The Delaware State Bar Association has proposed amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) and certain other provisions of the Delaware Code, which address a number of different topics, including the streamlined back-end merger process under Section 251(h) of the DGCL, springing director and stockholder consents, certain charter amendments without stockholder approval, and the statute of limitations for breach of contract claims. If approved by the Delaware General Assembly and signed into law by the governor, the proposed amendments are expected to become effective on August 1, 2014.
Amendments to Section 251(h)
In 2013, the DGCL was amended to add Section 251(h), which eliminates the need for a stockholder vote on a back-end merger in a two-step transaction involving a front-end tender or exchange offer when certain conditions are met. Since Section 251(h) became effective, more than 25 Section 251(h) deals have been announced. The statute’s use in practice and the manner in which practitioners have been structuring Section 251(h) deals in certain circumstances have raised questions with respect to the statute’s application and utility. The 2014 proposed amendments seek to address certain interpretation issues and other questions with respect to Section 251(h) by clarifying or eliminating certain requirements in the statute.
First, the proposed amendments clarify that Section 251(h) applies to merger agreements that permit or require the merger to be effectuated under Section 251(h), thereby permitting merger agreements to provide that a merger under Section 251(h), may be abandoned and consummated under a different statutory provision without running afoul of Section 251(h). In that regard, the proposed amendments also clarify that the requirement to consummate the merger as soon as practicable after the completion of the offer only applies when the merger is effected under Section 251(h).
Second, the proposed amendments eliminate the prohibition against using Section 251(h) if a party to the merger agreement is an interested stockholder (as defined in Section 203 of the DGCL – i.e., the owner of 15 percent or more of the corporation’s voting stock). The proposed amendments, therefore, would allow a stockholder who owns 15 percent or more of the voting stock of a corporation to effect a merger with the corporation pursuant to Section 251(h), which currently is impermissible. The proposed amendments also abate the uncertainty surrounding the permissibility of Section 251(h) deals where the offeror enters into tender or support agreements with stockholders that own 15 percent or more of the target’s voting stock. Accordingly, the proposed amendments diminish the need to provide for backstops in the merger agreement (e.g., a top-up option or a covenant to hold a stockholders meeting) because there will be much less risk, if any at all, that it will be determined post-signing that the requirements to consummate the merger under Section 251(h) cannot be met.
Finally, the proposed amendments to Section 251(h) address certain questions regarding the front-end offer, timing, and ownership requirements that have arisen in connection with Section 251(h) deals. In particular, the requirement that the front-end offer be for any and all of the outstanding stock of the target corporation would, if the amendments are adopted, exclude target stock owned at the commencement of the offer by (1) the target corporation, (2) the offeror, (3) any person that owns, directly or indirectly, all of the outstanding stock of the offeror, and (4) any direct or indirect wholly owned subsidiary of any of the foregoing, and such shares would not need to be tendered into the offer or converted into the same consideration as shares accepted in the offer in the back-end merger. Also, the shares of stock that would count when determining if an acquiror has sufficient shares to effect the back-end merger under Section 251(h) would include (a) all target corporation stock irrevocably accepted for purchase or exchange and “received” by the depository before the offer’s expiration, and (b) all stock otherwise owned by the acquiror. Stock would be deemed “received” by the depository when stock certificates have been physically received or, for uncertificated stock, when such stock is transferred into the depository’s account, or an agent’s message has been received by the depository. Stock would not be deemed “received” by the depository if it is tendered by guaranteed delivery without being actually delivered to the depository.
The proposed amendments, however, do not alter directors’ fiduciary duties in mergers effected pursuant to Section 251(h) or the level of judicial scrutiny applicable to the decision to enter into a merger agreement under Section 251(h).
If adopted, the proposed amendments to Section 251(h) will apply to merger agreements signed on or after August 1, 2014.
Written Consent Amendments
In AGR Halifax Fund, Inc. v. Fiscina, the Delaware Court of Chancery raised concerns over the effectiveness and validity of written consents executed by individuals who had not yet become directors. In particular, the court in AGR Halifax found that individuals who were not yet directors could not execute consents prior to the time they became directors, even though the consents would be held in escrow and would not be delivered until after the individuals joined the board. That decision created practical issues for practitioners in certain transactions where it was deemed expedient to collect signatures from individuals at a time when they were not yet directors.
The proposed amendments to Sections 141(f) of the DGCL seek to address this issue by allowing for springing director consents. In particular, the proposed amendments would clarify that any person, whether or not a director at the time, may provide, whether through instruction to an agent or otherwise, that a written consent be effective at a future time, including a time dependent upon the occurrence of an event. This springing consent is, of course, predicated upon the consenting person being a director at such future effective time. Notably, the future effective time can be no later than 60 days after such instruction is given or such provision is made, and such consent is revocable prior to becoming effective.
Similar amendments have also been proposed to Section 228(c) of the DGCL with respect to stockholder action by written consent that substantively mirror the proposed amendments to Section 141(f) discussed above. The proposed amendments to Section 228(c), however, would not affect the requirement that the consent must bear the actual date of signature, and to the extent the consent provides for a later effective time, such later effective time would serve as the date of signature.
If adopted, the proposed amendments to Section 141(f) and Section 228(c) would become effective on August 1, 2014.
Charter Amendments Without Stockholder Approval
The proposed amendments, if adopted, would grant boards of directors of Delaware corporations flexibility with respect to certain ministerial amendments to the corporation’s certificate of incorporation without having to expend the time and expense of obtaining stockholder approval. The proposed amendments provide that, if a corporation has not opted-out in its certificate of incorporation, boards of directors may, without obtaining stockholder approval, amend the certificate of incorporation to change the corporation’s name and delete historical references to the initial incorporator, initial directors, and initial subscribers for stock, and provisions relating to previously effected changes to stock.
Additionally, the proposed amendments would eliminate the requirement in Section 242 of the DGCL that the notice of a stockholders meeting at which an amendment is to be voted on contain a copy of the amendment or brief summary thereof if, but only if, the notice constitutes a notice of internet availability of proxy materials under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Extending the Statute of Limitations for Breach of Contract Claims
Under Delaware law, the statute of limitations for a breach of contract claim cannot be extended beyond the statute of limitations period, which is typically three or four years. There is a statute in Delaware, however, that permits “specialty contracts” to be placed under seal and, for such contracts, the statute of limitations period would extend to 20 years. It has become relatively common for contracts to be placed under seal in an attempt to take advantage of that statutory provision, but it remains unclear whether the “under seal” statute is intended to extend to all types of agreements, thus raising enforceability concerns in practice.
In light of this issue, legislation has been proposed to amend Title 10 of the Delaware Code through the addition of new Section 8106(c) to permit contracting parties to agree to an extension of the statute of limitations for up to 20 years without having to use a sealed instrument as long as the written contract involves at least $100,000.
If adopted, new Section 8106(c) would become effective on August 1, 2014.
Other Proposed Amendments
Section 218 of the DGCL currently requires that a voting trust agreement, or any related amendment, be filed with the corporation’s registered office in the State of Delaware. The proposed amendments to Section 218 would permit voting trust agreements and related amendments to be delivered to the corporation’s principal place of business rather than its registered office.
The proposed amendments also address incorporator unavailability issues. Section 103(a)(1) of the DGCL currently provides that if an incorporator is unavailable due to death, incapacity, unknown address, or refusal or neglect to act, a person for whom the incorporator was acting may, subject to certain conditions, execute any certificate with the same effect as if it was executed by the incorporator. The proposed amendments would eliminate any limitations arising from the reason for the incorporator’s unavailability in Section 103(a)(1) and add a new Section 108(d), which would allow any person for whom or on whose behalf an unavailable incorporator was acting to, subject to certain conditions, take any action that the unavailable incorporator would be entitled to take under Sections 107 and 108 of the DGCL.
If adopted, the proposed amendments to Section 218 and Section 103(a)(1) would become effective on August 1, 2014.
Recently Effective Amendments to the DGCL
As a final note, on April 1, 2014, new Sections 204 and 205 of the DGCL went into effect authorizing the ratification of certain defective corporate acts and stock issuances and bestowing jurisdiction upon the Delaware Court of Chancery to hear matters related to such ratifications, as well as other matters relating to curing defective or potentially defective corporate acts.
Revenue generation continues to draw significant attention in the nonprofit sector. Rather than rely exclusively on donations, many nonprofits seek to become self-sustaining through earned income. While in some cases revenue may be generated by activities that clearly further the nonprofit’s mission, other activities may be desirable primarily for the revenue they produce or involve other aspects that do not fit neatly within a nonprofit (or tax-exempt) framework. In these situations, legal and business factors may favor the creation of a for-profit entity to carry on the activity.
While any nonprofit organization might consider launching a subsidiary, this article focuses on public charities that are tax-exempt under Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3). Private foundations and nonprofit organizations that fall under other categories of tax exemption, like trade associations or social welfare organizations, will encounter compliance requirements specific to their tax-exempt status.
Why Would a Charity Want to Create a For-Profit Subsidiary?
Expanding Activities Beyond Those That Are Clearly Charitable
Although charities and other nonprofit organizations generally are exempt from income tax, they can incur tax on their unrelated business income. The unrelated business income tax, or “UBIT,” applies to income derived from a regularly carried on trade or businesses that is unrelated to the performance of the organization’s tax-exempt (e.g., charitable) functions. This tax was introduced in 1950 as a means to prevent tax-exempt organizations from having an unfair advantage by virtue of their tax-exempt status over for-profit, taxable competitors when they engaged in commercial business activities.
An organization potentially can derive significant income from unrelated business activity and pay any UBIT incurred. At some point, however, the activity may become so substantial that it could threaten the tax-exempt status of the organization. In that case, the entity may be well-advised to move the activity into a separate legal entity, such as a subsidiary corporation. There is no bright-line for how much unrelated business activity is too much for a nonprofit to conduct; housing the activity in a corporate subsidiary can avoid concern about when this line has been crossed.
In addition, it is not always clear under federal tax law when an activity might be considered unrelated to the charity’s tax-exempt purpose. For instance, operating a training program or publishing books, while educational, may too closely resemble a for-profit business to qualify as substantially related to a charitable purpose. An organization may focus on serving low-income or other underserved communities, or selling its product at a lower price only to other charities, in order to be comfortable that the activity is substantially related. However, a nonprofit organization with a successful business model may not want to limit the scope of its activities in this way. Instead, it may wish to increase revenue by offering its product or service at fair market value to the broadest audience possible. A for-profit subsidiary maximizes flexibility to pursue a wide range of profit-making activities and to take advantage of future opportunities as they arise.
Shielding the Parent from Liability
A nonprofit organization, especially one with a large endowment or other significant assets, may not want to risk those assets by operating a business with potential liabilities. In these circumstances, it may be prudent for the nonprofit parent to protect its other assets and activities by isolating the business in a limited-liability subsidiary. No social service organization, for instance, would want to see its programs for at-risk youth jeopardized if the day-care center that it also owns is sued.
Attracting Outside Investors
A for-profit entity can raise money for its business by offering equity to outside investors. The nonprofit organization is limited to relying primarily on contributions, loans, investment income, or earned revenue to finance its activities, but it cannot offer ownership interests in itself. When contributions and other sources of revenue are insufficient to sustain or grow an activity, additional capital may be necessary. The for-profit vehicle expands access to capital by attracting investors who are motivated by receiving a return, in addition to funders who are willing to donate to the nonprofit parent.
Attracting and Compensating Employees
A for-profit entity can offer equity compensation to employees and other profit-sharing opportunities that a nonprofit organization cannot. This flexibility may be important for attracting talent, especially when competing with for-profit employers. A for-profit subsidiary also may be able to compensate individuals without concern about providing excess compensation under state and federal laws that govern the nonprofit parent.
Spinning Off the Business
If the nonprofit organization ultimately may sell the business, it may be easier to segregate the activity in a subsidiary, where the business can be valued separate from the parent organization. The parent’s equity interest in the subsidiary also could be transferred, avoiding a potentially complicated process of identifying and assigning individual assets and liabilities from the nonprofit in order to transfer the business activity.
Public Disclosure and Perception
While the existence of a controlled subsidiary and certain transactions with that subsidiary will be disclosed on the nonprofit organization’s publicly available annual Form 990, the subsidiary’s activities will not be subject to the same level of disclosure as it would if the activity was conducted directly by the nonprofit organization (for instance, with respect to the subsidiary’s income and expenditures and possibly the compensation it pays individuals, depending on what other roles the recipients have with respect to the nonprofit organization.) The nonprofit also may prefer a clear separation between its charitable activities and any for-profit endeavors, to avoid mission drift or a perception that its charitable work has been tainted or overshadowed by profit-making objectives.
Other
Other reasons also may exist for forming a separate legal entity (e.g., administrative convenience, availability of certain government funding, or requirements for operating in a foreign country).
What Are Some Disadvantages to Establishing a For-Profit Subsidiary?
Administrative Cost and Complexity
Two entities in general are more complicated to operate than one. The costs to form a subsidiary and maintain two separate entities therefore will be higher.
Corporate formalities must be observed to protect the separation of the entities. Each organization must have a separate governing body and should conduct separate board and committee meetings, with separate minutes taken. The entities also should avoid commingling assets by using separate bank accounts and should maintain an arm’s length relationship. If the subsidiary and the parent will share any resources such as office space or employees, or if one entity is going to provide goods or services to the other, or a license of any intellectual property, the entities should enter into a written resource-sharing, services, or licensing arrangement. A charity must receive at least fair market value for whatever it provides to the for-profit entity.
While the nonprofit parent will be the only (or at least the controlling) equity holder of the for-profit subsidiary and therefore will control the for-profit’s governing body, there are reasons to avoid complete overlap in the directors and officers of the two entities. Having some different directors and officers helps clarify when individuals are acting on behalf of the for-profit subsidiary versus the nonprofit parent; these lines can get blurred more easily if the directors and officers of both are identical. In addition, for transactions between the two entities, it may be desirable, or even required, for the nonprofit to have some board members who are not affiliated with the for-profit entity to approve the transaction.
A failure to segregate the subsidiary’s operations from the parent can result in the subsidiary’s separate status being disregarded by a regulator or a court and the activities being attributed to the parent for tax, liability, or other purposes. The time and expense involved in properly maintaining two separate entities therefore should be considered.
Prudent Investment Considerations
If the subsidiary’s activities are not related to the parent’s charitable purposes, investment in the new entity should be a reasonable use of the organization’s resources and may need to satisfy a “prudent investment” standard. (See “Capitalizing the New Entity” below.)
Compliance with Securities Laws
Depending on the number, residence, and sophistication of any other investors involved other than the nonprofit organization, securities laws may apply; this can involve compliance costs and delays. However, if participation is limited to the nonprofit, or to a small number of outside investors in addition to the nonprofit, securities-law compliance costs may not be significant.
Winding Down the New Entity
In order to wind-down a subsidiary, a dissolution process may be required. In addition, when a for-profit corporate subsidiary is dissolved, the subsidiary’s assets are deemed to be sold, potentially resulting in adverse tax consequences. This may make it difficult to liquidate an existing corporation. The nonprofit parent should consider its exit strategy before establishing a new entity.
Entity Selection for the Nonprofit Organization Subsidiary
For any or all of the advantages described above, the nonprofit organization may have decided in favor of creating a for-profit subsidiary. Additional questions remain.
Corporation or LLC?
While there are many types of for-profit entities, the two most useful vehicles for a nonprofit organization to consider when creating a subsidiary are the Subchapter C corporation and the limited liability company (LLC). Some considerations for the nonprofit parent will be the same as for any organization forming a subsidiary. For instance, the parent may be focused on limiting liability or establishing an appropriate management structure. Below are some considerations specific to nonprofit organizations.
Federal tax law considerations. For federal income tax purposes, a corporation is recognized as a separate taxpaying entity. The corporation will realize net income or loss, pay taxes, and distribute profits to shareholders. The profit is taxed to the corporation when earned and is taxed, with certain exceptions, to the shareholders when distributed as dividends, resulting in a double tax. For a tax-exempt nonprofit parent, the dividends it receives may not be taxable, because they qualify as passive income. However, the income of the subsidiary will be taxed at the subsidiary level.
Certain payments typically are deductible to the subsidiary as a business expense, such as the cost of borrowing money, renting space, or licensing intellectual property. However, in the case of a corporate subsidiary where the parent owns more than 50 percent of the stock (or, if the subsidiary is an LLC, more than 50 percent of the profit or capital interests), the interest, rents, and royalties paid by the subsidiary to the parent will be subject to UBIT.
In contrast to a corporation, LLCs are typically “pass-through” entities. Multiple-member LLCs are treated like partnerships and are not subject to income tax at the entity level (although an LLC can elect to be taxed separately from its members, in which case it would be taxable as a corporation). Instead, the LLC allocates to each member its share of the LLC’s income and expense, and each member pays its own tax on this net income (regardless of whether the LLC actually makes any distribution to its members). The Internal Revenue Service will attribute activities carried on by an LLC to its tax-exempt members when evaluating whether the nonprofit members are operated exclusively for exempt purposes.
An LLC may have only one member, in which case it is generally disregarded for federal income tax purposes. Its income and expenses are reflected on the tax return of its sole member, and the IRS will regard the nonexempt activities carried on by the LLC to be the activities of its sole member.
An LLC may work well when the nonprofit’s goal in setting up the subsidiary is to limit liability or to attract additional investors, and the LLC’s activities are still substantially related to the parent’s charitable mission. A tax-exempt parent may not wish to hold a membership interest in an LLC where the subsidiary will conduct an unrelated business activity. In that situation, the member may be required to file a Form 990-T and pay unrelated business income tax on its share of net income from the LLC. The revenue-generating activities also potentially could jeopardize the charity’s tax exemption. A nonprofit organization therefore may opt for a taxable corporation to house activities that are unrelated to its mission in order to avoid this attribution.
State law considerations. A subsidiary will be subject to registration and reporting requirements in its state of formation (e.g., with the secretary of state). If the entity establishes certain minimum contacts with another state through its operations, the entity also will be subject to the jurisdiction of that state.
Some states impose taxes or annual fees on LLCs, notwithstanding the fact that a single-member LLC is disregarded for federal income tax purposes or that a multiple-member LLC has only tax-exempt organizations as its members. A lack of uniformity across states means that an LLC subsidiary could owe taxes or fees in one or more states while operating in other states free of any entity-level payment.
Should the Subsidiary Be a Benefit Corporation?
For-profit corporations traditionally are organized to pursue maximum financial return for their shareholders. An increasing number of states have introduced a new form of legal entity that serves both a business and a social or charitable purpose. The benefit corporation is probably the best known of these options and has been adopted in more than half the states. Another alternative, the flexible purpose corporation, can be formed in California. Washington state has the social purpose corporation, and Delaware last summer introduced the Delaware public benefit corporation (not to be confused with the California nonprofit public benefit corporation). An LLC variation also exists in a number of states, called the low-profit limited liability company or “L3C.” These entities allow (and in some cases require) directors to take into account a social purpose and certain non-economic factors when making decisions, in addition to financial return.
There are similarities and significant differences among these new options that are beyond the scope of this article. A nonprofit parent forming a wholly-owned subsidiary may not find it worthwhile to consider any of them, as the nonprofit will have complete control over the subsidiary; with no other shareholders, there is little risk to the for-profit directors if they pursue a social purpose at the expense of maximizing profit. For a subsidiary with other investors, a social purpose entity may provide some measure of protection to directors as well as anchor the social mission by articulating it in the organizing documents and making it harder to change (as state laws typically require a supermajority vote). Use of one of these entities also may convey both to investors and to the public the intended social purpose of the subsidiary, which may be perceived as “more aligned” with the parent nonprofit’s mission.
Capitalizing the New Entity
Is the Investment an Appropriate Use of Nonprofit Funds?
The nonprofit parent must capitalize its subsidiary. A contribution in return for an equity interest is an investment. The parent must determine whether the investment is either (1) a prudent investment that will not violate any state fiduciary requirements or prudent investor laws, or (2) a “program-related” investment that is being made primarily to further a charitable purpose rather than an investment purpose. If a subsidiary is formed to house business activities that are unrelated to the parent’s tax-exempt purpose, only the first option may be available. The nonprofit therefore should be aware of any prudent investment standards that govern how the organization may invest its funds, for instance the standard set forth in the state’s version of the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA). In addition, a tax-exempt parent may have UBIT issues, if it uses debt to finance an unrelated investment.
Private foundations face additional restrictions. They generally may not own more than 20 percent of a business entity such as corporation or an LLC, unless the corporation or LLC is operating a business that is functionally related to the foundation’s mission. A private foundation also can be taxed on investments that jeopardize its tax-exempt purposes. A “program-related investment” – one that is made primarily to accomplish a charitable purpose and with no significant investment purpose (see Internal Revenue Code Section 4944) – is not subject to either of these restrictions.
Will the Subsidiary Have Other Investors?
Initial funding of a new subsidiary could come from a combination of capital contributions and loans from the nonprofit organization and possibly from other investors. If other investors will be involved, the arrangement becomes more complicated. A charity must make sure that it receives adequate value in return for its contribution, and it must avoid using charitable assets to subsidize for-profit investors. The charity therefore should receive an equity interest that reflects the fair market value of whatever it has contributed. It may need to have an appraisal conducted to confirm the value of its contribution or that of other investors, such that each investor receives a proportionate interest.
In addition, and as mentioned earlier, any transactions between the parent and its for-profit subsidiary, including licenses, leases, and loans, need to be at fair market value or better for the parent. The organization needs to be especially wary of any benefit, whether direct or indirect, to charity insiders who own some percentage of, or will be compensated by, the subsidiary entity. If charity insiders are involved, certain federal and state laws governing interested party transactions may apply (e.g., the excess benefit transaction rules under Internal Revenue Code Section 4958).
Conclusion
Use of a for-profit subsidiary can be an effective strategy for a variety of reasons, from shielding a nonprofit organization from liability or the tax consequences of conducting an unrelated business activity, to attracting outside investment and scaling a business beyond what might be possible if conducted inside the nonprofit parent. When a revenue-generating activity or a significant asset is involved, the directors of a nonprofit organization and legal counsel should consider whether a subsidiary would make sense.
E-mail, Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, Skype, WebEx . . . these and other diverse modes of electronic communication have exploded in recent years. We are now able to communicate faster, cheaper, and with more people simultaneously than ever before. At the same time, busy schedules make face-to-face board meetings a luxury directors don’t think they can afford.
A Tempting Shortcut
Responding to the difficulty of wrangling geographically diverse and busy volunteers, many nonprofit organizations are allowing directors to vote by e-mail. This seems like the perfect solution. An issue or opportunity arises that calls for a quick response before the next regular board meeting. Scheduling a special meeting seems impossible. Why not circulate an e-mail, ascertain that there is general agreement, and take action right away?
E-mail voting is seductively simple and fast, but that ease and speed is a trap: in many jurisdictions a board that relies on e-mail voting fails to comply with statutory and common law requirements for a valid meeting, thereby exposing its decisions to attack.
Most state statutes provide that board action may be taken either at a meeting (including a meeting by electronic communication) or by unanimous written consent. In theory, a court could consider an e-mail vote, which may not fit either category, nothing more than informal board action and invalidate the vote. Of course, there is almost no risk that informal action by a board of directors will be later overturned if no one objects. But, this type of dispute does tend to arise in the context of a split board of directors or a terminated employee. While neither of the following cases were ultimately decided on the issue of e-mail, or even proxy, voting, they do illustrate that courts may be asked to decide which group of warring directors is the legitimately elected board, Clemmons v. Crenshaw, 511 S.W.2d 449 (Mo. App. 1974), or whether an executive director’s contract was properly terminated, Wayne v. Capital Area Legal Services Corporation, 108 So.3d 103 (La. App. 2012), writ denied, 110 So.3d 1072 (La. 2013), appeal after remand, 2014 WL 1757587 (La. App. 2014).
Even more likely, without a vote that meets statutory requirements, an attorney representing a nonprofit organization in a loan transaction may be unwilling to issue the opinion of counsel required by the lender, thereby delaying or derailing an entire transaction.
A Hypothetical . . .
Let’s take an example.
Playball (PB) runs a youth baseball program. A local business owner offers to donate land for playing fields, and arranges for a mortgage loan to cover construction costs. As interest rates are rising, PB must lock in the rate quickly. PB’s president tries to schedule a special meeting of the board to approve the loan, but can’t find a time when a quorum of four of the seven directors can meet.
So, she sends an e-mail: “Hey do you think it is a good idea to take a loan from Local Friendly Bank to pay for the construction costs for our new ball fields.” Five directors respond, “OK by me,” while two object. With a majority vote in hand, PB’s president signs the commitment letter and pays a commitment fee.
The closing approaches. PB’s attorney prepares the opinion of counsel required by the lender, which must state, “All corporate proceedings required by law or the provisions of PB’s Certificate of Incorporation or bylaws to be taken by PB in connection with the transaction have been duly and validly taken.”
“Let me see the minutes of the meeting approving the loan,” says PB’s attorney.
“We couldn’t call a meeting, so we voted by e-mail,” responds PB’s president.
“OK,” says the attorney. “You need a unanimous written consent, or ratify the vote at a meeting. You can hold the meeting by teleconference or Skype.”
Unanimous consent is unattainable because two directors object. Meanwhile, one of the five original consenting directors has changed his vote to “No.” Of the remaining four consenting directors, two are traveling in Asia and cannot meet even by teleconference. With five of seven directors available – but only two who will vote in favor of the loan – PB’s attorney can’t deliver the opinion, the bank won’t make the loan, there is no deal, and PB forfeits its commitment fee.
While far-fetched, this scenario illustrates the danger of relying on informal board action.
The Prohibition on Voting by Proxy
In most states, the directors of nonprofit organizations may not vote by proxy, although generally members can. The theory behind this prohibition is that the robust discussion and interchange of ideas that occurs at board meetings is essential to the informed exercise of directors’ fiduciary duty to the corporation.
An e-mail vote – that is, a proposal circulated and responded to by e-mail – is essentially a proxy vote delivered electronically.
The common law regarding proper action by a board of directors, including the prohibition on proxy voting by directors, developed in the business (or stock) corporation arena. State statutes governing business corporations and nonprofit (or nonstock) corporations both reflect the codification of this common law. While some courts have recognized the validity of informal action by directors of closely held corporations (Model Bus. Corp. Act Annotated § 8.20 cmt. (4th Edition, 2013 Revision)), particularly where the directors and stockholders are identical, the directors of a nonprofit corporation should not rely on the availability of this exception. The directors of a nonstock corporation don’t hold an economic interest in that corporation. Rather, they are stewards of charitable funds charged with managing the organization and its assets for a charitable or public purpose, and must respond to a diverse constituency, which may consist of members, donors, clients, and even the general public. Yet directors of nonprofit organizations, usually unpaid volunteers, may be particularly prone to seek governance short-cuts.
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act
Approximately half the states have adopted a version of the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (MNCA). Because the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (3rd Edition, 2008) sets a uniform national standard, it is the focus of this article. Notable states that have not adopted the MNCA are California, Delaware, Massachusetts, and New York. But, even states that have not adopted the MNCA, such as Massachusetts and New York, have retained the same common law and statutory principles governing proper board action.
The relevant provisions of the MNCA were patterned after the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), and the law is substantially the same under both model statutes.
According to the Official Comments to the MBCA (Model Bus. Corp. Act Annotated § 8.20 cmt. (2013)):
A well-established principle of corporate common law accepted by implication in the Model Act is that directors may act only at a meeting unless otherwise expressly authorized by statute. The underlying theory is that the consultation and exchange of views is an integral part of the functioning of the board. A corollary to this principle, also accepted by implication in the Model Act, is that directors may not generally vote by proxy.
Statutory Alternatives
The law does provide some flexibility, giving the executive director or president of a nonprofit organization frantically trying to schedule a meeting of busy, far-flung directors some options. PB’s attorney tried to implement both of the statutory exceptions to the common law “in-person” meeting rule. These exceptions respond to modern technology, can be easily adapted as technology evolves, and should be incorporated into an organization’s bylaws.
Electronic Communication
The MNCA allows meetings to be conducted “through the use of, any means of communication by which all directors participating may simultaneously hear each other during the meeting,” unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise. Model Nonprofit Corporation Act Annotated § 8.20 (2008). This provision allows teleconferences and web-based conferencing that combines voice and video communication.
As explained in the Official Comments to the MNCA (Model Nonprofit Corporation Act Annotated § 8.20 cmt. (2008)):
With the development of modern electronic technology, it is possible that the advantages of the traditional meeting, at which all members are present at a single place, may be obtained even though the participants are physically dispersed and no two directors are present at the same place. The advantage of the traditional meeting is the opportunity for interchange that is permitted by a meeting in a single room at which participants are physically present. If this opportunity for interchange is thought to be available by the board of directors, a meeting may be conducted by electronic means although no two directors are physically present at the same place and no specific place for the meeting is designated.
Note, however, the continued preference for in-person meetings as the best way to insure thorough debate and discussion. According to the commentary, a meeting may be conducted by electronic means only if the same opportunity for interchange is available.
Unanimous Consent
A board of directors may also act by unanimous written consent, a methodology easily adapted to e-mail.
Section 8.21 of the MNCA permits a board of directors to act by unanimous written consent, if eachdirector signs “a consent in the form of a record describing the action to be taken and delivers it to the nonprofit corporation.” Model Nonprofit Corporation Act Annotated § 8.21 cmt. (2008).
The power of the board of directors to act unanimously without a meeting is based on the pragmatic consideration that in many situations a formal meeting is not needed. . .
. . . the requirement of unanimous consent precludes the possibility of stifling or ignoring opposing argument. A director opposed to an action that is proposed to be taken by unanimous consent, or uncertain about the desirability of that action, may compel the holding of a directors’ meeting to discuss the matter simply by withholding consent.
Thus, unanimous written consent provides the vehicle through which a nonprofit corporation can take advantage of the convenience of e-mail, but comply with statutory requirements. The difficulty is in striking the appropriate balance between risk and convenience.
The most prudent and careful course of action is to circulate a formal consent as an attachment to an e-mail. The organization’s leaders must then collect all of the directors’ signatures. While issues such as the security, accuracy retention and accessibility of electronic signatures and records are beyond the scope of this article, electronic signatures are now widely accepted under state and federal laws such as the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) and the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001–7031.
For example, under Section 1.40(53) of the MNCA:
“Sign” means, with present intent to authenticate or adopt a record:
(i) to execute or adopt a tangible symbol; or (ii) to attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic sound, symbol, or process.
According to the Official Comments to the MNCA, the definition of “sign” is patterned after the definition of that term in the UETA and other uniform statutes. (Model Nonprofit Corporation Act Annotated § 1.40.16cmt. (2008).)
Those definitions, in turn, were based on the definition of “electronic signature” in section 106(5) of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7006(5). The term includes manual, facsimile, conformed or electronic signatures. In this regard, it is intended that any manifestation of an intention to execute or authenticate a record will be accepted. Electronic signatures are expected to encompass any methodology approved by the secretary of state for purposes of verification of the authenticity of the record. This could include a typewritten conformed signature or other electronic entry in the form of a computer data compilation of any characters or series of characters comprising a name intended to evidence authorization and execution of a record.
There is also a growing consensus among practitioners that a proposal or resolution circulated by e-mail that is unanimously approved, constitutes a valid unanimous written consent, even if it lacks the formality of a written consent attached to an e-mail.
This is true under the MNCA, which defines a “record” as “information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.” MNCA § 1.40(43).
According to the commentary (Model Nonprofit Corporation Act Annotated § 1.40.14 cmt. (2008)),
The term includes both communication systems that in the normal course produce paper, such as telegrams and facsimiles, as well as communication systems that transmit and permit the retention of data that is then subject to subsequent retrieval and reproduction in perceivable form. The term is intended to be broadly construed and include the evolving methods of electronic delivery, such as email, the Internet and electronic transmissions between computers.
Therefore, under the MNCA a resolution circulated, signed, and returned electronically constitutes “a consent in the form of a record describing the action to be taken.” MNCA, § 8.21.
Some Warnings
Even if valid under local law, this type of board action can cause a host of practical problems. First, in most jurisdictions, all of the directors must respond affirmatively. Obtaining unanimous consent from even the most responsive directors of very small board can take weeks of communication. Without the discipline of a written consent with signature lines, the busy staff member responsible for “chasing” signatures might overlook a missing name.
Second, e-mail is an informal means of communication. Informality leads to ambiguity. Sometimes it’s hard to know when “yes” means “yes,” or if a director has “signed” the electronic record. Consider the e-mail exchange that might have followed the initial e-mail missive from PB’s president:
Director: “OK by me” President: “Is that a ‘yes’ vote?” Director: “I guess?” President: “I hate to be a pain, but could you please just e-mail me saying ‘yes’ and sign your name electronically?”
Furthermore, the e-mail “record” must be properly retained with the organization’s minutes.
Finally, the most likely problem in the context of informal communication is confusion over content. Even if the PB vote had been unanimous, it is hard to know exactly what the directors approved. The president’s e-mail leaves a lot of questions unanswered. What are the terms of the loan? When and how must it be repaid? What is the interest rate? Is it secured by a mortgage on the property? Would all the directors have voted in favor of the loan if they knew the terms? Perhaps some directors would have preferred to raise the funds to cover construction costs, rather than mortgage the newly acquired property.
Clearly, a practitioner advising a nonprofit organization must insist on the discipline of a formal resolution, even if the resolution is communicated in an e-mail. If the e-mail sent by PB’s president had included the complete text of a properly drafted borrowing resolution describing the terms of the transaction in detail, the other directors and PB’s attorney would have known exactly what action the board approved.
Of course, it is critical to verify the law in the organization’s state of incorporation – as many variations exist. For example, in Texas directors may vote by proxy if authorized by the certificate of formation or bylaws, Texas Business Organizations Code §§ 22.214; 22.215. Colorado, Georgia, Minnesota, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin all permit board action by less than unanimous written consent, although the specific statutory requirements differ. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 7-128-202; Ga. Code. Ann. § 14-3-821; Minn. Stat. § 317A.239; Texas Business Organizations Code § 22.220; Utah Code Ann. § 16-6a-813; Wis. Stat. § 181.0821.
Regardless of the form of board action, e-mail is undoubtedly a useful tool for taking the pulse of a board of directors. An organization may informally poll its directors and then ratify the decision at an in-person or electronic meeting, or by unanimous written consent.
In recent years, there has been an increase in mergers, asset transfers, and affiliations involving nonprofit organizations. These “business combinations” have been necessary in an environment that has become more challenging for nonprofits to obtain financial support in the form of public and private funding and contributions. The process for pursuing a nonprofit business combination, including use of letters of intent or term sheets, due diligence, and the negotiation and execution of documents to effectuate the combination, is very similar to the process used with for-profit entities. Nevertheless, business combinations involving nonprofits have important differences from their for-profit counterparts because of the unique nature of nonprofits. This article provides an overview of common forms of nonprofit corporation business combinations and highlights some aspects of these transactions that differentiate them from for-profit transactions.
Considerations for Moving Forward with Business Combinations
An initial step in any business combination is determining whether such combination makes sense to the nonprofit. The factors that a nonprofit board needs to take into consideration in such evaluation are very similar to those factors a for-profit board considers, including synergies, cost savings and other efficiencies to be obtained through the combination, work force issues, and the composition of the surviving entity’s board and the make-up of its officers. Moreover, the fiduciary duties imposed on nonprofit directors in acting on business combinations are very similar to the fiduciary duties imposed on for-profit directors. Still, there are some important differences between for-profit and nonprofit business combinations. For instance, a for-profit board needs to consider the financial impact a business combination will have on the entity’s owners (such as shareholders in a business corporation). In the context of a charitable nonprofit corporation, the interests of members may be relevant in a board’s consideration of a merger, but such interests are distinguishable because members do not have an ownership interest in the nonprofit. The differences between for-profits and nonprofits lead to other unique factors that need to be considered by a nonprofit board when evaluating a possible business combination.
If the proposed combination involves a nonprofit being merged out of existence, selling substantially all of its assets or becoming a “subsidiary” of another entity, a main focus of the nonprofit board likely relates to whether the mission of the entity will be carried on by the surviving entity in some respect with adequate resources dedicated to such mission. This may result in a requirement by the nonprofit that the mission of the surviving entity incorporate in some respect the nonprofit’s mission.
Other unique considerations include what will happen to any members of the nonprofit, as well as the proposed use of any institutional funds with donor restrictions (including endowment funds) of the nonprofit.
Similar to the situation involving a for-profit business combination, as the nonprofit commences discussions with another entity regarding a possible business combination, a letter of intent or term sheet (that is often non-binding) helps structure the proposed transaction and process for the combination. In order to protect the nonprofit, it is important to have a binding confidentiality agreement in place prior to any significant discussions between the parties.
Mergers
The Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, Third Edition (MNCA), and most state nonprofit corporation acts, permit a nonprofit corporation to merge with another nonprofit corporation pursuant to a process that is very similar to the process required for for-profit entities. State nonprofit corporation acts also may allow a nonprofit to merge with a for-profit entity, such as a business corporation, limited liability company, or limited partnership. In addition, state nonprofit corporation acts may allow a nonprofit to merge with an unincorporated nonprofit association as well as with an entity that is domesticated in another state. For any merger, it is important to confirm that it is permitted under both the applicable nonprofit corporation statute and the enabling statute for the other entity involved in the merger.
The process for a merger involving a nonprofit corporation is very similar to a merger involving a for-profit entity. It typically includes a plan of merger or merger agreement containing the terms of the merger and any appropriate representations and warranties of the merging parties. It also involves the filing of articles or certificate of merger with the state’s secretary of state. Regardless of whether the nonprofit is the surviving entity, it is generally necessary to obtain board of director approval as well as member approval if the nonprofit has members.
Depending on the type of entity that will be the surviving entity in the merger, there may be unique state law requirements, as well as requirements imposed on the nonprofit because of its tax-exempt status. A merger involving a charitable nonprofit can be subject to additional requirements if the charitable nonprofit is being merged out of existence and the surviving entity is not a charitable nonprofit. Some states impose requirements that steps be taken to ensure that the charitable assets or the fair value of such assets of a merged out entity continue to be used for a charitable purpose. A similar requirement is imposed on entities that have tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Additional requirements under the IRC are imposed on nonprofits that are private foundations. In addition, some states require a merger be approved by a governmental body, such as the state attorney general, or a court. Where there needs to be action taken to ensure the fair value of the charitable assets is preserved, a valuation by an independent appraiser is likely necessary.
There are significant benefits with regard to proceeding with a merger as the form of business combination. Similar to state for-profit entity acts, state nonprofit corporation acts provide that all assets and rights and liabilities of the merged out entity are automatically transferred/assumed by the surviving entity. There also is no need to dissolve the merged out entity because it no longer exists as a legal entity. In addition, state nonprofit corporation acts often will provide that any bequest, devise, gift, grant, or promise contained in a will or other instrument of donation inures to the surviving entity unless it is made pursuant to an instrument that specifically provides otherwise.
A main disadvantage to a merger is that the surviving entity inherits all of the liabilities of the merged out entity and it is not easily possible to unwind the arrangement if it is later determined that the combination has not resulted in the benefits the parties expected. As a result, it is extremely important as part of the due diligence process to determine what assets and liabilities might be assumed by the surviving entity.
Some state nonprofit corporation acts also permit the consolidation of nonprofits, which is very similar to a merger of a nonprofit with another nonprofit. The main distinction between a merger and consolidation is that a consolidation results in both nonprofits effectively being merged out of existence with the creation of a new entity. A main disadvantage with proceeding with a consolidation as opposed to a merger is that in a consolidation it is necessary to make an application to the IRS if the new entity seeks to have tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) of the IRC. Given the similar treatment of mergers and consolidations of nonprofits, more recent state nonprofit corporation acts have dropped the concept of consolidation.
Asset Acquisitions/Sales
Another form of business combination involves the acquisition or sale of assets of an entity. This might be in the form of a nonprofit acquiring the assets of another nonprofit or a for-profit. Alternatively, the transaction might involve a for-profit acquiring the assets of a nonprofit. The structure of such a transaction is very similar to the structure of an acquisition of assets involving for-profit entities. In particular, the selling entity transfers certain identified assets and liabilities to the acquiring entity.
Similar to a merger, the process for the sale of all or substantially all of the assets of a nonprofit is governed by the state nonprofit corporation acts. The MNCA and most nonprofit corporation statutes provide that a sale by a nonprofit of all or substantially all of its assets generally requires approval by the nonprofit corporation’s board of directors as well as the members if the nonprofit has members.
Often, the form of asset purchase agreement used is very similar to the form used in for-profit transactions and will include a description of the assets being transferred, the liabilities being assumed, and appropriate representations and warranties regarding such assets and liabilities and the parties. Still, such agreement likely will need to include provisions that are unique to a nonprofit. For instance, in the situation where a non-charitable entity is acquiring the assets of a charitable entity, the buyer may require that, as a condition of closing, the seller deliver any approvals necessary from state governmental authorities for the sale of the seller’s charitable assets.
A significant difference between an acquisition of the assets and liabilities of a nonprofit versus a for-profit can relate to the purchase price. If the acquisition involves two nonprofit entities, it may not be necessary for the acquiring nonprofit to pay fair market value (or anything) for the assets. Instead, the transaction can be structured as a gift of assets from the selling nonprofit to the acquiring nonprofit. Such gift should be permissible as long as the “selling” nonprofit corporation’s creditors are paid in full upon liquidation of the nonprofit.
A gift structure is not possible in the event the nonprofit is acquiring assets from a for-profit entity, or a for-profit entity is acquiring assets from a nonprofit entity. To the extent a charitable nonprofit is selling its assets to a non-charitable entity, such as a business corporation, similar to the situation in mergers, state nonprofit corporation acts often require that there be fair value paid for the assets. In addition, many states impose requirements that the nonprofit obtain approval from a governmental body (such as the attorney general) or a court in order to proceed with the transaction. In such situation, it would be important to obtain an independent valuation of the assets as part of the transaction.
A main advantage of an asset transaction is that the acquiring nonprofit is able to be selective in terms of the assets and liabilities it acquires. As a result, it can avoid being burdened with liabilities of the other entity. A main disadvantage is that additional steps may need to be taken in order to complete the transaction. These include obtaining assignments of any relevant revenue generating agreements including consents from the other parties to such agreements. In addition, the selling entity remains in existence and its board will need to take steps to either wind down its activities and dissolve or continue its existence.
Parent-Subsidiary Type Arrangements
Nonprofit corporations differ from for-profit entities in that nonprofits have no owners, whereas for-profits have shareholders or other owners. Still, a parent-subsidiary structure can be structured with nonprofits. The main difference is that the “parent” nonprofit does not own any shares or other interest in the nonprofit. Instead, it is treated as the parent because of the control it has over the other nonprofit. This might be as a result of the “parent” nonprofit becoming the sole voting member of the “subsidiary” nonprofit. It also could be accomplished by the parent nonprofit having the right to determine the directors of the subsidiary nonprofit. Another important difference between a nonprofit and for-profit parent-subsidiary structure is that nonprofits are unable to file consolidated tax returns with the IRS.
The arrangement, which is sometimes referred to as an “affiliation” of nonprofits, can be accomplished by amendments to the articles of incorporation and bylaws of the “subsidiary” nonprofit. These documents would be amended to reflect that the “parent” organization either as the sole member (with sole voting rights) of the “subsidiary” or having a right to determine the board of directors of the subsidiary.
Because this type of combination or affiliation is similar to a merger or acquisition of assets, parties often enter into some type of affiliation agreement that covers similar topics addressed in other business combination agreements. For instance, an affiliation agreement might address any change in activities of the subsidiary nonprofit as well as the composition of the parent’s board of directors as well as certain representations and warranties about the parties and their operations.
One of the main advantages of a parent-subsidiary type structure is that the parent does not assume the liabilities of the subsidiary entity. In addition, the affiliation often can be easily accomplished by amending the governance documents of the “subsidiary” entity. This type of structure is also attractive to entities that are not certain about the “permanency” of the arrangement and would like the ability to “unwind” the business combination if it is subsequently determined that the combination is not working out. The unwinding of the business combination can be accomplished through amendments to the governing documents to take the “parent” organization out of the control position of the “subsidiary.”
A disadvantage to this type of business combination is that the parties may not achieve the efficiencies that can be obtained through a merger. In particular, there will still be two separate entities that need to file their own Form 990s with the IRS. There also will be a need to keep in place two separate boards of directors (although the subsidiary board can be quite small and meet infrequently, assuming that the parent board is addressing issues relevant to the subsidiary). Some organizations that choose to use this type of structure will – through a merger – collapse the “subsidiary” into the “parent” at some later point in time when it is determined that the combination should be permanent.
A variation of this structure is the incorporation of a third nonprofit corporation that becomes the sole member (or parent) of the existing nonprofit corporations. This may be attractive to nonprofits that see themselves as “equals” to each other. The advantages to such a structure are similar to the advantages of the “parent/subsidiary” structure. One disadvantage is that a new nonprofit corporation needs to be incorporated and likely needs to obtain tax-exempt status. In addition, the IRS has shown some disfavor to granting tax-exempt status to entities that are merely holding companies with no operations. As a result, it may be necessary to have some activities of the combined nonprofits occurring at the “parent” level.
Forms of Less Integrated Affiliations
Although beyond the scope of this article, it is noted that nonprofits can be involved in other types of arrangements that result in organizations combining their resources to a lesser extent. For instance, two nonprofits may enter into arrangements for joint funding, joint programming, combined services, or other type of joint venture. These types of arrangements allow the involved nonprofits to maintain their autonomy while achieving some efficiencies. It is also possible for nonprofits to enter into joint venture arrangements with for-profit entities. Such arrangements raise tax issues that can impact the structure of any joint venture.
Unique Due Diligence Considerations Involving Nonprofit Business Combinations
Similar to business combinations involving for-profits, due diligence activities are important for business combinations involving nonprofit corporations. Many of the considerations for a for-profit business combination are important in due diligence reviews involving a nonprofit business combination. These include reviewing various information and documents relating to the other entity, including its governance documents (such as articles of incorporation, bylaws, and board policies), financial information (including audited financial statements and any audit reports), contractual arrangements, real and personal property, litigation, insurance coverages, and workforce/employees (and employee benefits).
Still, given the unique nature of nonprofits, there are other factors important to business combinations involving nonprofits that should be considered as part of the due diligence process. Below is a description of some of these considerations.
The tax-exempt status of any nonprofit involved in a business combination is important and should be confirmed through a review of the determination letter issued by the IRS. In addition, there should be a review of recent Form 990 federal tax filings for the nonprofit.
Many nonprofits are exempt from paying property taxes on their real estate as a result of being a nonprofit. This can mean significant savings to the nonprofit. Because exemption for property tax is not automatically determined on the basis of whether an entity is tax-exempt under the IRC, the parties to a business combination need to consider whether the resulting transaction will jeopardize any existing property tax exemptions.
Many nonprofits depend on public and private funding as well as bond financing. The terms of such funding and financings should be reviewed to determine whether the particular form of business combination will impact the continued existence of such arrangements. In addition, many nonprofits have institutional funds that have restrictions imposed on them by their donors. As noted above, in the context of a merger, any such funds presumptively are transferred to the surviving entity unless there are restrictions that prohibit such transfer. It is important that the restrictions be considered as part of the due diligence process to ensure that a transfer is possible and that the surviving entity is able to honor such restrictions.
As described above, a business combination involving a nonprofit corporation may require approval by the nonprofit’s members if it has any. For nonprofits with members, it is important to determine whether such “members” meet the state nonprofit corporation act’s definition of members. Typically, such definition focuses on individuals or entities that elect part or all of the board of directors. It is possible that a nonprofit may have a group of individuals designated as “members” who do not have such rights. In such circumstances, it may not be necessary to obtain their approval of the merger (or other business combination) unless the articles or bylaws of the organization mandate such approval.
As also described above, to the extent the business combination will result in an entity, other than a charitable nonprofit, as the surviving entity, it may be necessary to obtain state attorney general or court approval. Such determination should be made as part of the due diligence process.
Conclusion
A merger, asset transaction, or other business combination involving a nonprofit corporation has many characteristics that are similar to those of a business combination involving for-profit entities. Nevertheless, a business combination involving a nonprofit is not a typical M&A transaction and, due to the unique nature of a nonprofit, there are important differences that need to be addressed when considering such a business combination.
This Report addresses a subject that has never before been the sole focus of a bar association report: third-party legal opinions given by U.S. lawyers in cross-border transactions. It embodies years of work by lawyers experienced in the field.
As international transactions have become more common, requests to U.S. lawyers for cross-border opinions have increased. These opinions often raise issues that differ from those presented in purely domestic U.S. transactions, particularly when the agreement entered into by the parties chooses the law of a jurisdiction outside the United States as its governing law. These issues and other factors, such as language barriers and differences in legal systems, customs, and expectations, often make giving opinions in cross-border transactions more difficult and costly than in domestic U.S. transactions.
The recipients of cross-border opinions often are located in countries whose opinion practices are very different from those followed by U.S. lawyers. The linchpin of this Report is that the customary practice of the jurisdiction whose law is covered by an opinion letter should govern the meaning of standard language used in it and the work opinion preparers are expected to perform in preparing it.
This Report points out that some opinions that are standard in domestic U.S. transactions present challenges in a cross-border setting, and offers practical ways to address those challenges. It also analyzes special issues raised by opinions that are normally given only in cross-border transactions and suggests how they could be worded. The Report notes that sometimes legal uncertainties exist for which the parties to a cross-border transaction cannot look to a third-party legal opinion as the solution; instead those uncertainties must be dealt with by the parties in other ways with advice from their own counsel.
