Sample California Third-Party Legal Opinion for Venture Capital Financing Transactions

The Opinions Committee (the “Committee”) of the Business Law Section of the State Bar of California (the “California State Bar Business Law Section”) has prepared and issued this sample opinion (the “Venture Opinion”)1 in consultation with the Corporations Committee (the “Corporations Committee”) of the California State Bar Business Law Section, and with the approval of the Executive Committee of the California State Bar Business Law Section. The editors and contributors to the Venture Opinion are the following:

Reporter:

Richard N. Frasch

Other Drafting Committee Members:

Twila L. Foster

Jerome A. Grossman

Timothy G. Hoxie

Douglas F. Landrum

Ann Yvonne Walker

Contributors Outside The Committee:

Arthur N. Field

Donald W. Glazer

Jerome E. Hyman

Stanley Keller

Michael J. Kendall

James J. Rosenhauer

Suzanne Weakley Corporations Committee Representatives:

Julia K. Cowles

Jeffrey T. Drake

Christina F. Pearson

2013–2014 Opinions Committee

Steering Committee:

Richard N. Frasch, Co-Chair

Timothy G. Hoxie, Co-Chair

James F. Fotenos, Vice Chair

Kenneth J. Carl, Secretary

Ethan J. Falk

Jerome A. Grossman

Douglas F. Landrum

Carol K. Lucas

John B. Power

Peter S. Szurley

Ann Yvonne Walker

Steven O. Weise

Other Members:

Dennis B. Arnold

John Babala

Kenneth J. Baronsky

Mark A. Bonenfant

Thomas G. Brockington

Peter H. Carson

James Cochran

Nelson D. Crandall

Charles L. Crouch, III

Henry D. Evans, Jr.

Twila L. Foster

Norman Futami

Nora Gibson

Robert J. Gloistein

Thomas Klaus Gump

Meredith S. Jackson

John M. Jameson

David Johnson

Moshe J. Kupietzky

F. Daniel Leventhal

Kenneth Linhares

Richard Luther

Sean Monroe Theresa G. Moran

Peter S. Muñoz

Eustace A. Olliff

Sarah P. Payne

Susan Cooper Philpot

David M. Pike

Bradley J. Rock

Steven E. Sherman

Richard Smith

Brooks Stough

Jeffrey E. Sultan

Gail Suniga

Robert Thompson

Jack D. Welch, III

Benzion J. Westreich

Nancy H. Wojtas

INTRODUCTION

In 2009, the Opinions Committee of the Business Law Section of the State Bar of California published a commentary on customary practice with respect to third-party legal opinions given in venture capital financing transactions (the “2009 Venture Capital Report”).2 This sample opinion (the “Venture Opinion”), along with the accompanying footnotes, augments the 2009 Venture Capital Report by providing an illustration of what an opinion letter given in a venture capital financing transaction might look like.

The Venture Opinion builds upon several prior exemplars: the Committee’s Sample California Third-Party Legal Opinion for Business Transactions (the “Transactional Opinion”),3 the “Boston Form” based upon the ABA Legal Opinion Principles,4 and the form legal opinion of the National Venture Capital Association.5 Unlike the Venture Opinion, both the Transactional Opinion and the Boston Form use an unsecured loan as their transactional model. In addition to building on these prior forms, the Venture Opinion is based on various other opinion reports of the California State Bar Business Law Section6 and other bar associations, such as the Committee on Legal Opinions of the American Bar Association’s Section of Business Law7 and the TriBar Opinion Committee.8 The Venture Opinion provides an illustration of an opinion letter, based on the principles articulated in the 2009 Venture Capital Report, that is directly relevant to venture financings 9of the type frequently consummated in California and elsewhere, including examples of opinions on capitalization, stock issuances, and “no registration.”

The Committee chose as the transaction model for the Venture Opinion a private offering, not involving general solicitation or general advertising, of Series B Preferred Stock by a Delaware corporation10 under transaction documents governed by California law.11 The Venture Opinion is annotated and contains alternative language for use when the company is incorporated in California. Because the Venture Opinion uses a Delaware corporation as the issuer, opinion preparers should consider in each case whether they have the competence to give, when requested, opinions under the Delaware General Corporation Law.12 Finally, the opinion recipients are identified in the Venture Opinion as the purchasers of the company’s Series B Preferred Stock under the stock purchase agreement. A Series B Preferred Stock financing highlights, among other things, the serial nature of most Venture Financings.

As noted in the Transactional Opinion, no single form of legal opinion can be viewed as the “sole” or even in most cases the “best” or “preferred” form for use in Venture Financings or any other business transaction. The Venture Opinion, therefore, is illustrative and should not be treated as prescriptive.

The Venture Opinion should be interpreted in accordance with the customary practice of California lawyers in giving opinions (and advising those who receive opinions) as articulated in the various opinion reports of the California State Bar Business Law Section and other professional associations, such as the American Bar Association’s Section of Business Law and the TriBar Opinion Committee.

A clean version of the Venture Opinion, without footnotes, follows the annotated form and is attached as Exhibit A.

SAMPLE CALIFORNIA THIRD-PARTY LEGAL OPINION FOR VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCING TRANSACTIONS13

[Date14]

To the Purchasers on the date hereof15 of
[Company Name] Series B Preferred
Stock Listed on Exhibit A to the Series
B Preferred Stock [and Warrant] Purchase Agreement

Ladies and Gentlemen:

We have acted as counsel for [Company Name], a Delaware corporation (the “Company”),16 in connection with the sale and issuance on the date hereof by the Company to you of _____ shares of the Company’s Series B Preferred Stock (the “Shares”) [and the sale of warrants to purchase _____ shares of the Company’s [Type of Securities] (the “Warrants”), each] pursuant to the Series B Preferred Stock [and Warrant] Purchase Agreement (the “Purchase Agreement”), dated as of __________, 20___ among the Company and the persons listed on Exhibit A attached thereto (the “Purchasers”). This opinion letter is delivered to you pursuant to Section _____ of the Purchase Agreement.17 Each capitalized term that is defined in the Purchase Agreement and that is used but not defined in this opinion letter has the meaning given to it in the Purchase Agreement.

A. DOCUMENTS EXAMINED18

We have examined the following documents:19

(i) the Purchase Agreement;
(ii)the Investors’ Rights Agreement, dated as of ______, 20___ (the “Investors’ Rights Agreement”);
(iii)the Right of First Refusal and Co-Sale Agreement, dated as of _______, 20__ (the “Co-Sale Agreement”);
(iv)the Voting Agreement, dated as of __________, 20___ (the “Voting Agreement”);
(v)the [form of] Warrant[s] [to be] issued to the Purchasers pursuant to the Purchase Agreement;
(vi)the Schedule of Exceptions to the Purchase Agreement (the “Schedule of Exceptions”);
(vii)the Certificate of Incorporation of the Company, as amended to date, certified by the Delaware Secretary of State as of ____________, 20__ and certified to us by an officer of the Company as being complete and in full force and effect as of the date of this opinion letter (the “Restated Charter”);20
(viii)the Bylaws of the Company, certified to us by an officer of the Company as being complete and in full force and effect as of the date of this opinion letter;
(ix)records certified to us by an officer of the Company as constituting the records of proceedings and actions of the board of directors [and the stockholders]21 of the Company relevant to the opinions set forth below;22
(x)a Certificate of Status—Foreign Corporation with respect to the Company, issued by the California Secretary of State on __________, 20___;23
(xi)a Good Standing Certificate with respect to the Company, issued by the Delaware24 Secretary of State on __________, 20___;25
(xii)a certificate of the [Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, or other appropriate officer]26 of the Company identifying certain agreements and instruments to which the Company is a party or by which the Company’s properties or assets are bound (the “Certificate Relating to Agreements”); 27
(xiii)a copy of each of the agreements and instruments identified in the Certificate Relating to Agreements, certified to us as being a true and complete copy of the original (“Scheduled Agreements”); 28
(xiv)a certificate of the [Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, or other appropriate officer]29 of the Company as to certain factual matters relevant to the opinions expressed below;30 [and]
(xv)the Capitalization Records (as defined in Section E (“Certain Qualifications”) below). [; and]
[(xvi)the Certificate of Transfer Agent (as defined in Section E (“Certain Qualifications”) below).]

Each of the documents identified in items (i) through [(iv) OR (v)] above is sometimes referred to below as a “Transaction Document.”31

The shares of Common Stock issuable upon conversion of the Shares are referred to herein as the “Conversion Shares32 [,” the shares of Series B Preferred Stock issuable upon exercise of the Warrants are referred to below as the “Warrant Shares,” and the shares of Common Stock issuable upon conversion of the Warrant Shares are referred to below as the “Warrant Conversion Shares].”

We have also examined such other documents and made such further legal and factual examination and investigation as we deem necessary for purposes of giving the following opinions.33

B. CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS34

We have assumed, for purposes of the opinions set forth below, that:

(a)The information provided by the Company to the Purchasers in connection with the offer and sale of the Shares is accurate and complete;35
(b)The Company’s representations to us [that the Company and its agents have made no offer to sell the Shares by means of any general solicitation or in connection with the publication of any advertisement relating to such an offer and] that no offer or sale of the Shares has been made or will be made in any state outside of [California] where such offer or sale would be contrary to applicable law are accurate and complete;36
(c)The representations and warranties made by the Company and all prior purchasers of the Company’s securities given in connection with the sale of such securities are accurate and complete;37
(d)The Company is not disqualified from relying on the exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), provided by Rule 506 thereunder by reason of the provisions of paragraphs (d) or (e) of Rule 506;38 [; and]
(e)At the time of conversion of the Shares into Common Stock [and/or Warrant Shares into Common Stock] a sufficient number of shares of Common Stock will be authorized and available for issuance under the Company’s certificate of incorporation as then in effect to satisfy (i) the conversion of all Shares (and all other then outstanding shares of the Company’s Preferred Stock) into Common Stock at the then effective respective conversion rates of such shares and (ii) the exercise, conversion and exchange rights of all other then outstanding securities of the Company that are then, directly or indirectly, issuable or exchangeable for, or convertible into, Common Stock at their then effective rates of issuance, exchange or conversion.39 [; and]
[(f)At the time of exercise of the Warrants, a sufficient number of Warrant Shares will be authorized and available for issuance under the Company’s certificate of incorporation as then in effect to satisfy the Company’s obligations under the Warrants to issue all of such Warrant Shares.]40

C. OPINIONS

Based on the foregoing, and subject to the qualifications set forth in Section E (“Certain Qualifications”) below, [and except as specifically set forth in the Schedule of Exceptions,]41 we are of the opinion that:

1. The Company is a corporation validly existing42 and in good standing under the laws of the State of Delaware.43 The Company is qualified to transact intrastate business44 and is in good standing under the laws of the State of California.

2. The Company has the corporate power45 to enter into and perform46 its obligations under each of the Transaction Documents.47

3. The Transaction Documents have been duly authorized by all necessary corporate action on the part of the Company48 and have been duly executed and delivered by the Company.49

4. The Company’s authorized capitalization consists of (a) _____ shares of Common Stock, of which _____ shares are issued and outstanding, and (b) _____ shares of Preferred Stock, of which (i) _____ shares have been designated as Series A Preferred Stock, all of which are issued and outstanding, and (ii) _____ shares have been designated as Series B Preferred Stock, none of which have been issued.50 The issued and outstanding shares of Common Stock and Preferred Stock of the Company have been duly authorized51 and validly issued52 and are fully paid53 and nonassessable.54

5. The Shares have been duly authorized55 for issuance and, when issued and paid for in accordance with the provisions of the Purchase Agreement, will be validly issued, fully paid and nonassessable56 The Conversion Shares have been duly authorized for issuance and, when and if issued upon conversion of the Shares in accordance with the Restated Charter,57 will be validly issued, fully paid and nonassessable. [The Warrant Shares have been duly authorized for issuance and, when and if issued upon exercise of the Warrants in accordance with the provisions of the Warrants, will be validly issued, fully paid and nonassessable. The Warrant Conversion Shares have been duly authorized for issuance and, when and if issued upon conversion of the Warrant Shares in accordance with the Restated Charter,58 will be validly issued, fully paid and nonassessable.]

6. Each of the Purchase Agreement, Investors’ Rights Agreement, [and] Co-Sale Agreement [and Warrant]59 is a valid and binding obligation of the Company enforceable60 against the Company in accordance with its terms.61

7. All consents, approvals, authorizations or orders of, and filings, registrations and qualifications on the part of the Company with, any United States federal or California state regulatory authority or governmental body pursuant to any Covered Law (as defined in Section E (“Certain Qualifications”) below)62 required to execute and deliver the Transaction Documents63 and for the sale and issuance of the Shares [and Warrants] under the Purchase Agreement as of the closing have been obtained or made. 64

8. The execution and delivery by the Company of the Transaction Documents, and65 the sale and issuance of the Shares [and Warrants] under the Purchase Agreement as of the closing, do not66:

(a) violate the Restated Charter or the Bylaws;

(b) result in a breach of or constitute a default by the Company under any Scheduled Agreement, but excluding (i) financial covenants and similar provisions therein requiring financial calculations or determinations to ascertain compliance or (ii) provisions relating to the occurrence of a “material adverse event” or “material adverse change” or words or concepts to similar effect; 67

(c) violate any judgment, order or decree applicable to the Company of any court or arbitrator identified in Section _____ of the Schedule of Exceptions;68 or

(d) violate any Covered Law (as defined in Section E (“Certain Qualifications”) below) to which the Company is subject.69

9. Based on, and assuming the accuracy of, the representations of each of the Purchasers in the Purchase Agreement, the offer and sale of the Shares70 [and the Warrants] and, assuming [the Warrants were exercised by the Purchasers in accordance with their terms on the date of this opinion letter and] the Shares [and the Warrant Shares] were converted on the date of this opinion letter in accordance with the conversion provisions of the Restated Charter, the issuance of [the Warrant Shares and] the Conversion Shares [and Warrant Conversion Shares]71 do not require registration under Section 5 of the Securities Act [or qualification under the California Corporate Securities Law of 1968, as amended].72

D. CONFIRMATION

We are not representing the Company in any action or proceeding that is pending, or overtly threatened in writing by a potential claimant, that seeks to enjoin the transaction or challenge the validity of the Transaction Documents or the performance by the Company of its obligations thereunder.73

E. CERTAIN QUALIFICATIONS

Our opinions are limited to the federal law of the United States, the law of the State of California,74 and the Delaware75 General Corporation Law76 but in each case only to laws that in our experience are typically applicable to transactions of the type exemplified by the Transaction Documents. We express no opinion with respect to compliance with any law, rule or regulation that as a matter of customary practice is understood to be covered only when an opinion refers to it expressly. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing [and except as specifically stated herein], we express no opinion on local or municipal law, antitrust, unfair competition, environmental, land use, antifraud, tax, pension, labor, employee benefit, health care, privacy, margin, insolvency, fraudulent transfer, antiterrorism, money laundering, racketeering, criminal and civil forfeiture, foreign corrupt practices, foreign asset or trading controls, or investment company laws.77 We express no opinion on any securities laws except as expressly stated in Section C (“Opinions”), paragraph 9.78 The law covered by this opinion letter is referred to herein as the “Covered Law.”

Our opinions are subject to the following additional qualifications:

(1) Our opinions are subject to (a) bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization, arrangement, moratorium and other similar laws of general applicability relating to or affecting creditors’ rights generally; and (b) general principles of equity, including, without limitation, concepts of materiality, reasonableness, good faith and fair dealing, regardless of whether considered in a proceeding in equity or at law.79

(2) Where a statement is qualified by “to our knowledge” or any similar phrase, that knowledge is limited to the actual knowledge of lawyers currently in this firm who have been involved in representing the Company in connection with the Transaction Documents. Except as otherwise expressly indicated, we have not undertaken any independent investigation to determine the accuracy of any such statement, and no inference as to our knowledge of any matters bearing on the accuracy of any such statement should be drawn from the fact of our representation of the Company. 80

(3) We advise you that, on statutory or public policy grounds, waivers or limitations of the following may not be enforced: (i) broadly or vaguely stated rights, (ii) the benefits of statutory, regulatory or constitutional rights, (iii) unknown future defenses, and (iv) rights to one or more types of damages.

(4) [The enforcement of Section _____ of [the __________ Agreement], relating to the payment of attorneys’ fees and costs, is subject to the effect of Section 1717 of the California Civil Code.]81

(5) [We express no opinion regarding the enforceability of [Section _____] of the [__________ Agreement], which purports to fix the venue of proceedings related to the [__________ Agreement].]82

(6) [We express no opinion regarding the enforceability of [Section _____] of the [__________ Agreement], which purports to waive the parties’ rights to a jury trial.]83

(7) [We express no opinion regarding the enforceability of [Section _____] of the [__________ Agreement], which purports to submit disputes to arbitration.]84

(8) The opinions above relating to the fully paid status of all of the issued shares of capital stock of the Company are based, without independent verification, on the representation in the Officers’ Certificate to the effect that the Company has received the consideration in the amount and form approved by the Company’s Board of Directors prior to the issuance of each outstanding share of capital stock of the Company.85

(9) With respect to the equity capitalization opinion set forth in Section C (“Opinions”), paragraph 4,86 please note that we do not maintain any of the Company’s stock records. Such records are maintained by [a third-party stock transfer agent (“Agent”)] [the Company] and we do not have any control over the procedures used by [Agent] [the Company] for issuing and transferring shares of the Company’s capital stock. Accordingly, in giving the equity capitalization opinion, we have relied without further investigation on (a) the Restated Charter, (b) the Bylaws, (c) minute books relating to meetings and written actions of the incorporator(s), Board of Directors, and stockholders of the Company [in our possession] [delivered to us by the Company for the purposes of giving this opinion], (d) our review of the stock records of the Company maintained by [Agent] [the Company], consisting of [description], (e) statements in a certificate the Company has delivered to us relating to the equity capitalization of the Company, and (f) the attached Certificate of Transfer Agent issued by [Agent] [the Company] as of [date] (collectively, the “Capitalization Records”). We have not undertaken to verify the accuracy and completeness of that information other than by reviewing the Capitalization Records. Accordingly, our opinion on the number and character of issued and outstanding securities means that, based upon the examination referred to above, the Capitalization Records are consistent with the information as to the number and character of outstanding securities that is set forth in Section C (“Opinions”), paragraph 4.87

(10) We express no opinion as to the enforceability of any indemnification or contribution provisions in the Transaction Documents (or other provisions having an effect similar to any of these types of provisions) to the extent that the enforceability of such provisions is limited [by United States federal or state laws concerning the issuance or sale of securities or] by public policy or statutory provisions or that such indemnification or similar provisions purport to indemnify a party against, or release a party from liability for, its own fraudulent or illegal actions or [gross] negligence. 8887. The Committee believes that the current trend is against giving “Outstanding Options Opinions” and “No Outstanding Preemptive Rights Opinions” and, therefore, neither has been included in the Venture Opinion. See supra note 54. Nevertheless, to the extent those opinions are given, the further qualifications articulated in the 2009 Venture Capital Report are appropriate:

(11) [We express no opinion as to whether the members of the Company’s Board of Directors or officers have complied with their fiduciary duties in connection with their approval of the Transaction Documents or the effect, if any, of any Covered Law regarding (a) the fiduciary duties of majority stockholders, or (b) the rights of minority stockholders with respect to the transactions contemplated by the Transaction Documents or the corporate or other approvals of those transactions.]89

(12) We express no opinion with respect to, or as to the effect of, any provisions imposing obligations to vote the Company’s capital stock in a certain manner or to comply with any drag-along provisions, including without limitation those provisions set forth in the Voting Agreement.90

This opinion letter may be relied on solely by the Purchasers for use in connection with their purchase and sale of the Shares [and Warrants] pursuant to the Purchase Agreement. This opinion letter may not be relied on by any other party or for any other purpose without our prior written consent.91

Very truly yours,
[Law Firm]

EXHIBIT A SAMPLE CALIFORNIA THIRD-PARTY LEGAL OPINION FOR VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCING TRANSACTIONS (UNANNOTATED)

[Date]

To the Purchasers on the date hereof of

[Company Name] Series B Preferred

Stock Listed on Exhibit A to the Series

B Preferred Stock [and Warrant] Purchase Agreement

Ladies and Gentlemen:

We have acted as counsel for [Company Name], a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), in connection with the sale and issuance on the date hereof by the Company to you of _____ shares of the Company’s Series B Preferred Stock (the “Shares”) [and the sale of warrants to purchase _____ shares of the Company’s [Type of Securities] (the “Warrants”), each] pursuant to the Series B Preferred Stock [and Warrant] Purchase Agreement (the “Purchase Agreement”), dated as of __________, 20___ among the Company and the persons listed on Exhibit A attached thereto (the “Purchasers”). This opinion letter is delivered to you pursuant to Section _____ of the Purchase Agreement. Each capitalized term that is defined in the Purchase Agreement and that is used but not defined in this opinion letter has the meaning given to it in the Purchase Agreement.

A. DOCUMENTS EXAMINED

We have examined the following documents:

(i)the Purchase Agreement;
(ii)the Investors’ Rights Agreement, dated as of ______ , 20__ (the “Investors’ Rights Agreement”);
(iii)the Right of First Refusal and Co-Sale Agreement, dated as of __________, 20__ (the “Co-Sale Agreement”);
(iv)the Voting Agreement, dated as of __________, 20__ (the “Voting Agreement”);
(v)the [form of] Warrant[s] [to be] issued to the Purchasers pursuant to the Purchase Agreement;
(vi)the Schedule of Exceptions to the Purchase Agreement (the “Schedule of Exceptions”);
(vii)the Certificate of Incorporation of the Company, as amended to date, certified by the Delaware Secretary of State as of ____________, 20__ and certified to us by an officer of the Company as being complete and in full force and effect as of the date of this opinion letter (the “Restated Charter”);
(viii)the Bylaws of the Company, certified to us by an officer of the Company as being complete and in full force and effect as of the date of this opinion letter;
(ix)records certified to us by an officer of the Company as constituting the records of proceedings and actions of the board of directors [and the stockholders] of the Company relevant to the opinions set forth below;
(x)a Certificate of Status—Foreign Corporation with respect to the Company, issued by the California Secretary of State on __________, 20__;
(xi)a Good Standing Certificate with respect to the Company, issued by the Delaware Secretary of State on __________, 20___;
(xii)a certificate of the [Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, or other appropriate officer] of the Company identifying certain agreements and instruments to which the Company is a party or by which the Company’s properties or assets are bound (the “Certificate Relating to Agreements”);
(xiii)a copy of each of the agreements and instruments identified in the Certificate Relating to Agreements, certified to us as being a true and complete copy of the original (“Scheduled Agreements”);
(xiv)a certificate of the [Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, or other appropriate officer] of the Company as to certain factual matters relevant to the opinions expressed below; [and]
(xv)the Capitalization Records (as defined in Section E (“Certain Qualifications”) below). [; and]
[(xvi)the Certificate of Transfer Agent (as defined in Section E (“Certain Qualifications”) below).]

Each of the documents identified in items (i) through [(iv) OR (v)] above is sometimes referred to below as a “Transaction Document.”

The shares of Common Stock issuable upon conversion of the Shares are referred to herein as the “Conversion Shares [,” the shares of Series B Preferred Stock issuable upon exercise of the Warrants are referred to below as the “Warrant Shares,” and the shares of Common Stock issuable upon conversion of the Warrant Shares are referred to below as the “Warrant Conversion Shares].”

We have also examined such other documents and made such further legal and factual examination and investigation as we deem necessary for purposes of giving the following opinions.

B. CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS

We have assumed, for purposes of the opinions set forth below, that:

(a)The information provided by the Company to the Purchasers in connection with the offer and sale of the Shares is accurate and complete;
(b)The Company’s representations to us [that the Company and its agents have made no offer to sell the Shares by means of any general solicitation or in connection with the publication of any advertisement relating to such an offer and] that no offer or sale of the Shares has been made or will be made in any state outside of [California] where such offer or sale would be contrary to applicable law are accurate and complete;
(c)The representations and warranties made by the Company and all prior purchasers of the Company’s securities given in connection with the sale of such securities are accurate and complete;
(d)The Company is not disqualified from relying on the exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), provided by Rule 506 thereunder by reason of the provisions of paragraphs (d) or (e) of Rule 506; [; and]
(e)At the time of conversion of the Shares into Common Stock [and/or Warrant Shares into Common Stock] a sufficient number of shares of Common Stock will be authorized and available for issuance under the Company’s certificate of incorporation as then in effect to satisfy (i) the conversion of all Shares (and all other then outstanding shares of the Company’s Preferred Stock) into Common Stock at the then effective respective conversion rates of such shares and (ii) the exercise, conversion and exchange rights of all other then outstanding securities of the Company that are then, directly or indirectly, issuable or exchangeable for, or convertible into, Common Stock at their then effective rates of issuance, exchange or conversion. [; and]
[(f)At the time of exercise of the Warrants, a sufficient number of Warrant Shares will be authorized and available for issuance under the Company’s certificate of incorporation as then in effect to satisfy the Company’s obligations under the Warrants to issue all of such Warrant Shares.]

C. OPINIONS

Based on the foregoing, and subject to the qualifications set forth in Section E (“Certain Qualifications”) below, [and except as specifically set forth in the Schedule of Exceptions,] we are of the opinion that:

1. The Company is a corporation validly existing and in good standing under the laws of the State of Delaware. The Company is qualified to transact intrastate business and is in good standing under the laws of the State of California.

2. The Company has the corporate power to enter into and perform its obligations under each of the Transaction Documents.

3. The Transaction Documents have been duly authorized by all necessary corporate action on the part of the Company and have been duly executed and delivered by the Company.

4. The Company’s authorized capitalization consists of (a) _____ shares of Common Stock, of which _____ shares are issued and outstanding, and (b) _____ shares of Preferred Stock, of which (i) _____ shares have been designated as Series A Preferred Stock, all of which are issued and outstanding, and (ii) _____ shares have been designated as Series B Preferred Stock, none of which have been issued. The issued and outstanding shares of Common Stock and Preferred Stock of the Company have been duly authorized and validly issued and are fully paid and nonassessable.

5. The Shares have been duly authorized for issuance and, when issued and paid for in accordance with the provisions of the Purchase Agreement, will be validly issued, fully paid and nonassessable. The Conversion Shares have been duly authorized for issuance and, when and if issued upon conversion of the Shares in accordance with the Restated Charter, will be validly issued, fully paid and nonassessable. [The Warrant Shares have been duly authorized for issuance and, when and if issued upon exercise of the Warrants in accordance with the provisions of the Warrants, will be validly issued, fully paid and nonassessable. The Warrant Conversion Shares have been duly authorized for issuance and, when and if issued upon conversion of the Warrant Shares in accordance with the Restated Charter, will be validly issued, fully paid and nonassessable.]

6. Each of the Purchase Agreement, Investors’ Rights Agreement, [and] Co-Sale Agreement [and Warrant] is a valid and binding obligation of the Company enforceable against the Company in accordance with its terms.

7. All consents, approvals, authorizations or orders of, and filings, registrations and qualifications on the part of the Company with, any United States federal or California state regulatory authority or governmental body pursuant to any Covered Law (as defined in Section E (“Certain Qualifications”) below) required to execute and deliver the Transaction Documents and for the sale and issuance of the Shares [and Warrants] under the Purchase Agreement as of the closing have been obtained or made.

8. The execution and delivery by the Company of the Transaction Documents, and the sale and issuance of the Shares [and Warrants] under the Purchase Agreement as of the closing, do not:

(a) violate the Restated Charter or the Bylaws;

(b) result in a breach of or constitute a default by the Company under any Scheduled Agreement, but excluding (i) financial covenants and similar provisions therein requiring financial calculations or determinations to ascertain compliance or (ii) provisions relating to the occurrence of a “material adverse event” or “material adverse change” or words or concepts to similar effect;

(c) violate any judgment, order or decree applicable to the Company of any court or arbitrator identified in Section _____ of the Schedule of Exceptions; or

(d) violate any Covered Law (as defined in Section E (“Certain Qualifications”) below) to which the Company is subject.

9. Based on, and assuming the accuracy of, the representations of each of the Purchasers in the Purchase Agreement, the offer and sale of the Shares [and the Warrants] and, assuming [the Warrants were exercised by the Purchasers in accordance with their terms on the date of this opinion letter and] the Shares [and the Warrant Shares] were converted on the date of this opinion letter in accordance with the conversion provisions of the Restated Charter, the issuance of [the Warrant Shares and] the Conversion Shares [and Warrant Conversion Shares] do not require registration under Section 5 of the Securities Act [or qualification under the California Corporate Securities Law of 1968, as amended].

D. CONFIRMATION

We are not representing the Company in any action or proceeding that is pending, or overtly threatened in writing by a potential claimant, that seeks to enjoin the transaction or challenge the validity of the Transaction Documents or the performance by the Company of its obligations thereunder.

E. CERTAIN QUALIFICATIONS

Our opinions are limited to the federal law of the United States, the law of the State of California, and the Delaware General Corporation Law but in each case only to laws that in our experience are typically applicable to transactions of the type exemplified by the Transaction Documents. We express no opinion with respect to compliance with any law, rule or regulation that as a matter of customary practice is understood to be covered only when an opinion refers to it expressly. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing [and except as specifically stated herein,] we express no opinion on local or municipal law, antitrust, unfair competition, environmental, land use, antifraud, tax, pension, labor, employee benefit, health care, margin, privacy, insolvency, fraudulent transfer, antiterrorism, money laundering, racketeering, criminal and civil forfeiture, foreign corrupt practices, foreign asset or trading controls, or investment company laws. We express no opinion on any securities laws except as expressly stated in Section C (“Opinions”), paragraph 9. The law covered by this opinion letter is referred to herein as the “Covered Law.”

Our opinions are subject to the following additional qualifications:

(1) Our opinions are subject to (a) bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization, arrangement, moratorium and other similar laws of general applicability relating to or affecting creditors’ rights generally; and (b) general principles of equity, including, without limitation, concepts of materiality, reasonableness, good faith and fair dealing, regardless of whether considered in a proceeding in equity or at law.

(2) Where a statement is qualified by “to our knowledge” or any similar phrase, that knowledge is limited to the actual knowledge of lawyers currently in this firm who have been involved in representing the Company in connection with the Transaction Documents. Except as otherwise expressly indicated, we have not undertaken any independent investigation to determine the accuracy of any such statement, and no inference as to our knowledge of any matters bearing on the accuracy of any such statement should be drawn from the fact of our representation of the Company.

(3) We advise you that, on statutory or public policy grounds, waivers or limitations of the following may not be enforced: (i) broadly or vaguely stated rights, (ii) the benefits of statutory, regulatory or constitutional rights, (iii) unknown future defenses, and (iv) rights to one or more types of damages.

(4) [The enforcement of Section _____ of [the __________ Agreement], relating to the payment of attorneys’ fees and costs, is subject to the effect of Section 1717 of the California Civil Code.]

(5) [We express no opinion regarding the enforceability of [Section _____] of the [__________ Agreement], which purports to fix the venue of proceedings related to the [__________ Agreement].]

(6) [We express no opinion regarding the enforceability of [Section _____] of the [__________ Agreement], which purports to waive the parties’ rights to a jury trial.]

(7) [We express no opinion regarding the enforceability of [Section _____] of the [__________ Agreement], which purports to submit disputes to arbitration.]

(8) The opinions above relating to the fully paid status of all of the issued shares of capital stock of the Company are based, without independent verification, on the representation in the Officers’ Certificate to the effect that the Company has received the consideration in the amount and form approved by the Company’s Board of Directors prior to the issuance of each outstanding share of capital stock of the Company.

(9) With respect to the equity capitalization opinion set forth in Section C (“Opinions”), paragraph 4, please note that we do not maintain any of the Company’s stock records. Such records are maintained by [a third-party stock transfer agent (“Agent”)] [the Company] and we do not have any control over the procedures used by [Agent] [the Company] for issuing and transferring shares of the Company’s capital stock. Accordingly, in giving the equity capitalization opinion, we have relied without further investigation on (a) the Restated Charter, (b) the Bylaws, (c) minute books relating to meetings and written actions of the incorporator(s), Board of Directors, and stockholders of the Company [in our possession] [delivered to us by the Company for the purposes of giving this opinion], (d) our review of the stock records of the Company maintained by [Agent] [the Company], consisting of [description], (e) statements in a certificate the Company has delivered to us relating to the equity capitalization of the Company, and (f) the attached Certificate of Transfer Agent issued by [Agent] [the Company] as of [date] (collectively, the “Capitalization Records”). We have not undertaken to verify the accuracy and completeness of that information other than by reviewing the Capitalization Records. Accordingly, our opinion on the number and character of issued and outstanding securities means that, based upon the examination referred to above, the Capitalization Records are consistent with the information as to the number and character of outstanding securities that is set forth in Section C (“Opinions”), paragraph 4.

(10) We express no opinion as to the enforceability of any indemnification or contribution provisions in the Transaction Documents (or other provisions having an effect similar to any of these types of provisions) to the extent that the enforceability of such provisions is limited [by United States federal or state laws concerning the issuance or sale of securities or] by public policy or statutory provisions or that such indemnification or similar provisions purport to indemnify a party against, or release a party from liability for, its own fraudulent or illegal actions or [gross] negligence.

(11) [We express no opinion as to whether the members of the Company’s Board of Directors or officers have complied with their fiduciary duties in connection with their approval of the Transaction Documents or the effect, if any, of any Covered Law regarding (a) the fiduciary duties of majority stockholders, or (b) the rights of minority stockholders with respect to the transactions contemplated by the Transaction Documents or the corporate or other approvals of those transactions.]

(12) We express no opinion with respect to, or as to the effect of, any provisions imposing obligations to vote the Company’s capital stock in a certain manner or to comply with any drag-along provisions, including without limitation those provisions set forth in the Voting Agreement.

This opinion letter may be relied on solely by the Purchasers for use in connection with their purchase and sale of the Shares [and Warrants] pursuant to the Purchase Agreement. This opinion letter may not be relied on by any other party or for any other purpose without our prior written consent.

Very truly yours,
[Law Firm]

_____________

1. The statements and views in the Venture Opinion and accompanying footnotes are those of the collective membership of the Committee and not necessarily those of the State Bar of California. The Venture Opinion is made available with the understanding that neither the State Bar of California nor the Committee is engaged in rendering legal or other professional services in publishing it. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent, professional person should be sought.

2. Opinions Comm. of the Bus. Law Section of the State Bar of Cal., Report on Selected Legal Opinion Issues in Venture Capital Financing Transactions, 65 BUS. LAW. 161 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 Venture Capital Report].

3. OPINIONS COMM. OF THE BUS. LAW SECTION OF THE STATE BAR OF CAL., SAMPLE CALIFORNIA THIRD-PARTY LEGAL OPINION FOR BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (rev. Aug. 2014) [hereinafter TRANSACTIONAL OPINION], avail-able at apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/tribar (under the “State and Other Bar Reports” subsection).

4. Donald W. Glazer & Stanley Keller, A Streamlined Form of Closing Opinion Based on the ABA Legal Opinion Principles, 61 BUS. LAW. 389 (2005) [hereinafter Boston Form].

5. MODEL LEGAL OPINION OF THE NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION (rev. June 2013) [hereinafter NVCA FORM], available at http://goo.gl/VIjFz (under the “Model Legal Documents” tab). The original NVCA Form predates the publication of both the 2009 Venture Capital Report and the Transactional Opinion.

6. See, e.g., CORPS. COMM. OF THE BUS. LAW SECTION OF THE STATE BAR OF CAL., LEGAL OPINIONS IN BUSI-NESS TRANSACTIONS (EXCLUDING THE REMEDIES OPINION) (May 2005) (2007 printing) [hereinafter 2007 Business Transactions Report]; BUS. LAW SECTION, STATE BAR OF CAL., REPORT ON THIRD-PARTY REMEDIES OPINIONS: 2007 UPDATE (2007) [hereinafter 2007 REMEDIES REPORT]; P’SHPS & LTD. LIAB. COS. COMM. OF THE BUS. LAW SECTION OF THE STATE BAR OF CAL., REPORT ON LEGAL OPINIONS CONCERNING CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES (Feb. 2000) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA LLC REPORT].

7. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Legal Opinions, Legal Opinion Principles, 53 BUS. LAW. 831 (1998) [hereinafter Principles]; ABA Comm. on Legal Opinions, Guidelines for the Preparation of Closing Opin-ions, 57 BUS. LAW. 875 (2002) [hereinafter Guidelines]; Subcomm. on Sec. Law Opinions, Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., ABA Section of Bus. Law, No Registration Opinions, 63 BUS. LAW. 187 (2007) [hereinafter No Registration Report]; Task Force on Sec. Law Opinions, Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., ABA Section of Bus. Law, Special Report: Negative Assurance in Securities Offerings (2008 Revision), 64 BUS. LAW. 395 (2009) [hereinafter Negative Assurance Report].

8. See, e.g., TriBar Opinion Comm., Report: Third-Party “Closing” Opinions, 53 BUS. LAW. 591 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 TriBar Report]; TriBar Opinion Comm., The Remedies Opinion—Deciding When to Include Exceptions and Assumptions, 59 BUS. LAW. 1483 (2004) [hereinafter TriBar Remedies Opinion Report]; TriBar Opinion Comm., Report on Duly Authorized Opinions on Preferred Stock, 63 BUS. LAW. 921 (May 2008) [hereinafter 2008 TriBar Preferred Stock Report].

9. Following the convention of the 2009 Venture Capital Report, as used in the Venture Opinion and the accompanying footnotes, the term “Venture Financing” refers to an equity investment in a privately held company by professional investors, and is not restricted to the financing of technology companies as the term “Venture” might imply. 2009 Venture Capital Report, supra note 2, at 163; see also infra note 11 (the Venture Financing addressed in the Venture Opinion is a private offering not involving general solicitation or general advertising).

10. As noted in the 2009 Venture Capital Report:

Although at one time venture-backed companies often incorporated in California and then reincorporated in Delaware immediately before an initial public offering, today venture-backed companies usually incorporate in Delaware at the outset.

2009 Venture Capital Report, supra note 2, at 166.

11. The Venture Opinion does not address issues raised by newly adopted Rule 506(c) under Regulation D, 78 Fed. Reg. 44771 (July 25, 2013) (effective September 23, 2013). Rule 506(c) permits general solicitation and general advertising in offerings meeting specified requirements. The Committee cannot predict whether venture firms will rely on Rule 506(c) for Venture Financings in the future to avoid registration under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended [hereinafter Securities Act]. The Committee notes that traditionally venture capital firms have preferred to include only professional investors known to them in the offerings they lead. See also infra notes 36 (which further discusses Rule 506(c)) & 70 (last sentence refers to a proposed update to the No Registration Report, supra note 7, to address the changes in Regulation D).

In addition, the Venture Opinion does not address “crowdfunding” as authorized under Title III of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 [hereinafter JOBS Act] creating new section 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act and addressed in recently proposed regulations of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 78 Fed. Reg. 66427 (proposed Oct. 23, 2013). Due to the $1,000,000 limitation on proceeds raised in a crowdfunding offering and limitations on the amount per investor that may be included in such an offering, Venture Financings are not likely to be conducted using the “crowdfunding” exemption from registration.

12. The fact that venture (and other) transactions commonly involve Delaware corporations presents an issue for non-Delaware lawyers asked to give legal opinions in these transactions. The 2007 Business Transactions Report states:

[A] lawyer should not be asked to render opinions on matters that are outside his or her area of professional competence. Where an opinion is appropriate but beyond the competence of the opinion giver, then the opinion giver should associate competent counsel to render the opinion.

2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 20 (footnote omitted); see infra note 51. The practice of non-Delaware lawyers has long been to give opinions on routine matters such as the corporate status of Delaware corporations and the due authorization by Delaware corporations of agreements when they regularly represent Delaware corporations and follow developments in Delaware corporation law. The practice of non-Delaware lawyers has been not to give opinions on more difficult questions of Delaware corporation law or on Delaware contract law (although some California lawyers, like lawyers elsewhere, also give routine opinions on Delaware limited liability companies even though those opinions require some consideration of Delaware contract law). See, e.g., 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 91–92; TriBar Opinion Comm., Third-Party “Closing” Opinions: Limited Liability Companies, 61 BUS. LAW. 679, 681–83 (2006) (discussing coverage by non-Delaware lawyers of Delaware contract law for purposes of providing closing opinions on Delaware limited liability companies).

No easy line can be drawn between “routine” and “more difficult” questions of Delaware corporation law. Opinion preparers must decide whether they are competent to give requested opinions. The Committee believes that the matters addressed in the Venture Opinion are matters on which California lawyers who regularly advise Delaware corporations and who follow developments in Delaware corporation law are typically competent to cover. If, however, the opinion preparers recognize that an opinion they have been asked to give involves an issue with respect to which they do not feel competent, they should consider obtaining an opinion letter from Delaware counsel, addressed directly to the opinion recipient, that covers that issue and in their own opinion letter either expressly rely on Delaware counsel’s opinion or include an express exception or assumption regarding that issue. See 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 35–38 (discussing foreign law and the retention of local counsel); see also infra note 51. A preliminary call to competent Delaware counsel to discuss the requested opinion may help the opinion preparers decide whether to retain Delaware counsel to address the issue in question.

13. Consistent with the Transactional Opinion, the Venture Opinion is often referred to as an “opinion letter” even though, in addition to legal opinions, it contains a factual confirmation (which is presented in Section D (“Confirmation”)). As with the Transactional Opinion, the Venture Opinion does not specifically state that it is to be interpreted in accordance with the customary practice of lawyers giving opinions in California; however, regardless of whether such a statement is included in the opinion letter, the opinion letter should be interpreted in light of such customary practice. Some opinion preparers, nonetheless, include a reference to customary practice in their opinion letters to make clear how the opinion letter is to be interpreted. One increasingly accepted method of referring to customary practice is to refer to the Principles, supra note 7. This could be done by including, either at the beginning or at the end of the opinion letter, a statement such as:

This opinion letter shall be interpreted in accordance with the Legal Opinion Principles published by the Committee on Legal Opinions of the American Bar Association’s Section of Business Law, 53 Bus. Law 831 (1998)[, a copy of which is attached].

See TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 1 n.1; ABA MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS COMM., VOLUME II, MODEL STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT WITH COMMENTARY: EXHIBITS, ANCILLARY DOCUMENTS, AND APPENDICES 61 (2010) (recommends including reference to the Principles). As is suggested by the bracketed language, if the Principles are incorporated, some firms attach a copy of the Principles to the opinion letter.

14. By its nature, a third-party legal opinion letter speaks only as of its date. Accordingly, it does not cover subsequent changes in law or fact. See Principles, supra note 7, at 833.

15. Inclusion of the words “on the date hereof ” is intended to make clear that the opinion letter is only for the benefit of Purchasers at the closing occurring on that date. Typically, in a Venture Financing, if a stock purchase agreement contemplates additional closings, it will require delivery of a new opinion letter at each closing.

16. Although at one time venture-backed companies were often incorporated in California and then reincorporated in Delaware immediately before an initial public offering, today venture-backed companies located in California usually incorporate in Delaware at the outset. See 2009 Venture Cap-ital Report, supra note 2, at 166.

17. It is common to state the context in which the opinion letter is being delivered. The Venture Opinion refers to the provision (which is typically included in a stock purchase agreement) that makes delivery of an opinion letter a condition to closing. See TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 2 n.5.

18. Like the Transactional Opinion, the Venture Opinion follows the order set out in the 2007 Business Transactions Report: (1) introductory matters, for example, the date, the identity of the opinion recipient, the role of the opinion giver giving the opinion letter, and the purpose for which the opinion letter is given; (2) a general or specific recitation of the documents and other factual and legal matters reviewed by the opinion preparers, including in some instances a statement of reliance on various factual assumptions; (3) the legal conclusions expressed in the opinion letter, and any qualifications to the legal conclusions; (4) matters peculiar to the particular opinion letter, for example, references to opinion letters of local counsel in other jurisdictions and specific limitations on the use of the opinion letter; and (5) the signature of the opinion giver. See TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 3 n.6 (citing the 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 21).

For the reasons set forth in the Transactional Opinion, the Venture Opinion departs from the foregoing framework in one significant respect: it separates factual confirmations—whether or not traditionally expressed with the legal conclusions—from the legal conclusions by placing them in a separate section, Section D (“Confirmation”), immediately following the numbered opinion paragraphs. See TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 3 n.6.

19. Practice varies on whether to list documents that the opinion preparers have reviewed. See TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 3 n.7, and for an extended discussion regarding the description of an opinion giver’s factual examination, see 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 24–32.

20. The Delaware term “Certificate of Incorporation” is used throughout the Venture Opinion because the assumed transaction is the Venture Financing of a Delaware corporation. The appropriate California term—“Articles of Incorporation”—should be used if the Company is incorporated in California and all references herein changed accordingly. For a sample Certificate of Incorporation for a Delaware corporation, see CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF THE NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION (Aug. 2013), available at http://goo.gl/VIjFz (under the “Model Legal Documents” tab).

Alternative language for use if the Company is incorporated in California follows:

the Articles of Incorporation of the Company, as amended to date, certified by the California Secretary of State as of ______, 20___ and certified to us by an officer of the Company as being complete and in full force and effect as of the date of this opinion letter (the “Restated Charter”);

21. The Delaware term “stockholder” is used throughout the Venture Opinion because the assumed transaction involves a Delaware corporation. The appropriate California term—“shareholder”—should be used if the Company is incorporated in California and all references in the Venture Opinion changed accordingly.

22. Although some opinion preparers may review the corporate minute books, others may rely on a secretary’s certificate confirming adoption of the relevant resolutions. See TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 4 n.8.

23. If the Company is incorporated in California, this provision is not applicable.

24. Alternative language for use if the Company is incorporated in California follows:

a Certificate of Status—Domestic Coporation with respect to the Company, issued by the California Secretary of State on _____, 20___;

When the Company is a California corporation, some opinion preparers also obtain a good standing letter from the Franchise Tax Board to confirm that no suspension of the corporation’s charter for non-payment of taxes is imminent. The Committee believes that, absent some particular concern about tax delinquencies, a Franchise Tax Board letter need not be obtained to give a good standing opinion on a California corporation. The Secretary of State’s good standing certificate reflects whether as a result of a tax delinquency the corporation’s charter has been suspended or forfeited. See TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 4 n.9 (citing the 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 42).

25. For a general description of the certificates of public officials customarily relied on, see 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 26–28. As the 2007 Business Transactions Report concludes, at least in routine cases, customary practice requires neither that every certificate be dated the date of the opinion letter nor that the opinion letter state that the opinions it contains are based solely on the certificates listed, without telephonic or other update.

26. The Transactional Opinion refers to the delivery of this certificate by the Company’s “Chief Financial Officer, General Counsel, or other appropriate officer.” See TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 5 n.12. The Committee notes that most early stage companies engaging in Venture Financings do not have a General Counsel and that opinion preparers ordinarily rely on a certificate of the Chief Executive Officer or Chief Financial Officer. Nothing would preclude the General Counsel of a company with the relevant knowledge from delivering a certificate of the type described in connection with a Venture Financing.

27. When the Purchase Agreement includes a schedule of certain agreements of the Company, the opinion preparers instead often refer to the agreements and instruments identified on the relevant schedule. See TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 5 n.12; see also NVCA FORM, supra note 5, at 2 n.7 (“Consideration should be given to which contracts should be covered in light of the cost constraints of many venture financings.”).

28. The Venture Opinion uses the term “Scheduled Agreements” to describe the list of contracts that are addressed in the opinion letter, rather than the term “Material Agreements”—the term used in the Transactional Opinion—to avoid any suggestion that the list of contracts corresponds to those that might be viewed as objectively “material” under some standard, such as that included in Item 601(b)(10) of Regulation S-K promulgated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Regardless of whether the term “Material” is used, the Committee believes that, by referring to a list of agreements, opinion givers are not implicitly giving an opinion that the agreements on the list comprise all “material” agreements to which the Company is a party (regardless of how “material” might be defined).

29. See supra note 26.

30. This certificate addresses factual matters relevant to the Company and the opinion giver. These may include such matters as the absence of dissolution proceedings and the absence (or identification) of pending litigation. Some opinion preparers do not refer to this certificate and instead rely on the general statement about the making of “further legal and factual examination” to cover any such matters. See TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 5 n.13. Finally, some opinion preparers draft this certificate (as well as other similar opinion-related certificates) to be signed by an officer on behalf of the Company. Other opinion preparers draft the certificate to be signed by an officer in his or her own name. The Committee believes that these approaches are all appropriate.

31. Opinion preparers should take care that the Company’s Certificate of Incorporation is not included in the definition of Transaction Documents. See NVCA FORM, supra note 5, at 1 n.2 (“Inclusion of the certificate of incorporation would be both illogical (e.g., in the case of the due execution and delivery opinion) and troublesome (e.g., in the case of the enforceability opinion).”); see also 2009 Venture Capital Report, supra note 2, at 170–72 (an extended discussion of the business issues that underlie historical—and inappropriate—requests for an opinion to the effect that the provisions of the Certificate of Incorporation “work”).

32. See NVCA FORM, supra note 5, at 3 n.12 (“Because shares may be issued in the future under antidilution clauses or otherwise, as a matter of customary practice [an opinion regarding the duly authorized, validly issued, fully paid and nonassessable status of conversion shares] is understood to mean that sufficient authorized shares are available on the date of the opinion letter, not that sufficient authorized shares necessarily will be available on the conversion date. To make the limited nature of the opinion clear, some opinion preparers include an express assumption regarding the availability of sufficient authorized shares in the future.”). The Venture Opinion addresses this issue expressly in the assumptions below (see Section B (“Assumptions”), paragraphs (e) and (f)). It does not address the issue in the opinions themselves or in the definition of terms but these approaches are also acceptable.

33. Some opinion givers include a statement to the effect that they have not conducted a search of the docket of any court or other tribunal. According to the 1998 TriBar Report, no such disclaimer is necessary (and no such search is required in connection with a “no litigation” confirmation). See TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 6 n.14 (citing the 1998 TriBar Report, supra note 8, at 664; 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 64 n.195); see also Section D (“Confirmation”) (concerning the “no litigation” confirmation). Also, some opinion givers omit the last paragraph, thus intending to imply that the list of documents reviewed constitutes the exclusive scope of their document review. Merely deleting the last paragraph, however, is not generally understood to be sufficient to limit the responsibility of the opinion preparers to review other pertinent documents. When such a limitation is intended, additional language should be added that makes clear that the opinions being given are based solely on a review of the listed documents. 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 25–26 (“If no specific limitation is included, a list of documents is not generally understood to constitute a limitation on the general responsibility of the opinion giver to follow customary diligence in rendering the opinion.”).

34. The 1998 TriBar Report takes the view that assumptions of general applicability need not be stated. For example (and without limitation), the following assumptions, relating to facts that “are common to transactions generally and are customarily assumed as a matter of course,” are understood to be applicable whether or not stated as long as they are not known to be false or reliance on them in the particular circumstance is not unreasonable: (a) that individuals have legal capacity, (b) that copies of documents furnished to the opinion preparers conform to the originals, (c) that the original documents furnished to the opinion preparers are authentic, (d) that the signatures on executed documents are genuine, and (e) that the agreement that is the subject of the enforceability opinion is binding on the other parties to it. See TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 6 n.15 (citing the 1998 TriBar Report, supra note 8, at 615).

Similarly, as a matter of customary practice, opinion givers may assume, without so stating, that those who have approved an agreement have satisfied their fiduciary obligations and have disclosed any interest in the transaction, see TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 6 n.15 (citing 1998 TriBar Report, supra note 8, at 629); see also infra note 89, and that contracts covered by the “no breach” opinion that by their terms are governed by the law of a jurisdiction whose law is not being covered in the opinion letter are being interpreted in accordance with their plain meaning, see TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 6 n.15 (citing 1998 TriBar Report, supra note 8, at 660). Nevertheless, many California opinion givers expressly state some or all of these assumptions, see TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 6 n.15 (citing 1998 TriBar Report, supra note 8, at 610). For a discussion of the practice of some opinion givers of stating expressly that no fiduciary opinion is being given, see infra note 89. See also TriBar Remedies Opinion Report, supra note 8, at 1484 (for a discussion of the appropriateness of the use of unstated assumptions).

