The Barton Doctrine: Is It Applicable After Closing of a Bankruptcy Case?

The Barton doctrine, first articulated by the Supreme Court in 1881, requires a party to obtain leave from the appointing court (frequently a bankruptcy court) before suing a court-appointed officer in another court for actions taken in their official capacity.^[1] The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent the suing party from obtaining an advantage over the other claimants while the court-appointed officer is in control of the estate.^[2]

Under the doctrine, failure to seek permission from the appointing court deprives the second court of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, any proceeding commenced without leave must be dismissed; otherwise, it would constitute a “usurpation of the powers and duties” reserved to the appointing court.^[3] The Barton doctrine does not prevent suits against court‑appointed officers but rather requires that permission be granted by the appointing court before a suit can proceed elsewhere.

Though originally applied to receivers, nearly all federal circuits—except the D.C. Circuit—have held that the Barton doctrine applies in bankruptcy proceedings.^[4] While a bankruptcy case is ongoing, a suit filed against a bankruptcy trustee or similar officer in another court without prior permission must be dismissed, although the same suit can be brought directly in the bankruptcy court itself.^[5] There is a circuit split, however, over whether the Barton doctrine applies after a bankruptcy case has closed.

I. Barton v. Barbour

In Barton v. Barbour, the plaintiff, Ms. Barton, was a passenger who was injured in a railway accident. Barbour had previously been appointed as receiver for the railroad company and was operating the railroad for the benefit of creditors at the time of the accident.^[6] Ms. Barton sued Mr. Barbour in the District of Columbia, seeking $5,000 for her injuries. He responded that he could not be sued there because the plaintiff had not obtained leave from the Virginia state court that had appointed him to serve as the receiver. The District of Columbia court agreed and dismissed the case. The plaintiff appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which affirmed, creating what is now known as the Barton doctrine.

The Supreme Court stated that “[i]t is a general rule that before suit is brought against a receiver[,] leave of the court by which he was appointed must be obtained.”^[7] The Court stated that any suit against a receiver necessarily involves an attempt to obtain receivership property. In fact, the Court suggested that the main reason a person would sue a receiver is to obtain a position ahead of other creditors. The Court also reasoned that, to enforce the judgment, the plaintiff would need to levy against property already in the hands of another court—the one that had appointed the receiver. The Court stated that it could not allow this outcome, as it would undermine the power of the appointing court. The Court concluded that the court administering the receivership should act as a gatekeeper, determining whether a claim has enough merit to proceed, whether in front of it or in another venue. This prevents estate assets from being “wasted in the costs of unnecessary litigation.”^[8]

The Court did note an exception to its rule, though: “[I]f one claims that the assignee has wrongfully taken possession of his property as property of the bankrupt, he is entitled to sue him in his private capacity as a wrong-doer in an action at law for its recovery.”^[9] Comparing the receiver to “an assignee in bankruptcy,” the Court observed that if “by mistake or wrongfully, the receiver takes possession of property belonging to another, such person may bring suit therefor against him personally as a matter of right; for in such case the receiver would be acting ultra vires.”^[10] But when the receiver is acting within the scope of his or her authority, then the matter must be handled with the blessing of the appointing court.

II. 28 U.S.C § 959

Congress enacted legislation in the wake of Barton to address the concern that operating trustees and receivers were improperly being shielded from legitimate actions while running a business. This legislation has been amended many times but is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 959. That section provides:

(a) Trustees, receivers or managers of any property, including debtors in possession, may be sued, without leave of the court appointing them, with respect to any of their acts or transactions in carrying on business connected with such property. Such actions shall be subject to the general equity power of such court so far as the same may be necessary to the ends of justice, but this shall not deprive a litigant of his right to trial by jury.

(b) Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States, including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be bound to do if in possession thereof.

In addition to requiring that trustees, receivers, and debtors in possession comply with nonbankruptcy law, the statute prohibits a court from using its equity jurisdiction to deprive a person of a right to a jury trial.