The purpose of this Report is to promote a better understanding of opinion practice in cross-border transactions. We hope that U.S. lawyers who give cross-border opinions and lawyers, both U.S. and non-U.S., who advise the recipients of those opinions will find this Report helpful.
Timothy G. Hoxie,
Chair, Legal Opinions Committee, ABA Business Law Section
Ettore Santucci,Reporter,
Vice Chair, Legal Opinions Committee, ABA Business Law Section
As a condition to closing financial transactions in the United States, legal counsel for one party often delivers to the other party a letter expressing counsel’s opinion on various legal issues relating to its client and the transaction. That opinion letter is commonly referred to as a “third-party closing opinion” or simply a “closing opinion.” U.S. lawyers sometimes are asked to deliver closing opinions to non-U.S. parties in similar transactions that involve both U.S. and non-U.S. parties (cross-border transactions).2Those closing opinions, which this Report refers to as “outbound opinions” because they are given by U.S. lawyers to non-U.S. recipients on matters of U.S. law, are the subject of this Report.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States opinion givers and opinion recipients share a common conceptual framework for preparing and interpreting closing opinions. U.S. customary practice3is well established with regard to many standard opinions, and guidance on what specific opinions mean, and the work required to support them, is available in bar association reports and other materials. Applying this guidance in cross-border transactions, however, is not always straightforward, and in some cases what is appropriate in a domestic U.S. transaction is not appropriate in a similar cross-border transaction. Moreover, on many issues that arise in cross-border transactions little, if any, guidance is available.
The dearth of authoritative sources on cross-border opinion practice and the absence of a shared conceptual framework between U.S. opinion givers, on the one hand, and non-U.S. opinion recipients and their counsel, on the other, create the potential for misunderstanding over such matters as: (1) what opinions U.S. lawyers are in a position to give, (2) the meaning of opinions commonly given, and (3) the work U.S. lawyers are expected to perform to support the opinions they give. The risk of misunderstanding can be compounded by differences in legal systems, legal education, opinion practice, and languages (even when documents are in English or are translated into English), and a general lack of familiarity on the part of many non-U.S. recipients and their counsel with U.S. closing opinion practice.4The potential for misunderstanding has grown as the number and type of participants in, and the complexity of, cross-border transactions have increased.
The goals of this Report are: (1) to describe what the parties in a cross-border transaction should consider when deciding whether to request a closing opinion from U.S. counsel and, if requested, which opinions are appropriate for U.S. counsel to give; (2) to clarify the application of U.S. customary practice to outbound opinions; (3) to provide guidance on the special considerations that apply to opinions commonly given in domestic U.S. transactions when those opinions are requested in cross-border transactions; (4) to identify opinions U.S. lawyers should not be asked to give in cross-border transactions and to explain why; (5) to provide guidance on both the meaning of, and the work expected to be performed to support, opinions frequently given by U.S. lawyers in cross-border transactions but not in domestic U.S. transactions; and (6) to suggest guidelines for U.S. opinion givers and counsel for non-U.S. opinion recipients to facilitate cross-border opinion practice.
II. APPLICATION OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF U.S. OPINION PRACTICE IN CROSS-BORDER TRANSACTIONS
II-1 THE THRESHOLD QUESTION
As stated in section 1.2 of the ABA Guidelines for the Preparation of Closing Opinions,5opinions to third parties “should be limited to reasonably specific and determinable matters” and the benefit of an opinion to the third-party recipient “should warrant the time and expense required to prepare it.” The opinions expressed in a closing opinion are not guarantees but rather expressions of professional judgment, and the costs of preparing them can be substantial. At the outset of a transaction the opinion giver and the opinion recipient and its legal counsel should work together to weigh the benefit the recipient seeks from each opinion it is requesting against the difficulty and expense of preparing it, as well as the difficulty of understanding its meaning and what it covers and does not cover.6In domestic U.S. transactions this cost/benefit analysis has led to requests for fewer and narrower opinions. Indeed, in some types of domestic U.S. transactions in which closing opinions were once routinely requested, closing opinions now are requested infrequently, if at all. In the cross-border setting a cost/benefit analysis is at least as important.
Many of the opinions U.S. lawyers are asked to give in cross-border transactions appear on their surface to be the same as in domestic U.S. transactions. Appearances, however, can be deceiving. For the reasons discussed in this Report, in cross-border transactions giving opinions commonly given in domestic U.S. transactions often is more difficult and costly; in some cases special assumptions, exceptions, or qualifications must be added to the opinion letter, and in other cases the opinion cannot be given at all.
Opinions given by U.S. lawyers also can be problematic from the standpoint of non-U.S. recipients. This is because U.S. opinions often cannot be understood without reference to U.S. customary practice, and for a non-U.S. recipient to understand what particular opinions do and do not cover under U.S. customary practice can be burdensome and costly.
In light of the difficulties in both preparing and interpreting outbound opinions, and of the potential for their being misunderstood by non-U.S. recipients, this Committee recommends that early in a cross-border transaction7the U.S. opinion preparers and the non-U.S. recipient (and its counsel) discuss: (1) the cost of preparing each of the opinions the recipient is considering requesting; (2) the benefit the recipient is seeking from each opinion and whether, if given, the opinion would provide that benefit; and (3) if the recipient is not familiar with U.S. customary practice, the additional cost to it in time and resources (possibly including the cost of retaining U.S. counsel) of understanding what each opinion means.
Closing opinions seldom are given in transactions that have no U.S. nexus. In cross-border transactions in which U.S. lawyers are involved, however, they sometimes are the only lawyers who are asked to deliver a closing opinion even though no good reason exists for treating the U.S. lawyers differently from the non-U.S. lawyers involved in the transaction.8This Committee recommends that, rather than automatically expecting U.S. lawyers to give opinions in cross-border transactions, non-U.S. parties and their counsel consider whether they can obtain the benefit they are seeking from a closing opinion in other or better ways (for example, by obtaining the advice of their own counsel).
II-2 U.S. CUSTOMARY PRACTICE
U.S. customary practice covers the meaning of words and phrases commonly used in closing opinions. Thus, it amplifies the meaning of standard language, supplies customarily understood limitations, and permits the opinion preparers to rely on many generally understood assumptions, exceptions, and qualifications without stating them expressly.9U.S. customary practice also establishes the scope and nature of the work the opinion preparers are expected to perform in preparing specific opinions.10Important sources of guidance on U.S. customary practice can be accessed through the Legal Opinion Resource Center maintained by the ABA Legal Opinions Committee.11
U.S. customary practice governs the preparation and interpretation of closing opinions of U.S. lawyers, whether delivered in domestic U.S. or cross-border transactions. In cross-border transactions, when giving opinions to non-U.S. recipients on matters of U.S. law, U.S. lawyers are not expected to ascertain opinion practices in the recipient’s country or any other countries connected with the transaction, much less to conform their opinion letters to those practices.12They also are not expected to determine how the opinions they are giving are being interpreted by the non-U.S. recipient or its legal counsel.
When U.S. lawyers deliver closing opinions in cross-border transactions, they necessarily rely on U.S. customary practice for the meaning and scope of the opinions they give and the work they are expected to perform to support each opinion—just as they do when giving opinions in domestic U.S. transactions. If that were not the case, opinions in cross-border transactions could not take the same abbreviated form as domestic U.S. closing opinions and instead would need to spell out—in what is probably impossible detail—all of the assumptions, exceptions, and qualifications that as a matter of U.S. customary practice are understood to be implicit.13
When a non-U.S. opinion recipient is not represented by U.S. counsel and neither the recipient nor its counsel is familiar with U.S. customary practice, the recipient runs a serious risk of misunderstanding an outbound opinion that is based on U.S. customary practice.14That risk increases when the opinion request prepared by the recipient’s non-U.S counsel uses terms not commonly used in U.S. opinions and the U.S. opinion givers respond with an opinion letter that uses standard U.S. terminology.
To help reduce the risk of misunderstanding, this Committee recommends that opinion givers include in their third-party closing opinions an express statement that the opinions they are giving are intended to be interpreted in accordance with U.S. customary practice.15That statement would: (1) alert non-U.S. recipients to the need for them to obtain informed advice regarding the meaning and scope of the opinions they are receiving; and (2) make clear, if a suit later is brought against the U.S. opinion giver in a court outside the United States, that the opinions are intended to be read, and supported by work done by the U.S. lawyers who give them, in accordance with U.S. customary practice.
Whether or not such a statement is included in an outbound opinion, U.S. customary practice necessarily governs the preparation and interpretation of closing opinions delivered by U.S. lawyers in cross-border transactions, just as it does for those delivered in domestic U.S. transactions. Not including such a statement (even if included in a draft but omitted from the final opinion letter) should not be taken to imply that U.S. customary practice does not apply. An opinion giver has no responsibility to advise an opinion recipient that U.S. customary practice applies or of its significance or to confirm that a non-U.S. recipient understands the meaning of and limitations on the opinions it is receiving. Non-U.S. opinion recipients are responsible for deciding what they need to do to understand the opinions they receive from U.S. lawyers, including, to the extent that they deem appropriate, consulting their own counsel on the application of U.S. customary practice.16A U.S. opinion giver has no responsibility to counsel the opinion recipient because the opinion recipient is not the opinion giver’s client.
II-3 OMNIBUS CROSS-BORDER ASSUMPTION
In many cross-border transactions the agreement between the parties chooses the law of a jurisdiction other than the United States as its governing law (the Chosen Law). Opinions given by U.S. counsel cover the law of a specified U.S. state (or states) and often federal U.S. law (the Covered Law). Because U.S. counsel’s opinions do not cover the non-U.S. Chosen Law, the opinion preparers necessarily must assume that each provision of the agreement (including its governing law clause) is valid, binding, and enforceable under the Chosen Law. The assumption covers the choice of law rules of the jurisdiction of the Chosen Law (the Chosen Law Country), the substantive and procedural law of the Chosen Law Country, and the procedural rules governing matters such as the jurisdiction of courts, venue, and service of process that a court in the Chosen Law Country or in another non-U.S. jurisdiction would apply if an action regarding the enforceability of the agreement were brought in that court. This Report refers to the foregoing assumption as the “Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption.” This Committee recommends that the Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption be stated expressly in outbound opinion letters.17Even if the assumption is not stated, however, this Committee believes that it should be understood to apply because non-U.S. recipients cannot expect U.S. lawyers to give opinions without assuming matters covered by the assumption (or to confirm matters under foreign laws that their opinions do not cover).
III. OPINIONS FREQUENTLY REQUESTED IN CROSS-BORDER TRANSACTIONS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO OPINIONS FREQUENTLY GIVEN IN DOMESTIC U.S. TRANSACTIONS
Some opinions frequently requested in cross-border transactions are the same as, or very similar to, opinions U.S. lawyers frequently give in domestic U.S. transactions (these opinions are discussed in Parts III-1, -2, -6, -7, and -9). In the cross-border context, however, these opinions can raise issues not presented in the domestic U.S. context that make them difficult or impossible to give, necessitate additional qualifications, or require other changes in their wording.18Other opinions frequently requested in cross-border transactions are not usually requested or given in domestic U.S. transactions (these opinions are discussed in Parts III-2, -3, and -4).
III-1 AVOIDANCE OF ENFORCEABILITY OPINIONS GIVEN “AS IF” THE AGREEMENT WERE GOVERNED BY THE LAW OF A U.S. JURISDICTION RATHER THAN THE CHOSEN NON-U.S. LAW
In domestic U.S. transactions the state whose law is covered by the closing opinion (the Covered Law State) may not be the state whose law is the Chosen Law. In that event, U.S. lawyers sometimes give an opinion on the enforceability of the agreement as if the Covered Law were the Chosen Law.19In cross-border transactions, however, when the Chosen Law is the law of a jurisdiction outside the United States, U.S. lawyers ordinarily do not give “as if” enforceability opinions for the reasons discussed below.
To give an “as if” enforceability opinion, the opinion preparers must consider how the highest court of the Covered Law State, in deciding whether to enforce the agreement, would interpret the terms of the agreement under the Covered Law (rather than the Chosen Law). Differences in how the agreement would be interpreted under the Covered Law and under the Chosen Law normally pose a serious problem for the opinion preparers when the law governing the agreement is the law of a jurisdiction outside the United States, because the agreement may use terms from the Chosen Law having no counterparts under the Covered Law. Thus, the opinion preparers have no way to make a professional judgment with the confidence needed to give an opinion as to how the highest court of the Covered Law State would interpret the agreement under the Covered Law.20Applying the “as if” approach to agreements governed by non-U.S. law also can produce a meaningless opinion because provisions that do not appear in the agreement, such as so-called “non-derogable norms” of contract law in civil law countries, may be among a cross-border transaction’s most material terms, but the opinion preparers cannot be expected to be aware of them.21
Therefore, an “as if” opinion would be of no practical use to the recipient, particularly when one considers that the parties meant for the transaction to be governed by the non-U.S. Chosen Law both to the extent that terms are stated in the agreement and to the extent that provisions of the Chosen Law otherwise apply. The opinion recipient and its non-U.S. counsel presumably know how the agreement would be enforced in the Chosen Law Country. Conversely, neither the opinion recipient nor counsel for the U.S. party knows with any degree of confidence how a court in the Covered Law State that chose to apply the Covered Law, rather than the Chosen Law, might enforce a “hypothetical” agreement (i.e., the “as if” agreement rather than the actual agreement the parties entered into). Moreover, a court in the Covered Law State would likely see no reason to apply its own jurisdiction’s law rather than the law the parties chose and, were it to do so, it would likely have little, if any, precedent to guide it. Thus, rather than speculating about hypothetical scenarios that might make an “as if” opinion meaningful, the opinion recipient would be better served by focusing on whether a court in the Covered Law State, if asked to enforce the agreement, would do what the parties intended: apply the Chosen Law. That topic is discussed in the next section of this Report, which deals with choice-of-law opinions. If a court in the Covered Law State applies the Chosen Law, it will rely on testimony from experts knowledgeable about that law and practice in the Chosen Law Country. In so doing, the court will not engage in the exercise in which the preparers of an “as if” enforceability opinion would have to engage: pretending that the agreement is governed by a law (the Covered Law) that the parties did not choose.
These interpretive problems are inherent in giving an outbound “as if” enforceability opinion on an agreement governed by non-U.S. law and create the potential for misunderstanding by the opinion recipient in a cross-border transaction. In giving that opinion U.S. opinion preparers may interpret the terms of the agreement, even those that appear to have counterparts under the Covered Law, in ways that would come as a surprise to the non-U.S. recipient because those interpretations are based on U.S. legal principles with which the recipient is not familiar. Moreover, as discussed above, the opinion preparers may not have considered material terms because, instead of appearing in the agreement itself, they are prescribed by a statute or other law of the Chosen Law Country. The non-U.S. recipient would have little or no way of knowing how the opinion preparers using the “as if” approach came to the conclusion that a court applying the Covered Law would enforce the agreement, and may not be aware that the opinion does not address what the recipient believes to be the “true” commercial bargain.
For these reasons, this Committee regards as well-advised the practice of U.S. lawyers not to give an “as if” enforceability opinion in cross-border transactions when the agreement is governed by the law of a jurisdiction outside the United States, and believes that insisting that U.S. lawyers give it normally is inappropriate.22
When the Chosen Law is the law of a non-U.S. jurisdiction, a non-U.S. party to a cross-border transaction may request an opinion from U.S. counsel for the U.S. party that, in an action relating to the parties’ agreement in a court of the Covered Law State, that court will give effect to the governing law clause and apply the Chosen Law.23In the case of contracts, many states have choice-of-law rules based on section 187(2) of the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.24Under section 187(2), a governing law clause is given effect unless one or both of the following exceptions apply: (1) the state whose law is chosen (the Chosen Law State) does not have a substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and no other reasonable basis exists for the parties’ choice of law; or (2) giving effect to the agreement under the Chosen Law would be contrary to a fundamental policy of the state whose law would have applied had the agreement not contained a governing law clause (the Default State), if the Default State has a materially greater interest in the issue than the Chosen Law State.25This Report refers to the second exception under section 187(2)—as described in clause (2) above—as the “Second Prong of the Restatement Test.”
In domestic U.S. transactions, when U.S. lawyers give an opinion on the effectiveness of a governing law clause that chooses the law of another state26and the choice-of-law rules of the Covered Law State follow the Restatement, many opinion preparers limit the opinion’s coverage of the Second Prong of the Restatement Test or avoid covering it altogether.27They do so because of the difficulty U.S. lawyers have determining with the confidence needed to give an opinion (1) whether the Covered Law would govern in the absence of a governing law clause, (2) whether the state whose law would govern—i.e., the Default State— has a materially greater interest in the issue, and (3) whether giving effect to the agreement under the Chosen Law would violate a fundamental policy of the Default State. Covering the Second Prong of the Restatement Test is even more problematic in the cross-border context because foreign legal systems are involved and each of these three determinations calls for an analysis U.S. lawyers ordinarily are not in a position to make.28
Even if the Covered Law State is, or is treated for purposes of the choice-oflaw opinion as if it were, the Default State, determining whether a fundamental policy of the Covered Law State would be violated requires the opinion preparers to have a full understanding of what the agreement provides and means under the Chosen Law.29When, as this Report assumes, the Chosen Law is the law of a jurisdiction outside the United States, U.S. lawyers will not have that understanding because of their limited, if any, familiarity with that law. Thus, they are not in a position to determine whether giving effect to the agreement as interpreted under the Chosen Law would violate a fundamental policy ofanyjurisdiction, including one of the Covered Law State.30Statutes or other laws in the Chosen Law Country may supply provisions that do not appear in the agreement or may override or modify provisions that do appear. In addition, terms in the agreement, some of which are likely to have no counterparts in U.S. law, may have a meaning under the Chosen Law that would come as a surprise to U.S. lawyers.31The inevitable imprecision of translating into English agreements written in another language32ordinarily will exacerbate the problem.33As a result, even when the terminology of the agreement looks familiar to the opinion preparers, for example because it is based on a U.S. form of agreement, they cannot be expected to know whether the terms used have the same meaning under the Chosen Law as they do under the Covered Law.
Some U.S. lawyers are unwilling to give choice-of-law opinions in cross-border transactions in which the Chosen Law is the law of a jurisdiction outside the United States. Non-U.S. recipients, however, may request this opinion and regard it as important. This Committee believes that when the choice-of-law rules of the Covered Law State follow section 187(2) of the Restatement U.S. lawyers can give an opinion on the effectiveness under the Covered Law of a governing law clause choosing the law of a jurisdiction outside the United States, but, for the reasons discussed above, only if the opinion does not cover the Second Prong of the Restatement Test.34Accordingly, this Committee recommends that, when giving choice-of-law opinions in cross-border transactions in which the Chosen Law is the law of a jurisdiction outside the United States, U.S. lawyers exclude coverage of the Second Prong by making clear in the opinion letter, by means of an express exception or assumption, that the opinion does not cover the fundamental policies of the Covered Law State or any other state or country that may be the Default State.35
An outbound choice-of-law opinion that does not cover fundamental policies under the Second Prong of the Restatement Test still covers matters important to non-U.S. recipients. Among those matters are: (1) the presence under the Covered Law of a sufficient nexus with the Chosen Law State to satisfy the first prong of the Restatement test; (2) the inapplicability under the Covered Law of mechanical rules (for example a rule that the governing law shall be the law of the place where the contract was entered into or the law of the jurisdiction with the closest relationship to the transaction) that would prevent a court in the Covered Law State from giving effect to the governing law clause; (3) the satisfaction of formal or procedural requirements under the conflict-of-laws rules of the Covered Law State; and (4) the absence of a general prohibition against application of the Chosen Law by the courts of the Covered Law State.36
When the Chosen Law is the law of a jurisdiction outside of the United States, the opinion preparers are entitled to base a choice-of-law opinion on an assumption that the agreement generally and the governing law clause specifically are valid, binding, and enforceable under the Chosen Law. For this purpose they are entitled to rely, without so stating, on the Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption.37
The parties to cross-border transactions often choose arbitration as the method for resolving disputes that may later arise between them and to that end include in their agreements mandatory arbitration clauses.38Arbitration clauses, however, would be of no value if courts were unwilling to compel the parties to arbitrate or to enforce arbitral awards made under them.39Consequently, when an arbitration clause is included in an agreement in a cross-border transaction, a non-U.S. party may ask U.S. counsel for the U.S. party for an opinion that, under the Covered Law, (1) the agreement of the parties to arbitrate is an enforceable obligation of the U.S. party and (2) an arbitral award against the U.S. party made in accordance with the clause will be recognized and enforced by courts in the Covered Law State without a re-hearing on the merits.
The United States is a signatory to the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (which is commonly referred to as the New York Convention).40As discussed in greater detail in Parts III-3.1 and III-3.2,41if the New York Convention applies to the transaction, U.S. counsel for the U.S. party usually will have no difficulty giving an opinion that, subject to the exceptions provided in the New York Convention, the agreement to arbitrate is enforceable under U.S. federal law against the U.S. party and an arbitral award made in accordance with the clause will be recognized and enforced in the United States.42This opinion does no more than confirm that the prerequisites for application of the New York Convention have been satisfied. It does not cover the applicability of any of the exceptions provided in the New York Convention, whether in the context of a suit to compel arbitration or a suit to have an arbitral award recognized and enforced.43
Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (the FAA) brings the provisions of the New York Convention into the framework of the U.S. legal system.44The FAA preempts state law if state law conflicts with or departs significantly from the policies of the New York Convention or the FAA.45While the New York Convention is not the only treaty that applies to international arbitration,46it is the most important.47This Report covers only opinions on arbitration clauses subject to the New York Convention. If the arbitration clause is not subject to the New York Convention and related provisions of the FAA, this Report does not address whether an opinion can be given.
Pursuant to section 202 of the FAA, the New York Convention applies to any arbitration agreement or foreign arbitral award arising out of an international contractual transaction. For purposes of the FAA, a transaction is not international if it is entirely between U.S. citizens, unless it otherwise involves international commerce, for example because it concerns property located outside the United States, the contract is to be performed outside the United States, or the transaction bears some other reasonable relationship to a foreign country. In addition, in the United States the New York Convention is subject to two important reservations48: (1) a reciprocity requirement that limits its application to awards made in other countries that are parties to the Convention;49and (2) a requirement that limits its application to transactions considered “commercial.”50Neither the New York Convention nor the FAA defines the term “commercial,” leaving that issue to the courts.
The New York Convention applies only to “foreign arbitral awards,” which it defines as any arbitral award that: (1) is made in the territory of a country other than the country where recognition and enforcement of the award is sought, or (2) is not considered a domestic award under the law of the country where recognition and enforcement of the award are sought.51As discussed later in this Part, the Convention’s definition of “foreign arbitral award” may present an issue for the opinion preparers if the agreement does not require that the arbitration take place outside the United States or is silent as to the location of the arbitration.52
The New York Convention promotes international arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism, and, consistent with that policy objective, U.S. courts have consistently compelled international arbitration, recognized and enforced international arbitral awards, and construed narrowly the grounds for judicial review of arbitral awards.53Outbound opinions on the enforceability under U.S. law of agreements to arbitrate outside the United States are discussed in Part III-3.1. Outbound opinions on the recognition and enforcement in the United States of future foreign arbitral awards are discussed in Part III-3.2.
III-3.1 Enforceability of the Agreement to Arbitrate
The New York Convention requires the courts of a signatory country to enforce “an agreement in writing”54in which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences that may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter “capable of settlement by arbitration.”55Giving an opinion in reliance on the New York Convention on the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate requires the opinion preparers to determine that the New York Convention applies. If the agreement to arbitrate is silent or ambiguous as to whether arbitration must take place outside the United States, or expressly allows arbitration to take place either in the United States or elsewhere, the New York Convention may not apply because an award made in an arbitration conducted pursuant to that type of agreement may not qualify as a foreign arbitral award. In those situations many opinion givers include in their opinions an express assumption that arbitration will take place outside the United States. Alternatively, they may base the opinion on an express assumption that the transaction and the dispute subject to arbitration have a sufficient foreign nexus to satisfy the second part of the definition of a “foreign arbitral award” in the New York Convention.
A court may refuse to enforce an agreement to arbitrate to which the New York Convention otherwise applies if it finds that it is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed.56Enforcement by a U.S. court of an arbitration clause under Chapter 2 of the FAA can take one of two forms. First, a party to an arbitration agreement can ask a court to compel the other party to arbitrate.57Second, if a party to an arbitration agreement brings suit in a U.S. court with respect to a matter subject to the agreement, the other party can ask the court to stay the proceeding pending arbitration.
An opinion normally can be given that an agreement subject to the New York Convention requiring arbitration outside the United States of future disputes arising in connection with a cross-border transaction is enforceable under U.S. federal law,58subject to the exceptions in the New York Convention.59To give the opinion, the opinion preparers need to satisfy themselves that the five prerequisites for application of the New York Convention and the FAA (the Five Arbitration Prerequisites) are met: (1) the parties have entered into a written agreement to arbitrate; (2) the agreement provides for arbitration in the territory of a signatory country to the New York Convention; (3) the agreement is between a U.S. and a foreign party or between foreign parties or, if it is entirely between U.S. parties, the underlying transaction is international in nature; (4) the agreement arises out of a legal relationship that qualifies as commercial under U.S. law; and (5) the agreement does not relate to a subject matter that is within one of the few categories that are not arbitrable under U.S. law. The first three requirements are primarily matters of form. The “commercial” and “arbitrable” prerequisites require the opinion preparers to reach substantive legal conclusions that will rarely be a problem in the kind of cross-border transactions in which outbound opinions typically are requested.60When the agreement selects non-U.S. law as its governing law, the opinion preparers are entitled to assume that the agreement generally and the arbitration clause specifically are valid, binding, and enforceable under the non-U.S. Chosen Law. For this purpose they are entitled to rely without so stating on the Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption.61
III-3.2 Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States
If the losing party refuses to honor a foreign arbitral award, the winner typically will seek to enforce it in the courts of a jurisdiction where the losing party has operations or assets.62An objective of the New York Convention is to make international arbitral awards that satisfy its conditions readily transportable from country to country. It does so by requiring that arbitral awards be treated as final as to the merits of the dispute and that they be recognized and enforced by courts in all signatory countries pursuant to a uniform and streamlined set of standards.63
Giving an opinion on the recognition and enforcement in the United States of a foreign arbitral award against a U.S. party requires a determination by the opinion preparers that the New York Convention applies. This is the same issue the opinion preparers are required to address when giving an opinion on the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate, as discussed earlier in this Report.
Apart from some simple formalities (producing authenticated copies of the award and the arbitration agreement with certified translations into the language of the forum court), the New York Convention allows each signatory country to establish its own procedures for enforcing foreign arbitral awards. The Convention does require, however, that signatory countries not subject the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards to substantially more onerous conditions or charges than apply to domestic awards. The United States established its procedures in Chapter 2 of the FAA.64
The New York Convention limits both the defenses that a party resisting enforcement of an arbitration award may assert and the scope of judicial review by a court in which enforcement is sought. The New York Convention lists seven grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award and provides that the list is exhaustive, not illustrative.
Only the party resisting enforcement (not the court) may assert five of the seven grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement under the New York Convention: (1) lack of legal capacity to enter into the agreement under the law applicable to the parties or invalidity of the arbitration agreement under the law chosen by the parties or otherwise applicable in the place where the award was made; (2) lack of proper notice of the arbitration to the party against whom enforcement is sought or failure of the arbitration proceedings to meet minimum standards of due process; (3) lack of jurisdiction, for example because the award relates to a dispute not covered by the arbitration agreement or exceeds the arbitrators’ authority; (4) failure of the composition of the arbitral panel or its procedure to conform to the requirements of the agreement or, if not specified in the agreement, to the law of the country where the arbitration took place; and (5) the award’s not becoming binding in, or being set aside or suspended by a competent authority of, the country in which the award was made. Consistent with the U.S. policy of favoring enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, U.S. courts generally have applied these grounds narrowly so as not to undermine the reliability of international arbitration for resolving disputes.65
Either the party resisting enforcement or the court on its own motion may raise the remaining two grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement under the New York Convention: (i) the dispute was not capable of resolution by arbitration under the law of the jurisdiction where enforcement is sought, and (ii) recognition and enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that jurisdiction. As noted above, U.S. courts have rarely held disputes arising under cross-border agreements to be non-arbitrable.66While the claim that recognition and enforcement of the award would be contrary to public policy is raised frequently, U.S. courts generally have construed that defense narrowly out of concern that refusing to give effect to an award on public policy grounds would disrupt the reliance many parties to cross-border agreements place on arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism.67
An opinion normally can be given that a foreign arbitral award made pursuant to an arbitration clause to which the New York Convention applies will be recognized and enforced in the United States under federal law,68subject to the exceptions set forth in the New York Convention.69To give the opinion, the opinion preparers need to satisfy themselves that the New York Convention and the FAA will apply to the award by determining that the Five Arbitration Prerequisites discussed in Part III-3.1 are met. The exceptions to enforceability provided by the New York Convention include a finding by the court asked to enforce the award, applying the law of its country, that the dispute was not arbitrable or that the award violates public policy.70Prior to the making of a specific award, the opinion preparers cannot determine whether an arbitral award would be subject to the exceptions in the New York Convention for arbitrability or public policy. Therefore, an opinion that a foreign arbitral award will be recognized and enforced in the United States under the New York Convention does not cover the possible application of those exceptions. While this is the case whether or not the opinion includes an express qualification to that effect, many opinion givers make clear in the opinion letter that they are not covering those exceptions, and this Committee endorses that approach.71
III-4 LITIGATION IN THE CROSS-BORDER CONTEXT
Although the parties to cross-border agreements often choose arbitration as the method for resolving disputes (in part because arbitration is governed by a network of international treaties), they also often leave disputes for the courts to decide. When they do, to avoid having to litigate in unfamiliar courts under unfamiliar laws,72they often include a clause naming the courts of one or more countries as the forum for resolving disputes relating to the agreement, as well as a choice-of-law clause, opinions on which are discussed in Part III-2. Taken together, these clauses are intended to determine both the court or courts in which suit will be brought and the law to be applied. A court named expressly in a forum selection clause is referred to in this Report as a “named court.”
When a forum selection clause is included in a cross-border agreement, the non-U.S. party may request an opinion from counsel for the U.S. party that the clause will be given effect by courts in the Covered Law State. This opinion, which is discussed in Part III-4.1, provides comfort to the non-U.S. party that courts in the Covered Law State will defer to the parties’ choice of courts when deciding whether to consider the merits of a dispute. In domestic U.S. transactions separate opinions are rarely requested or given on the enforceability of forum selection clauses.73
Non-U.S. parties to cross-border agreements that do not provide for arbitration but name a non-U.S. court as the forum for resolving disputes also may request an opinion that courts in the Covered Law State will recognize and enforce a foreign judgment rendered by the named court. This opinion, which is discussed in Part III-4.2, provides comfort to the non-U.S. party that, if it prevails in litigation before a court located in a jurisdiction outside the United States, it will be able to enforce that court’s judgment against the U.S. party in a court in the Covered Law State without a rehearing on the merits. This opinion typically is not requested in domestic U.S. transactions principally because the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires that a judgment obtained in any U.S. state be enforced in all other U.S. states.
Cross-border agreements often specify how process can be served on parties in different countries. Non-U.S. parties sometimes request an opinion from U.S. counsel that service on the U.S. party it represents in the manner specified in the agreement will be given effect in the courts of the Covered Law State. This opinion is discussed in Part III-4.4.
III-4.1 Forum Selection
This Part deals primarily with opinions on forum selection clauses that name non-U.S. courts as the forum for resolving disputes under the agreement (referred to in this Report as “outbound forum selection clauses”). This Part also deals with opinions on forum selection clauses that name courts in the Covered Law State (referred to in this Report as “inbound forum selection clauses”). Opinions on inbound forum selection clauses are not unusual when cross-border agreements name U.S. courts (often federal courts) as an alternative to non-U.S. courts.
In domestic U.S. transactions in which the agreement includes a forum selection clause a separate opinion ordinarily is not given on the effectiveness of that clause. Instead, unless expressly excluded, the enforceability of the forum selection clause usually is covered by an opinion on the enforceability under the Covered Law of the agreement of which the clause is a part.74Similarly, in cross-border transactions in which the Covered Law is the Chosen Law (for example New York law is chosen and New York courts are named), an opinion on the enforceability of the agreement under New York law covers the effectiveness of the inbound forum selection clause unless coverage of that clause is expressly excluded from the opinion.75
This Report, however, focuses on cross-border transactions in which the agreement chooses the law of a jurisdiction outside the United States as the governing law. When that is the case, U.S. lawyers are not in a position, as noted earlier, to give an opinion on the enforceability of the agreement as a whole. As a result, non-U.S. parties may ask U.S. counsel for a separate opinion that addresses whether a court in the Covered Law State applying the Covered Law would give effect to the forum selection clause specifically.76The opinion does not address the related, but different, matter of venue selection (i.e., designation in the agreement of a specific federal district court or a specific court of the Covered Law State as the only one in which suit may be brought).77
III-4.1.1 Permissive and Mandatory Forum Selection Clauses
A forum selection clause can be either permissive or mandatory. A permissive clause, often described also as a “consent to jurisdiction clause,” typically permits the parties to bring suit in courts of a specified state or country, but does not prohibit the parties from bringing suit elsewhere.78A mandatory clause requires the parties to bring suit only in the courts of the specified state or country to the exclusion of all others. Both permissive and mandatory forum selection clauses typically include the voluntary consent by the parties to the jurisdiction of the named courts.79
Cross-border agreements governed by non-U.S. law that include a forum selection clause80may provide that in the event of a dispute, the parties either: (1) may bring suit in the courts of the Chosen Law Country (referred to in this Report as a “permissive outbound forum selection clause”), or (2) shall bring suitonlyin the courts of the Chosen Law Country (referred to in this Report as a “mandatory outbound forum selection clause”).81Sometimes, a cross-border agreement either: (1) permits the parties to bring suit in courts in the U.S. state82where the U.S. party to the agreement is located or owns substantial assets (referred to in this Report as a “permissive inbound forum selection clause”), or (2) requires the parties to bring suit only in a specified court in the United States (referred to in this Report as a “mandatory inbound forum selection clause”).83
An opinion that a permissive outbound forum selection clause will be given effect under the Covered Law requires the opinion preparers to conclude that, if the non-U.S. party sues the U.S. party in the non-U.S. court named in the clause, courts in the Covered Law State, if presented with the question, would find that the consent of the opinion giver’s client to be sued in that non-U.S. court is effective under the Covered Law.84
An opinion that a permissive inbound forum selection clause naming the courts of the Covered Law State will be given effect under the Covered Law requires the opinion preparers to: (1) make the same determinations regarding personal and subject matter jurisdiction they would have to make if they were giving an enforceability opinion under the Covered Law on an agreement containing a forum selection clause naming the courts of the Covered Law State in a domestic U.S. transaction;85and (2) determine that the Covered Law does not prevent the non-U.S. opinion recipient, by reason of its status as a non-U.S. person, from bringing suit in the court or courts in the Covered Law State named in the clause.
An opinion on a mandatory outbound forum selection clause requires the opinion preparers to conclude that courts in the Covered Law State applying the Covered Law would grant the request of the non-U.S. opinion recipient to refuse to hear the case on its merits, and therefore would dismiss it, if the opinion giver’s client, contrary to the agreement, sues the non-U.S. party in those courts. This dismissal is sometimes referred to as an “ouster” of the case to the courts of the Chosen Law Country named in the agreement.
An opinion on a mandatory inbound forum selection clause requires the opinion preparers to conclude that, under the Covered Law, the parties’ choice of the named state or federal court would be given effect.
The work required to give an opinion on a permissive forum selection clause (discussed in Part III-4.1.3) is different from that required for a mandatory forum selection clause (discussed in Part III-4.1.4). Thus, an initial question for the opinion preparers is whether they should treat the clause on which they are giving an opinion as permissive or mandatory. Although, depending on the wording of a particular clause, answering that question might appear easy, it often is not for the reasons discussed below.86
As discussed later in this Part, courts in the Covered Law State may look to the non-U.S. Chosen Law when deciding whether a particular forum selection clause is permissive or mandatory.87The opinion preparers, on the other hand, would read the clause as it would be interpreted under the Covered Law in deciding whether it is permissive or mandatory.88In the event the two readings produce different results, the opinion preparers, to clarify for the recipient the manner in which they are analyzing the forum selection clause for purposes of the opinion, should consider including in the opinion letter language making clear whether they are treating the clause as permissive or mandatory.89If the opinion preparers choose not to do so, an alternative approach is for them to analyze the clause both ways—i.e., as both permissive and mandatory.90That approach, however, will require them to do additional work and that work likely will be difficult to justify on a cost-benefit basis. Moreover, depending on the Covered Law, it may not be possible to give the opinion if the clause is analyzed as both mandatory and permissive, while the opinion could have been given had the clause been treated only as permissive.91
III-4.1.2 Applicable Law
In deciding whether to give effect to a forum selection clause, a court in the Covered Law State will have to determine, as to each issue it is required to resolve, whether to apply: (1) the Covered Law, (2) the substantive law of the Chosen Law Country (the Chosen Contract Law), or (3) the procedural law of the named non-U.S. court (the Selected Forum Law).92This Report focuses primarily on the common cross-border situation in which the Chosen Contract Law and the Selected Forum Law are the law of the Chosen Law Country.93The issues a court in the Covered Law State typically will consider are: (i) whether a forum selection clause is presumptively effective under the Covered Law (this is often referred to as “enforceability in principle”); (ii) whether the specific circumstances of the case before it rebut the presumptive effectiveness of the parties’ choice of forum; (iii) whether the forum selection clause is invalidated by defects in the formation of the agreement such as fraud, duress, or mistake; (iv) whether the agreement itself is valid under the Chosen Contract Law; (v) whether the forum selection clause is permissive or mandatory; and (vi) whether it covers the dispute in question. Prior to 2006 U.S. courts generally applied the law of the state where they were located to all these issues, even when the agreement selected non-U.S. law as its governing law.94Starting with a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 2006, however, a trend has developed of applying the Chosen Contract Law to questions relating to the validity and interpretation of forum selection clauses in cross-border agreements.95 While this view has gained widespread acceptance, its acceptance is not universal.96
Therefore, when a court in the Covered Law State is asked to give effect to a forum selection clause in an agreement that chooses the law of a jurisdiction outside the United States as its governing law, the court can be expected to apply the law of the Chosen Law Country to at least some issues bearing on effectiveness of the clause, depending on the state and the wording of the agreement. The result, as discussed in detail in Part III-4.1.3 for permissive forum selection clauses and Part III-4.1.4 for mandatory forum selection clauses, is that in giving an opinion that a clause naming non-U.S. courts will be given effect under the Covered Law, the opinion preparers need to rely on assumptions regarding issues governed by non-U.S. law (such as the formation, validity, and interpretation of the contract and personal and subject matter jurisdiction of the named court), which they can do by relying on the Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption.
III-4.1.3 Opinions Addressing Permissive Forum Selection Clauses
The purpose of a permissive forum selection clause is to give a party wishing to bring a legal action the ability to bring it in any of the courts named in the clause. Thus, a clause may provide a non-U.S. party flexibility to bring suit against a U.S. party in a court in the Chosen Law Country or in a court in a U.S. state (which may be the Covered Law State) where the U.S. party has assets or operations by naming both courts. While the same flexibility might be provided by not having a forum selection clause in the agreement, having a permissive clause, particularly one stating the consent of all parties to being sued in the named courts helps ensure that the named courts will have personal jurisdiction over the parties when they otherwise might not.
An opinion that a permissive forum selection clause will be given effect under the Covered Law confirms the right of the recipient to bring suit against the U.S. party in the named courts of a jurisdiction that is named in the clause. A permissive clause does not prohibit the parties, either expressly or implicitly, from bringing suit in courts in other jurisdictions (which thus include courts in the Covered Law State if they are not named). If, however, a permissive forum selection clause does not name courts in the Covered Law State, the opinion does not address whether those courts will hear the case if suit is brought there.
Whether a clause is permissive outbound or permissive inbound, as discussed below, an opinion on its effectiveness only covers issues governed by the Covered Law. The effectiveness of a forum selection clause, however, also depends on matters that are governed by non-U.S. law, for example formation of the contract and validity of the forum selection clause under the Chosen Law.97To the extent that these matters are not governed by the Covered Law, the opinion preparers are entitled to assume that the agreement generally and the forum selection clause specifically are valid, binding, and enforceable under the Chosen Law, which they can do by relying, without so stating, on the Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption.98
III-4.1.3.1 PERMISSIVE CLAUSES NAMING COURTS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
A U.S. lawyer normally will be able to give an opinion that under the Covered Law a court in the Covered Law State will give effect to a forum selection clause permitting suit to be brought in a named court in a non-U.S. jurisdiction named in a cross-border agreement.99The opinion means that the Covered Law does not prohibit a U.S. party represented by the opinion giver from consenting to the jurisdiction of the named court and that conditions imposed by the Covered Law, if any, on the U.S. party’s agreement to be sued in the named non-U.S. jurisdiction have been met. The opinion does not mean that a court in the Covered Law State would be bound by a decision of a named non-U.S. court if the non-U.S. party later brings an action in the Covered Law State to have a foreign judgment enforced.100
As a matter of U.S. customary practice, the opinion is understood not to cover specialized federal or state statutes, rules, or regulations that may prohibit or restrict commerce with jurisdictions outside the United States in which a named court is located, unless they are addressed expressly.101The opinion also does not address the effectiveness of the submission by the opinion giver’s client to the jurisdiction of the named non-U.S. court under the Chosen Contract Law or the Selected Forum Law, which are covered by the Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption. Thus, the opinion provides a non-U.S. recipient comfort only on the narrow legal issue that the Covered Law does not shield the opinion giver’s client from its agreement to be sued by the recipient in a named court located outside the United States.
III-4.1.3.2 PERMISSIVE CLAUSES NAMING COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES
A U.S. lawyer ordinarily will be able to give an opinion that under the Covered Law a court in the Covered Law State will give effect to a permissive forum selection clause naming courts in the Covered Law State. The opinion means that the clause is enforceable against the parties because they submitted voluntarily to the jurisdiction of courts in the Covered Law State, even though the agreement requires those courts to apply the law of another country in resolving the dispute.102If the clause names a U.S. federal court as one of the courts where the parties may bring suit, the opinion means that the named federal court also will give the clause effect under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While many opinion givers do not take an exception for the possible lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction, some do.103
Giving an opinion on the enforceability of a permissive inbound forum selection clause in an agreement choosing the law of a jurisdiction outside the United States as its governing law requires the opinion preparers to be satisfied that under the Covered Law the named courts of the Covered Law State would have personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the matters covered by the clause.104The opinion preparers also must be satisfied that the Covered Law does not prevent the opinion recipient, by reason of its status as a non-U.S. person, from bringing suit in the named court in the Covered Law State as a procedural matter.105The opinion does not, however, cover issues other than jurisdiction that may impair the ability of the recipient to maintain an action in the Covered Law State, such as a failure to qualify to do business there when otherwise required to initiate suit.106If the agreement includes a waiver of the doctrine offorum non conveniens, the opinion also covers the effectiveness of the waiver, absent an express exception. If the agreement does not include such a waiver, the opinion does not cover the possible refusal of the named court to hear the case based on the application of that doctrine.107
When an agreement contains a permissive forum selection clause, different parties may bring suit in different courts over the same disputed matter. An opinion on a permissive forum selection clause does not address whether a court in the Covered Law State would grant a motion to dismiss or stay the case if one party has brought suit in that court and another party has brought suit with regard to the same disputed matter in another court.108
III-4.1.4 Opinions Addressing Mandatory Forum Selection Clauses
III-4.1.4.1 MANDATORY CLAUSES NAMING COURTS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
To give an opinion on the effectiveness under the Covered Law of a mandatory forum selection clause naming a non-U.S. court as the exclusive forum for resolving disputes, the opinion preparers need to satisfy themselves that, if the U.S. party they represent sues the other party in a court in the Covered Law State in violation of the agreement, the court will decline to consider the merits of the case.109Although state law varies, most U.S. states have adopted the so-called modern view that forum selection clauses will be given effect unless doing so would be unfair or unreasonable or violate a strong public policy of the state.110Some U.S. states, however, adhere to an older view that courts are generally free to determine for themselves whether to take jurisdiction over cases brought before them based on a variety of discretionary factors, without giving meaningful weight to the parties’ contractual choice.
III-4.1.4.2 BREMEN AND THE MODERN VIEW
The modern view was adopted in the cross-border context by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1972 inM/S Bremen & Unterweser Reederel, GmbH v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.111InBrementhe Court held112that a forum selection clause is presumptively effective and should not be set aside unless the party challenging it makes a strong showing that: (i) enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust; (ii) the clause is invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching, undue influence, or abuse of bargaining power; or (iii) giving effect to a forum selection clause when it would require the case to be dismissed in favor of another court will result in the enforcement by that other court of a contractual provision that would contravene a strong public policy of the jurisdiction where suit is brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial decision.113This Report refers to these grounds collectively as the “Bremenexception.” To protect identified classes of contracting parties from exploitative contractual terms, some states have adopted statutes codifying specific non-waivable public policy rules that the courts of those states often treat as exceptions to the enforceability of mandatory forum selection clauses naming courts in other states or countries.114
If the Covered Law State has adopted the modern view, an opinion normally can be given that under the Covered Law a court in the Covered Law State will give effect to a mandatory outbound forum selection clause when the agreement chooses the law of a jurisdiction outside the United States as its governing law115and names a court in that or another jurisdiction outside the United States as the exclusive forum for resolving disputes.116Different states, however, have adopted different versions of the modern view, and some versions may lead the opinion preparers to question whether the state whose law they are covering has, in fact, adopted the modern view. Thus, the opinion preparers need to tailor their opinion to the specifics of the Covered Law. Even if the opinion does not expressly refer to theBremenexception, an opinion on the effectiveness of a mandatory forum selection clause, whether or not it names a U.S. court, is understood as a matter of U.S. customary practice not to cover the possibility that a court, applying theBremenexception, will decline to give the clause effect.117
When giving an opinion on the effectiveness of a mandatory outbound forum selection clause, the opinion preparers need to consider whether to refer expressly to theBremenexception. In domestic U.S. transactions, the forum selection clause, which normally names a court in the Covered Law State, is covered by an opinion on the enforceability of the entire agreement under the Covered Law (which also is the Chosen Law when an enforceability opinion is given on the entire agreement).118In cross-border transactions, however, a forum selection clause often names the courts of a jurisdiction other than the Covered Law State when it is included in an agreement that does not choose the Covered Law as its governing law. When the named court is not in the Covered Law State and the Chosen Law is not the Covered Law, a court applying the Covered Law may decline to give a mandatory forum selection clause effect not only on the basis of the first two prongs of theBremenexception, but also on the basis of the third—strong public policy—prong.119Nevertheless, as in domestic U.S. transactions, an opinion on the effectiveness of a mandatory outbound forum selection clause is understood, as a matter of U.S. customary practice, not to cover the possibility that a court will decline to give the clause effect on the basis of the third prong of theBremenexception as well as the first two. Because of the greater likelihood that theBremenexception, particularly the public policy prong, will apply in cross-border transactions and because non-U.S. recipients are less likely than U.S. recipients to be familiar with theBremenexception, this Committee recommends that an express reference to theBremenexception be included in opinion letters containing opinions on mandatory forum selection clauses naming courts outside the United States.120
While the opinion only covers issues governed by the Covered Law, the effectiveness of a mandatory forum selection clause also depends on matters governed by the non-U.S. Chosen Law such as the validity of the agreement as a whole and the enforceability of the clause itself.121These matters, however, are covered by the Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption, whether stated or not, and, therefore, need not be addressed specifically in the opinion letter.122
A court in the Covered Law State may only be willing to decline jurisdiction over the case if it is satisfied that the named non-U.S. court will give effect to the parties’ choice of forum and hear the case if suit is brought in that court; otherwise the parties might not haveanyforum in which to resolve their dispute. These and other procedural matters ordinarily will be governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the named court is located (lex fori). Therefore, an opinion on a mandatory forum selection clause naming a court outside the United States must be based on an assumption that the named court will recognize the parties’ submission to its jurisdiction and decide the merits of the claims being made. As with other issues governed by non-U.S. law, such as the formation, validity, and interpretation of the contract, the personal and subject matter jurisdiction of the named court is covered by the Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption.123
To conclude, an opinion on the effectiveness of a mandatory forum selection clause naming a court outside the United States provides comfort to the non-U.S. recipient that courts in the Covered Law State will defer to the parties’ choice of the named court as the exclusive forum for resolving disputes.124This deference is particularly important for non-U.S. parties who want not only the Chosen Law to govern but also the courts of the Chosen Law Country to be the only courts that can resolve disputes relating to the agreement (for example because of their expertise in applying the Chosen Law). As discussed above, a U.S. lawyer usually will be able to give the opinion when the Covered Law State has adopted the modern view, but, whether or not the opinion letter so states expressly, the opinion is subject to theBremenexception and the Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption.