The Committee notes that the recent decision in Fortress Credit Corp. v. Dechert, 934 N.Y.S.2d 119 (App. Div. 2011), may lead some opinion givers to state expressly some or all of the assumptions of general applicability. This stems from the fact that the court in that case noted, as one of the bases for dismissing the action, that the opinion letter in question included an assumption regarding the genuineness of the documents reviewed. Although the result in the case no doubt was correct, the Committee believes that, in the absence of facts suggesting that the opinion preparers knew that the documents were not genuine, the case should ultimately have been decided the same way whether or not an express assumption had been included in the opinion letter. However, for many of the same reasons that some opinion givers are inclined to include an express reference to the Principles in their opinion letters (see, e.g., supra note 13), some opinion givers state some or all of the general assumptions. The Committee believes that, whether or not assumptions of general application are stated, an opinion letter should be read as if they were stated—and the opinion preparers should not be respon-sible for affirmatively investigating their accuracy. The Committee notes that a “laundry list” approach to assumptions (and to qualifications/exceptions)—that is, utilizing a standard list of assumptions, qualifications, or exceptions that may include assumptions, qualifications, or exceptions that do not apply to the actual terms of the agreement(s) being considered—can impair the value of an opinion letter as a communications tool. See TriBar Remedies Opinion Report, supra note 8, at 1486.

In addition to assumptions of general application, opinion givers sometimes include express assumptions about matters that are not generally applicable to all opinions but are necessary for the particular opinions being given. Inclusion of these assumptions is required if they are to be relied on, and their inclusion shifts to the recipient the burden of confirming the matters assumed or taking the risk that they are not accurate. See 1998 TriBar Report, supra note 8, at 616.

35. If the Venture Financing includes any unaccredited investors and relies on Regulation D as the exemption from registration under the Securities Act, this assumption may be necessary to support the Regulation D exemption, although it relates much more directly to Rule 10b-5, as to which no opinion or “negative assurance” is typically given in Venture Financings. See 2009 Venture Capital Re-port, supra note 2, at 188. In Venture Financings that rely on the statutory private placement exemption provided by section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act and not on Regulation D, or that rely on Regulation D but do not include any unaccredited investors, this assumption is not needed to address a specific disclosure requirement of Regulation D. However, a court may consider the accuracy and completeness of information provided to the Purchasers as a factor in deciding whether a section 4(a)(2) exemption is available.

The opinion preparers representing the Company in a Venture Financing may assist in the preparation of disclosure documents (such as a private placement memorandum) used in connection with the transaction, but the core of the contents of the documents and their completeness and accuracy are the responsibility of the Company, its board of directors, and its officers, who are in a much better position than the opinion preparers to know the relevant facts about the Company. This assumption makes clear that the Venture Opinion does not cover the accuracy or adequacy of the disclosure provided by the Company to the Purchasers.

36. Prior to its amendment in 2013, Rule 506 under the Securities Act was not available for offerings utilizing general solicitation or general advertising. However, pursuant to section 201(a) of the Jobs Act, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission revised Rule 506 to provide, among other things, that the prohibition against general solicitation and general advertising in Rule 502(c) would not apply to offers or sales of securities made in compliance with new Rule 506(c). 78 Fed. Reg. 44771 (July 25, 2013). One of the requirements of Rule 506(c) is that the issuer take reasonable steps to verify that each purchaser is an accredited investor. As indicated in supra note 11, the Venture Opinion does not address Rule 506(c) offerings. See infra note 70.

37. See 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 82 (“To be certain that the exemption from federal registration or California qualification is available in a particular transaction, the opinion giver must determine that the transaction is not part of other offers or sales of securities that, taken together, would not qualify for the exemption. These requirements often involve mixed questions of law and fact. The opinion giver will typically rely upon officers’ certificates and may review the Company’s minute book and stock book in an effort to substantiate the factual basis for the determination of whether there are other transactions that may have to be ‘integrated’ with the current offering.” (footnotes omitted)).

See the introductory clause to opinion 9 that seeks to cover the facts described in the 2007 Business Transactions Report and that tracks the form of the “no registration opinion” suggested in the NVCA FORM. See NVCA FORM, supra note 5 (opinion 8).

38. Section 926 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, required the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to adopt new requirements for offerings made in reliance on the Rule 506 exemption, including Venture Financings. Rule 506, as revised, now requires: (i) that no persons related to the offering (as identified in Rule 506(d)(1)) be “bad actors” (as defined in Rule 506(d)) and (ii) that written disclosure of prior bad actor events (as identified in Rule 506(e)) be provided to each purchaser a reasonable time prior to sale. The Committee believes that opinion givers may appropriately rely on an express assumption regarding the absence of “bad actors.” The Committee does not take a position on whether the absence of “bad actors” may be addressed by expressly assuming the accuracy of the representations set forth in certificates or other documents. See generally No Registration Report, supra note 7, at 191–92 (sample opinion, while predating the bad actor rules, relies on reference to representations in agreements to establish facts).

39. See supra note 32.

40. See supra note 32.

41. Opinion literature has long recognized that the benefit an opinion provides a recipient must be balanced against the costs of preparing the opinion. See, e.g., 2007 REMEDIES REPORT, supra note 6, app. 4, at 4–9. Most early stage venture-backed companies have limited resources that place a practical limit on the diligence the opinion preparers can perform without exceeding the Company’s budget for legal fees in the transaction. In these transactions, the Schedule of Exceptions to the representations and warranties in the Purchase Agreement—a document that, in a traditional Venture Financing, is not likely to be lengthy—often discloses matters such as potentially defective securities issuances, failures to have made required filings, and failures to have followed procedural requirements in approving organizational documents or contracts. These disclosures may be made out of a belief that they evidence a real problem; they may also be made simply because the Company is unwilling or unable to invest the time or incur the expense of determining whether a real problem exists. In either case, an opinion recipient’s counsel should discuss with its client the potential legal consequences of the matters disclosed in the Schedule of Exceptions so that the client can make an informed decision as to whether to assume the risk and proceed with the Venture Financing.

The subject matter of certain representations and warranties for which exceptions are taken may also be the subject of requested opinions (as in opinions on the validity of stock issuances, breaches of existing agreements, or the obtaining of consents or approvals) or confirmations (such as the absence of litigation). As a result, exceptions similar to those taken in the Schedule of Exceptions may be relevant to the opinions given. While the opinion preparers may choose to restate in the opinion letter itself some or all of the exceptions in the Schedule of Exceptions to the extent the opinion preparers find them relevant (and to set them out either as exceptions, qualifications, or assumptions, as appropriate), opinion preparers in Venture Financings often include an exception or qualification in the opinion letter substantially similar to that included in the bracketed text when the Schedule of Exceptions includes matters that might otherwise be addressed by express exceptions, qualifications, or assumptions. Considerations such as cost, or the desire to avoid highlighting in an opinion letter matters that could provide a “road map” for a plaintiff or governmental agency to pursue legal action against the Company based on the disclosed problem, are reasons for this practice in the Venture Financing context, though not all opinion givers follow this practice and not all recipients accept opinion letters containing the bracketed language. The Committee believes that this practice can be appropriate in the context of Venture Financings when the exceptions or qualifications are clearly identified in the Schedule of Exceptions, and when their effect as possible limitations on the relevant opinions is or should be apparent. The fact that items constituting exceptions or qualifications are set forth outside the opinion letter in a document to which the letter refers and to which the recipient and its counsel have access should not of itself require restatement of those exceptions or qualifications in the opinion letter when their potential relevance to the topics addressed in the opinion letter should be understood by both opinion giver and recipient.

Regardless of how exceptions, qualifications, and assumptions are stated, the opinion preparers should not give an opinion that, while technically correct, they recognize will mislead the opinion recipient with regard to its subject matter. See, e.g., 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 10 (fraudulent and misleading opinions); id. at 20 (“[A] lawyer should not render an opinion based on factual assumptions if the lawyer knows that the assumptions are false or that reliance on those facts is unreasonable.”). For example, if the opinion preparers discover that a board meeting at which the directors approved the issuance of shares was not in fact a valid meeting despite minutes to the contrary, a disclosure of the “possible invalidity of the board meeting” in the Schedule of Exceptions may not be sufficient to permit giving a “validly issued” opinion regarding the issuance of those shares. By contrast, where the facts at issue are not clear (such as where there is inadequate record keeping, but the opinion preparers believe the actual facts would support the giving of a particular opinion), noting the state of the record in the Schedule of Exceptions is appropriate and would appropriately qualify the opinion given.

Some opinion preparers broaden the bracketed text by including a reference to the Purchase Agreement itself in addition to the reference to the Schedule of Exceptions. This practice may have the unfortunate consequence of making it difficult for the opinion recipient to determine what facts or other disclosures the opinion giver is relying upon for purposes of giving opinions (e.g., factual statements that may be set forth in exceptions to affirmative or negative covenants or other provisions, exhibits, or schedules in the Purchase Agreement). Even if the opinion giver were to limit the broader reference to include only representations in the Purchase Agreement, the opinion recipient may find it difficult to determine if the opinion giver is inappropriately attempting to rely on more in the Purchase Agreement than just the factual representations in the Purchase Agreement. See, e.g., DONALD W. GLAZER, SCOTT FITZGIBBON & STEVEN O. WEISE, GLAZER AND FITZGIBBON ON LEGAL OPINIONS § 4.2.1, at 121 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter GLAZER & FITZGIBBON] (“Opinion preparers also sometimes base opinions on representations of the company in the agreement. Representations, however, often are framed not as statements of fact, which may be relied on to support an opinion, but as conclusions of law, which may not.”).

Finally, the Committee notes that the bracketed text may be less appropriate (as the cost/benefit analysis may be less compelling) for opinion letters delivered in transactions for later stage venture-backed companies when the amount being raised justifies more diligence and a larger budget for legal fees.

42. Practice has moved toward giving the “validly existing” opinion and away from the “duly incorporated” opinion. See NVCA FORM, supra note 5, at 1 n.1; 1998 TriBar Report, supra note 8, at 642–43.

43. Alternative language for use if the Company is incorporated in California follows:

The Company is a corporation validly existing and in good standing under the laws of the State of California.

If the Company is incorporated in California, the second sentence of this opinion (regarding qualification to transact business in California) is not necessary. For the distinction between the “validly existing” opinion and the “duly incorporated” opinion in California, see TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 8 n.17 (citing the 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 40). For the distinction between the “validly existing” opinion and the “duly incorporated” opinion in Delaware, see 1998 TriBar Report, supra note 8, at 641–47.

44. This language tracks the California Corporations Code. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2105(a) (West 1990 & Supp. 2012).

45. Consistent with the Transactional Opinion, this opinion does not include: (1) an opinion that “the Company has the corporate power and authority to … ,” and (2) reference to the power of the Company to “own and operate its assets.” See TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 8–9 n.18 (“Historically, the corporate power opinion included a reference to ‘authority’ in addition to ‘power.’ Because of concerns that a reference to ‘authority’ could lead to a more expansive interpretation of the ‘corporate power’ opinion, current practice appears to be moving away from including ‘authority.’ However, the ‘corporate power’ opinion is generally understood to have the same meaning whether or not ‘authority’ is included and, to the extent that the word ‘authority’ is included, it is generally understood to be limited to ‘corporate authority’ even without the modifier ‘corporate’ immediately preceding the word ‘authority.’ In addition, the corporate power opinion has historically included an express opinion that the subject corporation has the corporate power to own and operate its assets. Current practice seems to be evolving away from this form of opinion in favor of limiting the ‘corporate power’ opinion to the Company’s power to carry on its business as it is currently conducted.” (citing the 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 44)).

The Committee notes that venture capital investors may have an interest in whether the business that is to be conducted by the Company is ultra vires. For example, venture capital investors often provide seed funding to a newly formed (or relatively new) corporation with a proposed business plan but little or no established operations. Thus, in Venture Financings, “[o]pinion recipients sometimes ask that this opinion be broadened, for example, to cover the Company’s corporate power to conduct its business.” NVCA FORM, supra note 5, at 1 n.3. In this regard, if the corporate power opinion is written to include the Company’s power to carry on its business and is not limited to the Company’s business as currently conducted, the Committee believes that the opinion giver should consider including other qualifying conditions in the opinion. If the business of the Company is described in a document that has been delivered to the investors, the opinion should make explicit reference to that document. For example, “The Company has the corporate power to conduct its business as proposed to be conducted in its Business Plan dated ______, 20_____,” or “The Company has the corporate power to conduct its business as described in Section ____ of the Purchase Agreement.” Alternatively, the opinion may be based on an officer’s certificate or disclosure document describing the Company’s business as currently and proposed to be conducted. In either case, the opinion requires a review of the Company’s Certificate of Incorporation (or Articles of Incorporation if the Company is incorporated in California) to confirm the absence of any limitations on corporate power. See TRANS-ACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 8–9 n.18 (citing the 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 44).

46. The opinion on corporate power to “perform” covers both the obligations in the Transaction Documents that the Company is required to meet at closing and the obligations that the Company is required to perform in the future. See 1998 TriBar Report, supra note 8, at 657−58 & n.139 (general discussion of obligations to be performed in the future). Opinion preparers must determine whether the corporation law of the state in which the Company was incorporated or the Company’s Restated Charter or Bylaws prohibit the Company from performing its obligations under the Transaction Documents both at and after the closing. For example, is the Company agreeing to conduct a banking business that would not be permitted under its articles of incorporation? See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 202 (West 1990 & Supp. 2012).

47. Some opinion givers include a supplemental reference to the sale and issuance of the securities that are the subject of the Venture Financing:

The Company has the corporate power to enter into and perform its obligations under the Transaction Documents, including without limitation, the sale and issuance of the Shares [and the Warrants], and the issuance of the Conversion Shares[, Warrant Shares and the Warrant Conversion Shares]. (emphasis added).

The Committee believes that the supplemental reference to “the sale and issuance of the Shares …” is redundant (a view that is consistent with the NVCA FORM). See NVCA FORM, supra note 5.

In analyzing whether the Company has the corporate power to “perform its obligations,” opinion givers sometimes have concerns regarding circumstances that may arise in the future: for example, the law could change or the certificate of incorporation could be amended to prohibit future stock issuances or sufficient authorized but unissued shares might not be available when Conversion Shares, Warrant Shares, and Warrant Conversion Shares are to be issued. Nevertheless, the opinion preparers are entitled to rely on customary practice that the opinion letter speaks only as of its date and thus may ignore possible changes in the law or subsequent amendments to the certificate of incorporation. See GLAZER & FITZGIBBON, supra note 41, § 2.2.1, at 572. In addition, the opinion preparers may rely on the assumptions that in the Venture Opinion are stated expressly (Section B (“Assumptions”), paragraphs (e) and (f)) for the sufficiency of available common and preferred shares when Conversion Shares, Warrant Shares, and Warrant Conversion Shares are issued.

48. This opinion follows the formulation recommended in the 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 45–48. Regardless of whether the word “performance” is included in the opinion, it covers the corporate authorizations the Company is required to obtain under the corporation law of the state where it is incorporated to execute, deliver, and perform its obligations under the Transaction Documents. 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 45.

This opinion is understood, as a matter of customary practice, to mean that the Company has taken the corporate action required to authorize its officers to bind the Company contractually to perform its obligations under the Transaction Documents. As a matter of customary practice, the opinion is understood not to provide assurance that the Company has taken the corporate action required to authorize performance after the closing of obligations in the Transaction Documents, such as an obligation to issue shares in the future at a price based on a future market price, when that action can be taken only at some future date.

Finally, by covering “corporate action on the part of the Company,” the opinion by its terms makes clear that, in general, it is not covering authorizations or approvals that do not constitute corporate action but that are required by a law other than the applicable corporation law (i.e., usually the law of the state in which the Company is incorporated). For example, the opinion does not cover board approval of the future filing of a registration statement under a registration rights agreement even though board approval of the filing (or at least signing of the registration statement by a majority of directors) is required by the Securities Act. See 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 45 (“The phrase ‘duly authorized by all necessary corporate action on the part of the Company’ may be preferable to ‘duly authorized’ alone, as the latter might be construed to imply authorization under law other than the GCL or by a governmental regulatory body . . . , although the Committee does not believe that any such inference is justified or appropriate.”). However, if the Company is a Delaware corporation and it may be subject to the requirements of section 2115 of the California Corporations Code (which provides for the application of specified provisions of California corporation law to certain internal affairs of foreign corporations that have a sufficient nexus to California to justify their application), CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1990 & Supp. 2012), the Committee believes that a due authorization opinion in an opinion letter that covers California law and does not expressly limit the opinion’s coverage to the Delaware corporation law also addresses any authorization requirements imposed by section 2115 on a “quasi-California” Delaware corporation. See 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 47–48 (“If [section 2115 applies], the opinion giver [of a duly authorized opinion] will need to be aware of the provisions of the Corporations Code specified in Section 2115 as possibly being applicable to the “quasi-foreign” corporation.”); CERTIFICATE OF INCOR-PORATION OF THE NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION iii–iv (rev. Aug. 2013), available at http://goo.gl/VIjFz (under the “Model Legal Documents” tab) (for a legal analysis of the interaction between Delaware corporation law and section 2115); infra note 75 (for further discussion of the interaction of Delaware corporation law and section 2115). That said, under customary practice the opinion giver may assume, without so stating, that the requirements for application of section 2115 have not been met unless the opinion giver believes that assumption is not reliable given the apparent locus of the Company’s business or identity of its stockholders.

49. The last clause of this opinion means that the relevant agreements have been executed and delivered by duly authorized officers or agents:

The “duly executed” opinion involves a review of the minutes or reliance upon an officers’ certificate to establish that the officers executing the documents on behalf of the Company have been validly elected, that they are or were officers of the Company at the time of execution, and that they were in fact authorized to execute the documents on behalf of the Company. While the “duly executed” opinion also addresses the genuineness of the signatures of the signing officers, such genuineness is expressly or implicitly assumed.

Giving an opinion that a document has been “duly delivered” generally means that the opinion giver is present at the delivery of the signed agreement or otherwise satisfied as to the implementation of procedures for actual delivery.

2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 46. As a matter of customary usage, therefore, “execution” means the signing of relevant documents by an authorized person, and “delivery” means the transmission of those documents to the appropriate parties at consummation of the transaction, thus completing these elements of contract formation. Under this customary usage, “execution” alone—without “delivery”—would not result in the formation of a contract. The Committee is cognizant of section 1933 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1933 (West 2007) (“The execution of an instrument is the subscribing and delivering it, with or without affixing a seal.”), but believes, as a matter of customary usage, that “executed,” standing alone in an opinion, merely means that appropriate persons have signed the agreement on behalf of the Company. See TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 9 n.19 (citing 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 45–48).

Closings today often are effected by an electronic exchange of signature pages. When the opinion preparers do not witness the physical execution of the signature pages, they are permitted, as a matter of customary practice, to assume, without so stating, that all signatures are genuine. See GLAZER & FITZGIBBON, supra note 41, § 4.3.3, at 152 (a partial listing of implied assumptions that need not be expressly stated under customary practice); see also supra note 34. In addition, customary practice permits the opinion preparers to assume, without so stating, that an electronic exchange of signature pages, coupled with express or implied authorization to attach them to the relevant documents, is an appropriate procedure to constitute actual delivery. Some opinion preparers are not comfortable relying on customary practice, however, and instead obtain an officer’s certificate regarding execution and delivery of the relevant documents and describe their reliance in the opinion letter as follows:

In rendering the opinion set forth in Section C (“Opinions”), paragraph 3 concerning the Company’s execution and delivery of the Transaction Documents, we have not necessarily observed their execution by the Company but have relied exclusively upon representations regarding the Company’s execution and delivery of the Transaction Documents made to us in a certificate and our review of copies, facsimiles or .pdf files of executed signature pages delivered to us by rep-resentatives of the Company or their agents.

The Committee believes that either approach is acceptable.

50. See 1998 TriBar Report, supra note 8, at 651–52 (general discussion of the authorized capital opinion under Delaware law); 2008 TriBar Preferred Stock Report, supra note 8 (under Delaware law); 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 65–66 (extended discussion of the authorized capital opinion as it relates to California corporations); C. Stephen Bigler & John Mark Zeberkiewicz, Restoring Equity: Delaware’s Legislative Cure for Defects in Stock Issuances and Other Corporate Acts, 69 BUS. LAW. 393 (2014).

51. See 1998 TriBar Report, supra note 8, at 648–49 (extended general discussion of the duly authorized opinion); 2008 TriBar Preferred Stock Report, supra note 8 (amplification regarding duly authorized opinions on preferred stock). Note that the duly authorized opinion confirms that the Company has the power under the corporation law of the state where the Company is incorporated and the Company’s charter documents to create stock with the rights, powers, and preferences of the shares in question. 2008 TriBar Preferred Stock Report, supra note 8, at 923–24; 2009 Venture Capital Report, supra note 2, at 171; see also 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 66–69 (extended discussion of the duly authorized opinion as it relates to California corporations). For issues presented under Delaware law that California lawyers may not have the competence to advise on, see supra note 12. See generally 2008 TriBar Preferred Stock Report, supra note 8, at 923 n.12 (“The applicable state corporation statute may be the statute of the state in which the opinion preparers practice or it may be the statute of another state, such as Delaware. Non-Delaware lawyers are usually willing to give the duly authorized opinion on preferred stock issued by Delaware corporations when difficult issues are not presented.”); C. Stephen Bigler & Jennifer Veet Barrett, Words that Matter: Consid-erations in Drafting Preferred Stock Provisions, BUS. L. TODAY (Jan. 2014), http://goo.gl/BkT58Z; C. Stephen Bigler & Jennifer Veet Barrett, Drafting a Mandatory Put Provision for Preferred Stock After ThoughtWorks, BUS. L. TODAY (Jan. 2012), http://goo.gl/7UTU93; MODEL LEGAL DOCUMENTS OF THE NA-TIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION (2014), available at http://goo.gl/VIjFz (under the “Model Legal Documents” tab) (complete set of venture capital documents under Delaware law updated as of the date of publication of this Venture Opinion).

52. See 1998 TriBar Report, supra note 8, at 648–49 (extended general discussion of the validly issued opinion); 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 69–71 (extended discussion of the validly issued opinion as it relates to California corporations); see also NVCA FORM, supra note 5, at 3 n.10 (“Because the opinion on the valid issuance of the outstanding shares will require a review of each issuance of shares, in many situations it will not be cost justified. For a description of the work customarily required to be performed to give this opinion, see [2008 TriBar Preferred Stock Report, supra note 8].”).

53. In Venture Financings in which a third-party opinion letter is given, investors routinely request an opinion that the outstanding securities of the Company are fully paid and nonassessable. As a matter of customary diligence, opinion preparers usually confirm that the Company has received the consideration required by the corporate action authorizing the issuance by obtaining an officer’s certificate. See 1998 TriBar Report, supra note 8, at 650–51 (extended discussion of the fully paid and nonassessable opinion); 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 72–74 (extended discussion of the fully paid and nonassessable opinion as it relates to California corporations); see also Section E (“Certain Qualifications”), paragraph (8) below for reference to reliance in the opinion letter on such an officer’s certificate.

54. In the past, opinion letters in Venture Financings sometimes have covered three additional items:(a) the reservation of shares for future issuance (a “Reservation of Shares Opinion”), (b) the number of outstanding stock options and the number of shares reserved for grant or issuance under stock option plans (an “Outstanding Options Opinion”), and (c) the absence of certain preemptive rights (a “No Outstanding Preemptive Rights Opinion”). These opinions (whether taking the form of an opinion or a confirmation) have not been included in the Venture Opinion for the reasons that follow:

Reservation of Shares

In Venture Financings, opinion givers in the past have stated that the Company has taken the action necessary to reserve the number of shares required to be issued under the Purchase Agreement, upon conversion of convertible securities and upon the exercise of options or warrants. Consistent with the conclusions of the 2007 Business Transactions Report, the Committee believes that such “reservation of shares” opinions should not be requested:

[Because the California GCL does not] provide any legal effect to the “reservation” of shares … [t]he opinion is almost entirely factual (i.e., establishing the existence of resolutions “reserving” shares for future issuance). Because reservations have no legal effect under the GCL, lawyers generally resist giving this opinion as it is potentially misleading and opinion recipients ordinarily are satisfied by a representation by the Company or by an officer’s certificate on this point. An alternative is for the opinion to address only the question of whether the board of directors of the Company has duly adopted a resolution “reserving” such shares and whether that resolution remains in force.

2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 74. Similar concerns about misleading opinions arise under Delaware law. See NVCA FORM, supra note 5, at 3 n.12 (second paragraph addresses concerns under Delaware law).

Although the Committee believes that the reservation of shares should be addressed only in the Company’s representations and warranties in the Purchase Agreement, if an opinion giver decides to provide an opinion on this point, then it might give an opinion that the board of directors has adopted a resolution reserving a specified number of shares for issuance. See NVCA FORM, supra note 5, at 3 n.12. For example, in Section A (“Documents Examined”) above, the following language could be included:

Resolutions adopted by the Board of Directors of the Company and copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibit A reserving (a) the Shares to be issued pursuant to the Purchase Agreement, (b) [the Warrant Shares to be issued upon exercise of the Warrants, (c)] the Conversion Shares [and Warrant Conversion Shares] to be issued upon conversion of the Shares [and Warrant Shares, respectively], and (d) shares of Common Stock of the Company for issuance under the Company’s [Stock Plan Name] (the “Resolutions”).

Similarly, in Section C (“Opinions”), the following language could be included:

The Board of Directors of the Company has adopted the Resolutions.

Outstanding Options

Likewise, even though sometimes given in the past, an opinion regarding the number of shares issuable upon exercise of outstanding options and reserved for future issuance under option plans or pools ordinarily should not be requested. For an extended discussion, see 2009 Venture Capital Report, supra note 2, at 172–73. Compare NVCA FORM, supra note 5, at 3 n.10 (under Delaware law) (“Opinion recipients sometimes ask an opinion giver to state that, to the opinion giver’s knowledge, the Company has no outstanding options, warrants or other rights to acquire Company stock other than as disclosed in the Transaction Documents. Many law firms are unwilling to give this opinion because it constitutes negative assurance on a factual matter they rarely are in a position to confirm. When, however, the opinion is given, the opinion letter should describe what the opinion preparers have done to support it.”).

No Outstanding Preemptive Rights

In Venture Financings, opinion givers in the past have often given an opinion regarding the absence of certain preemptive rights. The 2009 Venture Capital Report discouraged this practice, a view the Committee confirms. For an extended discussion, see 2009 Venture Capital Report, supra note 2, at 175–77. In contrast, with respect to Delaware corporations, a limited opinion on preemptive rights may be possible if requested. See NVCA FORM, supra note 5, at 3 n.13 and accompanying text (under Delaware law).

55. The Committee believes that an opinion recipient should not request either (1) a separate opinion to the effect that “the rights, preferences and privileges [of the stock being purchased in the transaction] are as set forth in the Restated Charter,” or (2) a quasiremedies opinion that provisions in the Restated Charter will be “enforceable.” See 2009 Venture Capital Report, supra note 2, at 170–72; 2008 TriBar Preferred Stock Report, supra note 8, at 924.

56. In Venture Financings in which a third-party opinion letter is given, investors routinely request an opinion that the securities they are purchasing are fully paid and nonassessable. See 1998 TriBar Report, supra note 8, at 650 & n.136; 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 72–74. Because many Venture Financings have historically involved a real-time exchange of checks or wire transfers, stock certificates, signature pages of the Transaction Documents, and other closing documents (such as the third-party opinion of Company counsel), a practice of expressly assuming in the opinion letter that the Shares have been paid for in accordance with the terms of the Purchase Agreement has evolved. In giving the opinion set forth in this sentence, the opinion preparers still must determine that the consideration for the Shares called for by the Purchase Agreement is consistent with that set forth in the resolutions of the board authorizing the stock issuance and the corporation law of the state in which the Company was incorporated.

57. See supra note 32. Also, note that, if the Restated Charter includes a “pay-to-play” provision applicable to future financings, operation of the “pay-to-play” mandatory conversion feature raises questions as to the validity of the issuance of the Conversion Shares. See infra note 90.

58. See supra note 32.

59. This opinion does not cover all documents defined as the Transaction Documents. The Voting Agreement is intentionally omitted. The Committee believes that an opinion of Company counsel regarding the enforceability of a voting agreement against the Company is of little or no value to the recipient and should not be requested. See 2009 Venture Capital Report, supra note 2, at 182–85. Moreover, the enforceability of some provisions typically contained in a voting agreement, particularly so-called “drag-along” provisions, is not free from doubt even as against the stockholders to whom they apply (and whose obligations are not ordinarily covered by an opinion of Company counsel in a Venture Financing). Id. at 185. Other agreements ancillary to the sale of the securities in a Venture Financing (commercial agreements, intellectual property licenses, and “management rights letters”) are also not generally an appropriate subject of a third-party opinion. For an extended discussion, see 2009 Venture Capital Report, supra note 2, at 187–88. See also Section E (“Certain Qualifications”), paragraph 12.

60. The 2007 Remedies Report addresses the meaning and scope of this opinion. According to that report, the remedies opinion is customarily understood to mean that “(i) a contract has been formed, (ii) a remedy will be available in the event of a breach of the undertakings in the contract (or the undertakings will otherwise be given effect), and (iii) remedies in the contract will be given effect, unless, in the case of (ii) or (iii), expressly or implicitly excluded.” 2007 REMEDIES REPORT, supra note 6, at 3. In establishing whether a contract has been formed, the opinion preparers will need to confirm or assume the predicates of formation, many of which, as a matter of customary practice, they are permitted to assume without so stating (for example, the capacity of individuals) and others of which are covered in other opinions that typically accompany a remedies opinion, such as (in the case of parties who are entities) the opinions addressing power and due authorization. See TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 11–12 n.23. As to what a remedies opinion does not mean, see supra note 55 (remedies opinion on the certificate of incorporation (Delaware) or the articles of incorporation (California) is not appropriate).

The 2007 Remedies Report goes on to note:

[T]his report … concludes that the long-standing supposed continental divide over the meaning and scope of the remedies opinion—the “New York view” that it covers “each and every” provision of a contract versus the “California view” that it covers only the “essential provisions”— should no longer be of concern in opinion practice. Instead, the focus should be on customary practice. Customary practice comprises customary diligence (particularly the legal diligence customarily undertaken in giving a remedies opinion), customary competence, and customary usage (the customarily understood meaning of terms used in third-party legal opinions).

2007 REMEDIES REPORT, supra note 6, at 1.

Giving a legal opinion in general—and giving an enforceability opinion in particular—requires that the opinion preparers conduct factual and legal due diligence. A good discussion of customary factual diligence cited by the 2007 Remedies Report can be found in Article II of the 1998 TriBar Report. 1998 TriBar Report, supra note 8, at 608–19. Customary legal diligence, addressed in Appendix 8 of the 2007 Remedies Report, begins with a review by competent opinion preparers of the agreement or agreements covered by the opinion. 2007 REMEDIES REPORT, supra note 6, app. 8. If a question arises about the enforceability of a particular provision, the opinion preparers must determine whether the opinion covers the issue. If it does, they must determine whether the issue can be resolved. If the issue cannot be resolved, they should include an appropriate exception in the opinion. See 2007 REM-EDIES REPORT, supra note 6, app. 8, at 7–8.

61. Absent express qualifications or assumptions, a remedies opinion covers the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause in each agreement covered by the opinion. See TriBar Remedies Opinion Re-port, supra note 8, at 1495 (“The remedies opinion addresses the enforceability of the provision in most agreements that chooses the law of a particular jurisdiction as the governing law.”). When California law is chosen (i.e., an “inbound” choice of law), that choice is effective under California’s choice-of-law rules in most commercial transactions involving at least $250,000. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (West 2004). However, consistent with the trend toward Delaware incorporation is a trend toward the selection of Delaware law as the law governing the stock purchase agreement and other transactional documents in a Venture Financing. An opinion giver faced with a request for a remedies opinion on agreements that choose another state’s law as their governing law must decide how to respond. Although the Committee notes that some opinion givers are of the view that no remedies opinion should be given when the documents in question select the law of a state other than California as the governing law, the Committee believes that, in general, practice “now greatly favors permitting the primary opinion giver to give an opinion to the effect that, if the law of the State of California were held to apply to the agreement, notwithstanding the choice of law of another jurisdiction, the agreement would be enforceable.” 2007 REMEDIES REPORT, supra note 6, app. 10, at B-1 (endnote 1); see also 2007 REMEDIES REPORT, supra note 6, app. 4, at 12 (also supporting the use of this so-called “as if ” approach). If such an opinion is given (assuming, for illustrative purposes, that the relevant Transaction Documents are governed by Delaware law), the lead-in to the enforceability opinion would be modified to read substantially as follows:

If a court were to apply the law of California to the interpretation and enforcement of the [transaction documents], rather than the law of Delaware as provided therein, each of the [transaction documents] would be . . . .

In addition, although not required in such an event, many lawyers modify the statement about the law covered by this opinion (which appears at the beginning of Section E (“Certain Qualifications”) of the Venture Opinion) by adding to it the following:

We note that the [transaction documents] provide that they are to be governed by the law of the State of Delaware. Except with respect to those portions of the [transaction documents] that are governed by the Delaware General Corporation Law, our opinion in Section C (“Opinions”), paragraph 6 above regarding the validity, binding effect and enforceability of the [transaction documents] is given as though each of the [transaction documents] were governed by Internal California Law. As used herein, “Internal California Law” means the internal laws of the State of California applicable to a contract made by California residents in the State of California that selects California law as the governing law of such contract, without regard to any laws or equitable principles regarding choice of law, conflict of laws or public policies that might make any other law(s) applicable.

See also NVCA FORM, supra note 5, at 1 n.5. The Committee notes that the foregoing language differs slightly from the language recommended in the 2009 Venture Capital Report but no difference in meaning is intended. Rather, the additional sentence at the end is intended merely to provide further clarification of the meaning of an “as if ” remedies opinion. See 2009 Venture Capital Report, supra note 2, at 167.

The “as if ” remedies opinion does not cover the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause because it assumes that the choice-of-law clause is not enforced. See TriBar Remedies Opinion Report, supra note 8, at 1497 n.70 (“[The “as if ” remedies] opinion has the same meaning as any other remedies opinion except that it does not address the enforceability of the chosen law provision.”). Although not requested, some opinion givers state expressly that an “as if ” remedies opinion does not address the enforceability under California law of the choice-of-law clause in the agreements being covered.

If under California law sufficient contacts or bases exist to support the parties’ choice of law, and the opinion giver is giving a specific opinion on the choice-of-law clause, a form for such an opinion (where a law other than that of California is chosen) follows:

In a proceeding in a court of the State of California for the enforcement of the [transaction documents], and based on [describe contacts or bases for choosing law of chosen state], the court should give effect to Section ____ [choice-of-law provision] of the [transaction document], except to the extent (i) that any provision of the [transaction document] is determined by the court to be contrary to a fundamental policy of the state whose law would apply in the absence of that Section, and (ii) that state has a materially greater interest in the determination of the particular issue than does the state whose law is chosen.

See 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 88–91; 2007 REMEDIES REPORT, supra note 6, app. 10, at B-1 to B-6; see also TriBar Opinion Comm., Supplemental Report: Opinions on Chosen-Law Provisions Under the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 68 BUS. LAW. 1161 (2013). This opinion could be given as a supplement to the “as if ” remedies opinion. It also could be given as a standalone opinion, without any remedies opinion, if the opinion recipient does not request a remedies opinion. See 2007 REMEDIES REPORT, supra note 6, at 90–91.

62. In the case of a “consents and approvals” opinion, the opinion preparers may rely on the qualifications in Section E (“Certain Qualifications”), which, among other things, exclude from the coverage of the opinion securities laws and many other laws (Section E (“Certain Qualifications”), first paragraph, last two sentences).

63. Opinion 7 generally follows the formulation of the “consents and approvals” opinion appearing in the 2007 Business Transactions Report but without the securities law exclusions, which are unnecessary in light of Section E (“Certain Qualifications”), first paragraph, last two sentences, of the Venture Opinion. See 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 61; see also supra note 62 (discussing exclusion of coverage of securities laws) & infra note 65 (discussing requests for “performance” opinions). If the opinion giver decides to give an opinion on consents and approvals required for the Company’s performance of future obligations, the opinion preparers should consider whether or not the Company’s future obligations under the Transaction Documents are sufficiently clear that they can identify all of the consents and approvals the Company needs to perform those obligations. See infra note 65 (which is equally applicable to this opinion 7).

64. The Committee has intentionally not included an exception for notice filings required by Regulation D under the Securities Act. Except for the “no registration” opinion (see opinion 9), the Venture Opinion does not cover securities laws. See infra note 78. The Venture Opinion expressly excludes coverage of securities laws (except for opinion 9), but that express exclusion would be implied even if not expressly stated. Compare NVCA FORM, supra note 5, at 2 n.8 (“Securities law approvals and filings are understood as a matter of customary practice not to be covered by this opinion unless referred to specifically. Some lawyers, however, choose to make this explicit by including [the articulated exception regarding the notice filings pursuant to Regulation D of the Securities Act and the California Corporate Securities Law of 1968, as amended], or a statement indicating that the only opinion covering securities laws is [the no registration opinion]. Such an exclusion does not mean that other laws customarily understood to be excluded are covered.”).

The Committee notes that, although not necessary, some firms regularly include an express exclusion for federal and state securities laws at the end of the “no approvals and consent” opinion such as the following:

except that we express no opinion as to federal or state securities laws.

The Committee believes that this approach is acceptable and that the inclusion of such an express exclusion does not mean that other opinions that do not include the exclusion are intended to cover such laws.

65. The formulation of this opinion (and opinion 7) often refers to “performance of the Company’s obligations,” “the consummation of the transactions,” or “sale and issuance of the Shares [and Warrants]” under the Purchase Agreement. Although some bar association reports have taken the view that these formulations “may” be different (suggesting, of course, that they also may not be), the Committee believes that in most contexts they are different, and that “performance” adds a future element to the opinion when the Company has obligations to be performed after the closing, while “consummation” or “sale and issuance of the Shares [and Warrants]” covers only matters through the closing of the transaction. See GLAZER & FITZGIBBON, supra note 41, § 15.5, at 572; 1998 TriBar Report, supra note 8, at 662–63; supra note 63 (discusses similar issue regarding “consents and approvals” opinion 7). As it relates to opinion 8(d), coverage of “performance,” although common, requires the opinion preparers to consider compliance with many laws (i.e., those Covered Laws (as defined in Section E (“Certain Qualifications”) below) of either (or both) California and Delaware) because the Transaction Documents often require the Company to perform numerous obligations after the closing. In contrast to the “due authorization” opinion, which “only” requires a review of the Company’s constituent documents, minute books, and similar corporate records and the applicable corporation law (i.e., Delaware or California or both), opinion 8 (and opinion 7) covers many more potentially applicable laws. As discussed elsewhere (see, e.g., supra notes 41 & 48), to reduce the opinion preparers’ factual and legal diligence in a Venture Financing when legal budgets are limited and time is critical, opinion givers often use a narrower formulation that does not add a future element to the opinion. The formulation of the “no violation” opinion in the Venture Opinion focuses on the execution and delivery of the Transaction Documents and the performance of the obligations the Company is required to perform at the closing: the sale and issuance of the Shares at the closing and, where applicable, the sale of the Warrants at the closing (or, the functional equivalent: “the consummation of the transactions”) under the Purchase Agreement. If the opinion giver agrees to give a “no violation” opinion on the Company’s performance in the future of specific obligations, it normally should address the Company’s performance of those obligations in a separate opinion (as is done with respect to securities laws in Section C (“Opinions”), paragraph 9). See 2007 BUSINESS TRANSAC-TIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 61–62.

Finally, if the opinion giver agrees to give an opinion on the “performance” of all of the Company’s obligations under the Transaction Documents, the opinion will cover not only “performance” by the Company of its obligations under the Transaction Documents as of the closing but also the performance of its obligations after the closing, for example, post-closing issuances of Shares and Warrants in installments pursuant to the Transaction Documents. The analysis required to support an opinion covering the performance of future obligations can be difficult. See generally GLAZER & FITZGIBBON, supra note 41, §§ 13.2.3, 16.3.7, at 548–52, 602–07; 1998 TriBar Report, supra note 8, at 657–58 (general discussion of coverage of obligations to be performed in the future); see also 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 48–56 (discussing the diligence required to deliver a “no violation” opinion that covers the performance of future obligations under the Transaction Documents). As the foregoing reports and treatise generally state, certain assumptions and limitations on coverage of the opinion are understood as a matter of customary practice to apply, whether or not expressly stated in the opinion. See GLAZER & FITZGIBBON, supra note 41, § 13.2.3, at 548–52 (opinion only covers facts at the time of delivery but, if an agreement obligates the Company to take actions in specified circumstances, an exception is necessary if those actions are prohibited; further, the opinion only covers required actions, not voluntary ones).

66. See 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 48–57 (an explanation of the opinions listed in opinion 8 of the Venture Opinion).

67. For a discussion of the agreements covered by this opinion, see supra notes 26 and 27 and Section A (“Documents Examined”), paragraphs (xii) and (xiii). Consistent with the Transactional Opinion, this opinion should cover an agreed list of reviewed agreements and not a vaguely defined universe (e.g., “all agreements known to us”), which is less precise and, therefore, more susceptible to later disputes. See TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 13 n.26. Further, as suggested by the 2007 Business Transactions Report, the Venture Opinion expressly excludes financial covenants and similar provisions. See 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 51–52 n.161 (extended discussion of lawyers’ evaluation of financial covenants in the context of third-party noncontravention opinions).

68. As noted in the Transactional Opinion, the Committee believes that the trend in practice is toward use of the above formulation of this opinion, although the following formulation is not un-common. If used, this alternative formulation should be accompanied by a statement as to what constitutes “knowledge”:

violate any judgment, order or decree of any court or arbitrator applicable to the Company and known to us;

See TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 14 n.27; see also Section B (“Certain Qualifications”), paragraph 2.

The NVCA FORM, supra note 5, at 2 provides two alternative formulations of this opinion, both of which are consistent with the above formulation:

violate any court order, judgment or decree, if any, listed in Schedule _____ to this opinion letter

violate any court order, judgment or decree, if any, listed in Schedule _____ to the Purchase Agreement

69. See generally TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 14 n.28. This opinion is limited to the law of the jurisdiction(s) whose law is expressly covered by the opinion letter. As a matter of customary usage, it is understood not to cover local laws and certain regulatory laws (such as securities laws). 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 55–57; 2007 REMEDIES REPORT, supra note 6, app. 10, at 13. In addition, customary usage limits the coverage of the opinion to laws a lawyer would reasonably recognize to apply to transactions of the type covered by the opinion and excludes from the coverage of the opinion laws, such as securities and tax laws, that even when applicable are understood to be covered only when referred to expressly. 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 56 n.168; Principles, supra note 7. Consequently, although language stating that only laws “typically applicable” to transactions of the type addressed by the opinion letter is unnecessary, some lawyers include language to that effect in their opinion letters. To resolve any doubt as to the law covered by the opinion, the Venture Opinion uses the term “Covered Law” and defines it to incorporate the foregoing understandings. Finally, the “no violation” opinion should be understood to mean that neither the execution and delivery by the Company of the Transaction Documents nor sale and issuance of the Shares [and Warrants] under the Purchase Agreement will result in a fine, penalty, or other similar sanction against the Company under Covered Law. See 2007 BUSINESS TRANS-ACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 55. The opinion does not cover the enforceability of the Transaction Documents. Rather, that is a matter covered by the remedies opinion in opinion 6.

70. For an extended discussion of the meaning and scope of opinions regarding the availability of an exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act, and qualification requirements under state law (a “No Registration Opinion”), see 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 78–83. In this regard, the No Registration Report is also instructive:

[A no registration opinion] is based on the assumption that [1] the Purchase Agreement contains representations by the issuer relating to the offering of the securities, including the absence of “general solicitation” and “general advertising” and prior sales of similar securities that could be integrated with the offering covered by the opinion; … [2] that the Purchase Agreement includes agreements by the issuer to limit future offers of the same or similar securities and, in certain cases, to provide information to holders of the securities; … [and] [3] that the purchasers are agreeing not to resell the securities except pursuant to an effective registration statement under the Securities Act or an exemption, such as Rule 144.

[Further,] [t]he opinion giver … must be satisfied as to the eligibility of the purchasers to acquire the securities pursuant to the exemption from registration being relied on. For example, an offering being made in reliance on Rule 506 of Regulation D may be structured so as to require all of the purchasers to be “accredited investors.” The opinion giver may rely on representations in the Purchase Agreement, a placement agent’s certificate, investor questionnaires or other procedures in confirming the eligibility of the purchasers. Ordinarily, the text of the opinion letter itself will not refer to any of the above matters.

No Registration Report, supra note 7, at 187–88. Note that the No Registration Report was published prior to the adoption of Rule 506(c), which now permits “general solicitation” and “general advertising” in offerings made in compliance with that Rule. See supra note 36. The Securities Law Opinions Subcommittee of the ABA Business Law Section’s Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities is currently considering an update to the No Registration Report to address the changes in Regulation D.

71. In many Venture Financings, No Registration Opinions are requested and given with respect to the issuance of Common Stock (or other securities) upon conversion of a convertible security or the exercise of Warrants (as has been done above in opinion 9). A No Registration Opinion can be problematic to the extent it covers Warrant Shares, Conversion Shares, or Warrant Conversion Shares because further consideration may or may not be payable for the underlying shares when they are issued. Because the transaction to which the Venture Opinion is directed involves the issuance of Warrants, the Venture Opinion adopts the approach described in a note to the NVCA Form, i.e., that an opinion on Shares issuable upon exercise of warrants (as well as options and other rights) may be given based on an express assumption that the warrants, options, or other rights were exercised and the underlying shares issued at the closing of the transaction. See NVCA FORM, supra note 5, at 4 n.16 (“When warrants, options or other rights to acquire Company stock are exercisable upon the payment of cash, the no registration opinion can raise difficult issues because the exemption under Section 3(a)(9) of the Securities Act would not be available (other than possibly if the warrants, options or other rights are exercised on a net exercise basis) and the availability of another exemption, such as under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act, would depend on the facts at the time of exercise. Accordingly, many firms will not give a no registration opinion on the issuance of shares upon the future exercise of warrants, options or other rights. Some firms, however, will give the opinion based on an express assumption that the warrants, options or other rights were exercised and the underlying shares issued at the closing [of the Venture Financing that is the subject of the opinion].”).

Although not including an opinion on the issuance of shares upon the exercise of warrants, the NVCA Form does include an opinion on the issuance of shares upon the conversion of a convertible security. That opinion, modified to adopt the definitions and style of the Venture Opinion, is as follows:

Based on, and assuming the accuracy of, the representations of each of the Purchasers in the Purchase Agreement, the offer and sale of the Shares does not, and the issuance of the Conversion Shares upon conversion of the Shares in accordance with the conversion provisions of the Restated Charter will not (assuming no commission or other remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting the conversion), require registration under Section 5 of the Securities Act [or qualification under the California Corporate Securities Law of 1968, as amended].

See NVCA FORM, supra note 5, at 3–4; see also No Registration Report, supra note 7, at 188 (“In cases where the securities being sold are convertible into Common Stock … some lawyers refer in the opinion letter to the conditions of the Section 3(a)(9) exemption from registration, for example by expressly assuming that no commission or other remuneration will be paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting conversion. Others, regarding these conditions to be so well understood that they need not be stated or for other reasons, do not refer to these conditions.”).

72. Consistent with the 2009 Venture Capital Report, the Committee believes that opinion givers should not ordinarily give opinions on the blue sky laws of states other than those states where the opinion givers regard themselves as competent to do so. See supra note 12 (competency should be the relevant test for lawyers, not licensing in a particular state). Nevertheless, in the past, some California lawyers have given those opinions based solely upon a review of unofficial compilations of foreign state blue sky laws, qualified as follows:

With respect to the securities laws of __________, we have based our opinion solely upon our examination of such laws and the rules and regulations of the authorities administering such laws, all as reported in [an unofficial compilation]. Neither special rulings of such authorities nor opinions of counsel in that jurisdiction have been obtained.

See 2009 Venture Capital Report, supra note 2, at 180–81.

73. This no litigation confirmation conforms to its counterpart in the Transactional Opinion. For an extended discussion of its meaning and customary diligence to support it, see TRANSACTIONAL OPIN-ION, supra note 3, at 14–15 n.29; 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 62–64.

74. If the law of a state other than California is selected to govern the Transaction Documents, an “as if ” remedies opinion might be given and additional language would be required at this point in the opinion letter. See supra note 61.

75. Many of the opinions in the Venture Opinion will cover the Delaware General Corporation Law as a consequence of the issuer being a Delaware corporation. See 2009 Venture Capital Report, supra note 2, at 166. In particular, the following opinions, among others, will require the opinion preparers to consider the Delaware General Corporation Law: (i) corporate status in opinion 1, (ii) corporate power to perform each of the Transaction Documents in opinion 2, (iii) all necessary corporate action has been taken in opinion 3, (iv) the authorized and outstanding capitalization of the Company in opinion 4, (v) shares of common and preferred stock are duly authorized, validly issued, fully paid, and nonassessable in opinion 5; (vi) consents and approvals under the Delaware General Corporation Law in opinion 7, and (vii) no violation of the Restated Charter, Bylaws, or laws applicable to the Company in opinion 8. Under the internal affairs doctrine, which provides that the corporation law of the state in which a corporation is incorporated regulates the corporation’s internal affairs, the Delaware General Corporation Law will govern many of the matters covered by the opinions given in a Venture Financing.

Section 2115 of the California Corporations Code (“Section 2115”), however, provides that specified provisions of California corporation law apply to certain internal affairs of foreign corporations that have sufficient nexus to California to justify their application. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1990 & Supp. 2012). Generally, for a foreign corporation to be subject to Section 2115, more than half of its holders of voting securities must have addresses in California and the average of the property, sales, and payroll factors used in California state tax determinations applicable to a foreign corporation must exceed 50 percent. While the Delaware Supreme Court has held that the application of Section 2115 to a Delaware corporation is unconstitutional, see VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005), California has no definitive authority to the same effect. Opinion givers are therefore cautioned to consider the potential application of Section 2115 and its impact on the opinions in the Venture Opinion. See 2009 Venture Capital Report, supra note 2, at 166 n.8 (describes recent case law developments regarding Section 2115); supra note 48 (for further discussion of the interaction of Delaware corporation law and Section 2115).

In a Venture Financing, opinion preparers often use one of two approaches to resolve legal issues under Section 2115. One approach is to revise the transaction documents and the Company’s constituent corporate documents to comply with both California and Delaware law. This approach, however, may not always be possible because certain rights and remedies insisted on by investors may be effective under Delaware law but not California law (e.g., “pay to play” charter provisions, see infra note 90). In such situations, a second approach is to include a qualification or exception in Section E (“Certain Qualifications”) of the opinion letter for the possible invalidity of those rights and remedies under Section 2115.

Of course, if the Company is incorporated in California, the California Corporations Code would apply in its entirety, and Section 2115 would not be relevant.

76. By customary usage, the statement “[w]e express no opinion herein as to the application or effect of the law of any other jurisdiction” is understood even if not stated. See TRANSACTIONAL OPINION,

supra note 3, at 15 n.30 (citing 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 86–91; 1998 TriBar Report, supra note 8, at 631).

77. If the Company is a regulated entity, such as an investment company subject to regulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended, the law addressed by the opinion letter would include federal and California laws regulating the Company, unless those laws are expressly excluded (as is done in the Venture Opinion). Moreover, even if the Company is not a regulated entity, the opinion giver may be unwilling to cover certain laws. For instance, an opinion giver may expressly exclude compliance with laws affecting the insurance, utility, telecommunications, or banking industries from its opinion letter. If the opinion recipient wants an opinion that the opinion giver is not in a position to give, special counsel often will be engaged to give it. See TRANS-ACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 15–16 n.30 (citing 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 34).

78. This sentence is included to avoid misunderstanding. As a matter of customary practice, securities laws are understood not to be covered in an opinion letter unless, as in opinion 9, they are addressed expressly. See Principles, supra note 7, at 832 (II.D); NVCA FORM, supra note 5, at 2 n.8. The Committee has intentionally omitted an exception for securities law filings from the “consents and approvals” opinion because of this qualification. See supra note 64.

79. For a discussion of the bankruptcy and equitable principles exceptions, see TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 16 n.32; 2007 REMEDIES REPORT, supra note 6, app. 10, at 3–9.