III. The Barton Doctrine Protects Court-Appointed Fiduciaries in Bankruptcy

As noted, substantially all circuit courts of appeal have held that the Barton doctrine applies in bankruptcy. The Barton doctrine protects not just trustees but all officers appointed by the bankruptcy court when they act in their official capacity.^[11] This includes receivers, attorneys for trustees, and officers acting under the trustee/receiver’s direction or serving in a functionally equivalent role.^[12] The Barton doctrine has in recent years been expanded to cover trustees appointed pursuant to a plan of reorganization and other court-appointed roles.^[13]

The American Bankruptcy Institute Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 in 2014 proposed an amendment to the Bankruptcy Code that expressly adopts and expands the Barton doctrine. The proposed amendment would expand the scope of the Barton doctrine to the following persons in Chapter 11 reorganization cases: Chapter 11 trustees, estate neutrals/examiners, and statutory committees and their members, as well as professionals retained by each of the foregoing. According to the Commission’s Final Report, the proposed expansion reflects the Commissioners’ beliefs that it “would (i) allow any trustee, estate neutral, and statutory committee and its members to perform their fiduciary duties with confidence and focus, and (ii) eliminate unnecessary litigation concerning the application of the Barton doctrine and whether the court in which a litigant files the action has subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.”^[14]

IV. A Circuit Split Exists Regarding Whether the Barton Doctrine Remains Applicable Once a Bankruptcy Case Is Closed

The question of whether the Barton doctrine continues to apply after a bankruptcy case has closed has resulted in a 5–1 circuit split. Circuits holding that the Barton doctrine continues to apply after a case has closed reason that it is necessary to protect court-appointed officers. The bankruptcy court that approves a professional’s employment can hold them accountable, but the professional can be confident that if the bankruptcy court blesses what they have done, they do not have to worry about nettlesome litigation elsewhere. In this way, application of the Barton doctrine increases the likelihood that parties will be interested and willing to serve as estate fiduciaries. As one court noted, “the court that appointed the trustee has a strong interest in protecting him from unjustified personal liability for acts taken within the scope of his official duties.”^[15]

Despite the policy merits of such an approach, the Eleventh Circuit has held that extension of the doctrine after a case is closed is unwarranted because bankruptcy courts lack in rem jurisdiction once a case is closed. Separately, the Eleventh Circuit has suggested that judicial immunity provides fairly strong protection for court-appointed officers.

A. Circuits That Support the Barton Doctrine’s Extension

Seventh Circuit: In In re Linton,^[16] the Seventh Circuit held that the Barton doctrine continues to apply after a bankruptcy case is closed. In that case, a Chapter 7 trustee commenced a fraudulent transfer action against the debtor, her husband, and their sons. The trustee later dismissed the action, and the bankruptcy proceeding was closed. Eleven months later, the debtor and her husband sought leave from the bankruptcy court to file a malicious prosecution suit against the trustee in state court, arguing that the adversary proceeding was meritless. They had already filed the suit without waiting for the court’s permission, and it remained dormant pending the court’s decision. The bankruptcy court denied their motion, and the district court affirmed this decision.

The Seventh Circuit held that the Barton doctrine continued to apply notwithstanding the fact that the bankruptcy case had closed. Acknowledging that Barton was a bankruptcy case, not a receivership case, the Seventh Circuit stated:

Just like an equity receiver, a trustee in bankruptcy is working in effect for the court that appointed or approved him, administering property that has come under the court’s control by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code. If he is burdened with having to defend against suits by litigants disappointed by his actions on the court’s behalf, his work for the court will be impeded.^[17]

The court stated that the trustee’s burden of defending against suits by litigants is most concerning while the bankruptcy proceeding is ongoing. “The threat of his being distracted or intimidated is then very great.”^[18]

Nevertheless, the court stated, the doctrine should be continued after the bankruptcy “had been wound up.”^[19] Without the doctrine, “trusteeship will become a more irksome duty,” and it will be more difficult for courts to appoint competent trustees.^[20] The court continued that the expense of bankruptcy administration—already a source of considerable concern—will become even more expensive because trustees will need to pay higher malpractice premiums.^[21] Moreover, the court reasoned, “requiring that leave to sue be sought enables bankruptcy judges to monitor the work of the trustees more effectively. It does this by compelling suits growing out of that work to be as it were prefiled before the bankruptcy judge that made the appointment; this helps the judge decide whether to approve this trustee in a subsequent case.”^[22]