III-4.1.4.3 MANDATORY CLAUSES NAMING COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES
In the unusual case in which a cross-border agreement that does not choose U.S. law as its governing law selects courts in the Covered Law State as the exclusive forum for resolving disputes relating to the agreement, a U.S. lawyer ordinarily can give an opinion that under the Covered Law the mandatory inbound forum selection clause will be given effect.125The opinion means that the clause is enforceable against the parties because they submitted voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the named courts in the Covered Law State, even though those courts will be applying the law of another country in resolving the dispute.126The opinion does not cover issues other than jurisdiction that may prevent the recipient from maintaining an action in the named courts of the Covered Law State, such as the opinion recipient’s failure to qualify to do business in the Covered Law State when otherwise required.127The opinion does not cover venue.
Prior to 2013, federal law was unclear as to how much deference a U.S. federal court was required to give a mandatory forum selection clause if suit was brought in a federal court other than the named court. The U.S. Supreme Court clarified the law inAtlantic Marine,128holding that, so long as the federal courts have jurisdiction under federal law, federal courts are required to give controlling weight to the parties’ choice of the named court as the exclusive forum in all but the most exceptional cases.129
III-4.2 Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the United States
Because the non-U.S. parties to a cross-border agreement may obtain a judgment for breach of the agreement outside the United States but then have to enforce the judgment in the United States (where the U.S. party’s assets are located),130they may request an opinion that courts in the Covered Law State will recognize and enforce131judgments obtained in non-U.S. courts without a rehearing on the merits of the case.132As discussed below, a U.S. lawyer usually can give this opinion when the Covered Law State has a statute in effect that provides for the enforceability of foreign judgments.133
Many U.S. states have adopted a version of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act (the Uniform Act).134The Uniform Act governs the recognition of a judgment by a court of a foreign country that grants or denies recovery of a sum of money,135other than for taxes, fines, or domestic support, and that is final, conclusive, and enforceable under the law of that country, unless one of the grounds for nonrecognition specified in the Uniform Act applies. The Uniform Act provides three mandatory grounds for nonrecognition136and eight discretionary grounds.137With the exception of reciprocity as a condition for recognition of a foreign judgment,138the Uniform Act codifies general common law rules of comity.
In states that have adopted a version of the Uniform Act, U.S. lawyers normally can give an opinion that a foreign judgment against the U.S. party they represent will be recognized and enforced by a court applying the Covered Law subject to the prerequisites and exceptions set forth in the version of the Uniform Act enacted in the Covered Law State. Some opinion givers choose to spell out the precise statutory prerequisites or grounds for nonrecognition under the statute, while others limit the opinion’s coverage by incorporating the statutory prerequisites and exceptions by reference in the opinion without restating or summarizing them.139Whether the opinion so states or not, the opinion does not cover compliance with statutory prerequisites because that determination can be made only after a foreign judgment has actually been rendered.
In states that have not adopted the Uniform Act or a statute to similar effect, the law of comity normally governs the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Depending on the case law in their state, lawyers in those states may or may not be able to give an opinion under the law they are covering that a judgment by a foreign court will be recognized and enforced in the Covered Law State.140As a condition of enforcement, some states require that the courts of the foreign country where the judgment was obtained recognize and enforce, in a reciprocal manner, judgments by their state courts. A determination that the reciprocity requirement is met may be difficult or impossible to make without the advice of a lawyer with expertise in the law of the foreign country, and therefore, a U.S. lawyer who is willing to give an opinion may need to rely on an express assumption to that effect.
III-4.3 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements
In 2005 the Hague Conference on Private International Law adopted the Convention on Choice of Courts Agreements (the Hague Convention) with the goal of achieving for mandatory forum selection clauses in cross-border agreements and resulting judgments what the New York Convention achieved for arbitration clauses and resulting awards.141The Hague Convention was signed by the United States (subject to Senate consent) on January 19, 2009, and was also signed by Singapore on March 25, 2015, the European Community on April 1, 2009, and Mexico on September 26, 2007.142It is expected to be signed in the near future by Argentina, Australia, and Canada, among others. The Hague Convention came into effect on October 1, 2015.143Although commentators expect the U.S. Senate to consent to its becoming effective in the United States, full ratification by the United States likely will be delayed until implementing legislation has been enacted (as was the case with U.S. accession to the New York Convention).144
For the Hague Convention to apply to a forum selection clause, the clause must: (1) be agreed to by at least two parties, (2) be in writing or expressed in another acceptable means of communication, (3) designate the courts of one signatory country to the exclusion of all other courts for the resolution of disputes arising under the agreement, and (4) relate to international civil or commercial cases (the Four Hague Prerequisites).145The Hague Convention by its terms applies only to mandatory forum selection clauses, but it permits a signa-tory country to declare that it also will apply to permissive forum selection clauses meeting its other prerequisites.146The Hague Convention provides that: (i) the named court must hear the case if the mandatory forum selection clause is effective according to the standards established by the Hague Convention, unless the clause is null and void under the law of the named court’s country;147and (ii) if a party to the agreement commences an action in a court other than the named court, that court must dismiss the case if the complaint relates to matters covered by the mandatory forum selection clause, unless one of five exceptions applies.148The Hague Convention applies to commercial agreements and specifically excludes, among others: agreements involving consumers; employment agreements; real property and tenancies; the validity, nullity, or dissolution of business entities and the validity of decisions of their governing bodies; and the validity of intellectual property rights other than copyright unless the action is brought for a breach of contract.149
III-4.3.1 Effectiveness of Forum Selection Clause Under the Hague Convention
If it is signed and ratified by enough countries, the Hague Convention should achieve a meaningful degree of harmonization of legal standards that are currently a source of uncertainty, as discussed earlier in this Report. For example, Article 2 provides that the Hague Convention does not apply to tort or criminal claims that do not arise under the agreement, Article 3 provides that a forum selection clause shall be deemed mandatory unless the parties expressly provide otherwise, and Article 6 provides that determinations by a court that is not named in a forum selection clause as to whether an agreement is null and void must be made under the law of the jurisdiction in which the named court is located. On some of these topics U.S. courts currently are divided, and differences between their interpretation of U.S. law and the law of other countries can be meaningful. The Hague Convention also allows a court that is not named in the forum selection clause to apply, at least in part, the law of the jurisdiction where it is located (as opposed to the Chosen Contract Law or the Selected Forum Law) to some issues that bear upon the enforcement of the clause. For example, Article 6 of the Convention provides that grounds for not enforcing a forum selection clause include lack of capacity to enter into the agreement, manifest injustice, or violation of public policy, in each case as determined under the law of the jurisdiction where the court being asked to enforce a mandatory forum selection clause naming a court in another jurisdiction is located.
Assuming that the Hague Convention is ratified by the United States without additional qualifications, U.S. opinion givers should be able to give an opinion that a court in the Covered Law State will give effect to a mandatory forum selection clause that satisfies the Four Hague Prerequisites and names the courts of a jurisdiction outside the United States that is a signatory to the Convention, subject to the exceptions set forth in the Hague Convention.150To give the opinion, the opinion preparers would need to confirm that the Four Hague Prerequisites are satisfied. Because the Hague Convention provides that exceptions similar to theBremenexception can be invoked by a court not named in a mandatory forum selection clause to deny enforcement of the clause, the discussion in Part III-4.1.4.2 regarding theBremenexception would apply to opinions under the Convention.151
If a mandatory forum selection clause names a court outside the United States and the agreement containing the clause chooses non-U.S. law as its governing law, the opinion would not cover the threshold issue of whether the clause is valid under either the Chosen Contract Law or the law of the jurisdiction outside the United States where the named court is located. Because these matters are not governed by the Covered Law, the opinion preparers are entitled to assume that both the agreement generally and the forum selection clause specifically are valid, binding, and enforceable under all applicable non-U.S laws. For this purpose, the opinion preparers may rely without so stating on the Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption.152
III-4.3.2 Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments Under the Hague Convention
The Hague Convention provides that, if a court named in a mandatory forum selection clause satisfying the Four Hague Prerequisites renders a judgment on the merits153of a case and that court is in a signatory country, the courts of all other signatory countries must recognize and enforce that judgment without reviewing the merits, unless the judgment falls within one of the exceptions established by the Hague Convention.154Except for the right to review the named court’s decision to determine whether one of the exceptions set forth in the Hague Convention applies, the courts of signatory countries will be bound by the findings of fact and decisions of law of the named court. The Hague Convention provides that the amount of compensatory damages awarded is not reviewable, but allows a court of a signatory country that is asked to enforce a foreign judgment to refuse to recognize awards of punitive or exemplary damages. The enforcing court may postpone recognition and enforcement of a judgment if the named court is reviewing the case or the time limits to seek review of that court’s decision have not expired.
Assuming that the Hague Convention is ratified by the United States without additional qualifications, U.S. opinion givers normally should be able to give an opinion that a judgment by a court named in a mandatory155forum selection clause that is located in a country that is a signatory to the Hague Convention will be recognized and enforced in the United States, subject to the exceptions set forth in the Hague Convention.156To give the opinion, the opinion preparers would need to determine that the forum selection clause satisfies the Four Hague Prerequisites on the date of the opinion letter. Because the Hague Convention provides that a violation of the public policy of the country where enforcement is sought is one of the grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment, U.S. opinion preparers should not have to include an express public policy exception in their opinion letters (although to help reduce the risk of misunderstanding they may choose to do so).
III-4.4 Service of Process
Agreements in cross-border transactions often contain a provision that specifies the manner in which a party wishing to bring suit can serve process on the other party. Such a clause provides certainty and allows parties such as international lenders to avoid the complexity, cost, and delay of resorting to procedures established by multilateral conventions or bilateral treaties for international service of process if the party being sued is not in the same country as the party bringing suit.157When a cross-border agreement contains a service of process clause, non-U.S. parties sometimes request an opinion from counsel for the U.S. party that service on the U.S. party in the manner specified in the agreement will be effective under the Covered Law. This opinion addresses the non-U.S. party’s concern that a court in the Covered Law State would find service in the manner specified in the agreement inadequate to establish jurisdiction over the opinion giver’s client.
III-4.4.1 Service of Process for Suits in Named Courts Outside the United States
When the agreement contains an outbound forum selection clause naming a court outside the United States and the agreement does not choose U.S. law as its governing law, an opinion of U.S. counsel that service of process in the manner specified in the agreement is effective provides a non-U.S. recipient comfort that a court in the Covered Law State will not refuse to recognize a judgment of the named non-U.S. court against the opinion giver’s client on the grounds that the service made on the opinion giver’s client was inadequate.158The opinion does not address whether the service of process clause is effective under the Chosen Law or whether the methods specified in the clause satisfy the requirements for validly commencing the suit in the named court outside the United States. These matters, which are not governed by U.S. law, are covered by the Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption, on which the opinion preparers are entitled to rely without so stating.159
If a court in the Covered Law State is later asked to enforce a judgment of the named non-U.S. court against the U.S. party, the law of the Covered Law State will determine whether the method used to serve process for purposes of bringing suit in the named court outside the United States was permissible under the Covered Law. If it is held not to be permissible, the court in the Covered Law State will likely refuse to recognize and enforce the non-U.S. court’s judgment, even though (i) under the named non-U.S. court’s procedural rules it had personal jurisdiction over the U.S. party against whom the judgment was rendered and (ii) under the Chosen Contract Law the forum selection clause was valid.160
Giving the opinion should present no difficulty if under the Covered Law the non-U.S. party seeking to have a judgment of a court outside the United States enforced could have used the methods for service of process specified in the agreement to bring suit against the U.S. party in a court in the Covered Law State (assuming for this purpose that bringing suit in the Covered Law State is permitted under the agreement).161Thus, the opinion normally will present no difficulty when the agreement only permits service in person on the U.S. party or on its duly appointed agent.162
If the Covered Law does not clearly permit the methods for service of process specified in the agreement to be used to bring suit against the U.S. party in a court in the Covered Law State, the opinion preparers will need to consider whether service by those methods would be grounds for a court in the Covered Law State to refuse to recognize a judgment of a court outside the United States.163The laws of many states impose special conditions on, or expressly disallow, waivers of service of process and may restrict the effectiveness of service of process by mail, publication, or methods other than personal service or service on an agent, if they do not assure adequate and timely notice to a defendant that a suit has been brought against it. Depending on the method in question, the law may not be clear enough to permit an opinion to be given or may only permit a reasoned opinion.
III-4.4.2 Service of Process When Suit Can Be Brought in the United States
If a forum selection clause in a cross-border agreement choosing non-U.S. law as its governing law names courts in the Covered Law State as a forum in which the parties may bring suit to resolve disputes under the agreement, the opinion provides a non-U.S. recipient comfort that under the Covered Law service of process in the manner specified in the agreement will establish personal jurisdiction over the opinion giver’s client if the recipient sues the opinion giver’s client in those courts. The opinion also provides the non-U.S. party comfort that under the Covered Law the methods for serving process specified in the agreement will be effective if, after obtaining a judgment from a court outside the United States, the non-U.S. party sues the U.S. party in a court in the Covered Law State to enforce that judgment.164
Whether the opinion can be given will, again, depend on the methods for service of process specified in the agreement and the law of the Covered Law State. Some states have adopted statutes or rules of court specifying which methods of service of process are permissible, while others have left that matter for the courts to decide. Sometimes, the law covering a particular method specified in the agreement will not be clear enough to permit an opinion to be given or may only permit a reasoned opinion.
III-4.4.3 Service of Process Through Agents Outside the United States
Cross-border agreements often provide for the appointment by the U.S. party of an attorney-in-fact or other agent in a foreign country and permit notices to be given to the U.S. party and service of process to be made on the U.S. party through that agent. The non-U.S. party to a cross-border agreement sometimes requests an opinion of U.S. counsel that the agent has been duly and validly appointed by the U.S. party. State law in the United States generally permits the appointment of agents for service of process. If the creation and scope of the agency are governed by the Covered Law, the requested opinion normally can be given.
The non-U.S. party sometimes requests an additional opinion that under the Covered Law it is permitted to serve the U.S. party through the U.S. party’s appointed agent in the manner specified in the agreement.165Giving this opinion should present no difficulty if an opinion could be given that (i) the agent was duly appointed and (ii) as discussed earlier in this Part, the methods of service of process specified in the agreement are permissible under the Covered Law. If the agency relationship is not governed by the Covered Law (for example because it is created under an agreement governed by non-U.S. law), the opinion giver may assume the validity of the agent’s appointment under the governing non-U.S. law by relying, without so stating, on the Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption.166The opinion in that event would mean that under the Covered Law the U.S. party duly authorized, executed, and delivered the document appointing the agent,167the appointment of the agent is effective against the U.S. party, assuming the validity of the agency relationship under applicable non-U.S. law, and service can be made on the U.S. party by serving the agent.
III-5 ENTITY STATUS, POWER, AND ACTION
If an agreement designates non-U.S. law as its governing law, that law governs the validity, binding effect, and enforceability of the agreement. The Chosen Law, however, does not govern the corporate power of the U.S. party to the agreement to enter into and perform its obligations under the agreement or its authorization, execution, and delivery of the agreement. Closing opinions typically cover these matters in domestic U.S. transactions, and the non-U.S. parties to cross-border agreements ordinarily request opinions on these matters from U.S. counsel. The wording of these opinions and the work the opinion preparers are expected to perform to support them are the same in cross-border transactions and domestic U.S. transactions because the law governing them is the same—i.e., the law of the state of the U.S. party’s organization.168
In deciding whether they can give an opinion that a U.S. corporation or other legal entity has the power to enter into and perform its obligations under, and has duly authorized, the agreement (a power and authority opinion), the opinion preparers need to understand the general scope of the activities their client is committing to perform because some activities may exceed the client’s power under its organizational documents or the law under which it was formed.169To give the opinion, however, the opinion preparers do not have to consider every provision of the agreement. Rather, all they need to understand is the nature of the business activities covered by, and the general scope of their client’s undertakings in, the agreement. Ordinarily, as in domestic U.S. transactions, the activities a client is committing to perform, for example repayment of a loan with interest, purchase of goods or services, or issuance of shares of capital stock or other securities, are readily apparent based on the opinion preparers’ familiarity with the client, transaction, and agreement. When those activities are not obvious, however, for example because an agreement governed by non-U.S. law uses concepts or terminology having no counterpart in the Covered Law, the opinion preparers may wish to seek clarification.170
In the cross-border context, some aspects of due execution and delivery, such as authentication by a notary, attestation by witnesses, or special form requirements for specific types of agreements or undertakings, may be governed by the non-U.S. Chosen Contract Law or by some law other than the Covered Law, such as the law of the jurisdiction where the agreement is executed and delivered.171Because due execution and delivery are required for an agreement to be an enforceable obligation, the opinion preparers are permitted to rely, without so stating, on the Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption to the extent that they are not governed by the Covered Law.172
III-6 NO BREACH OR DEFAULT
The non-U.S. party to a cross-border agreement may ask U.S. counsel for the U.S. party for an opinion that the execution and delivery of the agreement and its performance by the opinion giver’s client will not result in a breach of or default under other contracts to which the opinion giver’s client is a party.173This opinion addresses the concern of the opinion recipient that the transaction might have an adverse effect on the U.S. party under its existing contracts, for example because the transaction would violate a negative covenant, or on the opinion recipient, for example because the transaction might expose the non-U.S. party to a claim that entering into the agreement tortiously interferes with an existing contract of the U.S. party.
When a cross-border agreement chooses non-U.S. law as its governing law, giving a no breach or default opinion can be more difficult than in a domestic U.S. transaction even though the wording of the opinion is the same. That is because the opinion requires an understanding of the specific contractual obligations the opinion preparers’ client is undertaking (not just the transaction’s general scope and structure as is required to give a power and authority opinion) and the opinion preparers cannot be expected to have expertise in the non-U.S. law governing those obligations. Nevertheless, giving a no breach or default opinion may be possible to the extent that the opinion preparers do not need a complete understanding of every obligation their client is undertaking but instead only of those obligations being undertaken by the client pursuant to the agreement that could result in a breach of or default under the particular contracts to which the client is already a party that the opinion preparers specify they are covering in the opinion.174What those obligations are in a particular situation, and therefore whether the opinion can be given, will depend on: (1) the nature of the transaction and (2) the terms of the contracts being covered by the opinion. For example, for U.S. counsel to give a no breach or default opinion in a cross-border loan transaction in which the loan agreement is governed by German law, the opinion preparers need not have the level of understanding of the agreement they would need when giving an enforceability opinion on behalf of the U.S. borrower in a comparable domestic U.S. transaction on a loan agreement choosing the Covered Law as its governing law. Instead, all the opinion preparers need is an understanding of those provisions of the loan agreement (for example the granting of a security interest) that may cause other contracts to which the borrower is already a party to be breached.
Recognizing that they may not fully understand each and every obligation their client is undertaking under an agreement governed by non-U.S. law, the opinion preparers nevertheless may decide, depending on the nature of the agreement, its complexity, and other factors, that they can give a no breach or default opinion based on their general familiarity with the client, the transaction, and the agreement.175In making that decision, the opinion preparers may choose to seek additional clarification about the client’s obligations from their client or from counsel knowledgeable about the Chosen Law.176
Normally a company is a party to many contracts, only some of which are likely to be of practical concern. Therefore, the parties and their counsel should identify which contracts are to be covered by the opinion and consider the practicality of doing the work needed to address them.177The contracts identified for coverage may include contracts governed by the law of a jurisdiction other than the Covered Law State. In domestic U.S. transactions, when a contract covered by a no breach or default opinion chooses as its governing law the law of another U.S. state, U.S. customary practice permits the opinion preparers to interpret that contract as lawyers in the Covered Law State would understand it.178
This approach applies whether or not stated, but to help reduce the risk of misunderstanding, some U.S. lawyers spell it out in their opinion letters.179
When a no breach or default opinion covers contracts governed by the law of a U.S. state other than the Covered Law State, the same approach works as well for cross-border transactions as it does for domestic U.S. transactions. That approach does not, however, work well if the opinion preparers are asked to give a no breach or default opinion covering contracts governed by the law of a jurisdiction other than a U.S. state. Foreign contracts to which the opinion giver’s client is a party are likely to contain terms that are unfamiliar to a U.S. lawyer and their interpretation may depend on legal concepts that do not have counterparts in U.S. law. Foreign contracts also may incorporate (with or without explicit reference) provisions supplied by statutes in the non-U.S. jurisdictions whose law they choose as their governing law. Thus, foreign contracts may have a meaning that is materially different from what the opinion preparers would think if they based their analysis on the approach permitted by U.S. customary practice for interpreting contracts governed by the laws of U.S. states other than the Covered Law State. Therefore, U.S. lawyers giving no breach or default opinions should not be expected to cover contracts that are governed by the law of jurisdictions outside the United States.180
In addition to a no breach or default opinion, non-U.S. opinion recipients (like opinion recipients in domestic U.S. transactions) sometimes request an opinion that the execution, delivery, and performance of the agreement will not violate judgments, injunctions, orders, or decrees to which the opinion giver’s client is subject. The analysis discussed above for giving a no breach or default opinion in a cross-border transaction also applies to giving this opinion. As they do when identifying contracts to be covered by a no breach or default opinion, the parties and their counsel should discuss early in the transaction whether judgments, injunctions, orders, or decrees are to be covered and, if so, how they should be identified in the opinion letter.
III-7 NO VIOLATION OF U.S. STATUTES, RULES, OR REGULATIONS; NO APPROVALS OR FILINGS
Opinion recipients sometimes request an opinion that execution and delivery of an agreement by the company do not, and performance by the company of its obligations under the agreement will not, violate statutes, rules, and regulations under the Covered Law.181This opinion covers statutes, rules, and regulations that, if violated, will subject the company to a fine, penalty, or other governmental sanction.182
Despite its apparent breadth, a no violation opinion does not cover all statutes, rules, and regulations of the Covered Law because no lawyer, no matter how diligent, can reasonably be expected to be familiar with every law that might possibly apply. Instead, as a matter of U.S. customary practice, the opinion is understood to cover only statutes, rules, and regulations183that a lawyer in the Covered Law State exercising customary professional diligence would reasonably be expected to recognize as being applicable to the entity, transaction, or agreement to which the opinion relates.184Moreover, as a matter of U.S. customary practice, even some laws that are clearly applicable, such as tax, insolvency, and securities laws, are not covered unless an opinion refers to them expressly.185
A no violation opinion in a cross-border transaction raises the same issues as its counterpart in a domestic U.S. transaction: (1) what statutes, rules, and regulations would the opinion preparers, exercising customary professional diligence, reasonably be expected to recognize as being applicable to the entity, transaction, or agreement to which the opinion relates; and (2) which statutes, rules, and regulations, even if applicable, should be understood not to be covered unless they are addressed expressly. The answers to these questions are not always clear in domestic U.S. transactions; they are even less clear in cross-border transactions because of the absence of a consensus over which statutes, rules, or regulations among those specifically applicable to cross-border transactions should be understood to be covered. In addition, the answers may differ from transaction to transaction. As a result, although practice varies, in cross-border transactions many opinion givers include anon-exclusivelist of statutes, rules, and regulations that may apply but that they nonetheless are not covering.186
As a technical matter a U.S. party’s execution, delivery, or performance of its obligations under the agreement may not “violate” some U.S. statutes, rules, and regulations relating to cross-border transactions. For example, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or “CFIUS,” a federal interagency committee empowered to review foreign investments in U.S. companies for national security concerns, has the power to require that the parties to an agreement mitigate those concerns, or, if they cannot be mitigated, to block a transaction. The parties can submit the transaction to CFIUS for pre-closing review, which prevents CFIUS from reviewing a completed transaction or ordering post-closing mitigation. While a pre-closing filing with CFIUS is voluntary, and thus a failure to make the filing does not violate a U.S. statute or regulation, the consequences of a failure to file can be significant (including divestiture).187Thus, if a pre-closing filing is not being made, many U.S. lawyers expressly exclude CFIUS review from the coverage of their no violation opinions.188
One way opinion givers can help reduce the risk of misunderstanding about the coverage of a no violation opinion in a cross-border transaction is for them to include in the opinion letter: (1) a general statement that the opinion only covers statutes, rules, and regulations that a lawyer in the Covered Law State exercising customary professional diligence would reasonably be expected to recognize as being applicable to the entity, transaction, or agreement to which the opinion relates; and (2) a non-exclusive list of specific U.S. statutes, rules, and regulations affecting cross-border transactions that might be applicable but nevertheless are not covered.189Many specialized statutes, rules, and regulations (mostly federal) that rarely apply to domestic U.S. transactions apply to similar cross-border transactions because non-U.S. parties are involved or performance is to occur outside the United States.190Whether these laws apply to a particular cross-border transaction often depends on many factors, including the nationality of entities that are not the opinion giver’s clients or that may be controlled, directly or indirectly, by persons from different jurisdictions. Often in these situations the opinion preparers cannot determine the relevant facts with the confidence needed to give an opinion.191In addition, many of these statutes, rules, and regulations have an expansive reach and their possible impact on a particular cross-border transaction may be uncertain because of the broad discretion they grant to the agencies of the U.S. federal government charged with their interpretation and enforcement.192A non-exclusive list of statutes, rules, and regulations not covered by a no violation opinion on a cross-border agreement, if tailored thoughtfully to the circumstances, will make the opinion clearer and help reduce the cost of its preparation.
In many cross-border transactions, in the course of advising their clients the parties’ own counsel identify particular U.S. statutes, rules, and regulations that may be applicable to the entity, transaction, or agreement, and then help their clients structure the transaction to comply with those statutes, rules, and regulations, or to take advantage of available exemptions.193When the opinion preparers are willing to cover those statutes, rules, or regulations in a no violation opinion, for example because they have done the work to ensure compliance, they can reduce the risk of misunderstanding over the opinion’s coverage by referring expressly in the opinion letter to the particular statutes, rules, and regulations they are covering.194
Because customary practice for no violation opinions in cross-border transactions is continuing to evolve, the opinion preparers should discuss with the recipient early in the transaction which of the many specialized statutes, rules, and regulations that might apply to the entity, transaction, or agreement they are prepared to cover in the opinion. In those discussions, each side should be guided (as in domestic U.S. transactions) by the practicality of addressing particular statutes, rules, or regulations, considering such matters as the degree of certainty that is possible, the significance of specific statutes, rules, or regulations to the particular transaction, and the cost of performing the additional work, if any, required to give the opinion.195
In addition to a no violation opinion, non-U.S. opinion recipients (like opinion recipients in domestic U.S. transactions) sometimes request an opinion that the execution and delivery by the opinion giver’s client of the agreement and the consummation by it of the transactions contemplated by the agreement do not require, except as set forth in the opinion, any consent, approval, license, or exemption by, order or authorization of, or filing, recording, or registration by the opinion giver’s client with, any governmental authority pursuant to the Covered Law.196Some of the U.S. statutes, rules, and regulations that apply to cross-border transactions provide for review or approval by or require filings with the federal government. The analysis in this Part III-7 also applies to no approvals or filings opinions in cross-border transactions. If specific approvals or filings are to be covered, they should be identified in a similar manner early in the transaction.
If the agreement chooses non-U.S. law as its governing law, to give either a no violation or no approvals or filings opinion, the opinion preparers need to have a general understanding of the transaction and the obligations the parties are undertaking in the agreement as interpreted under the Chosen Law. What they need to do to gain that understanding and to conduct the necessary legal analysis under the Covered Law will depend on the statutes, rules, and regulations to be covered and may require advice from others about the transaction or agreement.197In many cases an understanding comparable to that required to give a no breach or default opinion (which is discussed in Part III-6) may suffice. When, however, the opinion covers specialized statutes, rules, or regulations specifically affecting cross-border transactions, giving the opinion may require a more in-depth understanding of matters covered by the Chosen Law, such as the legal status of the transaction, the respective rights and obligations of the parties under the agreement, and the status, domicile, and affiliations of non-U.S. parties.198In some cases, the opinion preparers may not be able to gain a sufficient understanding to give an opinion.
III-8 SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Depending on the circumstances, under U.S. law, the federal government, the governments of the various states, and the governments of foreign nations, as well as their respective instrumentalities, may be immune from suit and from having their properties attached by creditors and claimants.199Sovereigns can waive their immunity and ordinarily are not immune when they act in a private or commercial capacity. The scope of sovereign immunity for states, their agencies, and their instrumentalities, as well as political subdivisions of the state, including counties and municipalities and their instrumentalities, is a matter of state law and differs from state to state.200Federal law governs the immunity of the U.S. government, its agencies, and its instrumentalities.201A federal statute, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA),202governs the immunity in the United States of foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities.
III-8.1 Opinions Addressing the Immunity of U.S. Parties
In a cross-border transaction, the non-U.S. party sometimes asks for an opinion from counsel for the U.S. party that neither the U.S. party nor its property is entitled to sovereign immunity under federal law or the law of the Covered Law State.203This opinion typically deals with both aspects of sovereign immunity: the absence of immunity from the jurisdiction of courts in the Covered Law State (including legal process required to commence a suit or to enforce a foreign judgment in those courts) and the absence of immunity from attachment of assets (which a plaintiff may seek before or after obtaining a judgment).204Normally U.S. lawyers can give this opinion either because (1) the U.S. party is a private business entity and not under the control of the federal government, a state government, or another entity that is entitled to sovereign immunity (a U.S. sovereign); or (2) the U.S. party has legally waived sovereign immunity.
When the U.S. party is a private business and the opinion recipient knows that the U.S. party is neither a U.S. sovereign nor controlled by one, the U.S. party’s inability to claim sovereign immunity is self-evident, and an opinion that it is not entitled to sovereign immunity serves no purpose and ordinarily should not be requested. Nevertheless, should an opinion be requested and given, to satisfy themselves that their client is a private business not under the control of a U.S. sovereign, the opinion preparers may rely on express factual assumptions or a certificate from an officer of the client regarding the client’s owners and the absence of voting or other arrangements that would subject it to the control of a U.S. sovereign.
If the U.S. party is an agency or instrumentality of a U.S. sovereign, it may or may not be entitled to sovereign immunity depending on the circumstances of the specific transaction and applicable federal and state law. For example, U.S. sovereigns generally are not immune when they engage in commercial activities or enter into or perform agreements involving commercial activities. Generally, however, the opinion preparers will start with a presumption that, if their client is a state or the federal government, a state or federal agency or instrumentality, or a political subdivision of a state such as a county or municipality, it is entitled to immunity absent a clear provision to the contrary in the Covered Law.
Determining with confidence that a U.S. sovereign is engaging in a commercial transaction and is not therefore entitled to sovereign immunity under the Covered Law with respect to the agreement covered by the opinion often is difficult and, therefore, giving an unqualified opinion to that effect may be impossible. That, however, ordinarily is not an opinion problem because despite the possible, or even likely, availability of an exception from sovereign immunity for the commercial activities of a U.S. sovereign (or of some other exception under the Covered Law), the non-U.S. party ordinarily will insist on including in the agreement a provision that unconditionally and irrevocably waives the U.S. party’s sovereign immunity with respect to its obligations under the agreement. In the absence of such a waiver, U.S. lawyers ordinarily are unwilling to give an opinion that a U.S. sovereign is not immune or at the most will give only a qualified, reasoned opinion.
When an opinion on sovereign immunity is based on a contractual waiver, it means that, under the Covered Law: (i) the U.S. party’s constituent documents and any enabling legislation and implementing regulations give the U.S. party the power (corporate or governmental) to grant the waiver,205(ii) the U.S. party has taken all action (corporate or governmental) required to waive sovereign immunity,206and (iii) the waiver is valid and binding and cannot be uni-laterally withdrawn or revoked by the U.S. party or by the U.S. sovereign of which it is an agency or instrumentality.207
Although a waiver of sovereign immunity may be worded broadly to cover more than the U.S. party’s obligations under the agreement, the opinion should be drafted to cover only the non-U.S. party’s ability under the Covered Law to bring suit to enforce the agreement against the U.S. party, to execute a judgment obtained in such a suit, and to attach the assets of the U.S. party pursuant to such a judgment.208
If the agreement containing the waiver chooses non-U.S. law as its governing law, the opinion may be based, without so stating, on the Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption to the extent that the waiver’s effectiveness depends on the Chosen Law or some other non-U.S. law.209
III-8.2 Opinions Addressing the Immunity of Non-U.S. Parties
U.S. counsel representing a party that is, or may be, a foreign state or one of its agencies or instrumentalities (a foreign sovereign) in a transaction in the United States sometimes is asked for an opinion that, under the FSIA, the foreign sovereign is not entitled to sovereign immunity in the United States with respect to the transaction. Under the FSIA, (1) a foreign sovereign is immune from suit in federal and state courts in the United States, and (2) property in the United States of a foreign sovereign is immune from attachment and execution, except as otherwise specifically provided in the FSIA.210The FSIA provides seven specific exceptions from immunity, one of which is a waiver of immunity by a foreign sovereign.
In the absence of a waiver, the exception most often applicable in the types of transactions in which a closing opinion typically is requested is for activities of a foreign sovereign that are commercial in nature and that either are carried on in the United States or are the direct effect in the United States of a foreign sovereign’s commercial activity elsewhere.211Other exceptions may be available in specific circumstances.212However, rather than relying on the commercial nature of the transaction or another exception to sovereign immunity provided by the FSIA, U.S. parties typically require a non-U.S. party that might be a “foreign state” as defined in the FSIA to waive sovereign immunity through an express, unconditional, and irrevocable waiver in the agreement itself.213
A U.S. lawyer ordinarily can give an opinion that a foreign sovereign’s waiver of sovereign immunity is valid, binding, and effective under the FSIA.214The opinion, however, would not cover matters not governed by the Covered Law such as: (i) the foreign sovereign’s status, power, and authority to waive sovereign immunity; (ii) governmental approvals required for the waiver to be valid and binding in the foreign sovereign’s jurisdiction; (iii) effectiveness of the waiver under the law chosen to govern the agreement (if not the Covered Law) or under mandatory provisions of foreign law; or (iv) the foreign sovereign’s right to revoke the waiver.215
If a non-U.S. party has not waived sovereign immunity, whether an opinion can be given that the non-U.S. party is not immune under the FSIA depends on the circumstances. The opinion preparers could give an unqualified opinion if they are able to conclude with sufficient confidence that the non-U.S. party is not a “foreign state” as defined in the FSIA.216In rare situations a U.S. lawyer may believe, but not with the confidence needed to give an unqualified opinion, that a foreign sovereign’s activities in the transaction are commercial in nature and, therefore, fall within the FSIA exception for commercial activities; if so, if asked, the lawyer may be willing to give a qualified, reasoned opinion to that effect.
III-9 NO REQUIREMENT TO QUALIFY TO DO BUSINESS IN THE UNITED STATES
Lenders sometimes request an opinion that making a loan and, in the case of a secured loan, taking a security interest in a borrower’s property217will not require the lender to qualify to do business as a foreign company in the Covered Law State.218This opinion ordinarily is requested only when a non-U.S. lender is making a loan to a borrower in the Covered Law State and the lender is not otherwise conducting activities, and therefore is not qualified to do business generally, in that state. Although this opinion was once common, today it is rarely requested or given in domestic U.S. transactions. Some non-U.S. lenders, however, continue to request it in cross-border transactions. If the opinion is requested, U.S. lawyers ordinarily are willing to give it (if they are willing to give it at all) only when the transaction is a bank loan.219The opinion is not typically requested, and is almost never, if ever, given in transactions such as cross-border joint ventures or investments in U.S. businesses by non-U.S. parties because of the difficulty of analyzing a complex web of contractual rights and obligations and of concluding with the confidence needed to give an opinion that none of the non-U.S. party’s activities contemplated by the agreement will constitute “doing business” in the Covered Law State.
Some U.S. lawyers are willing to give the opinion with respect to activities of a non-U.S. lender contemplated by the agreement, but only when the Covered Law clearly provides that those activities do not require the lender to qualify to do business in the Covered Law State. The activities covered by the opinion ordinarily should be limited to the lender’s making a loan to a borrower in, or obtaining a guaranty from a guarantor in, the Covered Law State and its taking a security interest in collateral located there.220To give the opinion, the opinion preparers do not have to determine whether the lender’s possible future activities in the Covered Law State, such as exercising remedies under the loan agreement against a borrower or guarantor or enforcing rights against collateral, would constitute “doing business” under the Covered Law.221
Sometimes non-U.S. lenders request an opinion that covers additional matters under the Covered Law, such as licensing requirements, treatment as a resident for tax or other purposes, and exposure to being sued in the Covered Law State. Such requests are generally inappropriate because they relate to matters as to which the lender should be seeking advice from its own counsel rather than counsel for the borrower.222
IV. OTHER OUTBOUND OPINION ISSUES: SOME GUIDELINES FOR CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT
Although this Report covers most of the opinions that are commonly given by U.S. lawyers in cross-border transactions,223it does not cover every opinion a non-U.S. party may request. Moreover, non-U.S. parties and their counsel may seek formulations of opinions that are different from what U.S. lawyers commonly use. Thus, notwithstanding the guidance provided by this Report, opinion giving in cross-border transactions will continue to present challenges and opportunities for misunderstanding.224
Bar groups in the United States have articulated a Golden Rule225to provide guidance on what opinions U.S. lawyers can properly be asked and expected to give in domestic U.S. transactions.226The Golden Rule, however, does not translate easily to cross-border opinion giving.227That is principally because the Golden Rule relies on an assumption that the opinion giver and counsel for the recipient will be in analogous but opposite positions in other transactions. That assumption does not hold true when opinion givers and recipients’ counsel practice in different countries having different legal systems, rules of professional conduct, and opinion practices. Moreover, the opinions requested and given in one country are often different from those requested and given in another, and market expectations are different as well.228
While opinion discussions between U.S. lawyers and non-U.S. counsel for the recipient present challenges that U.S. lawyers on opposite sides do not face in domestic U.S. transactions, this Committee believes that the guidelines below, which derive in part from experience with the Golden Rule, will facilitate the giving of opinions in cross-border transactions, and often will reduce friction and cost, if followed by all parties and their counsel.
First, lawyers give opinions in accordance with the customary practice of the jurisdiction in which they practice and should not be expected to know or take into account any other jurisdiction’s practice.229
Second, the parties to a cross-border agreement and their counsel should consider whether the cost of preparing each opinion requested is justified by its benefit to the recipient in the specific transaction.230
Third, a non-U.S. recipient should not insist on receiving an opinion simply because U.S. lawyers give it in domestic U.S. transactions.231If the opinion is one that a non-U.S. recipient does not regularly ask non-U.S. lawyers to give in comparable circumstances, questions can legitimately be raised why it is asking U.S. counsel to give that opinion and whether the opinion’s benefit to the recipient justifies the cost to the opinion giver’s client. Conversely, if the opinion is one that is both regularly requested in the recipient’s jurisdiction and regularly given by U.S. lawyers in domestic U.S. practice, and the incremental cost of preparing it in a cross-border transaction is not significant, a question can legitimately be raised why a U.S. lawyer is refusing to give it to a non-U.S. recipient even though non-U.S. counsel for the recipient, acting under its jurisdiction’s practice, would not give an analogous opinion if the roles were reversed.
Fourth, opinion preparers and counsel for the recipient should always deal with each other professionally and should not treat a closing opinion as a bargaining chip in an economic exchange. Each side should work in good faith to bridge gaps in opinion coverage and achieve a sensible result for all parties under the circumstances. Gaps, however, cannot always be bridged; when U.S. counsel is unable to give a requested opinion, the non-U.S. party is put on notice that a legal issue may exist and faces a choice, with advice from its own counsel, between proceeding without a third-party legal opinion on the issue or changing the terms of the transaction to address the issue (if possible).232The opinion process should not be approached as a game in which one side wins and the other side loses.233
Fifth, non-U.S. counsel for the recipient should recognize that U.S. opinions are normally worded in particular ways and should not press U.S. opinion givers to deviate from commonly used language for which U.S. customary practice supplies a well-understood meaning (referred to as “customary usage”).234Customary usage is more than a matter of style. Sometimes, opinion requests by a non-U.S. party use different words and phrases than a U.S. opinion giver would use. The requested wording may stem from differences in law or practice between jurisdictions and not necessarily signal a substantive opinion issue. Misunderstandings and delays can be reduced if non-U.S. recipients and their counsel are sensitive to the importance to U.S. opinion givers of adhering to customary usage and, therefore, are willing to accept opinion language commonly used in the United States even if that language does not track the language of the initial opinion request.
Sixth, non-U.S. recipients should not treat an opinion given by U.S. counsel as providing anything more than U.S. counsel’s professional judgment on the particular legal issues the opinion addresses. They should not expect U.S. opinion givers to provide confirmations of what are essentially factual, rather than legal, matters or to state a lack of knowledge of acts or events.235The parties to a transaction should look to their own counsel to advise them on legal matters, structure the transaction, and negotiate agreements. This is particularly important in transactions involving countries where opinion practice is not well established and each party is represented by lawyers with the necessary expertise to advise it on the relevant issues without incurring the cost and delay of negotiating and preparing a third-party opinion.
V. CONCLUSION
When U.S. lawyers give opinions in cross-border transactions, they have to deal with legal and interpretive issues that do not arise in domestic U.S. transactions. In addition, they have to deal with expectations of non-U.S. opinion recipients that often are different from those of U.S. recipients. These factors, as well as others discussed in this Report, create a greater risk of misunderstanding in cross-border opinion practice than in domestic U.S. opinion practice.
U.S. lawyers rely on U.S. customary practice when giving opinions in cross-border transactions, just as they do in domestic U.S. transactions. As a result, non-U.S. parties and their non-U.S. counsel must be prepared to commit the time and resources (possibly including retaining U.S. counsel to advise them) required for them to understand the opinions being given. Early in a cross-border transaction counsel for the parties should discuss: (1) the work required to deliver each requested opinion, (2) the cost of preparing each opinion requested compared to its benefit to the recipient, and (3) the assumptions, exceptions, and qualifications that are required to give the requested opinions.
One way of reducing the risk of misunderstanding in cross-border transactions is for U.S. opinion givers to spell out in their opinion letters assumptions, exceptions, or qualifications that do not have to be stated in opinion letters in domestic U.S. transactions. The goal of doing so is greater clarity for the benefit of both non-U.S. opinion recipients and non-U.S. courts that later may be called upon to interpret the opinion letter. To achieve that goal, the opinion preparers should seek to strike the right balance between specificity in the opinion letter’s language and reliance on U.S. customary practice, which provides that commonly understood assumptions, exceptions, and qualifications apply whether stated or unstated.
In some cases legal uncertainties will require that exceptions be taken to opinions being given or may make it impossible to give an opinion. In those cases, the parties, working together and with advice from their own counsel, will need to deal with those uncertainties by finding ways to reduce or allocate the risks they pose. Third-party legal opinions, either in domestic U.S. or in cross-border transactions, should not be expected to—and in any event cannot—bridge gaps that the parties are unwilling or unable to fill.
This Committee hopes that this Report will help U.S. lawyers who give opinions in cross-border transactions and lawyers, both U.S. and non-U.S., who advise the recipients of those opinions gain a better understanding of U.S. opinion practice so as to facilitate both requesting and giving outbound opinions on matters subject to U.S. law.
APPENDIX A: LIST OF DEFINED TERMS
ABA Guidelines, p. 143
ABA Principles, p. 141
Bremenexception, p. 179
Brussels Regulation, p. 170
CFIUS, p. 202
Chosen Contract Law, p. 172
Chosen Law, p. 147
Chosen Law Country, p. 147
Chosen Law State, p. 151
closing opinion, p. 141
CLLS Opinion Guide, p. 142
coverage limitation, p. 147
Covered Law, p. 147
Covered Law State, p. 148
customary usage, p. 216
cross-border transactions, p. 141
Default State, p. 151
FAA, p. 156
Five Arbitration Prerequisites, p. 161
Foreign Money Claims Act, p. 186
foreign sovereign, p. 207
Four Hague Prerequisites, p. 189
FSIA, p. 207
Glazer Treatise, p. 144
Golden Rule, p. 214
IBA Report, p. 141
Hague Convention, p. 166
Hague Service Convention, p. 193
inbound forum selection clauses, p. 167
lex fori,p. 147
mandatory outbound forum selection clause, p. 169
mandatory inbound forum selection clause, p. 169
Model Law, p. 155
modern view, p. 172
named court, p. 166
New York Convention, p. 155
Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption, p. 147
outbound forum selection clauses, p. 167
outbound opinions, p. 141
Panama Convention, p. 156
permissive inbound forum selection clause, p. 169
permissive outbound forum selection clause, p. 169
power and authority opinion, p. 197
reciprocity requirement, p. 157
Rome II Regulation, p. 180
Second Prong of the Restatement Test, p. 151
Selected Forum Law, p. 172
Statement on Customary Practice, p. 142
third-party closing opinion, p. 141
TriBar 1998 Report, p. 154
TriBar Remedies Opinion Report, p. 148
TriBar Supplemental Chosen-Law Report, p. 152
UNCITRAL, p. 155
Uniform Act, p. 186
U.S. customary practice, p. 141
U.S. sovereign, p. 208
APPENDIX B: ILLUSTRATIVE OPINION LANGUAGE, INCLUDING SELECTED ASSUMPTIONS, EXCEPTIONS, AND QUALIFICATIONS
The following language, which also appears in various footnotes in this Report (as indicated below in parentheses), is intended only as illustrative of how certain opinions and related assumptions, exceptions, and qualifications discussed in this Report could be drafted. The illustrative language may need to be customized to suit the circumstances of particular transactions and applicable law. Also, this Report contains numerous suggestions as to the phrasing of the opinion as well as related assumptions, exceptions, and qualifications, both in text and in footnotes, concerning the opinions covered by the illustrative language that the opinion preparers may want to consider when drafting their opinion letters.
ASSUMPTIONS, EXCEPTIONS,ANDQUALIFICATIONS
1.Reference to U.S. customary practice(seenote 15 and accompanying text):
Alternative 1:This opinion letter shall be interpreted in accordance with the Legal Opinion Principles prepared by the Legal Opinions Committee of the American Bar Association’s Business Law Section as published in 53 BUS.LAW. 831 (1998)[, a copy of which is attached to this opinion letter].
Alternative 2:This opinion letter shall be interpreted in accordance with the customary practice of United States lawyers who regularly give, and lawyers who regularly advise recipients regarding, opinions of the kind included in this opinion letter.
2.Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption(seenote 17 and accompanying text):
We have assumed that the choice of the law of [FOREIGN COUNTRY] in the Agreement is valid and the Agreement and each of its provisions are valid, binding and enforceable under the law of [FOREIGN COUNTRY] and of any other jurisdiction whose law applies, other than law covered expressly in an opinion included in this opinion letter. [IF THE AGREEMENT CONTAINS A FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE, ADD—We also have assumed that, other than the courts of [COVERED LAW STATE] and United States federal courts, any court named in the forum selection clause of the Agreement will have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of any action brought in that court under the Agreement.]
3.Bremenexception for opinions on the validity of forum selection clauses(seenote 120 and accompanying text):
The opinion in numbered paragraph __ is limited to the extent that a court may decline to give effect to the forum selection clause in Section __ of the Agreement because enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust under the principles enunciated in the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in M/S Bremen & Unterweser Reederel, GmbH v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 402 U.S. 1 (1972) and in related cases, including that it would contravene a strong public policy of [COVERED LAW STATE].
4.Interpretation of contracts for purposes of the no breach or default opinion(seenote 179 and accompanying text):
We have interpreted the provisions of the contracts addressed by the opinion in numbered paragraph __ as those provisions would be understood in [COVERED LAW STATE] whether they are governed by the law of [COVERED LAW STATE] or by the law of another jurisdiction.
OPINIONS
1.Validity of choice of non-U.S. law(seenote 35 and accompanying text):
Under the law of [COVERED LAW STATE], the choice of the law of [FOREIGN COUNTRY] in the Agreement is valid except to the extent that giving effect to the law of [FOREIGN COUNTRY] would violate a fundamental policy of (i) the jurisdiction whose law is covered by this opinion letter or (ii) any other jurisdiction having a materially greater interest than [FOREIGN COUNTRY] in the determination of the issue, if the law of that jurisdiction would apply to the Agreement or any of its provisions in the absence of a governing law clause.
2.Enforceability of cross-border arbitration clause(seenote 59 and accompanying text):
The arbitration clause in Section ___ of the Agreement is valid and enforceable under the federal law of the United States and the law of [COVERED LAW STATE], except to the extent that an exception set forth in the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards or the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208, applies.(*)
(*)If the opinion is being given on the basis that the arbitration clause falls under the New York Convention and Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, some lawyers choose to be specific about the scope of the arbitration provision by using language such as the following:
The Company’s covenant in Section ___ of the Agreement to submit to mandatory arbitration in [ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES] is valid and enforceable under the federal law of the United States and the law of [COVERED LAW STATE] to the extent that the arbitration relates to contract claims arising under the Agreement, except to the extent that an exception set forth in the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards or the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208, applies.
3.Recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral award(seenote 69 and accompanying text):
Except to the extent that an exception set forth in the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”) and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 (the “FAA”), applies, an arbitral award made under Section __ of the Agreement will be recognized and enforced under the New York Convention and the FAA, if a proceeding to enforce the award is properly brought in a United States federal court within three years after the arbitral award is made.(*)
(*)If the opinion is being given on the basis that the arbitration clause falls under the New York Convention and Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, some lawyers choose to make it clear that the arbitral award must be a “foreign” award by using language such as the following:
Except to the extent that an exception set forth in the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”) and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 (the “FAA”), applies, an arbitral award made by [ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES] in accordance with the requirements of Section __ of the Agreement will be recognized and enforced under the New York Convention and the FAA to the extent that the arbitration relates to contract claims arising under the Agreement, if a proceeding to enforce the award is properly brought in a United States federal court within three years after the arbitral award is made.