80. Note that this paragraph should be deleted if “to our knowledge,” “known to us,” or similar language is not included in any of the opinions or confirmations being given. See TRANSACTIONAL OPIN-ION, supra note 3, at 17 n.33; 2007 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 15–17 (discussion of confirmations of fact). See also TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 17 n.33; 2007 BUSINESS TRANS-ACTIONS REPORT, supra note 6, at 32–34 (discussion of limitations on the basis of knowledge).

81. See TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 17 n.35 (citing 2007 REMEDIES REPORT, supra note 6, app. 10, at B-24 to B-25 (endnote 21 discusses attorney’s fee provisions)).

82. See TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 17 n.36 (citing 2007 REMEDIES REPORT, supra note 6, app. 10, at B-13 to B-14 (endnote 13 discusses forum selection clauses and consents to jurisdiction)).

83. See TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 17 n.37 (citing 2007 REMEDIES REPORT, supra note 6, app. 10, at B-15 to B-16 (endnote 15 discusses jury trial waivers)).

84. See TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 18 n.39 (citing 2007 REMEDIES REPORT, supra note 6, app. 10, at B-22 to B-24 (endnote 20 discusses arbitration provisions)). The Committee notes that many recent judicial decisions have considered challenges to the enforceability of arbitration clauses. Both federal and California case law make clear that public policy strongly favors enforcement of arbitration agreements. In the past, California courts often held that particular arbitration clauses were unenforceable because they were unconscionable. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 87 (Cal. 2000); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005). The Federal Arbitration Act generally provides that an agreement to arbitrate is enforceable, except on grounds that may exist for the revocation of any contract, such as unconscionability or fraud. In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the Arbitration Act preempted state law where the unconscionability was based on the terms of an arbitration clause itself and, therefore, held that the Arbitration Act preempted the holding in Discover Bank. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court held that where the pro-arbitration policy of the Arbitration Act conflicts with the enforcement of another federal law (such as the antitrust law) under the terms of a particular arbitration agreement, the policies of the other law must give way so long as the other law does not otherwise provide. See, e.g., American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). Applying Concepcion, California courts have upheld arbitration clauses and have not allowed class arbitrations in the absence of an agreement permitting class arbitration. See Truly Nolen of Am. v. Superior

Court, 208 Cal. App. 4th 487 (2012); see also Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 57 Cal. 4th 1109 (2013) (under the Arbitration Act, courts applying state unconscionability principles cannot mandate procedural rules that are inconsistent with fundamental attributes of arbitration; however, a court applying an unconscionability analysis may consider the value of benefits provided to employees by state statutes in determining whether a particular arbitral scheme provides an accessible, affordable process for resolving wage disputes); see also Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348 (2014) (class action waivers in labor contracts are enforceable due to preemption of state law public policy by the Arbitration Act; however, waivers of California’s Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”), permitting aggrieved persons to bring actions to enforce civil penalties for state Labor Code violations, are unenforceable as a violation of public policy; and the Arbitration Act does not preempt state law that provides for unenforceability of waivers of the rights of aggrieved persons to bring court actions as deputized actors for the state under the PAGA). As a result of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the Committee believes that as a general rule opinion givers need not include an exception for the enforceability of arbitration clauses in agreements among sophisticated parties in Venture Financings. Nevertheless, many opinion givers are not comfortable giving opinions on the enforceability of arbitration clauses because they believe that: (1) the law is not completely settled, (2) they do not closely follow developments in the law in this area, or (3) although arbitration clauses may be generally enforceable, they are unsure whether certain provisions of the arbitration clause are enforceable such that unenforceability of the particular provision might render the entire arbitration clause unenforceable because the unenforceable provision “permeates” the entire arbitration provision. In the case of such uncertainty, opinion givers may consider including this qualification (and may find that in many cases opinion recipients are willing to accept it).

85. See supra note 53.

86. The 2009 Venture Capital Report provides two forms of qualification for the capitalization opinion: one form when the opinion giver maintains the Company’s stock records and a second form when the Company or a third party maintains the Company’s stock records. See 2009 Venture Capital Report, supra note 2, at 168–69. Because opinion givers in many cases do not maintain the Company’s stock records, the Venture Opinion uses only the second form of qualification. If the opinion giver maintains the Company’s stock records, the first form of qualification may be appropriate and that qualification, modified to adopt the definitions and style of the Venture Opinion, is as follows:

In giving the equity capitalization opinion set forth in Section C (“Opinions”), paragraph (4), we have relied without further investigation on (a) the Restated Charter, (b) the Bylaws, (c) minute books relating to meetings and written actions of the incorporator(s), Board of Directors, and stockholders of the Company, and stock records consisting of [description], that [are in our possession] [have been delivered to us by the Company for the purposes of rendering this opinion], and (d) statements in a certificate the Company has delivered to us relating to the equity capitalization of the Company (collectively, the “Capitalization Records”). We have not undertaken to verify the accuracy and completeness of that information, other than by reviewing the Capitalization Records. Accordingly, our opinion on the number and character of issued and outstanding securities means that, based upon the examination referred to above, the Capitalization Records are consistent with the information as to the number and character of outstanding securities that is set forth in Section C (“Opinions”), paragraph (4).

See 2009 Venture Capital Report, supra note 2, at 169.

87. The Committee believes that the current trend is against giving “Outstanding Options Opinions” and “No Outstanding Preemptive Rights Opinions” and, therefore, neither has been included in the Venture Opinion. See supra note 54. Nevertheless, to the extent those opinions are given, the further qualifications articulated in the 2009 Venture Capital Report are appropriate:

Accordingly, our opinion on the number and character of issued and outstanding securities means that, based upon the examination referred to above, the Capitalization Records are consistent with the information as to the number and character of outstanding stock[, options, warrants, conversion privileges, or other rights] that is set forth in Section C (“Opinions”), paragraph 4.

2009 Venture Capital Report, supra note 2, at 169.

88. 2007 REMEDIES REPORT, supra note 6, app. 10, at B-26 to B-31 (endnotes 23 and 25 discuss indemnities). Both the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and federal court decisions have taken the position that corporate indemnification for liabilities arising under the Securities Act is against public policy. Such limitations may apply regardless of whether indemnification is permissible under applicable state laws. See, e.g., 2007 REMEDIES REPORT, supra note 6, app. 10, at B-31 (“The public policy against permitting one party to shift liability for breaches of the securities laws to another party, the conflicting judicial policies applicable to indemnities by buyers in securities purchase transactions, and the absence of decisive relevant case law make it difficult to render an opinion regarding the enforceability of such contractual provisions. Thus, it is customary practice to include an exception in a remedies opinion relating to the enforceability of those provisions.”).

The first bracketed language in the qualification may be deleted if Section E (“Certain Qualifications”), first paragraph, last sentence limits the coverage of securities laws to only Section C (“Opinions”), paragraph 9 (the “no registration opinion”).

Note that the sample language does not exclude negligence; opinion givers should confirm that the provision is sufficiently clear that it covers negligent acts of the indemnified party in which case the brackets around “gross” should be removed. See 2007 REMEDIES REPORT, supra note 6, app. 10, at B-26 to B-28.

89. Some lawyers believe that an opinion regarding compliance by the directors, officers, or principal stockholders with their fiduciary duties is appropriate as a stand-alone opinion or is implicit in the duly authorized opinion, the validly issued opinion (Section C (“Opinions”), paragraphs 4 and 5), or the enforceability opinion (Section C (“Opinions”), paragraph 6). The Committee believes that such a belief is inconsistent with customary practice. Prior published opinion reports make clear that compliance with fiduciary duties is covered by an opinion letter only if addressed expressly and that no such opinion should be implied. To avoid misunderstanding, some opinion givers may choose to state expressly that the opinions they are giving do not cover compliance with fiduciary duties. See 2009 Venture Capital Report, supra note 2, at 189; see also supra note 34.

90. Regarding voting agreements see supra note 59. If the Transaction Documents provide for a special mandatory conversion feature, often known as a “pay-to-play” provision, the opinion giver should also consider whether a qualification is appropriate. See supra notes 57 & 75 (third paragraph). The analysis (and conclusion) may differ depending upon whether the Company is a California or Delaware corporation. See 2009 Venture Capital Report, supra note 2, at 185–87.

91. Consistent with the Transactional Opinion, the Venture Opinion takes the traditional approach to reliance by permitting only those to whom it is addressed to rely on it. See TRANSACTIONAL OPINION, supra note 3, at 19 n.41 for an extended discussion.

 

Failure to Make Capital Contribution Does Not Necessarily Result in Reduction of Interest in LLC or LP

 

Hypothetical 1: Two people (Member A and Member B) agree to form a Delaware LLC, and they agree to contribute $50,000 each in start-up capital. Each member is to receive a 50% interest in the company. Member A contributes $50,000, but Member B contributes only $10,000. Does Member B own 50% of the company? 

Hypothetical 2: Two people agree to form a Delaware LLC, and they both agree to contribute $50,000 in start-up capital. Each member receives a 50% interest in the LLC. The company is managed by Member A. After a period of operations, Member A decides the company is in need of additional capital. He makes a capital call for an additional $50,000 from each member. Member A contributes the additional $50,000. Member B contributes nothing. Does Member B still own 50% of the company? 

*     *     * 

The Delaware Court of Chancery was recently faced with a variation of Hypothetical 1 in Grove v. Brown, 2013 WL 4041495 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2013), and its answer to the question posed above likely has implications to the answer to Hypothetical 2. Although failure to make an initial capital contribution may be somewhat unusual, LLC members and LP partners often must decide how to answer a capital call like that in Hypothetical 2. In the Grove decision, the Court of Chancery explained that a member’s failure to make the full amount of his initial capital contribution did not cause any reduction in his membership interest. If the members of an LLC or partners of an LP wish to have membership interest or partnership interest reduced for a deficiency of a capital contribution, the Court of Chancery held those parties must contract for it in the operating agreement. As explained below, in the context of capital calls, courts have enforced such provisions permitting dilution for failing to respond to a capital call. However, if the LLC agreement is silent on the subject, based on the Grove decision, a non-contributing member who fails to answer the call may find that the non-contributing member still owns the same amount of interest, and the contributing member who pays in additional capital may find that you do not always get what you pay for. 

Act Permits LLC Agreement to Provide for Reduction of Membership Interest 

The Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (the “Delaware LLC Act”) permits an LLC agreement to provide for the reduction of a member’s interest if that member fails to provide capital when so required. Specifically, 6 Del. C. § 18-502(c) provides: 

A limited liability company agreement may provide that the interest of any member who fails to make any contribution that the member is obligated to make shall be subject to specified penalties for, or specified consequences of, such failure. Such penalty or consequence may take the form of reducing or eliminating the defaulting member’s proportionate interest in a limited liability company . . . . 

(Emphasis added). This language, however, is clearly permissive. It is not one of the few mandatory provisions in the Delaware LLC Act. To the contrary, it states that an LLC agreement “may provide” for a reduction in a member’s interest if a required capital contribution is not made. The Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (the “Delaware LP Act”) contains a provision that similarly permits a partnership agreement to reduce a partner’s proportionate interest in the limited partnership in the event that partner fails to make a required capital contribution. See 6 Del. C. § 17-502(c). Significantly, neither Section 17-502(c) nor Section 18-502(c) distinguish between a failure to make a required initial capital contribution and a failure to make a subsequent required contribution in response to a valid call for capital.

If Operating Agreement Permits Dilution for Failure to Answer Capital Call, Delaware Will Enforce the Provision

Courts have found provisions adopted pursuant to Sections 17-502(c) and 18-502(c) enforceable. However, the Court of Chancery has held the parties to the strict language of the agreement. In Telstra Corp. v. Dynegy, Inc., 2003 WL 1016984 (Del. Ch. 2003), Telstra exercised a put option it had under the partnership agreement. If Telstra exercised the put in the first two years of the partnership’s existence, which it did, then Telstra was entitled to a purchase price that equaled the value of its capital account. A dispute arose as to whether it was appropriate to “book down” the value of Telstra’s capital account based on a decline in the company’s fair market value. Under the terms of the partnership agreement, a “book down” was only triggered upon certain events, one of which was a disparate capital contribution. 

The partnership agreement permitted capital calls. However, for a call for capital, the partnership agreement required: (1) approval of the board of managers, (2) notice sent to the partners, and (3) a 90 day window for the partners to answer the call. An officer of the partnership issued the relevant call without approval of the board of managers, rendering it invalid. Dynegy provided additional funds in response to the invalid capital call. Holding the parties to the terms of the agreement and refusing to allow Dynegy to benefit from the invalid capital call, the court found that “the Partnership was not permitted to accept the defendants’ purported ‘capital contribution,’” and that “the defendants were not free under the terms of the Agreement to unilaterally make a disproportionate contribution of capital to the Partnership.” Moreover, even if the call had been issued by the board, 90 days had not passed at the time Telstra exercised its put. The court found that “[i]t is only when a partner fails to contribute its pro rata share of the capital contributions by the due date that the non-contributing partner’s Partnership interest will be diluted.” Although the Telstra court never specifically referenced Section 17-502(c), it recognized that the provision permitting a reduction in partnership interest based on a capital call to be enforceable. 

Although not decided by a Delaware court, in Abuy Development, L.L.C. v. Yuba Motorsports, Inc., 2008 WL 1777412 (E.D. Mo. 2008), the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri found that Section 18-502(c) of the Delaware LLC Act permitted a provision that reduced a partner’s 50 percent holding in YCM, a Delaware LLC, based on failure to make a capital contribution. Initially, YCM was capitalized by a contribution of funds from Abuy, and Yuba received equal capital credit for preliminary work done on the project. Subsequently, each member was required to make an additional capital contribution in response to a call issued pursuant to the agreement. Abuy not only contributed capital to satisfy its obligation, but also contributed capital on behalf of Yuba pursuant to a promissory note between Abuy and Yuba. However, Yuba then failed to pay back the loan. After default on the loan, Abuy reduced Yuba’s interest in YCM. The YCM operating agreement specifically permitted one member to loan the other funds to answer a capital call. However, if the member who had been loaned money failed to pay back the loan plus interest, then under the terms of the YCM operating agreement “the Non-Defaulting Member may elect . . . to adjust the Capital Accounts of the Defaulting Member and the Non-Defaulting Member to reflect that the Non-Defaulting Member has made such Capital Contribution on its own behalf and not on behalf of the Defaulting Member thereby increasing the Percentage Interest of the Non-Defaulting Member and reducing the Percentage Interest of the Defaulting Member. . . .” In upholding the reduction of Yuba’s membership interest, the court specifically cited to Section 18-502(c) of the Delaware LLC Act as authorizing the provision. 

Although the Telstra and Abuy decisions demonstrated that courts will enforce provisions adopted pursuant to Sections 17-502(c) and 18-502(c), they failed to address what would happen to a partner’s or member’s interest if that partner or member failed to contribute capital and the operating agreement was silent as to the remedy.

Court of Chancery Refuses to Dilute Membership Interest in Absence of Provision in LLC Agreement 

In Grove v. Brown, 2013 WL 4041495 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2013), the Court of Chancery addressed the appropriate remedy for a failure of a member to make the full amount of his initial capital contribution where the agreement was silent on the subject. Mary Marlene Grove and Larry Grove on the one hand, and Melba Brown and Hubert Brown on the other, formed Heartfelt Home Health, LLC (Heartfelt), which was a home health-care staffing agency. Under the terms of the Heartfelt operating agreement, each member was to contribute $10,000 as an initial capital contribution, and each member was to receive a 25 percent stake in Heartfelt. In its first year of operations, Heartfelt was very successful. This success, however, led to a disagreement over the future of the business. The Groves advocated expansion into Maryland, and the Browns favored focusing on the existing business in Delaware. As will be further discussed below, the Groves and the Browns also disagreed over whether each member owned 25 percent of the company. 

Unable to resolve their disagreements, the Groves proposed to sell their equity to the Browns. The Groves also threatened to seek dissolution. In response, the Browns purported to merge Heartfelt with another entity they had formed, Heartfelt Home Health II, LLC (Heartfelt II). The Browns contended that they could cause a cash out merger because they claimed to hold more than 50 percent of Heartfelt due to the failure of the Browns to make a full capital contribution. In response, the Groves filed an action for breach of fiduciary duty. 

As a threshold matter, the court had to determine whether the Browns only owned 50 percent of Heartfelt, which would have denied them the legal authority to merge out the Groves. The Heartfelt operating agreement provided: 

The Members initially shall contribute a total of $40,000 to the Company capital. The description and each individual portion of this initial contribution are as follows: 

            Hubert E. Brown Jr.                $10,000          25%

            Melba E. Brown                       $10,000          25%

            Larry E. Grove                         $10,000           25%

          &nbsp Mary Marlene Grove              $10,000        &nbsp 25%

 

“The Operating Agreement further provides that profits and losses should be divided among the members ‘in proportion to each Member [sic] relative capital interest in the company.’” Although the operating agreement provided that each member would contribute $10,000 in capital, the Groves collectively contributed only $13,000. Specifically, Larry Grove had not contributed the full amount of the required $10,000. Based on this shortfall, the Browns claimed the Grove’s collective interest in the company had been reduced below 50 percent. Rejecting this argument and referring to the language cited above, the court stated: 

I find that these terms are unambiguous and that the Operating Agreement therefore provides that each of the four members was – and is today – an equal 25% owner of Heartfelt. Nothing in the Operating Agreement indicates that the allocation of relative ownership interests was contingent on the Members’ actions post-signing. Though the Operating Agreement imposes an obligation on the members to provide capital to Heartfelt, the Operating Agreement does not provide that one member’s failure to do so divests that member of his or her share of the company. 

The court noted Section 18-502(c) permits an LLC agreement to provide for the reduction of a member’s interest based on the failure to make a required capital contribution. The Heartfelt operating agreement, however, failed to provide for reduction or dilution of a member’s interest in the entity for failure to make such a capital contribution. Accordingly, the court found that Larry Grove held a 25 percent stake in the company despite his deficient capital contribution. 

Because the procedural context of the case involved a challenge to the merger of Heartfelt with Heartfelt II, as a partial remedy, the court held there should be an accounting to determine the amount of unpaid capital owed Heartfelt. By extension, in other situations outside of the merger context, if a member has failed to pay all or some of a required capital contribution, an action for breach of contract could be brought against that member to satisfy the unpaid portion of the required contribution.

Conclusion

The policy of both the Delaware LLC Act and the Delaware LP Act is to give the maximum effect to the freedom of contract. To that end, Sections 17-502(c) and 18-502(c) provide partners in Delaware LPs and members in Delaware LLCs the right, but not the obligation, to contract for the appropriate penalties in the event a partner or member fails to make a required capital contribution. However, the case law, and particularly the recent Grove case, teaches a number of lessons regarding this freedom to determine the remedy for failure to contribute the required capital. First, both Section 17-502(c) and 18-502(c) are permissive in nature. Based on Grove, a court will not attempt to rewrite the parties’ agreement to reallocate the membership interest even if the actual contributions are disproportionate. Second, based on the Telstra and Abuy decisions, courts will strictly apply the language of LP and LLC agreements adopted pursuant to either 17-502(c) or 18-502(c) when considering whether to permit a reduction in interest. Since traditionally equity has abhorred a forfeiture, it is not surprising that courts require careful compliance with provisions that will lead to a forfeiture of some or all of a member’s or partner’s interest. 

Finally, although Grove dealt with initial capital contributions, nothing about the decision limits Grove’s holding to a failure to make an initial contribution rather than a failure to answer a subsequent capital call. Therefore, if the parties to an operating agreement wish to permit a member’s interest to be reduced if that member fails to answer a capital call, the parties should make clear in the operating agreement the penalty of reduction in interest for failing to answer the capital call. Otherwise, there may be an action against the non-contributing member for an unpaid amount of the required capital contribution, but no reduction in membership interest.

Rolling Back the Repo Safe Harbors

Recent decades have seen substantial expansion in exemptions from the Bankruptcy Code’s normal operation for repurchase agreements. These repos, which are equivalent to very short-term (often one-day) secured loans, are exempt from core bankruptcy rules such as the automatic stay that enjoins debt collection, rules against prebankruptcy fraudulent transfers, and rules against eve-of-bankruptcy preferential payment to favored creditors over other creditors. While these exemptions can be justified for United States Treasury securities and similarly liquid obligations backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government, they are not justified for mortgage-backed securities and other securities that could prove illiquid or unable to fetch their expected long-run value in a panic. The exemptions from baseline bankruptcy rules facilitate this kind of panic selling and, according to many expert observers, characterized and exacerbated the financial crisis of 2007– 2009. The exemptions from normal bankruptcy rules should be limited to United States Treasury and similarly liquid securities, as they once were. The more recent expansion of these exemptions to mortgage-backed securities should be reversed.

Contents

Introduction

 I.   Background

II.   Principles for Policymakers

A.   Benefits

1.   Liquidity and Financing Costs

2.   Shadow Banking

3.   Systemic Risk

B.   Costs

1.   Liquidity and Financing Costs

2.   Shadow Banking

3.   Systemic Risk

a.   Raising Systemic Risk by Encouraging Short-term Finance

b.   Raising Systemic Risk by Facilitating Runs

c.   Raising Systemic Risk by Depressing Collateral Values During a Crisis

C.   Costs After Dodd-Frank

III.  Narrowing the Repo Safe Harbors

A.   Narrow the Repo Safe Harbors

B.   Substitution Effects and the Other Safe Harbors

C.   Reduce Bankruptcy Costs for Financial Contract Counterparties

IV.  Potential Critiques

A.   Lessons from Lehman

B.   Post-crisis Laws and Regulations

C.   Effects on the Housing Market

D.   Liquidity in Money Markets

Conclusion

Appendix: Statutory Proposal

Figures

Figure 1.    Overnight Repos as a Percentage of Total Primary Dealer Repo Financing, 2005–2009

Figure 2.    Prevalence of Less Liquid Collateral in Primary Dealers’ Repo Transactions, 2005−2009

INTRODUCTION

Special rules exempt an increasingly wide arc of creditors from the normal operation of bankruptcy. These so-called “safe harbors” exempt the bankrupt debtor’s financial-contract counterparties from the basic rules that halt creditor collection efforts when the bankruptcy begins, that claw back preferential and fraudulent prebankruptcy transfers that harm creditors overall, and that facilitate orderly liquidation or reorganization. These safe harbors for financial contracts exist for one articulated purpose: to promote stability in financial markets.1

Yet there is little evidence that they serve this purpose. Instead, considerable evidence shows that, when they matter most—in a financial crisis—the safe harbors exacerbate the crisis, weaken critical financial institutions, destabilize financial markets, and then prove costly to the real economy. Worse, the best available evidence also shows that the safe harbors distort the capital structure decisions of financial firms by subsidizing runnable short-term financing at the expense of other, safer debt channels, including longer-term financing. When financial firms favor volatile short-term over more stable long-term debt, they (and markets generally) are more likely to experience a “run” in the event of a market shock, such as the downturn in housing prices during the most recent recession.

It is time for the Bankruptcy Code to get out of the business of regulating financial markets. Other institutions—the Federal Reserve and Treasury—are better suited for this task. The Bankruptcy Code should therefore be returned to about where it stood in 1984: safe harbors should exist only for agreements involving United States Treasury securities and several other, highly liquid assets (e.g., bank certificates of deposit, eligible bankers’ acceptances, and agency securities2 backed by the government’s full faith and credit). Safe harbors for these repos can be justified on grounds that have nothing to do with systemic risk management and they are at base sufficiently liquid and likely to retain fundamental value in a crisis that they pose no real systemic risk.3 For all other repos, such as mortgage-backed repos, the core rationale for safe harboring them—reducing systemic risk—lacks foundation. Their safe harbor should therefore be eliminated and they should be returned to ordinary bankruptcy practice.

Two of us have written on the scope of the safe harbor previously.4 We focus here in this article on the safe harbors for repurchase agreements (“repos”)— even though the protections for swaps and other financial contracts should be narrowed as well5—because the safe harbors for a wide array of repos are the most dangerous to financial stability. We are not the first to make this point.6 In this paper we aggregate and evaluate the existing evidence, sharpen arguments made by prior scholars (including ourselves) and regulators, and examine the counter-arguments that proponents of the safe harbors commonly make.

The fundamental problem is this: The repo safe harbors exacerbated the financial crisis of 20072009 by encouraging the use of short-term repo financing by major American financial firms. The bulk of repo volume is overnight and the vast majority has a maturity of less than three months. This expansion of repo led that market to use securities that could not, and did not, retain their value in the crisis, thereby worsening the crisis and weakening financial firms and markets. The broad expansion of short-term repo, particularly repos of mortgage-backed securities, made major American financial firms more sensitive to financial shocks, more sensitive to disruption in the housing market, and more likely to propagate those shocks through the financial system via rapid close-outs, such as those that induced massive government backing of the financial system in 2007–2009. That government backing included a guarantee of the money market industry after the Reserve Primary Fund broke the buck in the wake of Lehman’s failure, the rescue of AIG after the Lehman failure, the bailout of government-sponsored enterprises—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mae—that issue widely repo’ed securities, and the Federal Reserve’s Primary Dealer Credit Facility—sized in the tens of billions of dollars—to support the repo market. This wide and deep governmental support makes clear that, although it is often mistakenly thought (particularly by industry representatives) that the safe harbors mitigate systemic risk, the reality is that the safe harbors both (1) make too many core financial institutions more fragile, by facilitating their reliance on short-term debt that is unstable in a crisis and (2) shift the epicenter of systemic risk to other sectors of the financial market, particularly after the government buttresses the safe-harbored market.

Today, proponents of the current safe harbors sometimes argue that regulators are bringing systemic risks under control, thanks to various federal and international regulatory changes. But if systemic risks are being brought under control, what then remains of the original rationale for the safe harbors? Either systemic risk still matters in bankruptcy, or it does not. If systemic risk is relevant (as we conclude it may be), the evidence indicates that the safe harbors exacerbated systemic disturbance during the financial crisis. If systemic risk is not relevant (as proponents of the safe harbors sometimes assert), then bankruptcy should return to first principles, without the deep carve-outs (beyond U.S. Treasury securities) from the automatic stay, preference law, fraudulent conveyance law, and the limitation on ipso facto clauses.7

Hence, we recommend scaling back the repo safe harbor to approximately the 1984 scope for “repurchase agreements,”8 namely, safe harboring only repos on U.S. Treasury and agency securities backed by the government’s full faith and credit, certificates of deposits, and bankers’ acceptances. This proposal is consonant with recommendations from leading economists and legal scholars9 and federal regulators.10 The Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbors for other financial contracts should be narrowed as well, to ensure that the other safe harbors do not provide end-runs around the narrowed scope of the repo safe harbors.11 Equally important, the Bankruptcy Code’s rules governing adequate protection, setoff rights, and assumption and rejection of executory contracts should be modified to protect contracting parties better in general and to better protect financial contract counterparties in particular. The latter often face substantially greater costs from the bankruptcy process than other creditors and nonfinancial counterparties. Indeed, these costs are a driver of demand for safe-harbored financial contracts.12 Reducing these costs will reduce the demand for financial instruments that short-circuit the Bankruptcy Code.

Although we address only the Bankruptcy Code in this article, its logic would support comparably narrowing the safe harbors in other federal statutes—e.g., the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and the Dodd-Frank Act.13

I. BACKGROUND

A repurchase agreement (“repo”) is a type of short-term financing that is economically equivalent to a secured loan. In Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp. v. Spencer S&L Ass’n (In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp.), the Third Circuit succinctly described repos as follows:

A standard repurchase agreement, commonly called a “repo,” consists of a two-part transaction. The first part is the transfer of specified securities by one party, the dealer, to another party, the purchaser, in exchange for cash. The second part consists of a contemporaneous agreement by the dealer to repurchase the securities at the original price, plus an agreed upon additional amount on a specified future date. A “reverse repo” is the identical transaction viewed from the perspective of the dealer who purchases securities with an agreement to resell.14

A repo is economically equivalent to a secured loan because the dealer receives funds immediately and promises to repay those funds, plus a premium (i.e., interest), at a future date. The transaction is secured by the securities. Courts15 and commentators16 are well aware of this economic equivalence.

Many market participants utilize the repo market, most notably the Federal Reserve, which uses the repo market to implement monetary policy, principally via repos on Treasury securities and agency debt.17 Sophisticated institutional investors use it to safely meet short and long-term liquidity needs, corporations and money market funds use it for cash management, and broker-dealers use it to finance their securities inventory and other investments. (This is sometimes called “shadow banking.”18) As of 2010, U.S. Treasury and agency securities (including agency mortgage-backed securities and securities not backed by the full faith and credit of the United States) made up about 75 percent of collateral used in repo transactions.19 The U.S. Treasury repo market is a critical component not only of the U.S. capital markets, but also of global capital markets. It has become a principal means of financing the market for U.S. government securities.

The repo market has expanded from its U.S. Treasury securities base to include other types of financial investments, such as mortgage-backed securities and mortgage loans.20 This expansion in the repo market has coincided with expansion in the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbors for repos. The safe harbor for “securities contracts” first appeared in the Bankruptcy Code in 1982.21 Two years later, in 1984, Congress added the safe harbor for “repurchase agreements.”22 “Repurchase agreements” were defined (in section 101(47)) as agreements that provided for the transfer of one or more of the following instruments: (1) certificates of deposit; (2) eligible bankers’ acceptances; and (3) securities that are direct obligations of, or that are fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by, the United States or any agency of the United States.

In 2005, Congress expanded the range of safe-harbored repos by amending the definition of “repurchase agreement” to include transfers of the following additional instruments23:

  • mortgage loans;
  • mortgage-related securities (as defined in section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934);
  • interests in mortgage-related securities or mortgage loans; and
  • qualified foreign government securities (defined as securities that are direct obligations of, or that are fully guaranteed by, the central government of a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development).24

Congress also expanded the definition of “securities contract” in section 741(7) to include a

contract for the purchase, sale, or loan of a security, a certificate of deposit, a mortgage loan, any interest in a mortgage loan, a group or index of [the foregoing], . . . or option on any of the foregoing, . . . and including any repurchase or reverse repurchase transaction on any such security, certificate of deposit, mortgage loan, interest, group or index, or option (whether or not such repurchase or reverse repurchase transaction is a “repurchase agreement,” as defined in section 101).25

Although the securities contract safe harbor is available to a narrower set of market participants—a “stockbroker, financial institution, financial participant, or securities clearing agency”26—than the repo safe harbor, virtually all systemically important financial institutions are eligible for protection as “financial institutions” or “financial participants.”27

The safe harbors for repurchase agreements exempt favored creditors from the operation of normal bankruptcy practice, such as the automatic stay (stopping collection efforts outside of the bankruptcy court), avoidance recovery (of preferential and fraudulent prebankruptcy transfers from the debtor to the favored creditor), and the limitation on the creditor’s right to immediately and fully setoff and net monies it owes the debtor against sums the debtor owes it. The relevant Bankruptcy Code provisions are:

  • Sections 555 and 559, which protect the safe-harbored creditors’ contractual rights to liquidate, terminate, and accelerate repurchase agreements— rights that are normally suspended in bankruptcy;
  • Sections 362(b)(7) and 362(o), which protect repo counterparties’ setoff rights and their rights to realize against margin or other collateral posted by the debtor (exercise of these rights is normally barred by the automatic stay); and
  • Sections 546(f) and 548(d), which shield repo counterparties from preferential or fraudulent transfer actions seeking to recover margin, settlement, or other payments made in connection with the repo agreements.28

Together, these provisions permit counterparties to exercise nearly all out-of-bankruptcy contractual rights, notwithstanding the baseline automatic stay and avoidance powers of the bankruptcy court. As Collier explains, “[m]ost repurchase agreements afford a non-defaulting party the right to ‘close-out’ or ‘liquidate’ the agreement upon the other party’s default.”29 Inside bankruptcy, other creditors cannot exercise these contractual rights to terminate their contracts with the bankrupt debtor; safe-harbored creditors can. They are effectively exempt from bankruptcy.

Furthermore, virtually all repos contain ipso facto clauses, as do many loans and executory contracts. These clauses give the favored party the right to declare a default, terminate the contract, and accelerate any obligations owed by the debtor if it files for bankruptcy, becomes insolvent, or fails to maintain itself as financially sound.30 Clauses like these are typically nullified in bankruptcy because otherwise neither a reorganization nor even an effective liquidation is normally possible. Not so for safe-harbored financial contracts like repos. With respect to these contracts, ipso facto clauses are fully enforceable.

II. PRINCIPLES FOR POLICYMAKERS

These departures from basic bankruptcy rules need justification. Financial contracts should receive safe harbor treatment only when benefits exceed costs. Proponents of the current safe harbors typically point to two related benefits: (1) improving the liquidity of collateral and reducing financing costs and (2) reducing systemic risk.31 Neither justification, however, can support the broad departures from normal bankruptcy practice.

A.  BENEFITS

1. Liquidity and Financing Costs

The safe harbors undoubtedly improve the liquidity of repurchase agreements and the underlying collateral. Because counterparties can terminate repos and liquidate collateral, regardless of any bankruptcy filing by the debtor, the safe harbors allow counterparties to avoid bankruptcy-specific costs of distress, such as inadequate protection of collateral values, deviations from absolute priority, and cherry-picking of executory contracts by the debtor (assuming in-the-money contracts and rejecting out-of-the-money contracts with the same counterparty). These costs are thought to be non-trivial and to exceed the costs associated with terminating repos and liquidating collateral outside bankruptcy.32 Because the safe harbors allow counterparties to avoid these costs, the collateral is more “liquid” in the sense that it can be sold at a price close to its fundamental value. The more liquid the collateral, the lower the costs of default to counterparties. And lower costs of default translate into better terms of trade for debtors: Debtors receive a higher purchase price for securities (a smaller “haircut”) when these securities can be liquidated at lower cost.33

2. Shadow Banking

The safe harbors played an important role in the growth of shadow banking.34 Corporate cash managers, as well as pension and mutual funds, investment banks, and other institutional investors with large cash reserves want immediate access to this cash, but would also like to earn a return on the cash until it is needed. Safe-harbored repos provide the solution: They function like demand deposits, but without the government guarantee. The cash provider earns a small return on its cash, the investment is safe because the repo’s duration is generally very short (often overnight), and the underlying collateral can be liquidated without interference from the Bankruptcy Code.35

3. Systemic Risk

Because they improve the liquidity of collateral, the safe harbors are thought to mitigate systemic risk. In the event of a debtor’s default, counterparties can quickly terminate contracts with the debtor, liquidate collateral to cover any losses, and re-hedge by entering new contracts with new debtors. In this way, the debtor’s distress will have no knock-on effects on the counterparties. In the absence of the safe harbors, counterparties would incur larger losses due to the various bankruptcy-specific costs, and these losses might trigger distress at the counterparties themselves.36 Additionally, the safe harbors may increase the supply of credit to institutions suffering liquidity crises, potentially allowing them to avoid collapse. A distressed institution typically faces a “debt overhang” problem: It cannot readily attract new loans because creditors worry that if they lend, some of the value of that loan will support the prior distressed debt and not the new loan. By reducing costs of default and by making the new lender’s recovery more certain, the safe harbors ease the debt overhang problem and thereby allow distressed institutions to attract new investment and potentially avoid default.

B.  COSTS

The costs of the safe harbors are mirror-images of the benefits.

1. Liquidity and Financing Costs

Liquidity does not come for free. The safe harbors enhance liquidity in repo markets by reducing liquidity in other markets, especially markets for traditional, long-term lending. Because safe harbor benefits are available for some kinds of financing (repos, which are largely short-term credit facilities) but not others (traditional, longer-term lending and other shorter-term markets), the Bankruptcy Code is implicitly subsidizing some markets at the expense of others.37 Liquidity is shifted from one market to another. In the process, the safe harbors artificially distort the capital structure of financial institutions toward less stable, run-prone financing. Even worse, the costs of this risk-shifting are borne by the public, the U.S. Treasury, and the American taxpayer via increased financial instability.

Figure 1:
Overnight Repos as a Percentage of Total Primary Dealer Repo Financing, January 5, 2005–July 22, 200938

Figure 2:
Prevalence of Less Liquid Collateral in Primary Dealers’ Repo Transactions, January 5, 2005–July 22, 200939

Mortgage loan repurchase agreements, for example, substitute for warehouse loans. The former are safe harbored from normal bankruptcy rules, the latter are not. The former are thereby favored financially and made more liquid, but the latter are disfavored and made relatively less liquid. We see no principled reasons to favor the favored and disfavor the disfavored. One Federal Reserve report describes this problem and illustrates the sharp increase in overnight repo financing and illiquid collateral in the run-up to the financial crisis:

[C]onditions in 2008 [became] particularly precarious [due to] the resort to less liquid collateral in repo agreements. . . . Originally focused on the highest quality collateral—Treasury and Agency debt—repo transactions by 2008 were making use of below-investment-grade corporate debt and equities and even whole loans and trust receipts. This shift toward less liquid collateral increased the risks attending a crisis in the market since, in the event of a crisis, selling off these securities would likely take time and occur at a significant loss.40

Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the rapid growth of shortterm (overnight) financing via repo during the years after October 2005, when the Bankruptcy Code’s repo safe harbors expanded substantially. Figure 1 shows that, in terms of dollar volume, short-term repos increased sharply after 2005, while longer-term repos stayed relatively constant. Figure 2 is more important: It shows that repos involving illiquid collateral, such as mortgages and mortgage-backed securities, accounted for an increasing share of primary dealer repos. By 2008, they accounted for nearly 60 percent of all primary dealer repos. Although these figures cannot prove causal relationships, they provide suggestive evidence that the safe harbors facilitated the over-reliance of financial institutions on short-term financing with relatively illiquid collateral.

The safe harbors, in other words, plausibly encourage less stable financing for our largest and most important financial institutions, thereby making it more likely that a stressed institution will need to liquidate in a costly way. Those who might be prepared to lend long term to an important financial institution would, all else equal, be induced by the safe harbors to lend short term (via repo) and roll over that repo on a regular basis. They are then incentivized to decline to rollover (to run) in the event of a financial crisis or in the event of financial difficulty with the borrower. This broad safe harboring policy is unwise. It weakens American financial structures and institutions.41

To be sure, the foregoing argument assumes that the safe harbors merely “move” liquidity around, favoring some markets (repos) and not others (longer-term financing). The net “liquidity effect” of the safe harbors might not be zero. The safe harbors could have a net positive effect, increasing liquidity overall and lowering the cost of capital of institutions that rely on repo financing. This is plausible if the safe harbors allow counterparties to avoid substantial costs associated with the bankruptcy process, such as administrative expenses and inadequate protection of collateral values, which are deadweight costs, and violations of absolute priority (such as inappropriate distribution to shareholders). Because they avoid these costs, repo counterparties offer more liquidity on better terms to borrowers. This argument, however, implies that every creditor should be free to contract around the Bankruptcy Code. Every creditor should enjoy the safe harbors. We take no position on the longstanding academic debate42 over whether a wide array of creditors should be free to contract around bankruptcy. But if the safe harbors increase social welfare because they increase liquidity overall (and not just for the benefited creditors at the expense of other creditors), then the safe harbors should apply to all secured debt, not just financial contracts.

But one should be uncertain whether there is a net liquidity gain for the economy or, indeed, for a particular debtor. The “net liquidity effect” of the safe harbors could well be negative if they make it more difficult to reorganize a debtor that used safe-harbored repos or if they disrupt an economy-wide market. When a debtor files for bankruptcy, most counterparties are stayed from terminating their agreements with the debtor and/or engaging in self-help remedies against estate assets that serve as their collateral. These baseline bankruptcy rules do not apply to repo counterparties. These safe-harbored counterparties can, and will, rapidly close out their positions, selling their collateralized assets into the marketplace at whatever price they can get. If there is widespread selling, there can be a rapid destruction of collateral value as counterparties, unimpeded by the automatic stay, terminate and enforce their rights in debtor assets that serve as collateral. In other words, the safe harbors may have both redistributive effects (favoring repos at the expense of other financing) and deadweight costs (causing value destruction in the event of default). If the safe harbors facilitate widespread selling of the underlying collateral, and if the collateral does not maintain its fundamental value, then owners of that collateral will have reason not to sell that collateral, waiting for its value to recover. This process, which seems to have been at work in the financial crisis, dries up liquidity.

Hence, in principle, the net liquidity effect of the safe harbors could be positive, negative, or zero.

2. Shadow Banking

Safe-harbored repos allow financial institutions to offer the equivalent of demand deposits. Outside of a crisis, shadow banking expands the ability of banks to fund risky, illiquid investments such as mortgages. In a crisis, shadow banking exposes financial institutions to destructive runs. Although safe-harbored repos replicate demand deposits, they lack the FDIC guarantee that applies to true demand deposits. The “on demand” feature of safe-harbored repos is both their virtue and their vice, as the next subsection discusses in greater detail.

3. Systemic Risk

The safe harbors have long been justified on the ground that they mitigate systemic risk by reducing contagion.43 Three reasons show why this common assertion is false.

a. Raising Systemic Risk by Encouraging Short-term Finance

The additional credit that the safe harbors facilitate allows a systemically important financial institution to become larger, more leveraged with more easily runnable debt, and—as a result—more systemically important and more dangerous both before and after it becomes distressed. Repo use, for example, expanded greatly during the run-up to the financial crisis, growing faster than financial debt grew overall in the American economy.44 Many observers view the safe harbors as necessary for this expansion.

This growth in short-term finance45 rendered American financial institutions more fragile than they would have been without the safe harbors. Worse, when these institutions suffered distress, repo counterparties could refuse to renew the contracts or demand additional collateral before agreeing to renew the contracts, and they did. This “rollover risk,” when realized, drained liquidity from these institutions and thereby exacerbated financial stress instead of relieving it.

Opponents of reform often emphasize that the safe harbors increase the supply of credit to an institution suffering a liquidity crisis. They point to J.P. Morgan’s willingness to continue supplying liquidity to Lehman as it foundered. But Lehman’s acute need for liquidity was itself a product of the safe harbors, which encouraged it to rely on short-term financing and to have large safe-harbored obligations before the crisis. When Lehman foundered, it needed to replace this financing. Put differently, one of the most lauded purported benefits of the safe harbors—increasing the supply of liquidity to failing institutions—is a feature that only partially mitigates a problem that the safe harbors themselves create, namely, capital structures that overly rely on short-term, run-prone financing. Thus, even a core safe harbor benefit—facilitating crisis financing—comes packaged with serious negatives—facilitating runs, encouraging interconnectedness via repo, expanded run-prone, short-term financing, and excessive leverage.

b. Raising Systemic Risk by Facilitating Runs

Second, by permitting counterparties to “run” on failing institutions, as stated in the prior paragraph, the safe harbors accelerate failure and exacerbate the risk of systemic collapse.46 This is a lesson of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy: during the days preceding and following the filing, counterparties refused to roll over repos (or demanded larger haircuts) and terminated other financial contracts en masse, effectively draining Lehman of liquidity.47 Had Lehman not become so dependent on safe-harbored repos—more than one-third of its liabilities were said to be in repo—it might have been better positioned to weather the crisis long enough for a more stable solution to emerge. Opponents of narrowing, who point to the Lehman close-outs as a success, ignore that the safe harbors put Lehman in the fragile position it occupied. Opponents also ignore the knock-on failures in the money market and elsewhere—failures that were every bit as serious as those that the contagion rationale for safe harbors is supposed to prevent.

c. Raising Systemic Risk by Depressing Collateral Values During a Crisis

By facilitating runs on systemically important financial institutions, the safe harbors induce the institutions’ counterparties to terminate all financial contracts en masse, via cross-default clauses, and liquidate the supporting collateral en masse. En masse liquidation of collateral other than the safest (i.e., United States government obligations) typically leads to low-price fire-sale close-outs, further weakening the target institution and temporarily depressing the market value of comparable collateral held by other institutions. These two effects—fire sales and depressed collateral values generally—spread the distress at the failing institution to other, initially healthier institutions. Recent empirical work confirms the importance of these fire-sale externalities.48

The safe harbors, in other words, facilitate contagion.49 Part of the reason they facilitate contagion is that they are built on old-school contagion concepts: If X defaults on obligations to Y, Y may suffer large losses that force it to default on its own obligations to Z, which may in turn default on its obligations to its counterparties, and so on throughout the financial system. This is the “dominos” theory of systemic risk. But systemic risk can arise from other channels: If X defaults on obligations to Y, Y will liquidate collateral posted by X. If X defaults on many obligations to many parties, all of these counterparties will liquidate the same type of collateral that Y is liquidating. Not only will Y (and the other counterparties) fetch fire sale prices for the collateral, but any other institution (say, Z) holding that type of collateral will need to mark its balance sheet accordingly to reflect the new market prices. In this way, X’s distress spreads to Z through the market for collateral, even though X does no business with Z. Because the safe harbors facilitate fire sales of collateral, they magnify this channel of contagion. One channel of contagion (dominos) is mitigated while another (the collateral channel) is exacerbated.

A growing battery of evidence highlights the importance of the collateral channel as a vector of contagion. We now know that there was a “run on repo” and other sources of short-term funding during the financial crisis50—the very harm that the safe harbors were constructed to avoid. There was panic selling across financial markets of mortgage-backed securities.51 Several Federal Reserve Governors have pointed to this panic and run as critical to the financial crisis.52 This panic selling, which was supported by overly wide safe harbors and could not have been as wide without them, may well have pushed prices of some of the underlying securities temporarily below their long-run value, making financial institutions appear to be insolvent or less solvent than they would otherwise have been.

The analytic misstep that one might make, and which safe harbor proponents appear to make, is to assume that the local benefit of the safe harbors to an individual market participant scales up to also be an aggregate benefit of the safe harbors to the entire repo market. It does not. If only one firm with one safe-harbored repo counterparty fails, then the counterparty can quickly liquidate the collateral and maintain the firm’s own liquidity, because its sale will not disrupt the market overall. This can be a good, local result. But if many counterparties of major failed firms liquidate their repo collateral simultaneously, a result that the safe harbors facilitate, then the liquidity benefit can be (and it seems was) reversed. The safe harbors encourage liquidity at low usage levels; they impede liquidity at large usage levels. Policymakers must guard against wishful thinking here, expecting that what works on the micro-level of a single failed firm with a small set of counterparties will work as well, or even in the same direction, when many firms are liquidating collateral underlying their safe-harbored repos.

C.  COSTS AFTER DODD-FRANK

It could be argued that, if the safe harbors contribute to the too-big-to-fail problem, that problem is better addressed by Title I of Dodd-Frank and other statutes than by amending the Bankruptcy Code, which affects all debtors, regardless of whether they are too-big-to-fail. Title I of Dodd-Frank undoubtedly moderates the risk-taking of systemically important institutions and the associated regulatory monitoring of major financial firms further does so. Indeed, if there were widespread agreement that the Dodd-Frank Act has relegated systemic crises to history’s dustbin, we would be less concerned about the safe harbors being an unjustified deviation from bankruptcy basics, as the damage from their deviation from basic bankruptcy principles might only be slight if there were no more systemic financial crises.

But systemic crises are unlikely to be a thing of the past, and regulation is unlikely to be perfect. Some financial institutions will become too-big-to-fail, despite regulators’ best efforts, and some of those too-big-to-fail institutions will become distressed despite existing statutory and regulatory safeguards. Moreover, Dodd-Frank’s orderly liquidation authority and its regulatory initiatives are untested and may fail. A strong way to moderate these risks is to reduce the scope of the safe harbors, which allow distressed institutions to become larger, more leveraged, and more threatening to market stability. Like engineers who seek redundancy and backup in complex systems, bankruptcy reformers should seek a Code that supports financial stability, not one that undercuts it.

Finally, this systemic risk counterargument to narrowing the repo safe harbor— that systemic risk is now handled, and handled well enough, by Dodd-Frank’s Title I—undercuts, and perhaps destroys, the foundational justification for the safe harbors in the first place. Their foundational bankruptcy justification was to help control systemic risk. But the safe harbors should be eliminated—not narrowed—if systemic risk is now best addressed through the “front door” of Dodd-Frank and related regulation rather than the “back door” of the Bankruptcy Code. The primary justification for the safe harbors is their role in mitigating systemic risk. If that role has been assumed by other laws and regulations, the original foundation of the safe harbors has crumbled.

III. NARROWING THE REPO SAFE HARBORS

The challenge for policymakers is clear. The repo safe harbors increase the risk and amplitude of crises, but also increase asset liquidity and the supply of credit outside of crises. The first effect must be balanced against the second. Various proposals have been put forward to achieve this balance, but most rely heavily on a federal regulator to monitor the repo market, limit the kinds of collateral that are repo-ed, set position limits, and perhaps impose taxes that force counterparties to internalize the costs of repo-based financing to market stability.53 Indeed, many proposals would leave the safe harbors intact but use Dodd-Frank and related authority to monitor and mitigate systemic risk.

We support proposals for greater regulatory oversight of repo markets. But it is unwise to rely exclusively on federal regulators to mitigate systemic risk. Regulators are imperfect, as the recent crisis illustrates. And the current safe harbors make regulation harder and more complex by fostering shadow banking. A better approach, we think, is to narrow the repo safe harbors in a simple way that is (i) predictable, (ii) does not depend on the fallible discretion of regulators, and (iii) provides a back-stop that protects the financial system when federal regulators make mistakes. We want redundancy in systemic risk protection.

A.  NARROW THE REPO SAFE HARBORS

Policymakers can strike the right balance—protecting markets but preserving the credit-enhancing effects of repo-based financing—by narrowing the safe harbors to protect only repos involving highly liquid securities backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government (“FFC securities”), including Treasuries and some agency securities (e.g., those guaranteed by Ginnie Mae). This category amounts to about half of the outstanding securities in the repo market, so it is not small. Repos on other collateral—such as private mortgage-backed securities, equities, bonds, and agency securities that lack the backing of the United States’ full faith and credit—should not receive safe harbor treatment.54

The case for protecting repos on Treasuries and other FFC securities is straightforward. First, safe harbor protection is consistent with longstanding public policy fostering liquidity in the market for government securities. It is cheaper for the government to issue debt when the securities it issues can be readily repo-ed by investors.

Equally important, safe harbors for repos on FFC securities are unlikely to contribute to systemic risk. Recall that the safe harbors contribute to systemic risk by exposing failing institutions to runs and collateral fire sales. Although the potential for a run exists when a failing institution has entered safe-harbored repos, the risk of collateral fire sales is minimal when the collateral consists of FFC securities. These securities are nearly equivalent to cash, are widely traded, and—due to government backing—unlikely to lose their liquidity during crises. Indeed, this is a crucial distinction between repos on FFC securities and repos on any other asset: FFC securities tend to retain their liquidity in good times and bad.55 For other assets, liquidity is endogenous: The current liquidity of the asset is no guide to its future liquidity and its capacity to be sold quickly at long-run value in a crisis.

Safe harbors for repos on FFC securities are, therefore, unlikely to increase the risk or amplitude of market crises. The opposite is true for repos on other assets. Even if the assets are liquid today, in a normal economy, they may become highly illiquid in a crisis, thereby exacerbating market crises via the collateral channel. The history of mortgage-backed securities offers a case in point, as asset-backed securities performed poorly during the financial crisis.56

A large class of Agency assets lacks FFC support but has implicit government backing, namely the mortgage securities backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-sponsored entities. The empirical case for rolling back the safe harbor for repos of these agency-backed mortgage securities is closer than that for private mortgage-backed securities. During the financial crisis, these entities were put into a government-financed conservatorship and bailed out.57 Recent work by Begalle, Martin, McAndrews, and McLaughlin shows that agency-backed securities are less likely to retain their long-run value than Treasuries, which suggests that they should not receive the same safe-harbor treatment as Treasuries.58 The authors estimate the time needed to liquidate a typical large dealer’s repo portfolio without affecting market price. Even during stable, non-crisis market conditions, Treasuries can be liquidated more quickly in much larger volume—nearly twice as much daily—than agency securities without affecting market prices. A typical large dealer would need more than three weeks to liquidate its portfolio of agency securities without a price impact—a time span similar to that for liquidating private securities without price impact. By contrast, the dealer could unload its Treasury portfolio in nine days. These comparisons are unfavorable to non-FFC agency securities during stable conditions. Worse yet, during a crisis, a flight-to-quality would widen the gap, as Treasuries become more desirable.59

Despite these projections, however, non-FFC agency securities did well during the recent crisis: neither their liquidity nor their pricing deteriorated substantially.60 This surprisingly robust performance was likely a product of massive government support to both the repo markets (about 40 percent of which is agency-backed)61 and the agencies themselves. Fannie and Freddie entered federal conservatorship and received about $187.4 billion in government support.62

Agency-backed securities were, in retrospect, de facto FFC securities during the crisis. Indeed, the robust in-crisis performance of Agency securities might suggest that the repo safe harbor could be extended to both de jure FFC securities (e.g., Treasuries) and de facto FFC securities (e.g., agency-backed MBS) without increasing the risk or amplitude of market crises.