Finally, the court expressed concern for the integrity of bankruptcy jurisdiction absent extension of the doctrine:

If debtors, creditors, defendants in adversary proceedings, and other parties to a bankruptcy proceeding could sue the trustee in state court for damages arising out of the conduct of the proceeding, that court would have the practical power to turn bankruptcy losers into bankruptcy winners, and vice versa. A creditor who had gotten nothing in the bankruptcy proceeding might sue the trustee for negligence in failing to maximize the assets available to creditors, or to the particular creditor. A debtor who had failed to obtain a discharge might through a suit against the trustee obtain the funds necessary to pay the debt that had not been discharged.^[23]

First Circuit: Similarly, in Muratore v. Darr,^[24] the owner of a corporate debtor sued the Chapter 11 trustee in the district court, asserting claims for alleged misfeasance or malfeasance, abuse of process, negligence and violations of RICO while administering the bankruptcy estate. Specifically, the owner claimed that the trustee had failed to pay taxes, improperly sold properties, and allowed the purchase of property with illegal funds, among other allegations. The district court granted the trustee’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the Barton doctrine because such suit was brought without the prior permission of the bankruptcy court. The owner appealed.

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, concluding that the Barton doctrine did apply and that the owner’s claims did not fall under the exception provided by 28 U.S.C. § 959(a), which allows trustees to be sued without leave for acts in carrying on business connected with the estate. The court found that the owner’s allegations pertained to the trustee’s administrative duties as a trustee rather than acts in furtherance of the debtor’s business. The court held that merely taking actions to preserve the estate—holding, collecting, liquidating or maintaining property—did not constitute “carrying on business.”^[25] Rather, the statute is intended to permit redress for torts committed while operating a business.

The court specifically rejected the owner’s argument that the Barton doctrine should not apply because the bankruptcy case was closed, noting that the doctrine serves purposes beyond protecting estate assets, such as ensuring competent trustees and effective monitoring by bankruptcy judges.^[26]

Ninth Circuit: In In re Crown Vantage, Inc.,^[27] the Ninth Circuit held that the Barton doctrine applied notwithstanding the fact that a plan had been confirmed and therefore a bankruptcy estate no longer existed. The court required plaintiffs pursuing claims against a post-confirmation liquidating trustee to obtain leave from the bankruptcy court before filing suit in Delaware.

The court observed that if leave of the bankruptcy court were not first obtained, then the other forum lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the suit. The court noted that “[t]he Barton doctrine applies in bankruptcy, because ‘[t]he trustee in bankruptcy is a statutory successor to the equity receiver,’ and ‘[j]ust like the equity receiver, a trustee in bankruptcy is working in effect for the court that appointed or approved him, administering property that has come under the court’s control by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code.’”^[28]

The court explained:

Indeed, the policies underlying the Barton doctrine apply with greater force to bankruptcy proceedings than to other proceedings involving receivers. The filing of a bankruptcy petition creates a bankruptcy estate, consisting of all of the debtor’s legal or equitable interests in property “wherever located and by whomever held.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). Thus, “[t]he district court in which the bankruptcy case is commenced obtains exclusive in rem jurisdiction over all of the property in the estate.” The court’s exercise of in rem bankruptcy jurisdiction “essentially creates a fiction that the property—regardless of actual location—is legally located within the jurisdictional boundaries of the district in which the court sits.” Thus, the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court exceeds that of any other court-appointed receiver. The requirement of uniform application of bankruptcy law dictates that all legal proceedings that affect the administration of the bankruptcy estate be brought either in bankruptcy court or with leave of the bankruptcy court.^[29]