4.Validity of forum selection clause if the opinion does not characterize the clause as permissive or mandatory(seenote 90 and accompanying text):
The forum selection clause in Section __ of the Agreement is valid and enforceable under the law of [COVERED LAW STATE] for actions relating to contract claims arising under the Agreement.
5.Validity of permissive outbound forum selection clause(seenote 99 and accompanying text):
The Company’s agreement in Section __ of the Agreement to submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of [FOREIGN LAW COUNTRY] is valid and enforceable under the law of [COVERED LAW STATE] for actions relating to contract claims arising under the Agreement.
6.Validity of permissive inbound forum selection clause(seenote 102 and accompanying text):
The Company’s agreement in Section __ of the Agreement to submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of [COVERED LAW STATE] [and United States federal courts] is valid and enforceable under the law of [COVERED LAW STATE] [and the federal law of the United States] for actions relating to contract claims arising under the Agreement.
7.Validity of mandatory outbound forum selection clause(seenote 116 and accompanying text):
The Company’s agreement in Section __ of the Agreement that the courts of [FOREIGN COUNTRY] shall have exclusive jurisdiction is valid and enforceable under the law of [COVERED LAW STATE] for actions relating to contract claims arising under the Agreement.
8.Validity of mandatory inbound forum selection clause(seenote 125 and accompanying text):
The Company’s agreement in Section __ of the Agreement that the courts of [COVERED LAW STATE] [and United States federal courts] shall have exclusive jurisdiction is valid and enforceable under the law of [COVERED LAW STATE] [and the federal law of the United States] for actions relating to contract claims arising under the Agreement.
9.Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments(seenote 133 and accompanying text):
To the extent that it relates to contract claims arising under the Agreement, a final and conclusive judgment granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, other than a judgment for taxes, a fine or other penalty, rendered by a court of [FOREIGN COUNTRY] against the Company that is enforceable in [FOREIGN COUNTRY] will be recognized as valid and enforced under the law of [COVERED LAW STATE] by the courts of [COVERED LAW STATE] or by United States federal courts having jurisdiction and applying the law of [COVERED LAW STATE], without a re-examination of the substantive issues underlying the judgment, subject to (i) grounds for non-recognition and exceptions to enforcement set forth in the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act as adopted in [COVERED LAW STATE] (the “Act”)[IF OPINION GIVER WISHES TO REFER TO PARTICULAR EXCEPTIONS FROM THE STATUTE, ADD— , which include, but are not limited to, _________________ ] and (ii) the court’s power to stay proceedings to enforce a foreign judgment pending determination of any appeal or until the expiration of time sufficient to enable the defendant to prosecute an appeal. [IF APPLICABLE IN THE COVERED LAW STATE, ADD—This opinion is based on the assumption that the law of [FOREIGN COUNTRY] requires a court of competent jurisdiction in [FOREIGN COUNTRY], in a reciprocal manner, to recognize and enforce a final and conclusive judgment of a court of [COVERED LAW STATE] without reconsideration of the merits.]
10.Validity of service of process(seenote 161 and accompanying text):
The methods for service of process set forth in Section __ of the Agreement are valid under the law of [COVERED LAW STATE].
11.No violation of U.S. statutes, rules, or regulations(seenotes 189 & 194 and accompanying text):
Except as set forth below, the execution and delivery of the Agreement by the Company and consummation by the Company of the transactions contemplated by the Agreement do not result in any violation by the Company of statutes of the United States or [COVERED LAW STATE], or rules or regulations thereunder, that, subject to the limitations in the following sentence, we would reasonably be expected to recognize as being applicable to an entity, transaction or agreement to which this opinion letter relates.(*)
(*)Some lawyers choose to be specific about statutes, rules, or regulations that are not covered by the no violation opinion by using language such as the following:
The opinion in paragraph __ does not cover, without limitation, the following statutes, rules, and regulations: [. . .], or other statutes, rules, or regulations customarily understood to be excluded even though they are not expressly stated to be excluded.
12.No sovereign immunity of U.S. party(seenote 204 and accompanying text):
Neither [U.S. PARTY] nor its assets are immune on grounds of sovereign immunity from (i) suit in connection with the Agreement in the courts in [COVERED LAW STATE] [or United States federal courts] or (ii) related legal process, including service of process, attachment of assets, or enforcement by those courts of a judgment against the Company related to the Agreement.
13.Waiver of sovereign immunity under FSIA(seenote 214 and accompanying text):
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, as amended, [NONU.S. PARTY] has validly waived its sovereign immunity (if any) from (i) suit in the courts in [COVERED LAW STATE] and United States federal courts and (ii) related legal process, including service of process, attachment of assets, or enforcement by those courts of a judgment against [NON-U.S. PARTY] related to the Agreement.
14.Foreign lender not required to qualify to do business(see note 220 and accompanying text):
Lender is not required to qualify to do business as a foreign corporation in [COVERED LAW STATE] solely by reason of its execution and delivery of the Agreement and consummation on the date of this letter of the transactions contemplated by the Agreement.
__________
1. Ettore Santucci, Vice Chair, Legal Opinions Committee, ABA Business Law Section, served as Reporter for this Report.
The other members of the editorial group for this Report were: J. Truman Bidwell, Jr., Daniel Bush-ner, Peter Castellon, Sylvia Fung Chin, Edward H. Fleischman, Richard N. Frasch, Donald W. Glazer, Timothy G. Hoxie, Jerome E. Hyman, Stanley Keller, Noël J. Para, John B. Power, James J. Rosen-hauer, and Elizabeth van Schilfgaarde. The views expressed in this Report are not necessarily the views of all members of the editorial group or of their respective law firms.
2. MICHAELGRUSON, STEPHENHUTTER& MICHAELKUTSCHERA, LEGALOPINIONS ININTERNATIONALTRANSACTIONS10–11 (4th ed. 2003) [hereinafter IBA REPORT] (a project of the Subcommittee on Legal Opinions of the Committee on Banking Law of the Section on Business Law of the International Bar Association) (“The practice of asking counsel . . . for legal opinions originated in the U.S. It is not a common practice in purely domestic transactions in other countries. . . . Legal opinions, however, are gaining increasing acceptance in international transactions, including transactions involving only non-U.S. parties.”).
3. The term “U.S. customary practice,” as used in this Report, refers to the practice of lawyers who regularly give, and lawyers who regularly advise opinion recipients regarding, opinions in transactions between U.S. parties. U.S. customary practice covers both the meaning of standard language used in opinion letters and the work U.S. opinion preparers are expected to perform in preparing them.See generallyComm. on Legal Ops., ABA Bus. Law Section,Legal Opinion Principles, 53 BUS. LAW. 831 (1998) [hereinafterABA Principles];Statement on the Role of Customary Practice in the Preparation and Understanding of Third-Party Legal Opinions, 63 BUS. LAW. 1277 (2008) [hereinafterStatement on Customary Practice] (a statement approved by many state bar associations and other U.S. bar groups).
4.See Guide to the Questions to Be Addressed When Providing Opinion Letters on English Law in Financial Transactions, CITYLONDONL. SOC’Y3 11 (Nov. 17, 2011), http://citysolicitors.org.uk [hereinafterCLLS Opinion Guide]. (“The approach to giving opinion letters may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, because legal practitioners in each jurisdiction are bound by their own separate professional rules and because the practice of giving opinion letters may have developed differently. In particular, there is a significant difference of practice as between the United States and England.”).
In some non-U.S. jurisdictions, lawyers give written opinions primarily to their own clients, sometimes permitting third parties to rely on them. Ordinarily, however, those opinions are reasoned and are not analogous to third-party closing opinions typically given by U.S. lawyers.SeeIBA REPORT,supranote 2, at 8–9.
5. Comm. on Legal Ops., ABA Bus. Law Section,Guidelines for the Preparation of Closing Opinions, 57 BUS. LAW. 875, 876 (2002) (§ 1.2) [hereinafterABA Guidelines].
6. For a discussion of the cost-effectiveness of a third-party opinion on the enforceability of the agreement, see BUS. LAWSECTION, STATEBAR OFCAL., REPORT ONTHIRD-PARTYREMEDIESOPINIONS: 2007 UPDATEapp. 4, at 15 (2007). (“In the absence of special factors, the benefit to be obtained by an opinion recipient from a third-party remedies opinion can often be realized in a more cost-efficient and informative manner through advice provided by the opinion recipient’s own counsel, especially as it relates to documents regularly prepared by counsel to the opinion recipient for the opinion recipient. In general, it would seem inappropriate for a third-party remedies opinion to be requested or given in that circumstance.”).
7.See ABA Guidelines,supranote 5, at 877 (§ 2.1). (“Early in the negotiation of the transaction documents, counsel for the opinion recipient should specify the opinions the opinion recipient wishes to receive. The opinion giver should respond promptly with any concerns or proposed exceptions, providing, to the extent practicable, the form of its proposed opinions.”).
Beginning discussions early is even more important in cross-border transactions because the non-U.S. lawyers representing the opinion recipient may not appreciate fully the work required for the U.S. lawyers to give the requested opinions. Also, before the U.S. lawyers can commit to giving an opinion, they may need time to understand how non-U.S. law affects their analysis even though their opinion letter only covers matters of U.S. law. U.S. counsel may be involved in some, but not all, aspects of the transaction and may need extra time to become familiar with relevant issues. Early discussions may lead the opinion preparers to conclude that they need to consult with non-U.S. counsel or lead the opinion recipient to conclude that it needs to consult with U.S. counsel.
8. If non-U.S. lawyers are also delivering closing opinions and in that connection are limiting their liability to the recipient, consideration should be given to whether U.S. lawyers similarly should be permitted to limit their liability to the recipient.
9.See generally Statement on Customary Practice,supranote 3.
10.See generally Statement on Customary Practice,supranote 3;see alsoRESTATEMENT(THIRD)OF THELAWGOVERNINGLAWYERS§ 51(2)(a) (2000) (lawyer owes duty of care to non-client when lawyer or client “invites the non-client to rely on the lawyer’s opinion”);id.§ 95 cmt. c (stating that the standard of care a lawyer giving a third-party closing opinion owes the recipient is to exercise “the competence and diligence normally exercised by lawyers in similar circumstances”). For a general discussion of the duty of care of opinion givers and the relevance of U.S. customary practice, see DONALDW. GLAZER, SCOTTFITZGIBBON& STEVENO. WEISE, GLAZER ANDFITZGIBBON ONLEGALOPINIONS: DRAFTING, INTERPRETING,ANDSUPPORTINGCLOSINGOPINIONS INBUSINESSTRANSACTIONS§ 1.6.1 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter GLAZERTREATISE].
12. In some countries a generally understood practice may not exist on which lawyers can rely for the meaning and scope of their legal opinions in the same way U.S. opinion givers rely on U.S. customary practice.See, e.g.,CLLS Opinion Guide,supranote 4, at 13 (¶¶63–64) (terms of opinion should be complete and self-reliant, because there is no English law on whether it is possible to rely on “customary practice” being implied; good practice to use language that is easily intelligible and for the letter to be clearly laid out, or the reader may fail to detect the true message or draw the correct conclusion). Nevertheless, in England, at least, lawyers recognize that U.S. opinion givers rely on customary practice rather than stating expressly matters that English lawyers usually state expressly in opinion letters on English law.See, e.g.,CLLS Opinion Guide,supranote 4, at 12 (¶60) (advising English lawyers on opinions given by U.S. lawyers in cross-border transactions).
13. U.S. closing opinions express legal conclusions in a streamlined manner and depend on U.S. customary practice to supply many assumptions, exceptions, and qualifications that otherwise would have to be stated expressly in every opinion letter. The ABA Legal Opinion Accord, a document of almost seventy pages, illustrates the magnitude of the task of trying to spell out all of those assumptions, exceptions, and qualifications.See generallyComm. on Legal Ops., ABA Bus. Law Section,Third-Party Legal Opinion Report, Including the Legal Opinion Accord, of the Section of Business Law,American Bar Association, 47 BUS. LAW. 167, 179 (1991).
14. The same concerns apply to a U.S. recipient of an opinion of non-U.S. counsel if the recipient is not familiar with the non-U.S. opinion practice under which the opinion was prepared. The U.S. recipient ordinarily should not assume that the opinion can be interpreted in accordance with U.S. customary practice or that it can rely on the apparent meaning of the words used in the opinion.See generallyGLAZERTREATISE,supranote 10, § 5.3; IBA REPORT,supranote 2, at 19.
This opinion letter shall be interpreted in accordance with the Legal Opinion Principles prepared by the Legal Opinions Committee of the American Bar Association’s Business Law Section as published in 53 BUS. LAW. 831 (1998)[, a copy of which is attached to this opinion letter].
Instead of incorporating theABA Principlesexpressly in their opinion letter, some U.S. lawyers refer to U.S. customary practice generally using language such as the following:
This opinion letter shall be interpreted in accordance with the customary practice of United States lawyers who regularly give, and lawyers who regularly advise recipients regarding, opinions of the kind included in this opinion letter.
See, e.g., Donald W. Glazer & Stanley Keller,A Streamlined Form of Closing Opinion Based on the ABA Legal Opinion Principles, 61 BUS. LAW. 389, 393 (2005). If the ABA Principles are incorporated by reference, they may be attached to the opinion letter for greater clarity and easier access by a non-U.S. recipient.See ABA Principles,supranote 3.
16. Nevertheless, as stated in theABA Guidelines, an opinion giver should not give an opinion that the opinion giver recognizes will mislead the recipient with regard to matters covered by the opinion.ABA Guidelines,supranote 5, at 877 (§ 1.5).
17. The Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption could be worded as follows:
We have assumed that the choice of the law of [FOREIGN COUNTRY] in the Agreement is valid and the Agreement and each of its provisions are valid, binding and enforceable under the law of [FOREIGN COUNTRY] and of any other jurisdiction whose law applies, other than law covered expressly in an opinion included in this opinion letter. [IF THE AGREEMENT CONTAINS A FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE, ADD—We also have assumed that, other than the courts of [COVERED LAW STATE] and United States federal courts, any court named in the forum selection clause of the Agreement will have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of any action brought in that court under the Agreement.]
Because procedural matters ordinarily are governed by the law of the jurisdiction where a legal action is brought (commonly referred to as thelex fori), the third sentence of the illustrative language above covers both (i) the Chosen Law and (ii) if a court named in the forum selection clause is located in a jurisdiction outside the United States other than the Chosen Law Country, the law of that jurisdiction.See infratext accompanying note 123.
The Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption complements the statement traditionally included in an opinion letter regarding the law it is covering (the coverage limitation) because, as discussed in later sections of this Report, some of the legal conclusions the opinion preparers must reach under the Covered Law depend on assumptions as to matters governed by the Chosen Law or thelex forieven though neither one is covered by the opinion. If the opinion preparers expressly state that their opinions are to be interpreted in accordance with U.S. customary practice, for consistency they also ordinarily should state the Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption expressly.See supranote 16 and accompanying text.
18. To make the opinions they are giving easier for non-U.S. recipients to understand, U.S. opinion preparers may choose to be somewhat more expansive in their cross-border opinion letters than in opinion letters they deliver in domestic U.S. transactions. For example, they may choose to spell out assumptions, exceptions, or qualifications that under U.S. customary practice are generally understood without being stated (even though they may not always spell them out in their domestic U.S. opinion letters), while at the same time making clear that the stated assumptions, exceptions, and qualifications are not intended to be exclusive.
19. That may be because the opinion giver’s client does not have local counsel in the Chosen Law State, or because the opinion recipient does not insist on receiving an opinion on the enforceability of the agreement under the Chosen Law (perhaps because it is receiving that opinion from its own counsel).SeeTriBar Op. Comm.,Special Report of the TriBar Opinion Committee: The Remedies Opinion—Deciding When to Include Exceptions and Assumptions, 59 BUS. LAW. 1483, 1497 n.70 (2004) [hereinafterTriBar Remedies Opinion Report] (discussing practice of rendering “as if” enforceability opinions).
20. These interpretive issues are equally present when the agreement is drafted in English, or when the opinion preparers are allowed to rely on a translation of the agreement into English, because the problem is not simply language, but legal concepts and technical terms that do not always lend themselves to translation. Even if the parties approve dual versions of the agreement, one in a foreign language and one in English, the situation is not necessarily better and may in fact be worse if suit against the U.S. opinion giver is brought in a court of the Chosen Law Country and ambiguities or conflicts exist between the two versions, because the English version on which the opinion giver relied for the “as if” analysis may or may not be the version on which the court relies.
21. This is not the same issue addressed above (how a provision of the agreement would be interpreted by a court in the Covered Law State). Rather, because a U.S. lawyer willing to give an “as if” opinion is permitted to disregard the Chosen Law, the issue is whether that U.S. lawyer would, in applying the “as if” logic, be analyzing a set of terms that under the Covered Law are in fact different from the those to which the parties intended to agree as they are under the Chosen Law. This issue results from likely differences between the legal system on which the opinion is based and the legal system on which the agreement is based. In many civil law jurisdictions, for example, the parties do not have the same latitude they have in the United States, subject to limited exceptions, to negotiate whatever business terms they wish, which in U.S. practice ordinarily are spelled out in the agreement itself. By contrast, statutes in many code-based jurisdictions supply terms that need not be, and ordinarily are not, set forth expressly in the agreement, or require that agreements conform to a statutory scheme that permits limited deviations from the norm (i.e., a statute either supplements or overrides negotiated contract clauses). Similar problems may arise even when the Chosen Law Country is a common law country.See infranote 33.
22. This position is consistent with the IBA Report’s conclusion regarding inbound “as if” enforceability opinions of non-U.S. counsel (“as if” formulation “makes no sense . . . where foreign countries are involved; . . . difference[s] in law and contract practice [make it] ludicrous to suggest to a lawyer from a civil law country or even from a non-U.S. common law jurisdiction that he read a New York law agreement as if it were governed by his law”). IBA REPORT,supranote 2, at 168. Sometimes, but infrequently, U.S. lawyers may be willing to give an “as if” opinion if they are satisfied that the agreement would be interpreted under the Covered Law in the same general way it would under the Chosen Law (for example because they also happen to have expertise in the Chosen Law Country’s law and practice with respect to agreements of the type on which they are giving the opinion). When giving the opinion, they often make clear in the opinion letter that the opinion (i) is based on a reading of the agreement within its four corners and as its provisions would be understood by a lawyer in the Covered Law State, which may be different in meaningful ways from how lawyers in the Chosen Law Country may understand them, and (ii) does not cover any substantive provisions of the non-U.S. Chosen Law that may be incorporated by reference in the agreement or supplied by the law of the Chosen Law Country. Some U.S. lawyers also add a statement to the effect that they are not qualified to interpret the terms of the agreement under the Chosen Law.
23. This opinion addresses the concern of the recipient that the Chosen Law will not be given effect should it choose to seek enforcement of the agreement in the courts of the Covered Law State (particularly when, as is often the case, the opinion giver’s client has significant operations there), rather than the courts of the Chosen Law Country. For example, in a cross-border loan, if the lender is located in Germany, the borrower is located in California, and the agreement chooses German law, the lender may ask a California lawyer for an opinion that the agreement’s choice of German law will be given effect under California law if the lender sues the borrower in the California courts.SeeIBA REPORT,supranote 2, at 250. Unlike the “as if” enforceability opinion discussed earlier in this Report (which would cover the agreement generally), the choice-of-law opinion only covers the specific issue whether, if a dispute relating to the agreement were litigated in a California court, the governing law clause would be given effect under California choice-of-law rules.
24. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONFLICT OFLAWS§ 187 (1971). This Report assumes that section 187(1) (which provides that the law chosen by the parties will be applied if the particular issue is one that the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue) does not apply and, thus, that the applicable test is set forth in section 187(2). The first exception under section 187(2) applies when sufficient contacts are not present between the parties or the transaction and the state whose law is chosen. That may be a concern in cross-border transactions when the parties as a matter of convenience or for other reasons (for example, the chosen law’s being better developed for the type of the transaction) choose the governing law of a jurisdiction with which neither they nor the transaction have any relationship. Some states have enacted statutes that validate, if spec-ified conditions relating to the nature and size of the transaction are met, contractual provisions selecting that state’s law regardless of whether contacts exist with that state.See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE§ 1646.5 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 6, § 2708 (2011); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW§ 5-1401 (Mc-Kinney 2010). Such statutes, however, typically do not address the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses selecting the law ofanotherjurisdiction, and thus have no bearing on whether a court in the state that enacted the statute would give effect to the parties’ choice of the law of a jurisdiction outside the United States as the law governing their agreement. Other states have enacted statutes that validate contractual provisions selecting the law of another jurisdiction, whether a different state or foreign county, if specified conditions are met.See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE§271.005 (West 2013). Some states, for example New York, have developed their own rules for enforcing choice-of-law clauses selecting the law of another jurisdiction. This Report only deals with choice-of-law rules based on section 187(2) of the Restatement.
26. In many domestic U.S. transactions in which the Chosen Law is not the Covered Law, recipients do not insist on receiving an opinion that specifically addresses the effectiveness of the governing law clause under the Covered Law. In lieu of a choice-of-law opinion, recipients often are willing to accept an enforceability opinion that is given “as if” the Covered Law were the Chosen Law. In the cross-border context, as discussed in Part III-1, “as if” enforceability opinions normally are not given.See supratext accompanying note 22.
27.See generallyTriBar Op. Comm.,Supplemental Report: Opinions on Chosen-Law Provisions Under the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 68 BUS. LAW. 1161, 1168 & n.25 (2013) [hereinafterTriBar Supplemental Chosen-Law Report] (some lawyers are unwilling to give choice-of-law opinions; others treat the Covered Law State as if it were the Default State; others make clear opinion does not cover possibility that choice-of-law rules of Covered Law State might require consideration of fundamental policies of some other state, e.g., by expressly excluding fundamental policies of other states; and others expressly exclude coverage of fundamental policies of Covered Law State as well as other states).
28.See generally id.at 1163–64 & nn.5–13 (factors for determining Default State include needs of interstate and international systems, protection of justified expectations, and needs of judicial system; breadth and inherent imprecision of factors can (and often do) prevent opinion preparers from being able to identify Default State with the confidence opinions require). In the cross-border context the facts needed to determine what jurisdiction is the Default State are even more complex than in the domestic U.S. context, and the analysis is harder because of the possible relevance of the laws of countries of which the opinion preparers have limited, if any, knowledge. For an example of the kind of fact-intensive inquiry needed for a proper application of the Second Prong of the Restatement Test, seeWise v. Zwicker & Associates, P.C., 780 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2014).
29.TriBar Supplemental Chosen-Law Report,supranote 27, at 1166 & n.14 (noting that Restatement requires that agreement be interpreted under the Chosen Law for purposes of determining whether giving effect to agreement will violate fundamental policy of the Default State; meaning of contractual provisions under Chosen Law may be different than under Covered Law and that possibility may prevent opinion preparers from giving choice-of-law opinion, depending on type of agreement, matters covered, and terminology used).
30.See supranote 21 and accompanying text (discussing this interpretive difficulty in context of as-if opinions).
31. The IBA Report recognizes this interpretive problem but concludes that the challenges it poses for the opinion preparers can be reduced to a manageable level if the agreement sets forth comprehensively the rights and obligations of, and the remedies available to, the parties and does not rely extensively on a general body of applicable foreign law to govern the relationship between the parties. IBA REPORT,supranote 2, at 168. The IBA Report also concludes that the opinion could be given based on the opinion giver’s reading of the agreement “on its face and within the four corners of the document” even though the opinion giver is not familiar with the foreign law governing the agreement.Id.at 260. For the reasons discussed later in this Part, this Committee disagrees with these conclusions and recommends that the opinion expressly exclude coverage of the fundamental policies of any jurisdiction (whatever the Default State may be) that under the Second Prong of the Restatement Test might lead a court in the Covered Law State to decline to enforce the governing law clause.See infranote 33 and accompanying text.
32. When the opinion preparers rely on a translation, they often disclose that reliance in the opinion letter and expressly assume that the translation is a complete, fair, and accurate English rendition of the foreign language text of the agreement.
33. The same problems can arise even when the agreement is in English and the language of the Chosen Law Country also is English. An example is the phrase “best efforts,” a phrase that U.S. opinion preparers would likely not know has a different meaning in England than in many U.S. states. Under English law, “best efforts” means that a party to an agreement will do whatever is required to perform the obligation involved, no matter how onerous. In the United States, “best efforts” in many states means that a party will use the highest level of effort that is commercially reasonable under the circumstances. Depending on the facts, a U.S. court might find that an agreement using “best efforts” as interpreted under English law violates a fundamental policy of the Covered Law State against the imposition of a penalty if, for example, it requires a party to spend extravagant sums to cure a minor defect in performance. Because a choice-of-law opinion covering the Second Prong of the Restatement Test would cover the terms of the agreement as interpreted in accordance with English law, the failure (albeit understandable) of U.S. opinion preparers to understand the English interpretation of “best efforts” might result in an erroneous opinion that the choice of English law will be given effect by the courts of the Covered Law State (even assuming that the Default State is the Covered Law State).
34. The exclusion of fundamental policies from the opinion’s coverage should be readily understood by non-U.S. opinion recipients because the choice-of-law rules of many foreign countries are similar to the Restatement test: first determine whether the parties’ choice of law can be recognized in general, then identify any specific limitations, including public policy limitations, on the application of the chosen law.Cf.IBA REPORT,supranote 2, at 164–68 (acknowledging the existence of an “unavoidable gap” in confirming the effectiveness of the governing law clause, as neither foreign nor U.S. counsel can say whether giving effect to the agreement under the non-U.S. law selected by the parties would violate a fundamental policy of the jurisdiction whose law would otherwise apply without having expertise in all laws that may apply, and stating that “although the practical implications of this problem are small, it should be noted that this gap does exist and cannot be closed. The risk it creates must be assumed by the person who ultimately relies on the opinion.”).
Under the law of [COVERED LAW STATE], the choice of the law of [FOREIGN COUNTRY] in the Agreement is valid except to the extent that giving effect to the law of [FOREIGN COUNTRY] would violate a fundamental policy of (i) the jurisdiction whose law is covered by this opinion letter or (ii) any other jurisdiction having a materially greater interest than [FOREIGN COUNTRY] in the determination of the issue, if the law of that jurisdiction would apply to the Agreement or any of its provisions in the absence of a governing law clause.
Some U.S. lawyers include in their outbound choice-of-law opinions a statement that they “do not believe” that application of the non-U.S. law chosen in the agreement would be contrary to a fundamental policy of the Covered Law State or other jurisdictions whose law may apply. This Committee recommends against including such language because of the difficulty discussed earlier in this Part of establishing a reasonable basis for that belief and because statements regarding an opinion giver’s knowledge or belief should be limited to matters of fact, not law.SeeTriBar Op. Comm.,Third-Party “Closing” Opinions: A Report of the TriBar Opinion Committee, 53 BUS. LAW. 591, 619 n.59 (1998) [hereinafterTriBar 1998 Report].
36. These are some of the reasons why governing law clauses are not enforced in many countries. They explain why non-U.S. recipients ordinarily expect to receive choice-of-law opinions even though subject to “public policy” limitations.SeeIBA REPORT,supranote 2, at 165. Not all states apply choice-of-law rules based on section 187(2) of the Restatement, and even those that do may not follow the Restatement in all respects.See TriBar Supplemental Chosen-Law Report,supranote 27, at 1162 & n.2. When applying section 187(2) of the Restatement, opinion preparers need to make a determination that the Chosen Law State has a reasonable relationship to the parties or the transaction. The opinion preparers in each particular state need to assess what other determinations, if any, are required under the Covered Law. New York, for example, applies common law principles in determining whether to give effect to a choice-of-law clause choosing the law of another state. Id.
37.See supratext accompanying note 17. Because the Chosen Law is the law of a jurisdiction outside the United States, the validity and binding effect of the agreement as a whole are not governed by the Covered Law. Often non-U.S. parties will request opinions from U.S. counsel that the U.S. party has the corporate power to enter into the agreement and that it has duly authorized, executed, and delivered the agreement.See infratext accompanying notes 168–72.
38. Parties typically adopt so-called “broad form” arbitration clauses pursuant to which they elect to submit to arbitration the full range of disputes that may arise out of or relate to their contractual relationship, including issues relating to contract formation, such as fraudulent inducement to contract.
39. Although international arbitration is a private method of dispute resolution, it requires the support of a legal system if a party refuses to arbitrate or the losing party refuses to honor an arbitral award.See generallyALANREDFERN ET AL., LAW ANDPRACTICE OFINTERNATIONALCOMMERCIALARBITRATION328 (4th ed. 2004). The court asked to enforce an arbitral award often will not be located where the arbitration took place, but rather where the losing party has operations or assets. Because the law of any one country may not be sufficient to deal with international arbitration, countries have entered into treaties and conventions. These treaties and conventions have the force of law in all signatory countries and are applied by their national courts.
40. June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention]. As of the date of this Report, the New York Convention has more than 155 signatories, including both developed and less-developed countries. For an updated list of signatory countries, seeStatus,Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), U.N. COMM’N ONINT’LTRADEL., http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2015) [hereinafterNew York Convention Status]. Initiatives are ongoing to clarify or modify the New York Convention to reflect over fifty years of practice and jurisprudence. In 1985 the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) approved the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, designed to modernize and harmonize arbitration laws applicable to both domestic and cross-border transactions. UNCITRAL MODELLAW ONINT’LCOMMERCIALARBITRATION, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (June 21, 1985) [hereinafter MODELLAW],available athttp://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf. The Model Law incorporates the provisions of the New York Convention but is more comprehensive and detailed. The U.N. General Assembly recommended the Model Law to member states for adoption, and many countries have adopted it, in some cases with minor changes.See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with amendments as adopted in 2006, U.N. COMM’N ONINT’LTRADEL., http://www. uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2015). The Model Law, although not binding as a matter of U.S. law, provides valuable guidance on the interpretation of principles and practice under the New York Convention.
42. The New York Convention in the form ratified by the United States is not applicable to agreements to arbitrate in countries that are not signatories. See infranote 48. While this Report only deals with arbitration clauses subject to the New York Convention, if another international treaty to which the United States is a party applies to the arbitration clause, the ability of a U.S. lawyer to give an opinion on its enforceability will depend on the wording of the treaty and practice in its application. In the absence of a governing international treaty, the opinion preparers often will be unable to give an opinion on the arbitration clause because of the cost of doing the legal analysis and the difficulty of making the necessary determinations.
43.See infratext accompanying notes 56, 65–66. As a practical matter, the opinion preparers cannot address whether a U.S. court will determine that an exception provided in the New York Convention applies to a future dispute because that determination will depend on the specific claims made and the legal issues raised when a suit actually is brought.
44.See9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 (2012). Sections 203–205 of the FAA give U.S. federal courts non-exclusive jurisdiction over actions to enforce international arbitration agreements and awards, regardless of the amount in controversy, and allow defendants to remove actions brought in state court to federal court.See id.§§ 203–205. Pursuant to sections 206–207 of the FAA, a federal court may compel arbitration in accordance with the parties’ agreement and, subject to a three-year time limit, may issue an order confirming a foreign arbitral award unless one of the exceptions enumerated in the New York Convention applies.See id.§§ 206–207. Domestic, rather than international, arbitration clauses are covered by Chapter 1 of the FAA, not Chapter 2.
45. That is the case for both domestic arbitration in interstate U.S. commerce and international arbitration. This Report does not address how opinion preparers deal with arbitration clauses in closing opinions delivered in domestic U.S. transactions, where practice is not uniform. While beyond the scope of this Report, opinion preparers should be aware that the case law dealing with domestic U.S. arbitration clauses has not always been consistent when state law and Chapter 1 of the FAA do not line up precisely. Some aspects of state law also may apply to international arbitration, so long as they do not conflict with the New York Convention. Depending on the state, therefore, the opinion preparers may have to consider state law on arbitration in addition to Chapter 2 of the FAA.
46. For example, the United States is a party to the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 336 [hereinafter Panama Convention], which Congress has implemented in Chapter 3 of the FAA.See generally9 U.S.C. §§ 301–307 (2012). Chapter 3 of the FAA incorporates by reference sections 202–207 of the FAA.See id.§ 302. As a result, implementation of the Panama Convention tracks closely that of the New York Convention. Under both the New York Convention (as implemented by the United States) and the Panama Convention, U.S. courts will only recognize and enforce arbitral awards made in arbitrations conducted in countries that are parties to the respective Convention (the reciprocity requirement). The FAA further provides that the Panama Convention applies when both conventions are applicable if a majority of the parties to the arbitration agreement are citizens of countries that have ratified or acceded to the Panama Convention and that are member states of the Organization of American States.See id.§ 305. In all other cases the New York Convention applies.
47. The New York Convention has more signatories than any other convention relating to arbitration.See generally New York Convention Status,supranote 40. It expressly recognizes, however, the right of the parties to an arbitration agreement to invoke, if applicable, remedies and procedures available under other multilateral or bilateral treaties or the law of the country where enforcement is sought.
48. These reservations were adopted by the United States through a 1970 instrument of accession.See New York Convention Status,supranote 40.
49. U.S. courts have interpreted reciprocity as a formal requirement, not as a substantive issue.SeeFertilizer Corp. v. IDI Mgmt., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948, 953 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (holding that reciprocity only required determination that India was signatory to New York Convention, not analysis of how Convention was applied in India).
50. The New York Convention allows signatory countries to declare, as the United States has done, that they will apply the Convention only to disputes arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, that are considered commercial under the national law of the country making the declaration.SeeNew York Convention,supranote 40. Examples of matters that under the law of many countries are not deemed “commercial” are civil rights, employment discrimination, and family law and child custody.See generallyWILLIAMW. PARK, ARBITRATION OFINTERNATIONALBUSINESSDISPUTES120 & n.18 (2006). Building upon practice under the New York Convention, the Model Law seeks to make the term more uniform and precise, stating that legal relationships of a commercial nature include: (1) trade transactions for the supply or exchange of goods or services; (2) distribution agreements; (3) commercial representation or agency arrangements; (4) factoring; (5) leasing; (6) construction of works; (7) consulting; (8) engineering; (9) licensing; (10) investment; (11) financing; (12) banking; (13) insurance; (14) exploitation agreements or concessions; (15) joint ventures or other forms of industrial or business cooperation; and (16) carriage of goods or passengers by air, sea, rail, or road.SeeMODELLAW,supranote 40. When U.S. courts have considered whether particular activities are “commercial” under the New York Convention and the FAA, they often have treated “commercial” in the international context as encompassing a broader range of matters than in the domestic context. For a discussion of the separate, but related, concept of subject matter arbitrability, seeinfranotes 55 & 60.
51. New York Convention,supranote 40, art. 1. This definition reflects a compromise among signatory countries that favored a strict territorial approach (the first clause) and those that favored taking into account the nationality of the parties, the subject of the dispute, and the rules of the arbitration, including the governing law.See generallyPaolo Contini,International Commercial Arbitration: The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 283, 293–94 (1959). Application of the first part of the definition of foreign arbitral award is purely mechanical. Application of the second part, however, requires a facts-and-circumstances analysis because, if an arbitral award regarding a cross-border transaction is made in the United States, the New York Convention may or may not apply depending on whether U.S. law considers the award a “domestic” or “non-domestic” award. The New York Convention leaves it to signatory countries to define “non-domestic” awards. The United States has not adopted a statutory definition, leaving the term for the courts to define.SeeBergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983) (award made in New York involving Norwegian and Swiss parties a “foreign” award because award made within the legal framework of another country, e.g., under foreign law or involving non-U.S. parties, is not considered domestic).
52. Section 202 of the FAA provides that an agreement or award entirely between U.S. citizens does not fall within the New York Convention unless it involves property located abroad, performance or enforcement abroad, or “has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states.” The New York Convention clearly applies to: (1) arbitral awards made outside the United States, because they satisfy the “territorial” part of the definition discussed earlier in this Part so long as the transaction itself has a foreign nexus; and (2) arbitral awards made in the United States if the parties are all non-U.S. parties. What is not as clear under the Convention and cases interpreting it, however, is whether and when an award made in the United States involving a transaction between a U.S. party and a non-U.S. party will be held under U.S. law to be a “domestic” award rather than a “foreign” award.See, e.g., Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997) (New York Convention clearly applies to disputes involving two non-domestic parties and a U.S. corporation and contract performance in the Middle East; yet domestic arbitration provisions of the FAA apply as well, giving U.S. district court power to vacate or modify award under the domestic law of the state in which, or under which, the award was made); Jain v. de Méré, 51 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 1995) (arbitration dispute between French and Indian parties governed by French law clearly within Chapter 2 of the FAA, but where agreement failed to specify a location for arbitration U.S. district court had same power under Chapter 1 of the FAA to compel arbitration in its own U.S. district as it would for domestic arbitration),cert. denied, 516 U.S. 914 (1995). In those situations the opinion preparers may need to assume expressly that the transaction and the dispute subject to arbitration have a foreign nexus sufficient to satisfy the second part of the definition of “foreign arbitral award” in the New York Convention or that the arbitration will take place outside the United States so as to satisfy the first part of that definition.See infratext following notes 55 & 63.
53. The New York Convention imposes two principal requirements on U.S. courts: first, it requires them to defer to the jurisdiction of arbitrators when actions are brought concerning matters covered by arbitration agreements; and second, it requires them to enforce foreign arbitral awards without reviewing the merits of the arbitration decision.SeeGerald Asken & Wendy S. Dorman,Applications of the New York Convention by United States Courts: A Twenty-Year Review (1970–1990), 2 AM. REV. INT’LARB. 65 (1991);see alsoPeter Gillies,Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards—The New York Convention, 9 INT’LTRADE& BUS. L. REV. 19, 27–28 (2005) (citing The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Société Nationale Algerienne pour la Recherche, la Production, le Transport, la Transformation et la Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures v. Distrigas Corp., 80 B.R. 606, 612 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987)).
54. The New York Convention provides that the term “agreement in writing” includes an arbitration clause in a contract, as well as a separate arbitration agreement. New York Convention,supranote 40, art. II.2. The New York Convention does not prescribe the precise form of the agreement to arbitrate, however, and courts have treated as “an agreement in writing” an exchange of letters or telexes through agents and brokers or subsequent conduct by parties who have received (but not signed) contract forms that include or incorporate by reference an arbitration clause.See, e.g., Chloe Z Fishing Co. v. Odyssey Re (London) Ltd., 109 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (interpreting article II.2 requirement as exhaustive and mandatory, but then deeming it met by marine insurance broker’s slip and insurer’s certificate of insurance, although letters were not exchanged);see generallyAsken & Dorman,supranote 53. The requirement that an agreement be in writing rarely is a problem for the opinion preparers because closing opinions ordinarily are given only in transactions in which the parties execute and deliver a “traditional” written agreement. Even though the opinion preparers are allowed to rely on the Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption with respect to contract formation and validity generally when the agreement chooses non-U.S. law as its governing law, they should decline to give an opinion if the agreement to arbitrate is not in an agreement signed by both parties, unless they are willing to deal with issues such as whether an exchange of e-mails satisfies the requirement that an arbitration agreement be in writing.
55.SeeNew York Convention,supranote 40, art. II(2). Whether the subject matter of a dispute arising under an agreement in a cross-border transaction is capable of being settled by arbitration is referred to as the “arbitrability” issue. Arbitrability is decided by the court being asked to enforce an arbitration clause under the law of the jurisdiction in which the court is located. REDFERN ET AL.,supranote 39, at 163–64. Although in theory the subject matter of all disputes is as capable of being decided by a qualified arbitrator as by a judge, in most countries some areas of the law are reserved for the courts and, therefore, under the New York Convention are not “capable of settlement by arbitration.”See, e.g., PARK,supranote 50, at 115, 121 (noting that courts have resisted giving effect to agreements to arbitrate “core” public law claims for fear that private adjudicators may under-enforce laws designed to protect society at large). Courts in the United States generally presume that disputes in cross-border transactions are capable of settlement by arbitration and show significant deference to arbitrators’ decisions regarding threshold arbitration issues.See, e.g., BG Grp. Plc v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014); see generallyREDFERN ET AL.,supranote 39, at 172. Accordingly, while arbitrability is a requirement for the application of the New York Convention, it normally will not prevent U.S. lawyers from giving an opinion that an agreement to arbitrate is enforceable under the Covered Law because arbitrability is rarely an issue in the types of cross-border transactions on which opinions are requested.
The term “arbitrability” is sometimes used to refer to the separate issue of whether the parties to an agreement intended that a particular dispute be arbitrated.See, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (party cannot be required to submit to arbitration a dispute it has not agreed to submit); Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 761 F.3d 326, 334 (3d Cir. 2014) (arbitrability a “gateway” issue for judicial determination unless parties unmistakably provide otherwise; court to decide whether arbitration clause applies to a particular type of controversy);see generallyPARK,supranote 50, at 111 & n.41 (suggesting that American courts’ increasing use of “arbitrability” interchangeably with “jurisdiction” is regrettable since it blurs distinction between refusing to compel arbitration because of parties’ drafting choice and refusing to compel because non-waivable legal rules prohibit arbitrator from considering subject matter). Lack of intent to arbitrate a particular matter is one of the defenses the New York Convention provides a party resisting enforcement. Unlike subject matter arbitrability, however, the intent of the parties to arbitrate a particular dispute cannot be determined (if it can at all) until after an actual dispute arises and, therefore, is not covered by an opinion on the validity of an arbitration clause. Moreover, as discussed later in this Report, the applicability of specific defenses or exceptions under the Convention is not covered by the opinion.See infranotes 59–60. Consistent with international practice, this Report uses the term “arbitrability” only as described in the preceding paragraph.
56. Courts in the United States (as in most of the jurisdictions that have adopted the New York Convention) construe these grounds for refusing to compel arbitration narrowly in light of the goal of the Convention to promote international arbitration. In deciding whether an arbitration clause that is part of a broader agreement (as opposed to a stand-alone agreement) is invalid under this exception, a court theoretically could approach “validity” in one of two ways: it could consider the validity of the broader agreement of which the clause is part, or it could consider only the validity of the arbitration clause itself. Courts in the United States generally have chosen not to focus on whether the broader agreement is valid as a whole. Instead, they usually consider the validity of the arbitration clause standing alone, and, if they determine that the clause itself (separately from the agreement of which it is a part) is not “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed,” New York Convention,supranote 40, art. II(3), they refer the parties to arbitration and leave the validity of the broader agreement, as well as any other disputed issues raised by the parties, for the arbitrators to decide. Consistent with the parties’ intent that substantive issues be resolved by arbitration, not the judicial system, U.S. courts applying the New York Convention tend to favor the validity of arbitration clauses absent compelling grounds for invalidity, for example that the agreement to arbitrate has been obtained by fraud, mistake, or duress. The New York Convention gives courts authority to assist the parties in implementing their intent to arbitrate disputes. For example, if an agreement specifies that arbitration is to take place in a particular country pursuant to the rules of an arbitration organization that does not exist in that country, a court considering whether the arbitration clause is capable of being performed may, instead of refusing to enforce the agreement, specify an alternative arbitral forum and rules so as to give effect to the parties’ intent that disputes between them be resolved outside of the courts. This authority, however, is used rarely.
57. Commentators have pointed out that enforcing an agreement to arbitrate is different from enforcing other commercial agreements.See, e.g., REDFERN ET AL.,supranote 39, at 8. An award of damages for breach of the arbitration clause is unlikely to be a practical remedy given the difficulty of quantifying the loss. Under the FAA, a court order compelling arbitration carries the same force and sanctions (including contempt of court) as other injunctive relief. Although authorized by the FAA and not uncommon, court orders for specific performance may be difficult to enforce if the non-U.S. parties against whom they are issued continue to refuse to arbitrate and are beyond the reach of the court. Indirect enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate may be the most effective remedy: if a dispute arises between the parties and one party brings suit in violation of the arbitration clause, the New York Convention requires the court to stay the proceeding, leaving arbitration as the only available route for resolving the dispute.
58. This opinion addresses a federal statute (the FAA). Thus, to reduce the risk of misunderstanding, the opinion letter should cover U.S. federal law expressly, at least for purposes of this opinion.
The arbitration clause in Section ___ of the Agreement is valid and enforceable under the federal law of the United States and the law of [COVERED LAW STATE], except to the extent that an exception set forth in the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards or the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208, applies.
Some opinion givers choose to be specific about the scope of the arbitration clause in the agreement (instead of just referring to it as an “arbitration clause”) to make it clear that the agreement to arbitrate must fall within the coverage of the New York Convention and the FAA by using language such as the following:
The Company’s covenant in Section ___ of the Agreement to submit to mandatory arbitration in [ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES] is valid and enforceable under the federal law of the United States and the law of [COVERED LAW STATE] to the extent that the arbitration relates to contract claims arising under the Agreement, except to the extent that an exception set forth in the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards or the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208, applies.
Some opinion givers refer expressly to the exceptions provided in Article II.3 of the New York Convention, which allows a U.S. court to refuse to refer the parties to arbitration if it finds that the agreement to arbitrate is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed. New York Convention,supranote 40, art. II(3);see also supranote 56 and accompanying text.
60. For a general discussion of subject matter arbitrability, seesupranote 55. Although many cases decided under the FAA discuss which matters are arbitrable, cases discussing the meaning of “commercial” are scarce. Nonetheless, in practice, the two concepts overlap to a great extent. U.S. courts will enforce almost all arbitration clauses in cross-border transactions, regardless of whether the subject matter of the agreement is governed by contract or statute.SeeJoseph T. McLaughlin,Arbitrability: Current Trends in the United States, 59 ALB. L. REV. 905, 906 (1996). The U.S. Supreme Court has held repeatedly that the FAA creates a strong presumption of arbitrability and over time has narrowed significantly the types of transactions in which contracting parties cannot agree to arbitration, particularly in international commerce.Id.at 940;see, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (finding claim for discrimination under Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 arbitrable); Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (finding claims under Securities Act of 1933 arbitrable); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (finding claims under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and RICO arbitrable); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (finding antitrust claims arising under Sherman Act arbitrable in case involving international agreements); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517 (1974) (upholding compulsory arbitration of fraud-based claims where subject matter of transaction was sale of securities in case involving international commerce to prevent “damage [to] the fabric of international commerce and trade,” even though subject matter may not have been arbitrable in domestic transactions). Lower courts often cite the U.S. Supreme Court’s statement inMitsubishithat “international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes” compel them to enforce arbitration.See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 629.
When international commerce is the subject of a transaction, the presumption of arbitrability applies even though the arbitration of disputes between the parties may implicate what are often regarded as “core” public laws for the protection of broad societal interests, such as antitrust and insolvency. McLaughlin,supra, at 936, 937;see, e.g.,Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 629; Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1989) (arbitration of churning claim brought by bankruptcy trustee enforced); Société Nationale Algerienne Pour La Recherche, La Production, Le Transport, La Trasnsformation et La Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures v. Distrigas Corp., 80 B.R. 606, 613–14 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (bankruptcy stay modified to allow international arbitration).
Licenses of intellectual property commonly include arbitration clauses. Although at one time arbitrability sometimes was an issue when the subject of a dispute was intellectual property (see generallyJulian D.M. Lew,Final Report on Intellectual Property Disputes and Arbitration, 9 ICC INT’LCT. ARB. BULL. 37 (1998) (federal patent and trademark protections considered matters reserved for the courts)), in 1982 Congress expressly provided for the arbitration of patent-related issues (see35 U.S.C. § 294 (2012)), and courts have found that U.S. law does not forbid arbitration of disputes relating to copyrights and trademarks even in the absence of a specific federal statute.SeeMcLaughlin,supra, at 939–40.
Employment disputes, as opposed to disputes relating to collective bargaining/labor relations, normally have been held to be arbitrable, particularly because Congress included in key statutes (section 512 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991) language expressly encouraging arbitration of sex, race, and disability discrimination claims.See42 U.S.C. § 12212 (2012) (Americans with Disabilities Act);id. § 1981 (Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution) (Civil Rights Act);see alsoMcLaughlin,supra, at 916, 918, 921.But seeIonosphere Clubs, Inc. v. Shugrue, 22 F.3d 403, 409 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that priority of vacation pay claims in Chapter 11 case were for court to resolve and not subject to arbitration under collective bargaining agreement).
Whether a matter is arbitrable continues to be a significant issue for agreements relating to the following: matrimonial and family matters; inheritance, wills, and estates; consumer transactions; and labor relations. In the unlikely event that a cross-border agreement on which a closing opinion is requested covers one of these matters, the opinion preparers ordinarily should decline to give the opinion because courts may be reluctant to sever claims involving non-arbitrable matters from other claims if they all arise under the same agreement.
61.See supranote 17 and accompanying text. Typically non-U.S. parties will request an opinion from U.S. counsel that the U.S. party has the corporate power to enter into the agreement containing the arbitration clause and that it has duly authorized, executed, and delivered the agreement.See infratext accompanying notes 168–72.
62. Often, the parties to cross-border transactions choose as the place for arbitration a “neutral” country where none of them has connections. That means that an arbitral award usually will have to be enforced in a country other than the country in which the arbitration took place (typically the “home” country of the losing party).