We disagree with that view. A security enjoys de facto FFC status when market participants anticipate government backing. But expectations about government support to financial markets can be erroneous, particularly because government support depends in part on political calculations in the executive branch and the Congress; the recent experience during the crisis created an anti-bailout perspective among many there. Indeed, during the crisis itself, many expected that Lehman Brothers would be bailed out, perhaps including Lehman executives; yet it was allowed, indeed encouraged, to file for bankruptcy. Put bluntly, de facto FFC securities might not be bailed out in a future crisis: the negative reaction to the 2008–2009 bailouts has been substantial.

Additionally, having a repo safe harbor for de facto FFC securities can damage the financial system: The existence of a repo safe harbor facilitates having these securities repo’ed in many financially important areas of the financial system, some of which can be fragile financial interconnections that can only exist with repo safe harbors. But repo’ing securities that cannot maintain their value and liquidity without government support can create more underlying financial fragility that, in a crisis, calls forth government support that would not otherwise be needed. Accordingly, our policy analysis is to consider the appropriateness of a repo safe harbor if the securities and their guaranteeing agencies were not bailed out. Without a bailout, agency securities lacking the government’s full faith and credit would likely have suffered serious illiquidity, similar to that of private mortgage-backed securities. Their widespread liquidation would have further degraded collateral prices in the economy, heightening the very systemic risks that the safe harbors were intended to avoid.

* * *

The foregoing discussion addresses repos of securities that are currently liquid but might be illiquid in a crisis. But today’s safe harbors also protect repos of assets that are currently illiquid, even during normal market conditions. Thanks to the safe harbors, these repos allow distressed institutions to increase in size and leverage, as noted above. In the absence of safe harbor treatment, the institutions would be limited to ordinary secured debt financing to finance their growth. To be sure, this “ordinary” secured debt might also be very short-term financing. But even if it is just as short term as repo financing, this “ordinary” secured debt is subject to ordinary bankruptcy rules, such as the automatic stay, which prevent a value-destroying run on the debtor, fire sales of its collateral, and, if the financial stress leads to a system-wide crisis, the potential degradation of system-wide liquidity if the sales put excessive downward pressure on the collateral’s price.

The repo safe harbors should therefore be limited to agreements collateralized by securities issued by the U.S. government or otherwise backed by the government’s full faith and credit. Proposed basic statutory amendments are set out in the appendix. This rollback tracks the definition of “repurchase agreement” as originally enacted in 1984. Our conclusion rests on the available empirical evidence, the logic of the relationships, and the experience during the financial crisis.63

B.  SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS AND THE OTHER SAFE HARBORS

If Congress rolls back the repo safe harbor as we recommend, markets will adjust. The price for repo’ing a mortgage-backed security, for example, will rise relative to other financing channels. We anticipate several kinds of responses, some positive, some benign, and some pernicious.

A positive, or at least benign, response is that financial institutions may reduce their reliance on repo-based financing and increase their use of less run-prone debt. In the absence of safe-harbor protection, repo lenders will demand higher haircuts because the underlying collateral is less liquid. Counterparties will, at the margin, more carefully assess with whom they deal and will seek more collateral. Repo-based financing will, therefore, be more expensive and less attractive. We may therefore see substitution toward more traditional secured debt financing. This might include short-term secured debt and longer-term debt. Longer-term debt should provide more stable financing.

A less attractive response is that counterparties may try to obtain safe-harbor protection for repos using the derivatives safe harbors. We have in this paper focused on the repo safe harbor, but comparable protection is available to counterparties to swaps, forwards, options, and other derivative contracts, including combinations of these contracts. If a mortgage-backed repo does not receive protection under the repo safe harbors, counterparties could construct a synthetic repo that has the same economics as a mortgage-backed repo but receives protection under the safe harbors for swap agreements.64

This possibility presents a statutory drafting problem: the drafters must close end-run “loopholes” by narrowing the derivatives safe harbors at the same time they narrow the repo safe harbors. That task is doable, but drafting is rarely perfect, and the ingenuity of financial market players and their lawyers is great.

An even less attractive response is that repo-based financing might migrate from smaller, systemically benign institutions to the biggest, systemically important financial institutions. That would tend to occur if the largest too-big-to-fail financial institutions continue to be too-big-to-fail, inducing non-safe-harbored repo investors in the mortgage-backed sector to protect themselves by migrating further to too-big-to-fail institutions. If that is the substitution effect, then rolling back the repo safe harbors will not have made the financial system much safer than before.65

Lastly, some of the currently existing short-term repo channels are set up in ways that can only handle short-term finance. These channels cannot and will not shift to being providers of long-term debt. This inelasticity may well mean that the market adjustments from rolling back the repo safe harbors will not be immediate. But a normal economic expectation would be that the costs of using this channel will rise, while the costs of other channels will fall, and over time markets will adjust away from the more expensive channel to the less expensive one.

While we cannot assuredly predict where the substitution will occur, and when it will happen, we can state that the current broad safe harbors did not work well during the financial crisis. They had encouraged the growth of investment channels that proved to be highly unstable and they failed to contain the crisis when it erupted. In our view, our financial system could not do much worse than have the weak, run-prone structures and incentives that we have now and that the broad safe harbors promoted and still promote. The downside of malign substitution from rollback is possible but seems limited, leaving the major issue, in our judgment, only the size and breadth of the improvement.

Moreover, we repeat the point we have made earlier: in general those drafting the Bankruptcy Code should leave monetary and financial policy to the institutions designated to do so. The mortgage-backed repo safe harbors are efforts at macro financial policy, not bankruptcy policy.66

C.  REDUCE BANKRUPTCY COSTS FOR FINANCIAL CONTRACT COUNTERPARTIES

The demand for safe-harbored repos derives partly from inefficiencies in the Bankruptcy Code.67 Without the safe harbors, it is said, counterparties would be exposed indefinitely to interest rate and spread risk, affecting their capital and liquidity, and would be unable to effectively hedge their risk.

These are important concerns, but they should not be overstated. In the absence of safe harbor treatment, repos are likely to be treated as secured loans, not executory contracts, by bankruptcy courts. If the status of repos as secured loans is unclear, the Code should be amended to make this clear. Like any secured loan, the repo contract should terminate upon the bankruptcy filing and the counterparty’s secured claim set equal to the value of the underlying collateral on the filing date.68 Counterparties should face the same risks and have the same protections as any secured lender in bankruptcy: The value of the collateral may vary over time and courts must adequately protect the secured party from deterioration in value.69

True, some collateral, such as mortgage-backed securities, is more volatile than the collateral underlying some secured loans. Safe-harbor proponents indicate that this volatility justifies exemption from the normal workings of bankruptcy. But the very reason asserted for bankruptcy exemption—high volatility—is a reason that should make Congress and policymakers worry that the exemption unwisely subjects the financial system to greater risk. We have that concern, and policymakers should as well.

Some of the volatility problem comes from the likelihood that the adequacy of bankruptcy protection may be adequate in form but inadequate in financial reality. Interest rate shifts may change the value of the underlying collateral and interest is not necessarily available even to secured lenders.70 A long stay might be costly to non-safe-harbored repo debt, as it can be for many secured creditors. This difficulty might warrant amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that better protects the counterparty’s interest in the collateral, as valued on the filing date.71 Additionally, in some cases the collateral will be assets that are unnecessary to an effective reorganization of the debtor, warranting a liftstay order, particularly in cases of operating companies using repo.

Lastly, proponents of wide safe harbors worry about a counterparty needing liquidity that is tied up in a bankruptcy proceeding. Above we addressed such concerns: since all creditors have such worries, this is more a reason to safe harbor all debt from bankruptcy. But another market feature blunts the strength of this problem. A counterparty with an intense need for the cash—one that cannot wait out the bankruptcy process—has modern market alternatives. A wide and deep market of claims trading has arisen in recent years in bankruptcy.72 A liquidity-constrained counterparty can sell the claim for cash to a financier that can wait out the bankruptcy process, in a way that was much harder to accomplish decades ago. We do not assert that the market for claims trading is perfect, but there is one and it blunts the force of the liquidity argument.

IV. POTENTIAL CRITIQUES

Opponents of reform often make the following arguments in favor of retaining the status quo:

(1)   The safe harbors prevented a systemic meltdown following the Lehman bankruptcy.73

(2)   Little would be gained by narrowing the repo safe harbors because the risk-taking activities of systemically important institutions are now constrained under recently enacted laws and regulations.74

(3)   Our proposal will reduce the liquidity of mortgage-related securities and thereby undermine long-standing federal policy supporting the housing market.

(4)   There is a worldwide demand for money-like obligations that monetary policymakers need to meet. Wide repo safe harbors facilitate meeting that demand.

We have addressed some of these issues obliquely above. We address each directly now.

A. LESSONS FROM LEHMAN

Opponents of reform often argue that the safe harbors mitigated the market impact of Lehman’s failure. In particular, the safe harbors prevented Lehman’s failure from destabilizing its counterparties in the dealer market. There are two problems with this argument. First, it is a selective recounting of developments in financial markets after Lehman’s collapse. Most obviously, it ignores the subsequent failure of AIG, the failure of the Reserve Fund, the needed guarantee of the entire money market, and the disarray and freezing of many financial channels. There was a major financial crisis and Lehman’s collapse is generally thought to have deepened it.

The more important problem with the argument—that the safe harbors saved Lehman’s dealer counterparties—is that it is probably incorrect.75 Lehman and its counterparties required $28 billion in Fed assistance to stabilize the Lehman repo book when it filed, the Federal Reserve reports.76 The safe harbors were, contrary to the opponents’ recounting, insufficient to stabilize even Lehman’s own repo book. And worse:

[O]ther dealers [in the tri-party repo market] experienced stress during the following days [after Lehman filed]. . . . [S]tress in this market would [apparently] have been considerably worse, absent the exceptional policy responses that took place, including the presence of the [Fed’s Primary Dealer Credit Facility].77

The Primary Dealer Credit Facility was a credit facility that the Federal Reserve created to backstop the tri-party repo market and illiquid collateral in that repo market (which we argue here should not benefit from the safe harbor).78 The Lehman Bankruptcy Examiner’s Report recounts the importance of the Fed’s Primary Dealer Credit Facility in steadying repo markets around the time of Lehman’s bankruptcy.79 The Fed’s facility was not in use just prior to the Lehman bankruptcy in mid-September; by October 1—two weeks after Lehman filed—the facility had seen repo dealers draw $148 billion on it.80

In other words, even the safe-harbored repo market needed massive government support and could not rely on the safe harbors to achieve stability. This result is hard to square with the view that the safe harbors prevented further failure after Lehman went down.

B. POST-CRISIS LAWS AND REGULATIONS

Our proposed reform—narrowing the repo safe harbors to approximately their 1984 extent—could be said to be “fighting yesterday’s war.” In a post-Dodd-Frank world, the costs of the safe harbors—especially their systemic risk effects—are now addressed and minimized by federal regulators. Indeed, any modification of the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbors would simply complicate and undermine the coordinated efforts of federal regulators and their counterparts around the world.

This is an important argument, and would be particularly powerful if we were advocating reforms designed to be primary tools in mitigating systemic risk. That is indeed a job that should be left in the hands of regulators. But we are not proposing that the Bankruptcy Code play a larger or different role in regulating systemic risk. We are instead arguing that the Code should get out of the business of regulating systemic risk. For over twenty years, Congress has added an expanding array of safe harbor provisions to the Bankruptcy Code with the stated intent of minimizing the risk of systemic distress. We think this is a mistake, especially with respect to repos, because the available evidence suggests that the safe harbors make systemic crises more likely and more severe.

More importantly, our proposal complements current efforts by federal regulators to limit the risk-taking of systemically important firms. Despite their best efforts, regulators may make mistakes and a systemically important institution may collapse (this is precisely why Congress adopted Title II of Dodd-Frank). The broad safe harbors we now have magnify the cost of regulatory error. They allow a failing institution to become more leveraged, more dependent on runnable short-term debt, and more likely to need a bailout when it collapses. Thus, our proposal—to narrow the repo safe harbors—helps reduce the cost of regulator error. Our proposal builds redundancy into the financial regulatory system.

The importance of this redundancy should not be overlooked. Regulators responsible for financial safety regret that they lack authority to handle broad aspects of systemic risk residing in the so-called “shadow banking” system.81 If broad portions of the repo market move out of the banking system, as some believe safety regulation for banking might induce,82 then the systemic costs of the Bankruptcy Code’s subsidy to short-term repo financing could rise, to the discredit of the bankruptcy system. While riskier repo transactions declined in the wake of the financial crisis, they have climbed back up since83 and Federal Reserve regulators continue in 2014 to worry that several Wall Street firms are seriously vulnerable to a repo run.84 Narrowing the repo safe harbors to Treasuries helps to keep the shadow banking system, which is less susceptible now to direct regulation, from overly relying on mortgage-backed repos.

Moreover, Congress, via Dodd-Frank, expected bankruptcy to play an important role in resolving distress of systemically important financial institutions. The resolution planning process required in Dodd-Frank for financial institutions requires that the institutions plan for resolution under the Bankruptcy Code if they are eligible to file for bankruptcy. Title II of Dodd-Frank and many of its key regulatory interpreters expect bankruptcy to be the first line of resolution defense, with the expanded Dodd-Frank processes kicking in only if bankruptcy fails.85

C. EFFECTS ON THE HOUSING MARKET

Our proposal would eliminate safe harbor protection for repos on mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. These assets will become less liquid, the supply of credit to the housing market could decline, and it could become harder for potential homeowners to obtain mortgages.

We offer no view here about the value of subsidizing mortgages. This is a matter for policymakers in other arenas to decide. But the American housing market was robust and mortgages were common before the repo safe harbor for mortgage-backed securities became explicitly available in 2005. The benefit to housing could not have been fundamental; the impact in facilitating the financial crisis was, however, substantial. If policymakers nevertheless decide that the safe-harbor benefit to liquidity of mortgage-backed securities is worth continuing, despite its impact in the financial crisis, then it should not move forward via a type of “off-budget” financing by which major risks from their being safe-harbored are borne by the U.S. Treasury, taxpayers, and the American economy but are not otherwise accounted for. If mortgage-backed securities are to get the benefit of the safe harbors, then they should be backed by the full faith and credit of the United States, a result that policymakers and experts have recommended anyway as superior to the current implicit guarantees of government-backed, but not government-guaranteed, entities and their securities.86

D. LIQUIDITY IN MONEY MARKETS

Repos are an important part of the money market87 and the safe harbors are generally thought to play an important role in supporting the use of repos in money markets.88 Our proposal would affect liquidity in money markets by reducing the range of assets subject to repo safe-harbor protection.89 This might even lead to a “collateral shortage”: Market participants may be unable to quickly access collateral that is subject to safe-harbor protection.90

These are important downsides of our proposal. Outside of a crisis, the safe harbors increase asset liquidity, promote liquidity in money markets, and expand access to credit. In a crisis, however, the safe harbors have opposite effects. A balance must be struck between (i) rules that foster the creation of money-like claims and (ii) rules that protect financial markets from destabilizing runs in systemically important institutions. This is obvious; there is an academic consensus that such a balance must be struck.91 Although there are many ways to strike this balance, our proposal is a simple way to achieve it.

Our proposal will not prevent the financial system from creating money-like claims. First off, the Treasury market is itself broad and, in our view, should continue to have safe-harbor repos. Second, a repo rollback will shift creation of these claims from weakly capitalized financial entities to well-capitalized ones. The repo safe harbors are intrinsic to modern private money creation primarily because they protect counterparties of weakly capitalized, insolvency-prone financial entities. The safe harbors are unimportant if the entity seeking to create near-money is so well capitalized that its strength and survivability are unquestioned. Indeed, private money creation has a long history,92 and for most of that history private money was created without repo safe harbors, which are a modern phenomenon, dating from the 1980s. Narrow safe harbors, such as those that we recommend, would provide private competitive incentives for some financial entities to move toward such ultra-safe structures, so that they could profit from issuing more near-money, which weakly capitalized financially entities could not. Regulators could analogously modulate safety-enhancing financial regulation with private money creation in mind.

* * *

If our proposal has a large adverse effect on liquidity in money markets, and if federal regulators believe that the benefits of greater liquidity in these markets outweigh the potential systemic risks, regulators can expand the scope of the repo safe harbor in a simple way: The federal government can offer full faith and credit backing to a broader range of securities.

In other words, if there is a collateral shortage in money markets, or if regulatory authorities want more money-like channels with unimpeachable collateral to be built,93 public authorities ought to push for appropriate private ordering or for government full faith and credit backing. To do otherwise is to ask bankruptcy to do what it cannot. If the collateral that provides the foundation to a money channel cannot retain its long-run value in a crisis, the legal framework has not created a solid money channel. Instead it has created a money channel that can operate during stable economic times but that in a financial crisis cracks, constricts, and collapses. It fails during a financial crisis because the foundational collateral does not retain its long-run value. But if important financial institutions rely on this shaky channel, then when it cracks, government authorities are pressed to conclude that they must support the channel to prevent its full collapse. Government authorities face the choice of propping up the channel and bailing out its participants, or allowing the real economy to suffer.94

CONCLUSION

The repo safe harbors are too wide and should be narrowed. The safe harbors should be limited to United States Treasury and similar securities with the government’s full faith and credit backing them up. They should not encompass private mortgage-backed securities.

The safe harbors depart sharply from standard bankruptcy practice, effectively putting a large class of creditors outside the normal operation of the Code, by exempting them from the automatic stay, the bankruptcy court’s avoidance powers, the normal scope of setoff, and the normal treatment of ipso facto clauses. These departures demand strong justification, but there is no strong justification for mortgage-backed repos. If the safe harbors truly supported systemic financial safety, they might well be justified. But the safe harbors do no such thing. They may well indeed do the opposite by encouraging short-term financing at the expense of stable long-term financing, by facilitating more runnable debt, and by facilitating runs—and especially destructive ones—when a financial firm weakens.

The departure from core bankruptcy principles—a recent one, beginning only a few decades ago and expanding substantially as recently as 2005 and 2006—is unjustified and should be ended.

APPENDIX: STATUTORY PROPOSAL

Amend section 101(47) to read approximately as it did in 1984:

101(47): “repurchase agreement” (which definition also applies to a reverse repurchase agreement) means an agreement, including related terms, which provides for the transfer of certificates of deposit, eligible bankers’ acceptances, or securities that are direct obligations of, or that are fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by, the United States or any agency of the United States, if backed by the full faith and credit of the United States, against the transfer of funds by the transferee of such certificates of deposit, eligible bankers’ acceptances, or securities with a simultaneous agreement by such transferee to transfer to the transferor thereof certificates of deposit, eligible bankers’ acceptances, or securities as described above, at a date certain not later than one year after such transfers or on demand, against the transfer of funds;

Additionally, the definition of “securities contract” would need to be narrowed in order to prevent it from safe harboring repurchase agreements that fall outside the scope of the narrowed repo safe harbor. For example, a securities contract to purchase a security could be paired with a formally separate securities contract to sell that security back at a later time. That pairing could functionally substitute for a repo. Hence, section 741(7), which safe harbors certain securities transactions, should also be narrowed to eliminate transactions that are functionally equivalent to repos. Other conforming changes would likely be needed.

__________________

* Charles Evans Gerber Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Much of this paper was drafted while Professor Morrison was the Paul H. & Theo Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law at the University of Chicago Law School and received generous financial support from the SNR Denton Fund.

** David Berg Professor of Corporate Law, Harvard Law School.

*** United States Bankruptcy Judge for the District of Delaware. We thank Stephen Adams, Jim Baillie, Patrick Bolton, Felton Booker, Larry Brandman, Darrell Duffie, Mark Ellenberg, David Fel-senthal, Gary Gorton, Seth Grosshandler, Howell Jackson, Stephen Lubben, Antoine Martin, Knox McIlwain, James Peck, Enrico Perotti, David Skeel, Joseph Sommer, Richard Squire, Kimberly Summe, Suresh Sundaresan, Daniel Tarullo, Bruce Tuckman, Shmuel Vasser, Eric Waxman, and conference participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Conference on the Risks of Wholesale Funding) and Harvard Law School for discussion and comments on this paper and earlier work on the scope of the repo safe harbors.

The authors are members of the Advisory Committee on Derivatives, Financial Contracts, and Safe Harbors of the American Bankruptcy Institute’s Bankruptcy Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11.

1. See, e.g., Exploring Chapter 11 Reform: Corporate and Financial Institution Insolvencies; Treatment of Derivatives, Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial & Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 6 (2014) (statement of Seth Grosshandler) [hereinafter Grosshandler Statement], available at http://goo.gl/QpTsgK (“safe harbors” have proven to be very effective in containing the risk of contagion by allowing counterparties to terminate volatile financial contracts with the debtor quickly, thus limiting their exposure to possibly catastrophic losses from the failure of the debtor. This is the very reason why Congress enacted the safe harbors in the first place.”).

2. On agency securities and the safe harbors generally, see Shmuel Vasser, Derivatives in Bank-ruptcy, 60 BUS. LAW. 1507, 1511–13 (2005). Bankers’ acceptances are not in modern times an important category, although the category persists in the statute.

3. The U.S. Treasury repo market has become a principal means of financing the market for United States government securities. TOBIAS ADRIAN ET AL., FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORT—REPO AND SECURITIES LENDING 1, 17 (2013), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr529.pdf.

4. Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 101 (2005); Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payments Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2011).

5. Much of the prior scholarship advocates narrowing the safe harbors generally, but does not focus on the specific case for narrowing the repo safe harbors. See, e.g., Edwards & Morrison, supra note 4; Stephen J. Lubben, Repeal the Safe Harbors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 319 (2010); Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1036 (2007); Roe, supra note 4; Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 253 (2009); see also Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Bankruptcy Code’s Safe Har-bors for Settlement Payments and Securities: When Is Safe Too Safe?, 49 TEX. INTL L.J. 243 (2013).

6. See generally sources cited at supra notes 4 and 5. Our proposal resembles reforms advocated by legal scholars and economists. See, e.g., Thomas Jackson & David Skeel, Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in Bankruptcy, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 152, 179 (2012) (“In our view, each of these costs would be well addressed by our proposal to exempt repos that are collateralized by cash or cash-like securities from the automatic stay.”); Darrell Duffie & David A. Skeel, A Dialogue on the Costs and Benefits of Automatic Stays for Derivatives and Repurchase Agreements, in BANKRUPTCY NOT BAILOUT: A SPECIAL CHAPTER 14, at 133 (Kenneth E. Scott & John B. Taylor eds., 2012) (same); Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2010, at 269, 287 (proposing that banks and similar financial institutions benefit from the repo safe harbor only with respect to repos on Treasuries and other assets approved by regulators).

Our proposal is also compatible with other potential reforms for limiting the systemic risk potential of repo markets. See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya & T. Sabri Öncü, The Repurchase Agreement (Repo) Market, in REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 319 (Viral V. Acharya, Thomas F. Cooley, Matthew P. Richardson & Ingo Walter eds., 2010) (advocating an FDIC-like “repo resolution authority” to regulate repo markets); Enrico Perotti & Javier Suarez, A Pigovian Approach to Liquidity Regulation, 7 INTL J. CENT. BANKING 3 (2011) (advocating a tax on short-term funding such as repos).

7. On the connection between repo safe harbors and collateral fire sales, see generally BRIAN BE-GALLE, ANTOINE MARTIN, JAMES MCANDREWS & SUSAN MCLAUGHLIN, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORT—THE RISK OF FIRE SALES IN THE TRI-PARTY REPO MARKET (2013), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr616.html; Gaetano Antinolfi et al., Repos, Fire Sales, and Bankruptcy Policy (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2012-15, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2189583; Sebastian Infante, Repo Collateral Fire Sales: The Effects of Exemp-tion from the Automatic Stay (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series No. 2013-83, 2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2013/201383/201383pap.pdf.

8. The 1984 Code safe-harbored securities transactions between securities dealers and similar entities. Mortgage-backed securities were not as widespread in the marketplace at that time.

9. See, e.g., Duffie & Skeel, supra note 5; Jackson & Skeel, supra note 5; sources cited at supra note 4.

10. See THOMAS M. HOENIG & CHARLES S. MORRIS, RESTRUCTURING THE BANKING SYSTEM TO IMPROVE SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS 16 (2011), available at http://goo.gl/pUmTqC (“[T]he bankruptcy law for repurchase agreement collateral should be rolled back to the pre-2005 rules. This change would eliminate mortgage-related assets from being exempt from the automatic stay in bankruptcy when a borrower defaults on its repurchase obligation.”). Thomas Hoenig was then-President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City and is now Vice Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

11. We do not here address the safe harbors for swaps and other derivatives transactions.

12. See Jun Kyung Auh & Suresh Sundaresan, Bankruptcy Code, Optimal Liability Structure, and Secured Short-Term Debt (Columbia Bus. Sch. Research Paper No. 13-8, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2217669.

13. Banking statutes govern the resolution of banks, but the Bankruptcy Code is the initial legal structure to resolve bank holding companies, most bank affiliates, insurance holding companies, and many nonbank financial institutions.

14. 878 F.2d 742, 743 (3d Cir. 1989).

15. E.g., Granite Partners, L.P. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 275, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“any attempt to determine whether a repo or reverse repo transaction is more like a secured loan than a purchase and sale by weighing economic factors on a finely tuned balance scale would be an essentially formalistic and ultimately unproductive exercise” (quoting In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 67 B.R. 557, 597 (D.N.J. 1986))).

16. E.g., Vasser, supra note 2, at 1513 (“A repo is essentially a current sale and a forward contract. Economically, however, it is hard to distinguish a repo from a secured loan where the underlying securities serve as collateral, since the repurchase price includes interest on the imputed loan created by the repo.”).

17. Open Market Operations: Transaction Data, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/omo_transaction_data.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2014).

18. See, e.g., Gorton & Metrick, supra note 5; Enrico Perotti, The Roots of Shadow Banking, in SHADOW BANKING WITHIN AND ACROSS NATIONAL BORDERS (Stijn Claessens, Douglas Evanoff, Luc Laeven & George Kaufman eds., forthcoming 2014).

19. PAYMENTS RISK COMM., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., TASK FORCE REPORT ON TRI-PARTY REPO INFRA-STRUCTURE 3 (2010), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/prc/files/report_100517.pdf.

20. Kenneth D. Gardade, The Evolution of Repo Contracting Conventions in the 1980’s, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. POLY REV., May 2006, 27, 27–28 (2006); see also In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 878 F.2d 742, 745–46 (3d Cir. 1989); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 559.04, 559.LH (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed. 2007).

21. Pub. L. No. 97-222, § 8, 96 Stat. 235, 237 (1982).

22. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 391, 98 Stat. 333, 364–65. The Senate Report addressing the 1984 amendments noted that the “Lombard-Wall proceedings and their extensive press coverage have had an adverse impact on the financial markets and undermined the primary purpose of Public Law 97-222 [which introduced the “securities contract” safe harbor] because the repo market is subject to the same ripple effects as other securities markets.” S. REP. NO. 98–65, at 47 (1983) (citation omitted).

23. The 2005 expansion is discussed in detail in Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and the New Bankruptcy Code: Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 641 (2005).

24. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 907, 119 Stat. 23, 171–72 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101(47) (2012)).

25. Id. § 907, 119 Stat. at 173–74 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 741(7) (2012)); Financial Netting Improvements Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-390, § 5, 120 Stat. 2692, 2695–98 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101(25)(a) (2012)).

26. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2012).

27. A “financial participant,” for example, includes an entity that entered into protected financial transactions (swaps, repos, forwards, etc.) worth at least $1 billion in notional value (or $100 million in mark-to-market value) at some point during the fifteen months preceding the bankruptcy filing date. Id. § 101(22A).

28. For the baseline bankruptcy rules, see generally id. § 362(a)(7) (setoffs); id. § 362(d) (automatic stay); id. §§ 365, 541(c)(1) (debtor’s contract right is property of the estate); id. § 365(e)(1) (providing for unenforceability of ipso facto clauses that make the debtor’s bankruptcy a default under its contract); id. § 547 (requiring return of preferences); id. § 548 (fraudulent conveyance liability for mismatched consideration).

29. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 20, 559.04.

30. Id. ¶¶ 559.04, 559.LH.

31. See, e.g., Grosshandler, supra note 1. These purported benefits to the American economy are not fully distinct. They overlap.

32. In the model of Auh & Sundaresan, supra note 12, these bankruptcy-specific costs drive the demand for safe-harbored repos. In the absence of these costs, the safe harbors for repos would have no effects on liquidity.

33. Grosshandler, supra note 1, at 4 (“One of the tangible effects of the safe harbors under ‘business as usual’ conditions, that is, prior to a bankruptcy, is the increase of the liquidity of Safe Harbored Contracts, which reduces both the cost of these transactions and the costs to the issuers of the assets underlying the transactions—the securities or commodities being bought or sold, the mortgages and credit card receivables being financed, the risks being hedged. These benefits flow directly from the certainty provided to market participants that, in the event of the failure of their counterparty, they will be able to realize the value of their bargained-for security, crystalize their loss and hedge the risk related to their counterparty’s failure.”).

34. See generally Gorton & Metrick, supra note 5, at 276–79.

35. A transactionally complex implication: Repos are often used to hedge derivative positions and to short securities. Id. at 278–79. Because repo collateral can be “rehypothecated,” repos provide an important vehicle for shorting securities, which can improve market efficiency. While this market is a useful one for its participants, it is unclear whether the safe harbors are vital for it.

36. To ease discussion, we use the terms “borrower,” “lender,” and “collateral” in place of “seller,” “purchaser,” and “purchased securities,” notwithstanding that repos are structured formally as purchases and sales of assets, and not as secured loans. This vocabulary of collateral, borrower, and lender is conventional in the industry.

37. In the event of financial failure, non-safe-harbored creditors (oftentimes longer-term creditors) will be less likely to be paid immediately, while safe-harbored creditors (oftentimes shorter-term creditors) are permitted to immediately liquidate collateral—this thereby contributes to a market preference for safe-harbored debt over non-safe-harbored funding, all else equal.

38. This figure comes from Tobias Adrian, Christopher R. Burke & James J. McAndrews, The Fed-eral Reserve’s Primary Dealer Credit Facility, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y.: CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. & FIN., Aug. 2009, at 1, 2 (2009) (Figure 1 in original). We added the vertical line for October 2005, to identify the years before and after the repo safe harbors were expanded.

39. Id. at 4 (Figure 3 in original). We added the vertical line for October 2005, to identify the years before and after the repo safe harbors were expanded.

40. Id. at 3−4.

41. Some of this disfavoring of long-term finance over short-term finance arises from how baseline bankruptcy rules treat the time value of money. Appropriate compensation for the time value of any delay to both sets of creditors, prioritized at the underlying priority level of the principal amount, would even up the bankruptcy value of safe-harbored and non-safe-harbored investments. (Because the safe-harbored investors can close out immediately, they are less concerned with the time value of any delay in realization than are non-safe-harbored investors.) This possibility should be an issue for further analysis.

42. See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51 (1992); Alan Schwartz, A Contract Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807 (1998).

43. Steven L. Schwarcz & Ori Sharon, The Bankruptcy-Law Safe Harbor for Derivatives: A Path De-pendence Analysis, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2351025 (describing the justification at page 14).

44. Total financial sector debt was reported in 2010 to have been twenty times larger than it was in 1981. The repo market overall was fifty times greater than its 1981 size. Much of the greater growth in repos was during the 2000–2007 run-up to the financial crisis. Fed. Reserve Bd., Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1: Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States 9 (Sept. 17, 2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/20100917/zl.pdf; Statistical Supplement to the Federal Reserve Bulletin, FED. RES. BD., www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/supplement/default.htm (last updated May 30, 2014) (Table 1.43 of the bulletin); U.S. Government Securities Dealers—Positions and Financing, Statis-tical Supplement to the Federal Reserve System, FED. RES. ARCHIVAL SYS. FOR ECON. RESEARCH, http://www.fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications/frd/page/314888 (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).

45. Overnight repos rose from being one-half of primary dealer repo financing in early 2005 to about 70 percent of primary dealer repo financing in 2008–2009. Adrian et al., supra note 38, at 3 (Chart 2). We understand that the overnight share of repos has persistently been above 50 percent of the overall repo market.

46. The role of the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbors in facilitating “runs” has been explored in many studies by economists, regulators, and legal scholars. Recent examples include Gaetano Antinolfi et al., Repos, Fire Sales, and Bankruptcy Policy (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2012-15, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2189583; Auh & Sundaresan, supra note 12.

47. See, e.g., ADAM COPELAND, ANTOINE MARTIN & MICHAEL WALKER, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORT—REPO RUNS: EVIDENCE FROM THE TRI-PARTY REPO MARKET 26–27 (2012), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr506.html (documenting a collapse in tri-party repo collateral posted by Lehman during the week before its bankruptcy); Michael J. Fleming & Asani Sar-kar, The Failure Resolution of Lehman Brothers, 20 FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POLY REV (forthcoming 2014) (describing how the run of the counterparties for Lehman’s reverse repo assets, which were a large part of Lehman’s holdings, left Lehman cash-constrained); Kimberly Anne Summe, Lessons Learned from the Lehman Bankruptcy, in BANKRUPTCY NOT BAILOUTS: A SPECIAL CHAPTER 14, at 79 (Kenneth E. Scott & John B. Taylor eds., 2010) (reporting that 80 percent of Lehman’s derivative portfolio was terminated within the first five weeks after the bankruptcy filing).

48. Fernando Duarte & Thomas M. Eisenbach, Fire-Sale Spillovers and Systemic Risk (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Working Paper No. 645, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2340669.

49. Two Fed researchers state:

There is an apparent puzzle at the heart of the 2007 credit crisis. The subprime mortgage sector is small relative to the financial system as a whole and the exposure was widely dispersed through securitization. Yet the crisis in the credit market has been potent. Traditionally, financial contagion has been viewed through the lens of defaults, where if A has borrowed from B and B has borrowed from C, then the default of A impacts B, which then impacts C, etc. However, in a modern market-based financial system, the channel of contagion is through price changes and the measured risks and marked-to-market capital of financial institutions. When balance sheets are marked to market, asset price changes show up immediately on balance sheets and elicit response from financial market participants. Even if exposures are dispersed widely throughout the financial system, the potential impact of a shock can be amplified many-fold through market price changes.

Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, Liquidity and Financial Contagion, FIN. STABILITY REV.—SPECIAL ISSUE ON LIQUIDITY, Feb. 2008, at 1, 1.

50. Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 425, 428 (2012); Arvind Krishnamurthy, Stefan Nagel & Dmitry Orlov, Sizing Up Repo (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 17768, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17768. To be sure, we do not think that a complex phenomenon such as the financial crisis grew solely from an overly wide ambit for the repo safe harbors. Rather our view is that a negative economic event occurred, could occur again, and the wide safe harbors played a supporting role. Without that support, we do not believe the crisis would have been averted. But if multiple reforms are undertaken, the financial system can be made safer. Narrowing the repo safe harbor is one of the appropriate reforms in a wider package.

51. The “deleveraging spiral” that led to en masse fire sales of mortgage-related securities is described by Federal Reserve economists in BEGALLE, MARTIN, MCANDREWS & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 7, at 2.

52. Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Shadow Banking and Systemic Risk Regulation, Remarks at the Americans for Financial Reform and Economic Policy Institute Conference (Nov. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Tarullo, Shadow Banking and Systemic Risk Regulation], available at http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20131122a.htm; Jeremy C. Stein, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., The Fire-Sales Problem and Securities Financing Transactions, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and International Monetary Fund Conference on Shadow Banking Within and Across National Borders (Nov. 7, 2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/stein20131107a.pdf.

While presiding over one of the Fed’s regional banks and serving as a voting member of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), the current FDIC vice chair called for a repo rollback along the lines outlined here. See Hoenig & Morris, supra note 10, at 16–17. Other, academic analyses have concluded similarly. See Skeel & Jackson, supra note 5, at 177–79; Roe, supra note 4.

53. See the proposals listed at supra notes 4 and 5.

54. Here is a breakdown of the collateral backing the American repo market: U.S. Treasury securities (at 34.7% of the market) and full faith and credit obligations of U.S. agencies (5.9%) would remain safe harbored. Equities (at 4.5%), private mortgage-backed securities and collateralized mortgage obligations (at 3.9%), corporate bonds (at 3.5%), and a miscellaneous category (at 2.7%) would not be safe harbored. Of the government-sponsored mortgage-backed securities and collateralized mortgage obligations (at 45% of the entire repo market), approximately one-quarter were backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government (such as bonds guaranteed by Ginnie Mae), amounting to 11% of the total repo collateral; they would be safe harbored. Bonds guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the United States. See US Repo Market Factsheet, SIFMA (June 27, 2012), available at http://www.sifma.org/research/item.aspx?id=8589939674.

55. Even U.S. Treasury securities could become illiquid, but that illiquidity is likely to arise only when the U.S. government is insolvent. Were that to occur, systemic risk would be a problem with or without the safe harbors. The nation would be facing an economic crisis of such severity that safe harboring Treasuries would be a minor issue.

56. COPELAND, MARTIN & WALKER, supra note 47, at 32.

57. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets and Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1129.aspx (announcing conservatorship for Fannie and Freddie).

58. BEGALLE, MARTIN, MCANDREWS & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 7, at 14–18.

59. Id. at 15–16 (“It is worth noting that these estimates are conservative. The assumption regarding the number of days to liquidate is for normal market conditions taking into account historical daily turnover in each asset class and is meant to avoid signaling effects. Under stressed market conditions, liquidating most asset classes would take longer. One possible exception is Treasury securities, which tend to benefit from flight-to-quality episodes.”).

60. COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN. SYS., THE ROLE OF MARGIN REQUIREMENTS AND HAIRCUTS IN PROCYCLICALITY 11 (Bank for Int’l Settlements CGFS Paper No. 36, 2010), available at www.bis.org/publ/cgfs36.pdf.

61. And one-quarter of the agency securities here do receive the full faith and credit of the United States (the quarter guaranteed by Ginnie Mae), but are mixed in with the data on agency-backed securities’ performance during the crisis.

62. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOV-ERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2015, APPENDIX: GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES 1–3 (2014) (describing total expenditures to Fannie and Freddie as $116.1 billion and $71.3 billion, respectively), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2015/assets/gov.pdf.

63. We do not address considerations beyond those relating to financial stability and systemic risk. Other opponents of safe harbors may point to rapid close-outs as impeding reorganization of industrial firms, which they probably do. But because that process lacks the potential for knock-on effects to the entire economy, we are unsure of the correct policy. If the safe-harbored debts are a small part of an industrial firm’s capital structure (in contrast to the one-third or more that it constituted for Lehman and other major financial firms), refinancing via section 364 debtor-in-possession prioritized financing should be possible.

64. For a description of synthetic repos, see MOORAD CHOUDHRY, THE REPO HANDBOOK 192–95 (2002). One can conceptualize this as follows: A counterparty buys the security from the debtor under one contract and simultaneously enters a total return swap with the debtor under a separate and formally distinct contract. The total return swap requires the debtor to make periodic interest payments and requires the counterparty to pay any changes in the value of the securities. When the swap matures, the counterparty will sell the security back to the debtor. Through these three transactions, the parties replicate a repo. Each transaction—the two securities contracts and the swap—is safe harbored by the Code.

65. Another possibility is that, in the absence of safe-harbor protection, repo counterparties insist that their bank counterparties be well-capitalized, with capital levels even greater than those required by regulators. This would be a systemically positive effect.

66. Bankruptcy policymakers should, however, be aware of how bankruptcy policy can tilt financing away from the stable long term to the less stable short term. Better attention to how interest is paid in bankruptcy, or not paid, on long-term undersecured debt and the adequacy of protection could strengthen long-term financing channels.

67. See, e.g., Grosshandler, supra note 1, at 8 (“Absent safe-harbor protection, counterparties would be subject to the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay and assumption/rejection powers, which would subject Safe Harbored Contract counterparties to a variety of risks. Unlike other contracts, the value of Safe Harbored Contacts typically can change rapidly based on the fluctuating value of the underlying assets or collateral, prevailing market conditions and other factors. The inability of counterparties to terminate such contracts and foreclose on collateral exposes them to risks that cannot be hedged effectively. If the debtor is given the right to assume or reject Safe Harbored Contracts in bankruptcy, this effectively gives the debtor an indefinite option to perform or terminate the contract, making it impossible to effectively hedge the related risks in an adequate manner. It could also potentially give the debtor the right to ‘cherry pick’ between contracts, exacerbating losses to creditors. Although the Bankruptcy Code provides protections to secured creditors, the mechanisms are not timely enough and are too cumbersome to obtain to effectively protect counterparties under volatile Safe Harbored Contracts, especially on a large scale, such as during the failure of a systemically important financial institution.”).

68. See Skeel & Jackson, supra note 5, at 173–80. Indeed, the predecessor to the mortgage repo was the warehouse secured loan. See supra Part II.B.1.

69. In the unlikely event that a repo were treated as an executory contract, the counterparty would face similar challenges as those raised with a secured loan. For example, under section 365(d)(2) of the Code, the trustee in a Chapter 11 case has until confirmation of a plan to assume or reject an executory contract. But the statute also provides that “the court, on the request of any party to such contract or lease, may order the trustee to determine within a specified period of time whether to assume or reject such contract or lease.” 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (2012).

70. Id. §§ 502, 506(b).

71. And the difficulty might justify revisiting whether adequate protection for an extended length stay should encompass the time value of money, prioritized at the level of the basic obligation.

72. See, e.g., Victoria Ivashina, Benjamin Iverson & David C. Smith, The Ownership and Trading of Debt Claims in Chapter 11 Restructurings (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper, 2013), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1573311; Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648 (2010).

73. See, e.g., Grosshandler, supra note 1, at 6–7 (“The effectiveness of the safe harbors in containing contagion was demonstrated during the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. None of Lehman Brothers’ counterparties (many financial institutions among them) failed because of losses under Safe Harbored Contracts with Lehman. Almost all counterparties exercised their safe-harbored rights to terminate, net and exercise rights against collateral, with only approximately 3% of Lehman’s derivatives book remaining outstanding after three months following its bankruptcy petition. If these counterparties were not protected by the safe harbors, these positions would have been indefinitely frozen, causing potentially catastrophic capital and liquidity implications for counterparties in addition to any losses under the contracts. While subsequent failures (and near-failures) occurred during the financial crisis, they had other causes—mainly losses caused by outsized exposures to the subprime mortgage market and the seizure of the inter-bank credit market. The effects of these dynamics were exacerbated by the political uncertainty caused by letting Lehman fail, while shoring up other institutions, which led to or exacerbated runs on not just broker-dealers, but on insured depository institutions (the first time runs had occurred since the Great Depression).”).

74. Id. at 13–14 (“Take for example the criticism that the safe harbor for repurchase agreements has created an incentive for large financial institutions to rely excessively on short-term repurchase agreements rather than on other forms of funding. The banking and securities regulators are uniquely positioned to address any such issues. In fact, regulators have already taken steps to reduce reliance on short-term funding through tougher capital and liquidity requirements, and plan further action. These rules address specific concerns about the funding profile of major financial institutions without increasing risks to counterparties that would arise if the safe harbors were instead narrowed or eliminated.”).

75. ADAM COPELAND, ANTOINE MARTIN & MICHAEL WALKER, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORT: THE TRI-PARTY REPO MARKET BEFORE THE 2010 REFORMS 55–64 (2010), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr477.pdf.

76. Id. at 56.

77. Id. at 61.

78. On September 14, 2008, fear that a Lehman failure would “put other financial institutions at risk” led the Fed to expand the Primary Dealer Credit Facility. Adrian, Burke & McAndrews, supra note 38, at 3. “The facility proved to be a critical recourse for primary dealers at the time of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy.” Id. at 9.

79. See Report of the Examiner Anton R. Valukas at 139099, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010), available at http://lehmanreport.jenner.com. The examiner describes Lehman’s direct reliance on the facility, allowing it to pay counterparties. Id. at 1399.

80. Fed. Reserve Bd., Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.4.1: Factors Affecting Reserve Balances (Oct. 2, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/20081002/ (showing outstanding loans of $147.7 billion through its Primary Dealer Credit Facility).

81. Tarullo, supra note 46 (Federal Reserve governor concludes that “completion of this task [of promoting financial safety] will require a more comprehensive set of measures, . . . some of which must cover financial actors not subject to prudential regulatory oversight.”). Moreover, “[w]e would do the American public a fundamental disservice were we to declare victory without tackling the structural weaknesses of short-term wholesale funding markets,” Tarullo had previously concluded. Peter Eavis, A New Fed Thought for ‘Too Big to Fail’ Banks: Shrink Them, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 3, 2013, 1:32 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/03/fed-governor-pushes-for-measure-aimed-at-strengthening-large-banks/.

82. National Public Radio: New Rules Force Big Banks to Keep a Bigger Cushion (Nat’l Pub. Radio broadcast Apr. 9, 2014) (analysis of Karen Shaw Petrou, Federal Financial Analytics), available at http://goo.gl/txkMbJ (“[I]f the big banks can’t [operate in a market] because of these [new] rules, the business is going to go to non-banks.”).

83. Rob Wile, They’re Back: Subprime MBS Are Reemerging in the Repo Market, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 3, 2012, 1:46 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/theyre-back-subprime-mbs-are-reemerging-in-the-repo-market-2012-2.

84. See Eric Rosengren, Broker Dealer Finance and Financial Stability: Keynote Remarks at the Conference on the Risks of Wholesale Funding (Aug. 13, 2014), available at http://www.bostonfed.org/news/speeches/rosengren/2014/081314/081314text.pdf (Rosengren is the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston); John Carney, Wall Street’s Reason to Fear the Repo, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2014, at 6.

85. See Implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 82–88 (2011) (statement of Martin J. Gruenberg, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spdec0611.html (“If the firms are successful in their resolution planning, then [Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority] would only be used in the rare instance where resolution under the Bankruptcy Code would have serious adverse effects on U.S. financial stability.”); The Bankruptcy Code and Financial Institution Insolvencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of Regulatory Reform, Commercial & Antitrust Law, H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 12 (2013) (statement of Jeffrey M. Lacker, President, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond), available at http://goo.gl/9MybDd (“[T]he Dodd-Frank Act envisions bankruptcy without government support as the first and most preferable option in the case of a failing financial institution.”); see also Exploring Chapter 11 Reform: Corporate and Financial Insti-tution Insolvencies; Treatment of Derivatives: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of Regulatory Reform, Commer-cial & Antitrust Law, H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 5 (2014) (statement of Thomas H. Jackson), available at http://goo.gl/6iVMPj (describing FDIC view that Dodd-Frank expects bankruptcy, not Orderly Liquidation Authority, to be the normal mode of resolution for distressed System-atically Important Financial Institutions).

86. See Nick Timiraos, What Can Take the Place of Fannie and Freddie?, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15, 2014, 5:00 AM EST), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2014/03/15/what-can-take-the-place-of-fannie-and-freddie/tab/print/. The academic, industry, and perhaps regulatory consensus proposal is reported to be to make the implied guarantee explicit, backed by the federal government’s full faith and credit.

87. Zoltan Pozsar, Shadow Banking: The Money View 5 (U.S. Treasury, Office of Fin. Research Working Paper No. 14-04, 2014), available at http://goo.gl/3obp6I.

88. See, e.g., Gorton & Metrick, supra note 5, at 284 (“The rise of shadow banking was facilitated by a demand-driven expansion in the bankruptcy safe harbor for repos.”).

89. Our proposal might reduce the extent to which repo’d assets are rehypothecated. We see this as a virtue, however, because it should reduce financial interconnectedness involving weakened securities—a problem during the financial crisis.

90. On collateral shortages, see Gorton & Metrick, supra note 5, at 289–90. Cf. Chrystin On-dersma, Shadow Banking and Financial Distress: The Treatment of “Money-Claims” in Bankruptcy, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 79.

91. Perotti, supra note 18.

92. GARY GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE DONT SEE THEM COMING 10–25 (2012).

93. The view that we need more near-money channels is not unanimous. Jeremy Stein, prior to joining the Federal Reserve, suggested that the greater problem may be the excessive manufacture of near-money obligations. Jeremy C. Stein, Monetary Policy as Financial Stability Regulation, 127 Q.J. ECON. 57 (2012).

94. Consider this description:

Prior to the . . . crisis there was a credit boom . . . in housing. The mortgages were typically securitized into bonds that were used as collateral in repo. During the credit boom, over 1996–2007, . . . mortgage-backed securities grew by 1,691 percent. When house prices started to decline these mortgage-backed securities became questionable, leading to the financial crisis, when the short-term debt was not renewed, leading to almost a complete collapse in the volume of collateral. . . . The decline in house prices led lenders to question the value of the collateral in mortgage-backed bonds, as well as other securitizations.

Gary Gorton & Guillermo Ordoñez, Collateral Crises, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 343, 346 (2014).

 

Civility as the Core of Professionalism

Civil behavior is a core element of attorney professionalism. As the guardians of the Rule of Law that defines the American social and political fabric, lawyers should embody civility in all they do. Not only do lawyers serve as representatives of their clients, they serve as officers of the legal system and public citizens having special responsibility for the quality of justice. To fulfill these overarching and overlapping roles, lawyers must make civility their professional standard and ideal. 

What Exactly Is “Civility”?

The concept of civility is broad. The French and Latin etymologies of the word suggest, roughly, “relating to citizens.” In its earliest use, the term referred to exhibiting good behavior for the good of a community. The early Greeks thought that civility was both a private virtue and a public necessity, which functioned to hold the state together. Some writers equate civility with respect. So, civility is a behavioral code of decency or respect that is the hallmark of living as citizens in the same state. 

It may also be useful at the outset to dispense with some widely held misconceptions about civility, likening it to: (1) agreement, (2) the absence of criticism, (3) liking a person, and (4) good manners. These are all myths. 

Civility is not the same as agreement. The presence of civility does not mean the absence of disagreement. In fact, underlying the codes of civility is the assumption that people will disagree. The democratic process thrives on dialogue and dialogue requires disagreement. Professor Stephen Carter of Yale Law School has stated, in one of his many writings on civility, “[a] nation where everybody agrees is not a nation of civility but a nation without diversity, waiting to die.” 

Civility is not the absence of criticism. Respect for the other person or party may in fact call for criticism. For example, a law firm partner who fails to point out an error in a young lawyer’s brief isn’t being civil – that partner isn’t doing his or her job. 

Civility is not the same as liking someone. It is a myth that civility is more possible in small communities where everyone knows each other. Knowing or liking the other person is not a prerequisite for civility. Civility compels us to show respect even for strangers who may be sharing our space, whether in the public square, in the office, in the courtroom, or in cyberspace. 

Civility should not be equated with politeness or manners alone. Although impoliteness is almost always uncivil, good manners alone are not a mark of civility. Politely refusing to serve someone at a lunch counter on the basis of skin color, or cordially informing a law graduate that the firm does not hire women, is not civil behavior. 

Civility is a code of decency that characterizes a civilized society. But how is that code reflected in the practice of law? 

Civil Conduct is a Condition of Lawyer Licensing

A civility imperative permeates bar admission standards. The legal profession is largely self-governing, with ultimate authority over the profession resting with the courts in nearly all states. Courts typically set the standards for who becomes admitted to practice in a state and prescribe the ethical obligations that lawyers are bound, by their oath, to fulfill. 

Candidates for bar admission in every state must satisfy the board of bar admissions that they are of good moral character and general fitness to practice law. The state licensing authority’s committee on character and fitness will recommend admission only where the applicant’s record demonstrates that he or she meets basic eligibility requirements for the practice of law and justifies the trust of clients, adversaries, courts, and others with respect to the professional duties owed to them. Those eligibility requirements typically require applicants to demonstrate exemplary conduct that reflects well on the profession. 

Capacity to act in a manner that engenders respect for the law and the profession – in other words, civility – is a requirement for receiving a law license and, in some jurisdictions, for retaining the privilege of practicing law. It follows that aspiring and practicing lawyers should be disabused of the notion that effective representation ever requires or justifies incivility. 

