not the court.”).
 Fed. R. Evid. 803(6), 902(11); United States v. Senat, 698 F. App’x 701, 706 (3d. Cir. 2017).
 See, e.g., Stumpff v. Harris, 31 N.E.3d 164, 173 (Ohio App. 2 Dist. 2015) (“Numerous courts, both state and federal, have held that items produced in discovery are implicitly authenticated by the act of production by the opposing party); Churches of Christ in Christian Union v. Evangelical Ben. Trust, S.D. Ohio No. C2:07CV1186, 2009 WL 2146095, *5 (July 15, 2009) (“Where a document is produced in discovery, ‘there [is] sufficient circumstantial evidence to support its authenticity’ at trial.”).
 In re L.P., 749 S.E.2d 389, 392-392 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013).
 Rules of Evid., Rule 901(a). Idaho v. Koch, 334 P.3d 280 (Idaho 2014).
 State v. Smith, 2015-1359 La. App. 4 Cir. 4/20/16, 2016 WL 3353892, *10-11 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2016); see also OraLabs, Inc. v. Kind Group LLC, 2015 WL 4538444, *4, Fn 7 (D. Colo. 2015) (in a patent and trade dress infringement action, the court admitted, over hearsay objections, Twitter posts offered to show actual confusion between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s products.).
 Jones v. U.S., 813 A.2d 220, 226-227 (D.C. 2002).
 Dente v. Riddell, Inc., 664 F.2d 1, 2 n.1 (1st Cir. 1981).
 Mills v. Texas Compensation Ins. Co., 220 F.2d 942, 946 (5th Cir. 1955).
 U.S. v. Gomez-Alvarez, 781 F.3d 787, 792 (5th Cir. 2015).
 Jerden v. Amstutz, 430 F.3d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 2005).
 See, e.g., Hastings v. Bonner, 578 F.2d 136, 142-143 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1312 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Jamerson, 549 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1977).
 See United States v. Henderson, 409 F.3d 1293, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005).
 Inselman v. S & J Operating Co., 44 F.3d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1995).
 See United States v. Adams, 271 F.3d 1236, 1241 (10th Cir. 2001) (“In order to qualify as an adequate offer of proof, the proponent must, first, describe the evidence and what it tends to show and, second, identify the grounds for admitting the evidence.”).
 Murphy v. City of Flagler Beach, 761 F.2d 622 (11th Cir. 1985).
 See id. at 1241-42 (“On numerous occasions we have held that merely telling the court the content of . . . proposed testimony is not an offer of proof.”).
 Fed. R. Evid. 103(c) (The trial court “may direct an offer of proof be made in question-and-answer form.”). See, e.g., United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 168 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (stating that “hearings were held for approximately six weeks” on whether DNA evidence was admissible).
 Adams, 271 F.2d at 1242.
 Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 116 (1943).
 Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(2); Beech Aircraft v. Rainy, 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
 Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692 (1931).
 United States v. Harris, 536 F.3d 798, 812 (7th Cir. Ill. Aug. 6, 2008), overruled on other grounds.
 See, e.g., United States v. St. Michael’s Credit Union, 880 F.2d 579 (1st Cir. 1989); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (Apr. 28, 1965).
 Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 3.4(e).
 Jones v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 188 F.3d 709, 731 (7th Cir. 1999) (“We find nothing improper in this line of argument. Closing arguments are the time in the trial process when counsel is given the opportunity to discuss more freely the weaknesses in his opponent’s case.”).
 Vineyard v. County of Murray, Ga., 990 F.2d 1207, 1214 (11th Cir. 1993).
 See, Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1) (“If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may: (A) resolve the issue against the party; and (B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.”).
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2).
 Arch Ins. Co. v. Broan-NuTone, LLC, 509 F. App’x 453, fn. 5 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ford v. Cnty. of Grand Traverse, 535 F.3d 483, 492 (6th Cir. 2008).
 U. S. Indus., Inc. v. Semco Mfg., Inc., 562 F.2d 1061, 1065 (8th Cir. 1977).
 Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 135, 139 (6th Cir. 1995).
 Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 405 (2006).
 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000); citing Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 554-555, 110 S.Ct. 1331, 108 L.Ed.2d 504 (1990); Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, at 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 696, n.6, 82 S.Ct. 1404, 8 L.Ed.2d 777 (1962).
 Daly v. Moore, 491 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1974) (explaining that a court should refuse instructions not applicable to the facts).
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(b)(3).
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(b) (1)-(2); see also Vialpando v. Cooper Cameron Corp., 92 F. App’x 612 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “a district court can no longer give mid-trial instructions without first advising the parties of its intent to do so and giving the parties an opportunity to object to the proposed instruction.”).
 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2017 WL 3232424 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2017); see also Daly, 491 F.2d.104 (affirming court’s omission of instructions on the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment since no facts supported a violation).