63.See generallyNew York Convention,supranote 40. Both recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award deal with giving effect to the decision of the arbitrators, as opposed to compelling the parties to submit their dispute to the arbitrators for a decision. Typically, the winning party asks the court to recognize the award and enforce it against the losing party. Sometimes the winning party will ask a court to treat an arbitral award as a defense or counterclaim if the losing party brings a suit relating to a dispute that was the subject of the arbitration in which the award was made.
64.See9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 (2012). The FAA grants U.S. federal district courts non-exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over actions arising under the New York Convention regardless of the amount in controversy, addresses issues of venue, and permits removal of an action from state court to federal court by the defendant at any time prior to trial. The FAA requires the court to have personal jurisdiction over the party against whom enforcement of the foreign award is sought, for example because that party is a resident of or owns property in the United States. Personal jurisdiction and venue may be consented to in writing by parties who otherwise would not be subject to jurisdiction or who might have an objection to venue. The period for enforcement of an award under the New York Convention is three years.See id.
65.See, e.g., Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Société Générale de l’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974) (endorsing “pro enforcement bias” of New York Convention);see generallyPARK, supranote 50, at 127 (noting that five procedural defenses are not intended to permit judicial review of merits of dispute, but merely allow courts to reject awards resulting from fraudulent, unfair, or basically unjust arbitration). U.S. courts have generally interpreted these defenses narrowly. If one or more of the specified grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement are proven to exist, the New York Convention permits the forum court to refuse enforcement but does not require it to do so. New York Convention,supranote 40, art. V.
66.See supranotes 55 & 60 and accompanying text. When a U.S. court is considering whether to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award made pursuant to a valid arbitration clause that is subject to the New York Convention, its determination whether a dispute is arbitrable focuses narrowly on the specifics of the dispute that was actually submitted to arbitration rather than on the general subject matter of the agreement. Although the term “arbitrability” is used in connection with both an agreement to arbitrate’s being enforced by a court and a foreign arbitral award’s being recognized by a court under the New York Convention, the work the opinion preparers are expected to perform to support opinions on enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate and on recognition and enforcement of an award is different. To give an opinion that an agreement to arbitrate is enforceable, the opinion preparers must consider the broader issue of whether the subject matter of the agreement can be included in a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate.See supranotes 55 & 60 and accompanying text. To give an opinion that a future arbitral award will be recognized and enforced, however, the opinion preparers do not have to consider arbitrability because it is one of seven exceptions in the New York Convention and the opinion does not cover their possible application to awards made after an opinion is given.SeeMitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (noting that after allowing arbitration of antitrust issues to go forward, courts have another opportunity at award enforcement stage to ensure that government’s legitimate interest in enforcing antitrust laws has been addressed appropriately by arbitrators);see alsoPARK,supranote 50, at 116, 139 (stating that Justice Blackmun’s opinion inMitsubishi Motorspromotes transnational commercial arbitration because courts may compel arbitration of public law claims and still reserve “second look” after award is made to protect public interest, though second look might open door to rehearing on merits).
67. The language first used by the court inParsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Société Générale de l’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA)has become the standard for public policy challenges: “enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be denied on this basis only where enforcement would violate the forum state’s most basic notions of morality and justice.” 508 F.2d at 974;see alsoPARK,supranote 50, at 128;see generallyGillies,supranote 53.
68. This opinion addresses a federal statute (the FAA). Thus, the opinion letter should cover U.S. federal law expressly, at least for purposes of this opinion.
Except to the extent that an exception set forth in the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”) and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 (the “FAA”), applies, an arbitral award made under Section __ of the Agreement will be recognized and enforced under the New York Convention and the FAA, if a proceeding to enforce the award is properly brought in a United States federal court within three years after the arbitral award is made.
Some lawyers choose to make clear that the arbitral award must be a “foreign” award under the New York Convention and the FAA by using language such as the following:
Except to the extent that an exception set forth in the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”) and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 (the “FAA”), applies, an arbitral award made by [ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES] in accordance with the requirements of Section __ of the Agreement will be recognized and enforced under the New York Convention and the FAA to the extent that the arbitration relates to contract claims arising under the Agreement, if a proceeding to enforce the award is properly brought in a United States federal court within three years after the arbitral award is made.
Some opinion givers refer expressly to the exceptions provided in Article V.2(a) or (b) of the New York Convention (subject matter of the dispute not capable of settlement by arbitration or recognition and enforcement of the award contrary to U.S. public policy). New York Convention,supranote 40, art. V.2;see also supranotes 66–67 and accompanying text.
70.See generallyCOMM.ONINT’LCOMMERCIALARBITRATION, INT’LLAWASS’N, INTERIMREPORT ONPUBLICPOLICY AS ABAR TOENFORCEMENT OFINTERNATIONALARBITRALAWARDS(2000),available athttp://www.ilahq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/19.
72. The courts of all the jurisdictions involved in a cross-border transaction ordinarily can claim jurisdiction over a dispute between the parties. Therefore, the parties often specify in the agreement the courts they want to resolve disputes under the agreement. The desire to establish a uniform international framework for doing so with assurance of a consistent outcome was the impetus behind the Hague Convention on Choice of Courts Agreements (the Hague Convention).See infraPart III-4.3 and text accompanying notes 141–56.
74.See generally TriBar Remedies Opinion Report,supranote 19, at 1498 & n.72 (discussing forum selection clause designating courts of the Covered Law State). In domestic U.S. transactions the remedies opinion ordinarily covers agreements that choose the Covered Law as their governing law and the courts of the Covered Law State as the forum for resolving disputes. The TriBar Remedies Opinion Report does not address opinions on forum selection clauses that do not name the courts of the Covered Law State, which often is the case in cross-border agreements choosing non-U.S. law as their governing law, where often the courts of the Chosen Law Country are named.
75.See generallyIBA REPORT,supranote 2, at 192–95.
76. As discussed in Parts II-4.1.3 and II-4.1.4, the opinion is worded differently depending on the type of forum selection clause and is subject to different assumptions, exceptions, and qualifications, which may be stated or unstated.
77. As a matter of U.S. customary practice, if the agreement contains an inbound forum selection clause the opinion is understood to be based on an assumption, which may be stated or unstated, that an action brought in a named court in the United States will meet applicable federal or state venue requirements. Some U.S. lawyers choose to include an express exception for venue requirements, particularly when the agreement names a specific federal district court, because of the wide discretion federal courts have exercised under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer venue from one federal district to another.But see infranote 129.
Opinions specifically covering venue selection are rarely requested or given because of the inability to know whether venue requirements will be satisfied when an action is actually brought. Depending on the law of the Covered Law State, state courts may have discretion to decide the proper venue, without necessarily according significant deference to the parties’ choice. Federal venue generally is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391, which provides three alternative grounds for establishing whether venue is proper: (1) if all parties reside in the state where the court is located, a federal district where any defendant resides; (2) a federal district where the events occurred or the property is located; or (3) any federal district in which the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Ordinarily the opinion preparers have no way of knowing whether the first or second ground will be satisfied, and in cross-border transactions often they will not be satisfied. The third ground ordinarily should be satisfied if the forum selection clause includes an express consent of the parties to be sued in the federal district court named in the agreement; in some circumstances, however, that may not be so, for example when neither the parties nor the transaction has any connection with the United States. If venue is improper, the case must be dismissed or transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3).See, e.g., Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 1998) (dismissing for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3)); Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1990) (dismissing claim covered by mandatory forum selection clause for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3));cf.Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33 (1988) (valid forum selection clause given controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases); Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110, 1112 n.1 (1st Cir. 1993) (applying Rule 12(b)(6)).
78. In an agreement containing a permissive clause the parties typically submit themselves to the jurisdiction of a specified court, which assures a party who chooses to bring suit in that court that the court will have personal jurisdiction over the other party.SeeMichael Gruson,Forum Selection Clauses in International and Interstate Commercial Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 133, 192–205 [hereinafter Gruson,Forum Selection] (discussing contractual submission to personal jurisdiction). Permissive forum selection clauses in cross-border agreements often provide a non-U.S. party flexibility to bring suit against a U.S. party in the non-U.S. party’s own jurisdiction or in a U.S. state where the U.S. party has assets or operations.See infranotes 97–108 and accompanying text.
Permissive clauses often are accompanied by a waiver of the right to assert the doctrine offorum non conveniensin suits brought in courts named in the agreement. The waiver is intended to prevent a court in which suit has been brought from granting a party’s request that the suit be dismissed in favor of another court (e.g., a court in that party’s own jurisdiction) on the ground that proceeding in that other court would be more convenient to the parties, the witnesses, or the court itself.See, e.g., Vivendi S.A. v. T-Mobile USA Inc., 586 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2009). Therefore, a permissive forum selection clause accompanied by a waiver offorum non conveniensis the functional equivalent for the party being sued of a mandatory clause because, once the plaintiff chooses to bring the suit in a court named in the clause, the party being sued cannot claim that a different court would be more convenient.
79. Even if the consent is not expressed, U.S. courts ordinarily deem it implicit in the clause.See infranote 104 and accompanying text.But seeGlobal Packaging Inc. v. Superior Court of Orange Cty., 196 Cal. App. 4th 1623 (2011) (if parties mean forum selection clause to include consent to jurisdiction, they should not leave it to implication because courts should not be called upon to function as a backstop for sloppy contract drafting).
80. As noted above, forum selection clauses in cross-border transactions serve the parties’ desire for predictability, in light of concerns about being forced to litigate in an unfamiliar legal system or in an inconvenient forum.See generallyMichael E. Solimine,Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure, 25 CORNELLINT’LL.J. 51 (1992) (discussing contractual choice-of-forum clauses).
81. This Part focuses on the typical situation in which the courts selected in the forum selection clause are those of the Chosen Law Country.
82. Often, when a permissive clause names U.S. courts, it names both the state courts of the Covered Law State and federal courts sitting in that state.See infranote 103 and accompanying text.
83. When an agreement chooses non-U.S. law as its governing law, a forum selection clause ordinarily will not require that suit be brought only in the United States. When it does, it rarely requires that suit be brought only in a state court in the United States. It is more common that the agreement requires that suit be brought only in a federal court in the United States. Some agreements simply refer to “courts in the State of _________,” which could be interpreted to mean either that state’s courts or U.S. federal courts sitting in that state.
84.See infratext accompanying note 100;see also infranote 136 and accompanying text (discussing a party’s agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign court in connection with the enforcement by a court in the Covered Law State of a judgment of that foreign court).
85.See TriBar Remedies Opinion Report,supranote 19, at 1500 & n.81 (opinion on permissive clause means that parties may bring suit in the designated forum and addresses requirements for personal and subject matter jurisdiction);see also infratext accompanying notes 104–08.
86. This is a threshold question that a court in the Covered Law State must resolve before addressing the effectiveness of a forum selection clause. Whether the clause is permissive or mandatory is a question of law in most cases.See, e.g., Global Seafood Inc. v. Bantry Bay Mussels Ltd., 659 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2011) (clause held permissive because it contained no specific language of exclusion depriving U.S. court of jurisdiction); Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 77 (9th Cir. 1987). In the United States, forum selection clauses usually are presumed to be permissive unless the parties clearly provide that they are mandatory.See, e.g., New Moon Shipping Co. v. Man B&W Diesel AG, 121 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 1997); Caldas & Sons, Inc. v. Willingham, 17 F.3d 123 (5th Cir. 1994) (despite use of word “shall,” clause deemed permissive because lack of clear, unequivocal, and mandatory language indicated parties merely submitted to the jurisdiction of Zurich courts).
Outside the United States, forum selection clauses often are presumed to be mandatory unless the parties clearly provide that they are permissive. See, e.g., Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000, art. 23, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 8 (Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters) [hereinafter Brussels Regulation]; TH Agric. & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Grp. Ltd. (TH Agric. II), 488 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2007) (same clause found to be permissive under Kansas law, mandatory under Dutch law).
87.See infratext accompanying notes 92–96;see, e.g., Rio Tinto PLC v. Vale SA, No. 14 Civ. 03042 (RMB) (AJP), 2014 WL 7191250 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2014) (parties brought in English law experts to determine whether clause was mandatory); Baxter Int’l Inc. v. AXA Versicherung AG, 908 F. Supp. 2d 920, 923, 925 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (parties used German law experts to interpret clause); Ashall Homes Ltd. v. Rok Entm’t Grp., Inc., 992 A.2d 1239 (Del. 2010) (court interpreted clause in accordance with law (English) chosen to govern the contract);TH Agric. II, 488 F.3d at 1294–1296 (Dutch law applied to interpretation of clause because the agreement selected it as the governing law).
88. If the opinion giver’s client has counsel in the Chosen Law Country, the opinion preparers’ reading of the clause might be based on that counsel’s advice as to how the clause would be interpreted under the chosen non-U.S. law. If the opinion preparers have received such advice, they might choose to indicate their reliance on it in the opinion letter.
89. Nevertheless, after considering the issue the opinion preparers might choose not to make clear how they are reading a clause for a variety of reasons. These reasons include uncertainty whether a court in the Covered Law State would look to the Covered Law or the non-U.S. Chosen Law to determine the nature of the clause and uncertainty whether, even if the court were to apply the Covered Law, it would interpret the clause as permissive or mandatory. The interpretation adopted by a court may depend on whether the court finds clear evidence of the parties’ intent. That intent, however, may be unclear (the agreement, for example, may expressly contemplate that suit may be brought in a court of the Chosen Law Country but neither expressly permit nor prohibit suit from being brought elsewhere), and that lack of clarity may lead some courts to conclude that the parties intended the named court to be the exclusive forum and other courts to conclude that the parties intended to allow for suit to be brought in multiple courts.See, e.g., Boland v. George S. May Int’l Co., 969 N.E.2d 166 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (clause declaring that “jurisdiction shall vest in the State of Illinois” permissive absent plain statement that jurisdiction should be exclusive). U.S. courts dealing with an ambiguous forum selection clause often attempt to discern the parties’ intent from the agreement as a whole.See, e.g., Autoridad de Energia Eléctrica de Puerto Rico v. Ericsson Inc., 201 F.3d 15, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2000) (forum selection clause accompanied by choice-of-law language that indicated intent to make named court exclusive forum). The task is made more difficult when the drafters of a forum selection clause, rather than simply identifying courts where disputes are to be resolved and stating whether the selection is exclusive or non-exclusive, use less precise terms such as courts having jurisdiction or venue, which are sometimes used interchangeably.See, e.g., Global Seafood Inc. v. Bantry Bay Mussels Ltd., 659 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2011).
Small differences in terminology may be deemed sufficient by a court to treat differently two clauses that seem virtually indistinguishable, and case law in the Covered Law State may not provide much, if any, clear guidance.See, e.g., Terra Int’l Inc. v. Miss. Chem. Corp., 119 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 1997); Boutari & Sons Wines & Spirits S.A. v. Attiki Imp. & Distrib. Inc., 22 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 1994). Some courts have adopted interpretive rules under which certain words are deemed to make a clause mandatory and others to make it permissive. Case law is inconsistent, however, and contract language that the opinion preparers regard as clear may be interpreted differently by a court.See, e.g., K&V Sci. Co. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft, 314 F.3d 494 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding “jurisdiction for all and any disputes [ . . . ] is Munich” permissive because parties did not use words like “exclusive,” “sole,” or “only” that would indicate parties’ intent to make it mandatory); Nascone v. Spudnuts, Inc., 735 F.2d 763, 767 (3d Cir. 1984) (reference to venue indicates a mandatory clause); Hull 753 Corp. v. Elbe Flugzeugwerke GmbH, 58 F. Supp. 2d 925 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (deeming “place of jurisdiction shall be Dresden” a permissive clause in light of reference to jurisdiction and not venue).
90. An opinion that does not characterize the forum selection clause as permissive or mandatory could be worded as follows:
The forum selection clause in Section __ of the Agreement is valid and enforceable under the law of [COVERED LAW STATE] for actions relating to contract claims arising under the Agreement.
Analyzing the clause as both permissive and mandatory may allow the opinion preparers to give the opinion even if they have been unable to decide with the confidence needed to give an opinion whether a court of the Covered Law State would find the provision to be permissive or mandatory. When the Covered Law is not the Chosen Law, the opinion recipient should seek advice from its own counsel whether the forum selection clause will be interpreted as permissive or mandatory under the Chosen Law. An opinion giver is not responsible for providing the recipient, who is not its client, legal advice. If a court in the Covered Law State, for example, interpreted the clause under the Covered Law as permissive and declined a request by the opinion recipient (who had intended to negotiate for a mandatory outbound forum selection clause) to dismiss an action brought in that court by the opinion giver’s client, the opinion would be correct even though under the Chosen Law the clause would have been interpreted as mandatory. Seeinfranotes 95 and 96 and accompanying text regarding the law a U.S. court would apply to the interpretation of a forum selection clause contained in an agreement that chooses non-U.S. law as the governing law.
91. See, for example,infratext accompanying notes 110–17 regarding states that have not adopted the so-called modern view. In addition, other issues discussed later in this Report bear on the opinion preparers’ ability to conclude that a forum selection clause would be given effect under the Covered Law.
92. If the clause names a U.S. federal court, federal law, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, will apply.See infratext accompanying note 103;see also supratext accompanying note 77 (regarding venue). If the agreement containing the forum selection clause does not contain a governing law clause, the opinion preparers may be able to give an opinion on the enforceability of the forum selection clause under the Covered Law even though they cannot determine which law a named court would apply. The Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption permits the opinion preparers to assume that the agreement containing the clause is enforceable under whatever foreign law may govern the agreement.See supranote 17 and accompanying text. Some commentators, particularly outside the United States, maintain that in the absence of an explicit choice-of-law clause the substantive law of the jurisdiction where the named court is located should always be regarded as the governing law because it was implicitly chosen by the parties when they named a court for the resolution of disputes.
93. When this is not the case, for example if Germany is the Chosen Law Country, but French courts are named in the forum selection clause, a French court could be expected to apply French law to procedural issues and German law to substantive issues, but also may apply French law to some substantive issues. Effective January 10, 2015, the Brussels Regulation was amended to clarify that the law governing the validity of a forum selection clause is the law of the jurisdiction where the named court is located, not the Chosen Contract Law. Brussels Regulation,supranote 86,as amended byEU Council Regulation 1215/2015 of 12 December 2012, art. 23. Assuming that the agreement chooses the law of the Chosen Law Country to govern, the conclusions in this section of the Report generally apply whether the courts named in a forum selection clause are located in the Chosen Law Country or in some other jurisdiction outside the United States, because neither the law of the jurisdiction where the named court is located (in the example, French law) nor the Chosen Contract Law (in the example, German law) is covered by the opinion letter and, in giving an opinion on the effectiveness of the forum selection clause, the opinion preparers can rely on the Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption with respect to the law of all jurisdictions outside the United States that may be applicable.See supranote 17 and accompanying text.
94. Jason Webb Yackee,Choice of Law Considerations in the Validity & Enforcement of International Forum Selection Clauses: Whose Law Applies?, 9 UCLA J. INT’LL. & FOREIGNAFF. 43, 46, 63, 67 (2004) (criticizing tendency of U.S. courts considering the validity of forum selection clauses to reflexively apply their own law (thelex fori));see generallyJ. Zachary Courson, Survey, Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd.:A New Federal Standard—Applying Contracting Parties’ Choice of Law to the Analysis of Forum Selection Agreements, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 597, 601, 604–07, 610 (2008).
95. Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418 (10th Cir. 2006). TheYavuzcourt, citing Professor Yackee’s article (see supranote 94) and the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 cmt. e (1971), held that courts ordinarily should honor a cross-border agreement’s choice of forum as it is construed under the law chosen by the parties to govern the agreement. The court found no reason why a U.S. court should apply to the forum selection clause a law different from the law governing other clauses, noting that international commerce requires the security parties derive from knowing that their contractual choices will be respected.Id. at 428–31 (“if parties agree on forum selection clause that has particular meaning under the law of a specific jurisdiction, and also agree that the contract is to be interpreted under the law of that jurisdiction, respect for the parties’ autonomy and demands of predictability in international transactions require that courts give effect to that meaning under that law”);see alsoMartinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2014) (Chosen Contract Law (English law) applied to determine whether forum selection clause is permissive or mandatory and claim subject to clause, even though federal U.S. law ultimately must govern enforceability of clause); Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378 (2d Cir. 2007) (citingYavuz,court should not single out forum selection clause for interpretation under law other than the law chosen to govern contract as a whole). The holding inYavuzis consistent with decisions in the domestic U.S. context where: (1) an agreement chooses as its governing law the law of a U.S. state other than the state whose court is asked to enforce the forum selection clause; and (2) that court (which was not selected as the forum in the agreement), after holding the outbound choice-of-law clause effective, interprets the forum selection clause under the Chosen Contract Law.SeeJacobson v. Mailboxes Etc. USA, Inc., 646 N.E.2d 741, 744 n.6 (Mass. 1995) (where agreement chose California law as governing law and California courts as exclusive forum, Massachusetts court applied governing law (California) both to enforceability of forum selection clause generally and to interpretation of that clause).
96.See also,e.g., Albemarle Corp. v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 628 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 2014) (court stated that federal law must be applied, but then looked at chosen English law to hold clause mandatory); Doe 1, Doe 2 & Ramkissoon v. AOL, 552 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2009); Abbott Labs. Inc. v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 476 F.3d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 2007); Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying federal law to all issues regarding forum selection clause);see generallyCourson,supranote 94, at 615–20. Courts and commentators continue to differ as to which specific aspects of forum selection relate to contract formation and interpretation as opposed to enforceability, and which issues are procedural (and therefore presumptively governed by the Covered Law as thelex fori) and which issues are substantive (and therefore presumptively governed by the Chosen Contract Law).SeeCourson,supranote 94, at 621–24;see alsoPeter M. Haver, Enforceability of Forum Selection Clauses in U.S. Court Proceedings: What Law Applies in an International Setting? 1–2, 4–6 (Apr. 22, 2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Reporter, as presented to the meeting of the Joint Cross Border Finance and International Commercial Law Subcommittee of the ABA Business Law Section in Denver on April 22, 2010).
97.See generallyYackee,supranote 94, at 50–56. Formal conditions for validity, which may include the form, content, or location of the forum selection clause, are not uncommon outside the United States.See, e.g., Brussels Regulation,supranote 86 (establishing four specific “forms” in which forum selection agreements must be made, which the European Court of Justice has suggested should be strictly construed); CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE[C.P.C.][CIVILPROCEDURECODE] art. 48 (Fr.) (requiring forum selection clause to be specified in an instrument signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought and specification to be “very apparent”); Cour de casation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] com., Feb. 27, 1996, REV. CRITIQUEDROITINT’L’PRIVÉ1996, 734 (French court finding invalid forum selection clause printed in very small type on back of first page of contract); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 22, 2001 (Ger.) (German Supreme Court finding forum selection clause included in loan guarantee form invalid because not physically signed by borrower). Contrary to the law of many U.S. states and European Union law, the law of some jurisdictions may provide that forum selection clauses are unenforceable in principle or valid only under limited circumstances. In addition, in some civil law countries to be valid certain categories of contracts must be executed in the presence of a notary public acting, depending on the circumstances, as a witness or as a public official.
98.See supratext accompanying note 17. In particular, the opinion does not address whether a court outside the Covered Law State, whether in another U.S. state or in a jurisdiction outside the United States, would have personal or subject matter jurisdiction, because those issues would not be governed by the Covered Law. Non-U.S. parties may request an opinion that a U.S. party has the corporate power to agree to a forum selection clause choosing a court outside the United States and that the agreement has been duly authorized, executed, and delivered by the U.S. party.See infratext accompanying notes 168–71.
The Company’s agreement in Section __ of the Agreement to submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of [FOREIGN LAW COUNTRY] is valid and enforceable under the law of [COVERED LAW STATE] for actions relating to contract claims arising under the Agreement.
If a forum selection clause names U.S. federal courts, the opinion letter should cover U.S. federal law expressly, at least for the purposes of this opinion.
100.See infranotes 136–37 and accompanying text. Opinions on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are discussed in Part III-4.2. Grounds on which a U.S. court can refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment include the foreign judicial system’s not providing for impartial tribunals or having procedures incompatible with basic due process of law and questionable integrity of the court rendering the judgment in the specific case. The opinion preparers cannot make a professional judgment regarding any of these matters.See alsoIBA REPORT,supranote 2, at 194, 279.
101.See infratext accompanying notes 185–95. A number of U.S. statutes, rules, and regulations, mostly federal, that rarely apply to domestic U.S. transactions apply to similar cross-border transactions because non-U.S. parties are involved or because performance is to occur outside the United States. For example, the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) within the U.S. Treasury Department manages sanctions and trade restrictions with particular countries and parties pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. § 1701et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. § 1601et seq.), and other similar statutes (see, e.g., OFAC regulations regarding Syria, 31 C.F.R. pt. 542, and OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals List of persons and entities with whom, and with whose affiliates, U.S. citizens are not permitted to conduct business).
The Company’s agreement in Section __ of the Agreement to submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of [COVERED LAW STATE] [and United States federal courts] is valid and enforceable under the law of [COVERED LAW STATE] [and the federal law of the United States] for actions relating to contract claims arising under the Agreement.
If a forum selection clause names U.S. federal courts, the opinion letter should cover U.S. federal law expressly, at least for the purposes of this opinion.
103.See generally TriBar Remedies Opinion Report,supranote 19, at 1499 n.78 (when a forum selection clause permits but does not require an action to be brought in federal court, many lawyers do not take an exception for the possible lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Some, however, do. Both practices are common.) The opinion preparers cannot know the facts and circumstances of a future suit when they give the opinion and therefore cannot predict whether requirements for federal court jurisdiction will be satisfied. See alsosupranote 77 for a discussion of venue.
104.See TriBar Remedies Opinion Report,supranote 19, at 1499. The personal and subject matter jurisdiction of a named court of the Covered Law State is governed by the Covered Law not the Chosen Law. Therefore, the analysis the opinion preparers are required to conduct is the same as the analysis required to give an opinion on the enforceability of an agreement governed by the Covered Law that contains a permissive forum selection clause (unless coverage of the clause is excluded from that opinion). The opinion is based on the facts as of the date of the opinion letter, and the opinion letter need not point out that the jurisdictional requirements may no longer be satisfied when suit actually is brought.TriBar Remedies Opinion Report,supranote 19, at 1499 & n.76;see alsoGLAZERTREATISE,supranote 10, at 387; Gruson,Forum Selection,supranote 78, at 136–37.
Even if the forum selection clause is not accompanied by an express consent of the parties to personal jurisdiction, U.S. courts ordinarily deem that consent implicit. Some states, however, require the parties or the transaction to have sufficient contacts with that state.See, e.g., McRae v. J.D./ M.D., Inc., 511 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1987) (forum selection clause alone not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction absent some minimum contacts or long-arm statute). In those states the opinion preparers must either expressly assume or satisfy themselves that there are sufficient contacts for the named court to take the case. That may be a concern in cross-border transactions if the parties choose the named state court even though neither they nor the transaction have any relationship with that state.
Normally, the requirement of subject matter jurisdiction is satisfied if the named state court is a court of general jurisdiction.TriBar Remedies Opinion Report,supranote 19, at 1499 & n.78 (if a clause specifies a particular type of court, such as, for example, the Delaware Chancery Court, the opinion preparers must determine whether the disputes covered by the clause are within that court’s subject matter jurisdiction, because the parties cannot by contract confer subject matter jurisdiction on a specialized court).
Some states, such as New York and California, have enacted statutes expressly validating forum selection clauses for transactions above a specified size if the clause selects the courts of that state as the forum for resolving disputesandthe agreement containing the clause chooses the law of that state as its governing law. Some statutes also provide that the parties are deemed to have waived the right to assert the doctrine offorum non conveniens. Such statutes, however, do not apply to an agreement that chooses the law of another state or country as its governing law.
105. Thus, the opinion provides comfort to the non-U.S. recipient that it would not face automatic dismissal if it were to bring suit in a court in the Covered Law State named in the agreement, as would be the case, for example, in countries whose law prohibits private parties from voluntarily electing to sue or be sued in their courts. The Covered Law State also may have other requirements that the opinion recipient must satisfy to bring suit there, such as, for example, being qualified to do business in the state. If those requirements relate to the opinion recipient, the opinion does not cover them.
106.See, e.g., Credit Suisse Int’l v. Urbi, DeSarrollos Urbanos, S.A.B. de C.V., 971 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (foreign corporation doing business in New York without qualifying to do so prohibited from bringing suit there even if New York law prevents the defendant, who agreed to inbound forum selection clause, from asserting that New York courts are inconvenient or lack jurisdiction).
107.TriBar Remedies Opinion Report,supranote 19, at 1501 (permissive clause does not foreclose suit elsewhere or prevent application of doctrine offorum non conveniens(absent waiver); thus opinion does not mean that a party may not bring suit in another court or that named court will hear case). Although not required, in the absence of a waiver, some opinion preparers state expressly that the named court may decline to hear the case on the grounds that it is an inconvenient forum.
108. Whether the court would grant the motion may depend on which suit was brought first (lis alibi pendensrule), the convenience of the parties, witnesses, or the court (absent a waiver offorum non conveniens), or other priority/ordering considerations that cannot be known by the opinion preparers when they give the opinion.
109. When a party to an agreement brings suit in a court that is not named in a mandatory forum selection clause, that court typically enforces the clause by granting the other party’s motion to dismiss or stay the proceedings, thus requiring the plaintiff, if it wishes to pursue the action, to bring a new suit in the named court.
110.See TriBar Remedies Opinion Report,supranote 19, at 1501 & n.84 (as interpreted by the courts, for enforcement to be unfair or unreasonable, a judicial determination is required that “enforcement of the clause would be so unreasonable and unjust as to make a trial in the selected forum so gravely difficult and inconvenient that the challenging party would, for all practical purposes, be deprived of his or her day in court”).
111. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). Prior to 1972 U.S. courts considered agreements selecting foreign courts as the exclusive forum for resolving disputes involving a U.S. party to be an impermissible ouster of their jurisdiction.Bremenmarked the U.S. Supreme Court’s rejection of the “per seinvalidity” rule in favor of a “prima facievalidity” rule. The over forty years since theBremendecision have witnessed a sea change in the willingness of U.S. courts to enforce mandatory forum selection clauses in cross-border agreements.See generallyYackee,supranote 94, at 47–50, 64–67. The followingdictainBremenis often quoted by U.S. courts: “The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on the parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts. . . . The elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element in international trade, commerce and contracting.”See Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9, 14. InPhillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 383–84 (2d Cir. 2007), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted a four-part analysis for determining the validity and enforceability of a forum selection clause in a cross-border agreement: (1) Was the clause reasonably disclosed to the resisting party? (2) Is the clause mandatory or permissive? (3) Does the clause extend to the claims involved in the suit? and (4) Has theBremenpresumption been rebutted? Some aspects of theBremenexception are factual in nature, for example whether consent was coerced or otherwise invalid. Others are legal or equitable, for example, whether a strong public policy is implicated.
112. AlthoughBremenwas decided under federal admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, it expresses the prevailing view in the United States on the issue of ouster. Recently the U.S. Supreme Court held, in a diversity jurisdiction case, that clauses choosing a particular federal court as the exclusive forum for resolving disputes are presumptively enforceable under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the W.D. of Texas, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 (2013) (when an agreement contains a forum selection clause and an action is brought in federal court, in all but the most unusual cases the interest of justice is served by holding parties to their choice of forum). When a mandatory forum selection clause names the courts of a particular state and an action is brought in those courts, those courts will apply their state’s law in determining the enforceability of the forum selection clause. Many state courts followBremen.
113. The public policy ground only comes into play when the court considering whether to enforce a mandatory forum selection clause is not a named court. Thus, it applies when a court that is not named is asked to dismiss a suit brought in that court in violation of the forum selection clause. InAtlantic Marinethe Court held that when a party to an agreement has violated a contractual obligation by filing suit in a court other than the one named in a valid mandatory forum selection clause, “[that court’s] dismissal would work no injustice on the plaintiff” even though, as a result of the running of a statute of limitations or otherwise, the plaintiff is unable to pursue its action in the named court.Id. at 582–84. The court noted that claiming that a suit was brought in violation of a mandatory forum selection clause is different from claimingforum non conveniens, where the burden is on the party seeking to move the case to a different court because of the potentially harsh results of dismissal.Id. at 580–81;see, e.g., Sinochem Int’l v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007); Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 39 (1955).
Although a key issue inBremenwas whether giving effect to a forum selection clause choosing English courts would violate a U.S. policy of not enforcing exculpation provisions in some situations, U.S. courts generally are reluctant to apply the public policy exception to deny enforcement of a forum selection clause in agreements between sophisticated commercial parties.SeeYackee,supranote 94, at 48–49, 79–83, 95 & n.276;see alsoYackee,supranote 94, at 81 & n.202 (observing that, to deflect criticism of theBremenexception as “unmanageably elastic” and “muddled and ambiguous,” courts apply it only when strong public policies are involved).
114.See, e.g., Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 495 (9th Cir. 2000) (refusing to enforce mandatory forum selection clause choosing Pennsylvania courts, because to do so would contravene “strong public policy to protect California franchisees from expense, inconvenience, and possible prejudice of litigating in non-California venue” as articulated by California franchising statute); Verdugo v. Alliantgroup, L.P., 237 Cal. App. 4th 141 (2015) (holding forum selection clause unenforceable because it would operate as a waiver of unwaivable California Labor Code right in violation of California public policy);but seeBrooks v. Sotheby’s, No. 13-CV-02183 RS, 2013 WL 3339356 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2013) (mandatory forum selection clause given effect because plaintiff did not show English courts would not provide same or equivalent remedies, despite California public policy against waiving claims under consumer protection statute). In some states the modern view is codified in a statute, while in many others it has been adopted in judicial decisions.
115. For the same reasons separate opinions on the effectiveness of forum selection clauses normally are not requested or given in domestic U.S. transactions, they normally are not requested or given in cross-border transactions when the agreement chooses the Covered Law as its governing law: in those situations, absent an express exception, an opinion that the agreement is valid, binding, and enforceable under the Covered Law covers the effectiveness of the forum selection clause.See supratext accompanying note 74. If a forum selection clause names a U.S. federal court in the Covered Law State, the opinion letter should cover U.S. federal law expressly, at least for purposes of this opinion.
The Company’s agreement in Section __ of the Agreement that the courts of [FOREIGN COUNTRY] shall have exclusive jurisdiction is valid and enforceable under the law of [COVERED LAW STATE] for actions relating to contract claims arising under the Agreement.
For sample wording of a qualification regarding the possible application of theBremenexception, seeinfranote 120.
Opinion givers may need to consider whether an exception is necessary when a forum selection clause expressly covers not only disputes arising under the agreement, but also claims arising in tort and disputes involving extra-contractual claims relating to the transaction broadly. This type of clause appears most frequently in agreements with parties from EU member countries because Council Regulation (EC) 864/2007 (Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations) art, 14, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40, 46 [hereinafter Rome II Regulation], governing choice of law by EU courts in non-contractual (e.g., tort) matters, specifically allows the parties to provide in their agreement that the law that governs the agreement also applies to non-contractual causes of action; the same construct extends to forum selection under the Rome II Regulation. Depending on the law of the specific state, a U.S. court may be unwilling to defer to the parties’ choice of forum for extra-contractual disputes, with the court’s determination often turning on whether the claims are intertwined with, or dependent upon the construction of, the parties’ contractual relationship.See, e.g.,Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110, 1121 (1st Cir. 1993) (refusing effort to evade enforcement of forum selection clause through artful pleading of tort claim in context of contract dispute); Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 203 (3d Cir. 1983) (pleading of alternative non-contractual theories of liability does not prevent enforcement of forum selection clause when relationship is contractual),overruled on other grounds,490 U.S. 495 (1989); Ashall Homes Ltd. v. Rok Entm’t Grp., Inc., 992 A.2d 1239, 1248 (Del. 2010) (in policing boundary between contract and tort, court should consider extent to which tort claims relate to contractual relationship or hinge on contract’s scope). Depending on the law of the specific state, when tort claims are involved a U.S. court may decide that the law of the place where the claim arose, e.g., where the wrongful conduct took place or harm occurred, must be applied by a court in that jurisdiction, rather than deferring to the parties’ agreement as to a different governing law and forum. In some states, courts may focus instead on the intent of the parties with respect to the scope of the forum selection clause, thus being willing to broadly enforce the clause in a manner similar to what the Rome II Regulation requires if, for example, the language of the agreement provides that “all disputes arising out of or relating to the contract or the relationships formed thereby, including statutory claims and related tort claims,” are covered by the clause.
117. A court will apply the various prongs of theBremenexception based on the nature of the claims made by the parties and the facts and circumstances at the time of the dispute, none of which the opinion preparers can ascertain when the opinion is given.
118. While the analysis is the same in domestic U.S. transactions as in cross-border transactions, the limited impact in domestic U.S. transactions of theBremenexception is so well understood that many U.S. lawyers do not expressly refer to it when giving enforceability opinions.See TriBar Remedies Opinion Report,supranote 19, at 1501 & n.87, 1502 & nn.88–89. The TriBar report, however, only addresses opinions on the enforceability of agreements, including forum selection clauses in those agreements, that choose as their governing law the law covered by the opinion. The TriBar report does not address an opinion that is directed specifically at the effectiveness under the Covered Law of a forum selection clause in an agreement that is not governed by the Covered Law. The TriBar report therefore does not consider the desirability of including in that opinion an express reference to theBremenexception. It also points out that the practice of not referring to theBremenexception even in the opinions it does address is not universal, with some lawyers pointing out the possible application of theBremenexception.
119. As a practical matter the opinion preparers cannot be expected to determine whether a U.S. court will decline to give effect to a mandatory outbound forum selection clause on the basis of the third prong of theBremenexception because that determination requires knowledge they cannot be expected to have of how the named court would go about enforcing each obligation of the opinion giver’s client in the agreement containing the clause.
120.See supratext accompanying note 113. The reference could be worded as follows:
The opinion in numbered paragraph __ is limited to the extent that a court may decline to give effect to the forum selection clause in Section __ of the Agreement because enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust under the principles enunciated in the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in M/S Bremen & Unterweser Reederel, GmbH v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 402 U.S. 1 (1972) and in related cases, including that it would contravene a strong public policy of [COVERED LAW STATE].
If the opinion letter contains an opinion on the enforceability of the forum selection clause but not of the governing law clause, the opinion preparers should consider including in the opinion letter an express assumption that the choice of non-U.S. law as the governing law of the agreement will be given effect under the Covered Law. One could argue that the assumption is technically unnecessary because, if the forum selection clause is mandatory, it names a non-U.S. court, and a court in the Covered Law State gives the clause effect, no court in the Covered Law State would have the opportunity to consider independently the merits of the case and, therefore, to reach the choice-of-law issue.See, e.g., Gruson,Forum Selection,supranote 78, at 191 (once parties to agreement validly agree that foreign forum should adjudicate disputes, it is difficult to see what legitimate concern an excluded forum in which suit was brought would protect by deciding choice-of-law question). As discussed earlier, however, to decide that a mandatory outbound forum selection clause is effective, a court in the Covered Law State applying the Covered Law first must give effect to the choice of the Chosen Law Country’s law in the agreement.See supranotes 93–96 and accompanying text. Absent a choice-of-law opinion, assuming that a court in the Covered Law State would give effect to the choice-of-law clause will eliminate any risk that an opinion on the effectiveness of a forum selection clause naming courts in the Chosen Law Country could be interpreted as including an implicit, unqualified opinion that a court in the Covered Law State also will give effect to the choice of the Chosen Law Country’s law. Not all U.S. lawyers see a need to include this assumption, instead wording the Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption in a way that addresses the choice-of-law issue.See supranote 17 and accompanying text.
121. This is the same as for opinions on the effectiveness of permissive forum selection clauses.See supratext accompanying notes 99–101.
122.See supratext accompanying note 17. Typically a non-U.S. party will want comfort from a U.S. lawyer that a U.S. party has the corporate power to agree that a non-U.S. court will be the exclusive forum under the agreement. That issue is covered by the standard opinion on due authorization, execution, and delivery of the agreement under the Covered Law.See infratext accompanying notes 168–72.
123.See supranote 17. The last sentence of the illustrative Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption covers this issue not only under the Chosen Law but also under thelex foriso as to address the possibility that the court named in the forum selection clause is in a jurisdiction other than the Chosen Law Country.
124. This conclusion is consistent with the modern view, which requires a court to give substantial weight to the parties’ choice of courts. A non-U.S. recipient whose goal is not to be exposed to the risk of litigation in U.S. courts often seeks comfort on this issue because in many countries, instead of deferring to the parties’ choice of forum, a court decides whether to take a case by applying broad discretionary standards such as reasonableness, fairness, the extent of contacts with the parties and the transaction, the burden on the court, and the convenience of the parties or the witnesses.See generallyHaver,supranote 96, at 2–3. The opinion also gives a non-U.S. recipient comfort that, in drafting the forum selection clause, it does not have to satisfy special form requirements imposed by the Covered Law, such as capitalized, special, or bold-face type, a specific placement within the agreement, or special signing formalities. If the Chosen Law imposes such form requirements, the Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption covers them. In addition, the opinion could be important to a non-U.S. recipient because the validity under the Covered Law of the submission by a U.S. party to the exclusive jurisdiction of a non-U.S. court may be relevant to the enforcement of the clause by the named non-U.S. court.See generallyMichael Gruson,Controlling Site of Litigation,inSOVEREIGNLENDING: MANAGINGLEGALRISK29, 35–36 (Michael Gruson & Ralph Reisner eds., 1984). The opinion also supports a conclusion that a judgment obtained in the named non-U.S. court will be recognized and enforced by courts in the Covered Law State, as discussed in Part III-4.2.
The Company’s agreement in Section __ of the Agreement that the courts of [COVERED LAW STATE] [and United States federal courts] shall have exclusive jurisdiction is valid and enforceable under the law of [COVERED LAW STATE] [and the federal law of the United States] for actions relating to contract claims arising under the Agreement.
126. Some states, however, require the parties or the transaction to have sufficient contacts with the state for a court in the state to take a case.See generally supranote 104 and accompanying text.
The fact that a named court in the Covered Law State will be required to apply the law of another country will not prevent it from taking jurisdiction and deciding the case.Cf.Cambridge Biotech Corp. v. Pasteur Sanofi Diagnostics, 740 N.E.2d 195 (Mass. 2000) (upholding parties’ choice of French courts as forum for resolving disputes arising under agreement that chose Massachusetts law to govern, even though result was that Massachusetts law would be applied by French courts). If the clause specifies a U.S. federal court as the exclusive forum, the opinion preparers need to consider federal rules governing subject matter and personal jurisdiction.See supranote 103 and accompanying text.
128.See supranote 77. Under federal venue rules, (i) if an action is commenced in the named federal district court, in most cases that court will have venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 by reason of the parties’ express consent to be sued there; (ii) if an action is commenced in a federal district court other than the named federal district court and that other court does not have venue under § 1391, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406 the case can be transferred to the named court; and (iii) if an action is commenced in a federal district court other than the named federal district court, even if that other court has venue under § 1391 a party can request transfer of the case to the named court in reliance on the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding inAtlantic Marinethat “§ 1404 permits transfer to any district where venue is also proper . . . or to any other district to which the parties have agreed by contract [ . . . because] the federal venue statute is not the right set of rules to deal with mandatory forum selection.” Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the W.D. of Texas, 134 S. Ct. 568, 574 (2013). Thus, as a practical matter venue should not be a concern for non-U.S. parties when the agreement requires that suit be brought only in a specified federal district court. If asked, however, a U.S. lawyer typically will not be in a position to give an opinion covering federal venue rules.See supranote 77. Many opinion givers have continued the pre-Atlantic Marinepractice of including an express exception for the federal venue rules in their opinion letters.
129.See supranote 112. InAtlantic Marinethe Court stated that a refusal to transfer the case to the federal district court named in a mandatory forum selection clause is “conceivable,” but “will not be common” and requires “extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the parties.”Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 134 S. Ct. at 581–82. Contrary to the wide discretion federal courts generally have under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to allocate venue within the federal system, underAtlantic Marinea federal district court in which suit was brought in violation of the agreement cannot consider the convenience of the court, parties, or witnesses and must transfer the case to the named federal district court. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the same standard would apply to mandatory forum selection clauses naming state courts even though in that situation a federal court cannot transfer the case to the named state court and instead must dismiss it.
130. A non-U.S. party often will seek to enforce an agreement that chooses non-U.S. law as its governing law in the courts of the non-U.S. jurisdiction whose law is chosen. If, however, the U.S. party’s assets or operations are in the United States, the non-U.S. party may need a U.S. court to enforce a judgment it has obtained outside the United States.
131. Recognition and enforcement are related but distinct concepts. Recognition of a foreign judgment means that a U.S. court accepts the determination of legal rights and obligations made by the non-U.S. court that decided the case on its merits. Enforcement involves the use of legal process in the United States to require the losing party to comply with the judgment of the foreign court. Recognition is a prerequisite to enforcement.
132. For many years enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States was solely a common law issue, with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision inHilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), as the leading authority. Today, however, state statutes or state court decisions provide the applicable legal framework. The Hague Convention (which is discussed in Part III-4.3) is the first international treaty signed by the United States on this subject but has not yet become effective. If and when it does and is ratified by the U.S. Senate, it will govern many judgments relating to cross-border transactions in which the agreement contains a mandatory forum selection clause. Until then, and even after for judgments relating to agreements that do not contain a mandatory forum selection clause covered by the Hague Convention, state law will continue to govern the enforceability of foreign judgments. In 2005, the American Law Institute completed work on a proposed federal statute that would preempt state law.SeeAM. LAWINST., RECOGNITION ANDENFORCEMENT OFFOREIGNJUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS ANDPROPOSEDFEDERALSTATUTE(proposed final draft Apr. 11, 2005),available athttps://www.ali.org/publications/show/recognition-and-enforcement-foreign-judgments-analysis-and-proposed-federal-statute/. One of the ALI’s objectives was to provide a comprehensive uniform regime designed to address concerns about U.S. law frequently voiced by other countries and, thereby, to promote bilateral or multi lateral treaties broader in scope than the Hague Convention.
To the extent that it relates to contract claims arising under the Agreement, a final and conclusive judgment granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, other than a judgment for taxes, a fine or other penalty, rendered by a court of [FOREIGN COUNTRY] against the Company that is enforceable in [FOREIGN COUNTRY] will be recognized as valid and enforced under the law of [COVERED LAW STATE] by the courts of [COVERED LAW STATE] or by United States federal courts having jurisdiction and applying the law of [COVERED LAW STATE], without a re-examination of the substantive issues underlying the judgment, subject to (i) grounds for non-recognition and exceptions to enforcement set forth in the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act as adopted in [COVERED LAW STATE] (the “Act”) [IF OPINION GIVER WISHES TO REFER TO PARTICULAR EXCEPTIONS FROM THE STATUTE, ADD —, which include, but are not limited to, _________________] and (ii) the court’s power to stay proceedings to enforce a foreign judgment pending determination of any appeal or until the expiration of time sufficient to enable the defendant to prosecute an appeal. [IF APPLICABLE IN THE COVERED LAW STATE, ADD—This opinion is based on the assumption that the law of [FOREIGN COUNTRY] requires a court of competent jurisdiction in [FOREIGN COUNTRY], in a reciprocal manner, to recognize and enforce a final and conclusive judgment of a court of [COVERED LAW STATE] without reconsideration of the merits.]
SeeIBA REPORT,supranote 2, at 196 (noting that, though of limited value, the opinion is frequently requested because legal requirements vary significantly in number and specificity from country to country (most often including requirements relating to fair and due process, no violation of public policy, and reciprocity)).
134. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRYMONEYJUDGMENTRECOGNITIONACT(UNIF. LAWCOMM’N2005) [hereinafter UNIFORMACT]. While establishing minimum standards under which state courts are required to enforce foreign judgments, the Uniform Act leaves courts free to recognize foreign judgments for other reasons applying widely accepted principles of comity. The Uniform Act does not apply to judgments enforcing foreign arbitral awards, because arbitral awards are covered by the FAA.See supranotes 40 & 44–46 and accompanying text. Approximately thirty-five states (including California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, and Texas) have adopted the Uniform Act (or a prior version with largely similar rules and procedures—the Uniform Foreign Money Judgment Recognition Act of 1962). In other states the case law may or may not provide the opinion preparers a basis for reaching conclusions with the confidence needed to give an unqualified opinion.
135. When the foreign judgment is expressed in a currency other than U.S. dollars, a U.S. court must also decide how it should be satisfied. Many states have adopted the Uniform Foreign Money Claims Act (UNIF. FOREIGNMONEYCLAIMSACT(UNIF. LAWCOMM’N1989) [hereinafter FOREIGN-MONEYCLAIMSACT]). That act (1) recognizes the parties’ right to select the currency for their transaction and allocate the risk of exchange rate fluctuations; and (2) in the absence of an agreement, codifies the basic principle that the aggrieved party should be restored to the economic position in which it would have been had the breach not occurred. In deciding how a foreign judgment should be satisfied, courts normally apply the so-called “payment day rule” (conversion of foreign currency into U.S. dollars at the exchange rate in effect when the judgment is paid), but alternatively sometimes apply other rules (such as the “breach day rule” or the “judgment day rule”). The Foreign Money Claims Act is intended to promote uniform judicial determination of claims expressed in a foreign currency, thereby reducing forum shopping and uncertainty, and to address related issues such as adjustments to and interest on foreign money claims. An opinion on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments under the Uniform Act does not cover currency conversion and related issues.