Beyond Client Representation: Lawyer as Public Citizen

Notions of a lawyer’s core civility duty also are rooted in ethical principles informing and defining the practice of law. Those principles, having evolved over the centuries to lend moral structure and a higher purpose to a life in the law today, speak plainly to a lawyer’s dual duties as officer of the legal system and public citizen, beyond the role client advocate. At the very top of the lawyer’s code of ethics – in the Preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct – we read of those larger civic duties binding every practicing lawyer. 

Civility concepts suffuse the hortatory language of the Preamble. For example, the Preamble makes clear that even in client dealings, counsel is expected to show respect for the legal system in his or her role as advisor, negotiator, or evaluator (Preamble Cmt. 5). In addition, lawyers should resolve conflicts inherent in duties owed to client, the legal system, and the lawyer’s own interest through the exercise of discretion and judgment “while maintaining a professional, courteous, and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal system” (Preamble Cmt. 9, emphasis added). 

Tension Between Zealous Advocacy and Civility

Even for the most ethically conscientious lawyers, there is seemingly ubiquitous tension between the duty of zealous advocacy and the duty to conduct oneself civilly at all times. Model Rule 1.2 compels zealous advocacy, and Comment 1 to the Rule speaks to the depth of that duty, noting that a lawyer 

should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to a lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf. (Rule 1.2 Cmt. 1) 

The distorted image in popular culture of lawyer as a partisan and combative zealot would seem to preclude civil behavior as the preferred approach to legal practice. Not so. That same comment goes on to explain: 

A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. . . . The lawyer’s duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect. (Rule 1.3 Cmt. 1) 

Thus, there are firm limits to the lawyer’s duty to act with zeal in advocacy, but the precise location of those limits is not always easy to discern. Therein lies the tension. Appropriate zeal, however, never extends to offensive tactics or treating people with discourtesy or disrespect. 

The individual lawyer is the guardian of the tone of interactions that will serve both the client and the legal system well. Clients may not understand these limits. Many clients are under the misconception that because they hired the lawyer, they have the power to dictate that lawyer’s conduct. It falls to the lawyer to manage and correct that expectation and to let the client know the lawyer is more than a “hired gun.” In practice, that often means refusing a client’s demand to act uncivilly or to engage in sharp or unethical practices with other parties in a case or matter. 

The rules themselves make it clear, of course, that the lawyer is not just a hired gun. Model Rule 1.16(b)(4) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides that a lawyer may withdraw if the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has fundamental disagreement, and Rule 3.1 provides that a lawyer cannot abuse legal procedure by frivolously bringing or defending a proceeding, or asserting or defending an issue. Egregious forms of uncivil behavior in a court proceeding also may constitute conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, within the meaning of Rule 8.4(d). 

The Problem of Declining Civility in the Legal Profession

Although civility is central to the ethical and public-service bedrock of the American legal profession, substantial evidence points to a steady rise in incivility within the American bar. It is problematic to pin down the incidence of incivility and unprofessional conduct because incivility, without some associated violation of the ethical rules, historically has not been prosecuted by the regulatory authorities. Thus there is no good systemic data on incivility’s prevalence. There have been countless writings, however, about widespread and growing dissatisfaction among judges and established lawyers who bemoan what they see as the gradual degradation of the practice of law, from a vocation graced by congenial professional relationships to one stigmatized by abrasive dog-eat-dog confrontations. 

Discussion of the problem tends to dwell on two areas: (1) examples of lawyers behaving horribly, from which most of us easily distinguish ourselves; and (2) possible causes and justifications of that behavior – rather than possible solutions. Traditional media and social media carry countless accounts of lawyers screaming, using expletives, or otherwise being uncivil. Lawyers who reflect on the trend generally pin the cause on any of a combination of factors, including the influence of outrageous media portrayals; inexperienced lawyers who increasingly start their own law practices without adequate mentoring; and the impact of modern technology that isolates lawyers and others behind their computers, providing anonymous platforms for digital expression. 

The scattered data that is available tends to confirm that uncivil lawyer conduct is pervasive. A 2007 survey done by the Illinois Supreme Court Commission on Professionalism, for example, took a close look at specific behaviors of attorneys across the state and concluded that the vast majority of practicing lawyers experience unprofessional behavior by fellow members of the bar. Over the prior year, 71 percent had reported experiencing rudeness – described as sarcasm, condescending comments, swearing, or inappropriate interruption. An even higher percentage of respondents reported being the victim of a complex of more specific behaviors loosely described as “strategic incivility,” reflecting a perception that opposing counsel strategically employed uncivil behaviors in an attempt to gain the upper hand, typically in litigation. The complained-of conduct included, for example, deliberate misrepresentation of facts, not agreeing to reasonable requests for accommodation, indiscriminate or frivolous use of pleadings, and inflammatory writing in briefs or motions. 

Whatever the causes, the first step toward a real remedy to the incivility pandemic is recognition of the deeply destructive impact of uncivil conduct on individual lawyers who engage in it, on those subjected to it, on the bar as a whole, and ultimately on the American system of justice. It begins with recognition that civility is, and must be, the cornerstone of legal practice. 

Benefits of Civility

Aside from the most obvious reasons that lawyers should act civilly – that is, that the profession requires it of them and it’s just the right thing to do – a number of tangible benefits accrue from civil conduct in terms of reputational gain and career damage avoidance, as well as strategic advantage in a lawyer’s engagement. 

Lawyers who behave with civility also report higher personal and professional rewards. Conversely, lawyer job dissatisfaction is often correlated with unprofessional behavior by opposing counsel. In the 2007 Survey on Professionalism of the Illinois Supreme Court Commission, 95 percent of the respondents reported that the consequences of incivility made the practice of law less satisfying. 

Other research shows that lawyers are more than twice as likely as the general population to suffer from mental illness and substance abuse. Law can be a high-pressure occupation, and it appears that needless stress is added by uncivil behavior directed to counsel. “Needless” is used as a descriptor here because the consequences of incivility, as acknowledged by over 92 percent of the survey respondents, often add nothing to the pursuit of justice or to service of client interests. Consequences include making it more difficult to resolve our clients’ matters, increasing the cost to our clients, and undermining public confidence in the justice system. They are the exact opposite of the goals we should strive to accomplish as lawyers. 

Moreover, judges are not fond of being asked to decide disputes between opposing counsel extraneous to deciding the merits of the respective clients’ case. Judges will tell you that mediating bickering between counsel is the least tasteful part of their job. Even if a judge avoids wading into a dispute between counsel, the fact that a lawyer was disrespectful or used bad behavior cannot help but register on the judge’s consciousness. Then, if there is a close call on a motion or other issue, and the judge has a choice between ruling in favor of the client whose lawyer was civil and professional or in favor of the client whose lawyer has been a troublemaker, the Judges-Are-Human rule may well control. Similarly, juries also report being negatively affected by rude behavior exhibited by trial attorneys. In sum, lawyer conduct can and does affect the results lawyers deliver to their clients, and ultimately the success of their practices. 

It naturally follows that a lawyer’s reputation for professional conduct is part and parcel of his or her reputation for excellence in practice. Before the advent of the Internet, evaluations of attorneys were conducted and disseminated largely by and for lawyers and published yearly in books with entries listing an attorney’s achievements by name, geographic region, and specialty. Now, any person who has contact with an attorney may rate and comment on the attorney’s performance and professionalism on websites devoted to rating and ranking attorneys or through general social media channels. In the realm of the Internet, one uncivil outburst may haunt an attorney for years; and reputations may be built and destroyed quickly. Even a cursory search of some of these websites shows that clients regularly comment (especially if they are displeased) about an attorney’s communication style and respect for his or her clients and the system of justice. 

Not surprisingly, research shows that clients evaluate a lawyer who exhibits civility and professionalism as a more effective lawyer. If clients evaluate their lawyers as being effective, they stay with them; if they see their lawyers as ineffective, they will go elsewhere for legal services, particularly in a climate in which the supply of lawyers exceeds the demand for legal services. Research also shows that superior service, in which relationship abilities are central, increases client retention rates by about one third. Effective client service and positive relationships, in turn, increase profit to the lawyers by about the same rate. 

Bad Behavior/Bad Consequences

Historically, incivility per se has by and large not been prosecuted by attorney regulatory authorities. Since 2010, however, several attorneys have been suspended by their states’ high courts for uncivil conduct implicating a lawyer’s duty to uphold the administration of justice and other ethics rules. 

The Supreme Court of South Carolina has disciplined several attorneys for incivility, citing not only ethics rules but that state’s Lawyer’s Oath, taken upon admission to the bar. The oath contains a pledge of civility. In Illinois, an attorney was prosecuted by disciplinary authorities for oral and written statements made to judges and an attorney that violated various ethical rules, including Illinois Rule 8.4(a) (modeled after the corresponding ABA Model Rule). 

Outside of the courtroom, much of the uncivil arrow-slinging between counsel historically has occurred during discovery disputes in litigation. However, the growing influence of technology in litigation, with its potential for marshaling exponentially more information and data at trial than ever, and the commensurate need to control and limit that information to what is relevant and manageable, suggests courts will grow even less tolerant of lawyers trying to manipulate the pre-trial fact discovery process or engaging in endless, contentious discovery disputes. Moreover, while never wise or virtuous, it is no longer profitable to play “hide the ball” in litigation as clients are demanding better results at reduced costs. 

Movement Toward Systemic Solutions to Incivility

There have been programmatic efforts, largely led by judges, to address and curb spreading incivility in the legal profession. In 1996, the Conference of Chief Justices adopted a resolution calling for the courts of the highest jurisdiction in each state to take a leadership role in evaluating the contemporary needs of the legal community with respect to lawyer professionalism. In response, the supreme courts of 14 states have established commissions on professionalism to promote principles of professionalism and civility throughout their states. 

Many more states have, either through their supreme courts or bar associations, formed committees that have studied professionalism issues and formulated principles articulating the aspirational or ideal behavior the lawyers should strive to exhibit. These professionalism codes nearly all state at the outset that they do not form the basis of discipline but are provided as guidance – attorneys and judges should strive to embody professionalism above the floor of acceptable conduct that is memorialized in the attorney rules of ethics. They also typically echo a theme found in the Preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: that lawyers have an obligation to improve the administration of justice. 

In 2004, a relatively aggressive stance was taken by the Supreme Court of South Carolina. The South Carolina high court amended the oath attorneys take upon admission to the bar to include a pledge of civility and courtesy to judges and court personnel and the language “to opposing parties and their counsel, I pledge fairness, integrity, and civility, not only in court, but also in all written and oral communications.” It also amended the disciplinary rules to provide that a violation of the civility oath could be grounds for discipline. Similar civility pledges were added to the lawyers’ oath of admission by the Supreme Court of Florida in 2011 and by the Supreme Court of California in 2014. 

Some jurisdictions, in states including New Jersey, Georgia, Illinois, Florida, Arizona, and North Carolina, have taken the voluntary aspirational codes further and have adopted an intermediary or peer review system to mediate complaints against lawyers or judges who do not abide by the aspirational code. It is challenging to implement an enforcement mechanism in a way that inspires voluntary compliance with an aspirational code and the success of these mechanisms has been inconsistent. 

Without question, the most effective ways of addressing incivility entail bringing lawyers together for training and mentoring. Mentoring programs are being offered by an increasing number of state commissions and bar associations. The American Inns of Court, modeled after the apprenticeship training programs of barristers in England, brings seasoned and newer attorneys together into small groups to study, present, and discuss some of the pressing issues facing the profession. 

Conclusion: A Time to Recommit to Civility

The needed rebirth of civility, at a critical juncture in the evolution of the legal profession, should be seen by lawyers not as pain, but as gain. Technology and globalization are facilitating greater client influence and requiring increased transparency; civil behavior is more important than ever. As the research conclusively bears out, (1) civil lawyers are more effective and achieve better outcomes; (2) civil lawyers build better reputations; (3) civility breeds job satisfaction; and (4) incivility may invite attorney discipline. Not only does our profession require us to be civil, and it is simply the right thing to do, but professionalism among lawyers is required by the larger American society in order to preserve a great profession and survive as a civil society bound to the Rule of Law.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

How Practitioners Can Apply Legal Project Management to M&A: New Tools for New Times

Managing a complex project with multiple interested parties and specialists, often across borders and time zones, while subject to time and budgetary pressures, is a challenging exercise. It demands special skills, techniques, and tools. Just ask any manager involved in developing the next jetliner, or smart phone, or power plant. Or you can ask an M&A lawyer. 

The fact of the matter is, however, that most M&A lawyers do not see themselves in such a light. Until recently, most business lawyers had not even heard the words “project management” uttered in connection with M&A. 

The Old Way

There is little wonder why this is the case. Under the “classic” approach, a lawyer would receive a hurried (and sometimes harried) phone call from the client reporting that a business deal had been struck, providing the lawyer with only a skeletal outline of terms. Along with such bare bones information, the lawyer would be asked: how quickly can you turn out the documents? Sometimes, the client would also ask an important, but uncomfortable question: how much will it cost? 

With the classic approach, there was little discussion regarding business objectives, priorities, allocation of responsibilities, optimum resources, deal and operational risks, budgeting, and so on. 

Why the Old Way No Longer Works

Such a modus operandi might have been the accepted, even prevailing practice in the last millennium. However, in the still evolving new age of deal lawyering, such a seat-of-the-pants approach can place a lawyer at a serious competitive disadvantage, make the work unprofitable and even risk the loss of the client relationship. A number of factors are converging to fundamentally transform the legal landscape and make legal project management techniques essential in handling M&A transactions, including the following:

  • increasingly sophisticated clients who demand more transparency, better communication, effective containment of risk, and more predictability with fewer surprises;
  • heightened sensitivity to the size and variability of legal fees;
  • an oversupply of lawyers relative to the amount of available work; and
  • disaggregation of legal services, with increasing use of outsourcing and alternative service providers. 

In Altman Weil’s 2014 Annual Survey of Law Firms in Transition, 94 percent of law firm leaders surveyed agreed that a focus on improved practice efficiency will remain a permanent feature of the legal market. That same survey noted that partners have only a “moderate” awareness of the challenges of the new legal market and a corresponding level of adaptability to change. The same survey found in firms of over 250 lawyers, legal project management is one of the primary ways firm management is responding to the client’s mandate for value and efficiency. 

Lawyers are relatively late adopters of project management practices. For example, the medical profession has for some time embraced these techniques with excellent results. In his ground-breaking 2009 bestseller, The Checklist Manifesto: How to Get Things Right, Dr. Atul Gawande promoted the use of checklists (such as those used by pilots as standard operating procedure) in hospital operating rooms. To be sure, there was initial pushback from veteran surgeons who regarded checklists as undercutting their autonomy and questioning their judgment. However, the approach was validated when hospitals saw adverse event rates plummet following the adoption of checklists. 

When lawyers first hear of legal project management, or LPM, they react much like those surgeons who resisted operating room checklists: “Why do we need to do this? This is not the way that I have always practiced. This encroaches on my autonomy. I know all these punchlist items already – this is a colossal waste of time.” 

Increasingly, however, sophisticated general counsel and purchasers of legal services, either individually or through their organizations, have become converts when it comes to LPM and are insisting that firms adopt and adhere to LPM techniques and protocols. It is evidenced by the RFPs they circulate and their responses to client satisfaction surveys. 

Benefits of the New Way

What are the objectives of those adopting LPM? Among other things, they wish to accomplish the following:

  • reduce errors;
  • improve efficiency and reduce “deal friction”;
  • better allocate resources;
  • increase accountability, transparency, consistency, and predictability; and
  • establish a basis for more accurate budgeting and predictable reporting. 

Ryan Stafford, vice president of Littelfuse, a global manufacturer of components used in consumer electronics to automobiles, commercial vehicles, and industrial equipment, represents the views of many general counsel when he observes: “We are expected to deliver acquisitions on time and within budget. I expect no less from our law firms and I expect them to take concrete actions to drive efficiency and cost savings into the way they do deals with us.” 

Specific New Tools and How They Can Help

The buzz surrounding LPM has been growing exponentially. Every lawyer’s electronic inbox has been inundated of late with a barrage of e-mails announcing webinars, seminars, books, and articles on the topic. The ABA has published several books on LPM as well.

However, few of these programs and materials focus on applying LPM specifically to the handling of M&A transactions. That reality drove the formation two years ago of the Legal Project Management Task Force of the M&A Committee of the Business Law Section of the ABA. Comprised of practicing attorneys, general counsel, legal consultants and academics, the Task Force is taking a fresh look at how business lawyers handle M&A transactions, and developing a menu of tools and approaches to drive and promote the adoption of LPM. 

In its short period of existence, the LPM Task Force has begun developing a variety of checklists, guides, and templates that transactional lawyers can readily use to manage M&A transactions. The overall objective is not to promulgate and then impose a uniform set of best practices that practitioners are expected to use in all circumstances. Rather, the Task Force is seeking to produce a menu of tools that deal lawyers can customize and utilize when and to the extent they deem appropriate, depending on the transaction and the parties involved. 

We have organized the tools by four deal phases, namely, pre-deal, deal, post-closing and billing, and by user, be it the client (“C”), client’s counsel (“CC”), and opposing counsel (“OC”) as shown in the following table and described in more detail in the notes following the table. We have also included two billing tools. 

Deal Phase

LPM Tool

Parties

Pre-deal-1

Acquisition Task Checklist

C & CC

Pre-deal-2

Initial Attorney/Client Scoping Discussion Outline

C & CC

Pre-deal-3

Formal Attorney/Client Scoping Letter

C & CC

Pre-deal-4

Deal Management Discussion Outline

C & CC

Pre-deal-5

Deal Counsel Compact

C, CC & OC

Pre-deal-6

Kickoff Meeting Agenda

C, CC & OC

Deal-1

Deal Issues Drafting Guide

C & CC

Deal-2

Deal Issues Negotiating Tool*

C, CC & OC

Deal-3

Roles and Responsibilities Tool: Leading/Assisting/Consulting/Informed

Chart

C & CC

Deal-4

Status Report

C & CC

Post-closing-1

After Action Assessment Checklist*

C & CC

Billing-1

M&A Phase Billing Codes

C & CC

Billing-2

Value Based M&A Billing Arrangements*

C & CC

While many of the tools have been completed, at least for road-testing purposes, others, as noted with an asterisk (*), are still in preparation. 

Pre-deal-1. Acquisition Task List: This tool is equivalent of a “pre-flight checklist” for an M&A deal. It is intended to help ensure nothing falls through the cracks, and that all the myriad tasks associated with a typical M&A transaction are covered and coordinated.

Pre-deal-2. Outline of Initial Attorney/Client Conversation Scoping Discussion Outline: “Plans are worthless, but planning is everything,” is a famous quote ascribed to General Dwight D. Eisenhower. This particular LPM tool builds on that notion. It provides a script for an early stage conversation between the client and the attorney regarding important background information on the deal (e.g., deal structure, industry, business objectives, timing, etc.), key issues likely to arise, and the scope of work to be undertaken by the law firm. In addition to aiding the client and attorney in organizing and coordinating their respective responsibilities, this up front information provides a baseline for the lawyer to prepare a budget or furnish a fee estimate by defining what work the attorney is expected to do.

Pre-deal-3. Formal Attorney/Client Scoping Letter: Lawyers ask clients to sign engagement letters all the time. However, apart from some boilerplate, these letters focus principally on billing rates and fee arrangements and speak in only the most general terms about what is expected of the lawyer. This project involves developing a formal scoping letter on a standalone basis or as an addendum to the engagement letter detailing what the lawyer is expected to do, and just as importantly, what the lawyer is not expected to do, the resources to be employed, and how client and counsel will collaborate.

Pre-deal-4. Deal Management Attorney/Client Discussion Outline: This suggested outline of a conversation between the client and the attorney addresses how the deal will be run (e.g., confidentiality concerns, communication protocols, other advisors who are involved, risk factors, closing mechanics, etc.). This discussion addresses matters that, while not affecting the scope of work to be done, do affect the deal process and quite possibly how efficiently it is conducted.

Pre-deal-5. Deal Counsel Compact: This tool is a checklist of principles and guidelines that deal principals can jointly adopt and customize at the outset of their transaction to promote a higher degree of collaboration among all parties in a M&A transaction. These suggested rules of engagement between opposing deal counsel are intended to reduce deal friction and streamline the deal making process.

Pre-deal-6. Kickoff Meeting Agenda: This tool provides a checklist for an initial all hands/all parties meeting to address communication and negotiations protocols. A staple of investment banks for initial public offerings and financings, the kickoff meeting agenda provides an opportunity for key players and their counsel to set the agenda for the deal, discuss background, structure, deal documents, parties timetables, and communications protocol. A menu of items that may be addressed during the M&A Kickoff Meeting is set forth on this checklist.

Deal-1. Deal Issues Drafting Guide: The Drafting Guide covers a wide range of issues to be considered, decided, and covered in a definitive agreement. It is intended to be used as an internal guide to drafting and negotiating deal issues. The issues are largely derived from the M&A Committee’s Deal Points Studies.

Deal-2. Deal Issues Negotiating Tool: The Negotiating Tool is intended to highlight and facilitate the negotiation of significant deal issues early in the process. Typically, many key deal issues such as indemnification baskets and caps are not reflected in a letter of intent, but are instead negotiated piecemeal or through the exchange of draft after draft of the deal documents. With the Deal Issues Negotiating Tool, counsel can exchange proposals and attempt to crystallize the more significant deal issues at an early stage.

Deal-3. Leading/Assisting/Consulting Informed Chart: This is a suggested chart for tracking the specific roles and responsibilities of individual members of the deal team in a transaction. The purpose of the chart is to make the right people accountable and ensure others are kept in the loop and positioned to provide useful input.

Deal-4. Status Report: This is a suggested chart for tracking the status and timely completion of various action items necessary to bring a transaction to a successful close. Sometimes called an “Information Radiator,” the tool is intended to provide progress updates on the status of various key tasks.

Post-closing-1. After-Action Assessment Checklist: Task Force Project Manager Aileen Leventon, President of QLex Consulting Inc., is an advocate of increased use of after-action reviews following the closing of transactions. She notes: “Post-matter debriefs have been common in other professional services firms and industries for a long time – once they realize that they need to meet a raised bar with each new matter.” Clients and law firms are beginning to implement the practice more systematically and broadly. After-action reviews focus on lessons learned and enable the firm, practice group, and client to learn by considering what went right and what went wrong, and what might be improved. This checklist guides the client and counsel through the after-action assessment process and suggests questions that may be considered to elicit lessons learned – what was right and wrong in the deal process and what the team can do to improve the handling of future deals. 

Billing-1. M&A Phase Billing Codes: The original ABA Project Code Set for non-litigation matters has not been applied consistently, nor has it produced meaningful data that improves budgeting or identifies opportunities to improve efficiency and staffing. This has been compounded by the responses of various e-billing software vendors, law firms and individual clients who have developed a hodge-podge of suggested M&A-related coding. The Task Force has developed a simple and sensible set of uniform codes with the objective that they will be widely adopted in connection with M&A transactions. The codes reflect the phases of a transaction based on temporal factors rather than tasks – in other words, the way deal lawyers think about the work that goes into a fee estimate or budget. They capture the involvement of subject matter experts that support the deal team so that there is a common vocabulary within law firms and with clients on the level of effort and costs associated with a transaction. An M&A group that consistently codes time using these codes, even where not required by the client, will also have an apples-to-apples way to compare past work when working up a fee estimate or budget for a new deal. 

Billing-2. Value Based M&A Billing Arrangements: While value-based fee structures are commonplace in litigation matters, clients and their external M&A counsel often struggle as to how to implement value-based fee structures for M&A deals that align client and counsel interests. We are creating a menu of value-based fee structures that are used successfully by clients and firms for transactional work. We are also creating a checklist of “good faith circuit breakers” that client and counsel can use when agreeing to these structures, especially fixed or capped arrangements. The circuit breakers are intended to outline certain scenarios where unforeseen circumstances impact all parties’ expectations and require significant expenditure of additional legal fees. 

Final Observations

As noted above, our Task Force members have been hard at work and have collaborated to create working prototypes of many of these tools, a good number of which are currently being “road-tested” by M&A Committee members and others in the course of actual transactions. Even when finalized, these checklists and forms are not intended to serve as “one-size-fits-all” solutions. Rather, they are meant to be resources and tools that lawyers and their clients can consult, adapt, and employ when they deem appropriate. The end result will hopefully be M&A lawyers who are more adept and conscious project managers and transactions that proceed more smoothly and efficiently.

As Cornell Boggs, Dow Corning’s senior vice president and general counsel succinctly puts it, “The rules have changed in the M&A game and we are seeking counsel who are deploying the tools and resources to drive transparency, accountability and predictability into the deal process.”

 

Personal Property Secured Transactions

I. THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 9

A. IN GENERAL

The first task for a lawyer advising a client about a planned secured transaction is to determine whether Article 9 applies to it (including whether it is a secured transactions at all). Reaching an incorrect conclusion on this issue can lead to a disastrous result. For example, if a person is unaware that Article 9 applies, the person might fail to perfect a security interest under Article 9 and end up losing all interest in the collateral to some other claimant. Alternatively, if Article 9 does not apply, the person might erroneously comply with Article 9 but fail to do whatever applicable law does require to obtain and perfect an interest in the collateral.

The latter problem arose in In re Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway, Ltd.,1 in which Wheeling & Lake Erie Railway Company (“Wheeling”) extended the debtor, Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway, a $6 million line of credit. The debtor in return granted Wheeling a security interest in all accounts and payment intangibles. A few years later, a tragic derailment accident occurred in Quebec and the debtor filed a claim with its insurer for business interruption damages. In the debtor’s bankruptcy, Wheeling claimed that the insurance proceeds were part of its collateral. The court concluded that—because Article 9 does not apply to an interest in, or a claim under, an insurance policy, unless the claim is for loss or damage to collateral,2 and because an insurance claim for lost business is not a claim for loss or damage to collateral—Article 9 did not apply to Wheeling’s security interest.3 The court then analyzed Wheeling’s security interest under Maine common law. The court was unsure what Maine law would require to perfect a security interest in an insurance policy or claim, but ultimately concluded that some step, beyond the execution of a security agreement, designed to furnish fair notice to other creditors is required.4 The secured party had taken none of the possible steps.5

Sometimes, other law takes precedence over Article 9. In Lili Collections, LLC v. Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government,6 the court ruled that—because Article 9 does not apply to the extent that other state law expressly governs the creation, perfection, priority, or enforcement of a security interest created by the state or a governmental agency thereof,7 and because provisions of the relevant state law restrict the ability of state agencies to borrow funds and pledge assets— Article 9 did not apply to a contractor’s assignment of its right to payment from a state agency.8 According to the court, Article 9’s anti-assignment rules did not render ineffective the clause in the contractor’s agreement with the agency prohibiting assignment. This conclusion is suspect because the state did not create the security interest, the contractor did.

A somewhat similar issue arose in Etzler v. Indiana Department of Revenue,9 in which a secured party claimed its security interest in a breeder’s award owed to the debtor by a state agency was superior to the rights of a judgment creditor. The judgment creditor claimed that the security interest was excluded from Article 9 by Indiana’s non-uniform section 9-104(d)(14), which refers to “the creation, perfection, priority, or enforcement of a security interest created by . . . a governmental unit of the state,” and which was modeled on section 9-109(c)(2) of the U.C.C. However, the court properly rejected that argument, noting that the provision deals with government debtors, not government account debtors.10

One recurring issue concerning the scope of Article 9 arises when a seller of goods, particularly motor vehicles, includes language in the sales agreement conditioning the entire transaction on the availability of third-party financing, yet allows the buyer to take possession of the goods. Section 2-401(1) provides that the retention of title by the seller of delivered goods is limited in effect to a security interest.11 If the conditional sale is a “sale,” it creates a security interest and the seller must comply with Article 9 when perfecting and enforcing its rights to the goods. If no “sale” has occurred because of the condition, then there is no security interest.12 In In re Heien,13 a vehicle buyer signed a bailment contract in connection with the purchase of a car. The bailment contract provided that the purchase was conditioned on approval of the buyer’s financing and, until then, the vehicle remained the seller’s property. The court ruled that, even if the bailment contract was contemporaneous with the purchase agreement, because the buyer obtained delivery of the vehicle, a “sale” had occurred. Thus, the seller’s interest was limited to a security interest and the vehicle came into the buyer’s bankruptcy estate.

B. LEASING

Distinguishing a lease of goods—which is governed by Article 2A of the U.C.C.—from a sale with a retained security interest—which is governed by Articles 2 and 9—is often difficult. The issue is a heavily factual one, and rests on whether the putative lessor retains, as a practical matter, a meaningful economic interest in the goods.14 The U.C.C. contains some detailed rules that give a definitive answer in some situations in which the lease is not terminable by the lessee. Among these are when the lease extends beyond the economic life of the goods or the lessee has an option to buy the goods for nominal consideration.15 When these definitive rules do not apply, the analysis falls back to an all-the-facts-and-circumstances test.16 The issue can be important because a lessor that overlooks the possibility that its transaction is a sale combined with a security interest might not perfect what turns out to be a “security interest.”

In re Gutierrez17 involved an automobile lease that was not subject to termination by the lessee. The lease provided that the lessee would become the owner of the automobile at the end of the lease. Although these facts ordinarily should make the transaction a disguised sale with a retained security interest, the court ruled that the agreement was a lease, not a secured sale, because the agreement expressly stated that it was a lease.18 As such, the transaction was governed by the Puerto Rico Act to Regulate Personal Property Lease Contracts and the lessee waived the right to have the lease treated under the U.C.C. as a secured sale.19 Because of this non-U.C.C. statute, the lessee’s waiver was effective. Ordinarily, a person subject to a particular article of the U.C.C. cannot waive its application.

Four other courts held that leasing transactions were true leases after properly analyzing whether the lessor retained a residual interest in goods. In In re Johnson,20 the court held that a four-year lease of a truck with an option to purchase at the end of the term for $8,500 was a true lease. The court ruled that, because the lessee did not show that the option price was nominal in relation to the anticipated fair market value of the truck at the end of the lease term or the lessee’s costs of performing under the agreement, the transaction was a true lease.21

The court, in In re Wells,22 ruled that a ninety-one-month lease of a two-year-old vehicle with an option to purchase at the end of the term for $3,444 was a true lease because the term was not for the remaining economic life of the vehicle and, regardless of whether the option price was equal to 20 percent or 38.8 percent of the vehicle’s original value, it was not nominal.23

In GEO Finance, LLC v. University Square 2751, LLC,24 a ten-year lease of a geo-thermal water supply system with an option to purchase at any time for approximately $300,000 and an option to renew for eight consecutive five-year terms was a true lease because the system had a useful life of fifty years and the option price was not nominal.25

Finally, CD Construction, LLC v. Hard Hat Industries, Inc.26 involved a sale-leaseback transaction for an excavator. The court ruled that the transaction created a true eighteen-month lease even though the lessee had a purchase option any time after the sixth month. The lease term was for less than the economic life of the excavator, there was no obligation or option to renew the lease, and the purchase option price was not nominal. The court properly concluded that the transaction did not satisfy the bright-line test under section 1-203(b) for a sale with a retained security interest.27

II. ATTACHMENT OF A SECURITY INTEREST

In general, there are three requirements for a security interest to attach, that is, effectively to come into existence: (i) the debtor must authenticate a security agreement that describes the collateral; (ii) value must be given; and (iii) the debtor must have rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in the collateral.28 There were significant cases on each of these requirements last year.

A. EXISTENCE OF SECURITY AGREEMENT

The requirement of an authenticated security agreement is fairly easy to satisfy. The agreement must create or provide for a security interest;29 that is, it must include language indicating that the debtor has given a secured party an interest in personal property to secure payment or performance of an obligation (or in connection with a sale covered by Article 9),30 and it must describe the collateral.31 If no single document satisfies these requirements, multiple writings may do so collectively, under what is known as the “composite document rule.”32

In In re Brown,33 the debtor signed a letter granting her former romantic partner the right to drive her vehicle until the debtor paid a $3,000 debt (unless the former partner earlier allowed any female in the vehicle). The court ruled that the letter did not create a security interest because it provided only the right to drive the vehicle, not to repossess or sell the car in the event of a default.34

In Royal Jewelers Inc. v. Light,35 the debtor signed an agreement purporting to grant a security agreement in collateral—a ring—described in a separate exhibit, but did not sign the exhibit. The court properly ruled that there is no requirement that the debtor separately authenticate or sign an exhibit that the security agreement references, even though that exhibit contains the description of the collateral.36

Four cases last year dealt with whether the proper person authenticated the security agreement. In Old Battleground Properties, Inc. v. Central Carolina Surgical Eye Associates, P.A.,37 a creditor claimed a security interest in specified works of art. Several pieces of art were expressly excluded from the collateral description in the creditor’s financing statement and the creditor sent a letter to another secured party denying that the creditor had a security interest in those works of art. The remaining art was described in a security agreement purportedly executed by the debtor’s husband on the debtor’s behalf, but the debtor alleged that her husband was not so authorized to sign on her behalf and that his signature was a forgery. Accordingly, the court refused temporarily to restrain the debtor from transferring the artwork because the creditor had not shown a likelihood of success on its claim of a security interest in any of the artwork.

The remaining three cases all dealt with collateral owned by a limited liability company (“LLC”) or by the members of an LLC. In Hepp v. Ultra Green Energy Services, LLC,38 the court held that the managing member of an LLC did not have actual authority to bind the LLC to a note and security agreement and might not have had apparent authority, which requires conduct by the principal—not the agent—that causes a third party to believe that the agent is authorized.39

The case of United Bank v. Expressway Auto Parts, Ltd.40 is somewhat similar. An individual signed a security agreement on behalf of the debtor, an LLC of which he identified himself as a member. However, the individual was neither a member nor a manager of the LLC, and thus lacked actual authority to bind the LLC. However, the court held that the individual had apparent authority and that the LLC ratified his action by reporting the secured obligation as a liability on its federal income tax returns and making monthly payments for eight years.41

In In re Floyd,42 the sole members of an LLC signed a note and security agreement on behalf of the LLC and had the creditor’s security interest noted on the certificate of title for, among other things, a vehicle owned by one of them individually. The court ruled that this was sufficient because the parol evidence— including the application for the certificate of title that the owner must have signed—demonstrated their intent to grant a security interest.43

The debtor need not authenticate a written security agreement if the secured party has possession of the collateral pursuant to an unauthenticated security agreement (which can be oral). In In re Cable’s Enterprise, LLC,44 the court applied this rule and held that a lender—to whom the debtor had, at the time the loan was made, given possession of an excavator as security for the loan— had a valid security interest despite the absence of an authenticated agreement.

For some transactions or collateral, law outside Article 9 imposes additional requirements for a valid security agreement. Such was the case in Martino v. American Airlines Federal Credit Union,45 which involved a credit union’s efforts to set off a customer’s deposit account against the customer’s obligation on a credit card issued by the credit union. The Truth in Lending Act prohibits a credit card issuer from offsetting a cardholder’s indebtedness arising in connection with a consumer credit transaction against funds of the cardholder held on deposit with the issuer.46 The regulations promulgated thereunder clarify that this prohibition does not alter or affect the right of the card issuer to “[o]btain or enforce a consensual security interest in the funds.”47 However, the Official Staff Interpretation of the regulation places a hurdle on the card issuer’s path toward obtaining such a security interest by requiring that the consumer “specifically intend to grant a security interest in the deposit account.”48 The Martino court ruled that a credit union did not satisfy this heightened standard because the language in the credit card agreement purporting to grant the credit union a security interest was not separately signed and did not reference a specific amount of deposited funds or a specific deposit account number, even though it did appear in a box with bolded text.49

To be effective, an authenticated security agreement must provide a description of the collateral.50 In most cases, a description of collateral by type of property defined in Article 9 is sufficient.51 However, in a consumer transaction, a description of consumer goods only by type is insufficient.52

In Morris v. Ark Valley Credit Union,53 the debtor executed mortgages on his real property. A clause in the mortgages purported to grant a security interest in “fixtures” on the real property. In reversing a bankruptcy court decision to the contrary, the district court held that, because the mortgage described the collateral not just as fixtures, but as fixtures attached to specified real property, the description was not just by type of collateral, and hence a security interest could attach to the debtor’s mobile home if it was a fixture.54

B. VALUE GIVEN

The requirement for attachment that “value has been given”55 is written in the passive voice quite intentionally. The value need not come from the secured party and need not go to the debtor, a term defined to mean the owner of the collateral.56 In fact, Article 9 contemplates that the debtor need not be the principal obligor or even owe the secured obligation at all, but might instead be someone other than the person to whom the secured party extended credit.57 Two cases explored this rule last year.

In Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. KLCC Investments, LLC,58 the debtor received a $14 million loan and later that day executed a security agreement purporting to grant a security interest in a securities account to an LLC to secure the resulting indebtedness. The court ruled that the security interest attached even though the loaned funds came from the personal account of the LLC’s owner.59 Similarly, in In re DigitalBridge Holdings, Inc.,60 the funds loaned to the debtor came from an affiliate of the secured party, rather than the secured party itself. The court ruled that the security interest attached, after noting that the debtor authenticated a promissory note payable to the secured party and no other party claimed a right to collect the debt.61

C. RIGHTS IN THE COLLATERAL

A few secured parties ran into trouble last year with the requirement that the debtor have rights in the collateral or the power to convey rights in it. For example, in In re 11 East 36th, LLC,62 an LLC authenticated a pledge agreement by which it purported to grant a security interest in its membership interest in a subsidiary LLC that owned several condominium units. When both entities filed for bankruptcy protection, the lender claimed a security interest in the subsidiary’s condominium units. The court ruled that the parent did not own the subsidiary’s units, so the security interest could not attach to those units, even though the lender filed a financing statement identifying some of those units as the collateral.63 The lender had only a security interest in the parent’s interest in its subsidiary.64

In ACF 2006 Corp. v. William F. Conour Clerk’s Entry of Default Entered 11/18/ 2013,65 a lender had a perfected security interest in a law firm’s accounts, which included the firm’s rights under contingent fee agreements with clients. However, the court ruled the security interest did not encumber all the fees recovered upon resolution of the cases after the representation was switched to another firm because the debtor law firm was entitled only to the quantum meruit portion of the fees for the services that the debtor law firm had performed.66

Even when a debtor’s rights to transfer property are restricted by contract or law, the debtor might nevertheless be permitted to grant a security interest in that property. Article 9 contains several rules that override some contractual and legal restrictions on assignment.67 In Clark v. Missouri Lottery Commission,68 a lottery winner purported to grant a bank a security interest in the winner’s right to future lottery distributions to secure a series of loans. Later, relying on a state statute that prohibits the assignment of lottery proceeds,69 the winner sought a declaratory judgment that the assignment was void. The court ruled that, because section 9-406 overrides restrictions on assignment and expressly prevails in the event of conflict with other law, the security interest attached.70

III. PERFECTION OF A SECURITY INTEREST

A. GOVERNING LAW AND METHOD OF PERFECTION

In general, perfection of a security interest is necessary for the secured party to have priority over the rights of lien creditors, other secured parties, and buyers, lessees, and licensees of the collateral.71 The method or methods by which a secured party can perfect depend on the type of collateral and the nature of the transaction. The dominant method of perfection is by filing a financing statement, but other methods include taking possession or control of the collateral, complying with a certificate of title statute, and complying with any preemptive federal law.72 Some security interests are perfected automatically upon attachment.73 The first issue to resolve in determining how to perfect is to ascertain which state’s law governs.

In general, the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located governs perfection and the effect of perfection.74 This rule played a critical role in an important case from last year: In re SemCrude, L.P.75 The debtors in the case purchased oil from producers in several states and resold the oil to downstream purchasers. The debtors also traded financial oil derivatives on the New York Mercantile Exchange and on over-the-counter markets, and these trades eventually led to a liquidity crisis that caused the debtors to file bankruptcy. On the date of the petition, the debtors had not yet paid numerous producers. The producers brought adversary proceedings against the downstream purchasers, alleging that the purchasers violated the producers’ security interests in the oil. The producers, which had not filed financing statements against the debtors, relied on nonuniform statutes in several states that purport to grant producers, such as themselves, an automatically perfected purchase-money security interest in the oil or gas they produce and then sell on credit.76 In decisions several years ago, the bankruptcy court ruled that the law of the jurisdictions in which the debtors were located for Article 9 purposes—Delaware and Oklahoma—governed perfection of the producers’ security interests and thus the automatic perfection rules of other states did not apply.77 Because the producers had not filed in Delaware or Oklahoma or otherwise complied with those states’ law on perfection, the producers’ security interests were unperfected and the downstream buyers took free of those security interests under U.C.C. section 9-317(b). Last year, the district court affirmed, following the reasoning of the bankruptcy court.78

Article 9 does not apply to a landlord’s lien, which is a product of the common law or non-U.C.C. statutory law, not of a contract.79 However, Article 9 does apply if a lease of real property grants the landlord a security interest in the tenant’s personal property. Such was the case in In re University General Hospital System, Inc.80 Because the landlord had not done anything to perfect its security interest, the landlord was not entitled, in the tenant’s bankruptcy proceeding, to relief from the stay to use the collateral.81

B. ADEQUACY OF A FINANCING STATEMENT

To be sufficient to perfect a security interest, a filed financing statement must be authorized by the debtor in an authenticated record.82 By authenticating a security agreement, a debtor automatically authorizes the secured party to file a financing statement covering the collateral described in the financing statement.83 A financing statement filed before a security agreement is made, and without the debtor’s authorization in some other authenticated record, is ineffective when filed. However, the debtor’s subsequent authentication of a security agreement or other authorization provides the needed authorization, which then in turn makes a previously filed financing statement retroactively effective.84

In In re Adoni Group, Inc.,85 a lender filed a financing statement one day before the debtor authenticated the security agreement. The court ruled quite properly that the financing statement was sufficient to perfect the security interest.86

To be sufficient, a filed financing statement must also indicate the collateral covered.87 That indication need not be specific, it need only reasonably describe the collateral.88 Moreover, a filed financing statement with a minor error is effective provided the error does not render the statement seriously misleading.89 In In re Sterling United, Inc.,90 a filed financing statement described the collateral as:

[a]ll assets of the Debtor including, but not limited to, any and all equipment, fixtures, inventory, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments, investment property, general intangibles, letter-of-credit rights and deposit accounts . . . and located at or relating to the operation of the premises at 100 River Rock Drive, Suite 304, Buffalo, New York.

The debtor’s bankruptcy trustee argued that the security interest was unperfected and avoidable because the debtor no longer owned or operated from the River Rock Drive location. The court rejected this argument. In doing so, the court first observed that the language specifying the incorrect location modified the clause beginning “including, but not limited to,” not the opening phrase “[a]ll assets of the Debtor.”91 Hence, the collateral description was not incorrect. The court then observed that, even if the description was ambiguous, and if the description could be read to limit all the collateral to the incorrect location— because the purpose of filing is to provide inquiry notice and a reasonable searcher confronting an ambiguous description should investigate further—the financing statement was not seriously misleading.92

C. TERMINATION STATEMENTS

Another decision was made last year in the widely publicized case of In re Motors Liquidation Co. In 2014, in response to a certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that a termination statement is authorized by the secured party if the secured party of record reviewed and knowingly approved the termination statement for filing, regardless of whether the secured party subjectively intended or understood the effect of the filing.93 Early last year, the Second Circuit applied that ruling and held that termination statements prepared by debtor’s counsel in connection with the payoff of a separate $300 million lease transaction, and which, the court concluded, were reviewed and approved by the secured party and its counsel, were effective. As a result, the financing statement referenced in one of the terminations statements, and which related to a $1.5 billion term loan, was terminated.94

D. PERFECTION BY CONTROL

A security interest in a deposit account as original collateral can be perfected only by control.95 If the secured party is not the depositary bank, then the secured party can obtain control either by becoming the depositary bank’s customer with respect to the deposit account or, more commonly, entering into an agreement with the bank pursuant to which the bank agrees to comply with the secured party’s instructions with respect to the deposit account.96

In In re Southeastern Stud & Components, Inc.,97 there were discrepancies between the correct numbers for the debtor’s deposit accounts and the account numbers referenced in a deposit account control agreement among the debtor, the depositary bank, and the secured party. The court ruled that the discrepancies did not undermine control given that the debtor and the bank were aware of the accounts to which the control agreement applied and, because a financing statement filed by the secured party identified deposit accounts as the collateral, a third party would have inquiry notice regarding the secured party’s security interest.98 Although the court’s conclusion is correct, given that nothing about control requires or imparts notice to third parties,99 the court’s comments about the financing statement seem irrelevant to the issue.

IV. PRIORITY

A. BUYERS

A buyer of goods takes free of an unperfected security interest in the goods if the buyer gives value and receives delivery without knowledge of the security interest.100 Two noteworthy cases dealt with this rule last year.

In In re SemCrude, L.P., after concluding that oil producers’ security interests were unperfected because the producers had not filed financing statements in the states where the debtors were located,101 the court addressed the priority between the producers of the oil and the downstream buyers. The court held that there was insufficient evidence to raise a factual dispute about whether the buyers knew of the security interests even though the buyers allegedly knew: (i) that the debtors had purchased oil in states with laws that created the security interests in the oil, (ii) the identities of some of the producers, and (iii) that the producers were unpaid.102 While the buyers might have known that the debtors had purchased the oil on credit, they might not have known that the producers were still unpaid at the time the oil was resold to the buyers or that the oil was encumbered, especially because the debtors had warranted good title.103

In Four County Bank v. Tidewater Equipment Co.,104 a secured party filed financing statements to perfect its security interest in two items of equipment before the debtor sold the equipment. However, the secured party failed to file continuation statements until after the financing statements had lapsed, and thus its interest became unperfected and was deemed never to have been perfected against a purchaser for value.105 As a result, a buyer that had no knowledge of the security interest when it received delivery of the equipment took free of the secured party’s retroactively unperfected security interest.106 The court refused to impose, under the guise of the duty of good faith, a requirement that buyers search for filed financing statements.107

B. COMPETING SECURED PARTIES

In general, when there are two perfected security interests in the same collateral, priority is determined under the first-to-file-or-perfect rule. The first security interest perfected or subject to an effective financing statement has priority, provided there was no period thereafter when there was neither filing nor perfection.108

In HSBC Bank USA v. Perez,109 each of two banks purchased a duplicate original promissory note for the same mortgage loan. When the mortgagor defaulted, each bank sought to foreclose. Because the sale of a promissory note is an Article 9 transaction,110 the court looked to Article 9’s priority rules to determine which bank had priority.111 The court then correctly ruled that priority was based not on the order in which the banks filed an assignment of the mortgage, but on the first-to-file-or-perfect rule of section 9-322.112 Accordingly, the first bank to take possession of its note had priority with respect to the mortgage.113

Cases involving duplicate original promissory notes—each assigned to a different party—are not that unusual.114 Unfortunately, the court in Perez, like the courts in many of the other cases, got tripped up in the analysis. First, the court offered no explanation as to why the first-to-file-or-perfect rule of section 9-322 was the appropriate priority rule to resolve the dispute, rather than either section 9-330 or 9-331,115 each of which deals with purchasers of promissory notes. More to the point, none of these three priority rules is designed to deal with the problem resulting from duplicate original notes. In other words, the court implicitly treated the two notes as the same piece of property, but nothing in the priority rules contemplates such a thing. While doing so has the advantage of protecting an unsophisticated home buyer duped into making the duplicate notes, it ignores an assumption underlying both Articles 3 and 9 that anything capable of being possessed is unique.

C. OTHER CLAIMANTS

In general, a security interest is effective against creditors of the debtor and purchasers of the collateral.116 Article 9 does allow a licensee in ordinary course of business to take its rights under a nonexclusive license free of a security interest, even if that security interest is perfected,117 but there is no protection for a licensee under an exclusive license.

In Cyber Solutions International, LLC v. Priva Security Corp.,118 a secured party had a perfected security interest in the debtor’s intellectual property, including the copyrights associated with a specific semiconductor chip. Subsequently, the debtor granted an exclusive license to the copyrights. In a later dispute between the secured party and the licensee, the court ruled that the licensee took subject to the security interest and that the secured party also had priority over derivative products developed by the licensee. As the court put it, although the license agreement purported to grant the licensee ownership over improvements, the debtor did not, in light of the security agreement, have authority to grant such ownership to the licensee.119

Article 9 protects depositary banks. Such a bank has no duty, beyond those to which it agrees, to anyone with a security interest in a deposit account.120 If the bank has a security interest in a deposit account it maintains, that security interest will have priority over almost any other security interest.121 And, the bank’s setoff rights are largely unaffected by the debtor’s grant of a security interest in a deposit account.122 In spite of all this, in American Home Assurance Co. v. Weaver Aggregate Transport, Inc.,123 the court ruled that a garnishee bank that had a perfected security interest in a deposit account it maintained for the debtor did not have setoff rights sufficient to defeat the rights of the garnishing judgment creditor. The court reasoned that, because the bank failed to declare the debtor in default before service of the writ of garnishment, the bank did not have a present right to the funds or a basis on which to object to their release.124 The decision is wrong.

V. ENFORCEMENT OF A SECURITY INTEREST

A. NOTIFICATION OF DISPOSITION

After default, a secured party may repossess and dispose of the collateral.125 Before most dispositions, the secured party must send notification of the disposition to the debtor and any secondary obligor.126 This duty cannot be waived or varied in the security agreement,127 but can be waived in an agreement authenticated after default.128

In Ross v. Rothstein,129 after the debtor defaulted on a secured loan, the debtor and secured party entered into a superseding security agreement in which the debtor acknowledged default, granted a security interest in additional collateral, and authorized the secured party to sell all the collateral without notification. At the same time, the parties entered into a forbearance agreement under which the secured party agreed not to foreclose for about four months. When the forbearance period expired, the secured party sold the collateral without sending notification to the debtor. In subsequent litigation, the court ruled that the debtor had waived the right to notification of the sale in the superseding security agreement, noting that the forbearance agreement did not extend the due date of the secured obligation or negate the existence of a default.130

In Key Equipment Finance v. Southwest Contracting, Inc.,131 the debtor and guarantors similarly and effectively waived the right to notification of a disposition of the collateral—a dredge—by signing a workout agreement after default. The parties agreed that, upon breach of the workout agreement, “the total indebtedness then outstanding would be due and owing ‘without . . . any other notice to [the debtor or the guarantors] whatsoever.’”132

B. CONDUCTING A COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE DISPOSITION

A secured party may dispose of collateral by a sale, lease, or license.133 The disposition may be public—that is, an auction—or private.134 However, every aspect of a disposition must be “commercially reasonable.”135 If a secured party’s compliance with this standard is challenged, the secured party has the burden of proof.136 There were several notable cases about commercial reasonableness last year.

In Ross v. Rothstein,137 the debtor not only challenged the secured party’s failure to send notification of the disposition,138 but also claimed that the disposition—a series of sales of stock on the Over-The-Counter QB Tier Market (“OTCQB”)—was conducted in a commercially unreasonable manner because a sale a few hours later would have generated several thousand dollars more. The court rejected this argument on two grounds. First, the court noted that the secured party had, at the time, no benefit of hindsight and, pursuant to U.C.C section 9-627(a),139 the fact that a greater amount could have been obtained by disposition at a different time is not sufficient to show that the disposition was commercially unreasonable.140 Second, the court concluded that sales of stock on the OTCQB were not the subject of individual negotiation, and thus the OTCQB is a “recognized market” within the meaning of section 9-627(b).141 Because the shares were sold in the usual manner on that market, the court conclusively treated the sale as having been conducted in a commercially reasonable manner.