The First Circuit held that the bankruptcy court’s in rem jurisdiction continues post-confirmation.^[30] The court agreed “with the analysis of [its] sister circuits that ‘the doctrine serves additional purposes even after the bankruptcy case has been closed and the assets are no longer in the trustee’s hands.’”^[31] If there were any objections to anything regarding the estate, the court stated, the objections should have been registered before confirmation. If a party fails to timely object, the party cannot later complain about a specific provision, even if the provision is inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code. To raise identical issues in a second court “is an impermissible collateral attack.”^[32]

Tenth Circuit: In Satterfield v. Malloy,^[33] the debtor brought an action against the Chapter 7 trustee of his bankruptcy estate based on the trustee’s allegedly wrongful actions in his capacity as trustee. The debtor argued that the trustee’s actions were ultra vires, meaning beyond his legal power or authority, and thus not protected by the Barton doctrine. The debtor also contended that his action was authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 959, which allows trustees to be sued without leave of the appointing court for acts or transactions in carrying on business connected with the estate. Finally, the debtor argued that the Barton doctrine was inapplicable because his bankruptcy proceedings had concluded.

The court rejected all of these arguments. Regarding the debtor’s last argument related to applicability of the Barton doctrine after the case was closed, the Tenth Circuit stated: “Consistent with the holdings of other circuits, we reject this proposition. . . . [T]he Barton doctrine continues to serve important purposes even after a bankruptcy is complete.”^[34] The court continued:

The Barton doctrine exists to ensure other courts do not intervene in the bankruptcy court’s administration of an estate without permission. A holding that [the trustee] acted ultra vires simply because he allegedly discharged his duties as trustee with improper motives would severely undermine this important judicial goal. We conclude that [the trustee’s] actions fell within the scope of his court-appointed authority as trustee because each of the alleged actions was related to his trusteeship duties. Accordingly, [the debtor] was required to obtain leave of the bankruptcy court before filing suit in the district court.^[35]

Fifth Circuit: In In re Foster,^[36] the Chapter 7 debtor listed three properties as assets in her bankruptcy case, but her husband claimed these properties were his separate property. The trustee initiated a case against the debtor’s husband to determine if the properties were part of the bankruptcy estate and intervened in the divorce proceedings to protect the estate’s interest. Ultimately, the bankruptcy court determined that the properties were part of the bankruptcy estate and authorized their sale by the trustee. Thereafter, the bankruptcy case was closed.

Almost ten months later, the debtor filed a motion to reopen the bankruptcy case to sue the trustee and vacate the judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which was denied. She then filed a complaint in Texas state court against the trustee, the trustee’s lawyers, and others asserting that they acted in an ultra vires manner, without obtaining permission from the bankruptcy court. The trustee moved to reopen the bankruptcy case to remove the action, dismiss the complaint, and impose sanctions. The bankruptcy court granted that motion and ultimately dismissed the complaint. The debtor appealed the bankruptcy court’s decisions, but the district court affirmed.

The Fifth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court properly applied the Barton doctrine. Acknowledging that the Barton doctrine does not apply to acts outside the scope of the trustee’s official duties, the court noted that such exception is applied narrowly and only “to the actual wrongful seizure of property by a trustee.”^[37] The court found that such exception was inapplicable because all the alleged acts by the defendants occurred in their official capacity. The court affirmed dismissal of the complaint pursuant to the Barton doctrine notwithstanding the fact that the bankruptcy case had been closed when the complaint was filed. But, in doing so, it did not discuss the impact of closure of the case.

B. The Eleventh Circuit Does Not Support the Barton Doctrine’s Extension

Eleventh Circuit: In Tufts v. Hay,^[38] Mr. Hay and his law firm represented a debtor in a Chapter 11 case in North Carolina. Mr. Tufts and his firm were representing the debtor in various cases in Florida when the bankruptcy case began. Hay told Tufts that there was a court order approving Tufts’s continued representation of the debtor. Relying on those representations, Tufts did extensive legal work for the debtor. There was no court authorization for Tufts to do this work, however. Because the work was done without authorization, the bankruptcy court ordered Tufts to disgorge the funds collected and held him in contempt when he failed to do so. The underlying bankruptcy case itself was ultimately dismissed by consent order. After dismissal, Tufts sued Hay in district court without first seeking leave from the bankruptcy court. The district court dismissed the suit based on the Barton doctrine. Tufts appealed.