136. They are: (1) the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law; (2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant, except that jurisdiction is deemed established, if the defendant: (i) was served with process personally in the foreign country; (ii) voluntarily appeared other than to contest jurisdiction; (iii) agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court; or (iv) had an office in the foreign country (the specified grounds are not exclusive and the forum court may find that the foreign court had personal jurisdiction on some other basis); or (3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute. UNIFORMACT,supranote 134, §§ 4(b), 5.
137. They are: (1) the defendant did not receive notice of the proceeding in sufficient time to prepare a defense; (2) the judgment was obtained by “extrinsic” fraud on the part of the prevailing party that deprived the losing party of an adequate opportunity to present its case (such as deliberately serving the defendant at the wrong address), as opposed to “intrinsic” fraud (such as false testimony or forged evidence), which is a matter for the foreign court to deal with; (3) the judgment is repugnant to the public policy of the forum state or the United States (a stringent test, requiring clear injury to public health, public morals, or public confidence in the administration of law, as opposed to a mere difference in law, no matter how significant); (4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment; (5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to a valid agreement such as an exclusive forum selection or arbitration clause; (6) judgment was rendered by the foreign court solely on the basis of personal service and the forum court believes that the original action should have been dismissed on grounds offorum non conveniens; (7) substantial doubt exists regarding the impartiality or integrity of the specific court that rendered the judgment (such as corruption of the judge); or (8) the specific proceeding leading to the judgment (as opposed to the entire judicial system in the foreign country) was incompatible with the due process of law. UNIFORMACT,supranote 134, § 4(c).
138. The drafters of the Uniform Act decided, after lengthy debate, not to include a reciprocity requirement, noting that “while recognition of U.S. judgments continues to be problematic in a number of foreign countries, there [is] insufficient evidence to establish that a reciprocity requirement would have greater effect on encouraging foreign recognition of U.S. judgments.” UNIFORMACT,supranote 134, prefatory note.
140. In some cases the cost of preparing the opinion may be prohibitive. In other cases only a reasoned or qualified opinion may be possible.
141.Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, HAGUECONF.ONPRIV. INT’LL. (June 30, 2005), http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt37en.pdf [hereinafter Hague Convention]. This was the culmination of a twenty-five-year process promoted by the United States with the goal of creating a multilateral treaty that would allow litigants to obtain and enforce judgments internationally on a scale comparable to that of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Currently parties to cross-border agreements have no assurance that a judgment they obtain in one country will be recognized as final and legally binding by courts in other countries. As discussed in Part III-4.2, U.S. courts generally recognize and enforce foreign judgments under the Uniform Act or principles of comity, typically without a reciprocity requirement.See supratext accompanying notes 134–38. The same is not always true for the enforcement of U.S. judgments abroad.SeeMatthew H. Adler & Michele Crimaldi Zarychta,The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: The United States Joins the Judgment Enforcement Band, 27 NW. J. INT’LL. & BUS. 1 (2007). In the absence of treaties between the United States and other countries on the enforcement of judgments, U.S. judgment creditors must seek enforcement abroad under non-treaty rules, which can be slow, procedurally complex, and uncertain. Moreover courts in some countries may have reservations about fully recognizing and enforcing U.S. judgments because of discomfort with U.S. notions of expansive jurisdiction and some aspects of U.S.-style litigation such as jury verdicts, pre-trial discovery, class actions, contingent fees, and punitive or multiple damages.Id. at 7 n.24;seeComm. on Foreign & Comparative Law, N.Y. City Bar Ass’n,Survey of Foreign Recognition of U.S. Money Judgments, 56 REC. ASS’NB. CITYN.Y. 378 (2001),discussed inRichard W. Hulbert,Some Thoughts on Judgments, Reciprocity and the Seeming Paradox of International Commercial Arbitration, 29 U. PA. J. INT’LL. 641, 647 (2008). The Hague Convention will give commercial parties greater certainty as to the effectiveness of mandatory forum selection clauses and the enforceability of judgments in signatory countries. HAGUECONFERENCE ONPRIVATEINT’LLAW, OUTLINE—HAGUECHOICE OFCOURTCONVENTION(2008) [hereinafter HAGUECONFERENCEOUTLINE],available athttp://www.hcch.net/upload/outline37e.pdf.
143. The European Union had exclusive authority to ratify the Hague Convention, which does not have to be signed by individual member countries, except for Denmark, to be binding on them. When the European Union gave its approval on June 1, 2015, enough countries had ratified the Hague Convention for it to become effective for European Union members (other than Denmark) and Mexico. When additional countries will sign and ratify the Hague Convention to make it meaningful for cross-border transactions remains an open question.SeeHAGUECONFERENCEOUTLINE,supranote 141, at 2.
144. The State Department is working with Congress to determine the best way to implement the Hague Convention. On January 19, 2013, the State Department recommended implementing the Hague Convention in a memorandum that included draft implementing legislation. The memorandum recommended that implementing legislation take the form of a combination of federal and state statutes in what has been referred to as a “cooperative federalism” approach, under which a state could opt out of the federal implementing law and instead enact its version of a uniform act. Although the objective would be for the federal implementing law and the uniform state act to be as similar as possible to ensure consistency throughout the United States, the precise balance between federal and state law on issues the Hague Convention leaves to be determined under the law of each signatory country remains an open question.
145. Under the Hague Convention a case is not “international” if all parties are from the country where recognition and enforcement is sought and all issues relating to the dispute, other than the location of the named court, involve only that country. Hague Convention,supranote 141, art. 1(2). Entities are resident where they were formed, have their statutory seat, or have their headquarters or other principal place of business. Hague Convention,supranote 141, art. 4(2).
146. Hague Convention,supranote 141, art. 22. The Hague Convention applies to permissive forum selection clauses only if both the country of the named court that issued the judgment and the country of the court being asked to enforce it have made the optional declaration (reciprocity requirement). If they have, judgments by a court named in a permissive clause will be recognized and enforced if: (1) suit was brought in that court first and (2) a judgment has not already been rendered by another court that also was permitted to hear the case. Hague Convention,supranote 141, art. 22.The declaration would also limit the availability of the doctrine offorum non conveniens. Commentators see the potential for this optional declaration, if made widely, to increase greatly the impact of the Hague Convention because forum selection clauses in cross-border agreements often name multiple courts on a non-exclusive basis.
147. Hague Convention,supranote 141, art. 5(1). In particular, the named court may not decline jurisdiction because it believes that a court of another country is more appropriate (forum non conveniens) or that a suit was brought first in another court (lis alibi pendens). The jurisdictional rules of the Hague Convention do not affect signatory countries’ internal rules as to the named court’s subject matter jurisdiction, minimum value of the claim, or venue, although the Hague Convention recommends that when the named court has discretion on these issues it give due consideration to the contractual choice of the parties. Hague Convention,supranote 141, art. 5(3)(b). The named court also may refuse jurisdiction if it determines that the country in which it is located has no connection with the defendant or the claim because the Hague Convention discourages “random” forum shopping. Hague Convention,supranote 141, art. 19.
148. Those exceptions are: (1) the forum selection clause is null and void under the law of the jurisdiction in which the named court is located, including its conflict-of-law rules, (2) a party lacked the capacity to enter into the forum selection clause under the law of the country in which the court asked to enforce the agreement is located, (3) giving effect to the agreement would lead to a manifest injustice or would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the country of the court asked to enforce the agreement, (4) for reasons beyond the parties’ control, the agreement cannot reasonably be performed, and (5) the named court has declined to hear the case. Hague Convention,supranote 141, art. 6.
149. Hague Convention,supranote 141, art. 2. Other subjects excluded are: status and legal capacity of natural persons; spousal and child support obligations; family law; will and succession; insolvency; common carriers, both of passengers and goods; most maritime matters; antitrust and competition law; nuclear damage; personal injury; tort claims for damage to property not arising out of a contractual relationship; real property and tenancies; public registers; and arbitration. Hague Convention,supranote 141, art. 2.
150. Because the matters addressed by the opinion would be governed by a treaty to which the United States is a party and, therefore, are a matter of federal law, the opinion letter should cover U.S. federal law expressly, at least for purposes of this opinion.
152.See supranote 17 and accompanying text. Sometimes, non-U.S. parties request a specific opinion that a U.S. party has the corporate power to choose a non-U.S. court as the forum for resolving disputes. This opinion is generally subsumed in the typical opinion that a U.S. party has duly authorized, executed, and delivered the agreement.See infratext accompanying notes 168–71.
153. Injunctions and other interim measures of protection or relief are excluded from the scope of the Hague Convention. The Hague Convention, therefore, neither requires nor precludes the grant, refusal, or termination of interim protective measures, such as preliminary injunctions, by a court that is not named, and does not require a named court to abide by them, if granted. Hague Convention,supranote 141, art. 7. The Hague Convention requires that settlements approved by the named court that have the force of judgments under the law of the jurisdiction in which it is located be recognized and enforced in every signatory country in the same manner as foreign judgments. Hague Convention,supranote 141, art. 12.
154. The exceptions include the following: (1) the judgment was given by default, such that the court being asked to enforce the judgment is not bound by the findings of fact on which the named court based its jurisdiction; (2) the judgment does not have effect or is subject to review in the country in which the named court is located; (3) the agreement was null and void under the law of the country in which the named court is located, including its conflict-of-law rules, unless the named court has determined that the agreement is valid; (4) a party lacked the capacity to conclude the agreement under the law of the country in which the court being asked to enforce the judgment is located; (5) the defendant either (i) did not receive notice of the complaint in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable it to arrange for its defense, unless the defendant entered an appearance and presented its case in the named court without contesting lack of notice, or (ii) was notified of the complaint in the country in which the court being asked to enforce the judgment is located in a manner that is incompatible with fundamental principles of that country’s law concerning service of process; (6) the judgment was obtained by fraud in connection with a matter of procedure; (7) recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the country in which the court being asked to enforce the judgment is located, including because the specific proceedings leading to the named court’s judgment were incompatible with fundamental principles of procedural fairness of that country; (8) the judgment is inconsistent with another judgment rendered in a signatory country (including the countries in which the named court and the court being asked to enforce the judgment are located) in a dispute between the same parties that satisfies the conditions for being recognized and enforced under the Hague Convention; or (9) the judgment awards damages, including exemplary or punitive damages, that do not compensate a party for actual loss or harm suffered. Hague Convention,supranote 141, arts. 8–9.
155. If the United States makes the declaration discussed earlier in this Report,see supranote 146 and accompanying text, the opinion also could be given when a non-U.S. court is named in a permissive forum selection clause if the country where that court is located also has made the declaration.
156. Because the matters addressed by the opinion would be governed by a treaty to which the United States is a party and, therefore, a matter of federal law, to help reduce the risk of misunderstanding, the opinion letter should cover U.S. federal law expressly, at least for the purposes of this opinion.
157. The principal treaty is the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 68 U.N.T.S. 164 [hereinafter Hague Service Convention]. The Hague Service Convention provides for one main channel of transmission to be used when documents need to be transmitted between parties in different signatory countries. That channel relies on governmental authorities in both countries involved. The Hague Service Convention also provides for four alternative channels involving different parties, both governmental and non-governmental, in the country of origin and in the destination country in which service is to be made. The destination country may object to the use of some of the alternative channels and “derogatory channels” are allowed in bilateral or multilateral agreements among specific countries.
The Hague Service Convention does not provide substantive rules on actual service of process in signatory countries. Instead, those rules are provided by the internal law of each country. Depending on which channel of transmission is chosen, the country in which service of process is made may require that additional steps be taken (not governed by the Hague Service Convention) for service of process to be effective. Some countries allow service to be made using channels provided in the Hague Service Convention without acceptance by the addressee (service with compulsion), while other countries require voluntary acceptance of service by the addressee.
The Hague Service Convention also has provisions protecting a defendant, both prior to and after a judgment by default, that operate differently depending on which channel is used and legal requirements in the destination country. Among other things, at least six months must elapse between the date of transmission of the complaint and the entry of a default judgment, and the defendant has at least one year after the entry of a default judgment to challenge the effectiveness of service of process.
158. Seesupratext accompanying notes 130–40 for a discussion of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. If the Covered Law State has adopted some version of the Uniform Act, a court in the Covered Law State may refuse to enforce a foreign judgment if the defendant did not receive notice of the proceeding in sufficient time to prepare a defense.See supratext accompanying note 137. If the Covered Law State has not adopted the Uniform Act, the opinion preparers will have to look to the law of comity and U.S. due process standards.See supratext accompanying note 140. The Hague Convention (which is discussed in Part III-4.3) allows for nonrecognition of a foreign judgment if the defendant was notified of the proceedings in an untimely fashion or in a manner incompatible with fundamental principles concerning service of process under the law of the jurisdiction in which the court being asked to enforce the judgment is located.See supratext accompanying note 154.
The methods for service of process set forth in Section __ of the Agreement are valid under the law of [COVERED LAW STATE].
Ordinarily what those methods are will be obvious from a review of the agreement. Sometimes, however, that will not be the case, for example, because the service of process provision refers to methods of service under non-U.S. law. In that event the opinion preparers may decide to consult with non-U.S. counsel (and if they receive advice from non-U.S. counsel, may choose to state their reliance on that advice in the opinion letter).
162. Although many different methods for service of process may be permissible under the law of the jurisdiction outside the United States in which the named court is located, as a practical matter parties to cross-border agreements in transactions in which closing opinions are delivered usually choose methods on which an opinion can be given. An opinion on service of process does not cover other provisions often included in an agreement, such as (i) an express consent to be sued in a particular court, (ii) a waiver of procedural or substantive defenses, or (iii) a covenant not to claim that service of process was ineffective.
163. If the agreement provides for alternative methods of service of process, the opinion preparers will have to consider whether each method is permissible under the law of the Covered Law State and take an exception for methods they find problematic. If the agreement provides for service on one party by a particular method but not on the other or otherwise treats different parties differently under comparable circumstances (for example a non-U.S. lender may bring suit against a U.S. borrower in a particular way or court, but notvice versa), the opinion preparers also will have to consider whether the Covered Law permits such an agreement.
164. In either case, the Covered Law alone governs the adequacy of service of process for commencing a suit. In the case of enforcement of a foreign judgment, as discussed earlier in this Part, the opinion preparers also need to consider whether the method used to serve process in the non-U.S. court was permissible under the Covered Law. As a practical matter, if, as discussed earlier in this Part, an opinion can be given that all methods specified in the agreement for service of process to bring suit in the non-U.S. court are permissible under the Covered Law, this opinion also can be given.
165. If the agent is appointed in the agreement itself, this opinion would be subsumed in the opinion discussed earlier in this Part on the status under the Covered Law of the methods of service of process.See generallyIBA REPORT,supranote 2, at 276–77.
168.See generally TriBar 1998 Report,supranote 35, at 641–42 (§ 6.1), 652–54 (§§ 6.3 & 6.4).
169. For example, the business activities a corporation has the power to engage in may be restricted by its charter or, in the case of banking and insurance activities, by the corporation law under which it was incorporated.See TriBar 1998 Report,supranote 35, at 653 & nn.142–44 (§ 6.3), 654 & n.146 (§ 6.4);see alsoGLAZERTREATISE,supranote 10, at 236–44, 264–80. In addition, the applicable corporation law and the corporation’s charter and bylaws will determine which matters may be approved by directors and officers and which require shareholder approval. As a matter of U.S. customary practice the power and authority opinion is understood to address only restrictions on the entity’s power that derive from the statute under which the entity was formed or its governing documents, and not restrictions that derive from other statutes, rules, or regulations such as those requiring licenses or permits to engage in specific activities.
170. Depending on the circumstances, reliance on the client’s representations regarding the business activities it is undertaking in the agreement may be sufficient. Alternatively or in addition, the opinion preparers may consult with non-U.S. counsel on aspects of the transaction or non-U.S. law that bear on their analysis of their client’s power to enter into and perform its obligations under the agreement (and if the opinion preparers receive the advice of non-U.S. counsel, they may choose to state their reliance on that advice in the opinion letter).
171.SeeIBA REPORT,supranote 2, at 146 (under most countries’ choice-of-law rules, the law of the place where the agreement was executed, as well as the law chosen in the agreement, the law of the entity’s home jurisdiction, or possibly some other law may apply, so that advice from counsel in each jurisdiction as to proper execution and delivery may be appropriate on matters such as proper evidence of corporate authority, witness attestation, notarization requirements, signing procedures, sworn affidavit requirements, etc.).
172. This is the same as in domestic U.S. transactions when the Chosen Law is not the Covered Law. In states that follow the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, the Chosen Law normally governs at least some of the formalities required to execute and deliver a contract. For example, a “duly executed” opinion for a Delaware corporation means that persons having the actual authority to bind the corporation signed the agreement in such a manner as to bring it into effect as a binding obligation of the corporation, based on the Delaware General Corporation Law, the corporation’s charter and by-laws, resolutions of the board of directors, and evidence of the incumbency of signing officers. If, however, the agreement chooses as its governing law the law of a jurisdiction other than Delaware, an opinion whose coverage is limited to Delaware law would not cover the legal requirements for execution and delivery to the extent that the law of that other jurisdiction governs those matters.
173.See generally TriBar 1998 Report,supranote 35, at 654–61 (§ 6.5) (no breach or default). Sometimes the requested opinion is broader, covering acceleration of the company’s obligations, creation of rights in others to exercise remedies or require payments, creation of liens on the company’s assets, or termination of a contract.
174. Normally, those contracts will be specifically identified.See infranote 177.
175. In many transactions in which non-U.S. law is the governing law and a closing opinion of U.S. counsel is requested, the U.S. party will have retained non-U.S. counsel to work with U.S. counsel on the structure of the transaction and the terms of the agreement. Depending on their respective roles, U.S. counsel may be able to look to non-U.S. counsel for help in gaining the understanding needed to give a no breach or default opinion. The type of business the client engages in, the nature and complexity of the transaction, and other circumstances will all affect what the opinion preparers do in order to be able to give the opinion.
176. The client, for example, may be able to provide sufficient clarification about the commercial terms of the transaction and the business activities to be performed under the agreement. If the opinion preparers conclude that further clarification is necessary, for example because the agreement refers to foreign statutes or uses concepts under non-U.S. law with which the opinion preparers are not familiar, they may decide they need to consult with non-U.S. counsel for guidance on what the agreement means. In some circumstances, however, the cost of consulting non-U.S. counsel may not be justified by the benefit of the opinion to the recipient, or the transaction may be too complex or the governing non-U.S. law may be too intricate for U.S. counsel to give an unqualified opinion. If the opinion preparers receive advice from non-U.S. counsel, they may choose to state their reliance on that advice in the opinion letter.
In some cases, the opinion preparers may choose to describe in the opinion letter their understanding of those aspects of the transaction or agreement on which they have based their analysis or to rely on express assumptions about specific matters that are governed by non-U.S. law. A combination of these steps may be needed before U.S. counsel can give a no breach or default opinion in a cross-border transaction, and in some circumstances U.S. counsel may conclude that it does not have a sufficient understanding to give the opinion.
177.See ABA Guidelines,supranote 5, at 879 (§ 3.4). Practice has shifted away from covering contracts “known to counsel” and toward limiting the coverage of the opinion to specific contracts listed on a schedule, which may be part of the agreement or some other existing document, or may be prepared specifically for the opinion letter.
178.See TriBar 1998 Report,supranote 35, at 661 & n.161.
We have interpreted the provisions of the contracts addressed by the opinion in numbered paragraph __ as those provisions would be understood in [COVERED LAW STATE] whether they are governed by the law of [COVERED LAW STATE] or by the law of another jurisdiction.
180. TheCLLS Opinion Guidereaches a similar conclusion.CLLS Opinion Guide,supranote 4, at 10 (¶45) (English lawyers should give a no breach or default opinion only on contracts governed by English law and then only when the opinion giver is fully familiar with their terms). See also Part III-1, which discusses similar reasons why, when an agreement is governed by non-U.S. law, U.S. lawyers ordinarily will not give an “as if” opinion on its enforceability.
181.See generally TriBar 1998 Report,supranote 35, at 661–62 (§ 6.6) (violation of law). Whether the opinion is cast in the present or future tense, it covers not only violations resulting from the company’s entering into the agreement but also violations that could result from future performance by the company of its obligations under the agreement.TriBar 1998 Report,supranote 35, at 657–58, 662. Depending on the transaction, covering future performance may broaden significantly the analysis the opinion preparers must conduct, particularly if the agreement imposes on the company contingent as well as fixed obligations. As a matter of U.S. customary practice the opinion preparers are not required to speculate about future facts or to take into account the possibility of changes in statutes, rules, or regulations after the date of the opinion letter (except for changes then enacted but not yet in effect).TriBar 1998 Report,supranote 35, at 658 & nn.155–56. Some opinion preparers give a more limited opinion that removes the future element by covering only the execution and delivery of the agreement and “consummation of the transaction on the date of the closing.” In most, if not all, situations, this more limited opinion should strike the right balance between the benefit of the opinion to the recipient and its cost. If the recipient also wants an opinion on particular aspects of the company’s future performance, it should request that those aspects be specifically addressed.
182. A statute might, for example, make the export of certain types of goods illegal and impose sanctions ranging from a fine to an order prohibiting the company’s performance of its contractual obligations to deliver the goods (e.g., technology with military applications). In domestic U.S. transactions the no violation opinion complements the remedies opinion because statutes, rules, or regulations that, if violated, may subject the company to fines, penalties, or governmental sanctions may not render the agreement unenforceable as against the company and thus not require an exception to an opinion on the agreement’s enforceability.See TriBar 1998 Report,supranote 35, at 661. The no violation opinion does not address the enforceability of the agreement under the Covered Law (even though enforceability will not be addressed at all by U.S. counsel when the agreement chooses non-U.S. law as its governing law).
183. The no violation opinion does not cover ordinances or regulations adopted by political subdivisions below the federal and state level. See TriBar 1998 Report,supranote 35, at 661–62 & nn.164–65 (§ 6.6).
184.See ABA Principles,supranote 3, at 832 (¶II.B);see also TriBar 1998 Report,supranote 35, at 627–28 (opinion preparers do not ordinarily seek (nor are they expected to seek) guidance from experts in every specialized field of law that might be implicated by the undertakings in an agreement; effort would seldom be cost-justified even in very large transactions).
185. Which statutes, rules, and regulations are understood not to be covered depends on the parties and the transaction.See, e.g.,TriBar 1998 Report,supranote 35, at 628 & n.81 (while federal securities laws customarily not covered, opinion preparers should consider application of the Investment Company Act of 1940 when subject of opinion is a registered investment company), 661 (opinion preparers should consider laws regulating sale of narcotics when company in the pharmaceutical business is selling assets that include controlled substances, the sale of which without proper licenses could expose parties to serious sanctions). Discussions with U.S. counsel regarding the coverage of the no violation opinion may lead a non-U.S. opinion recipient to request that particular statutes, rules, or regulations be covered expressly, leaving it to the opinion preparers to decide whether and, if so, how they can cover them.See, e.g.,TriBar 1998 Report,supranote 35, at 628–29 (opinion does not cover statutes or regulations applicable solely to opinion recipient; custom not clear regarding coverage of application of Federal Reserve Board’s margin regulations to specific bank loan and, therefore, better practice is for recipient to request separate opinion if it wants margin regulations to be covered).
186. This approach is less common in domestic U.S. transactions, where opinion givers often choose not to state expressly what is understood as a matter of U.S. customary practice.See generally TriBar 1998 Report,supranote 35, at 630 (ordinarily counterproductive for opinion givers to try to list in opinion letter each area of law that is not covered, as list can never be complete).
187.See, e.g., William McConnell,Polaris Pares off U.S. Digital Security Arm, THEDEAL(Sept. 16, 2013) (discussing CFIUS order that Polaris Financial Technology Ltd., an Indian company, divest its 85.3 percent ownership stake in IdenTrust Inc., a U.S. company providing digital identification services); Richard Metheny,3 Things to Know About CFIUS’ Recent Activism, LAW360 (Sept. 16, 2015, 4:51 PM EST), http://www.law360.com/articles/477329/3-things-to-know-about-cfius-recent-activism (discussing CFIUS order that Huawei Technologies, a Chinese company, divest the assets of U.S.-based 3Leaf Systems, a cloud computing technology company);see also infranote 192.
188. An alternative to an exception is to point out in the opinion letter that no filing with CFIUS has been made, thereby putting the recipient on notice that under the statute a post-closing review of the transaction is possible and mitigation measures may be imposed.
Except as set forth below, the execution and delivery of the Agreement by the Company and consummation by the Company of the transactions contemplated by the Agreement do not result in any violation by the Company of statutes of the United States or [COVERED LAW STATE], or rules or regulations thereunder, that, subject to the limitations in the following sentence, we would reasonably be expected to recognize as being applicable to an entity, transaction or agreement to which this opinion letter relates. The opinion in this paragraph __ does not cover, without limitation, the following statutes, rules, and regulations: [ . . . ].
Whether it says so or not, the list should be understood not to be exhaustive or exclusive. Some opinion preparers couple a list of excluded statutes, rules, and regulations with wording such as the following:
[ . . . ], or other statutes, rules, or regulations customarily understood to be excluded even though they are not expressly stated to be excluded.
This wording, although not required as a matter of U.S. customary practice, is intended to put the recipient on notice that an opinion covers some matters (such as tax, insolvency, and securities laws) only if it does so expressly. Whether or not the opinion letter says so, however, those matters are not covered.
190. Among these statutes, rules, and regulations are: (i) the Exon-Florio Amendment to the Defense Production Act of 1950 (Exon-Florio), as amended by the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, including procedures governing CFIUS reviews thereunder; (ii) the Trading with the Enemy Acts; (iii) the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the National Emergencies Act and regulations issued thereunder, as well as other laws prohibiting or restricting, or imposing sanctions on persons engaging in certain types of activities involving specified countries; (iv) the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) of the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security; (v) the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) of the U.S. Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls; (vi) the Foreign Assets Control Regulations of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC); (vii) the USA PATRIOT Act and other anti-money laundering (AML) laws and regulations; (viii) a variety of U.S. executive orders (such as Executive Order 13224: Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit or Support Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 49079 (Sept. 24, 2001)); and (ix) the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Many opinion preparers believe that some or all of these laws are not covered by a no violation of law opinion even if not expressly excluded. Including a specific exception in the opinion letter, however, seems advisable to help reduce the risk of misunderstandings.
191. For example, a statute or regulation may apply to a transaction if it involves a party from a “black-listed” jurisdiction. The facts necessary to establish with the confidence needed to give an opinion the true “provenance” of parties involved in the transaction whom the opinion preparers may not even represent, as well as their direct and indirect affiliates, often are not ascertainable by U.S. counsel.
192. For example, in recent years CFIUS’s authority to scrutinize the effect on U.S. national security of foreign investments that could result in foreign control (evaluated functionally) of U.S. businesses has been extended to an ever broader range of transactions. The term “national security” is not defined by statute or regulation, and, while the statute under which CFIUS was established (50 App. U.S.C.A. § 2170) does list some factors CFIUS may consider and while CFIUS has provided some guidance about the types of national security considerations it has reviewed, those factors (such as “critical infrastructure” or “critical technologies”) are non-exclusive and general in nature.
193. This is often the case when failure to comply with particular statutes, rules, or regulations could result in serious governmental sanctions rather than a small fine or penalty.
194. This could be as simple as adding at the end of the first sentence in the italicized opinion language in note 189 above “including, without limitation, [ . . . ].”See generally TriBar 1998 Report,supranote 35, at 627–30, 662 (noting that in the absence of custom or in areas where custom is unclear, the opinion recipient should request specifically that the opinion cover those matters it wishes to have covered; custom is unclear as to many statutes, rules, and regulations that may bear on an agreement, including among others antitrust laws and Exon-Florio).
195.See TriBar 1998 Report,supranote 35, at 627–28, 662 & n.166 (analyzing which bodies of law are covered by the remedies opinion). That analysis also is referenced in that report’s discussion of the no violation opinion.Id.at 661. Delaying a discussion with the opinion recipient regarding the coverage of the no violation opinion may have the practical effect of limiting what the opinion preparers can analyze in the available time and may prevent them from addressing some statutes, rules, or regulations they might otherwise have been willing to cover in the opinion.
196.See generally TriBar 1998 Report,supranote 35, at 664–65 (§ 6.7) (opinion on approvals and filings overlaps considerably with no violation opinion).
197. Depending on the circumstances, reliance on the client’s factual representations about the scope of its undertakings in the agreement may be sufficient. Alternatively or in addition, the opinion preparers may decide to seek legal advice of non-U.S. counsel on some aspects of the agreement or on the governing non-U.S. law (and if the opinion preparers receive that advice, they may choose to state their reliance on it in the opinion letter).
199.See generallyIBA REPORT,supranote 2, at 211. Dating back centuries, sovereign immunity has been recognized as a legal principle in most legal systems, either as a procedural matter (one cannot sue the king in the courts he created) or as a substantive matter (the king can do no wrong).
200. In many jurisdictions the legal doctrine that traditionally has shielded state and local governments, as well as their instrumentalities, from litigation consists of two elements: (1) sovereign immunity, which applies to the state itself and its agencies, officers, and employees and immunizes them from suit in that state’s own courts without the state’s consent (see, e.g., Fernald Corp. v. Governor, 31 N.E.3d 47 (Mass. 2015) (history and character of corporation materially different from those characteristic of state agencies);see generallyRESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS§ 895B(1) (1979)); and (2) governmental immunity, which derives from but is narrower in scope than sovereign immunity and applies to political subdivisions of the state, such as counties and municipal corporations (see, e.g., Evans v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of El Paso Cty., 482 P.2d 968 (Colo. 1971); Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s Cty. v. Mayor & Common Council of Town of Riverdale, 578 A.2d 207 (Md. 1990); Tilton v. Dougherty, 493 A.2d 442 (N.H. 1985); Tilli v. Northampton Cty., 370 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (Pennsylvania law)). The difference stems from the fact that political subdivisions and municipal corporations have the dual character of governmental entities and corporate bodies functioning as private entities. Both sovereign and governmental immunity are procedural in nature and, unless waived, shield states and political subdivisions from judicial authority. Technically, they only apply when a state is sued in its own courts, but another state’s courts may give them effect voluntarily as a matter of comity.SeeNevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
Immunity may be based on common law, constitutional provisions, or state statutes. Under traditional common law principles, governmental immunity applies with respect to governmental or discretionary functions, but not corporate, ministerial, or proprietary functions. State constitutions may recognize a state’s sovereign immunity but generally do not deal with the governmental immunity of political subdivisions. Many state constitutions neither adopt nor abolish sovereign immunity but rather give the legislature express authority to determine its scope. In most if not all states, common law doctrines of both sovereign and governmental immunity have been replaced by statutes taking a variety of approaches, such that the scope of immunity may range from nearly absolute to nearly nonexistent.
Whether governmental or administrative bodies below the level of state government are protected from suit varies from state to state and typically depends on the relationship between the state and a particular body based on a wide variety of tests and factors.See, e.g., Ky. Ctr. for Arts Corp. v. Berns, 801 S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 1990); Rucker v. Hartford Cty., 558 A.2d 399 (Md. 1989); Ohio Valley Contractors v. Bd. of Educ. of Wetzel Cty., 293 S.E.2d 437 (W. Va. 1982). Statutory provisions, and in particular nomenclature like “agency,” “department,” or “division,” can affect a court’s determination whether a particular body has immunity. Statutes, however, are not always dispositive. Other questions courts often ask are: Was the body created by the legislature? Is it subject to the control of the legislature or the state’s executive branch? Is its funding part of the state budget? Does the body operate statewide? Examples of governmental bodies that often are entitled to share in the state’s immunity include: departments of the state’s executive branch and their divisions, state law enforcement agencies, state hospitals, state prisons, state agencies engaged in some non-governmental business functions, state universities, and local school districts. In the absence of statutory provisions that grant immunity for specific bodies or functions or types of claims, counties and municipal corporations may be subject to suit to the same extent as private parties.See, e.g.,Fernald Corp., 31 N.E.3d 47 (suit to clarify title to land does not implicate concerns that support finding of sovereign immunity). Identification and application of the rules on sovereign immunity and governmental immunity may be straightforward in some situations and not in others.
201. The sovereign immunity of the U.S. government is inherent in the constitutional structure of the federal government and not based on specific provisions of the U.S. Constitution.See, e.g., Cohens v. State of Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821); Christensen v. Ward, 916 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1990); Williamson v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 815 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1987). As a jurisdictional defense, when sovereign immunity applies it operates as a complete bar to lawsuits against the U.S. government, its departments and agencies, and their officers and employees in their official capacity, even if the government’s conduct may have been wrongful.See, e.g., Drake v. Panama Canal Comm’n, 907 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1990); Kozera v. Spirito, 723 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1983). Congress has the power to grant immunity to governmental corporations even though they have functions that are comparable to private entities and may not inherently possess sovereign immunity.See, e.g., Edmonds v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 684 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Ala. 1988). The government’s waiver of immunity or consent to suit is a prerequisite for a court’s jurisdiction.SeeUnited States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983). Congress alone has authority to enact legislation waiving immunity and giving consent to suit. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976). Congress’s authority includes the power to place conditions and limitations on a waiver (Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484 (1967); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941)) and to withdraw a waiver at any time it deems proper (Maricopa Cty., Ariz.v. Valley Nat’l Bank of Phoenix, 318 U.S. 357 (1943)).
Statutes creating federal administrative agencies and corporations often contain clauses permitting them to sue and be sued. These clauses have been construed as waiving sovereign immunity broadly for the entity.See, e.g., Roche v. Am. Red Cross, 680 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1988). General “sue and be sued” provisions are liberally construed because the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that, when Congress authorizes federal corporations to engage in commercial and business transactions with the public, those corporations, to establish they are entitled to sovereign immunity, must clearly show that implied restrictions on the ability of a plaintiff to sue them are necessary to avoid grave interference with their performance of a governmental function or that Congress plainly intended that the “sue and be sued” clause be read narrowly.See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512 (1984); Fed. Hous. Admin., Region No. 4 v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242 (1940).
202. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)–(a)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602–1611 (2012). Native American tribes are technically “foreign” sovereigns in the United States and as such they, as well as tribal corporations and in some cases their agents and counsel, are entitled to sovereign immunity under federal law. The sources of the law applicable to a particular tribe may include, in addition to federal statutes, regulations, and case law, treaties between the United States and the tribe, as well as tribal law and administrative ordinances of tribal courts. The resulting complexity can make the legal analysis required to give an opinion in a transaction involving an entity controlled by a Native American tribe challenging.
203. The reason why opinions regarding sovereign immunity are requested in cross-border transactions and not in domestic U.S. transactions is largely historical: in the past sovereigns accounted for a much larger proportion of cross-border transactions; the resulting practice of requesting opinions on sovereign immunity in those transactions has continued even though today most cross-border transactions in which opinions are given involve private parties.
Neither [U.S. PARTY] nor its assets are immune on grounds of sovereign immunity from (i) suit in connection with the Agreement in the courts in [COVERED LAW STATE] [or United States federal courts] or (ii) related legal process, including service of process, attachment of assets, or enforcement by those courts of a judgment against the Company related to the Agreement.
205. Even if a U.S. sovereign waives its immunity, a creditor may be unable to attach assets the U.S. sovereign needs to fulfill a public purpose.See, e.g., Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 330 (Tex. 2006) (legislation allowing for waiver of sovereign immunity may include measures designed to insulate public resources from the reach of judgment creditors). As a matter of U.S. customary practice the opinion is understood not to cover limitations, including but not limited to public interest, public policy, or equity, on the ability of a judgment creditor to exercise ordinary remedies with respect to properties of a U.S. sovereign that are integral to its governmental or non-commercial function. If, however, the opinion preparers are aware of a specific provision of the Covered Law that places onerous limits on the effectiveness of a waiver of sovereign immunity, they should consider taking a specific exception.
206. The action required may include approval not only by the U.S. party’s governing body or authorized officers but also by specific government agencies or officials with oversight authority over the U.S. party.
207. This assumes that the opinion letter covers the statutes, rules, and regulations governing the U.S. party’s status and power to waive sovereign immunity. Depending on the circumstances and the law covered by the opinion letter, the opinion preparers may have to interpret specialized statutes, rules, and regulations that affect the U.S. party’s status as a sovereign, or its power to waive sovereign immunity, and the judicial decisions that interpret them. If the opinion preparers cannot make the necessary legal determinations with sufficient confidence, they will need to qualify the opinion (or may not be able to give it at all). Sometimes an opinion also is requested that the waiver is valid, binding, and irrevocable under the Covered Law. Because giving that opinion would not require the opinion preparers to make any different or additional determinations than are required to give a typical sovereign immunity opinion (see supranote 204), a separate opinion on the effectiveness of the waiver adds nothing and therefore should not be requested.
208. An overly broad waiver might refer, for example, to “all immunities, including sovereign immunity, in any jurisdiction and under all applicable laws.” In the extreme, the concept of “legal immunity” is the opposite of the concept of “legal liability.” Ordinarily, U.S. sovereigns are subject to a different legal liability regime than private parties. For example, a state agency often is shielded from some aspects of tort liability, is exempt from taxation, and is excused from complying with some statutes, rules, or regulations that apply to private parties. While the opinion preparers may be able to give an opinion that the agency has effectively waived immunity from suit with respect to specific contractual obligations, ordinarily they will not be able to give an opinion that the waiver is effective as to all of the agency’s privileges and exemptions under all laws.
209.See supratext accompanying note 17. If, for example, the Chosen Law Country has a statute like the FSIA governing the immunity of sovereigns of other countries when they engage in transactions in that country (see infratext accompanying notes 202–12), it may include requirements for a valid waiver of immunity. The Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption also would cover compliance with that statute.
210.See28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1609 (2012). The FSIA defines a “foreign state” to include a political subdivision of a foreign state and an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. The FSIA defines an agency or instrumentality to include a separate legal person that is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision of a foreign state and an entity organized under the laws of, and the majority of whose shares or other ownership interests are owned by, a foreign state or political subdivision. Thus, a corporation that is majority-owned by a foreign state and incorporated in it is a “foreign state” within the meaning of the FSIA. Examples of when this definition may raise issues include financings by public-private partnerships, investment in or by sovereign wealth funds, and business transactions by enterprises in which the government owns a minority stake but also holds a “golden share” that gives it a veto over specified matters.See generallyGSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat’l Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805, 811 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Gang Chen v. China Cent. Television, 320 F. App’x 71, 72–73 (2d Cir. 2009); Globe Nuclear Servs. & Supply, Ltd. v. AO Teshsnabexport, 376 F.3d 282, 285 (4th Cir. 2004); Corporacion Mexicana de Servicios Maritimos, S.A. de C.V. v. The M/T Respect, 89 F.3d 650 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing the status of indirect subsidiaries); Proyecfin de Venezuela, S.A. v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, S.A., 760 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1985); O’Connell Mach. Co. v. M.V. “Americana,” 734 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1984),cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1086 (1984); Kao Hwa Shipping Co., S.A. v. China Steel Corp., 816 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
211. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(2), 1603(d) (2012). The legislative history of the FSIA indicates, for example, that a foreign state’s borrowing of money from U.S. commercial banks is “commercial” in nature and that a foreign state’s incurrence of indebtedness in the United States (if the loan agreement is negotiated and executed in the Untied States) is a commercial activity carried out in the United States.See, e.g., Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992) (foreign state engages in commercial activity when it acts not as a regulator of a market, but in the manner of a private player within it). For other examples of commercial activities, see Universal Trading & Inv. Co. v. Bureau for Representing Ukrainian Interests in Int’l & Foreign Courts, 727 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2013); Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1991); Eckert Int’l, Inc. v. Gov’t of Sovereign Democratic Republic of Fiji, 834 F. Supp. 167 (E.D. Va. 1993),aff’d, 32 F.3d 77 (4th Cir. 1994). Courts have great latitude in determining what activities are commercial and whether a particular commercial activity has been performed in the United States, sometimes with surprising results.See, e.g., EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 389 F. App’x 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2010) (securities held by Argentine law trust in New York banks on behalf of foreign state for investment and eventual sale is “the kind of activity that a private player in the market would carry on for profit and, therefore, a commercial activity in the U.S. under the FSIA”);see alsoBirch Shipping Corp. v. Embassy of Republic of Tanzania, 507 F. Supp. 311 (D.D.C. 1980).
212. For example, the FSIA contains an exception for the judicial enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate to which a foreign sovereign is a party, whether in an action to compel arbitration or an action to confirm an arbitral award. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) (2012). This exception is consistent with section 15 of the FAA, which provides that the enforcement of arbitration agreements and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards cannot be avoided by a foreign sovereign’s claiming the act of state doctrine (which states that every sovereign nation is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign nation) if they are otherwise covered by the New York Convention.
213. While an implicit waiver is not prohibited by the FSIA, it lacks the certainty of an express waiver, particularly one that is part of the agreement the parties are entering into in connection with the transaction and that expressly (i) covers immunity from suit, immunity from execution upon a judgment, and immunity from attachment prior to or after a judgment; and (ii) provides that it remains in effect notwithstanding any attempt to revoke or withdraw it. See generallyCapital Ventures Int’l v. Republic of Argentina, 552 F.3d 289 (2d Cir. 2009); Atwood Turnkey Drilling, Inc. v. Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A., 875 F.2d 1174, 1177 (5th Cir. 1989),cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1075 (1990); Proyecfin de Venezuela, S.A. v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, S.A., 760 F.2d 390, 393 (2d Cir. 1985); Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 676 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1982); ICC Chem. Corp. v. Indus. & Commercial Bank of China, 886 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
Determining how far a waiver extends under the FSIA may not be straightforward. InFirst National City Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 627 (1983) (Bancec), the U.S. Supreme Court held that duly created instrumentalities of a foreign state are to be accorded a presumption of independent status, such that the property of an instrumentality that has not waived immunity cannot be used to satisfy a judgment against another that has. This presumption, however, can be overcome if the instrumentality is so extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of principal and agent is created or if recognizing the instrumentality’s separate juridical status would work fraud or injustice.See generally EM Ltd., 473 F.3d at 476–80. Courts have been unwilling, however, to take theBancecanalysis too far.See, e.g., EM Ltd. v. Banco Central de la Republica Argentina, No. 13-3819, slip op. at 24 (2d Cir. Aug. 31, 2015) (“bothBancecand the FSIA legislative history caution against too easily overcoming the presumption of separateness”); NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Central de la Republica Argentina, 652 F.3d 172, 195–96 (2d Cir. 2011) (waiver under FSIA must be clear and unambiguous; broadly worded waiver not clear and unambiguous enough to waive central bank’s immunity);see alsoLatelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984) (cautions against too easily overcoming theBancecpresumption of separateness).
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, as amended, [NON-U.S. PARTY] has validly waived its sovereign immunity (if any) from (i) suit in the courts in [COVERED LAW STATE] and United States federal courts and (ii) related legal process, including service of process, attachment of assets, or enforcement by those courts of a judgment against [NON-U.S. PARTY] related to the Agreement.
215. On these issues the opinion can be based, without so stating expressly, on the Omnibus Cross-Border Assumption.See supratext accompanying note 17. Alternatively, the opinion preparers may expressly assume that under any applicable non-U.S. law the foreign state’s waiver is valid, binding, and effective, is unconditional, and cannot be unilaterally withdrawn or revoked.
216. The opinion preparers may need to base the opinion on stated assumptions as to factual matters and qualify it to the extent that the non-U.S. party’s status depends on non-U.S. law.
217. The opinion preparers ordinarily rely on a factual assumption that the non-U.S. lender has no other activities in or contacts with the Covered Law State or phrase the opinion to relate solely to specific activities involved in the transaction, or both.
218.See generally TriBar 1998 Report,supranote 35, at 646–47 & n.119 (§ 6.1.6) (opinion provides comfort that that recipient is not exposed to fines, penalties, or administrative sanctions for failure to qualify); GLAZERTREATISE,supranote 10, at 229 & n.26. Failing to qualify to do business in a state, if required, can expose an entity to adverse consequences, including the inability to enforce its rights under contracts in that state, typically unless and until the failure is cured.See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE§ 191(d) (West 2014) (discussing foreign lenders); Credit Suisse Int’l v. Urbi, DeSarrollos Urbanos, S.A.B. de C.V., 971 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 21, 2013) (unauthorized foreign corporation doing business in New York prohibited from bringing suit even if choice of New York forum valid). An opinion that a foreign judgment may be enforced in the Covered Law State does not address a lender’s need to qualify to do business in that state before it can sue to enforce the judgment.See supratext accompanying notes 106 & 127.
The opinion that a party is not required to qualify to do business as a result of a particular transaction requires an analysis of the legal definition of “doing business.” That distinguishes it from an opinion that an out-of-state entity is duly qualified to do business in a particular state, which, when given as it sometimes is in domestic U.S. transactions, is normally based on a certificate from state officials that the company has qualified to do business in the state. State officials do not issue certificates that qualification is not required.See also ABA Guidelines,supranote 5, at 877 (§ 4.1) (opinion that company is qualified as a foreign corporation in all jurisdictions in which its properties or activities require qualification should not be requested; analysis of “doing business” requirements in all relevant states is rarely cost-justified and requires knowledge of facts and expertise opinion preparers typically do not have).
219. Even in lending transactions the opinion preparers may be unwilling to give the opinion if the loan is not straightforward and requires them to address the difficult issues often presented by complex corporate financing transactions. For example, if the agreement provides for a series of loan advances, the opinion preparers may not be comfortable with activities that the lender may have the right to engage in under the agreement over the term of the transaction, which may, for example, be contingent on how the project being financed progresses (or fails to progress) over time.
Lender is not required to qualify to do business as a foreign corporation in [COVERED LAW STATE] solely by reason of its execution and delivery of the Agreement and consummation on the date of this letter of the transactions contemplated by the Agreement.
221. Depending on the facts and the Covered Law, steps a lender can later take to enforce its rights under the agreement, such as attachment of assets to execute on a judgment, foreclosure on collateral, or taking possession or disposing of the borrower’s or a guarantor’s property, may require it to qualify to do business in the Covered Law State. While some state statutes include in their list of activities that do not constitute “doing business” foreclosure by a lender on property in which it has a security interest and taking possession of collateral, many state statutes do not. If the lender requests that future activities in which it may engage in the Covered Law State be covered by the opinion but, as often will be the case, the Covered Law is not clear on whether those activities would constitute “doing business” for purposes of the qualification requirement, the opinion preparers may not be able to give the opinion or may have to qualify it.
222. State and federal regulations governing financial services and financial institutions determine what filings or permits are required for different types of lending. To determine whether and how they apply would require an opinion giver to conduct an analysis of the lender’s structure and operations in the United States that goes well beyond what can reasonably be expected of counsel for a borrower. Eligibility for the benefits of bilateral treaties against double taxation often depends on non-resident status or whether a non-U.S. entity has a “permanent establishment” in the United States, issues that go well beyond the specific transaction. Whether a non-U.S. party’s activities subject it to taxation in the United States at the federal, state, or local level is often a complex issue that does not bear on the question of whether a bank is required to qualify to do business as a foreign entity in a particular state.
223. TheCLLS Opinion Guidecontains a list of comparable opinions English lawyers give when transaction documents are governed by foreign law.CLLS Opinion Guide,supranote 4, at 11 (¶55).
224. The risk of misunderstanding is magnified by the growing number of countries and parties involved in cross-border transactions. Moreover, opinion discussions can be complicated by language barriers and widely different legal systems. Also, as discussed earlier in this Report, in many countries limited guidance is available on what third-party opinions can be given, what assumptions, exceptions, and qualifications are reasonable, what various opinions mean, and what work is required to support them.
225. TheABA Guidelinesexpress the Golden Rule as follows:
An opinion giver should not be asked to render an opinion that counsel for the opinion recipient would not render if it were the opinion giver and possessed the requisite expertise. Similarly, an opinion giver should not refuse to render an opinion that lawyers experienced in the matters under consideration would commonly render in comparable situations, assuming that the requested opinion is otherwise consistent with these Guidelines and the opinion giver has the requisite expertise and in its professional judgment is able to render the opinion.
ABA Guidelines,supranote 5, at 878 (§ 3.1).
226.See infranote 233. Many of the opinions which U.S. lawyers should not give are identified in bar association reports, which often characterize even requests for these opinions as inappropriate.
227.CLLS Opinion Guide,supranote 4, at 2 (¶8), 12 (¶59) (the Golden Rule can minimize difficulties and costs, but can be difficult to apply). As discussed in prior sections of this Report, opinions given in cross-border transactions often raise issues that do not arise when the same opinions are given in domestic U.S. transactions. Moreover, some opinions U.S. lawyers regularly give in cross-border transactions are not normally given in domestic U.S. transactions (e.g., separate opinions on choice of law, forum selection, and arbitration).
228. Even when a law firm has lawyers with expertise in, and is giving opinions covering, the law of more than one of the jurisdictions whose laws are involved in the transaction, it generally provides a separate opinion letter covering the law of each jurisdiction. This Committee endorses that approach because it reduces potential confusion if matters of both U.S. law and non-U.S. law were addressed in the same opinion letter. The different opinion letters can refer to each other, just as advice from, or reliance on opinions of, non-U.S. counsel from a different law firm can be referred to in opinion letters of U.S. counsel.
229.See supratext accompanying notes 9–16;see also CLLS Opinion Guide,supranote 4, at 12 (¶60).