In Bank of America v. Dello Russo,142 the foreclosing secured party relied on an investment broker hired by the debtor to market the collateral and find a buyer. The broker used a national marketing campaign to identify prospective purchasers for the assets: nearly all of the assets of three manufacturing companies. The secured party then, in an effort to increase the purchase price, negotiated with the only potential buyer expressing interest. The court held that the sale was commercially reasonable.143 There was no conflict of interest arising from the fact that one of the debtor’s executives was hired by the buyer following the acquisition nor was there any inference of collusion to sell the collateral for less than its value, given that the secured obligation exceeded $17 million, the purchase price was $1.5 million, and the guaranty was capped at $5.95 million, so that the secured party was not able to collect the full amount owed.144

In Harley-Davidson Credit Corp. v. Galvin,145 the secured party sold a repossessed aircraft through a dealer specializing in the sale of repossessed aircraft. However, the plane had been vandalized while in the secured party’s possession and then sold without repair and while not “airworthy.” The court noted that a sale through a dealer, if fairly conducted, is normally commercially reasonable, but it was the secured party’s obligation to show that the sale was fairly conducted, which the secured party had not yet done.146 The court concluded that a reasonable trier of fact could determine that the “sale after the vandalism fell below the standard of reasonable commercial practices among dealers.”147

Similarly, in In re Godfrey,148 the court ruled that the secured party’s private disposition of equipment might not have been commercially reasonable because the secured party: (i) did not respond to other potential purchasers who had expressed interest; (ii) sold the equipment to an auctioneer, who two days later re-sold the equipment at a previously noticed public auction; and (iii) might not have provided the debtor an opportunity to arrange for friendly or competitive bidders and was not responsive to the debtor’s request for the details of the sale.149

Finally, in In re Estate of Nardoni,150 a bank received certificates in its own name for the pledged stock, placed the certificates in a vault, and for three years refused either to sell the stock or to permit the debtor to sell the stock to pay off the secured obligation. The court ruled that the bank acted in a commercially unreasonable manner, even though no sale had yet been conducted, and in so doing, discharged the guarantors from any further liability.151

C. COLLECTING ON COLLATERAL

Upon default, or when otherwise agreed by the debtor, a secured party may notify account debtors to make payment directly to the secured party.152 After receipt of such a notification and of proof of the secured party’s security interest, if requested and not previously provided, an account debtor may discharge its obligation only by paying the secured party; payment to the debtor will not discharge the obligation.153

In Swift Energy Operating, LLC v. Plemco-South, Inc.,154 a factor bought some accounts of an oilfield service company and obtained a security interest in the debtor’s remaining accounts. Shortly thereafter, the accounts payable supervisor for one account debtor, Swift Energy Operating, LLC (“Swift Energy”), received an e-mail message from the factor instructing Swift Energy to pay the factor and requesting that the supervisor sign and return an acknowledgment form. The supervisor responded that she did not have authority to sign the form and advised the factor to make that request to the appropriate department. Soon thereafter, Swift Energy learned that the debtor was ceasing operations and wished to be paid the balance due on the account. Swift Energy complied and paid the debtor. Thereafter, the factor sued Swift Energy, claiming that the payment to the debtor had not discharged the obligation. The court155 concluded that, because Swift Energy’s accounts payable supervisor informed the factor that she was not the individual responsible for making payment decisions and informed the factor to whom it should send the assignment information, the factor had not provided proper notification to Swift Energy prior to the time it paid the debtor.156 This decision seems incorrect because it gives the account debtor the ability to control the effectiveness of a notification it receives.157

VI. LIABILITY ISSUES

There were several interesting cases last year about liability in connection with a secured transaction. In Macquarie Bank Ltd. v. Knickel,158 a secured party fore-closed on the debtor’s oil and gas leases in apparent satisfaction of the secured obligation and then used the debtor’s trade secrets that had also been pledged as collateral. The court held that the secured party did not have the right to use the trade secrets and was liable for misappropriation of those trade secrets.

In Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. KLCC Investments, LLC,159 a securities intermediary faced with competing claims to the securities credited to the debtor’s account refused to complete a transfer requested by the secured party with whom it had a control agreement. The intermediary then initiated an inter-pleader action. The secured party, which had priority in the securities at issue, filed a counterclaim against the intermediary for the lost value of the securities during the period when the intermediary refused to honor its instructions. The court dismissed the counterclaim. Noting that the “commencement of an interpleader action cannot itself give rise to liability,”160 the court con cluded that the damages the secured party claimed to have suffered arose from acts within the intermediary’s rights granted by law.161

In BancorpSouth Bank v. 51 Concrete, LLC,162 a secured party brought a successful conversion claim against the buyers of the debtor’s equipment subject to the secured party’s security interest for failing to turn over the proceeds they received upon resale. The secured party then sought to collect its attorney’s fees from the buyers, claiming a right to them under both law and contract. The court rejected both claims. First, the court concluded that the secured party was not entitled to attorney’s fees under U.C.C. section 9-607(d) because that provision allows a secured party to deduct attorney’s fees from any collections made; it does not create a right to attorney’s fees in addition to other damages.163 The court also ruled the secured party was not entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to its security agreement with the debtor, even though that agreement became effective against the buyers under section 9-201(a),164 because the agreement stated only that the secured party could “apply the proceeds of any collection or disposition first to . . . reasonable attorney’s fees,” and this case did not involve any collection or disposition.165 The result might have been different if the language of the security agreement was different, such as by referring to the “enforcement” of the security interest.

In Peterson v. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP,166 the bankruptcy trustee for some investors that made loans secured by nonexistent collateral sued a law firm for malpractice in connection with an accounts financing transaction. The trustee claimed that the firm negligently failed to advise the investors that, by not confirming with the account debtor the existence of the accounts while simultaneously structuring the transaction so that the funds putatively coming from the account debtor actually flowed through another entity owned and controlled by the borrower, there was a risk that the borrower was engaged in a massive Ponzi scheme. The court concluded that there was no principled distinction between business advice and legal advice,167 and that, in any event, the claim was not for failing to advise the investors not to do business with the debtor, but for failing to advise the client about the risks associated with the structure of the transaction.168

A buyer of collateral at an Article 9 disposition acquires the debtor’s rights in the collateral,169 but does not normally assume responsibility for the debtor’s obligations. However, the fact that the collateral is sold through an Article 9 disposition does not insulate the buyer from the principles of successor liability.170 There were two notable cases last year on successor liability that involved asset purchases at foreclosure sales.

In Millbrook IV, LLC v. Production Services Associates, LLC,171 the court held that a new entity formed to purchase the assets of the debtor at an Article 9 disposition was merely a “continuation” of the debtor because all four members of the board of managers of each entity were the same, the new entity voluntarily assumed the compensation and bonus agreements of the managers as well as specified debts to suppliers and vendors, and two of the three owners of the debtor owned a majority of the new entity.172

In contrast, the court, in Celestica, LLC v. Communications Acquisitions Corp.,173 ruled that an entity formed to buy the debtor’s assets at a foreclosure sale did not have successor liability under the de facto merger doctrine. Although the buyer did initially conduct the same business from the same location with the same management, the buyer did so to preserve the value of the assets as a going concern and, in the ensuing months, the management, location, and nature of the business changed.174 Although the owners of the buyer collectively owned 40.5 percent of the debtor, the majority owner of the debtor had no stake in the buyer, and the owners of the buyer paid $600,000 in cash to acquire the debtor’s assets.175 Finally, although the buyer did assume selected liabilities of the debtor, it assumed only those necessary to ensure continued operation of the business and did not assume substantial debts to insiders, including the two individuals who owned the buyer and who lost millions of dollars.176

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* Steve Weise is a partner in the Los Angeles office of Proskauer Rose LLP. Stephen L. Sepinuck is the Frederick N. & Barbara T. Curley professor and the associate dean for administration at Gonzaga University School of Law and the director of its Commercial Law Center.

1. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Keach (In re Montreal, Me. & Atl. Ry., Ltd.), 799 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015).

2. See U.C.C. §§ 9-102(a)(64)(E), 9-109(d)(8) (2013).

3. In re Montreal, 799 F.3d at 5–10. In so ruling, the court noted that, even when the insurance claim is settled, the resulting promise by the insurer to pay is still excluded. Id. at 6–8.

4. Id. at 10–11.

5. Id. at 11. Although Wheeling had filed a financing statement describing the collateral to include accounts and payment intangibles, the court ruled that “[t]hose forms of collateral, as defined in the UCC, do not include rights under an insurance policy.” Id. The court seems to have confused definitions with scope. The definition of “payment intangibles” is broad enough to cover the insurance claim, even though such claims are outside the scope of Article 9. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42), (61) (2013).

6. 175 So. 3d 434 (La. Ct. App. 2015).

7. U.C.C. § 9-109(c)(2) (2013).

8. Lili Collections, LLC, 175 So. 3d at 436 (citing LA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 8, 14; LA. STAT. ANN. § 39:1410.60).

9. 43 N.E.3d 250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

10. Id. at 256–57 (citing IND. CODE § 26-1-9.1-109(d)(14)). The court also ruled that the judgment creditor did not have priority over the secured party under U.C.C. § 9-317(a), because the judgment creditor was not a lien creditor. Id. at 257.

11. U.C.C. § 2-401(1) (2011); see also id. § 1-201(b)(35) (making a similar point in the definition of “security interest”).

12. The courts are divided on the effect of the condition. Compare Patterson v. Univ. Ford, Inc., 758 S.E.2d 185 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that unsatisfied financing condition in the conditional delivery agreement prevented the existence of a contract), with Hillen v. Dennis Dillon Auto Park & Truck Ctr., Inc. (In re Byrd), 546 B.R. 434 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2016) (holding that contract, which acknowledged that buyer would finance the transaction, but which was not “contingent on [buyer] obtaining financing,” did not prevent a sale from occurring), and In re Jones, No. 12-14608, 2013 WL 1092099 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Jan. 17, 2013) (holding that conditional language in bills of sale created a condition subsequent, not a condition precedent, and thus auto dealer was limited to a security interest).

13. Autocenters St. Charles, LLC v. Heien (In re Heien), 528 B.R. 901 (E.D. Mo. 2015).

14. See U.C.C. § 1-203(a)–(b) (2011).

15. See id. § 1-203(b).

16. See, e.g., In re Grubbs Constr. Co., 319 B.R. 698 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005); Coleman v. Daimler-Chrysler Servs. of N. Am., LLC, 623 S.E.2d 189 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).

17. Gutierrez v. Popular Auto, Inc., (In re Gutierrez), 526 B.R. 449 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2015).

18. Id. at 454–55, 462–63.

19. Id. at 462–63.

20. No. 15-00104-NPO, 2015 WL 1508460 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Mar. 27, 2015).

21. Id. at *4–6.

22. Wells v. Am. Fin., Inc. (In re Wells), No. 15-80056-CR-13, 2015 WL 3862969 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. June 22, 2015).

23. Id. at *2.

24. 105 F. Supp. 3d 753 (E.D. Mich. 2015).

25. Id. at 764–65. Consequently, the lessor did not need to file a financing statement and a buyer of the property in which the system was installed took subject to the lease and was liable in unjust enrichment for continuing to use the system without paying the monthly metered usage fee. Id. at 766–68.

26. No. 1-1552, 2015 WL 6509507 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2015).

27. Id. at *2–5. Unfortunately, the court then failed to analyze the transaction under the facts-and-circumstances test of section 1-203(a) or discuss the fact that the parties did not discuss the value of the excavator when setting the option price, or that its value apparently exceeded all the consideration due under the lease. See id. at *4.

28. See U.C.C. § 9-203(b) (2013).

29. See id. § 9-102(a)(74) (defining “security agreement”).

30. See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (2011) (defining “security interest”).

31. See U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(A) (2013).

32. See, e.g., Bank of Am., N.A. v. Outboard Marine Corp. (In re Outboard Marine Corp.), 300 B.R. 308, 323 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003); see generally In re Weir-Penn, Inc., 344 B.R. 791, 793 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2006) (citation omitted) (referencing “a collection of documents . . . [that] in the aggregate disclose an intent to grant a security interest in specific collateral”).

33. Simmons v. Brown (In re Brown), No. 14-72940-BEM, 2015 WL 2123819 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Apr. 29, 2015).

34. Id. at *3.

35. 859 N.W.2d 921 (N.D. 2015).

36. Id. at 927.

37. No. 15 CVS 1648, 2015 WL 846697 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2015).

38. No. 13 C 4692, 2015 WL 1952685 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2015).

39. Id. at *5–6; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03 & cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“[A]n agent’s apparent authority originates with express conduct by the principal . . . .”).

40. No. 15CA51, 2015 WL 6697469 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2015).

41. Id. at *4.

42. Gugino v. Rowley (In re Floyd), 540 B.R. 747 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2015).

43. Id. at 756–57.

44. Cable’s Enter., LLC v. Dunn (In re Cable’s Enter., LLC), No. 14-10782, 2015 WL 9412805 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Dec. 21, 2015).

45. 121 F. Supp. 3d 277 (D. Mass. 2015).

46. 15 U.S.C. § 1666h (2012).

47. 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(d)(2) (2016); see also id. § 1026.12(d)(2).

48. Id. pt. 226, supp. I, para. 12(d)(2), cmt. (1)(i).

49. Martino, 121 F. Supp. 3d at 284–90; see also Allen Benson, An Avoidable Trap for Credit Card Issuers, THE TRANSACTIONAL LAW., Oct. 2015, at 6, 6–9 (analyzing the Martino case).

50. U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(A) (2013).

51. See id. § 9-108(b).

52. Id. § 9-108(e)(2).

53. 536 B.R. 887 (D. Kan. 2015).

54. Id. at 892–93. But cf. Angell v. Accugenomics, Inc. (In re Gene Express, Inc.), No. 10-08432-8-JRL, 2013 WL 1787971, at *5–7 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Apr. 26, 2013) (holding that commercial real estate lease that purported to grant the landlord a security interest in “any personal property belonging to Tenant and left on the Premises” did not adequately describe the collateral because “personal property” is not a permissible description, but failing to address why the phrase “left on the premises” did not suffice to render the description something other than supergeneric). On remand, the bankruptcy court found that the mobile home was a fixture. Morris v. Ark. Valley Credit Union (In re Gracy), No. 13-11917, 2015 WL 5552651, at *4 (Bankr. D. Kan. Sept. 17, 2015).

55. U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(1) (2013).

56. See id. § 9-102(a)(28)(A). But cf. In re Adirondack Timber Enter., Inc., No. 08-12553, 2010 WL 1741378, at *3 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2010) (holding that debtor that authenticated an agreement granting a security interest to a manufacturer to secure all obligations owed to the manufacturer and its affiliates did not grant a security interest to the bank subsidiary of the manufacturer, and thus the bank was not entitled to adequate protection).

57. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(59) (2013) (defining “obligor”); id. § 9-102(a)(72) (defining “secondary obligor”); id. § 9-611(c)(1), (2) (specifying that notification of a disposition must be sent to the debtor and any secondary obligor, among others); id. § 9-621(b) (indicating when a secondary obligor is entitled to be sent a proposal to accept collateral); id. § 9-623(a) (indicating that collateral may be redeemed by the debtor and any secondary obligor, among others); id. § 9-625 (indicating the debtor, the obligor, and the secondary obligor, among others, may be entitled to damages if a secured party fails to comply with Part 6 of Article 9).

58. No. 06 Civ. 5466 (LAP), 2015 WL 5853916 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2015).

59. Id. at *8. The court also noted that contract law requires that consideration exist, not that it flow from the promisee to the promisor. Id.

60. Bird v. SKR Credit, Ltd. (In re DigitalBridge Holdings, Inc.), No. 10-34499, 2015 WL 5766761 (Bankr. D. Utah Sept. 30, 2015).

61. Id. at *9.

62. No. 13-11506 (RG), 2015 WL 397799 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2015).

63. Id. at *2.

64. Id. at *3. Moreover, this security interest was unperfected because the filed financing statement described the condominium units, rather than the membership interest in the subsidiary. Id.

65. No. 1:13-cv-01286-TWP-DML, 2015 WL 417553 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 30, 2015).

66. Id. at *6–7.

67. See U.C.C. §§ 9-406(d)–(f), 9-407, 9-408, 9-409 (2013).

68. 463 S.W.3d 843 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015).

69. MO. REV. STAT. § 313.285.1 (2000).

70. Clark, 463 S.W.3d at 846–48. Courts in Texas and California have reached conflicting decisions on this issue. Compare Tex. Lottery Comm’n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628, 635–39 (Tex. 2010) (holding that section 9-406 trumps the lottery statute’s restriction on assignment even though the lottery statute was more recent and more specific because section 9-406(f) makes clear that it takes precedence over other law), with Stone St. Capital, LLC v. Cal. State Lottery Comm’n, 80 Cal. Rptr. 3d 326, 330–40 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding that the California Lottery Act’s restriction on assignment of lottery winnings trumped section 9-406(f) because the specific rules in the Lottery Act controlled over the more general rules in Article 9, even though Article 9 was enacted more recently).

71. See U.C.C. §§ 9-317, 9-322(a) (2013).

72. See id. §§ 9-310 to -314.

73. Id. § 9-309.

74. See id. § 9-301(1).

75. J. Aron & Co. v. SemCrude, L.P. (In re SemCrude, L.P.), No. 08-11525 (BLS), 2015 WL 4594516 (D. Del. July 30, 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-3097 (3d Cir. Sept. 17, 2015).

76. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-339a (Supp. 2014); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.343 (West 2001).

77. Arrow Oil & Gas, Inc. v. SemCrude, L.P. (In re SemCrude, L.P.), 407 B.R. 112, 137 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (“Texas § 9.343 does not apply in deciding whether the Texas Producers’ claimed security interests were perfected. Rather, Delaware law or Oklahoma law governs perfection.”); Mull Drilling Co. v. SemCrude, L.P. (In re SemCrude, L.P.), 407 B.R. 82, 109 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (“Kansas § 9-339a does not govern in deciding whether the Kansas Producers’ claimed security interests were perfected. Rather, Delaware law or Oklahoma law governs perfection.”). This conclusion might have been different if laws in these states had purported to create a statutory lien rather than a security interest.

78. In re SemCrude, L.P., 2015 WL 4594516, at *9–10.

79. See U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(1) & cmt. 10 (2013).

80. No. 15-31086-H3-11, 2015 WL 3879484 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. June 22, 2015).

81. Id. at *1–2.

82. See U.C.C. § 9-509(a)(1) (2013).

83. Id. § 9-509(b).

84. See id. §§ 9-322 cmt. 4, 9-509 cmt. 3.

85. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Adoni Grp., Inc. v. Capital Bus. Credit, LLC (In re Adoni Grp., Inc.), 530 B.R. 592 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015).

86. Id. at 596–99.

87. See U.C.C. § 9-502(a)(3) (2013).

88. See id. § 9-108(a).

89. See id. § 9-506(a).

90. Ring v. First Niagara Bank, N.A. (In re Sterling United, Inc.), No. 1-13-11351-MJK, 2015 WL 7573240, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2015).

91. Id. at *2.

92. Id.

93. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Motors Liquidation Co. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 103 A.3d 1010, 1017–18 (Del. 2014).

94. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Motors Liquidation Co. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 777 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Each of the authors provided advice to the secured party during the litigation.

95. See U.C.C. § 9-312(b) (2013).

96. See id. § 9-104(a)(1)–(3).

97. Alexander v. Mill Steel Co. (In re Se. Stud & Components, Inc.), No. 14-32906-DHW, 2015 WL 7750209 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Dec. 1, 2015).

98. Id. at *3.

99. See U.C.C. § 9-342 (2013) (indicating that a bank need not disclose the existence of a control agreement to anyone unless requested to do so by the depositor).

100. Id. § 9-317(b).

101. J. Aron & Co. v. SemCrude, L.P. (In re SemCrude, L.P.), No. 08-11525 (BLS), 2015 WL 4594516, at *9 (D. Del. July 30, 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-3097 (3d Cir. Sept. 17, 2015); see supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text (discussing the case).

102. In re SemCrude, L.P., 2015 WL 4594516, at *10.

103. Id. The court also ruled that the buyers qualified as buyers in ordinary course of business who took free of the producers’ security interests under U.C.C. section 9-320(a), even if the security interests were perfected. Id. at *11–14. Although the buyers partially purchased on credit and partially paid in kind through cross-product netting arrangements prevalent in the oil and gas markets, these facts did not cause the transactions to fall outside the ordinary course of business or mean that the buyers acquired the goods in partial satisfaction of a money debt. Id.; see also U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(9) (2011) (defining “buyer in ordinary course of business”).

104. 771 S.E.2d 437 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).

105. Id. at 438–39; see U.C.C. § 9-515(c) (2013).

106. Four Cty. Bank, 771 S.E.2d at 439–40.

107. Id. at 440; cf. U.C.C. § 9-331 cmt. 5 (2013) (“‘[G]ood faith’ does not impose a general duty of inquiry . . . .”).

108. U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1) (2013).

109. 165 So. 3d 696 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).

110. See U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3) (2013).

111. Perez, 165 So. 2d at 699–701.

112. Id. at 701–702.

113. Id. Because the sale of a promissory note creates a security interest that is automatically perfected, see U.C.C. §§ 9-109(a)(3), 9-309(4) (2013), the court was incorrect to focus on which bank took possession first.

114. See, e.g., Provident Bank v. Cmty. Home Mortg. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d 558 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), discussed in Stephen L. Sepinuck & Kristen Adams, UCC Spotlight, COM. L. NEWSL. 1, 1–2 (A.B.A., Bus. L. Sec., July 2007), http://apps.americanbar.org/abanet/common/login/securedarea.cfm?areaType=committee&role=CL190000&url=/buslaw/committees/CL190000/newsletter/200707/spotlight.pdf; DLJ Mortg. Capital, Inc. v. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. B193493, 2008 WL 376941 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2008), discussed in Stephen L. Sepinuck & Kristen Adams, UCC Spotlight, COM. L. NEWSL. 2, 2–3 (A.B.A. Bus. L. Sec. July 2008), http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL190000pub/newsletter/200807/spotlight.pdf.

115. U.C.C. §§ 9-330, 9-331 (2013).

116. See id. § 9-201(a).

117. See id. § 9-321(b).

118. No. 1:13-CV-867, 2015 WL 852354 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Cyber Sols. Int’l, LLC v. Pro Mktg. Sales, Inc., No. 15-1359, 2016 WL 106087 (6th Cir. Jan. 11, 2016).

119. Id. at *6.

120. See U.C.C. § 9-342 (2013).

121. See id. § 9-327(3). The one exception is if the secured party has become the bank’s customer with respect to the deposit account. See id. § 9-327(4).

122. See id. § 9-340.

123. 84 F. Supp. 3d 1314 (M.D. Fla. 2015).

124. Id. at 1325–26.

125. See U.C.C. §§ 9-609, 9-610 (2013).

126. See id. § 9-611(b)–(d).

127. See id. § 9-602(7).

128. See id. § 9-624(a).

129. 92 F. Supp. 3d 1041 (D. Kan. 2015).

130. Id. at 1060–61.

131. No. 14-cv-00206-RBJ, 2015 WL 5159073 (D. Colo. Sept. 3, 2015).

132. Id. at *6 (quoting workout agreement). Even if the secured party failed to comply with Article 9 by not providing notification of the sale, the debtor and guarantors presented no evidence that they could have paid the debt or produced a buyer who would have purchased the dredge at a higher price. Id. at *7. Accordingly, the court also ruled that the presumption that no deficiency is owing, which arises when a secured party’s enforcement does not comply with Part 6 of Article 9, see U.C.C. § 9-626(a)(3)–(4) (2013), was rebutted. Key Equip. Fin., 2015 WL 5159073, at *7.

133. U.C.C. § 9-610(a) (2013).

134. See id. § 9-610(b).

135. Id.

136. Id. § 9-626(a)(1), (2).

137. 92 F. Supp. 3d 1041 (D. Kan. 2015).

138. Id. at 1061–62; see supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text (discussing the case).

139. U.C.C. § 9-627(a) (2013).

140. Ross, 92 F. Supp. 3d at 1062.

141. Id. at 1062–63.

142. 610 F. App’x 848 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).

143. Id. at 854–56.

144. Id. at 855.

145. 807 F.3d 407 (1st Cir. 2015).

146. Id. at 411–12.

147. Id. at 413.

148. Morgantown Excavators, Inc. v. Huntington Nat’l Bank (In re Godfrey), 537 B.R. 271 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2015).

149. Id. at 281–82.

150. No. 1-13-1075, 2015 WL 1514908 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 31, 2015).

151. Id. at *8–11.

152. U.C.C. § 9-607(a)(1) (2013).

153. Id. § 9-406(a), (c).

154. 157 So. 3d 1154 (La. Ct. App. 2015).

155. The trial court based its decision on the fact that Swift Energy’s account had not been sold to the factor, and thus the factor was not an “assignee” of the account within the meaning of section 9-406(a). Id. at 1161–62. The court of appeals rejected this conclusion and ruled that the factor was an “assignee” of all the debtor’s accounts. Id. at 1162.

156. Id. at 1162–64.

157. See U.C.C. § 1-202(e), (f) (2011) (providing when an organization is deemed to have received a notification).

158. 793 F.3d 926, 937–38 (8th Cir. 2015).

159. No. 06 Civ. 5466 (LAP), 2015 WL 5853916 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2015).

160. Id. at *15 (quoting Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Berger, No. 10 Civ. 8408 (PGG), 2012 WL 4217795, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2012)).

161. Id. at *15–16.

162. No. W2013-01753-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 340364 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2015). The Tennessee Supreme Court remanded the case “solely for the purpose of full consideration of Bancorp-South Bank’s prejudgment interest issue.” BancorpSouth Bank v. 51 Concrete, LLC, No. W2013-01753-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. June 11, 2015) (per curiam) (order at 1).

163. BancorpSouth Bank, 2015 WL 340364, at *4.

164. See U.C.C. § 9-201(a) (2013) (“[A] security agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral, and against creditors.”).

165. BancorpSouth Bank, 2015 WL 340364, at *5.

166. 792 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2015).

167. Id. at 791.

168. Id. at 793.

169. See U.C.C. § 9-617(a)(1) (2013).

170. See, e.g., Call Ctr. Techs., Inc. v. Grand Adventures Tour & Travel Publ’g Corp., 635 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2011); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 334 F. App’x 810 (9th Cir. 2009); Sourcing Mgmt., Inc. v. Simclar, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 3d 899 (N.D. Tex. 2015); Opportunity Fund, LLC v. Savana, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-528, 2014 WL 4079974 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 19, 2014); Ortiz v. Green Bull, Inc., No. 10-CV-3747 (ADS) (ETB), 2011 WL 5554522 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2011); Perceptron, Inc. v. Silicon Video, Inc., No. 5:06-CV-0412 (GTS/DEP), 2010 WL 3463098 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010); Miller v. Forge Mench P’ship Ltd., No. 00 Civ. 4314 (MBM), 2005 WL 267551 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2005); Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC, 887 N.E.2d 244 (Mass. 2008); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Schneider, Inc., 873 A.2d 1286 (Pa. 2005).

171. No. 2-14-0333, 2015 WL 1516531 (Ill. App. Ct. Apr. 1, 2015).

172. Id. at *3, *5–7.

173. 126 A.3d 835 (N.H. 2015).

174. Id. at 839–41.

175. Id. at 841.

176. Id. at 842.

 

That Pesky Little Thing Called Fraud: An Examination of Buyers’ Insistence Upon (and Sellers’ Too Ready Acceptance of ) Undefined “Fraud Carve-Outs” in Acquisition Agreements

 

In those states that have a high regard for the sanctity of contract, a well-crafted waiver of reliance provision can effectively eliminate the specter of a buyer’s post-closing fraud claim based upon alleged extra-contractual representations of the seller or its agents. But undefined “fraud carve-outs” continue to find their way into acquisition agreements notwithstanding these otherwise well-crafted waiver of reliance provisions. An undefined fraud carve-out threatens to undermine not only the waiver of reliance provision, but also the contractual cap on indemnification that was otherwise stated to be the exclusive remedy for the representations and warranties that were set forth in the contract. Practitioners continue to exhibit a limited appreciation of the many meanings of the term “fraud” and the extent to which a generalized fraud carve-out can potentially expand the universe of claims and remedies that can be brought outside the remedies specifically bargained-for under the parties’ written agreement. Given the frequent insistence upon (and continued acceptance by many of) undefined fraud carve-outs, and recent court decisions that bring the undefined fraud carve-out issue into focus, this article will examine the various (and sometimes surprising) meanings of the term “fraud,” and the resulting danger of generalized fraud carve-outs, and will propose some possible responses to the buyer who insists upon including the potentially problematic phrase “except in the case of fraud” as an exception to the exclusive remedy provision of an acquisition agreement.

I. INTRODUCTION

Post-closing fraud claims by a buyer against a seller are “regrettably familiar.”1 Indeed, allegations of fraud can occur whenever a buyer encounters what it contends to be an unanticipated problem with a business it acquired, and either the bargained-for contractual representations and warranties do not cover that particular problem or the bargained-for contractual cap on liability for breach of those contractual representations and warranties proves insufficient.2 If the buyer was in fact deliberately lied to by the seller, or facts were deliberately concealed from the buyer by the seller, respecting a matter that was specifically negotiated by the buyer to be represented by the seller as a predicate to the buyer’s decision to purchase, such claims are understandable and, more importantly, may be enforceable, without regard to any contractual limits on fraud claims. But, in many states, fraud claims can be premised upon something less than the intentional, personal deceit that is commonly understood to be encompassed by the term fraud.3 And for the seller who instructed its representatives to be completely forthcoming with all relevant information requested by the buyer, and who believed that it had a clear agreement with the buyer as to what the seller was and was not prepared to represent and warrant regarding the business being purchased (and the extent to which the seller was and was not prepared to compensate the buyer in the event any of those bargained-for representations and warranties were inaccurate), the assertion of a claim of fraud by the buyer is a breach of the very bargain the seller believed it had made with the buyer.

In 2009, The Business Lawyer published an article that was designed to awaken deal professionals and their counsel to the dangers of these generalized fraud in-trusions into the heavily negotiated contractual limitations of liability that are effected through indemnification caps and exclusive remedy provisions.4 Specifically, the 2009 The Business Lawyer article provided guidance for drafting contractual provisions designed to preserve the integrity of a fully negotiated contractual deal against at least some of the corrupting effects of the everelusive “fraud” claim.5

Based on the proliferation of published practice notes concerning this subject since the publication of that article,6 the message as to the need to disclaim reliance on extra-contractual representations has been heard and more or less acted upon by many practitioners. Recent case law suggests, however, that the disclaimers of reliance used by many practitioners are not as clear or robust as they could be and, as a result, varied fraud claims have been permitted to proceed in the face of some of these less than fully effective provisions.7 But it is not the purpose of this article to re-plow old ground regarding the need for clear disclaimers of reliance.8 Rather, the purpose of this article is to address a more troubling issue—that is, the persistent insistence by buyers upon, and the agreement by many sellers to, a generalized fraud carve-out even where the disclaimer of reliance clause is clear that extra-contractual representations should not form the basis of any post-closing claim.

II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM

After listing a number of drafting tips for maximizing the effectiveness of disclaimer of reliance provisions, the 2009 The Business Lawyer article warned that draftspersons should avoid generalized fraud carve-outs because they could potentially undermine the effectiveness of the enumerated drafting tips.9 But the article did not suggest that certain types of fraud cannot or should not be an appropriate exception to the otherwise carefully negotiated caps on liability that formed the basis for the contracting parties’ written agreement; rather, the message was that the decision to permit any tort or equity based claims outside of the contractually negotiated indemnification should be done knowingly and carefully, within the parties’ written agreement, and as a matter of contract. Accordingly, the article suggested that, in lieu of an undefined fraud carve-out, an appropriate area for negotiations was a specific carve-out for deliberate misrepresentations by certain agreed upon persons relating to the bargained-for representations and warranties specifically set forth in the written agreement.10

The suggestion that the term “fraud” be specifically defined, when used as an exception to an exclusive remedy provision, appears to have been largely ignored by many within the transactional bar.11 Indeed, a recent practice note analyzing “recent case law and market practice on barring fraud claims by disclaiming extra-contractual representations and warranties and reliance in private acquisition agreements” notes a surprising number of publicly reported private company acquisition agreements that contain an undefined fraud carve-out as an exception to the exclusive remedy provision, suggesting that in certain cases the fraud carve-out was even made directly to the disclaimer of reliance provision itself.12 And the ABA’s 2013 Private Target Mergers & Acquisitions Deal Points Study similarly suggests that the undefined fraud carve-out persists as a common component of most private target acquisition agreements.13 In fact, there appears to be a basic assumption among many practitioners that it is simply inappropriate for a seller to refuse to agree to a generalized fraud carve-out.14

So, if a generalized fraud carve-out is apparently “market,”15 why are such carve-outs problematic and why write an article decrying their use? First, an undefined fraud carve-out to an exclusive remedy provision potentially “renders that provision meaningless” with respect to any allegations of fraud,16 thereby exposing a seller to lengthy and expensive litigation defending itself against uncapped claims, which may or may not be related to the bargained-for contractual representations and warranties, and which may or may not prove valid.17 Second, a 2013 Delaware decision noted the ambiguity created with respect to the efficacy of a disclaimer of reliance provision due to the existence of a generalized fraud carve-out—i.e., whether the carve-out related only to fraud claims premised upon the contractual warranties set forth in the written agreement or also to extra-contractual statements or omissions that were otherwise disclaimed.18 Third, recent cases suggest that the existence of a fraud carve-out renders the survival period and indemnification procedures applicable to the contractual warranties and representations irrelevant to any misrepresentation claim premised upon fraud, even with respect to those contractual warranties and representations.19 Fourth, undefined fraud is an “elusive and shadowy term,”20 which may not be limited to deliberate lying despite that common conception.21 Fifth, an undefined fraud carve-out not only fails to define the term fraud, but also fails to define whose fraud is being carved-out. Sixth, the person alleging the fraud may in fact be the fraudster, who is seeking to extort an unbargained-for post-closing purchase price concession from the seller based upon the mere threat of an undefined fraud claim. And lastly, the courts are not always in the best position to sort out the valid from the invalid claims when it comes to allegations of fraud, particularly when those claims are based on extra-contractual statements.22

III. THE MANY MEANINGS OF THE TERM FRAUD

The common conception of the term fraud is that it necessarily involves dishonesty, trickery, and deceit on the part of the accused. Indeed, to think in terms of someone being “accused” of fraud—that fraud is essentially theft by deception—is not an uncommon view of the nature of fraud. Thus, the classic dictionary definition of the term fraud is an “intentional pervasion of truth in order to induce another to part with something of value or to surrender a legal right.”23 But fraud, in fact, is a legal term derived from the common law and courts of equity that is not necessarily limited to the deliberate conveyance of deceptive falsehoods designed to swindle an unsuspecting counterparty. And a fraud carve-out that does not qualify the term “fraud” with the specific type of fraud to which one is intending to refer may well be a carve-out that captures more than the egregious conduct intended to be captured.24

Fraud has many meanings in the law. Indeed, “fraud is a many splendored thing”25 that defies specific definition by the courts,26 and that varies from state to state. Fraud has been described by courts as being “infinite in variety”27 and “taking on protean form at will.”28 Perhaps the best description of the varied meanings of the term fraud is the statement made by one court that “[f]raud is kaleidoscopic.”29 The images of fraud that emerge through the eyehole of this “judicial kaleidoscope” may not be as multifaceted as the patterns that can be seen through a real kaleidoscope, where the cylinder is turned and the colored glass falls into place,30 but they are more varied than many practitioners appear to think. To illustrate that premise, this article will focus on just four possible meanings of the term fraud: common law fraud, equitable fraud, promissory fraud, and unfair dealings fraud. The conduct involved in each of these types of fraud may all be deemed fraudulent under the law, but such conduct may or may not involve the type of dishonest misrepresentation of fact sought to be captured by the use of the phrase “except in the case of fraud.”31

A. COMMON LAW FRAUD

Common law fraud in the United States is a tort that is derived from the original English action of deceit.32 In most states, a plaintiff ’s successful claim of common law fraud requires proof of each of the following elements:

(i) the defendant made a representation; (ii) the representation was false; (iii) the defendant acted with scienter (i.e., knew the representation was false or made it recklessly without sufficient knowledge as to whether it was true or false); (iv) the defendant intended that the plaintiff rely on the representation; (v) the plaintiff reasonably or justifiably relied upon the representation; and (vi) the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the representation.33

Thus, proof of common law fraud requires not only that a false representation was made by the seller, intending that it be relied upon by the buyer, with the buyer actually and justifiably relying upon that false representation to its detriment, but also that the seller acted with the requisite fraudulent state of mind in conveying that false representation.

While it may be a common belief that the “actual wickedness” that the term fraud connotes is the necessary fraudulent state of mind required to support a common law cause of action premised upon fraud, such has never truly been the case.34 It is true that in the nineteenth century English case of Derry v. Peek,35 which has been widely cited in the United States,36 it was established by Lord Herschell that proof of “fraud” is a requirement of an action for deceit and that “fraud is proved when it is shewn that a false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false.”37 And this concept was reduced by Lord Herschell into a seemingly simple requirement that “[t]o prevent a false statement being fraudulent, there must, I think, be an honest belief in its truth.”38 But the interpretation of this simple guidance that suggested that all fraud was based in moral dishonesty or wickedness plays out quite differently in the modern deal world.

Based on the principles set forth in Lord Herschell’s opinion in Derry v. Peek, the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the required state of mind to support a fraudulent misrepresentation claim as follows:

A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker (a) knows or believes that the matter is not as he represents it to be, (b) does not have the confidence in the accuracy of his representation that he states or implies, or (c) knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that he states or implies.39

And the Restatement’s comment to clause (b) above adds additional color to its definition of fraudulent misrepresentation as follows:

In order that a misrepresentation may be fraudulent it is not necessary that the maker know the matter is not as represented. Indeed, it is not necessary that he should even believe this to be so. It is enough that being conscious that he has neither knowledge nor belief in the existence of the matter he chooses to assert it as a fact. Indeed, since knowledge implies a firm conviction, a misrepresentation of a fact so made as to assert that the maker knows it, is fraudulent if he is conscious that he has merely a belief in its existence and recognizes that there is a chance, more or less great, that the fact may not be as it is represented. This is often expressed by saying that fraud is proved if it is shown that a false representation has been made without belief in its truth or recklessly, careless whether it is true or false.40

This is certainly less than the concept of deliberate lying or concealment that is often associated with the term “fraud.”

American courts have always had a broader view of the scienter requirement of Derry v. Peek than have the courts of England, reducing the scienter requirement in some cases to a standard that was “little more than negligence.”41 Indeed, as the law of fraud or deceit developed in the United States, it was made to fill gaps where the law of warranty was insufficient and the law of negligent misrepresentation had not yet been fully recognized as a cause of action.42 As a result, a claim of fraud was often the only available remedy when a buyer was induced by a seller’s false statement (regardless of the seller’s state of mind) to enter into a business transaction, and the line between statements being knowingly false and statements which were believed to be true, but not actually known to be true, appears to have become blurred.43 Essentially, fraud could arise in some states whenever a party made a statement that proved false unless at the time he or she made it he or she objectively knew it to be true: “The fraud consists in stating that the party knows the thing to exist, when he does not know it to exist; and if he does not know it to exist, he must ordinarily be deemed to know that he does not.”44 And “[a]n unqualified affirmation amounts to an affirmation of one’s own knowledge.”45 Thus, according to one court, any time an unqualified statement of fact is made (which is deemed by law to have been made to one’s own knowledge), “[i]t is immaterial whether a statement made as of one’s own knowledge is made innocently or knowingly” for the purpose of establishing fraudulent intent.46

The idea of a seller of a business having an honest belief in and being deemed to assert personal knowledge as to the absolute “truth” of every unqualified statement made as part of the representations and warranties of a modern acquisition agreement is a strange one indeed. Can a shareholder have an honest belief in the truth of an unqualified representation being made in a stock purchase agreement with respect to which the stockholder has no actual personal knowledge and which was based solely upon members of management’s knowledge? And is a qualification of a representation “to the knowledge of the seller” an in-dication that the seller actually has some direct knowledge upon which to base that representation? What about representations required to be made in the modern acquisition agreement with respect to which there is no basis to know whether they are true or false, but which are nonetheless made on an un-qualified basis as a matter of risk allocation? Can some form of negligence on the part of the seller, whether simple or gross, be a sufficient basis to sustain a claim of fraud?

This author does not believe that any seller intends to suggest that he or she has actual, personal knowledge sufficient to assert as true many of the representations and warranties contained in a modern acquisition agreement, never mind many of the statements made in management presentations. But does the existence of an undefined fraud carve-out create an opportunity for a buyer to suggest that the seller did in fact assert such personal knowledge? And given the fact that the representations and warranties in modern acquisition agreements are for the most part contractual risk allocation devices that are not dependent upon what the seller knew or did not know, should the modern U.S. acquisition agreement continue to contain “representations” (as opposed to only warranties) at all?47

An early statement of the less than wicked state of mind required to impose liability for common law fraud in the United States is that made by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in his classic work, The Common Law:

The common-law liability for the truth of statements is, therefore, more extensive than the sphere of actual moral fraud. But, again, it is enough in general if a representation is made recklessly, without knowing whether it is true or false. Now what does “recklessly” mean. It does not mean actual personal indifference to the truth of the statement. It means only that the data for the statement were so far insufficient that a prudent man could not have made it without leading to the inference that he was indifferent. That is to say, repeating an analysis which has been gone through with before, it means that the law, applying a general objective standard, determines that, if a man makes his statement on those data, he is liable, whatever was the state of his mind, and although he individually may have been perfectly free from wickedness in making it.48

Indeed, if the elements of common law fraud are otherwise present, “it need not be shown that the defendant also had a ‘bad’ motive in doing what he or she did,” because proof of a conscious intent to deceive is not necessarily a separate element of the cause of action for fraud in some states.49 Thus, a judge and a jury, looking at the available evidence after the fact, when the representation has in fact been proven false, decide what was the state of the seller’s mind when the representation was made (whether the seller had knowledge of the falsity of the statement itself, or simply had knowledge of the limited information upon which the seller had based its statement) in determining liability for generalized common law fraud. And common law fraud claims are “highly susceptible to the erroneous conclusions of judges and juries.”50

In light of the foregoing, one may well ask whether all claims that could be denominated “common law fraud” are truly intended to be carved out by a generalized fraud carve-out or only a specific subset?

B. EQUITABLE FRAUD

It is troubling enough that statements made in the negotiation of, or actually incorporated into the written representations and warranties set forth in, an acquisition agreement can be deemed fraudulent based upon an after-the-fact in-quiry into the real-time state of mind of the party who made those statements, particularly when that state of mind can be something less than the deliberate dishonesty that many suppose is required to support a claim of fraud. Even more troubling, however, is the fact that in the field of equity jurisprudence there is a type of fraud that does not require proof of scienter of any kind— i.e., equitable fraud. Indeed, “[t]he elements of scienter, that is, knowledge of the falsity and an intention to obtain an undue advantage therefrom, are not essential if plaintiff seeks to prove that a misrepresentation constituted only equitable fraud.”51

Equitable fraud is based on the simple principle that it is “fraudulent (in the equitable sense) for a defendant to hold a plaintiff to a bargain which has been induced by representations of the defendant which were untrue” regardless of any actual dishonesty on the part of the defendant.52 Thus, with only a slight twist of our judicial kaleidoscope, there appears a form of fraud that is devoid of any concept of moral fault. Unlike common law fraud, however, “[i]n an action for equitable fraud, the only relief that may be obtained is equitable relief, such as rescission or reformation of an agreement and not monetary damages.”53

Several recent Delaware cases confirm that the concept of equitable fraud is alive and well in modern jurisprudence.54 According to Delaware law, equitable fraud is available only in circumstances where equity jurisdiction is appropriate— i.e., claims involving abuse of fiduciary relationships or where an equitable remedy such as rescission or reformation is being sought.55 While the typical buyer/seller relationship in a sophisticated acquisition agreement rarely involves fiduciaries, claims of rescission are frequently made by disappointed buyers when the bargained-for indemnification is considered an insufficient remedy for a post-closing representation and warranty claim. Indeed, it was a claim of rescission that was made by the buyer in ABRY Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC.56

As most transactional lawyers are aware, ABRY stands for the proposition that Delaware public policy will not permit a court to enforce an exclusive remedy provision to dismiss fraud claims that are based upon the seller’s deliberate lies respecting the contractual representations and warranties set forth in a written acquisition agreement.57 But ABRY also stands for the proposition that Delaware public policy will permit, and courts will enforce, disclaimer of reliance and exclusive remedy provisions with respect to deliberate lies made outside the specific contractual representations and warranties made within the four corners of an acquisition agreement. Likewise, Delaware will permit an exclusive remedy provision to limit the remedies available for false statements of fact set forth in the specific contractual representations and warranties to the extent that those contractual misrepresentations did not constitute deliberate lies made by the seller itself or by others acting on behalf of the seller and with the seller’s knowledge of the falsity of such representations.58 Thus, but for the disclaimer of reliance and the exclusive remedy provision that limited the buyer’s remedies to the capped indemnification provision, the public policy issue regarding a seller’s in-ability to exclude claims of fraud based upon a seller’s deliberate lies respecting the representations and warranties set forth in the written acquisition agreement may have never been reached in the ABRY case, as an innocent or negligent misrepresentation either inside or outside the four corners of the written acquisition agreement may have been the basis for equitable relief.59

Accordingly, a generalized fraud carve-out could be deemed to include (and thus permit claims based on) equitable, as well as common law, fraud. Is that what the parties intended? And is it clear that claims premised upon misrepresentations of existing fact, whether at common law or in equity, are the extent of a generalized fraud carve-out?

C. PROMISSORY FRAUD

With another twist of our judicial kaleidoscope, the concept of “promissory fraud” appears. Although it has often been said that representations about future performance cannot form the basis of a fraud claim because a fraud claim must be premised upon a misrepresentation concerning an existing fact, many states permit fraud claims based upon allegations that a party to a contract made a promise of future performance that such party never intended to perform.60

Promissory fraud is an exception to the longstanding rule of the common law that “[t]he duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it[]—and nothing else.”61 Thus, “the cele-brated freedom to make contracts” supposedly includes “a considerable freedom to breach them as well.”62 But promissory fraud is considered a form of fraudulent inducement,63 where the existence of a contract is a required element of the cause of action,64 but the existence of the contract does not prevent the introduction of extraneous promises made outside the four corners of the written agreement to the extent those promises induced the execution of the written agreement.65 Moreover, once those extraneous promises are denominated as fraudulent, the existence of the contract also does not limit the available remedies for nonperformance of those promises to those arising under contract law as opposed to tort law.66 And while breach of a promised future performance is not proof of promissory fraud, in some states, a subsequent failure to perform, when coupled with even slight circumstances indicating an intention not to perform at the time the promise was made, is sufficient to prove fraud.67

A circumstance that has been deemed in certain cases to be evidence of promissory fraud is the defendant’s denial that he or she made the promise of future performance.68 Thus, if there is an ambiguity in an agreement, with the defendant claiming that it does not require performance under specified circumstances and the plaintiff claiming that it does, a subsequent finding in favor of the plaintiff as to the contract’s meaning can also result in a finding of promissory fraud against the defendant because the defendant has already admitted that he or she never intended to perform in accordance with the plaintiff ’s claimed interpretation of the contract.69

And imagine a circumstance in which a seller states at some point in the negotiation of the sale of his company that he intends to retire to his ranch following the sale of the business. The buyer then requests a non-compete and the seller refuses to agree to anything in writing regarding his future business activities, but reasserts that he is going to the ranch. The buyer closes, without a written non-compete agreement, and several years later the seller starts a competing business. Can the buyer successfully sue the seller for fraud notwithstanding its decision to proceed without a written non-compete? A nineteenth century English case (and remember that the United States inherited its common law from England) suggests that the answer to this question may well be yes.70

When carving out “claims of fraud” from exclusive remedy provisions, are the sophisticated parties involved in most corporate acquisitions intending to open up the possibility of introducing extraneous promises regarding future performance made in the period leading up to the execution of the written agreement, or dis-agreements as to the meaning of ambiguous provisions in the acquisition agreement, as potentially having been “insincere promises”71 that thereby constitute fraud? Are parties to a written agreement desirous of placing themselves in a position where a breach of contract claim can be converted into a tort claim through the use of the concept of promissory fraud? While these concepts have their place in protecting the consumer,72 do they really belong in the world of corporate acquisition agreements?

D. UNFAIR DEALINGS FRAUD

Even if the seller is somehow comfortable carving out common law fraud, equitable fraud, or promissory fraud from an exclusive remedy provision, a generalized fraud carve-out may not be limited to misrepresentations of fact or intention that have proved to have been false when made. Indeed, fraud can be “presumed or inferred from the circumstances or conditions of the parties’ contracting.”73

Conduct-based fraud can arise anytime one party is deemed to have taken an unfair advantage of the other party in such a manner that the court determines that the resulting bargain is “such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other: which are unequitable and unconscientious bargains.”74 So, with yet another slight twist of our judicial kaleidoscope, there appears the concept of “unfair dealings fraud,” a concept that eliminates the requirement that there has even been any false representation.

An example of a case finding “actual fraud,” without a misrepresentation having been made at all, is the Texas case of Dick’s Last Resort v. Market/Ross, Ltd.75 Dick’s involved the efforts of a landlord to pierce the veil of a corporate tenant to recover damages for breach of a lease agreement from the tenant’s parent companies and an ultimate individual owner.76 In Texas, by statute, a veil piercing claim arising from a contractual relationship requires proof of the use of a corporate counterparty for the purpose of perpetrating an “actual fraud” for the “direct personal benefit” of the person sought to be charged with the corporate counterparty’s contractual obligations.77

In essence, the landlord’s claim was that the tenant had deliberately set up a new entity that had no assets in order to enter into a lease renewal specifically for the purpose of shielding the parent companies from liability so that the parent companies would preserve flexibility to breach the lease in the future.78 The tenant’s ultimate individual owner admitted that he indeed had done exactly that.79 But the evidence was that there had never been any representation made to the landlord as to the financial wherewithal of the new corporate tenant, the new corporate tenant had fully performed for six of the ten years of the renewal term, the landlord never even inquired or did any diligence as to the financial soundness of the new tenant, and the existing tenant had expressly made its willingness to enter into the extended lease term conditioned upon the landlord’s acceptance of the new corporate tenant as the sole entity liable on the lease.80 Thus, the parent companies and their ultimate individual owner defended against the piercing claim by saying that “actual fraud” was simply a shorthand expression for common law fraud—i.e., the type of fraud that requires a misrepresentation and reliance, neither of which had been alleged by the landlord.81

But the Dick’s court held that “actual fraud” was not the same as common law fraud (with the elements of a false representation and reliance), but instead could be premised simply upon a finding of “conduct involving either dishonesty of purpose or intent to deceive”82—in this case, the use of a shell company as the new tenant in a lease renewal with a sophisticated lessor. With this finding of actual fraud by the jury, the new corporate tenant’s obligations under the lease were imposed upon the parent companies and their ultimate individual owner.83

While the doctrine of unfair dealings-based fraud may be appropriate to protect consumers from unscrupulous vendors who misrepresent the terms of so-called standard form contracts,84 do they really belong in a transaction between sophisticated parties who have bargained for the written agreement, negotiated at length, to be the extent of their respective obligations?85 And are sophisticated parties truly intending to carve out this type of fraud through a generalized fraud carve-out?

IV. SO WHAT DOES AN UNDEFINED FRAUD CARVE-OUT POTENTIALLY CARVE OUT?

Notwithstanding the many images of fraud that can be viewed through our judicial kaleidoscope, anecdotal evidence suggests that when transactional lawyers agree to a generalized fraud carve-out to an exclusive remedy provision, they are intending to preserve only their right to bring claims for “common law fraud.”86 But is language that simply carves out “claims of fraud” limited to claims based upon common law fraud, or can “claims of fraud” encompass some of the other concepts of fraud that do not necessarily require a false representation, scienter, and reliance? A 2009 English case provides one potential answer to that question.

In Cavell USA, Inc. v. Seaton Insurance Co.,87 the English Court of Appeal held that a fraud carve-out in a settlement agreement that released all legal and equitable claims against a party, “save” for claims “in the case of fraud,” was not limited to claims arising from the common law tort of deceit.88 Instead, recognizing that “the concept of fraud is notoriously difficult to define,” and impossible to confine in equity, the court found that “the concept of ‘fraud’ is wider than the concept of the tort of deceit where a fraudulent misrepresentation (or equivalent) is required.”89 While not precedent in the United States, the opinion was thoughtfully written and traced the historical reluctance of the common law and equity to define fraud or limit its application to the strict legal proof of the tort of deceit based on a fraudulent representation. As a result, this case suggests that a generalized fraud carve-out can have a meaning beyond the common law tort of fraud.

But even if the fraud carve-out is limited to claims of common law fraud only, is that carve-out intended to allow claims to proceed based upon any extra-contractual misrepresentations or only misrepresentations based upon the actual contractual representations and warranties bargained-for in the written acquisition agreement? Recent Delaware cases, like the holding in the English case of Cavell USA, suggest that a generalized fraud carve-out carries with it a potentially broad meaning that could undermine the disclaimer of reliance provision that was otherwise negotiated with respect to all purported extra-contractual representations.