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 51.
 Estate of Keatinge v. Biddle, 316 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2002).
 Positive Black Talk Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 65 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1366 (5th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds.
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c)(2); Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d); see also Abbott v. Babin, No. CV 15-00505-BAJ-EWD, 2017 WL 3138318, at *3 (M.D. La. May 26, 2017) (explaining that upon an untimely objection courts may only consider a plain error in the jury instructions).
 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. Rule 51; Foley v. Commonwealth Elec. Co., 312 F.3d 517, 90 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 895 (1st Cir. 2002).
 Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294 (9th Cir. 1996).
 Benaugh v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 104-CV-306, 2007 WL 1795305 (S.D. Ohio June 19, 2007), aff’d, 278 F. App’x 501 (6th Cir. 2008).
 Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294 (9th Cir. 1996) (reversing judgment since the instructions could allow a jury to find the defendant liable based on premise unsupported by law).
 United States v. Grube, No. CRIM C2-98-28-01, 1999 WL 33283321 (D.N.D. Jan. 16, 1999) (denying motion for new trial since the omitted instructions were superfluous and potentially misleading); see also Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 94 S. Ct. 396, 397, 38 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1973); Lannon v. Hogan, 555 F. Supp. 999 (D. Mass.), aff’d, 719 F.2d 518 (1st Cir. 1983) (generally cannot seek such relief based on a claim of improper jury instructions, unless the error “so infect[ed] the entire trial that the resulting conviction violated the requirements of Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
 Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc. v. Fendi USA, Inc., 314 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2002) (failure to make specific objections to jury instructions before jury retires to deliberate results in waiver, and Court of Appeals may review the instruction for fundamental error only.).
 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 737 (1993).
 Cleary v. Indiana Beach, Inc., 275 F.2d 543, 545-46 (7th Cir. 1960); Sullivan v. United States, 414 F.2d 714, 715-16 (9th Cir. 1969).
 Cleary, 275 F.2d at 546; Magnuson v. Fairmont Foods Co., 442 F.2d 95, 98-99 (7th Cir. 1971).
 See United States v. Williams, 635 F.2d 744, 745-46 (8th Cir. 1980) (“It is essential to a fair trial, civil or criminal, that a jury be cautioned as to permissible conduct in conversations outside the jury room. Such an admonition is particularly needed before a jury separates at night when they will converse with friends and relatives or perhaps encounter newspaper or television coverage of the trial.”); United States v. Hart, 729 F.2d 662, 667 n.10 (10th Cir. 1984) (“[A]n admonition . . . should be given at some point before jurors disperse for recesses or for the day, with reminders about the admonition sufficient to keep the jurors alert to proper conduct on their part.”).
 United States v. Dempsey, 830 F.2d 1084, 1089-90 (10th Cir. 1987).
 United States v. Gross, 451 F.2d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir. 1971).
 United States v. Williams, 87 F.3d 249, 255 (8th Cir. 1996).
 Taylors v. Reo Motors, Inc., 275 F.2d 699, 705-06 (10th Cir. 1960).
 United States v. DeCoito, 764 F.2d 690, 695 (9th Cir. 1985).
 United States. v. Welch, 945 F.2d 1378, 1383 (7th Cir. 1991).
 Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416, 431 (5th Cir. 1985).
 United States v. Chadwell, 798 F.3d 910, 914-15 (9th Cir. 2015).
 United States v. Aragon, 983 F.2d 1306, 1309 (4th Cir. 1993).
 Johnson v. Richardson, 701 F.2d 753, 757 (8th Cir. 1983).
 United States v. de la Cruz-Paulino, 61 F.3d 986, 997 (1st Cir. 1995).
 United States v. Gonzales, 121 F.3d 928, 945 (5th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds.
 United States v. Anthony, 565 F.2d 533, 536 (8th Cir. 1977); Unites States v. Johnson, 584 F.2d 148, 157-58 (6th Cir. 1978).
 McGowan v. Gillenwater, 429 F.2d 586, 587 (4th Cir. 1970).
 United States v. Weisner, 789 F.2d 1264, 1268 (7th Cir. 1986).
 Fed. R. Civ. P. § 51(b)(3).
 United States. v. Venerable, 807 F.2d 745, 747 (8th Cir. 1986).
 United States v. Gray, 199 F.3d 547, 550 (1st Cir. 1999).
 United States v. Scott, 642 F.2d 791, 797 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Bassler, 651 F.2d 600, 602 n.3 (8th Cir. 1981).
 See, e.g., United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1537 (8th Cir. 1995) (court permitted note-taking while examining exhibits only); United States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1985) (court permitted note-taking only during opening statements, closing statements, and jury charge).
 United States v. Scott, 642 F.3d 791, 797 (9th Cir. 2011).