230. The principle that the benefit of an opinion to the recipient should warrant the time and expense required to prepare it is particularly important in cross-border transactions.See ABA Guidelines,supranote 5, at 878 (§ 1.2);see generally supratext accompanying notes 6–7. The cost-benefit analysis should take into account such factors as the type of transaction, the importance of the agreement to the transaction, the role played by U.S. law (when the opinion is requested of U.S. counsel), and the relevance of the issues to be covered by the opinion to the commercial bargain between the parties.See CLLS Opinion Guide,supranote 4, at 11 (¶54). These factors may be weighted differently in the cross-border setting than in the domestic U.S. setting.In some jurisdictions or transactions, legal advice from a party’s own counsel may take the form of a written opinion; in that case, the cost of an opinion by U.S. counsel that duplicates an opinion the recipient already is receiving from its own counsel may well not be justified by the incremental benefit to the recipient.
231. Some opinions that are worded the same as opinions routinely given in domestic U.S. transactions are more difficult to give in cross-border transactions.See supraParts III-6 & III-7 (regarding no breach or default and no violation of law opinions);see also supratext following note 6.
232. Closing opinions serve as part of the recipient’s diligence, providing the opinion giver’s professional judgment on legal issues the recipient has determined to be important to it in the transaction.See ABA Guidelines,supranote 5, at 875 (§ 1.1). Recipients, however, should not expect opinions given to them by counsel for the other party to address all important legal issues. See generallyIBA REPORT,supranote 2, at 23–25 (some gaps will remain; opinion recipient should understand those gaps).
233. An opinion request requiring more than an expression of professional judgment on legal issues or seeking overly broad opinions is inappropriate.See ABA Guidelines,supranote 5, at 876 (§ 1.2) (opinion should be limited to reasonably specific and determinable matters that involve the exercise of professional judgment by the opinion giver). Examples cited by theABA Guidelinesof inappropriate requests include: an opinion that a client is qualified to do business wherever such qualification is required, possesses all necessary licenses and permits to conduct its business, is not in violation of any applicable laws or regulations, or is not in default under any of its contracts; a statement that a client’s assets are not subject to any prior security interests; a statement that the client’s representations and warranties in the agreement are accurate; and a blanket statement as to the absence of pending or threatened litigation or as to the expected outcome of litigation. Inappropriate opinion requests are not rendered appropriate by limiting them to the opinion giver’s knowledge or subjecting them to broadly worded disclaimers.
See also CLLS Opinion Guide,supranote 4, at 4 (¶9) (inappropriate for scope of opinion to become part of commercial negotiation; law firm instructed to request opinion it would be unwilling to give might explain to client that opinion is unlikely to assist in practice and could lead to difficulty and greater cost, pressuring opinion giver to give opinion will not change the law, and reasonableness of client’s reliance on opinion, if given, could be undermined in view of opinion giver’s reluctance).
234. Starting with a seminal 1979 report (TriBar Op. Comm.,Legal Opinions to Third Parties: An Easier Path, 34 BUS. LAW. 1891 (1979)), U.S. customary practice has evolved over the past thirty-five years, with U.S. lawyers developing a common understanding of the meaning of many standard opinions.
235.See ABA Guidelines,supranote 5, at 875 (§ 1.1), 880 (factual confirmations do not require the exercise of professional judgment and are inappropriate subjects for legal opinions even when limited by broadly worded disclaimers).
These form limited liability company agreements are designed for use for single-member limited liability companies (“LLCs”). Both forms are designed to comply with the requirements of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act. If a practitioner desires to use either form to organize an LLC under the laws of another jurisdiction, it will be necessary to consider carefully how any differences between the laws of that jurisdiction and the Delaware LLC Act affect the provisions of the forms.
One form is designed for use where the member is an individual, and the other form is designed for use where the member is an entity. Many of the provisions in the two forms are the same or similar. However, when there are two approaches to a given area, one of which is more complicated or detailed than the other, the more complicated or detailed approach is included in the entity member form and the simpler approach in the individual member form. Thus, for example, the individual member form uses management by the member, which is the simplest and most straightforward management structure in a single-member LLC, while the entity member form employs a manager-managed construct. In addition, the individual member form employs a simpler dissolution structure that tracks the default language of the Delaware LLC Act, permitting the LLC to be continued after dissolution but not requiring it. In contrast, the entity member form requires that, upon dissolution, the LLC will be continued to the extent permitted under the Delaware LLC Act. Similarly, the entity member form provides for officers and specifically describes the functions of the president, secretary, and treasurer, while the individual member form simply provides that the member may appoint officers if desired.
The forms are also designed to avoid certain pitfalls that can frequently occur with single member LLCs. Thus, for example, in connection with a voluntary transfer by the member of its entire LLC interest, both forms provide that the member will cease to be a member, the transferee will automatically and simultaneously be admitted as the successor member, and the LLC will continue without dissolution. This provision is designed to address the situation that arises when the sole member of an LLC transfers the entire interest in the LLC, just as a stockholder would transfer the stock in a wholly owned corporation, without expressly admitting the transferee as the successor member. Failure to do so can result in the inadvertent dissolution of the LLC, and the transfer provisions of the forms are designed to avoid this. It should be noted, however, that the forms are designed only to function for single-member LLCs. Thus, they should not be used for multi-member LLCs and should be amended and restated if they are used for a single-member LLC that subsequently has more than one economic member.
With regard to tax matters, both forms are intended for use only with an LLC formed with one economic member under the laws of one of the states that is not treated as a trust or corporation (including a corporation making an S election) for tax purposes.
Finally, it should be stressed that no form is appropriate for every use, and careful consideration should be given to the specific facts and circumstances in any individual situation before either of the forms is used. In this regard, while one or the other of the forms may be appropriate for a specific situation, in other situations, it may be desirable to combine provisions of the two forms by, for example, using manager management in a form where the member is an individual, or it may be desirable to add provisions that are not in either form if the specific circumstances dictate.
These forms are a project of the Limited Liability Company Subcommittee of the Committee on LLCs, Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Organizations of the ABA Business Law Section. The forms were approved by the Committee in 2013 after many years of work. The project was begun by Marty Lubaroff, one of the seminal figures in the alternative entity area. Over the years, many people contributed to the project. Without meaning to suggest that others have not made significant contributions, the following persons deserve special recognition for their efforts: Committee members Michael A. Bamberger, Carter G. Bishop, J. William Callison, Peter D. Hutcheon, Leon Andrew “Andy” Immerman, Lewis R. Kaster, Warren P. Kean, Daniel S. Kleinberger, Scott E. Ludwig, James J. Wheaton, an editorial board composed of Steven G. Frost, Robert R. Keatinge, Gregory W. Ladner, Ira Meislik, Lauris G.L. Rall, and Thomas E. Rutledge, and co-reporters Eric N. Feldman, Louis G. Hering, and Christina M. Houston. The Committee’s project editors, Paul M. Altman, Allan G. Donn, and Elizabeth S. Miller, also provided valuable input and revisions.
Single-Member LLC Entity Member Form
By LLCs, Partnerships and Unincorporated Entities Committee, ABA Business Law Section*
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AGREEMENT OF _____________________, LLC
THIS LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AGREEMENT1 (this “Agreement”) by the undersigned sole member (the “Member”) of ________________________, LLC,2 a Delaware limited liability company (the “Company”), is effective as of the date of formation of the Company.
The Member is executing this Agreement for the purpose of forming a limited liability company pursuant to and in accordance with the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101 et seq.), as amended from time to time3 (the “Delaware LLC Act”), and hereby agrees as follows4:
1. FORMATION
(i) The Company was formed on ____________ ___, ______5 by _________________ (the “Organizer”), acting in the capacity of an “authorized person”6 under section 18-201 of the Delaware LLC Act, executing the initial certificate of formation of the Company and filing it with the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware. The Member hereby acknowledges its authorization and approval of the Organizer’s taking, and otherwise ratifies, that action to form the Company under the Delaware LLC Act.7
(ii) Each of the Member, the Manager (as hereinafter defined) and ____________________8 is hereby designated as an authorized person, within the meaning of the Delaware LLC Act and otherwise, to execute, deliver and file any amendments and/or restatements to the certificate of formation of the Company and any other certificates (and any amendments and/or restatements thereof ) necessary for the Company to qualify to do business in a jurisdiction in which the Company may wish to conduct business.
2. PURPOSE
The Company is formed for the object and purpose of, and the nature of the business to be conducted and promoted by the Company is, to [engage in any lawful act or activity for which a limited liability company may be formed under the Delaware LLC Act] [specify activity, e.g., acquire and develop certain property, conduct specific business, etc.] and to engage in any and all activities necessary or incidental to the foregoing.9
(i) The Company shall have the power and authority to take any and all actions necessary, appropriate, advisable, convenient or incidental to or for the furtherance of the purpose set forth in Section 2, including, but not limited to, the power:
(a) to conduct its business, carry on its operations and have and exercise the powers granted to a limited liability company by the Delaware LLC Act in any state, territory, district or possession of the United States, or in any foreign country that may be necessary, convenient or incidental to the accomplishment of the purpose of the Company;
(b) to acquire, by purchase, lease, contribution of property or otherwise, and to own, hold, operate, maintain, finance, improve, lease, sell, convey, mortgage, transfer, demolish or dispose of any real or personal property that may be necessary, convenient or incidental to the accomplishment of the purpose of the Company;
(c) to enter into, perform and carry out contracts of any kind,11 including, without limitation, contracts with the Member or any person or other entity that directly or indirectly controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the Member (any such person or entity, an “Affiliate”), or any agent of the Company necessary to, in connection with, convenient to, or incidental to, the accomplishment of the purpose of the Company. For purposes of the definition of Affiliate, “control” means possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of an entity, whether through ownership of voting securities or otherwise;
(d) to purchase, take, receive, subscribe for or otherwise acquire, own, hold, vote, use, employ, sell, mortgage, lend, pledge, or otherwise dispose of, and otherwise use and deal in and with, shares or other interests in or obligations of domestic or foreign corporations, associations, general or limited partnerships (including, without limitation, the power to be admitted as a partner thereof and to exercise the rights and perform the duties created thereby), trusts, limited liability companies (including, without limitation, the power to be admitted as a member or appointed as a manager thereof and to exercise the rights and perform the duties created thereby), and other entities or individuals, or direct or indirect obligations of the United States or any foreign country or of any government, state, territory, governmental district or municipality or of any instrumentality of any of them;
(e) to lend money for any proper purpose, to invest and reinvest its funds, and to take and hold real and personal property for the payment of funds so lent or invested;
(f) to sue and be sued, complain and defend and participate in administrative or other proceedings, in its name;
(g) to appoint employees and agents of the Company, define their duties and fix their compensation;
(h) to indemnify any person or entity and to obtain any and all types of insurance;
(i) to cease its activities and cancel its insurance;
(j) to negotiate, enter into, renegotiate, extend, renew, terminate, modify, amend, waive, execute, acknowledge or take any other action with respect to any lease, contract or security agreement in respect of any assets of the Company;
(k) to borrow money and issue evidences of indebtedness, and to secure the debts of the Company by mortgage, pledge or other lien on any or all of the assets of the Company;
(l) to pay, collect, compromise, litigate, arbitrate or otherwise adjust or settle any and all other claims or demands of or against the Company; and
(m) to make, execute, acknowledge and file any and all documents or instruments necessary, convenient or incidental to the accomplishment of the purpose of the Company.
(ii) Upon the approval of the Member and upon such terms as the Member determines, in its sole discretion, and without any approval of, or action by, the Manager, the Company may (a) merge with, or consolidate into, any other entity to the extent permitted by section 18-209 of the Delaware LLC Act, (b) convert to any other entity to the extent permitted by section 18-216 of the Delaware LLC Act or (c) transfer to or domesticate or continue in any other jurisdiction to the extent permitted by section 18-213 of the Delaware LLC Act.
(iii) All real and personal property of the Company shall be owned by the Company as an entity. The Member shall not have any interest in any specific property of the Company. The interest of the Member in the Company is personal property.12
4. MEMBER
The following information with respect to the Member is to be provided on Schedule 1 and will be accurate as of the date hereof (except to the extent updated as provided below):
(i) the name and address of the Member; and
(ii) the capital contribution of the Member to the Company.13
The Manager or the Member may, but shall not be required to, update the information on Schedule 1 from time to time to reflect any changes in that information.
5. POWERS OF MEMBER
(i) The Member shall have the power to exercise any and all rights and powers granted to the Member pursuant to the express terms of this Agreement.14
(ii) Except as otherwise specifically provided by this Agreement, only the Manager shall have the power to act for and on behalf of, and to bind, the Company, and the Member, as a member of the Company, shall not have the power to act for and on behalf of or to bind the Company.15
(i) [______________] shall be the manager of the Company (the “Manager”) and, in that capacity, shall manage the Company in accordance with this Agreement. The Manager is an agent of the Company, and the actions of the Manager taken in that capacity and in accordance with this Agreement shall bind the Company. The salary or other compensation, if any, of the Manager shall be fixed from time to time by the Member and the Manager.17
(ii) Except to the extent otherwise provided in this Agreement, the Manager shall have full, exclusive and complete discretion to manage and control the business and affairs of the Company, to make all decisions affecting the business and affairs of the Company and to take all actions as he or she deems necessary or appropriate to accomplish the purpose of the Company as set forth herein and shall have all powers and authority necessary or desirable in connection with the foregoing, including the power and authority to execute all documents or instruments, perform all duties and powers and do all things for and on behalf of the Company in all matters necessary, desirable, convenient or incidental to the purpose of the Company.18 The Manager may delegate to other persons or entities so much of the Manager’s responsibilities hereunder that the Manager determines to be necessary, appropriate or convenient for the efficient administration and management of the Company’s business and affairs.19 The Manager, however, must retain the power to direct and control any person or entity to whom the Manager delegates any of the Manager’s responsibilities. The Manager shall be a “manager” (within the meaning of the Delaware LLC Act) of the Company.20
(iii) The Manager may be removed with or without cause by the Member. The Manager shall serve until removed or until the Manager’s earlier death, resignation or incapacity. The Manager may resign at any time upon 30 days’ prior written notice to the Member.21 Upon the removal, death, resignation, incapacity or resignation of the Manager, a successor shall be designated by the Member.
(iv) The Manager may delegate to any officer of the Company, if any, or to any other person or entity the authority to act on behalf of the Company as the Manager may from time to time deem appropriate in his or her sole discretion. The salaries or other compensation, if any, of the officers and agents, if any, of the Company shall be fixed from time to time by the Manager. Except as otherwise provided by the Manager, when the taking of that action has been authorized by the Manager, the Manager or any officer, if any, of the Company, or any other person specifically authorized by the Manager, may execute any contract or other agreement or document on behalf of the Company.
(v) The Company may have one or more of the following officers as determined by the Manager from time to time22: President, Secretary, Treasurer, and other officers the Manager may appoint from time to time. Any officers may be appointed and removed at the will of the Manager. If any officers are appointed by the Manager, they shall perform those functions specified by the Manager. If one or more of a President, Secretary or Treasurer is appointed, each shall perform those functions as are herein provided unless otherwise specified by the Manager:
(a) The President shall be the chief executive officer of the Company and shall, subject to the supervision, direction and control of the Manager, have the general powers and duties of supervision, direction, management and control of the day-to-day business and affairs of the Company and of the other officers of the Company, including the power to sign all instruments, contracts and agreements that have been approved by the Manager and all powers necessary to direct and control the organizational and reporting relationships within the Company, and shall have such other powers and perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the Manager.
(b) The Secretary shall keep or cause to be kept at the principal place of business of the Company, or other place the Manager may direct, a book of minutes of all formal actions of the Manager and the Member. The Secretary shall keep or cause to be kept at the principal place of business of the Company, a register or a duplicate register showing the name and address of the Member, the number and date of certificates issued in respect of the Member’s interest in the Company, if any, and the number and date of cancellation of every certificate surrendered for cancellation.23 The Secretary shall have those other powers and perform other duties as may be prescribed by the Manager or the President.
(c) The Treasurer shall be the chief financial officer and shall keep and maintain or cause to be kept and maintained adequate and correct books and records of accounts of the properties and business transactions of the Company. The books of account shall at all times be open to inspection by the Member. The Treasurer shall deposit all monies and other valuables in the name and to the credit of the Company with the depositaries designated by the Manager. The Treasurer shall disburse the funds of the Company as may be ordered by the Manager, shall render to the President and the Manager, whenever the Manager requests it, an account of all of his or her transactions as chief financial officer and of the financial condition of the Company and shall have other powers and perform other duties as may be prescribed by the Manager or the President.
(vi) The Manager may appoint, employ, or otherwise contract with those other persons or entities for the transaction of the business of the Company or the performance of services for or on behalf of the Company as it shall determine in its sole discretion.
(vii) Except as provided in Section 6.1(v), as otherwise expressly delegated by the Manager or to the extent that the Company’s registered agent has the authority to accept legal process or otherwise act on behalf of the Company as provided in the Delaware LLC Act, no person or entity other than the Manager shall be an agent of the Company or have any right, power or authority to transact any business in the name of the Company or to act for or on behalf of or to bind the Company.
(viii) The expression of any power or authority of the Manager in this Agreement shall not in any way limit or exclude any other power or authority of the Manager that is not expressly set forth in this Agreement; except that any power or authority of the Manager shall be subject to any limitations on the power or authority of the Manager expressly set forth in this Agreement and to any rights and powers granted to the Member pursuant to the express terms of this Agreement.24
6.2 RELIANCE BY THIRD PARTIES
The Manager or any officer of the Company may certify and authenticate records of the Company to third parties and any third party dealing with the Company, the Manager, the Member or any officer of the Company may rely upon a certificate signed by the Manager or any officer of the Company as to:
(i) the identity of the Manager, the Member or any officer of the Company;
(ii) the existence or non-existence of any fact or facts that constitute a condition precedent to acts by the Manager, the Member or any officer of the Company or are in any other manner germane to the affairs of the Company;
(iii) the persons who or entities that are authorized to execute and deliver any instrument or document of or on behalf of the Company; or
(iv) any act or failure to act by the Company or as to any other matter whatsoever involving the Company, the Member, the Manager or any officer of the Company.
6.3 RECORDS AND INFORMATION
The Manager shall maintain, and upon request make available to the Member, all of the books and records of the Company referenced in section 18-305 of the Delaware LLC Act, to the extent applicable to the Company, except to the extent that any books and records are maintained by an officer of the Company in accordance with Section 6.1(v). Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Delaware LLC Act, the Manager shall have no authority to keep any books and records of the Company confidential from the Member.25
7. TERM; DISSOLUTION
(i) The term of the Company shall be perpetual unless the Company is dissolved and terminated in accordance with this Section 7.26
(ii) The Company shall dissolve, and its affairs shall be wound up, upon the first to occur of the following: (a) the written consent of the Member; or (b) the entry of a decree of judicial dissolution under section 18-802 of the Delaware LLC Act.
(iii) Upon the occurrence of any event that terminates the continued membership of the Member in the Company, the Company shall not dissolve and the personal representative (as defined in the Delaware LLC Act) of the Member shall agree in writing to continue the Company and to the admission of the personal representative of the Member or its nominee or its designee to the Company as a Member, effective as of the occurrence of the event that terminated the continued membership of the Member in the Company.27
(iv) Upon the dissolution of the Company, the Manager shall wind up the Company’s affairs as provided in the Delaware LLC Act.28 Upon the winding up of the Company’s affairs, the Manager shall distribute the property of the Company as follows:
(a) First, to creditors, including the Member if it is a creditor, to the extent permitted by law, in satisfaction of the Company’s liabilities (whether by payment or the making of reasonable provision for payment thereof ); and
(b) Second, to the Member in cash or property, or partly in cash and partly in property, as determined by the Manager.29
(v) Upon the completion of the winding up of the Company, the Manager shall file a certificate of cancellation with the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware canceling the Company’s certificate of formation at which time the Company shall terminate.30
8. ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS; MEMBER LOANS
(i) The Member may, but is not required to, make additional capital contributions to the Company.31
(ii) The Member may, but is not required to, make loans to the Company. If and to the extent that loans are made by the Member to the Company, those loans shall be on terms determined by the Member and the Manager to be commercially reasonable. In the absence of any separate determination made by the Member and the Manager, all loans made by the Member to the Company shall be payable upon demand and shall bear interest at __% per year.32
(iii) To the extent that additional funds are made available by the Member to the Company, those funds shall be treated as loans made by the Member to the Company, and not as additional capital contributions made by the Member to the Company, unless specifically designated as additional capital contributions made by the Member to the Company.33
9. LIABILITY OF MEMBER
Except to the extent provided in the Delaware LLC Act, the Member shall not have any liability for the obligations or liabilities of the Company.34
10. TAX STATUS
At all times that the Company has only one member (who owns 100% of the limited liability company interests in the Company), it is the intention of the Member that the Company be disregarded as an entity separate from the Member for federal, state, local and foreign income tax purposes and that the Company be treated for those purposes, but not for purposes other than taxation, as a division of the Member.35
11. DISTRIBUTIONS
(i) Distributions shall be made to the Member at the times and in the amounts determined by the Manager, except that no distribution shall be made in violation of the Delaware LLC Act.36
(ii) Unless otherwise determined by the Member, no distribution shall be paid to the Member upon its resignation, whether in connection with the voluntary assignment of its entire interest pursuant to Section 13 or otherwise.37
12. ASSIGNMENTS
(i) The Member may transfer or assign (including as a pledge or other collateral assignment) in whole or in part its limited liability company interest.38
(ii) In connection with a voluntary transfer or assignment by the Member of its entire limited liability company interest in the Company (not including a pledge or collateral assignment or any transfer as a result thereof ):
(a) the Member will cease to be a member of the Company;
(b) the assignee will automatically and simultaneously be admitted as the successor Member without any further action at the time the voluntary transfer or assignment becomes effective under applicable law; and
(c) the Company shall be continued without dissolution.39
(iii) In connection with a partial assignment or transfer by the Member of its limited liability company interest (not including a pledge or collateral assignment or any transfer as a result thereof ), unless this Agreement is amended to reflect the fact that the Company will have more than one member, the assignee or transferee shall not be admitted as a member of the Company and shall not have any rights as a member other than the right to receive any distributions that are payable in respect of the interest transferred.40
(iv) Upon any pledge or other collateral assignment by the Member of all or any part of its limited liability company interest,41 the pledgee or collateral assignee shall have only those rights as are expressly stated in the controlling pledge or assignment agreement (including any right in connection with the foreclosure of the pledge or collateral assignment of the purchaser of the limited liability company interest to become a member of the Company) or are provided by other applicable law. If the pledgee or collateral assignee of all or any part of the Member’s limited liability company interest has the right under the controlling pledge or assignment agreement or under other applicable law to purchase the interest in foreclosure (or to cause or permit another person to purchase the interest in foreclosure), except as expressly stated in the controlling pledge or assignment agreement, the purchaser shall not be admitted as a member of the Company and shall not have any rights as a member other than the right to receive any distributions that are payable in respect of the interest foreclosed upon and purchased.42
13. RESIGNATION
The Member may resign from the Company at such time as it shall determine.43 Neither the filing of a voluntary petition in bankruptcy nor any other event specified in section 18-304 of the Delaware LLC Act will cause the Member to cease to be a member of the Company.44
14. ADMISSION OF ADDITIONAL MEMBERS
One or more additional members of the Company may be admitted to the Company with the written consent of the Member.45 In connection with the admission of any additional member of the Company (including an admission in connection with a partial assignment or transfer pursuant to Section 12(iii), but excluding an admission provided for in any pledge or collateral assignment agreement pursuant to Section 12(iv)), this Agreement shall be amended by the Member to make those changes it determines to reflect the fact that the Company will have more than one member, but the failure to so amend this Agreement shall not invalidate any otherwise valid assignment or transfer made by the Member.
(i) For purposes of this Agreement, “Covered Persons” means the Manager, the Member, any Affiliate of the Manager or Member and any officer, director, shareholder, partner or employee of the Manager or Member and their respective Affiliates, and any officer, employee or expressly authorized agent of the Company or its Affiliates.
(ii) The Member, whether acting as Member, in its capacity as Manager (if applicable) or in any other capacity, shall not be liable to the Company or to the Manager for any loss, damage or claim incurred by reason of any act or omission (whether or not constituting negligence or gross negligence) performed or omitted by the Member in good faith, and no other Covered Person shall be liable to the Company, the Member or the Manager for any loss, damage or claim incurred by reason of any act or omission (whether or not constituting negligence) performed or omitted by the Covered Person in good faith and in a manner reasonably believed to be within the scope of authority conferred on the Covered Person by this Agreement, except that a Covered Person (other than the Member, irrespective of the capacity in which it acts) shall be liable for any loss, damage or claim incurred by reason of the Covered Person’s gross negligence and a Covered Person (including the Member) shall be liable for any loss, damage or claim incurred by reason of the Covered Person’s willful misconduct.
(iii) A Covered Person shall be fully protected in relying in good faith upon the records of the Company and upon such information, opinions, reports or statements presented to the Company by any person or entity as to matters the Covered Person reasonably believes are within the professional or expert competence of that person or entity, including information, opinions, reports or statements as to the value and amount of the assets, liabilities, profits, losses or any other facts pertinent to the existence and amount of assets from which distributions to the Member might properly be paid.47 The foregoing provision shall in no way be deemed to reduce the limitation on liability of the Member provided in Clause (ii) of this Section 15.1.
15.2 DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF COVERED PERSONS
(i) To the extent that, at law or in equity, a Covered Person has duties (including fiduciary duties) and liabilities relating thereto to the Company, the Member or the Manager, a Covered Person acting under this Agreement shall not be liable to the Company, the Member or the Manager for its good faith reliance on the provisions of this Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement, to the extent that they restrict or eliminate the duties and liabilities of a Covered Person otherwise existing at law or in equity, are agreed by the Member to replace any other duties and liabilities of the Covered Person.48
(ii) All provisions of this Section 15 shall apply to any former Member or Manager of the Company for all actions or omissions taken while that person was the Member or the Manager, as applicable, of the Company to the same extent as if that person were still the Member or the Manager, as applicable, of the Company.
15.3 INDEMNIFICATION
To the fullest extent permitted by applicable law, the Member (irrespective of the capacity in which it acts) shall be entitled to indemnification from the Company for any loss, damage or claim incurred by the Member by reason of any act or omission (whether or not constituting negligence or gross negligence)49 performed or omitted and any other Covered Person shall be entitled to indemnification from the Company for any loss, damage or claim incurred by that Covered Person by reason of any act or omission (whether or not constituting negligence) performed or omitted by that Covered Person in good faith and in a manner reasonably believed to be within the scope of authority conferred on that Covered Person by this Agreement, except that no Covered Person (other than the Member, irrespective of the capacity in which it acts) shall be entitled to be indemnified in respect of any loss, damage or claim incurred by that Covered Person by reason of gross negligence and no Covered Person (including the Member) shall be entitled to be indemnified in respect of any loss, damage or claim incurred by that Covered Person by reason of willful misconduct with respect to those acts or omissions; but any indemnity under this Section 15 shall be provided out of and to the extent of Company assets only, and no Covered Person shall have any personal liability on account thereof.
15.4 EXPENSES
To the fullest extent permitted by applicable law, expenses (including legal fees) incurred by a Covered Person in defending any claim, demand, action, suit or proceeding shall, from time to time, be advanced by the Company before the final disposition of the claim, demand, action, suit or proceeding upon receipt by the Company of an undertaking by or on behalf of the Covered Person to repay that amount if it shall be determined that the Covered Person is not entitled to be indemnified under this Section 15.50
15.5 INDEMNITY CONTRACTS
The Manager and the Company may enter into indemnity contracts with any Covered Person and adopt written procedures pursuant to which arrangements are made for the advancement of expenses and the funding of obligations under this Section 15 and containing other procedures regarding indemnification as are appropriate.
15.6 INSURANCE
The Company may purchase and maintain insurance, to the extent and in amounts the Manager shall, in its sole discretion, deem reasonable, on behalf of Covered Persons and other persons or entities as the Manager shall determine, against any liability that may be asserted against or expenses that may be incurred by that person or entity in connection with the activities of the Company, regardless of whether the Company would have the power to indemnify that person or entity against the liability under this Agreement.
16. OUTSIDE BUSINESS
The Member or any Affiliate thereof may engage in or possess an interest in any business venture of any nature or description, independently or with others, similar or dissimilar to the business of the Company, and the Company and the Member shall have no rights by virtue of this Agreement in and to such independent ventures or the income or profits derived therefrom, and the pursuit of any such venture, even if competitive with the business of the Company, shall not be deemed wrongful or improper. The Member or any Affiliate thereof shall not be obligated to disclose or present any particular opportunity to the Company even if that opportunity is of a character that, if disclosed or presented to the Company, could be taken by the Company, and the Member or Affiliate thereof shall have the right to take for its own account (individually or as a partner, shareholder, fiduciary or otherwise) or to recommend to others any such particular opportunity.51
17. AMENDMENT
This Agreement may be amended or modified only by a written instrument signed by the Member; but if any amendment would affect the rights, obligations or liabilities of the Manager, that amendment shall not be effective with respect to the Manager unless that amendment is approved in writing by the Manager.52
18. GOVERNING LAW
This Agreement shall be governed by, and construed under, the laws of the State of Delaware, without regard to the rules of conflict of laws thereof or of any other jurisdiction that would call for the application of the substantive laws of a jurisdiction other than the State of Delaware.
19. TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT
This Agreement shall terminate and be of no further force or effect upon the filing of a certificate of cancellation cancelling the Company’s certificate of formation pursuant to Section 7(v) of this Agreement; but Sections 15.1, 15.2, 15.3 and 15.4 shall survive termination.53
20. EFFECTIVE DATE
Pursuant to section 18-201(d) of the Delaware LLC Act, this Agreement shall be effective as of the effective time of the filing of the Company’s certificate of formation [or specify another date subsequent to the effective time of the filing of the Company’s certificate of formation upon which this Agreement will be effective].54
21. NO THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES
Except as contemplated by Section 15, nothing in this Agreement, express or implied, is intended to confer upon any person or entity, other than the parties hereto and their respective successors, any benefits, rights or remedies.
22. MISCELLANEOUS
Throughout this Agreement, nouns, pronouns and verbs shall be construed as masculine, feminine, neuter, singular or plural, whichever shall be applicable. All references to “Sections” and “Clauses” shall refer to corresponding provisions of this Agreement. The use of the term “including” or any similar term shall be deemed to mean “including, without limitation.” Any reference in this Agreement to any law, rule or regulation shall be construed as reference to the law, rule or regulation as it may have been, or may from time to time be, amended, revised or reenacted and any successor thereto. The headings of sections in this Agreement are intended for reference purposes only and shall be given no substantive meaning or any interpretive force.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has duly executed this Limited Liability Company Agreement as of the day and year first aforesaid.
[MEMBER]
By: ____________________________
Name:
Title:
The Manager hereby executes this Agreement for the purposes of becoming a party hereto and agreeing to perform its obligations and duties hereunder and being entitled to enjoy its rights and benefits hereunder.55
[MANAGER]
_______________________________
Name:
The Company hereby executes this Agreement for the purposes of becoming a party hereto and agreeing to perform its obligations and duties hereunder and being entitled to enjoy its rights and benefits hereunder.56
[THE COMPANY]
By: ____________________________
Name:
Title:
Schedule 1
Name
Mailing Address
Agreed Value of Capital Contribution
_______________________
_______________________
$_____________________
* This form limited liability company agreement is one of two prepared by the LLCs, Partnerships and Unincorporated Entities Committee of the ABA Business Law Section. This form is designed for use where the only member is an entity and the other is designed for use where the only member is an individual. As a general rule, when there are two approaches to a given area, one of which is more complicated or detailed than the other, the more complicated or detailed approach is included in this form and the simpler approach in the individual member form. Thus, for example, the individual member form uses management by the member, that being the simplest and most straightforward management structure in a single-member limited liability company (an “LLC”), while the entity member form employs a manager-managed construct. Similarly, the entity member form includes an extensive list of powers of the LLC, while the individual member form simply includes only a general powers clause. This division is largely for organizational and instructive purposes. Generally speaking, these two approaches and the related provisions can be mixed and matched as the drafter deems appropriate for his or her individual situation. Thus, for example, one could have an individual as the member in a manager-managed LLC with no officers. Care should be taken, however, when mixing provisions of the two forms to be sure that any necessary conforming changes are made. Also note that neither form is intended to be used if the parties contemplate the possibility of there being more than one member or there being more than one person or entity having an economic interest in the LLC. In addition, neither form is intended to be used for a special purpose entity borrower in a structured financing transaction because these forms do not include a number of provisions, such as separateness covenants, that would typically be included in the LLC agreement of such an entity.
With regard to tax matters, this form is intended for use only for a domestic LLC (one formed under the laws of one of the states, not the laws of a foreign jurisdiction) that is not treated as a trust or corporation (including a corporation that makes an S election) for tax purposes and that has only a single economic member. Such an LLC should be disregarded for federal income taxes (see infra note 35). Because the LLC will be disregarded for federal tax purposes, contributions by, and distributions and payments (including compensatory payments and payments of interest) to, the member will be a matter of tax indifference, or non-events, to the member and the LLC. If the LLC is treated other than as disregarded for tax purposes, e.g., because it becomes a partnership through the addition of an additional economic member, it would become an entity for tax purposes separate from the member, and tax counsel should consider the economic interaction between the LLC and the member and make appropriate drafting changes.
It should be noted that a single-member LLC will not always be treated in the same way, and accorded the same rights, as a sole proprietorship or an individual, and, therefore, the decision to use a single-member LLC should be made in consideration of any relevant legal considerations. See, e.g., 3519–3513 Realty, LLC v. Law, 967 A.2d 954, 955 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2009) (interpreting a “statute [that] permits a landlord to remove a tenant if ‘[t]he owner of a building of three residential units or less seeks to personally occupy a unit’” and holding the statute inapplicable where a sole proprietor had transferred a building to his single-member LLC); Krueger v. Zeman Constr. Co., 758 N.W.2d 881, 887 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that “to have standing to assert a business-discrimination claim under [the Minnesota Human Rights Act] appellant must show both that respondent committed a discriminatory act in the performance of a contract and that [appellant]—not her limited liability company—has a contractual relationship with respondent”), aff ’d, 781 N.W.2d 858 (Minn. 2010). For a general discussion of separate entity effects, see CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW ¶ 5.05[1][e] (1994 & Supp. 2011).
Finally, this form is designed to comply with the requirements of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act and other applicable Delaware law. If any practitioner intends to utilize this form to organize a limited liability company under the laws of a jurisdiction other than Delaware, the limited liability company act and all other applicable laws of that jurisdiction will need to be carefully reviewed and compared to those of Delaware and, as needed, this form will need to be modified to conform with all applicable legal requirements and to ensure that the intent of the parties is carried out under the laws of the applicable jurisdiction.
1. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (2013) (defining a “limited liability company agreement” and providing that the agreement of a single-member LLC shall not be unenforceable by reason of there being only one person who is a party thereto).
2. The Delaware LLC Act sets forth requirements for the name of each domestic LLC, including the requirement that the name include “Limited Liability Company,” “L.L.C.,” or “LLC.” Id. § 18-102.
3. The Delaware LLC Act specifically reserves the ability to amend the Act from time to time and to have those amendments binding upon LLCs, their members and managers, and all rights of members and managers are subject to this reservation. Id. § 18-1106.
5. Under Delaware law, an LLC is formed at the time of filing of the certificate of formation or such later time and date as provided for therein, in each case assuming there has been substantial compliance with the requirements of section 18-201 of the Delaware LLC Act. Id. § 18-201(b). It should be noted that an LLC agreement is required under the Delaware LLC Act, but can be entered into before, after, or at the time of filing of the certificate of formation and that the LLC agreement can be made effective as of the formation of the LLC or at such other time as provided in or reflected by the LLC agreement. Id. § 18-201(d). If the person or entity intending to become the member of an LLC files the certificate of formation for the LLC and subsequently enters into the LLC agreement, care should be taken to make sure that no business is conducted by or on behalf of the LLC before the single member enters into the LLC agreement unless the LLC agreement is made effective as of the filing of the certificate of formation or as of a date before the commencement of business, in which case the provisions of the LLC agreement relating to the authority of the member or manager will relate back to the filing date or such other date with respect to any actions taken after that date. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.02(1) (2006).
6. Although the Delaware LLC Act uses “authorized person” in a number of sections, see, e.g., id. §§ 18-201, 18-204, 18-208, the term is not defined. Consequently, it is prudent to provide either in the LLC agreement or through proper action by the manager in the case of a manager-managed LLC or the member in the case of a member-managed LLC what person or entity is designated as an “authorized person” for purposes of the Delaware LLC Act.
7. The Delaware LLC Act requires that the certificate of formation state the name of the LLC and the address of the registered office and name and address of the registered agent for the LLC located in the State of Delaware. Id. § 18-201(a). Because these matters are required to be addressed in the certificate of formation, other than the name, they have not been included in this Agreement for the sake of simplicity and to avoid unintentional inconsistency.
8. There exists no requirement that there be, in addition to the manager, another authorized person, and there is similarly no requirement that the manager be an authorized person. The alternative formula herein set forth is for purposes of illustration.
9. The Delaware LLC Act provides that an LLC “may carry on any lawful business, purpose or activity, whether or not for profit, with the exception of the business of banking as defined in § 126 of Title 8.” Id. § 18-106(a). The purpose clause of an LLC agreement is significant because it delimits the activities in which the LLC may engage. The two basic approaches are to utilize a general purpose clause permitting the LLC to engage in any lawful activity or to utilize a specific purpose clause permitting the LLC to engage only in the specific activity for which it was formed and any necessary or incidental activities. The benefit of the former clause is that the LLC has the power and authority to engage in any lawful activity that may present itself whether or not it was initially contemplated. Conversely, the benefit of the latter clause is that it restricts the authorized use of the LLC to previously agreed-upon activities unless the purpose clause is amended. Where the LLC agreement designates a manager whose interest may not be identical to, or closely aligned with that of, the member, use of a narrow purpose clause will restrict the manager’s rightful ability to operate the LLC so that it will be only for the member’s intended purpose in creating the LLC. Similarly, a clear limitation on the power and authority of the LLC to take certain actions in Section 3 would accomplish the same objective. See also infra notes 11 & 18. Use of a narrow purpose clause also can affect the application of the business opportunity doctrine and limit the circumstances where the member or the manager would be deemed to be taking an opportunity. See, e.g., Grove v. Brown, C.A. No. 6793-VCG, 2013 WL 4041495 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2013). See also Section 16, which specifically eliminates the application of the doctrine to the member.
10. The Delaware LLC Act contains a broad recitation of the powers of an LLC, stating that:
A[n] [LLC] shall possess and may exercise all the powers and privileges granted by this chapter or by any other law or by its [LLC] agreement, together with any powers incidental thereto, including such powers and privileges as are necessary or convenient to the conduct, promotion or attainment of the business, purposes or activities of the [LLC].
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-106(b) (2013). This is in contrast with the approach taken in the Delaware General Corporation Law wherein there is both a general (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 121) and a specific (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122) listing of powers.
The powers clause of an LLC agreement is significant because, together with the governing statute, it establishes the power and authority of the LLC to act. The powers clause should conform to the purpose clause so that the LLC has the power and authority to accomplish its stated purpose. Thus, a broad powers clause should accompany a general purpose clause. Generally speaking, the powers clause provides that the LLC shall have all the power and authority to pursue its purpose, specifically lists each power and authority that may be necessary or desirable to pursue that purpose, or includes both general language and a specific list of enumerated powers. This latter approach, adopted by this Agreement, is probably most useful when the goal is to ensure that the LLC has the power and authority to take any action relating to any lawful activity. However, where the LLC agreement designates a manager whose interest may not be identical to, or closely aligned with that of, the member, consideration should be given to whether limiting the power and authority of the LLC to take certain actions is advisable in order to, in that manner, restrict the ability of the manager to cause the LLC to take those actions. See infra notes 18 & 19.
11. Notwithstanding the general prohibition against an LLC’s engaging in banking, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-106(a) (2013), LLCs are permitted to “make contracts of guaranty and suretyship and enter into interest rate, basis, currency, hedge or other swap agreements or cap, floor, put, call, option, exchange or collar agreements, derivative agreements, or other agreements similar to any of the foregoing.” Id. § 18-106(c).
13. Identifying what assets have been contributed to the LLC, and by negative implication what assets of the member have not been contributed, serves a variety of purposes. Initially, it determines the LLC’s capital base. Second, it defines those assets of the sole member that are not available (absent a successful effort to pierce the veil) to the creditors of the LLC. Third, in the event of a claim against the sole member, identification makes clear what assets are not (absent a successful reverse pierce) available to the creditor as no longer being the member’s property. See infra note 31.
14. As noted in footnote 16, caution should be exercised if choosing a manager whose interests are not identical to, or aligned with those of, the member. If the interests of the member and the manager are not closely aligned, in addition to the methods of limiting the ability of a manager to lead the LLC in directions not contemplated by the member referenced at infra note 16, it is possible to give the member approval rights over certain actions by the manager. Thus, for example, Section 3(ii) provides that the Company may merge or consolidate only with the approval of the member. In addition, if additional limitations on the authority of the manager are desired, the member could have approval rights, for example, over the filing of a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, over all borrowings or those above a certain dollar amount, over the acquisition or disposition of any assets outside the ordinary course or exceeding a set dollar amount, or the member could have an approval right over any action by the manager that relates to any business or purpose other than the limited business or purpose previously agreed by the member. This last type of approval right is similar to a limited purpose clause, but gives somewhat greater flexibility to the member and the manager. See supra note 10.
15. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (2013) (“Unless otherwise provided in a limited liability company agreement, each member and manager has the authority to bind the [LLC].”). Be aware that a member has the apparent authority to bind the LLC except as to a third party who is on notice of the contractual limitation on its authority. A member without authority who did act to bind the LLC would likely be in breach of the warranty of authority. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.10 (2006); see also id. § 8.09(1). Conversely, by so acting, the member may have, by conduct, amended the LLC agreement to vest in itself the power to bind the LLC. See infra note 52.
16. The two most common structures for management of a single-member LLC are management by the member (who may be designated a “managing member”) or management by one or more managers. This form addresses management by a manager. As noted at supra note 1, the companion individual member form addresses management by the member, which is the default rule under the Delaware LLC Act. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (2013). A manager may but need not be a member and can be an individual or an entity. This form contemplates that the manager will be an individual. If the manager is the member or another entity, certain provisions such as Section 6.1(iii) should be revised to address the manager’s dissolution or termination rather than death, resignation, or incapacity. Caution should be exercised if a manager is selected whose interests are not identical to, or closely aligned with those of, the member. If (i) the company’s purpose expressed in Section 2 is not limited to a specific business or project, (ii) the company’s power and authority is not expressly limited in Section 3, (iii) the member is not given approval rights over certain actions by the manager as described at supra note 14, or (iv) the manager’s powers are not expressly limited in Section 6.1, the manager, exercising the broad powers granted to a manager under Section 6.1 or the expansive powers given to the company under Section 3, might have the ability to lead the company in directions not contemplated by the member. See supra notes 10 & 11. If more than one manager is designated, the LLC agreement will need to provide procedures by which the managers act, including specifying what vote is required for action, e.g., majority of the managers or some higher vote. It should also be noted that in the context of a corporate subsidiary, there is sometimes a desire that the management structure of the LLC replicate to the maximum extent possible a corporate structure. Thus, the LLC may have a board of managers that functions like a board of directors and that supervises and in some instances appoints the officers of the LLC, and the LLC may have “bylaws” comparable to corporate bylaws providing for, among other things, action by the board of managers. If a “board” structure is desired, care needs to be taken in defining its structure as a collegial body rather than a mere grouping of individual agents.
It is important to note that any formalities with respect to management that are created in an LLC agreement must be observed in order to limit the risk that a court will pierce the LLC veil if its assets are insufficient to satisfy its liabilities. See, e.g., Irwin & Leighton, Inc. v. W.M. Anderson Co., 532 A.2d 983, 989 (Del. Ch. 1987) (discussing the importance of “appropriate formalities” in a corporate piercing analysis). Thus, if an LLC agreement establishes a manager and provides that the manager shall take all action on behalf of the LLC, then all action should be taken by the manager and the member should not act for the LLC unless it is doing it in its capacity as the manager.
17. To the extent the member is the manager and payments for services pursuant to Section 6.1(i) are deemed to be distributions, those distributions would be subject to section 18-607(a) of the Delaware LLC Act.
18. It is important to note that although the Delaware LLC Act contemplates management by a manager, the default rule is member management. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (2013). Thus, although as a default rule a manager has the authority to bind an LLC, id. § 18-402, a right to information, id. § 18-305(b), a right to seek judicial dissolution, id., and a right to wind up a dissolved LLC so long as the manager has not wrongfully dissolved the LLC, id. § 18-803, there is no default rule that gives a manager any general authority to manage an LLC. Consequently, a term in an LLC agreement giving the manager all of the authority provided by the Delaware LLC Act really gives the manager very little. Consistent with the member-management default rule, the default rule for a number of actions under the Delaware LLC Act requires member action. Perhaps the most significant of these relates to approval of a merger or consolidation. Under section 18-209(b) of the Delaware LLC Act, unless otherwise provided in the LLC agreement, a merger or consolidation must be approved by a majority of the members of the LLC, or if there is more than one class or group of members, then by a majority of each class or group of members. Id. § 18-209(b). The default rule for the allocation of voting rights is in proportion to the then current interest in company profits. Thus, even a broadly worded powers clause vesting in the manager all authority to manage and control the business and affairs of the LLC, as is included in this form, is probably not sufficient to displace the default voting rights of members under section 18-209(b) of the Delaware LLC Act or comparable provisions. See, e.g., id. §§ 18-213 (transfers or continuances), 18-216 (conversions). If it is desired that the manager have authority over those sorts of actions, it is necessary either to specifically reference each such action or include a general statement that the manager has the authority to consent to and approve any action that under the Delaware LLC Act the members would otherwise have the right to consent to or approve in each case without any action by the members. Pursuant to Section 3(ii), this form reserves all those approval rights to the member.
19. Id. § 18-407. Notwithstanding the proviso that the authority of each person shall be limited to the written delegation, this proviso relates only to actual authority. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (2006). However, each person with the title of “manager” will in all likelihood be deemed to have apparent authority to bind the LLC. See id. § 2.03.
20. The Delaware LLC Act defines a “manager,” inter alia, as one who is named as a manager of an LLC or who is so designated pursuant to an LLC agreement or a similar instrument. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(10) (2013); see also id. § 18-401.
21. Under section 18-602 of the Delaware LLC Act, notwithstanding that an LLC agreement restricts or eliminates a manager’s right to resign as manager from the LLC, a manager may resign at any time by giving written notice to the members and any other managers. If the manager’s resignation violates the LLC agreement, in addition to any remedies otherwise available under applicable law, the LLC may recover from the resigning manager damages for breach of the LLC agreement and offset the damages against the amount otherwise distributable to the resigning manager.
22. The appointment of “officers” by an LLC is a matter of private ordering. Where the company’s business does not require active day-to-day management, the manager may not want to appoint all three officers, if any at all. Consequently, this form makes the appointment optional. The persons appointed will have the actual agency authority as is defined in this Agreement and the apparent agency authority as a third party would reasonably ascribe to the titles given. See supra note 20; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03.
23. References to certificates for limited liability company interests are for purposes of illustration; there is no requirement that physical certificates be issued. See infra note 42.
24. This provision is intended to ensure that the manager has all power and authority necessary to manage the company, whether or not a specific power or authority is expressly referenced in this Agreement, but those powers and authority would be subject to any limitations on the manager’s authority under this Agreement and to any rights and powers granted to the member, such as the requirement for member approval of mergers, conversions, transfers, domestications, and continuances. See supra notes 15 & 19.
25. The Delaware LLC Act provides, as a general matter and subject to certain exceptions, that each member of an LLC has the right to certain specified information. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-305 (2013). Thus, implicit in this section of the Delaware LLC Act is that the LLC must maintain the required information. However, the Delaware LLC Act does not state who has responsibility to maintain the required information. To avoid any confusion on this point, this form takes the approach that the manager must maintain all required information unless one or more officers are appointed and any such officer or officers maintain some or all of the required information. This form also negates the statutory authority of the manager to keep any information confidential from the member because to do so would likely be inappropriate in the context of a single-member LLC absent very special circumstances.
It is also important to note that all recordkeeping requirements should be observed so as to reduce the risk that a court will pierce the LLC veil if the LLC’s assets are insufficient to satisfy its liabilities. In this regard, diligent recordkeeping will bolster the argument that the company is an entity separate and apart from the member.
26. Under the Delaware LLC Act, except as may be otherwise provided in the LLC agreement, an LLC has perpetual duration. Id. § 18-801(a)(1).
27. The dissolution provisions of Section 7 are designed to ensure the continuation of the company to the maximum extent possible. They do this by including a requirement that the personal representative of the member agree to continue the company upon the occurrence of any event that terminates the continued membership of the member in the company. See id. § 18-801(a)(4) (providing that an LLC agreement may obligate the personal representative of the last remaining member to agree to continue the LLC and to the admission of a new member). “Personal representative” is defined in the Delaware LLC Act to mean, as to an entity, the legal representative or successor thereof. Thus, the intended effect of Section 7 is to avoid any inadvertent dissolution of the company while leaving the member complete flexibility to dissolve the company at any time by written consent. It should also be noted that the Delaware Court of Chancery has held that a member may waive the right to judicial dissolution under section 18-802 of the Delaware LLC Act. See R&R Capital, LLC v. Buck Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, C.A. No. 3803-CC, 2008 WL 3846318 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008). Thus, waivers of the right to judicial dissolution are now frequently included in multi-member LLC agreements. However, in the context of a single-member LLC, as a practical matter, the remedy of judicial dissolution would be rarely invoked.