In Airborne Health, Inc. v. Squid Soap, LP,90 the Delaware Court of Chancery noted that “[w]hen drafters specifically preserve the right to assert fraud claims, they must say so if they intend to limit that right to claims based on written representations in the contract.”91 Similarly, in Anvil Holdings Corp. v. Iron Acquisition Co.,92 the Delaware Court of Chancery noted in dicta that the existence of a generalized fraud carve-out casts doubt upon the efficacy of an otherwise clear waiver of reliance clause.93 The waiver of reliance provision in Anvil was actually broadly written.94 But, based in part upon the existence of a generalized fraud carve-out, the court nevertheless noted that “it appears reasonably conceivable that the Purchase Agreement does not preclude the Buyer’s fraud claim to the extent that claim is based on misrepresentations or omissions by the Individual Defendants during meetings leading up to the closing of the Transaction.”95

Moreover, there are collateral effects to the generic exclusion of fraud, even if “fraud” means only common law fraud related to the express written representations and warranties as set forth in the acquisition agreement. In ENI Holdings, LLC v. KBR Group Holdings, LLC,96 the Delaware Court of Chancery held that an express fraud carve-out from the exclusive remedy provision of an acquisition agreement precluded the dismissal of a fraud-based claim arising from the agreement’s express contractual representations and warranties, even though that claim had been brought outside the contractual survival period.97 So a fraud carve-out may allow a buyer to make fraud claims based on the contractual representations and warranties after the expiration of the contractual survival periods set forth in the indemnification provisions of the acquisition agreement. Is that what the parties truly intended?

It would appear, therefore, that carving out undefined “fraud” from an exclusive remedy provision may be excluding more than just the conscious communication of deliberate lies by the seller to the buyer respecting the bargained-for factual predicates to the deal.98 Instead, a generalized fraud carve-out could permit assertion of common law fraud (with its potentially less than actually dishonest state of mind requirement), equitable fraud (which could involve any misstatements of fact regardless of fault), promissory fraud (which may allow a breach of contract claim to be converted into a fraud claim and, in some circumstances, to potentially allow the introduction of alleged extra-contractual promises of future performance that were not made part of the final negotiated agreement), and unfair dealings-based fraud (which potentially opens up second guessing about the overall fairness of the deal that was made). Are all these various forms of fraud what the parties intended to carve out through a clause that simply states: “except in the case of fraud”? And, even if the fraud carve-out is in fact limited to common law fraud, are the parties truly intending to extend the survival period for claims based on the contractually bargained-for representations and warranties if the buyer simply re-pleads its claim as one arising in tort rather than contract?

V. WHOSE FRAUD IS BEING CARVED OUT ANYWAY?

In ABRY Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC,99 then Vice Chancellor Strine100 distinguished not only between the various types of misrepresentations that can give rise to a claim of fraud, but also between a fraud involving the “Seller itself ” and one involving members of the management team of the port-folio company that was the subject of the stock purchase agreement.101 According to then Vice Chancellor Strine, only a fraud involving the “conscious participation in the communication of lies” by the “Seller itself ” and with respect to the representations and warranties specifically set forth in the stock purchase agreement constituted the type of fraud which, as a matter of public policy, could not be excluded by virtue of an exclusive remedy provision.102 A fraud perpetrated by the seller itself includes, of course, contractual representations made by the company in the acquisition agreement that are known by the seller to have been false when made.103 But then Vice Chancellor Strine thought there was nothing immoral about allocating the risk of lies being told by the management of the target company, without the seller’s knowledge, in such a way that the seller was not exposed to an extra-contractual fraud claim based upon its management team’s misrepresentations.104

In the absence of such a contractual allocation of risk, the common law has long held that a principal is liable for the fraud of his or her agent committed in the scope of that agent’s actual or apparent authority.105 And the agent is always personally liable for any fraud in which he or she participates, even if the fraud was committed solely for the benefit of the principal.106 Of course, these common law concepts were developed before the creation of the various limited liability entities that the law deems to have separate personhood from the individuals who manage and own them.107

A corporation or other limited liability entity is a non-sentient legal person and must act through human agents.108 It is the human officers or managers of these entities who are deemed the agents and the entities themselves that are deemed the principals.109 Thus, a corporate officer who is deemed to have committed a fraud in negotiating an acquisition agreement on behalf of his or her corporate principal is not only personally liable for the resulting damage claim, but so too is the corporate principal. And the corporate principal can be liable for its agent’s fraud even if the fraud benefited the agent.110 If members of management of a company being sold are listed as “knowledge parties” for the purposes of the representations and warranties being given by the selling shareholders, and there is an undefined fraud carve-out in the stock purchase agreement, are the selling shareholders creating the possibility that the buyer will attempt to impute a fraud committed by any such members of management to the selling shareholders?111

VI. THE CURRENT MARKET RATIONALE FOR, AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO, THE GENERALIZED FRAUD CARVE-OUT

A surprising number of agreements negotiated by the most sophisticated counsel in the transactional bar contain ambiguous terms simply because the use of such terms is considered market.112 Why it should be deemed market to have an undefined fraud carve-out to an exclusive remedy provision, when it is now also market to disclaim all extra-contractual representations made outside the four corners of the agreement, is a mystery, at least in the United States. But a comparison of the practice in England, with that of the United States, may shed some light on this phenomenon.

A. ENGLISH MARKET PRACTICE REGARDING FRAUD CARVE-OUTS

Like in the United States, undefined fraud carve-outs are also market in England.113 Unlike in the United States, where a fraud carve-out has developed as a market ask for a buyer (and sellers have apparently demonstrated a significant willingness to accede to that ask), in England, the absence of a generalized fraud carve-out has been viewed as potentially rendering ineffective, under the Unfair Contract Terms Act,114 a provision that otherwise validly disclaims liability for negligent or innocent misrepresentations.115 Thus, a fraud carve-out has generally been volunteered by sellers based upon a 1996 case, Thomas Witter Ltd. v. TBP Industries Ltd.116

In Thomas Witter, the court stated that a provision whereby the buyer disclaimed reliance upon any representation other than those contained in the written agreement would be invalid under the Unfair Contract Terms Act because the provision purported to exclude liability for any type of pre-contractual misrepresentation, including those that were fraudulently made.117 According to the court, it would be inappropriate to imply an exception for fraudulent misrepresentations from a disclaimer provision that did not explicitly provide for such exclusion.118 Therefore, it was suggested that a broad disclaimer provision without an express fraud exception would be invalid, even as to claims involving negligent or innocent misrepresentations, which could have otherwise been validly disclaimed.119 As stated by Mr. Justice Jacob: “It is not for the law to fudge a way for an exclusion clause to be valid. If a party wants to exclude liability for certain sorts of misrepresentations, it must spell those sorts out clearly.”120

English commentators have noted, however, that Thomas Witter has not sub-sequently been followed by the English courts and that an express carve-out for fraud is now not necessary.121 It appears that subsequent case law has effectively held that unless a disclaimer clause expressly includes fraudulent misrepresentations, it will not be deemed to do so simply by virtue of broad language concerning non-reliance upon all pre-contractual representations.122 In light of these subsequent case law developments, and the holding of Cavell USA suggesting that an express fraud carve-out includes more than just truly fraudulent misrepresentations, one would think that our English colleagues would begin to change market practice and cease the use of generalized fraud carve-outs. But old habits die hard. While some English commentators suggest that the practice of specifically carving out fraud should be discontinued,123 others have suggested continued caution.124 But the existence of a generalized fraud carve-out after Cavell USA can no longer be viewed as a meaningless concession in England because the term “fraud” has a meaning beyond mere fraudulent misrepresentation as an element of the tort of deceit.125 Market practice is nevertheless slow to change in both England and the United States.

B. U.S. MARKET PRACTICE REGARDING FRAUD CARVE-OUTS

In the United States, there is no general equivalent to the Unfair Contract Terms Act that would have potentially invalidated for all purposes (even as to innocent and negligent misrepresentations) a non-reliance clause that purported to disclaim all extra-contractual misrepresentations, even those that were determined to have been fraudulent.126 Like England, however, there are states where public policy does in fact override an effort by contracting parties to disclaim reliance upon fraudulent misrepresentations of fact that were alleged to have been made as an inducement to the counterparty to enter into the contract.127 Prior to the 2009 The Business Lawyer article, when this author would informally survey transactional lawyers as to the efficacy of disclaimers of reliance, even in states without such a strict public policy prohibition (Delaware, Texas, and New York primarily), the overwhelming sentiment was that “you can always bring a claim for fraud no matter what the contract says.” That assumption may have led many to agree to a fraud carve-out on an “it’s just sleeves off my vest” approach because of the belief that a fraud carve-out is read into the contract in any event.128 But practitioners should now know that, under many states’ law governing large corporate transactions in the United States, it is simply not the case that you can always bring a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation notwithstanding carefully crafted disclaimers of reliance and exclusive remedy provisions.129 Is the fraud carve-out, therefore, just an effort by some buyers to contractually get back to the place that was previously assumed, i.e., “you can always bring a claim for fraud no matter what the contract says”? If so, why are sellers agreeing to this? Why denominate the exact extent of the bargained-for representations and warranties in the first place if a party can instead claim reliance upon extra-contractual statements that were made in management presentations and discussions, but not incorporated into the carefully negotiated written representations and warranties that formed the basis of the parties’ written agreement? And even as to those representations and warranties that were incorporated into the written acquisition agreement, “why spend all of the time and effort negotiating detailed indemnification provisions if a buyer can avoid them based on the legal characterization it decides to place on the claim”?130 Is the explanation for this practice essentially the same as in England—i.e., old habits die hard?

A recent practice note illustrates, but does not necessarily explain the rationale for, the apparent disconnect between the purpose of the exclusive remedy provision and the ubiquitous, undefined fraud carve-out commonly associated with existing U.S. market practice.131 First, the authors note that, in U.S. acquisition agreements, the provisions governing indemnification “generally specify in detail the rights of the parties with respect to how claims are dealt with, including . . . timing, process, payment of claims, and limitations on liability.”132 And “[a]n [exclusive remedy] provision is intended to prevent a plaintiff from circumventing these carefully negotiated limitations by providing that the right of indemnification constitutes the only post-closing recourse available to either party and precludes the parties from seeking claims outside of the specifically negotiated indemnification terms.”133 But then the authors note that, based on a review of four years of ABA Private Target M&A Deal Points Studies, exclusive remedy provisions are also subject to “commonly negotiated carve-outs, usually fairly narrow in scope.”134 And what is the most common of these supposedly “narrow in scope” carve-outs? Undefined fraud, of course, is the most common carve-out.135 However, the authors do identify what they refer to as a “surprising” “trend to increasingly define the term ‘fraud.’”136 But the identified “definitions” of the term “fraud” were largely limited to the use of a descriptive adjective in front of the word fraud, such as “actual” or “intentional.”137

C. COMPARING U.S. VERSUS ENGLISH MARKET PRACTICE CONCERNING THE USE OF CONTRACTUAL REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES

It is always important when discussing fraud carve-outs in the U.S. market to keep in mind the distinction between fraud claims based upon extra-contractual representations and fraud claims based upon the representations and warranties set forth in the acquisition agreement itself. While it is against public policy to disclaim liability for fraudulent pre-contractual misrepresentations in England, a seller can apparently avoid incurring tort liability for any contractual statements regarding a purchased business made in an acquisition agreement if the seller carefully denominates those statements as warranties rather than representations. Indeed, a recent English case refused to allow carefully crafted contractual warranties in an acquisition agreement to be converted into tort-based representations that could circumvent the contractually limited remedies available for breach of those warranties.138 In contrast, at least in Delaware, liability for deliberate misrepresentations based on the contractual representations and warranties specifically set forth in a written agreement is the only type of misrepresentation-related liability that an exclusive remedy provision (and a related non-reliance provision) cannot avoid.139

The distinction between contractual warranties and contractual representations does not appear to mean much in the United States given that, unlike in England, “it is common market practice for a seller to make both representations and warranties” in an acquisition agreement.140 But a recent practice note comparing New York versus English practice on this subject suggests that the exclusive remedy provision of a standard New York acquisition agreement provides for the same result under a New York-style agreement that includes both representations and warranties as does an English-style agreement that only provides for warranties.141 The reason for this conclusion is that the exclusive remedy provisions of most New York acquisition agreements broadly exclude “all other rights, claims and causes of action that they might have against the other party, except pursuant to the indemnification provisions set forth in the indemnification article.”142 And this exclusion of other available remedies necessarily includes the remedy of rescission that is the primary benefit of bringing a claim as one based on a misrepresentation rather than merely a breach of warranty in both England and the United States.143 But then, to further illustrate, but still not explain the rationale for, the disconnect between the undefined fraud carve-out and the purpose of the exclusive remedy provision in the United States, the author simply notes that a generalized fraud carve-out could potentially moot the benefit of this exclusion of the remedy of rescission.144

So where does this leave us? While it is apparently “still a minority approach” in the U.S. market, there is a clear “trend to increasingly define fraud with some specificity when including it as an exception to an [exclusive remedy] provision.”145 And defining fraud by adding a descriptive adjective is certainly a step in the right direction, but it does not necessarily address all of the concerns previously noted in this article. So, if we are stuck with a market reality of a fraud carve-out to the exclusive remedy provision in the United States, how should the term “fraud” be defined so that it properly captures only the egregious form of fraudulent misrepresentation and then only with respect to the representations and warranties specifically bargained for in the written agreement?

D. ENCOURAGING A NEW APPROACH IN U.S. MARKET PRACTICE: SPECIFIC VERSUS GENERAL FRAUD CARVE-OUTS

A good start in crafting an appropriate definition of fraud that is specific rather than general is a provision from the acquisition agreement governing Miller Energy Resources, Inc.’s 2013 purchase of certain assets of Armstrong Cook Inlet, LLC.146

Section 11.3 of this acquisition agreement contains a fairly standard exclusive remedy provision mandating indemnification pursuant to Article 11 of the agreement as “the sole and exclusive remedy of each Party under, arising out of or relating to this Agreement, and the transactions contemplated hereby, whether based in contract, tort, strict liability, statute, common law or otherwise.”147 Like many acquisition agreements, however, this agreement also contains a fraud carve-out. But the difference in this agreement is that it is not a generalized fraud carve-out. Instead, the fraud carve-out in this agreement reads as follows:

Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing in this ARTICLE 11 is intended to limit the rights of the Parties with respect [to] intentional or willful misrepresentation of material facts which constitute common law fraud under applicable laws.148

The benefit of this more specific language is that it specifies the scienter requirement (“intentional or willful misrepresentation”), specifies the requirement that the misrepresentation must be of “material facts,” and maintains the requirement that the resulting intentional or willful149 misrepresentation of material facts must still constitute “common law fraud,” which appears intended to preserve the requirement that the buyer still has to prove all the other elements of common law fraud, including the buyer’s justifiable reliance. But the clause does not limit this more specific common law fraud carve-out to the contractual rather than extra-contractual representations, nor does it specify whose intentional or willful misrepresentations can be charged to the seller.

A recent example of a more specific fraud carve-out that defines fraud so that it only captures deliberate lies made by a seller through the contractual representations is the one set forth in the exclusive remedy provision of the acquisition agreement governing Cementos Argos S.A.’s. acquisition of certain assets of Vulcan Materials Company.150 In that agreement the fraud carve-out reads as follows:

[N]othing herein shall operate to limit the common law liability of any Seller to Purchasers for fraud in the event such Seller is finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have willfully and knowingly committed fraud against any Purchaser, with the specific intent to deceive and mislead any Purchaser, regarding the representations and warranties made herein or in any schedule, exhibit or certificate delivered pursuant hereto.151

Again, the scienter standard for fraud in this clause requires deliberate dishonesty, with intent to deceive. Moreover, the specifically defined fraud carve-out in this clause only relates to the representations and warranties made in the agreement or in a document delivered pursuant to the agreement, and each seller is only responsible for its own fraud.

Finally, the Stock Purchase Agreement governing Leonard Green & Partners, L.P.’s acquisition of the stock of Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. from Fifth & Pacific Companies, Inc. contains a defined term for “Fraud,” for the purposes of the fraud carve-out, as follows:

“Fraud” means, with respect to a Party, an actual and intentional fraud with respect to the making of the representations and warranties pursuant to Article IV or Article V (as applicable), provided, that such actual and intentional fraud of such Party shall only be deemed to exist if any of the individuals included on Section 1.1(vv) of the Seller Disclosure Letter (in the case of the Seller) or Buyer Disclosure Letter (in the case of the Buyer) had actual knowledge (as opposed to imputed or constructive knowledge) that the representations and warranties made by such Party pursuant to, in the case of the Seller, Article IV as qualified by the Seller Disclosure Letter, or, in the case of the Buyer, Article V as qualified by the Buyer Disclosure Letter, were actually breached when made, with the express intention that the other Party rely thereon to its detriment.152

This definition captures the intentional scienter requirement, the fact that the fraud has to relate only to the representations and warranties made in the agreement itself, the determination of whose fraud matters, the specific type of knowledge that constitutes fraud, and the requirement that there be a specific intention to harm the other party.

Of course, there are obvious other points that could be the subject of further negotiation respecting this definition of fraud. For example, this definition charges the seller with fraud committed by the named individuals rather than providing that the named individuals are liable for their own fraud only;153 and this definition still leaves open the possibility of bringing a claim of fraud outside the survival periods, without complying with the indemnification procedures and without the benefit of any limitations on recoverable losses that may have otherwise been bargained for as part of the indemnification provision.154 But given that only a claim of “Fraud” (as defined above) is carved out, rather than “any claim based on fraud,” then, depending on the deal dynamics, perhaps these potential deficiencies are something worth letting slide. The point is not that this definition of fraud is perfect, but that it begins to limit the many splendors of fraud to something concrete and understandable in the context of a sophisticated acquisition agreement.

There remains, of course, the argument that once you agree to eliminate all claims of extra-contractual fraud, why should you then agree to allow fraud claims to be premised on the contractually bargained-for representations and warranties that are subject to specifically bargained-for contractual remedies at all?155 But the market, at least in the United States, seems to be decidedly favoring those that persist in insisting upon some form of fraud carve-out.156

VII. CONCLUSION

What the term fraud denotes in the law is potentially more far reaching than that which it connotes. Fraud is an ancient term that comes to us shrouded in myth and legend. It is like that beast reported to be dwelling in the cave just on the other side of the swamp outside the village walls. It purportedly breaths fire, has wings, is massive, and is something to be feared and loathed, but until we go into the cave and drag him out (if he is actually there at all) we cannot “count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength.”157 And perhaps there is not just one creature that dwells in that cave, but several that have been mythically arranged into a composite, only one or more of which are actually to be feared, loathed, and perhaps killed, with the others being nothing more than harmless lizards whose collective “shadows” in the firelight only made them seem like a dragon.158

As noted in a 2008 The Business Lawyer article about the use of the term “consequential damages,” “many of the most sophisticated and ‘heavily counseled’ acquisition agreements contain ‘glaringly ambiguous terms that lead to avoidable litigation.’”159 “Fraud” is a term very much like the term “consequential damages.” Practitioners believe they know what both these terms mean, but they may, in fact, be basing that belief on those terms’ connotations, not their legal definitions. The term “fraud” carries with it a connotation that makes it extremely difficult for seller’s counsel to resist when buyer’s counsel insists on the inclusion of the seemingly straightforward phrase “except in the case of fraud” at the end of the exclusive remedy provision of an acquisition agreement. After all, who wants to be perceived as suggesting that his or her client would actually commit fraud, as that term is commonly, but not necessarily legally, understood? And clients rarely “get” this issue or have patience for it because they have no intention of acting other than honestly. But the purpose of this article has been to “get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the daylight”160 and demonstrate why simply acting honestly will not necessarily preclude the possibility of certain types of fraud claims. If this article has succeeded in that purpose, then perhaps future discussions with clients and opposing counsel regarding the need for better definition as to exactly what is meant by the phrase “except in the case of fraud” will be easier.

To have set out to identify as problematic an apparently common market practice of including undefined fraud carve-outs to exclusive remedy provisions, this author is “not so naı¨ve as to believe that this [a]rticle will suddenly change existing deal practice and result in more deliberate and thoughtful negotiation regarding [fraud carve-outs].”161 That does not appear to have been the case for consequential damage waivers despite identifying the term “consequential damages” as being “shockingly ambiguous” in a 2008 The Business Lawyer article.162 But this author hopes that the previously identified “minority trend” to clearly define fraud for the purpose of an exclusive remedy provision will become a dominant market practice for negotiated fraud carve-outs because “[a] properly drafted contract should clearly and unequivocally define the limits of the parties’ obligations in words that are well understood.”163 Only time will tell if that hope will be realized.

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* Glenn D. West is a Dallas-based partner with Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP. The views expressed in this article are those of the author only, and are not necessarily shared or endorsed by Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP or its partners. The author wishes to express appreciation to Dallas-based colleague, Jacqui Bogucki, for her research and cite-checking assistance in connection with making this article ready for publication, and Boston and New York-based colleagues, Kevin Sullivan and Irwin Warren, for their helpful editorial comments. The author is also grateful for the review of the English law aspects of this article by the author’s London-based colleagues, Hannah Field-Lowes, Simon Lyell, and Christopher Marks.

1. Transdigm Inc. v. Alcoa Global Fasteners, Inc., C.A. No. 7135-VCP, 2013 WL 2326881, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 29, 2013).

2. See Carol L. Newman, New California Supreme Court Decision May Undermine Enforceability of Contracts, VALLEY LAW. (San Fernando Valley Bar Ass’n, Tarzana, Cal.), Mar. 2013, at 18, 20, available at http://goo.gl/5b5OLs; see also Eurofins Panlabs, Inc. v. Ricerca Biosciences, LLC, C.A. No. 8431-VCN, 2014 WL 2457515, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2014) (“A combination of buyer’s remorse and ‘wishing makes it so’ may persuade a frustrated and disappointed buyer that only the seller’s misrepresentation could have placed the buyer in its unhappy predicament.”).

3. See infra Part III.

4. See Glenn D. West & W. Benton Lewis, Jr., Contractually Avoiding Extra-Contractual Liability— Can Your Contractual Deal Ever Really Be theEntire” Deal?, 64 BUS. LAW. 999 (2009).

5. See id.

6. See, e.g., Daniel Avery & Nicholas Perricone, Trends in M&A Provisions: Indemnification as an Exclusive Remedy, 16 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS L. REP. (BNA) 1349 (Sept. 19, 2013), available at http://goo.gl/PGFZ6U; Wilson Chu & Jessica Pearlman, Disclaimers of Reliance in Private M&A Deals Chart, PRAC. L. CO., http://us.practicallaw.com/2-562-5859 (last updated July 7, 2014); Roxanne L. Houtman & Catherine A. Schmierer, Walking the Tightrope: Limiting Fraud Claims Based on Extra-Contractual Statements and Omissions, BUS. L. TODAY (Aug. 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2013/08.html; George Bundy Smith & Thomas J. Hall, Exceptions to the Enforceability of Contractual Disclaimers of Reliance, N.Y. L.J. (June 18, 2010), http://goo.gl/1A1LWh;Linda R. Stahl, Beware the Boilerplate in Merger Clauses, LAW360 (June 28, 2013, 10:09 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/453829/beware-the-boilerplate-in-merger-clauses; Andrew M. Zeitlin & Alison P. Baker, At Liberty to Lie? The Viability of Fraud Claims After Disclaiming Reliance, 20 BUS. TORTS J., Apr. 2013, at 2, available at http://goo.gl/TURsBD; see also Robert K. Wise, Andrew J. Szygenda & Thomas F. Lillard, Of Lies and Disclaimers—Contracting Around Fraud Under Texas Law, 41 ST. MARYS L.J. 119 (2009) (containing a thorough examination of Texas law on this subject).

7. See, e.g., TEK Stainless Piping Prods., Inc. v. Smith, C.A. No. N13C-03-0175 MMJ CCLD, 2013 WL 5755468, at *3, *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2013) (permitting a claim for fraud and finding that language stating “[e]xcept as explicitly set forth herein, no representations, warranties or promises of any kind have been made by Buyer or any third party to induce Seller or Owner to execute this [A]greement” was not an anti-reliance clause that would bar a fraud claim because it “lack[ed] the specific anti-reliance language required” and was “not a clear and unambiguous agreement that the parties are not relying upon any representation or statement of fact not contained within the” agreement); All-trista Plastics, LLC v. Rockline Indus., Inc., C.A. No. N12C-09-094 JTV, 2013 WL 5210255, at *6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 4, 2013) (permitting a claim for fraud when a supply agreement’s standard “integration clause contain[ed] no explicit anti-reliance language”); Transdigm Inc. v. Alcoa Global Fasteners, Inc., C.A. No. 7135-VCP, 2013 WL 2326881, at *9 (Del. Ch. May 29, 2013) (permitting a fraud claim where the buyer only disclaimed reliance on extra-contractual representations that had been made, not reliance on extra-contractual omissions); Anvil Holding Corp. v. Iron Acquisition Co., C.A. Nos. 7975-VCP, N12C-11-053-DFP [CCLD], 2013 WL 229655, at *9 (Del. Ch. May 17, 2013) (permitting a fraud claim when the agreement “do[es] not clearly state that the parties disclaim reliance upon extra-contractual statements”); Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 341 S.W.3d 323, 336 (Tex. 2011) (finding that without a clear and unequivocal intent to disclaim reliance or waive claims for fraudulent inducement by having contract language that does not include the words “rely” or “reliance,” a standard merger clause does not preclude claims for fraudulent inducement); see also Practice Note, Disclaimers of Reliance in M&A Deals: Judicial Guidance and Market Practice, PRAC. L. CO. (Oct. 25, 2013), http://us.practicallaw.com/3-548-4147 (discussing many of these cases).

8. See West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1037–38 (providing a model non-reliance provision that specifically disclaims reliance by the buyer on any extra-contractual representations, disclaims any representations as to the “accuracy or completeness” of any information provided to the buyer by the seller, and disclaims any obligation of the seller to make any disclosures of fact not required to be disclosed pursuant to the specific representations and warranties set forth in the agreement).

9. Id. at 1033. This warning was repeated by other practitioners in 2010, in even more alarming language: “The fraud exception to the ‘sole remedy’ provision . . . can result in a host of unintended (and potentially catastrophic) consequences.” Christopher D. Kratovil & D. Joseph Meister, Weighing the Fraud Exception in Indemnification Provisions, HEADNOTES (Dallas Bar Ass’n, Dallas, Tex.), Feb. 2010, at 3, available at http://www2.dallasbar.org/documents/HN0210_FINAL.pdf.

10. West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1033.

11. “Ignored” is perhaps unfair. Deal dynamics can definitely require concessions on issues such as these that deal lawyers would prefer not to make. See infra note 112. And the conclusion as to how extensive is the use of generalized fraud carve-outs is based on surveys that exclude a significant number of private transactions that are not publicly available for review. See Lisa J. Hedrick, Finding the Market in Private-Company M&A, LAW360 (Mar. 3, 2014, 2:38 PM), http://www.law360.com/mergersacquisitions/articles/513619.

12. Practice Note, Disclaimers of Reliance in M&A Deals: Judicial Guidance and Market Practice, PRAC. L. CO. (Oct. 25, 2013), http://us.practicallaw.com/3-548-4147.

13. SUBCOMM. ON MKT. TRENDS OF THE BUS. LAW SECTION MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS COMM., 2013 PRIVATE TARGET MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS DEAL POINTS STUDY 104 (2013) (on file with The Business Lawyer).

14. See, e.g., Howard T. Spilko, Key Negotiating Points in Private Acquisition Agreements Comparison Chart, PRAC. L. CO., http://us.practicallaw.com/5-422-5017 (last updated July 7, 2014) (“[I]t is difficult for a seller to argue that fraud must be subject to any indemnification limitations.”); Avery & Perricone, supra note 6, at 3 (noting that “fraud was consistently a very common carve-out” from an exclusive remedy provision based on the authors’ review of several ABA studies).

15. Practice Note, What’s Market: Indemnification Provisions in Acquisition Agreements, PRAC. L. CO. (June 30, 2014), http://us.practicallaw.com/3-504-8533 (“Exclusive remedy provisions generally exclude claims based on fraud, criminal activity or willful misconduct and claims for equitable relief (such as specific performance).”). Of course, it must be again noted that the determination of market here is based solely upon publicly available sources, which necessarily exclude many private transactions. See supra note 11.

16. Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 7689 (HB), 2005 WL 832050, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2005); see also Eurofins Panlabs, Inc. v. Ricerca Biosciences, LLC, C.A. No. 8431-VCN, 2014 WL 2457515, at *4 n.33 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2014) (“[T]he fraud exception appears to liberate the party asserting fraud from the entirety of the [agreement’s] indemnification provisions.”).

17. ABRY Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1062 (Del. Ch. 2006); West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1023, 1034–35.

18. Anvil Holding Corp. v. Iron Acquisition Co., C.A. Nos. 7975-VCP, N12C-11-053-DFP [CCLD], 2013 WL 2249655, at *7 n.29 (Del. Ch. May 17, 2013).

19. ENI Holdings, LLC v. KBR Group Holdings, LLC, C.A. No. 8075-VCG, 2013 WL 6186326 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2013) (inapplicability of the contractual survival periods to misrepresentation claims premised on fraud, even though the claims were based upon contractual representations rather than extra-contractual representations); Wyle, Inc. v. ITT Corp., No. 653465/2011, 2013 WL 5754086 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 21, 2013) (inapplicability of contractual notice requirements to misrepresentation claims premised on fraud, even though the claims were based upon contractual representations rather than extra-contractual representations).

20. Kinard v. Sims, 53 S.W.2d 803, 805 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).

21. See James H. Wallenstein, Negotiating Non-Recourse Carve-Outs in Light of Recent Court Decisions, 35TH ANNUAL ADVANCED REAL ESTATE LAW COURSE (Dallas Bar Ass’n, Dallas, Tex.), Mar. 11, 2013, at 20 (on file with The Business Lawyer) (“The problem with the terms ‘fraud’ and ‘intentional misrepresentation’ is that they are not, as some may assume, limited to an evil act of gargantuan pro-portions . . . .”).

22. West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1017, 1023, 1034–35.

23. MERRIAM-WEBSTERS COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 498 (11th ed. 2008).

24. See, e.g., V. John Ella, Common Law Fraud Claims: A Critical Tool for Litigators, BENCH & B. MINN., Sept. 2006, at 18, 18 n.5, available at http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2006/sept06/fraud.htm. (“To add to the confusion, some courts use the term ‘fraud’ to denote a general category of misrepresentation claims.” (citing Williams v. Tweed, 520 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (“Three types of misrepresentations fall under [the] broad category of fraud: reckless misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and deceit.”))).

25. A phrase repeatedly used by this author in a series of presentations made with Byron Egan and Patricia Vella.

26. See, e.g., McClellan v. Cantrell, 217 F.3d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Fraud is a generic term. . . . No definite and invariable rule can be laid down as a general proposition defining fraud . . . .”); Comment, Deceit and Negligent Misrepresentation in Maryland, 35 MD. L. REV. 651, 658 n.45 (1976) (“The common law not only gives no definition of fraud, but perhaps wisely asserts as a principle that there shall be no definition of it . . . .” (quoting McAleer v. Horlsey, 35 Md. 439, 452 (1872))); Stonemets v. Head, 154 S.W. 108, 114 (Mo. 1913) (“[D]efinitions of fraud are of set purpose left general and flexible, and thereto courts match their astuteness against the versatile inventions of frauddoers.”); see generally L.A. SHERIDAN, FRAUD IN EQUITY: A STUDY IN ENGLISH AND IRISH LAW (Sir Isaac Pittman & Sons Ltd. 1957) (asserting that fraud has never been defined by the courts); Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 520–40 (2011) (discussing the varied mental states that can constitute fraud, and concluding that “[a] complete understanding of fraud would require a book-length treatment”).

27. Reddaway v. Banham, [1896] A.C. 199 (H.L.) 221 (Eng.).

28. Stonemets, 154 S.W. at 114, discussed in SHERIDAN, supra note 26, at 1.

29. Id.; see also Jeremy W. Dickens, Note, Equitable Subordination and Analogous Theories of Lender Liability: Toward a New Model ofControl,” 65 TEX. L. REV. 801, 815–16 (1987) (“A word of broad import, fraud implies a type of conduct capable of ‘kaleidoscopic variations’ and consequently not readily translated into definable categories.”).

30. Melanie F.F. Gibbs, How Kaleidoscopes Work, HOW STUFF WORKS (Jan. 19, 2012), http://science.howstuffworks.com/kaleidoscope.htm. The term “judicial kaleidoscope” is used in at least one reported decision. See Crosswhite v. United States, 369 F.2d 989, 992 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (“[A]ll of the circumstances must be blended together to form a judicial kaleidoscope upon which a decision may be patterned.”).

31. This section of necessity may be re-plowing a little old ground from the 2009 The Business Lawyer article, but where that is necessary this author is hopeful that the furrows are deeper and straighter. Moreover, this particular area of the law “is a complex object of study, and light dawns only gradually over the whole.” Gregory Klass, Meaning, Purpose, and Cause in the Law of Deception, 100 GEO. L.J. 449, 452 (2012).

32. See SHERIDAN, supra note 26, at 5; Ella, supra note 24, at 18 (“[F]raud has ancient roots as the independent tort of deceit . . . .”); Charles E. Fowler, Jr., The Economic Loss Rule and Its Application to the Tort of Negligent Misrepresentation in Texas, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 893, 918 (2012) (“The modern actions for fraud and negligent misrepresentation ‘have a common ancestor in the old writ of deceit.’”). There really never was a common law tort called “fraud.” See Armitage v. Nurse, [1997] EWCA 1279, [1998] Ch. 241, 250 (Eng.) (“The common law knows no generalised tort of fraud.”).

33. West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1013.

34. See O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 130 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881).

35. (1889) 14 A.C. 337, 376.

36. See, e.g., Tex. Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga, Tenn., 329 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1964); Hindman v. First Nat’l Bank, 112 F. 931 (6th Cir. 1902); Watson v. Jones, 25 So. 678 (Fla. 1899); Donnelly v. Balt. Trust & Guar. Co., 61 A. 301 (Md. 1905); Nash v. Minn. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 40 N.E. 1039 (Mass. 1895); Ray Cnty. Sav. Bank v. Hutton, 123 S.W. 47 (Mo. 1909); Shackett v. Bickford, 65 A. 252 (N.H. 1906); Kountze v. Kennedy, 41 N.E. 414 (N.Y. 1895); Tarault v. Seip, 74 S.E. 3 (N.C. 1912); Tartera v. Palumbo, 453 S.W.2d 780 (Tenn. 1970); Shwab v. Walters, 251 S.W. 42 (Tenn. 1923). However, some U.S. courts diluted Derry’s scienter requirement or simply deferred to prior existing American law with lesser scienter requirements. See infra note 41.

37. Derry, 14 A.C. at 374.

38. Id.

39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1977).

40. Id. § 526 cmt. e.

41. JAY M. FEINMAN, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES 63 (2000) (“Derry v. Peek was not accepted as wholeheartedly in the United States as it was in the Commonwealth, however; some American courts rejected it outright, while others significantly watered down the requirement of intent to allow actions in which there was little more than negligence.”); see also Robert W. Miller, Scienter in Deceit and Estoppel, 6 IND. L.J. 152, 158 (1930); Everett B. Morris, Liability for Innocent Misrepresentation, 64 U.S. L. REV. 121, 126 (1930); see generally Fowler V. Harper & Mary Coate McNeely, A Synthesis of the Law of Misrepresentation, 22 MINN. L. REV. 939 (1938).

42. See West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1007, 1011–12; see also Francis H. Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty, 42 HARV. L. REV. 733, 734–35 (1929); Miller, supra note 41, at 156–58; Glenn D. West & Kim M. Shah, Debunking the Myth of the Sandbagging Buyer: When Sellers Ask Buyers to Agree to Anti-Sandbagging Clauses, Who Is Sandbagging Whom?, M&A LAW. (Thompson/ West, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 2007, at 3.

43. See Bohlen, supra note 42, at 733–34.

44. Id. at 744 (quoting Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt, 18 N.E. 168, 169 (Mass. 1888)).

45. Swanson v. Domning, 86 N.W.2d 716, 720 (Minn. 1957).

46. Id.

47. This author does not necessarily intend to reopen the debate about whether there is a difference between representations and warranties in the United States, having previously expressed a preference for replacing the entire concept of representations and warranties with the concept of “indemnifiable matters.” See West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1037 n.233. But a recent English case suggests that this debate could be reopened. See Sycamore Bidco Ltd. v. Breslin, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 3443, [203], [210]–[211] (Eng.) (holding that contractual warranties clearly designated as such and made part of the negotiated contract were “‘warranties’ only, and not ‘representations,’” and were therefore subject only to the limited contractual remedies set forth in the written agreement, not rescission); see also Neil Mirchandani & Rebecca Huntsman, Can an Express Warranty Also Be a Representation?, HOGAN LOVELLS (Jan. 2013), http://goo.gl/LTfbBj (noting that the court found that “[i]t would be ‘a strange and uncommercial state of affairs’ for a party to negotiate detailed limitations on liability in relation to Warranties, but for such limitations not to apply to the same statements, were they to be construed as representations”); Claude Serfilippi, A New York Lawyer in London: Representations and Warranties in Acquisition Agreements—What’s the Big Deal?, CORP. PRAC. NEWSWIRE (Chadbourne & Parke LLP, New York, N.Y.), Dec. 2012, at 1, 2, available at http://goo.gl/dOHzsK(“What most U.S. lawyers might not appreciate, however, is that the distinction in remedies that forms the basis for the solicitor’s objection to include both representations and warranties in an acquisition agreement, is also present under the laws of most U.S. states. Yet, U.S. lawyers routinely include both representations and warranties in an acquisition agreement.”). A nod to Tina Stark and apologies to Ken Adams, who was “gnawing [his] hind leg” the last time this author noted an English case making this distinction. See Ken Adams, Glenn West Reopens theRepresents and Warrants” Can of Worms, ADAMS ON CONTRACT DRAFTING (Dec. 30, 2009), http://www.adamsdrafting.com/glenn-west-reopens-can-of-worms/. See generally West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1008 n.48 (noting the dispute as to the difference, vel non, between representations and warranties in the United States).

48. HOLMES, supra note 34, at 134–35.

49. Nielsen v. Adams, 388 N.W.2d 840, 846 (Neb. 1986); see also Page Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to Deceive, 5 UCLA L. REV. 583, 584 (1958). In apparent recognition of this fact, some practitioners add language to the fraud carve-out to make a “specific intent to deceive” a required element of the fraud being carved out. See, e.g., Stock Purchase Agreement, dated March 2, 2014, by and between CNO Financial Group, Inc. and Wilton Reassurance Company, PRAC. L. CO. § 7.7, at 61 (Mar. 2, 2014), http://us.practicallaw.com/9-559-8848 (“[N]othing contained in this Article VII (Indemnification) or in Article VIII (Taxes) shall alter or limit the rights and remedies of the parties to pursue a common law claim for fraud with specific intent to deceive.”).

50. West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1034; see also ABRY Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1062 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“Permitting a party to sue for relief that it has contractually promised not to pursue creates the possibility that [sellers] will face erroneous liability (when judges or juries make mistakes) . . . .”).

51. Jewish Ctr. of Sussex Cnty. v. Whale, 432 A.2d 521, 524 (N.J. 1981) (citations omitted). And, because the remedy for equitable fraud is rescission not damages, the misrepresentation upon which a claim of equitable fraud is based need not even be “material.” See Emily Sherwin, Nonmaterial Misrepresentation: Damages, Rescission, and the Possibility of Efficient Fraud, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1017, 1018–19 (2003).

52. Edmund Finnane, Rescission (Wentworth Selborne Chambers, Sydney, N.S.W., Austl.), Mar. 13, 2008, at 6–7, available at http://www.13wentworthselbornechambers.com.au/cle/rescission.pdf;West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1011.

53. Enright v. Lubow, 493 A.2d 1288, 1296 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985).

54. See, e.g., Eurofins Panlabs, Inc. v. Ricerca Biosciences, LLC, C.A. No. 8431-VCN, 2014 WL 2457515 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2014); Osram Sylvania, Inc. v. Townsend Ventures, LLC, C.A. No. 8123-VCP, 2013 WL 6199554 (Del. Ch. Nov. 19, 2013); Grzybowski v. Tracy, No. 3888-VCG, 2013 WL 4053515 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2013); In re Wayport, Inc. Litig., 76 A.3d 296 (Del. Ch. 2013).

55. Eurofins, 2014 WL 2457515, at *18; Osram Sylvania, 2013 WL 6199554, at *15; Grzybowski, 2013 WL 4053515, at *6.

56. 891 A.2d 1032 (Del. Ch. 2006); see West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 999–1002 (discussing the ABRY decision).

57. ABRY, 891 A.2d at 1064; West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1002.

58. ABRY, 891 A.2d at 1063–64; West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1000–01.

59. West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1016 n.103 (noting that both “innocent or negligent misrepresentations” suffice under Delaware law to constitute “equitable fraud”).

60. Curtis Bridgeman & Karen Sandrick, Bullshit Promises, 76 TENN. L. REV. 379, 383 (2009) (“Promissory fraud is currently recognized in some form or other in all fifty states and the District of Co-lumbia.”). However, New York’s “recognition” of promissory fraud as a cause of action independent of the breach of contract itself is less than clear. See Matthew D. Ingber & Christopher J. Houpt, Navigating the Shadowy Borderland Between Contract and Tort, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 13, 2010, at 1, 3, available at http://goo.gl/s9bZe2 (noting that promissory fraud claims are governed by “a very long and very puzzling line of New York cases. On at least four occasions, New York’s Court of Appeals has expressly held that ‘a contractual promise made with the undisclosed intention not to perform it constitutes fraud.’ At the same time, however, there are numerous Appellate Division cases that state precisely the opposite rule. Notably, federal courts in New York usually follow the Appellate Division rule, not that of the Court of Appeals, and do not recognize promissory fraud.”); see also infra note 144. The differing approaches to these issues by the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals “has been explained by the fact that there are fact-specific exceptions to the general principle [that promissory fraud is not a recognized cause of action in New York] and that the New York Court of Appeals has recognized four factual circumstances where the exception applies.” Tobin v. Gluck, Nos. 07-CV-1605 (MKB), 11-CV-3985 (MKB), 2014 WL 1310347, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014).

61. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897), quoted in E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 445 n.18 (Del. 1996). It has been noted, however, that Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., acting in his capacity as a judge, rather than an academic, did in fact support the concept of promissory fraud. See IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTED INTENT 5 (Yale Univ. Press 2005).

62. E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (1970), quoted in E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 679 A.2d at 445 n.18.

63. See Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, New Rules for Promissory Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 957, 962 (2006).

64. See, e.g., Haase v. Glazner, 62 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. 2001) (“Fraudulent inducement, however, is a particular species of fraud that arises only in the context of a contract and requires the existence of a contract as part of its proof.”).

65. See generally Justin Sweet, Promissory Fraud and the Parol Evidence Rule, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 877 (1961) (examining the applicability of the parol evidence rule to a claim of promissory fraud); Eric A. Posner, Essay, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533 (1998) (examining the rules of contractual interpretation, particularly the parol evidence rule).

66. See Sweet, supra note 65, at 900.

67. West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1014.

68. AYRES & KLASS, supra note 61, at 55.

69. See, e.g., H. Enters. Int’l v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 833 F. Supp. 1405, 1422 (D. Minn. 1993) (allowing a plaintiff-borrower’s claim for promissory fraud to be submitted to the jury where evidence existed that the defendant-lender did not intend to perform based on its interpretation of an ambiguous loan provision), discussed in AYRES & KLASS, supra note 61, at 55.

70. Harrison v. Gardner, (1817) 56 Eng. Rep. 308, 2 Madd. 198 (Eng.), discussed in SHERIDAN, supra note 26, at 45.

71. A term borrowed from the title of the book by Ayres and Klass.

72. See, e.g., AYRES & KLASS supra note 61, at 53–54; Bridgeman & Sandrick, supra note 60, at 387– 94; see also Oren Bar-Gill & Kevin Davis, Empty Promises, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2010).

73. Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, (1751) 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 101, (1750) 2 Ves. Sen. 125, 157 (Eng.).

74. Id. at 100.

75. 273 S.W.3d 905 (Tex. App. 2008); see also Glenn D. West & Stacie L. Cargill, Corporations, 62 SMU L. REV. 1057, 1066–73 (2009) (criticizing the Dick’s case).

76. Dick’s, 273 S.W.3d at 908.

77. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(b) (West, Westlaw through Third Called Sess. of the 83d Legis.).

78. Dick’s, 273 S.W.3d at 911; West & Cargill, supra note 75, at 1066, 1069.

79. Dick’s, 273 S.W.3d at 911.

80. Id. at 911–12; West & Cargill, supra note 75, at 1067, 1069. There was also a claim that the tenant had breached a subleasing prohibition that obligated the tenant to pay a fee for any subleasing. See id. at 1069 n.72.

81. Dick’s, 273 S.W.3d at 909–10.

82. Id. at 909.

83. Id. at 912–13; West & Cargill, supra note 75, at 1070.

84. See generally Russell Korobkin, The Borat Problem in Negotiation: Fraud, Assent, and the Behavioral Law and Economics of Standard Form Contracts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 51 (2013); West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1034.

85. See West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1034.

86. See, e.g., Kratovil & Meister, supra note 9, at 3.

87. [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1363 (Eng.).

88. Id. at [29].

89. Id. at [15], [29]; see Jessica Schuehle-Lewis, Crispin Daly & Mark Griffiths, Cavell USA Inc. and Another v. Seaton Insurance Company and Another: Interpretation of the TermFraud” Within an Agreement by the Court of Appeal, 7 INTL CORP. RESCUE 419 (2010), available at http://www.chasecambria.com/site/journal/icr.php?vol=8&issue=6.

90. 984 A.2d 126 (Del. Ch. 2009).

91. Id. at 141.

92. C.A. Nos. 7975-VCP, N12C-11-053-DFP [CCLD], 2013 WL 2249655 (Del. Ch. May 17, 2013).

93. Id. at *7 n.29.

94. Id. Notwithstanding the broad language in the provision, the court declined to consider whether it precluded the buyer’s fraud claim because the defendant-seller failed to plead the applicability of the disclaimer of reliance clause during briefing on the motion to dismiss. Id. at *7. Hence the court deemed the argument waived for the pending motion to dismiss and simply noted the argument in a footnote. Id. at *7 n.29.

95. Id. at *7 n.29. This author believes that a generalized fraud carve-out from an exclusive remedy provision should not, in fact, lessen the value and effect of a properly drafted disclaimer of reliance provision. If the parties have permitted fraud claims notwithstanding the exclusive remedy provision, the disclaimer of reliance should still have its intended effect of negating the element of reliance with respect to those representations as to which reliance was disclaimed. But the Anvil dictum raises some concern.

96. C.A. No. 8075-VCG, 2013 WL 6186326 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2013).

97. Id. at *17; see also Wyle, Inc. v. ITT Corp., No. 653465/2011, 2013 WL 5754086, at *5, *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 21, 2013) (permitting a buyer to assert fraud claims based on the express contractual representations and warranties even though those same claims were not sustainable under the contract because the time period for asserting such claims had expired).

98. ABRY Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1064 (Del. Ch. 2006).

99. Id.

100. Leo E. Strine, Jr. is now the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court.

101. ABRY, 891 A.2d at 1063–64; West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1002.

102. ABRY, 891 A.2d at 1064; West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1001–02.

103. ABRY, 891 A.2d at 1063; West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1001–02; see also DDJ Mgmt., LLC v. Rhone Grp. L.L.C., 931 N.E.2d 87 (N.Y. 2010); Glenn D. West & Natalie A. Smeltzer, Protecting the Integrity of the Entity-Specific Contract: TheNo Recourse Against Others” Clause—Missing or Ineffective Boilerplate?, 67 BUS. LAW. 39, 53–54 (2011) (discussing DDJ).

104. ABRY, 891 A.2d at 1063; West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1001–02. In the English case of HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, [2003] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 All E.R. 349 (appeal taken from Eng.), Lord Bingham suggested that the same distinction may apply in England. According to Lord Bingham, while one could not disclaim liability for one’s own fraud, one could disclaim liability for the fraud of one’s agents as long as such disclaimer was done in the clearest of language in the contract. Id. at [16]; see also Kevin Davis, Licensing Lies: Merger Clauses, the Parol Evidence Rule and Pre-Contractual Misrepresentations, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 485, 508 (1999) (“From a moral perspective it is critical to distinguish between the primary responsibility of an agent who has made a false or negligent misrepresentation and the vicarious responsibility of the en-terprise on whose behalf he acted.”); West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1022 n.149 (noting the distinction in the treatment of contract clauses disclaiming liability for one’s own fraud and those clauses that disclaim liability for an agent’s fraud).

105. E.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Nyland (CF8) Ltd., 878 F.2d 620, 624 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that it is an “established rule that a principal is liable to third parties for the acts of an agent operating within the scope of his real or apparent authority”); Johnson v. Schultz, 691 S.E.2d 701, 704 (N.C. 2010) (finding a principal liable for damages “resulting from the fraud of his agent committed during the existence of the agency and within the scope of the agent’s actual or apparent authority from the principal”); see, e.g., Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Jasam Realty Corp., 540 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding it is a “well-established principle that an agent’s frauds or misrepresentations are imputed to the principal if made within the scope of the agent’s authority”); see also Kolbe & Kolbe Millwork Co. v. Manson Ins. Agency, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 2d 1035 (W.D. Wis. 2013); see generally Steven N. Bulloch, Fraud Liability Under Agency Principles: A New Approach, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301 (1986); Paula J. Dalley, A Theory of Agency Law, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 495 (2011); Deborah A. DeMott, When Is a Principal Charged with an Agent’s Knowledge?, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INTL L. 291 (2003); Note, Liability of Principal for the Unauthorized Fraud of His Agent, 3 NEWARK L. REV. 75 (1938); James C. Porter, Liability of Principal for Fraud of Agent Committed for the Agent’s Benefit, 8 WASH. U. L. REV. 180 (1923).

106. West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1017; Glenn D. West, Protecting the Deal Professional from Personal Liability for Contract-Related Claims, PRIVATE EQUITY ALERT (Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 2006, at 5–7, available at http://goo.gl/nQzQGS; see, e.g., Miller v. Keyser, 90 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex. 2002) (noting the “longstanding rule that a corporate agent is personally liable for his own fraudulent or tortious acts”); see also Jonathan Bellamy, Commercial Fraud: Civil Liability (39 Essex Street, London, Eng., U.K.), July 2008, at 7, available at http://goo.gl/HQbqKS (“No one can escape liability for his fraud by saying ‘I wish to make it clear that I am committing this fraud on behalf of someone else and I am not to be personally liable.’” (quoting Standard Chartered Bank v. Pak. Nat’l Shipping Corp., [2002] UKHL 43, [22], [2003] 1 A.C. 959 (on appeal from Eng.))).

107. See West & Smeltzer, supra note 103, at 41–44 (discussing the history of limited liability entities).

108. See Yeary v. State, 711 S.E.2d 694, 697 (Ga. 2011); In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co. FSB, 235 S.W.3d 185, 189 (Tex. 2007); see also Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir. 1962) (“[W]hile it was perhaps long in coming, it is now almost ancient law that despite these conceptual, logical difficulties, a corporation acting through human agents has the legal capacity to do wrong as well as right.”).

109. See Diederich v. Wis. Wood Prods., Inc., 19 N.W.2d 268, 270–71 (Wis. 1945).

110. See Annotation, Liability of Corporation for Fraud of Officer for His Own Benefit but Within His Apparent Authority, 45 A.L.R. 615 (1926); Porter, supra note 105, at 188–89.

111. In the case of the management of a company being sold by selling shareholders, it is important to note that the management of the company being sold are agents of that company, not of the selling stockholders. But avoiding these arguments being made is always better if possible.

112. See Glenn D. West & Sara G. Duran, Reassessing the “Consequences” of Consequential Damage Waivers in Acquisition Agreements, 63 BUS. LAW. 777, 780 n.10, 805, 807 (2008). This is not necessarily because deal lawyers do not understand that they are doing this; many times deal dynamics simply do not permit the correction of these ambiguities. See supra note 11. But there are other less appealing theories explaining the “herd” mentality of many within the transactional bar, as well as the resulting tendency of many transactional lawyers to become document processors rather than contract draftspersons. See MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 39–40, 93–96, 149–50 (2013).