 See United States v. Rhodes, 631 F.2d 43, 45-46 (5th Cir. 1980) (“The court should also explain that the notes taken by each juror are to be used only as a convenience in refreshing that juror’s memory and that each juror should rely on his or her independent recollection of the evidence rather than be influenced by another juror’s notes.”).
 United States v. Richardson, 233 F.3d 1285, 1288-1289 (11th Cir. 2000).
 United States v. Rawlings, 522 F.3d 403, 408 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United States v. Bush, 47 F.3d 511, 514-516 (2nd Cir. 1995); DeBenedetto by DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 516 (4th Cir. 1985).
 Perhaps the most important protection is a screening mechanism where questions are submitted to a judge and reviewed by counsel prior to the question being posed. Rawlings, 522 F.3d at 408; United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d 457, 463 (6th Cir. 2000).
 Collins, 226 F.3d at 464.
 Charlotte Cty. Develop. Co. v. Lieber, 415 F.2d 447, 448 (5th Cir. 1969).
 United States v. Balsam, 203 F.3d 72, 86 (1st Cir. 2000).
 Budoff v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 1523, 1527 (6th Cir. 1984).
 United States v. Barfield Co., 359 F.2d 120, 123-24 (5th Cir. 1966).
 Dennis v. General Elec. Corp., 762 F.2d 365, 367 (4th Cir. 1985).
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2617 n.5, 171 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2008).
 CFE Racing Prod., Inc. v. BMF Wheels, Inc., 793 F.3d 571, 583 (6th Cir. 2015).
 Id. (explaining that the waiver rule serves to protect litigants’ right to trial by jury, discourage courts from reweighing evidence simply because they feel the jury could have reached another result, and prevent tactical victories at the expense of substantive interest as the pre-verdict motion enables the defending party to cure defects in proof) (quoting Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 9 F.3d 422, 426 (6th Cir. 1993)).
 Bowen v. Roberson, 688 F. App’x 168, 169 (3d Cir. 2017).
 McGinnis v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 817 F.3d 1241, 1254 (11th Cir. 2016).
 Bavlsik v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 870 F.3d 800, 805 (8th Cir. 2017).
 McGinnis, 817 F.3d at 1254.
 See, e.g., Stragapede v. City of Evanston, Illinois, 865 F.3d 861, 866 (7th Cir. 2017), as amended (Aug. 8, 2017) (upholding jury verdict in favor of plaintiff for ADA violation when challenged in renewed 50(b) motion on grounds that the jury properly discounted employer’s evidence).
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 59.
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b).
 Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that federal courts are guided by the common law’s established grounds for permitting new trials).
 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251, 61 S.Ct. 189, 85 L.Ed. 147 (1940).
 Kleinschmidt v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 253, 257 (D. Mass. 1956) (explaining that a party seeking new trial on ground of newly discovered evidence has substantial burden to explain why the evidence could not have been found by due diligence before trial).
 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 588 F.3d 614, 617 (8th Cir. 2009) (granting new trial in age discrimination case where jury instruction improperly shifted the burden of persuasion on a central issue).
 Warner v. Rossignol, 538 F.2d 910, 911 (1st Cir. 1976) (counsel’s conduct in going beyond the pleadings and evidence to speculate and exaggerate the plaintiff’s injuries, despite repeated warnings from the trial judge, warranted new trial).
 See, e.g., Bavlsik v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 4:13 CV 509 DDN, 2015 WL 4920300, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 18, 2015) (granting new trial on issue of damages and rejecting defendants’ argument that the record demonstrated a compromised verdict).
 McGinnis, 817 F.3d at 1254.
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(d).
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
 In re Transtexas Gas Corp., (5th Cir 2002), 303 F.3d 571.
 U.S. v. Mansion House Center North Redevelopment Co., (8th Cir. 1988), 855 F.2d 524,, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 557, 488 U.S. 993, 102 L.Ed.2d 583 (district court had jurisdiction to modify judgment, even after it was affirmed on appeal, in order to clarify its intentions and conform judgment to parties’ pretrial stipulation).
 See United States v. Cirami, 563 F.2d 26, 33 (2d Cir. 1977).
 Flores v. Town of Islip, No. 18-CV-3549 (GRB)(ST), 2020 WL 5211052, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2020) (the court granted a motion to proceed with a virtual trial but required counsel and the court staff to have a pre-trial conference to discuss the logistics of a virtual trial).
 In re Alle, No. 2:13-BK-38801-SK, 2021 WL 3032712 (C.D. Cal. July 19, 2021).
 See, e.g., New Jersey Federal Bankruptcy Court Zoom Trial Guidelines.
 For example, see the State of Washington’s Best Practices for Remote Jury Trials, https://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/content/Best%20Practices%20in%20Response%20to%20FAQ.PDF