The Eleventh Circuit held that the Barton doctrine does not extend beyond a bankruptcy case’s closure because bankruptcy courts have in rem jurisdiction over the estate. Once the assets of the estate were distributed, nothing that happened later would have any effect on the assets of the estate. Thus, there was no longer subject matter jurisdiction. The court stated:

[U]nder the “conceivable effects” test for section 1334(b), the Bankruptcy Court did not have jurisdiction to consider Tufts’s action, and Tufts counsel were not required to obtain leave from that court before filing this action in the District Court. The Barton doctrine did not therefore deprive the District Court of subject matter jurisdiction over this case. We expressly note that our holding here creates no categorical rule that the Barton doctrine can never apply once a bankruptcy case ends. We address this case only, and here these parties agreed this action could have no conceivable effect on the bankruptcy estate. On this record, the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction, and the Barton doctrine does not apply.^[39]

The Eleventh Circuit revisited and clarified its view on this issue in Chua v. Ekonomou.^[40] Chua ran a solo medical practice in Georgia. In 2005, a premed student moved into Chua’s home with him. Chua began prescribing medications to treat symptoms the student was displaying until, one day, Chua came home to find the student dead from an apparent drug overdose. Chua asserted that a conspiracy arose to “pin the blame” for the student’s death on him. The alleged conspiracy included a judge, a receiver appointed in a forfeiture action against him, the receiver’s attorney, and others. A jury found Chua guilty of felony murder and other offenses. Years later, Chua was released from prison, and he sued various defendants in district court, including the receiver, the receiver’s attorney, and the attorney’s law firm. The district court dismissed the claims against the receiver and related defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Barton doctrine because Chua had not sought leave from the court that had appointed the receiver.

On appeal, the court reiterated its holding in Tufts v. Hay that “the Barton doctrine has no application when jurisdiction over a matter no longer exists in the bankruptcy court.”^[41] The court explained that the policy arguments of the Seventh Circuit might be legitimate, but those concerns overlook subject matter jurisdiction. In any event, the Eleventh Circuit stated, there was no need to base the Barton doctrine on policy grounds “because court-appointed receivers enjoy judicial immunity for acts taken within the scope of their authority.”^[42] The court concluded that “[r]eceivers do not need the Barton doctrine to provide an additional layer of protection for the performance of their duties” once the jurisdiction of the court that appointed the receiver comes to an end.^[43] That immunity applies even if a trustee’s acts were malicious or in error. Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of claims against the receiver and related defendants based on the Barton doctrine and remanded with instructions to dismiss the claims against these defendants based on judicial immunity.

Conclusion

The Barton doctrine plays an important role in protecting court-appointed bankruptcy fiduciaries during the case. In that context, the doctrine has near-universal approval. While most circuits extend the doctrine past a bankruptcy case’s closure for policy reasons, the Eleventh Circuit’s jurisdictional analysis presents a strong argument that the doctrine should not be extended once the bankruptcy court no longer retains authority over a bankruptcy estate.

1. Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 136–37 (1881). ↑

2. Id. at 128. ↑

3. Id. at 136. ↑

4. See, e.g., Alexander v. Hedback, 718 F.3d 762, 767 (8th Cir. 2013); Satterfield v. Malloy, 700 F.3d 1231, 1234–35 (10th Cir. 2012); McDaniel v. Blust, 668 F.3d 153, 156–57 (4th Cir. 2012); In re VistaCare Group, LLC, 678 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2012); Lawrence v. Goldberg, 573 F.3d 1265, 1269 (11th Cir. 2009); Beck v. Fort James Corp. (In re Crown Vantage, Inc.), 421 F.3d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 2005); Muratore v. Darr, 375 F.3d 140, 147 (1st Cir. 2004); In re Linton, 136 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 1998); Lebovits v. Scheffel (In re Lehal Realty Assocs.), 101 F.3d 272, 276 (2d Cir. 1996); Allard v. Weitzman (In re DeLorean Motor Co.), 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993); Anderson v. United States, 520 F.2d 1027, 1029 (5th Cir. 1975). ↑