113. See infra notes 123–25 and accompanying text.

114. 1977, c. 50, § 8 (U.K.).

115. See Abbie Goldstone, Effective Exclusion Clauses: Ensuring They Work—Excluding and Limiting Liability, MONDAQ (Sept. 14, 2009), http://goo.gl/MdLjBk.

116. [1996] 2 All E.R. 575 (Ch.) (Eng.).

117. Id. at 598.

118. Id.

119. Id.

120. Id.

121. See Practice Note, Contracts: Entire Agreement Clauses, PRAC. L. CO., http://goo.gl/AYbOE3(last updated July 7, 2014); Goldstone, supra note 115; Entire Agreement Clauses: Ensure Careful Drafting, LEWIS SILKIN (May 6, 2011), http://goo.gl/HZjZ5r; JOHN CARTWRIGHT, MISREPRESENTATION, MISTAKE AND NON-DISCLOSURE 491–92 (3d ed. 2012).

122. See HIH Cas. & Gen. Ins. Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, [2003] UKHL 6, [16] (appeal taken from Eng.); Foodco UK LLP v. Henry Boots Devs. Ltd., [2010] EWHC (Ch) 358, [166]–[167] (Eng.); Matheson, Pre-contract Misrepresentations: AreEntire Agreement” Clauses Effective? LEXOLOGY (Dec. 8, 2010), http://goo.gl/Ezfdcb.

123. See, e.g., Practice Note, Contracts: Entire Agreement Clauses, PRAC. L. CO., http://goo.gl/oWJrz7(last updated July 7, 2014) (“However, by the time HIH Casualty was heard, the habit of inserting an express carve-out for fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation had taken hold and entire agreement clauses now normally contain one. We suggest the clause is omitted.”).

124. See, e.g., Christopher Luck, Practice Note, Asset Purchase Agreement: Commentary, PRAC. L. CO., http://goo.gl/guKm9T (last updated July 7, 2014) (“Nonetheless, it remains prudent for an entire agreement clause . . . to be drafted on the basis that liability for fraud is not excluded.”).

125. See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 121, at 493 (discussing the use of fraud carve-outs in England and noting that “[t]he precise scope of such a clause depends on the language used, but if it refers generally to ‘fraud’ it is unlikely to leave intact only claims in the tort of deceit, but may well also allow other claims where fraud has been established, such as rescission of the contract on the basis of a fraudulent misrepresentation, or claims in equity for a party’s dishonest abuse of his fiduciary position”).

126. But see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West, Westlaw current with urgency legislation through Ch. 25, also including Chs. 27, 39, 41, and 47 of 2014 Reg. Sess., Res. Ch. 1 of 2013–2014 2d Exec. Sess., and all propositions on the 6/3/2014 ballot).

127. West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1024–25; Chu & Pearlman, supra note 6.

128. See Gregory V. Gooding, Yes, Virginia, You Really Can Waive Fraud Claims, PRIVATE EQUITY REP. (Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York, N.Y.), Spring 2012, at 17, available at http://goo.gl/7AGXGB.

129. See West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1023–28. But this is not true in all states. See id. at 1024– 25; Chu & Pearlman, supra note 6.

130. Avery & Perricone, supra note 6, at 2.

131. Id.

132. Id. at 2.

133. Id.

134. Id.

135. Id. at 3.

136. Id. at 4.

137. Id. at 3.

138. Sycamore Bidco Ltd. v. Breslin, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 3443, [203], [209]–[211] (Eng.).

139. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.

140. Serfilippi, supra note 47, at 1; see supra note 47 for a discussion of the need to potentially reopen the debate as to whether U.S. lawyers should reconsider whether there is in fact a difference in the United States between only “warranting” and “representing and warranting” certain information regarding a business being purchased by a buyer. Without a representation having been made at all, a common law fraud claim would appear to lack an essential element of the cause of action. But recognizing the difficulties of changing the existing market practice of including both representations and warranties in U.S. acquisition agreements, the 2009 The Business Lawyer article attacked this issue by suggesting the inclusion of a provision to make clear that the representations and warranties are not actually intended to assert truth, but only to provide risk allocation. See West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1037; see also Ken Adams, My Exchange with Glenn West on UsingStates” Instead ofRepresents and Warrants,” ADAMS ON CONTRACT DRAFTING (June 6, 2012), http://www.adamsdrafting.com/my-exchange-with-glenn-west-on-using-states-instead-of-r-and-w/.

141. Serfilippi, supra note 47.

142. Id. at 3; see also Jonathan B. Stone, Differences Between English and US M&A Risk Allocation, LAW360 (Mar. 6, 2014, 3:38 PM), http://goo.gl/1B5Xs8 (“Most sellers under English law share purchase agreements will intentionally refrain from using the term ‘representation’ to limit the buyer’s ability to bring tortious, rather than contractual, claims, in particular, to rescind the contract. New York law generally does not recognize such a distinction and, in any event, most New York law-governed sale and purchase agreements will expressly exclude tortious remedies.”).

143. See Serfilippi, supra note 47, at 3; Stone, supra note 142.

144. See Serfilippi, supra note 47, at 4. Still another practice note suggests that New York is more like England than Delaware when it comes to premising fraud claims on contractually bargained-for representations and warranties rather than extra-contractual representations. See Daniel E. Wolf & Matthew Solum, Delaware vs. New York Governing Law—Six of One, Half Dozen of Other?, KIRKLAND M&A UPDATE (Kirkland & Ellis LLP, New York, N.Y.), Dec. 17, 2013, at 2, available at http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/MAUpdate_121713.pdf (“There are cases in New York, however, that suggest that fraud claims can only be based on conduct and statements outside of the contract, and not on contractual representations. Therefore, even with the fraud exception, a buyer’s recovery may be limited by the contractual cap even when the contractual representation was knowingly false (i.e., fraudulent).”). This author believes that the New York cases on this subject are confusing at best and suggest a failure at times to distinguish between the various types of fraud claims. See West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1014 n.97. While it is true that there are New York cases that state that a fraud claim must be premised on misrepresentations that are “collateral or extraneous to the contract,” Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Recovery Credit Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 13, 20 (2d Cir. 1996), this requirement has been interpreted by some cases to simply mean that New York does not recognize a claim based on mere promissory fraud. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 500 F.3d 171, 184 (2d Cir. 2007) (“New York distinguishes between a promissory statement of what will be done in the future that gives rise only to a breach of contract cause of action and a misrepresentation of a present fact that gives rise to a separate cause of action for fraudulent inducement. . . . That the alleged misrepresentations would represent, if proven, a breach of the contractual warranties as well does not alter the result. A plaintiff may elect to sue in fraud on the basis of misrepresentations that breach express warranties. Such cause of action enjoys a longstanding pedigree in New York.”); Koch Indus., Inc. v. Aktiengesellschaft, 727 F. Supp. 2d 199, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[U]nder New York law, alleged misrepresentations are collateral or extraneous to the contract if they ‘involve misstatements and omissions of present facts,’ rather than ‘contractual promises regarding prospective performance.’”). Still others suggest that you in fact cannot premise a fraud claim simply based on the warranties set forth in the contract unless you can allege that the warranties merely restate previous representations made outside the contract. See, e.g., MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 927 N.Y.S.2d 517, 531 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (“Nonetheless, to the extent that MBIA alleges that it relied on contractual representations and warranties in the Insurance Agreement and PSA, the fraud claim duplicates the breach of contract claims and must be dismissed. To sustain a claim for fraudulently inducing a party to contract, the plaintiff must allege a representation that is collateral to the contract, not simply a breach of a contractual warranty, and damages that are not recoverable in an action for breach of contract.”); Gotham Boxing, Inc. v. Finkel, No. 601479-2007, 2008 WL 104155, at *10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 8, 2008) (“To be sure, the distinction is a fine one. It seems to turn on whether the complaint alleges a particular statement, omission, or other conduct by the defendant, in addition to the text or statements that form the basis of the alleged contract. . . . [I]t does not seem to matter that the alleged fraudulent representation is virtually identical to the promise contained in the contract as long as it is made at a different time and place.”). But see First Bank of Ams. v. Motor Car Funding, Inc., 690 N.Y.S.2d 17, 21 (App. Div. 1999) (“A warranty is not a promise of performance, but a statement of present fact. Accordingly, a fraud claim can be based on a breach of contractual warranties notwithstanding the existence of a breach of contract claim.”). Re-conciling these cases is difficult and appears to constitute an area that would require an article all of its own. See Leo K. Barnes, Jr., Simultaneously Viable Causes of Action for Breach of Contract and Fraud, SUFFOLK LAW. (Suffolk Cnty. Bar Ass’n, Suffolk, N.Y.), Mar. 2009, at 8, 27, available at http://scba.org/suffolk_lawyer/tsl309.pdf (discussing many of these cases).

145. Avery & Perricone, supra note 6, at 3.

146. Purchase and Sale Agreement, dated November 22, 2013, among Cook Inlet Energy, LLC and Armstrong Cook Inlet, LLC, GMT Exploration Company, LLC, Dale Resources Alaska, LLC, Jonah Gas Company, LLC, and Nerd Gas Company LLC, PRAC. L. CO. (Nov. 22, 2013), http://us.practicallaw.com/8-550-8947.

147. Id. § 11.3, at 44.

148. Id. Still another approach is to mitigate the risk of fraud claims being based on any form of scienter less than actual dishonesty by excluding fraud based on any form of negligence. See, e.g., Membership Interest Purchase Agreement, dated May 1, 2014, by and among William C. Cocke, Jr., et al., as Sellers, J. Cody Bates as a Sable II Member, and Ferrellgas, L.P., as Purchaser, PRAC. L. CO. annex A, at 43 (May 1, 2014), http://us.practicallaw.com/8-567-5106 (“‘Fraud’ means actual fraud and does not include constructive fraud or negligent misrepresentation or omission.”); Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated May 27, 2014, by and among The Spectranetics Corporation, SAA Merger Sub, Inc., Angioscore Inc., and the Securityholders’ Representative, PRAC. L. CO. § 8.1(e)(ii), at 65 (May 27, 2014), http://us.practicallaw.com/4-570-1145 (“For purposes of this Article VIII, references to the term ‘fraud’ do not include negligent misrepresentation.”).

149. The term “willful” is somewhat ambiguous itself. See Johnson & Johnson v. Guidant Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d 336, 349–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Expressing frustration with “willful’s” ambiguous definition, distinguished jurist Judge Learned Hand stated: “It’s an awful word! It is one of the most troublesome words in a statute that I know. If I were to have the index purged, ‘wilful’ would lead all the rest in spite of its being at the end of the alphabet.” Id. at 349 n.9; see also Don Bivens, Comments on Proposed Civil Rule Amendments, REGULATIONS.GOV (Feb. 3, 2014), http://goo.gl/TGH3hC.Another approach is to define fraud as only including intentional and knowing misrepresentations by a person. See, e.g., Membership Interest Purchase Agreement, dated June 10, 2014, by and among Stamps.com Inc., Auctane LLC and the Members of Auctane LLC, PRAC. L. CO. §§ 1.1(nn), 7.2(g), at 5, 52 (June 10, 2014), http://us.practicallaw.com/4-572-5189.

150. Asset Purchase Agreement, dated January 23, 2014, by and among Florida Rock Industries, Inc., Florida Cement, Inc., Argos Cement LLC, Argos Ready Mix LLC, and, solely for purposes of Section 12.18, Vulcan Materials Company and Cementos Argos S.A., PRAC. L. CO. (Jan. 23, 2014), http://us.practicallaw.com/7-555-7066.

151. Id. § 8.6, at 55; see also Stock Purchase Agreement, dated April 5, 2014, by and among The Laclede Group, Inc., Energen Corp., and Alabama Gas Corp., PRAC. L. CO. §§ 9.06(a)(v), 9.07(a)(v), at 54, 56 (Apr. 5, 2014), http://us.practicallaw.com/1-565-5885 (providing a fraud carve-out “with respect to circumstances in which Seller is finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have willfully and knowingly committed fraud against Purchaser with specific intent to deceive and mislead Purchaser regarding the representations and warranties expressly set forth in Article II and Article III of this Agreement”); Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated May 9, 2014, by and among Akorn, Inc., Akorn Enters. II, Inc., VPI Holdings Corp. and Tailwind Mgmt. LP, PRAC. L. CO. § 9.13, at 74–75 (May 9, 2014), http://us.practicallaw.com/0-568-3228 (limiting the fraud carve-out to “intentional fraud with respect to any representation and warranty of the Company set forth in Article IV,” capping the liability of any shareholder for such intentional fraud to the actual proceeds received from the transaction by such shareholder, and specifically waiving all other forms of fraud “whether intentional, reckless, negligent, constructive or otherwise”).

152. Stock Purchase Agreement, dated December 10, 2013, by and between LBD Acquisition Company, LLC (“Buyer”) and Fifth & Pacific Companies, Inc. (“Seller”), regarding the purchase and sale of the capital stock of Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc., PRAC. L. CO. § 1.1(ll), at 5 (Dec. 10, 2013), http://us.practicallaw.com/4-552-0885; See Summary, Leonard Green & Partners, L.P. Acquisition of Stock of Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc., PRAC. L. CO. (Dec. 10, 2013), http://goo.gl/exJTss.

153. An example of an agreement limiting the fraud carve-out to the individuals actually committing the fraud rather than the seller parties generally can be found in Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated February 12, 2014, by and among Victory Electronic Cigarettes Corporation, VCIG LLC, FIN Electronic Cigarette Corporation, Inc., and Elliot B. Maisel, as Representative, PRAC. L. CO. § 7.1(d)(iv), at 31 (Feb. 12, 2014), http://us.practicallaw.com/1-558-8985 (“For purposes of clarity, the commission of actual fraud by a Shareholder shall not affect the application of the limitations set forth in this Article VII to any other Shareholder that has not also committed actual fraud with respect to the claim in question . . . .”); see also Stock Purchase Agreement, dated April 28, 2014, by and among Clarcor Inc., Clean Seller, LLC, Stanadyne Holdings, Inc. and Stanadyne Corp., PRAC. L. CO. § 8.06, at 51 (Apr. 28, 2014), http://us.practicallaw.com/4-567-1025 (fraud carve-out limited to “any claim of intentional fraud asserted against the Person who committed such fraud”); Amended and Restated Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated February 2, 2014, by and among Myriad Genetics, Inc., Myriad Crescendo, Inc., Crescendo Bioscience, Inc., and MDV IX, L.P., as Representative, PRAC. L. CO. § 10.2(b)(ii), at 92 (Feb. 2, 2014), http://us.practicallaw.com/5-557-1935 (fraud carve-out limited to “Claims against a Person for such Person’s own actual fraud with intent to deceive or intentional misrepresentation”). Obviously the issue regarding whose fraud is chargeable to the sellers is even more critical if the subject matter of the fraud is not limited to the representations and warranties set forth in the agreement but also includes extra-contractual representations. After all, the company’s officers included in the knowledge parties list may well end up working for the buyer. And it may be that the knowledge party list for the purpose of the contractual remedies may need to be different than the knowledge party list for whose knowledge counts for the purpose of a defined fraud finding chargeable to the seller.

154. The suggested fraud carve-out to the model exclusive remedy provision in the 2009 The Business Lawyer article, however, did make an effort to preserve indemnification as the sole remedy even in the event of a defined fraud, but with a cap equal to the purchase price. See West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1038. This is certainly preferable, as it maintains the contract as the source of all applicable remedies. See also Stock Purchase Agreement, dated February 6, 2014, by and among Illinois Tool Works Inc., ITW IPG Investments LLC, ITW Alpha S.A.R.L., ITW LLC & Co. KG, ITW Signode Holding GmbH, and Vault Bermuda Holding Co. Ltd., PRAC. L. CO. § 9.06, at 108 (Feb. 6, 2014), http://us.practicallaw.com/3-558-4665 (“After the Closing, other than as set forth in Section 2.06 or Section 11.09, the sole and exclusive remedy for any and all claims, Damages or other matters arising under, out of, or related to this Agreement or the transactions contemplated hereby, including in the case of fraud, shall be the rights of indemnification set forth in Section 6.05 and this Article IX only, and no Person will have any other entitlement, remedy or recourse, whether in contract, tort, strict liability, equitable remedy or otherwise, it being agreed that all of such other remedies, entitlements and recourse are expressly waived and released by the Parties to the fullest extent permitted by Law.” (emphasis added)). Another means of achieving this result is to make the defined fraud carve-out an exception to the indemnification caps, but not an exception to the exclusive remedy provision that declares contractual indemnification to be the sole and exclusive remedy for any claim (and specifically waives any right of rescission). See, e.g., Asset Sale Agreement, dated April 2, 2014, between StoneMor Operating LLC, et al., as Buyer, and S.E. Funeral Homes of Florida, LLC, et al., as Seller, PRAC. L. CO. §§ 8.3(b)(i)(B), 8.11, at 55, 61 (Apr. 2, 2014), http://us.practicallaw.com/2-565-8765.

155. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.

156. A buyer, of course, will view a deliberate and knowing failure to disclose information that is required to make the bargained-for representations and warranties in the agreement accurate at signing as fundamentally different than a breach occurring in any other circumstance. While the purchased business will be just as impacted by the non-disclosed information regardless of the state of mind of the seller, the buyer will argue that the risk allocation that resulted in the capped liability presupposes that the seller has not deliberately concealed information that was part of the bargained-for representation and warranty package, because that withheld information may have impacted the negotiation of the caps and deductibles in the first instance. Hence, a specific, rather than general, fraud carve-out should meet the justifiable expectations of both the seller and the buyer. And, it is worth mentioning that if a buyer is insisting upon any kind of fraud carve-out, the buyer should then agree to an anti-sandbagging provision in favor of the seller (limited to the same extent as the defined fraud carve-out in favor of the buyer) for the same reasons that the buyer is arguing for a fraud carve-out—i.e., the seller would not have agreed to the bargained-for representation and warranty package if it had known that the buyer knew information that the seller did not concerning certain of those representations and warranties. See West & Lewis, supra note 4, at 1032; West & Shah, supra note 42, at 3–4.

157. Holmes, supra note 61, at 469. The Holmesian “dragon” is a metaphor for the common law and the need to carefully examine and adapt its precepts to changing conditions, rather than blindly follow it for “no better reason . . . than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.” Id.; see Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1647–51 (1991).

158. See Ker Than, Top Ten Beasts and Dragons: How Reality Made Myth, LIVE SCI. (Mar. 1, 2011, 3:30 AM), http://www.livescience.com/11320-top-10-beasts-dragons-reality-myth.html. The use of the term “shadows” is a reference to Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave.” Plato, Allegory of the Cave, in THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 193 (Allan Bloom ed. & trans., Basic Books 1991) (c. 360 B.C.E.).

159. West & Duran, supra note 112, at 780 n.10 (citing Johnson & Johnson v. Guidant Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d 336, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)). See supra note 112 for possible explanations for this phenomenon.

160. Holmes, supra note 61, at 469. As Holmes noted, moreover, “to get [the dragon] out is only the first step. The next is either to kill him, or to tame him and make him a useful animal.” Id.

161. West & Duran, supra note 112, at 805.

162. Id. at 780.

163. Id. at 807.

 

When to Contract for Remedies

Contracting parties often include in their written agreement provisions on remedies for breach. Occasionally, these provisions simply restate what the law already provides. For example, it is not unusual for a security agreement to authorize the secured party to repossess and sell the collateral after default, rights that Article 9 expressly grants. While superfluity alone might not justify omitting or excising such a provision from a written agreement – after all, careful transactional lawyers seek comfort in the safety blanket of redundancy – there are reasons to avoid this practice. Expressly providing for remedies obviously available under the law lengthens the written agreement. More important, unless the agreement mentions every remedy that the law makes available, the clause might create a negative implication that the parties are not entitled to any of the unreferenced remedies. 

So, when should an agreement expressly provide for a remedy? When any one of the following six reasons applies. 

1. To Comply with the Law

Some transactions, particularly those involving a consumer, might require that a remedy be expressly stated to be available or for the transaction to be valid and unavoidable. If so, then obviously the agreement should expressly provide for the remedy. 

2. To Create or Expand a Remedy

Some statutory remedies are expressly made available only in limited situations, but the law allows parties to make those remedies available in other situations. U.C.C. § 9-601(a), for example, provides for certain basic remedies after default, but permits the parties to provide for additional remedies. As a result, a well-drafted security agreement will, depending on the type of collateral involved, cover the following: 

Disabling Non-equipment

U.C.C. § 9-609(a)(2) authorizes a secured party after default to disable equipment. The agreement should expand this authorization to cover non-equipment collateral, such as inventory, consumer goods, and software. Of course, the secured party should be aware that some state and federal laws might limit a secured party’s rights in this regard. For example, Connecticut requires 15-day’s advance notification of any electronic self-help, prohibits electronic self-help entirely if the secured party has reason to know it will result in grave harm to the public interest, and provides for nonwaivable consequential damages for its wrongful use. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42a-9-609(d)

Voting Collateral

Authorize the secured party to exercise the voting rights of the debtor with respect to collateralized stock, partnership interests, and LLC interests. Bear in mind, however, it remains unclear whether such a clause will in fact work, particularly with respect to LLC membership interests. Colorado law, for example, apparently requires a secured party to enforce the security agreement and become admitted as a member before the secured party may exercise voting rights associated with a membership interest pledged as collateral. In re Crossover Fin. I, LLC, 477 B.R. 196 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2012). Moreover, concerns about liability might impel a secured party to either omit such a clause from the security agreement or refrain from exercises the authority such a clause grants. 

Entering Premises 

Expressly authorize the secured party and its representatives to enter the debtor’s property after default to repossess collateral. U.C.C. § 9-609 grants a secured party the right to take possession of collateral after default, provided it acts without a breach of the peace. One factor relevant to whether a breach of the peace occurs is the existence and extent of a trespass. While a secured party probably has a license to enter the debtor’s driveway or carport even without express authorization, entering a garage or other structure is more problematic. If the security agreement authorizes the secured party to enter the debtor’s premises, it may help avoid any trespass claim. This authorization will not, by itself, be sufficient to prevent a breach of the peace and will be irrelevant if the debtor does not own or rent the premises where the collateral is located, but might nevertheless be helpful. 

Taking Non-collateral

Authorize the secured party, when repossessing the collateral, to repossess things in or attached to the collateral. For example, a consumer who has granted a security interest in a motor vehicle will typically keep in the vehicle items of personal property that are not and by law cannot be encumbered by the security interest. While a secured party might not need express authorization to temporarily take such property during a repossession, see Terra Partners v. Rabo Agrifinance, Inc., 2010 WL 3270225 (N.D. Tex. 2010), such authorization should help insulate the secured party from conversion and trespass claims with respect to such property. 

Retaining Surplus to Cover Unliquidated and Contingent Secured Obligations 

Indicate what the secured party may do with the proceeds of a collection or disposition if there are non-monetary or contingent obligations that remain outstanding. For example, the secured party should, after satisfying the non­-contingent monetary secured obligations, be permitted to hold onto additional proceeds until such time as the debtor’s non-monetary and contingent obligations are satisfied or discharged. While a secured party has nonwaivable duties to account for surplus proceeds of collateral and to remit them to either a junior lienor or the debtor, the security agreement would presumably be relevant to determining whether a surplus exists and should be able to specify – at least with respect to the debtor – how quickly the secured party must act in remitting any surplus. 

3. To Enhance Availability of a Discretionary Remedy

Some remedies, particularly equitable remedies, are within the court’s discretion. For example, the appointment of a receiver to manage collateral before final judgment is subject to a variety of factors, the most critical of which are whether the creditor is undersecured and whether the debtor is insolvent. To enhance the likelihood that a court will appoint a receiver, the mortgage or security agreement might provide for such an appointment upon the lender’s application therefor after the borrower’s default. Courts will not be bound by such a contractual provision, but the provision may help. It may also permit such an appointment to occur on an ex parte basis. 

Similarly, an award of specific performance is subject to court discretion and will not be ordered if, among other reasons, an award of damages would be adequate or the remedy would be unfair. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 357(a), 359(1), 364(1). Because courts regularly regard equitable relief as jurisdictional and beyond the competence of private contracting parties, they are unlikely to treat a clause expressly declaring damages to be inadequate or expressly authorizing specific performance as binding or even as relevant. This certainly appears to be the approach taken by federal courts. Nevertheless, a contractual clause declaring damages in certain instances to be inadequate – such as for breach of a covenant not to compete – might enhance the prospect that a court would conclude similarly. Moreover, in some states – Delaware, for example – courts regard a clause stipulating to the existence of irreparable harm in the event of breach as binding. See Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 2012 WL 2783101 (Del. 2012). A clause declaring goods to be sold as “unique” or indicating that the buyer will not be able to cover quickly enough to avoid irreparable injury might also be helpful because the U.C.C. authorizes specific performance when the goods are unique or in other proper circumstances. See U.C.C. § 2-716(1). 

Another set of remedies is available only following a material breach. Under modern contract law, the contracting parties’ main promises to each other are regarded as dependent – rather than independent – covenants. As a result, one condition to a party’s duty to perform is that there be no “uncured material failure” by the other party to perform. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237. In short, any breach gives rise to a claim for damages but only a material breach excuses the non-breaching party from the duty to perform. 

Unfortunately, it is not always clear what constitutes a material breach. As a result, when a dispute arises, a game of chicken may ensue. For example, a contractor renovating a home might, in violation of its agreement with the owners, leave them without running water for several days. The owners might respond by withholding the next installment payment. The contractor might then walk off the job. Who wins in the resulting lawsuit will depend on who was the first to materially breach. If the contractor’s initial breach was material, the owners were permitted to withhold payment. If not, the owners had a duty to pay. If their failure to pay was a material breach, then the contractor was justified in refusing to complete the work. If their failure to pay was not material, then the contractor’s refusal to finish was a further breach, and no doubt a material one. Needless to say, it is difficult to predict in advance how a court or jury will rule. 

To clarify the parties’ rights, the agreement might expressly provide under what circumstances a breach by one party will excuse the other. Such a clause need not – and probably should not – be exhaustive. That is, it should not purport to identify all the breaches that suspend the other party’s duty to perform, unless the drafter is confident that nothing else should so qualify. 

One caveat is in order. Some written agreements purport to do this by simply declaring a particular type of breach to be “material.” For example, one standard purchase agreement for the sale of grapes from a vineyard to a winery provides “[b]uyer’s failure to make payment within sixty (60) days of due dates constitutes material breach of this agreement.” There are at least two problems with this clause. First, outside Louisiana, the contract would be governed by U.C.C. Article 2, which does not use the phrase “material breach.” Thus, it is not clear what purpose such a declaration would serve in an agreement governed by that law. Second, payment by the buyer was the last act called for under the agreement; the seller would necessarily have shipped the grapes months before and have no duties remaining. As a result, the seller would have no performance to suspend if the buyer failed to pay, and the declaration of materiality would be meaningless. 

4. To Negate or Limit a Remedy

Contracting parties occasionally wish to make unavailable a remedy to which one or both of them would otherwise be entitled or to limit the extent or duration of a remedy that is to remain available. Common examples of this are disclaimers of consequential damages, liquidated damages clauses, limits on the time or grounds for rejecting tendered goods, clauses shortening the applicable limitations period, and terms conditioning a right to recovery on prompt notice of the claim. Secured lending on a nonrecourse basis can also be viewed as a negation of personal liability for any deficiency. Any intention to negate or limit a remedy must be stated in the parties’ agreement. 

Of course, parties must be very careful when negating remedies. If they limit one party to a single remedy, and the law makes that remedy unavailable, the party might find itself without any recourse for breach. 

5. To Set Standards

Some remedies are subject to vague standards that the parties cannot waive or disclaim but which they can help clarify. For example, Article 9 requires that every aspect of a disposition of collateral be commercially reasonable. U.C.C. § 9-610(b). The parties cannot by agreement alter this requirement, § 9-602(7), but they can set the standards for what is reasonable, as long as those standards are not themselves “manifestly” unreasonable. See §§ 1-302(b), 9-603(a). 

Accordingly, the security agreement should contain a clause on how the secured party may dispose of the collateral. Such a clause is particularly important when the parties anticipate no ready market for the collateral, such as closely-held stock. When dealing with such collateral, the agreement should, at a minimum, disclaim any obligation by the secured party to engage in a public offering of privately held securities. For collateral consisting of goods, particularly equipment, the security agreement should provide either that the secured party has no responsibility to clean, prepare, or repair the collateral before sale or limit any such duty to a specified dollar amount. Cf. § 9-610 cmt. 4. If there is a reasonable chance that the secured party will receive non­cash proceeds of a collateral disposition, the security agreement should provide standards on whether or when the secured party must apply noncash proceeds to the secured obligation. Cf. §§ 9-608(a)(4), 9-615(c). 

6. To Preserve a Remedy the Law Might Eliminate

A cautious lawyer might be concerned that the law will change to make unavailable a remedy for which the law currently provides. To such a lawyer, it is desirable to expressly provide for all remedies in every agreement. Yet consider all the assumptions underlying this rationale: (1) that the law will or might change so as to eliminate a remedy currently available, (2) the change will apply to contracts already entered into, and (3) parties will be permitted to contract around that change by agreement. This combination seems a remarkably unlikely and would probably be restricted to consumer transactions for which a legislature may wish to require that the remedy be expressly stated as a form of notice. In general, this is not a sufficient justification for expressly stating remedies that the law currently makes available.

 

Dealing with Unauthorized Online Dealers: Sales of “Genuine” Products

The growth of the Internet as an online marketplace has created not only many new opportunities for companies to sell their goods or services, but also poses many new challenges to companies seeking to protect their intellectual property rights. As many companies know far too well, online sellers (some authorized by the manufacturer; many more not authorized) now have low-cost, direct access to consumers through their own websites and through online market places such as alibaba.com, eBay, and amazon.com. This has led to a tsunami of online dealers infringing intellectual property rights. 

While many products sold by unauthorized online retailers are counterfeits, some sell products actually manufactured by and for the trademark owner. The sale by unauthorized dealers of “genuine” goods poses the greatest legal challenge to makers of well-known brands. It may or may not be a bigger business challenge, but counterfeits do not pose serious legal issues; “genuine” goods, on the other hand, are another matter. Further, the unauthorized sale of “genuine” goods is exploding on the Internet. Just look at a typical page on Amazon and hit the link to other offerings of “new” versions of the product on the Amazon Marketplace. 

Unauthorized dealers obtain the products they sell as “new” and “genuine” in a variety of ways. The dealers may purchase their goods from overseas markets where prices are lower than in the United States, then import them into the United States as “gray market” goods. They may buy the products cheaply in clearance sales or returns from authorized dealers in the United States. The goods may also have been transshipped by an authorized dealer to another for resale, in contravention of the distribution contract. The goods may simply have been stolen from the brand owner’s normal distribution channels. 

Such unauthorized dealers compete unfairly in a sense. They are essentially “free riders.” They have minimal overhead and do not invest significantly in customer service, showrooms, quality, or advertising. Nevertheless, unauthorized dealers reap the benefits of such efforts. They trade off the brand owner’s hard-earned reputation for quality and customer service. Not having the same overhead, they can undercut authorized dealers on price, driving prices down with their unfair advantage and making it difficult for authorized dealers (and ultimately the brand owner itself) to make a profit. Additionally, the product may differ in some way, such as lacking warranty protection. It is this differential in service and quality of promotion and quality inherent in a system of authorized dealerships which needs to be protected. 

Brand owners are not without legal recourse against unauthorized dealers, however. First, some simple, self-help measures need to be considered. 

Self-Help: Warranty Policy and the Unauthorized Dealer Page

As will be discussed in depth below, warranties are a key element to your armor against unauthorized dealers. Company warranties should expressly warn consumers that purchases from unauthorized dealers, even of otherwise “new” products from the company, void warranty protection. Aside from giving a benefit to customers who buy from preferred dealers, it provides an important trademark/copyright infringement weapon noted below. 

So, adopt a firm warranty policy. Next, publish it on the company website, listing authorized dealers for self-verification purposes. Examples are common with any company struggling with unauthorized dealers (see, e.g., www.monsterproducts.com/warranty/; www.klipsch.com/unauthorized; http://hoover.com/authorized-dealer/). Other steps to mark genuine products may be considered, such as covert or overt markers on the products for tracking them through the distribution chain. 

Self-Help: Take Downs of Unauthorized Dealer Offerings

eBay and similar online auction sites have takedown procedures which may be useful against unauthorized dealers. The key word here is “may.” Inspired by federal legislation called the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA), eBay has adopted an even broader means to take down postings offering infringing products beyond those infringing the owner’s copyright.           

Called the Verified Rights Owner (VeRO) program, eBay permits intellectual property owners to request the removal of listings it claims in good faith are infringing the owner’s patent, copyright, or trademark rights, through the filing of a simple form called a Notice of Claimed Infringement (see http://pages.ebay.com/help/tp/vero-rights-owner.html). Similar to procedures set up in the DMCA, the listing party is notified and has a limited time to file a counter notice to reinstate the listing. If it does so, the owner may have to file suit to enforce its rights in order to keep the listing off, but the listing party will have consented to jurisdiction in the federal court sitting in the Northern District of California. 

Outside eBay and websites with similar protections, all auction/sales online sites are subject to the DMCA, which provide similar protections for claims of copyright infringement only. 

While simple, the takedown procedures have a glaring weakness. Sophisticated, unscrupulous, unauthorized dealers simply repost the listing using a different name. Hence, the DMCA and VeRO programs are sometimes referred to as a “whack a mole” game, having little real effect.

Going to Court: Legal Weapons

If self-help measures are not adequate, using the courts may be necessary. Assuming you can identify the offender and it is subject to jurisdiction in the United States, the following approaches give you weapons to assert against unauthorized, online dealers.

Trademark Infringement

Trademark infringement is the principal weapon brand owners have in combating unauthorized dealers. Without more, however, there is nothing improper about selling genuine product by an unauthorized dealer, insofar as trademark or other law is concerned. The first sale doctrine in both trademark and copyright law bars the brand owner from controlling the downstream sales. But trademark infringement can still arise regardless of the first sale doctrine. 

The first sale doctrine provides that one who purchases a branded item generally has a right to resell that item in an unchanged state. The trademark rights of a brand owner are “exhausted” once the particular item has been sold in the market. But there is an exception to that which often applies in the context of unauthorized online dealers: the “material difference” exception.

The first sale doctrine does not protect alleged infringers who sell trademarked goods that are “materially different” from those sold by the trademark owner or its authorized dealers. A material difference from authorized goods creates confusion over the source of the product and results in loss of the trademark owner’s good will. In other words, materially different goods sold by an unauthorized seller are not considered “genuine,” because they are confusingly different. 

Courts define “material difference” broadly: it is virtually any difference that exists between the authorized goods and unauthorized goods that a consumer would likely consider relevant when purchasing the product. Even subtle differences apply. As one court put it, “it is by subtle differences that consumers are most easily confused.” 

Material differences may include differences in battery life between authorized and unauthorized batteries; differences in the variety, presentation, and composition of product; differences in the formulation, content, and blends of product; alterations to packages such as removal, grinding off, or cutting away reference numbers, SKUs, bar codes, and batch codes; differences in package shape and labels and lack of required warning labels. 

Of a non-physical nature, material differences include changes in operator manuals and service plans, and differences in available services for authorized versus unauthorized goods. Perhaps most commonly, differences in warranty protection coverage between authorized and unauthorized sales often lead to trademark infringement. 

In some jurisdictions, notably in Second Circuit law, a difference in quality control measures also constitutes trademark infringement of otherwise “genuine” goods under the owner’s mark.

Copyright Infringement 

Copyright infringement is the unauthorized copying of a work protected by a copyright registration. In the digital age, it is now simple for unauthorized dealers to blatantly copy images of products taken by the manufacturer or large blocks of text (product descriptions, specification, etc.) written by the manufacturer. Look for unauthorized copying by the dealer on their website or eBay/Amazon listing of images, block text, and logo use. Logos of the manufacturer used in a manner which falsely implies authorization may be copyright infringement and not fair use. 

Recently, the Supreme Court made a major pronouncement that mere unauthorized resale of a particular copyrighted item that is imported into the United States is not infringement. In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 1357 (2013), the Court held that the first sale doctrine applies to copies of a copyrighted work (like textbooks) which were lawfully made abroad, sold there, and then imported into the United States for resale as a “new” book. This second sale was held to be beyond the scope of copyright protection. This was a major victory for Costco, eBay, and Walmart, which regularly import gray market goods for resale in the United States. However, that does not bar copyright protection against unauthorized dealers in other respects. The unauthorized copying of images and text does not involve the question of selling the product itself; it instead involves using the copyrighted works on the product. 

Recent cases reflect that these principles play out with subtle standards of the quantity of proof required by the manufacturer to trigger copyright and trademark infringement or other liability, even when material differences may exist. See, e.g., L’Oreal USA, Inc. v. Trend Beauty, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 115795 (SD NY 2013) (pretextual vs. non-pretextual standards). Even a slight difference may suffice to establish infringement, the court noted. The effect of removing the seal vector and coding that would be visible to a consumer was open to factual interpretation, however, causing denial of summary judgment.

As is obvious, expertise is needed to appreciate the scope of unauthorized dealership law. Not all jurisdictions have the same standards. Further, as noted below, the issue reaches across a variety of bodies of law and can take place in a forum quite different from federal court.

Other Theories, Other Arenas for Combat 

Customs and ITC Proceedings. Combating unauthorized dealers is possible beyond simply DMCA takedowns and federal court actions. If the offender is overseas and exports products into the United States, options exist against U.S.-based distributors. Further, working with the Customs Service and bringing an action before the International Trade Commission (ITC) are also options. Samples of the valid trademark to compare against a trademark infringer can stop goods at the border, where the difference is readily discernible. However, Customs will generally have a hard time barring “genuine,” validly marked goods that originated from the trademark owner. As for the ITC, Section 337 of the Tariff Act declares “unlawful” the importation, sale for importation, or sale after importation of any article that infringes a valid patent or registered copyright or registered trademark. For the above restrictions to apply, an industry relating to the protected articles must exist within the United States or be in the process of being established. 

Unfair Competition, False Advertising, and Other Theories. Many unauthorized online dealers use false and/or misleading statements in their online advertisements. For example, some online dealers falsely represent that they are “authorized dealers” or that they are “authorized by leading manufacturers.” Many dealers also represent that the products they sell are covered by the manufacturers’ warranty, while the truth is that many warranties are void when products are sold by unauthorized dealers. These subject the dealer to liability under both the federal Lanham Act and various state “unfair competition” statutes. 

Additionally, under certain facts one may allege the common law tort of interference with prospective business advantage or inducement to breach contract. Also, state statutes (as in New York and California) may specifically deal with gray market goods, although those two statutes are markedly different in their purpose. 

Service providers, such as eBay, may be liable for contributory infringement with proof that the provider had sufficient notice of the infringing conduct by the direct infringer. Cases brought by Louis Vuitton and Tiffany point out the need for proving clear appreciation on the service provider’s part of the specific activity in question. Generalized notice is not sufficient. 

Yet another avenue of attack is to go against one’s own authorized dealers. They may be breaching the terms of their contract with the trademark owner, in selling new product out the back door to unauthorized dealers. This is somewhat cannibalistic, but it can effectively cut off an illicit channel and keep other dealers in line. 

Conclusion

The sale by unauthorized dealers of “genuine” goods poses the greatest legal challenge to makers of well-known brands. Manufacturers should implement self-help measures such as instituting an effective warranty policy, or covert tracking measures. Take-down measures through the DMCA and programs like eBay’s VeRO can remove a particular unauthorized sale listed online, at least in its present form. 

There is nothing per se illegal about an “unauthorized” sale of “genuine” goods. The first sale doctrine under both trademark and copyright law prohibits brand owners from controlling downstream sales in the first instance. However, such sales can constitute trademark or copyright infringement if material differences exist in the product. One of the more common avenues is to attack such sellers on the grounds that their “genuine” products are not covered by the manufacturer’s warranty, and thus are materially different from authorized goods. Additional remedies can be available under business tort theories such as interference with contractual relations. Further, outside the courts one can approach the Customs Service or seek administrative relief through the International Trade Commission if imported goods are involved.

Termination-on-Bankruptcy Provisions: Some Proposed Language

A fixture of many different kinds of business contracts is the termination-on-bankruptcy (or “ToB”) provision. It states that if the party in question experiences bankruptcy or any of a series of related circumstances, then depending on the contract, either the other party may terminate the contract or the contract will terminate automatically.

Such a provision is usually referred to as an “ipso facto clause,” ipso facto meaning “by the very nature of the situation.” The fewer obscure Latinisms in the practice of law, the better, hence our more straightforward label.

In the United States, bankruptcy law restricts enforceability of ToB provisions. Nevertheless, in certain circumstances they are enforceable; the purpose of this article is to propose model language for such circumstances, with the language following the guidelines in Kenneth A. Adams, A Manual of Style for Contract Drafting (3d ed. 2013). It also offers generic model language for contracts governed by a law other than the law of one of the U.S. states.

Context

As the name suggests, ToB provisions can provide for termination, but drafters also use them to specify that any of the stated circumstances will constitute an event of default having specified consequences that might or might not include termination.

Furthermore, ToB provisions occur in contracts either as a stand-alone provision or as part of a broader provision stating other circumstances that can lead to termination or an event of default.

As regards whether a ToB provision gives rise to a right to terminate or causes the contract to terminate automatically, that depends on whether the party having the benefit of the provision prefers to retain control or whether it is sufficiently concerned at the prospect of any of the specified events occurring that it wishes to have occurrence act as an automatic trigger.

Enforceability

Due to operation of three provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, ToB provisions conditioned on insolvency of the debtor or its financial condition, or commencement of a bankruptcy case of the debtor, are generally unenforceable in bankruptcy.

First, section 541(c) of the Bankruptcy Code strikes down ToB provisions that in effect enable the nondebtor party to forfeit property of the bankruptcy estate.

Second, section 363(l) of the Bankruptcy Code overrides ToB provisions that prevent the debtor from using, selling, or leasing its property.

And third, section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code states that a ToB provision in an executory contract – a contract with performance remaining due on both sides – is unenforceable in bankruptcy.

But section 365(e)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, in conjunction with section 365(c)(1), provides that a ToB provision is not invalid if the debtor or trustee is not permitted by applicable law to assume or assign the executory contract. So if by law an executory contract cannot be assumed by the debtor or trustee without the other party’s consent, then the nondebtor party can use the ToB provision to force rejection of the contract. See Kenneth A. Adams, The Bankruptcy Code’s Effect on a Drafter’s Ability to Restrict Assignment and Provide for Termination on Bankruptcy, Adams on Contract Drafting (Aug. 7, 2006).

This basis for enforcing a ToB provision is commonly referred to by bankruptcy lawyers as the “personal services” exception. The relevant caselaw is complex and beyond the scope of this article, but an example of a context where this exception would apply is when the promised performance by the debtor is so distinctive that it wouldn’t be reasonable to expect that another could render it. That might be the case if, for example, the debtor were a noted opera singer.

Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Code would render a ToB provision unenforceable only if a bankruptcy is actually filed. If a contract party is insolvent and no bankruptcy case is ever filed, it’s possible that the other party could use an appropriately worded ToB provision to terminate the contract. See Robert L. Eisenbach III, Are “Termination on Bankruptcy” Contract Clauses Enforceable?, In the (Red): The Business Bankruptcy Blog (Sept.16, 2007).

Finally, safe harbors in sections 555, 556, 559, 560, and 561 of the Bankruptcy Code permit enforcement of ToB provisions in specified securities and financial market transactions.

Given that in certain contexts ToB provisions are enforceable, it would be best that they be clear and concise. That’s the focus of the remainder of this article.

Proposed U.S. Language

The language proposed in this article doesn’t include language addressing any of the contexts discussed above. Instead, it considers only the circumstances that trigger the provision. Also, it refers only to the party in question – referred to for our purposes by the defined term “the Company” – instead of also encompassing subsidiaries or affiliates of that party.

Here’s our proposed language for use in contracts governed by the laws of one of the U.S. states. The four elements are linked by “and,” as the provision would be triggered by occurrence of one or more of the four circumstances.

  1. the Company commences a voluntary case under title 11 of the United States Code or the corresponding provisions of any successor laws;
  2. anyone commences an involuntary case against the Company under title 11 of the United States Code or the corresponding provisions of any successor laws and either (A) the case is not dismissed by midnight at the end of the 60th day after commencement or (B) the court before which the case is pending issues an order for relief or similar order approving the case;
  3. a court of competent jurisdiction appoints, or the Company makes an assignment of all or substantially all of its assets to, a custodian (as that term is defined in title 11 of the United States Code or the corresponding provisions of any successor laws) for the Company or all or substantially all of its assets; and
  4. the Company fails generally to pay its debts as they become due (unless those debts are subject to a good-faith dispute as to liability or amount) or acknowledges in writing that it is unable to do so. 

Drafting Points

Clause (1)

  • The bankruptcy clause in the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the right to make bankruptcy laws for the United States. It follows that title 11 of the United States Code – generally referred to as the Bankruptcy Code – is capable of preempting state law insofar as state law allocation of rights has a bankruptcy effect. For purposes of a ToB provision that applies to a company incorporated in a U.S. jurisdiction, it’s more economical to refer to title 11 instead of referring generically to the kind of proceeding involved.
  • The reference to “successor laws” simply provides for the possibility of title 11 being replaced by another statute.

Clause (2)

  • It makes sense that having someone commence an involuntary case against a company shouldn’t by itself trigger a ToB provision – that case could be groundless. But it wouldn’t be realistic to expect a party that has the benefit of a ToB provision to have to wait in every instance until the court issues an order approving the case – proceedings that drag on can harm business by creating uncertainty. So it’s reasonable to allow a party to invoke the provision if the case hasn’t been dismissed within some grace period. The proposed language uses a 60-day limit, but a different period could be used if circumstances warrant it.

Clause (3)

  • Title 11’s definition of “custodian” covers a number of circumstances that routinely are spelled out in ToB provisions. It also incorporates different terms that usually feature in the strings of nouns one routinely sees in ToB provisions – “receiver,” “trustee,” “assignee,” and “agent.” So invoking in a ToB provision the definition of “custodian” allows you to be more economical. The downside is that it requires the reader to consult something outside the contract and it results in omission of the familiar assignment-for-the-benefit-of-creditors language, but that problem passes with familiarity. For reference purposes, here’s the title 11 definition:

The term “custodian” means—

(A)      receiver or trustee of any of the property of the debtor, appointed in a case or proceeding not under this title;
(B)      assignee under a general assignment for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors; or
(C)      trustee, receiver, or agent under applicable law, or under a contract, that is appointed or authorized to take charge of property of the debtor for the purpose of enforcing a lien against such property, or for the purpose of general administration of such property for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors.

Clause (4)

  • How many bills have to go unpaid, and for how long, before you can say that a company has failed to pay its bills? It’s not clear – referring to a company’s failure to pay its debts is a vague standard, as you have to take into account the context. But an absolute standard wouldn’t work, so one has to live with a vague standard. By including the concept of “generally” not paying debts as they become due, and excluding debts subject to a good-faith dispute as to liability or amount, the standard is similar to that in section 303 of title 11 governing involuntary bankruptcy filings, which gives this language some judicial gloss. (We’ve permitted ourselves to eliminate two unhelpful legalisms by using “that” instead of “such” and “good-faith” instead of the Latinism “bona fide.”)
  • Many ToB provisions differentiate between a debtor’s inability to pay its debts and a debtor’s actually not paying its debts. Referring to a debtor’s inability to pay its debts is both unhelpfully overinclusive and underinclusive. Overinclusive, in that it would encompass circumstances in which the debtor is unable to pay its debts but doesn’t yet need to – that’s a nuance that would be hard to police. And underinclusive, in that one could get into an unhelpful discussion of whether a debtor is in fact able to pay its debts but simply elects not to.
  • Some ToB provisions use as a trigger balance-sheet insolvency (debts exceeding assets). But a debtor can be balance-sheet solvent but have a liquidity problem. Or a debtor can be balance-sheet insolvent but still have enough cash on hand to stay current on its debts. Furthermore, unless you have access to the accounts it might well be difficult to prove that a debtor is balance-sheet insolvent. So using a standard based on cashflow insolvency – failure to pay one’s debts as they become due – seems more in keeping with business considerations. 

Clauses Omitted

  • Another common ToB trigger refers to the debtor’s seeking an informal financial accommodation with its creditors, as opposed to filing for bankruptcy or engaging in a formal procedure under state law for resolving its debts, such as an assignment for the benefit of creditors. Clauses of this type usually stipulate that the contract may be terminated if the debtor arranges, or takes steps to arrange, a composition, workout, adjustment, or restructuring of its debts. Including such a clause would allow the contract to be terminated short of any formal proceeding or outright insolvency, but it might be perceived as overreaching if none of the other triggers occurs independently.
  • Some ToB provisions include as a trigger failure to comply with financial covenants. But if the nondebtor party is a bank or financial institution, the contract would invariably specify that breach of financial covenants constitute an event of default, so it would be redundant to add it as a ToB trigger. If the nondebtor party is not a bank or financial institution, presumably the nondebtor would not be in a good position to assess compliance with financial covenants imposed in some other contract.

Proposed International Language

Here is our proposed language for use in contracts governed by the laws of a jurisdiction other than one of the U.S. states:

  1. the Company commences a judicial or administrative proceeding under a law relating to insolvency for the purpose of reorganizing or liquidating the debtor or restructuring its debt;
  2. anyone commences any such proceeding against the Company and either (A) the proceeding is not dismissed by midnight at the end of the 60th day after commencement or (B) any court before which the proceeding is pending issues an order approving the case;
  3. a receiver, trustee, administrator, or liquidator (however each is referred to) is appointed or authorized, by law or under a contract, to take charge of property of the Company for the purpose of enforcing a lien against that property, or for the purpose of general administration of that property for the benefit of the Company’s creditors;
  4. the Company makes a general assignment for the benefit of creditors; and
  5. the Company generally fails to pay its debts as they become due (unless those debts are subject to a good-faith dispute as to liability or amount) or acknowledges in writing that it is unable to do so. 

Drafting Points

Clause (1)

  • This clause draws to some extent on the definition of “foreign proceeding” in article 2 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, incorporated as chapter 15 of title 11. The recurring pattern in the vast majority of jurisdictions is that insolvency laws offer a winding-up (or liquidation) option that is equivalent to chapter 7 of title 11 and many also offer a rescue or reorganization alternative that is equivalent to chapter 11 of title 11.
  • In some jurisdictions, the insolvency proceeding is controlled or supervised by an official body other than the court. That is why this clause uses the phrase “judicial or administrative proceeding.”

Clause (2)

  • This serves the same purpose as clause (2) of the proposed U.S. language.

Clause (3)

  • This clause reflects that in many jurisdictions outside the United States, lienholders are permitted to appoint a practitioner, commonly referred to as a “receiver,” to administer or sell some or all of the debtor’s property. In those jurisdictions, receivership is a mechanism for private enforcement by lenders of their security interests, rather than a collective bankruptcy proceeding, so it’s important to distinguish “receivership” procedures from bankruptcy procedures and to ensure that both types are covered in an international ToB provision.
  • The terms “trustee,” “administrator,” and “liquidator” are widely understood to refer to a practitioner appointed to preside over a collective bankruptcy proceeding and so are useful in distinguishing that function from receivership.

Clause (4)

  • General assignment for the benefit of creditors is a uniquely U.S. concept. If a ToB provision will not apply to U.S. debtors, this clause could be omitted.

Clause (5)

  • Clause (5) serves the same purpose as clause (4) of the proposed U.S. language.

Using the Proposed Language

The authors of this article believe that the proposed language is an improvement, in terms of substance and clarity, over the ToB provisions one usually sees. The world of contract drafting is drastically slow to change, but lawyers might be relatively quick to accept the language proposed in this article, whether or not they are aware of its merits.

For one thing, instead of novelty, the proposed language offers a refined and explicated version of ToB provisions currently in use, so it shouldn’t trigger alarm bells in those resistant to change.

Furthermore, the many transactional lawyers with little knowledge of bankruptcy practice might be willing to use the proposed language without worrying about nuances. We’ll take any kind of progress, even if it’s inadvertent.