5. For an excellent discussion of the Barton doctrine and the cases interpreting it, see Ronald A. Spinner, Breaking Down the Gate—Changes to the Barton “Gate Keeper” Role in the Eleventh Circuit, Norton Bankr. L. Adviser, May 2022. ↑

6. Barton, 104 U.S. at 136–37. ↑

7. Id. at 128. ↑

8. Id. at 130. ↑

9. Id. at 134. ↑

10. Id. ↑

11. In re Yellowstone Mt. Club, 841 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2016). ↑

12. In re Nathurst, 207 B.R. 755, 758 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997). ↑

13. In re Swan Transportation Co., 596 B.R. 127 (Bankr. D. Del. 2018) (Barton doctrine applied to actions against future claims trustee and is intended to protect liquidating trustees and other court appointees); Lankford v. Wagner, 853 F.3d 1119, 1122 (10th Cir. 2017) (extending Barton doctrine to trustee’s counsel where counsel acts under the direction of, or as the functional equivalent of, the trustee); In re MF Global Holdings Ltd., 562 B.R. 866, 869 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017) (enjoining action commenced by insurers against foreign provisional liquidator in Chapter 15 proceeding); In re Yellowstone Mt. Club, 841 F.3d at 1094 (applying doctrine to members of creditors’ committee); In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 557 B.R. 443, 449 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2016) (Barton doctrine applied to enjoin compliance with subpoena by liquidating trustee); In re East Coast Foods, Inc., 652 B.R. 910, 921 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2023) (Barton doctrine extended to post-confirmation Chapter 11 trustee); In re PH Dip, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-02843, 2023 WL 158879, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2023) (chief restructuring officer is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity when he is acting within the scope of his authority). ↑

14. Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, American Bankruptcy Institute, Final Report of the ABI Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, § IV(A)(5), at 44 (2014) (citation omitted). ↑

15. Lebovits v. Scheffel (In re Lehal Realty Assocs.), 101 F.3d 272, 276 (2d Cir. 1996). ↑

16. In re Linton, 136 F.3d 544, 546 (7th Cir. 1998). ↑

17. Id. at 545. ↑

18. Id. ↑

19. Id. ↑

20. Id. ↑

21. Id. ↑

22. Id. ↑

23. Id. at 546. ↑

24. Muratore v. Darr, 375 F.3d 140, 143 (1st Cir. 2004). ↑

25. Id. at 144–45. ↑

26. Id. at 147. ↑

27. Beck v. Fort James Corp. (In re Crown Vantage, Inc.), 421 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 2005). ↑

28. Id. at 971 (quoting In re Linton, 136 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 1998)). ↑

29. Id. (quoting Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp., Ltd. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 1998)) (citations omitted). ↑

30. Id. at 972. ↑

31. Id. (quoting Muratore v. Darr, 375 F.3d 140, 147 (1st Cir. 2004)). ↑

32. Id. at 973. ↑

33. Satterfield v. Malloy, 700 F.3d 1231, 1236 (10th Cir. 2012). ↑

34. Id. (citing In re Linton, 136 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 1998)). ↑

35. Id. at 1237. ↑

36. Foster v. Aurzada (In re Foster), No. 22-10310, 2023 WL 20872, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 3, 2023). ↑

37. In re Foster, 2023 WL 20872 at *5 (citing In re McKenzie, 716 F.3d 404, 415 (6th Cir. 2013); Leonard v. Vrooman, 383 F.2d 556, 560 (9th Cir. 1967)). ↑

38. Tufts v. Hay, 977 F.3d 1204, 1209 (11th Cir. 2020). ↑

39. Id. at 1209–10. ↑

40. Chua v. Ekonomou, 1 F.4th 948, 954 (11th Cir. 2021). ↑

41. Id. ↑

42. Id. at 954–55 (citing Prop. Mgmt. & Invs., Inc. v. Lewis, 752 F.2d 599, 602 (11th Cir. 1985)). ↑

43. Id. at 955. ↑