To the extent continuation of the LLC to the maximum extent possible is not the desired objective, a typical provision would provide for dissolution upon the written consent of the member, upon the entry of a decree of judicial dissolution under section 18-802 of the Delaware LLC Act, or upon the occurrence of any event that terminates the continued membership of the member in the LLC. See the dissolution section of the individual member form (Section 6 thereof ) for an example of such a provision. Section 18-801 of the Delaware LLC Act provides, as a default rule, that an LLC may, but is not required to, continue without dissolution when there are no members if within ninety days after the occurrence of the event that terminated the continued membership of the last remaining member, the personal representative of the last remaining member agrees in writing to continue the LLC and to the admission of the personal representative of that member or its nominee or designee to the LLC as a member effective as of the occurrence of the event that terminated the continued membership of the last remaining member.
Another alternative to preventing the inadvertent dissolution of an LLC upon the termination of the membership of the last remaining member of the LLC is to utilize a “springing member” provision. A typical springing member provision follows:
Upon the occurrence of any event that causes the member to cease to be a member of the Company (other than (i) upon an assignment by the member of all of its limited liability company interest in the Company and the admission of the transferee pursuant to Sections 12 and 14, or (ii) the resignation of the member and the admission of an additional member of the Company pursuant to Sections 13 and 14), the Springing Member shall, without any action of any person or entity and simultaneously with the member’s ceasing to be a member of the Company, automatically be admitted to the Company as the Special Member and shall continue the Company without dissolution. The Special Member may not resign from the Company or transfer its rights as Special Member unless a successor Special Member has been admitted to the Company as the Special Member by executing a counterpart to this Agreement; but the Special Member shall automatically cease to be a member of the Company upon the admission to the Company of a substitute member. The Special Member, in its capacity as Special Member, shall be a member of the Company who has no interest in the profits, losses and capital of the Company and has no right to receive any distributions of Company assets. Pursuant to section 18-301 of the Delaware LLC Act, the Special Member shall not be required to make any capital contributions to the Company and shall not receive a limited liability company interest in the Company. The Special Member, in its capacity as Special Member, shall have no authority to bind the Company. Except as required by any mandatory provision of the Delaware LLC Act or this Agreement, the Special Member, in its capacity as Special Member, shall have no right to vote on, approve or otherwise consent to any action by, or matter relating to, the Company, including, without limitation, a merger, consolidation or conversion of the Company. In order to reflect its agreement to be admitted to the Company as the Special Member, the Springing Member shall execute a counterpart to this Agreement. Before its admission to the Company as the Special Member, the Springing Member shall not be a member of the Company.
If this provision is incorporated, the Springing Member should execute a counterpart signature page to this Agreement and the following definitions should be incorporated herein:
“Special Member” means, upon that person’s admission to the Company as a member of the Company pursuant to Section [__], the Springing Member, in that person’s capacity as a member of the Company. The Special Member shall have only the rights and duties expressly set forth in this Agreement.
“Springing Member” means, initially, [_________], and, thereafter, any successor to the Springing Member, which successor shall be designated by the member to replace the Springing Member.
28. The Delaware LLC Act provides for the winding up of an LLC upon its dissolution setting forth, among other things, who conducts the winding up and certain specified powers of the persons conducting that activity. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-803 (2013). The Delaware LLC Act specifies the priority of the distribution of assets in the winding up of an LLC. Id. § 18-804. Generally, this requires distributions to be made first to creditors, then to members in satisfaction of liabilities for distributions, and thereafter to members first for the return of their contributions and second respecting their limited liability company interests.
29. The Delaware LLC Act provides that a member may not be required to accept an in-kind distribution to the extent that the member’s percentage interest in the asset distributed exceeds the member’s interest in distributions from the LLC. Id. § 18-605. In the case of a single-member LLC, there is no opportunity for disproportionate distributions among the members.
30. Upon the completion of the process of winding up of an LLC (id. § 18-803), a certificate of cancellation of the certificate of formation is to be filed with the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware, whereupon the separate legal existence of the LLC is terminated. Id. 18-203.
31. As noted at supra notes 14, 17, and 26, practitioners preparing single-member LLC agreements and clients using single-member LLCs must take care to avoid veil piercing—a risk to which single-member LLCs may, in some cases, be substantially more susceptible than are multimember LLCs. See 2 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 19:1, at 407 n.1 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing the risk of informality in the operation of single-member LLCs giving rise to a “greater risk of piercing the entity veil”). Note, however, that it is generally recognized to be more difficult to pierce the corporate veil in Delaware than in many other jurisdictions because fraudulent or other similar wrongful conduct is usually required under Delaware law. See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 2.8 (2013); In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 738 F. Supp. 825, 838 (D. Del. 1990). In a veil-piercing claim against the member of a single-member LLC, a plaintiff may claim that because, in practice, the owners of small single-owner businesses (especially those owned by individuals as opposed to entities) often view all of their personal assets as being available to ensure their business success, the court should view all of the assets of the member of a single-member LLC as being at risk in the claim in question. The member of a single-member LLC should carefully segregate its personal assets from those belonging to the LLC. As to the importance of treating the assets of the LLC as distinct from those of the sole member (and vice versa), see Mobil Oil Corp. v. Linear Films, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 260, 268 (D. Del. 1989) (“A subsidiary corporation may be deemed the alter ego of its corporate parent where there is a lack of attention to corporate formalities, such as where the assets of the two entities are commingled, and their operations intertwined. An alter ego relationship might also lie where a corporate parent exercises complete domination and control over its subsidiary.”). In addition, if the LLC agreement specifically lists the amount of the member’s contributions and provides that no contribution shall be deemed to have been made to the LLC and no asset of the member shall be deemed to be at risk for claims against the LLC unless expressly listed as a contribution in the LLC agreement, that may help to counter the above argument by a creditor.
Delaware courts have applied the same standard for piercing the veil in respect of an LLC as they have in the corporate context. See, e.g., U.S. Bank N.A. v. U.S. Timberlands Klamath Falls, L.L.C., C.A. No. 112-N, 2005 WL 2093694 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30, 2005). To state a claim of veil piercing, a party “must plead facts supporting an inference that [a party] created a sham entity designed to defraud investors and creditors.” Id. at *1 (citing Crosse v. BCBSD, Inc., 836 A.2d 492, 497 (Del. 2003)). The inquiry is fact-intensive, and the court would consider several factors, including: “(1) whether the company was adequately capitalized for the undertaking; (2) whether the company was solvent; (3) whether corporate formalities were observed; (4) whether the [member] siphoned company funds; and (5) whether, in general, the company simply functioned as a façade for the [member].” Id. at *1.
32. The practitioner should consider what interest rate is appropriate for a specific transaction. In this regard, using a market-based rate will lend support to the argument that the loan should be treated as such, and not be recharacterized as equity or be subordinated to debts owed to third-party creditors.
33. This formulation is intended to preserve claims by the member, vis-à-vis other creditors of the company, that additional funds provided by the member to the company were actually loans and thereby give the member equivalent rights and claims with respect to its loan as are enjoyed by the company’s other unsecured creditors. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-107 (2013) (providing, inter alia, that a member may lend money to an LLC and, subject to other applicable law, has the same rights and obligations with respect to any such matter as a person who is not a member). Note, however, that those loans possibly may be subject to equitable subordination as well as to veil-piercing attacks. See supra notes 14, 17, 26 & 32.
34. The rule of limited liability exists regardless of whether it is recited in the LLC agreement. The Delaware LLC Act provides:
Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, the debts, obligations and liabilities of a[n] [LLC], whether arising in contract, tort or otherwise, shall be solely the debts, obligations and liabilities of the [LLC], and no member or manager of a[n] [LLC] shall be obligated personally for any such debt, obligation or liability of the [LLC] solely by reason of being a member or acting as a manager of the [LLC].
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-303(a) (2013). A member, as to some or all obligations of the LLC, may agree to be personally obligated. See id. § 18-303(b).
35. On January 1, 1997, the so called “Check-the-Box” classification regulations went into effect. Generally speaking, under those regulations a single-member LLC will be, for purposes of federal income tax classification, a “disregarded entity.” Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2)(i) (as amended in 2014) (“Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph (c), a business entity that has a single owner and is not a corporation under paragraph (b) of this section is disregarded as an entity separate from its owner.”). For federal employment tax purposes (beginning in 2009), and for certain federal excise tax purposes (beginning in 2008), a “disregarded entity” is treated as separate from its owner. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2)(iv) (as amended in 2014) (employment taxes), -2(c)(2)(v) (as amended in 2014) (excise taxes). Under the original “Check-the-Box” regulations, a disregarded entity was disregarded for federal income, employment, and excise tax purposes. But see Notice 99-6, 1999-1 C.B. 321, obsoleted by T.D. 9356, 2007-39 I.R.B. 675 (elective treatment of disregarded entities for employment tax purposes before 2009). As a disregarded entity (sometimes referred to as a “Tax Nothing”), a single-member LLC so classified will not file an income tax return or itself report income, loss, deduction, or credit. Rather, those tax items will be incorporated into the tax return of and reported by the sole member of the single-member LLC. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (as amended in 2014) (“If the entity is disregarded, its activities are treated in the same manner as a sole proprietorship, branch, or division of the owner.”). If that sole member is an individual, those items will be reported on Schedule C (Profit or Loss from Business (Sole Proprietorship)), Schedule C-EZ (Net Profit from Business (Sole Proprietorship)), Schedule E (Supplemental Income and Loss), or Schedule F (Profit or Loss from Farming). A single-member LLC that would otherwise be treated as a disregarded entity may elect to be classified as a corporation. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2006). In most instances that election is made on Form 8832. If the single-member LLC meets the requirements for being taxed as an S corporation it may elect S corporation status on Form 2553. The regulations formerly required the single-member LLC to file both Form 2553 and Form 8832 in order to elect S corporation status, but under the 2005 amendments Form 2553 alone is now required. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(1)(v)(C) (as amended in 2006). A single-member LLC may not be classified as a partnership. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2006). Note that “Check-the-Box” applies only to “eligible entities” (i.e., business entities that are eligible to select a classification under the regulations). The vast majority of single-member LLCs, but not all, are eligible entities. A “corporation” formed under state or federal law is never an eligible entity. Other ineligible entities include insurance companies, banks, government-owned entities, and certain foreign “per se” corporations. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1(a)(3) (as amended in 2011), 301.7701-2(b) (as amended in 2006), 301.7701-3(c)(1)(v) (as amended in 2006). Assuming a single-member LLC formed in the United States is an eligible entity, it has a default classification as a disregarded entity; it is not necessary that it “check a box” or file Form 8832. Protective elections are possible, but are rarely made except for certain foreign entities. For a general review of “Check-the-Box,” see GARY HUFFMAN, WILLIAM MCKEE, WILLIAM NELSON, JAMES WHITMIRE & ROBERT WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS ¶ 3.06 (4th ed. 2007). Note that the number of members under Delaware or other applicable state law is not necessarily the same as the number for federal income tax purposes. For example, the IRS has treated a two-member LLC as a single-member LLC for federal tax purposes. Conversely, the IRS might consider an LLC with only one member, but two or more holders of economic interests, to be a multi-member entity for tax purposes. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-01-024 (Oct. 5, 2001).
Keep in mind that, while for purposes of federal income tax classification a single-member LLC may be a disregarded entity without its own tax identity or obligations, certain states will impose entity-level taxes on it. States imposing an entity-level tax potentially applicable to single-member LLCs include: Alabama (net worth based “business privilege” tax imposed on LLCs, ALA. CODE § 40-14A-22(a) (LexisNexis 2011)); California (entity-level franchise fee and gross receipts-based fee, CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 17941, 17942 (West 2004 and Supp. 2014)); Illinois (1.5% personal property replacement tax based on net income, 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/205(b) (West 2012)); Kentucky (entity-level income tax imposed upon LLCs, LPs, and LLPs; minimum tax of $175 per annum; rates up to 7% of income with alternative minimum tax calculations based upon gross receipts and gross profits also required, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 141.010(24), 141.040(5) (West 2010 and Supp. 2013)); New Hampshire (LLCs doing business in the state are subject to a 5% tax on dividends and interest, an 8.5% business profits tax, and the 0.75% business enterprise tax, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. chs. 77, 77-AQ, 77-E-1 (LexisNexis 2009 and Supp. 2013)); Ohio (8.5% entity-level tax imposed except where all owners give written consent to state tax jurisdictions, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5733.40, 5733.41 (LexisNexis 2014)); Pennsylvania (LLCs except certain professional LLCs subject to .699% capital stock and franchise taxes), 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8925 (West 2013)); Tennessee (excise tax of 6.5% of net earnings and franchise tax of $0.25 per $100 of net worth applied to LLCs, LLPs, and LPs, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-4-2105(a), 67-4-2106(a) (2013)); Texas (LLCs, as well as LPs, LLPs, and LLLPs, are subject to entity-level franchise tax, TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0002 (West 2008 and Supp. 2013)); Washington (all entities subject to business and occupations tax, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 25.05.500–25.05.570, 25.15.005–25.15.902 (West, Westlaw current with 2014 Legislation effective before June 12, 2014)). A state also may treat a single-member LLC as a separate entity for sales and use tax purposes, even if for income tax purposes the state follows the federal classification of the single-member LLC as a disregarded entity. See generally Bruce P. Ely, Christopher R. Grissom & William T. Thistle, State Tax Treatment of LLCs and LLPs—An Update, 56 ST. TAX NOTES 509 (May 17, 2010); see also JAMIE FENWICK, MICHAEL MCLOUGHLIN, SCOTT SALMON, PATRICK SMITH, ARTHUR TILLEY & BRIAN WOOD; STATE TAXATION OF PASS-THROUGH ENTITIES AND THEIR OWNERS app. tbl. 9 (2010) (INCOME AND FRANCHISE TAXES IMPOSED ON SINGLE-MEMBER LLCS).
While a single-member LLC may have employees, for purposes of federal employment taxation the sole member was treated under the original “Check-the-Box” regulations as the employer with responsibility for the collection and remission of those levies. See Med. Practice Solutions, LLC v. CIR, 132 T.C. 125 (2009), aff ’d sub nom. Britton v. Shulman, No. 09-1994, 2010 WL 3565790 (1st Cir. Aug. 24, 2010); Littriello v. United States, 484 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007); McNamee v. United States, 488 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2007); Kandi v. United States, No. C05-0840C, 2006 WL 83463 (W.D. Wa. 2006); Notice 99-6, 1991-1 C.B. 321, obsoleted by T.D. 9356, 2007-39 I.R.B. 675 (Aug. 15, 2007); see also Thomas E. Rutledge & Scott E. Ludwig, The Sixth Circuit Affirms Littriello: “Check-the-Box” Classification Regulations Are Upheld, J. TAX’N, June 2007, at 325; Thomas E. Rutledge & Scott E. Ludwig, Second Circuit Affirms McNamee: Validity of Check-the-Box Regulations Again Confirmed, J. TAX’N, July 2007, at 32; Thomas E. Rutledge, The Dispute Over Check-the-Box, SMLLCs and Liability for Employment Taxes, J. PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES, July/Aug. 2007, at 19. However, effective January 1, 2009, the single-member LLC is treated as the “employer,” and the liability of the sole member for any failure to collect and remit employment taxes is determined under Code section 6672. T.D. 9356, 2007-39 I.R.B. 675 (Aug. 15, 2007).
The IRS in Rev. Rul. 1999-5, 1999-1 C.B. 434 held that an LLC which, for federal tax purposes, is disregarded as an entity separate from its owner is converted to a partnership when a second member purchases an interest in that LLC. Cf. Rev. Rul. 1999-6, 1999-1 C.B. 432 (tax consequences when multi-member LLC becomes single-member LLC).
36. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-601 (2013). Section 18-607(a) of the Delaware LLC Act provides that:
[an LLC] shall not make a distribution to a member to the extent that at the time of the distribution, after giving effect to the distribution, all liabilities of the [LLC], other than liabilities to members on account of their limited liability company interests and liabilities for which the recourse of creditors is limited to specified property of the [LLC], exceed the fair value of the assets of the [LLC], except that the fair value of property that is subject to a liability for which the recourse of creditors is limited shall be included in the assets of the [LLC] only to the extent that the fair value of that property exceeds that liability. For purposes of this subsection (a), the term “distribution” shall not include amounts constituting reasonable compensation for present or past services or reasonable payments made in the ordinary course of business pursuant to a bona fide retirement plan or other benefits program.
Id. § 18-607(a). Section 18-607 applies to all distributions other than those made upon the winding up of an LLC, which are governed by section 18-804. Note that while Section 11(i) of this Agreement is by its terms limited to the Delaware LLC Act, other limitations of Delaware law, such as the Delaware Fraudulent Transfer Act, and comparable laws of other jurisdictions, may also apply.
37. The default rule under the Delaware LLC Act is that, upon resignation, a resigning member is entitled to any distribution provided under the LLC agreement and, if the LLC agreement does not so provide, then a resigning member is entitled to receive, within a reasonable time after resignation, the fair value of the member’s limited liability company interest as of the date of resignation based upon that member’s right to share in distributions from the LLC. Id. § 18-604. Section 11(ii) of this Agreement negates the effect of section 18-604 of the Delaware LLC Act. It does so in connection with a voluntary assignment because, as noted at supra note 40, it is assumed that consideration will be payable by the assignee to the assignor. In addition, it does so with all other resignations based on the assumption that upon the resignation of the member for any reason other than an assignment it may be in the best interest of the member and the company to preserve the value of the company by keeping all assets within the company and having the member’s personal representative continue the company pursuant to Section 7 of this Agreement. However, in all cases the rule is subject to a contrary determination by the member, thus providing the maximum flexibility.
38. As a general matter, this form takes a permissive approach to transfers and assignments of limited liability company interests by permitting all transfers and assignments. However, because this form is designed to be a single-member form where the company is disregarded for federal income tax purposes and because certain transfers and assignments can result in there being more than one member or one or more members and one or more economic interest holders, there are circumstances relating to certain transfers, as noted in the accompanying text and footnotes, where this agreement should be amended. As also noted, however, it is thought preferable that purported transfers be permitted than that those transfers be rendered void even if conforming amendments are not made. In this regard, it should also be noted that “limited liability company interest” is a defined term in the Delaware LLC Act as “a member’s share of the profits and losses of [an LLC] and a member’s right to receive distributions of the [LLC’s] assets.” Id. § 18-101(8). Thus, as a general matter, a transfer of a limited liability company interest does not necessarily result in the transferee’s being admitted as a member with respect to the interest transferred, and this form takes the position that certain transfers will result in admission of the transferee while others will not. See, e.g., Achaian, Inc. v. Leemon Family LLC, 25 A.3d 800, 804−05 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“[I]t is clear that the default rule under the [Delaware LLC] Act is that an assignment of an LLC interest, by itself, does not entitle the assignee to become a member of the LLC; rather, an assignee only receives the assigning member’s economic interest in the LLC to the extent assigned.”).
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-702(b) (2013). Although LLC agreements will often have a requirement that they be executed by any successor member, that formality, if not complied with upon a full assignment, may give rise to an unintended dissolution of the LLC if the successor is not admitted due to an inadvertent failure to sign the LLC agreement. Section 12 provides that in connection with a voluntary assignment of all of the member’s interest the assignee will automatically be admitted as the successor member. The triggering event is the effectiveness of the assignment under applicable law. Thus, if a purported assignment was not accepted, the assignment would not become effective so the assignee will never become the successor member. Since it is assumed that in connection with a voluntary assignment, any consideration will be payable by the assignee to the assignor, Section 11 of this Agreement provides that, unless otherwise determined by the member, the assignor member will not be entitled to a resigning distribution in connection with a voluntary assignment, which would otherwise be the case under section 18-604 of the Delaware LLC Act as described at supra note 38.
40. Sections 12 and 14 contemplate that in connection with a partial transfer or assignment by the member of its limited liability company interest (other than in connection with a pledge or collateral assignment (see infra note 43)), the transferee or assignee of the interest will not be admitted as a member unless this Agreement is amended to reflect the changes necessary if there is more than one member, including the relative rights and duties of the members and the fact that the company would no longer be disregarded as an entity separate from its owner for federal income tax purposes (see supra note 36). However, it is important to note that this form does not take the approach of voiding any transfer that would cause there to be one or more economic interest holding assignees in addition to the member even though under those circumstances the company would no longer be disregarded as an entity separate from its owner for federal income tax purposes and certain of the provisions, such as the distribution provision, would no longer work as drafted. The distribution provision would presumably be interpreted to provide that distributions would be made to the member and to the economic interest holding assignees in proportion to their relative limited liability company interests. See Achaian, 25 A.3d at 806 (court and parties agreed that LLC agreement that referred to single member needed to be read to apply to multiple members once additional members were admitted even though LLC agreement was not amended). It is, of course, preferable that in connection with any partial transfer, appropriate amendments be made to this Agreement to reflect the new tax treatment of the company, the changes with respect to the payment of distributions, and other matters that will or may be affected by the transfer. Nonetheless, this form takes the approach that it is better to permit those transfers with their attendant consequences than to provide that they are null and void. There may be transactions, however, where an inadvertent or other transfer that causes the company not to be disregarded as an entity separate from its owner for federal income tax purposes are so severe that the practitioner should consider including a provision that any such transfer would be void ab initio, at least if it is not done with the specific intention that the company would have a different tax status for federal income tax purposes. Under Delaware law, a contractual term that prohibits transfers will be enforceable and a prohibited transfer may be invalidated. See In re Conaway, C.A. No. 6056-VCG, 2012 WL 524190 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2012) (finding valid a limited partnership agreement’s restraint on alienation and invalidating a purported transfer in violation of the agreement).
41. In most cases, interests in an LLC are general intangibles and payment intangibles governed by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”). To facilitate a pledge of the interests in an LLC in connection with a financing, it may be desirable to opt into coverage of Revised Article 8 of the UCC. See generally Lynn A. Soukup, LLC and Partnership Interests as Collateral—The Alchemy of “Opting in” to Article 8, in SECURED TRANSACTIONS 2010: WHAT LAWYERS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT UCC ARTICLE 9, at 431 (PLI Com. L. & Practice, Course Handbook Series, 2010), available at 920 PLI/ Comm 431 (Westlaw); see also Robert R. Keatinge, Taking and Enforcing Security Interests in Unincorporated Businesses, in LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITIES IN TIMES OF CHANGE (ALI-ABA Mar. 12, 2002), available at VPC0312 ALI-ABA 245 (Westlaw); Robert R. Keatinge, Interests in Unincorporated Associations as Securities Under Article 8 of the UCC, in LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITIES IN TIMES OF CHANGE (ALI-ABA Mar. 12, 2002), available at WPC0312 ALI-ABA 361 (Westlaw). In that case, the LLC agreement (and the certificate representing the limited liability company interest in the case of a certificated interest) must expressly provide that the interests in the LLC will constitute securities for purposes of Article 8 of the UCC. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 8-103(c) (2013).
42. In connection with the pledge of the interests in an LLC, the practitioner should consider whether a lender foreclosing on the pledge has the right to become a substitute or additional member of the LLC or will simply be an assignee of a limited liability company interest. If the foreclosing lender is only an assignee, it will generally have no right to cause the LLC to make distributions or take other actions that may benefit its position. On the other hand, when a lender forecloses on a limited liability company interest and becomes the member of the LLC, it may assume liability, as the owner and operator of the LLC for the LLC’s activities—past and present. The practitioner should note that Section 12 of this Agreement provides that a pledgee or collateral assignee shall have the rights provided for in the agreement controlling the pledge or collateral assignment (and as provided by other applicable law), so that if pursuant to that agreement the pledgee or collateral assignee has the right to become a member, it will be able to do so under this Agreement, but if under the applicable security agreement, it does not have the right to become a member, Section 12 of this Agreement does not otherwise provide it with that right. It should also be noted that in connection with a pledge or collateral assignment by the member of part of its limited liability company interest, if the applicable security agreement governing the pledge or collateral assignment provides that the pledgee or collateral assignee can become a member, the situation may arise where there are two members of the LLC or one member of the LLC and one economic interest holding assignee under this Agreement. That situation should be addressed in the applicable security agreement, possibly by including a form of amendment to this Agreement that would apply in the event of foreclosure. Even where that is not the case, this Agreement gives effect to the transfer and admission provisions of the applicable security agreement, based on the view that it is better to have the provisions of this Agreement be consistent with the rights accorded by the member to any pledgee or collateral assignee rather than to have them inconsistent. This form assumes that when a security interest is granted in a limited liability company interest under applicable law, including the UCC, the holder of the security interest could cause the foreclosure and sale of the limited liability company interest subject thereto with the result that the purchaser, although not a member and not generally having the rights of a member, would have the right to receive any distributions that are payable in respect of the interest foreclosed upon and purchased. As noted at supra note 40, it is preferable that in connection with any partial transfer that could have this result, appropriate amendments be made to the LLC agreement to reflect the changes that will take effect. However, as with a voluntary transfer under Section 12, it is thought better to permit those transfers than to provide that they are null and void. In the event of a pledge or collateral assignment by the member of its entire LLC interest, the foreclosure on the pledge may result in the member’s ceasing to be a member of the LLC, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-702(b)(3) (2013), which could have the result of causing the dissolution of the LLC. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
43. Pursuant to the Delaware LLC Act, a member may resign from an LLC only at the time or upon the happening of the events specified in the LLC agreement, and, unless otherwise provided in the LLC agreement, a member may not resign from an LLC before the dissolution and winding up of the LLC. Id. § 18-603. Thus, Section 13 provides that the member may resign from the LLC at such time as it shall determine.
Also note that Section 11(ii) of this Agreement (together with the text at supra note 38) has been drafted to avoid the distribution requirement of section 18-604 upon the resignation of the member in the event of a voluntary assignment in full of its limited liability company interest.
44. The Delaware LLC Act provides a number of events that will cause a person to cease to be a member of an LLC unless they are modified in the LLC agreement or waived with the consent of all members. Id. § 18-304. Those events are a member’s making an assignment for the benefit of creditors, filing a voluntary petition for bankruptcy, being adjudged bankrupt or insolvent or having entered against that member an order for relief in a bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding, the filing of a petition or answer seeking the reorganization, arrangement, composition, readjustment, liquidation, dissolution, or similar relief for the member or the admission, or failure to contest a petition filed against the member in a proceeding of similar nature. Id. § 18-304(1). The last sentence of Section 13 is included to override the deemed cessation of membership of the member if the member files for bankruptcy or is otherwise involved in a specified bankruptcy event. Id. § 18-304.
45. The Delaware LLC Act, as a default rule, requires the consent of all incumbent members to the admission of a new member as a member. Id. §§ 18-301(b)(1), 18-702(a). This threshold may be modified in the LLC agreement.
46. The exculpation and indemnification provisions in Section 15 provide for broad exculpation and broad mandatory indemnification for the member irrespective of the capacity in which it is acting. These provisions also provide for exculpation and mandatory indemnification of the manager and the other identified “Covered Persons,” though those protections are not as broad as the coverage for the member. The practitioner should carefully consider the standards for exculpation and indemnification for the member as well as for all other “Covered Persons” and whether that indemnification should be mandatory or at the discretion of the member or the manager. In addition, in a single-member LLC that is being used as a subsidiary, the practitioner should consider conforming those provisions to the standard provisions employed by the member of the LLC with respect to its other subsidiaries. Pursuant to section 18-1101(e) of the Delaware LLC Act, liabilities for breach of contract and breach of duties (including fiduciary duties) to an LLC or to another member or manager or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by an LLC agreement may be limited or eliminated, except that the LLC agreement may not limit or eliminate liability for a bad-faith violation of the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
47. The Delaware LLC Act specifically authorizes a member, manager, or liquidating trustee to rely, in good faith, upon certain records and information including for purposes of making distributions to members and creditors. See id. § 18-406.
48. See id. § 18-1101(c) (duties (including fiduciary duties) to an LLC or to another member or manager or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by an LLC agreement may be expanded, restricted, or eliminated by that LLC agreement, except that the LLC agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing); see also id. § 18-1104 (“In any case not provided for in this chapter, the rules of law and equity, including the rules of law and equity relating to fiduciary duties and the law merchant, shall govern.”). If an LLC agreement is completely silent regarding fiduciary duties, the Delaware LLC Act expressly incorporates Delaware’s rules of law and equity relating to default fiduciary duties of loyalty and care. See id. § 18-1104.
49. The Delaware LLC Act specifically authorizes an LLC to indemnify and hold harmless any member, manager, or any person from any claim or demand. Id. § 18-108. To indemnify a person for his or her own negligence, Delaware case law in the corporate context requires that intention to be specifically stated, and indemnification for willful misconduct is prohibited. See Warburton v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 321 A.2d 345, 346–47 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974); State v. Interstate Amiesite Corp., 297 A.2d 41, 44 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972); James v. Getty Oil Co. (E. Operations), Inc., 472 A.2d 33, 38 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983).
50. This form provides for mandatory advancement. The drafter should consider whether mandatory advancement with respect to the member or other “Covered Persons” is appropriate in particular circumstances, keeping in mind that if advancement is discretionary, a decision to advance expenses could be viewed as an interested transaction that could be subject to higher judicial scrutiny. The drafter also should note that the treatment may differ between the member and other “Covered Persons.”
51. Note that this provision, which permits competition between the member and the LLC, constitutes a modification of default fiduciary duties under Delaware law. See Kahn v. Icahn, C.A. No. 15916, 1998 WL 832629 (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 1998). Also note that the manager and officers were not included in this section. Adding the manager and/or the officers to this provision may be appropriate under particular circumstances.
52. Although under Delaware law written agreements may be amended or modified by a course of dealing notwithstanding a provision that authorizes amendment only by written instrument, see, e.g., Council of Unitholders of Breakwater House Condo. v. Simpler, Civ. A. No. 89C-09-007, 1993 WL 81285, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. 1993); Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Asbury Park v. Pepsico, Inc., 297 A.2d 28, 33 (Del. 1972), the better practice is to provide for written amendments so that the exact terms of the current LLC agreement are always readily accessible to the member, the manager, and to any third parties to whom it has been provided.
53. An LLC agreement as a contract of the member or members of the LLC does not necessarily terminate upon the termination of the LLC. Thus, termination of the LLC agreement is a topic that should be specifically addressed in the LLC agreement and this should include specifying when the LLC agreement terminates and what, if any, provisions survive the general termination, e.g., indemnity provisions.
55. Although section 18-101(7) of the Delaware LLC Act provides that a manager is bound by the LLC agreement whether or not the manager executes the LLC agreement, in order to put a manager on notice that he or she is in fact bound by the terms of the LLC agreement, some practitioners include a joinder clause whereby the manager executes the LLC agreement, as provided above.
56. Because an LLC may have obligations to perform under its LLC agreement, some practitioners will make the LLC a party to its LLC agreement or will provide for a form of joinder, as provided above. The Delaware Supreme Court, in Elf Atochem North America, Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286 (Del. 1999), held that even though an LLC had not executed its LLC agreement, the LLC was nevertheless bound by an arbitration and forum selection clause in the LLC agreement. The court recognized that the LLC had not signed the LLC agreement. However, it stated that the members were the real parties in interest and that the LLC was simply their joint business vehicle and, therefore, it would enforce the clause against the LLC. In 2002, the Delaware LLC Act was amended to make express that the LLC is bound by the LLC agreement. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (2013). It should be noted that other jurisdictions have reached a contrary result in cases that also considered the enforceability of an arbitration clause against an LLC that was not a party to its LLC agreement. See, e.g., Mission Residential, LLC v. Triple Net Props., LLC, 564 S.E.2d 888 (Va. 2008) (applying Virginia law; note, however, that this decision was overturned by an amendment to the Virginia Limited Liability Company Act); Trover v. 419 OCR, Inc., 921 N.E.2d 1249 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (relying on separate legal existence of LLC under Illinois law and distinguishing Elf Atochem in holding that LLCs were not bound by arbitration clauses in operating agreements that did not specify LLCs were parties and did not include LLCs as signatories); In re Am. Media Distribs., LLC, 216 B.R. 486, 487 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (LLC is not a party and therefore cannot assume operating agreement); Bubbles & Bleach, LLC v. Becker, No. 97C 1320, 1997 WL 285938 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (applying Wisconsin law).
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AGREEMENT OF _____________________, LLC
THIS LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AGREEMENT1 (this “Agreement”) by the undersigned sole member (the “Member”) of ________________________, LLC,2 a Delaware limited liability company (the “Company”), is effective as of the date of formation of the Company.
The Member is executing this Agreement for the purpose of forming a limited liability company pursuant to and in accordance with the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101 et seq.), as amended from time to time3 (the “Delaware LLC Act”), and hereby agrees as follows4:
1. FORMATION
(i) The Company was formed on ____________ ___, ______5 by _________________ (the “Organizer”), acting in the capacity of an “authorized person”6 under section 18-201 of the Delaware LLC Act, executing the initial certificate of formation of the Company and filing it with the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware. The Member hereby acknowledges his or her authorization and approval of the Organizer’s taking, and otherwise ratifies, that action to form the Company under the Delaware LLC Act. 7
(ii) Each of the Member and ____________________8 is hereby designated as an authorized person, within the meaning of the Delaware LLC Act and otherwise, to execute, deliver and file any amendments and/or restatements to the certificate of formation of the Company and any other certificates (and any amendments and/or restatements thereof ) necessary for the Company to qualify to do business in a jurisdiction in which the Company may wish to conduct business.
2. PURPOSE
The Company is formed for the object and purpose of, and the nature of the business to be conducted and promoted by the Company is, to engage in any lawful act or activity for which a limited liability company may be formed under the Delaware LLC Act.9
(i) The Company shall have the power and authority to take any and all actions necessary, appropriate, advisable, convenient or incidental to or for the furtherance of the purpose set forth in Section 2.
(ii) All real and personal property of the Company shall be owned by the Company as an entity. The Member shall not have any interest in any specific property of the Company. The interest of the Member in the Company is personal property.11
4. MEMBER
The following information with respect to the Member is to be provided on Schedule 1 and will be accurate as of the date hereof (except to the extent updated as provided below):
(i) the name and address of the Member; and
(ii) the capital contribution of the Member to the Company.12
The Member may, but shall not be required to, update the information on Schedule 1 from time to time to reflect any changes in that information.
(i) The Member shall manage the Company in accordance with this Agreement. The Member is an agent of the Company, and the actions of the Member taken in that capacity and in accordance with this Agreement shall bind the Company.
(ii) The Member shall have full, exclusive and complete discretion to manage and control the business and affairs of the Company, to make all decisions affecting the business and affairs of the Company and to take all actions as he or she deems necessary or appropriate to accomplish the purpose of the Company as set forth herein and shall have all powers and authority necessary or desirable in connection with the foregoing, including the power and authority to execute all documents or instruments, perform all duties and powers and do all things for and on behalf of the Company in all matters necessary, desirable, convenient or incidental to the purpose of the Company.14
(iii) The Member may delegate to other persons or entities, including to officers of the Company appointed by the Member, so much of the Member’s responsibilities hereunder and authority to act on behalf of the Company as the Member determines in his or her sole discretion to be necessary, appropriate or convenient for the efficient administration and management of the Company’s business and affairs. Any person or entity may have titles the Member may elect, including the titles of President, Vice President, Treasurer, Secretary and Assistant Secretary, and the power and authority to act on behalf of the Company as the Member may delegate in writing to any such person or entity.15 The salaries or other compensation, if any, of the officers and agents, if any, of the Company shall be fixed from time to time by the Member. Except as otherwise provided by the Member, when the taking of action has been authorized by the Member, the Member or any officer, if any, of the Company, or any other person specifically authorized by the Member, may execute any contract or other agreement or document on behalf of the Company.
(iv) The Member may appoint, employ, or otherwise contract with other persons or entities for the transaction of the business of the Company or the performance of services for or on behalf of the Company as he or she shall determine in his or her sole discretion.
(v) Except as otherwise expressly delegated by the Member or to the extent that the Company’s registered agent has the authority to accept legal process or otherwise act on behalf of the Company as provided in the Delaware LLC Act, no person or entity other than the Member shall be an agent of the Company or have any right, power or authority to transact any business in the name of the Company or to act for or on behalf of or to bind the Company.
(vi) The expression of any power or authority of the Member in this Agreement shall not in any way limit or exclude any other power or authority of the Member that is not expressly set forth in this Agreement.16
(vii) The Member shall not be required to perform services for the Company solely by virtue of being a member of the Company. However, in consideration of the Member’s managing the affairs of the Company, the Company shall pay to the Member a salary in the amount of _________ per year payable in equal monthly installments. The Company may modify this Section 5.1(vii) to change amounts to be paid to the Member; however, no modification shall be made retroactively. Payments made pursuant to this Section 5.1(vii) shall not constitute distributions to the Member for purposes of the Delaware LLC Act.17
5.2 RELIANCE BY THIRD PARTIES
The Member or any officer of the Company may certify and authenticate records of the Company to third parties and any third party dealing with the Company, the Member or any officer of the Company may rely upon a certificate signed by the Member or any officer of the Company as to:
(i) the identity of the Member or any officer of the Company;
(ii) the existence or non-existence of any fact or facts that constitute a condition precedent to acts by the Member or any officer of the Company or are in any other manner germane to the affairs of the Company;
(iii) the persons who or entities that are authorized to execute and deliver any instrument or document of or on behalf of the Company; or
(iv) any act or failure to act by the Company or as to any other matter whatsoever involving the Company, the Member or any officer of the Company.
5.3 RECORDS AND INFORMATION
The Member shall maintain all of the books and records of the Company referenced in section 18-305 of the Delaware LLC Act, to the extent applicable to the Company, except to the extent that any books and records are maintained by an officer of the Company in accordance with Section 5.1(iii).18
6. TERM; DISSOLUTION
(i) The term of the Company shall be perpetual unless the Company is dissolved and terminated in accordance with this Section 6.19
(ii) The Company shall dissolve, and its affairs shall be wound up, upon the first to occur of the following: (a) the written consent of the Member; (b) the occurrence of any event that terminates the continued membership of the Member in the Company unless the Company is continued without dissolution in accordance with Section 6(iii) below; or (c) the entry of a decree of judicial dissolution under section 18-802 of the Delaware LLC Act.
(iii) Upon the occurrence of any event that terminates the continued membership of the Member in the Company, the Company shall not dissolve if the personal representative (as defined in the Delaware LLC Act) of the Member agrees in writing within [90] days following the occurrence of the event that terminated the continued membership of the Member in the Company to continue the Company and to the admission of the personal representative of the Member or his or her nominee or his or her designee to the Company as a Member, effective as of the occurrence of the event that terminated the continued membership of the Member in the Company.20
(iv) Upon the dissolution of the Company, the Member shall wind up the Company’s affairs as provided in the Delaware LLC Act.21 Upon the winding up of the Company’s affairs, the Member shall distribute the property of the Company as follows:
(a) First, to creditors, including the Member if he or she is a creditor, to the extent permitted by law, in satisfaction of the Company’s liabilities (whether by payment or the making of reasonable provision for payment thereof ); and
(b) Second, to the Member in cash or property, or partly in cash and partly in property, as determined by the Member.22
(v) Upon the completion of the winding up of the Company, the Member shall file a certificate of cancellation with the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware canceling the Company’s certificate of formation at which time the Company shall terminate.23
7. ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS; MEMBER LOANS
(i) The Member may, but is not required to, make additional capital contributions to the Company.24
(ii) The Member may, but is not required to, make loans to the Company. If and to the extent that loans are made by the Member to the Company, those loans shall be on terms determined by the Member to be commercially reasonable. In the absence of any separate determination made by the Member, all loans made by the Member to the Company shall be payable upon demand and shall bear interest at __% per year.25
(iii) To the extent that additional funds are made available by the Member to the Company, those funds shall be treated as loans made by the Member to the Company, and not as additional capital contributions made by the Member to the Company, unless specifically designated as additional capital contributions made by the Member to the Company.26
8. LIABILITY OF MEMBER
The Member shall not have any liability for the obligations or liabilities of the Company except to the extent provided in the Delaware LLC Act.27
9. TAX STATUS
At all times that the Company has only one member (who owns 100% of the limited liability company interests in the Company), it is the intention of the Member that the Company be disregarded as an entity separate and apart from the Member for federal, and, to the extent applicable, state, local and foreign income tax purposes and be treated as a sole proprietorship of the Member.28
10. DISTRIBUTIONS
(i) Distributions shall be made to the Member at the times and in the amounts determined by the Member, except that no distribution shall be made in violation of the Delaware LLC Act.29
(ii) Unless otherwise determined by the Member, no distribution shall be paid to the Member upon his or her resignation in connection with the voluntary assignment of his or her entire interest pursuant to Section 11. Unless otherwise determined by the Member, no distribution will be paid to the Member upon the occurrence of an event that causes the Member to cease to be a member of the Company if the Company is continued without dissolution in accordance with Section 6.30
11. ASSIGNMENTS
(i) The Member may transfer or assign (including as a pledge or other collateral assignment) in whole or in part his or her limited liability company interest.31
(ii) In connection with a voluntary transfer or assignment by the Member of his or her entire limited liability company interest in the Company (not including a pledge or collateral assignment or any transfer as a result thereof ):
(a) the Member will cease to be a member of the Company;
(b) the assignee will automatically and simultaneously be admitted as the successor Member without any further action at the time the voluntary transfer or assignment becomes effective under applicable law; and
(c) the Company shall be continued without dissolution.32
(iii) In connection with a partial assignment or transfer by the Member of his or her limited liability company interest (not including a pledge or collateral assignment or any transfer as a result thereof ), unless this Agreement is amended to reflect the fact that the Company will have more than one member, the assignee or transferee shall not be admitted as a member of the Company and shall not have any rights as a member other than the right to receive any distributions that are payable in respect of the interest transferred. 33
(iv) Upon any pledge or other collateral assignment by the Member of all or any part of his or her limited liability company interest,34 the pledgee or collateral assignee shall have only those rights expressly stated in the controlling pledge or assignment agreement (including any right in connection with the foreclosure of the pledge or collateral assignment of the purchaser of the limited liability company interest to become a member of the Company) or are provided by other applicable law. If the pledgee or collateral assignee of all or any part of the Member’s limited liability company interest has the right under the controlling pledge or assignment agreement or under other applicable law to purchase the interest in foreclosure (or to cause or permit another person to purchase the interest in foreclosure), except as expressly stated in the controlling pledge or assignment agreement, the purchaser shall not be admitted as a member of the Company and shall not have any rights as a member other than the right to receive any distributions that are payable in respect of the interest foreclosed upon and purchased. 35
12. RESIGNATION
The Member may resign from the Company at such time as he or she shall determine.36 Neither the filing of a voluntary petition in bankruptcy nor any other event specified in section 18-304 of the Delaware LLC Act will cause the Member to cease to be a member of the Company.37
13. ADMISSION OF ADDITIONAL MEMBERS
One or more additional members of the Company may be admitted to the Company with the written consent of the Member.38 In connection with the admission of any additional member of the Company (including an admission in connection with a partial assignment or transfer pursuant to Section 11(iii), but excluding an admission provided for in any pledge or collateral assignment agreement pursuant to Section 11(iv)), this Agreement shall be amended by the Member to make those changes he or she determines to reflect the fact that the Company will have more than one member, but the failure to so amend this Agreement shall not invalidate any otherwise valid assignment or transfer made by the Member.
(i) For purposes of this Agreement, “Covered Persons” means the Member, any Affiliate of the Member and any officer, director, shareholder, partner or employee of the Affiliates of the Member, and any officer, employee or expressly authorized agent of the Company or its Affiliates.
(ii) The Member, whether acting in his or her capacity as Member, or in any other capacity, shall not be liable to the Company for any loss, damage or claim incurred by reason of any act or omission (whether or not constituting negligence or gross negligence) performed or omitted by the Member in good faith, and no other Covered Person shall be liable to the Company or the Member for any loss, damage or claim incurred by reason of any act or omission (whether or not constituting negligence) performed or omitted by the Covered Person in good faith and in a manner reasonably believed to be within the scope of authority conferred on the Covered Person by this Agreement, except that a Covered Person (other than the Member, irrespective of the capacity in which he or she acts) shall be liable for any loss, damage or claim incurred by reason of the Covered Person’s gross negligence and a Covered Person (including the Member) shall be liable for any loss, damage or claim incurred by reason of the Covered Person’s willful misconduct.
(iii) A Covered Person shall be fully protected in relying in good faith upon the records of the Company and upon the information, opinions, reports or statements presented to the Company by any person or entity as to matters the Covered Person reasonably believes are within the professional or expert competence of that person or entity, including information, opinions, reports or statements as to the value and amount of the assets, liabilities, profits, losses or any other facts pertinent to the existence and amount of assets from which distributions to the Member might properly be paid.40 The foregoing provision shall in no way be deemed to reduce the limitation on liability of the Member provided in Clause (ii) of this Section 14.1.
14.2 DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF COVERED PERSONS
(i) To the extent that, at law or in equity, a Covered Person has duties (including fiduciary duties) and liabilities relating thereto to the Company or to the Member, a Covered Person acting under this Agreement shall not be liable to the Company or to the Member for its good faith reliance on the provisions of this Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement, to the extent that they restrict or eliminate the duties and liabilities of a Covered Person otherwise existing at law or in equity, are agreed by the Member to replace any other duties and liabilities of the Covered Person.41
(ii) All provisions of this Section 14 shall apply to any former Member of the Company for all actions or omissions taken while that person was the Member of the Company to the same extent as if that person were still the Member of the Company.
14.3 INDEMNIFICATION
To the fullest extent permitted by applicable law, the Member (irrespective of the capacity in which he or she acts) shall be entitled to indemnification from the Company for any loss, damage or claim incurred by the Member by reason of any act or omission (whether or not constituting negligence or gross negligence)42 performed or omitted, and any other Covered Person shall be entitled to indemnification from the Company for any loss, damage or claim incurred by that Covered Person by reason of any act or omission (whether or not constituting negligence) performed or omitted by that Covered Person in good faith and in a manner reasonably believed to be within the scope of authority conferred on that Covered Person by this Agreement, except that no Covered Person (other than the Member, irrespective of the capacity in which he or she acts) shall be entitled to be indemnified in respect of any loss, damage or claim incurred by that Covered Person by reason of gross negligence and no Covered Person (including the Member) shall be entitled to be indemnified in respect of any loss, damage or claims incurred by that Covered Person by reason of willful misconduct with respect to those acts or omissions; provided, however, that any indemnity under this Section 14 shall be provided out of and to the extent of Company assets only, and no Covered Person shall have any personal liability on account thereof.
14.4 EXPENSES
To the fullest extent permitted by applicable law, expenses (including legal fees) incurred by a Covered Person in defending any claim, demand, action, suit or proceeding shall, from time to time, be advanced by the Company before the final disposition of the claim, demand, action, suit or proceeding upon receipt by the Company of an undertaking by or on behalf of the Covered Person to repay that amount if it shall be determined that the Covered Person is not entitled to be indemnified under this Section 14.43
14.5 INDEMNITY CONTRACTS
The Member and the Company may enter into indemnity contracts with any Covered Person and adopt written procedures pursuant to which arrangements are made for the advancement of expenses and the funding of obligations under this Section 14 and containing other procedures regarding indemnification as are appropriate.
14.6 INSURANCE
The Company may purchase and maintain insurance, to the extent and in amounts the Member shall, in his or her sole discretion, deem reasonable, on behalf of Covered Persons and other persons or entities as the Member shall determine, against any liability that may be asserted against or expenses that may be incurred by that person or entity in connection with the activities of the Company, regardless of whether the Company would have the power to indemnify that person or entity against that liability under this Agreement.
15. OUTSIDE BUSINESS
The Member or any Affiliate thereof may engage in or possess an interest in any business venture of any nature or description, independently or with others, similar or dissimilar to the business of the Company, and the Company and the Member shall have no rights by virtue of this Agreement in and to independent ventures or the income or profits derived therefrom, and the pursuit of any venture, even if competitive with the business of the Company, shall not be deemed wrongful or improper. The Member or any Affiliate thereof shall not be obligated to disclose or present any particular opportunity to the Company even if that opportunity is of a character that, if disclosed or presented to the Company, could be taken by the Company, and the Member or Affiliate thereof shall have the right to take for its own account (individually or as a partner, shareholder, fiduciary or otherwise) or to recommend to others any particular opportunity.44
16. AMENDMENT
This Agreement may be amended or modified only by a written instrument signed by the Member.45
17. GOVERNING LAW
This Agreement shall be governed by, and construed under, the laws of the State of Delaware, without regard to the rules of conflict of laws thereof or of any other jurisdiction that would call for the application of the substantive laws of a jurisdiction other than the State of Delaware.
18. TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT
This Agreement shall terminate and be of no further force or effect upon the filing of a certificate of cancellation cancelling the Company’s certificate of formation pursuant to Section 6(v) of this Agreement; but Sections 14.1, 14.2, 14.3 and 14.4 shall survive termination.46
19. EFFECTIVE DATE
Pursuant to section 18-201(d) of the Delaware LLC Act, this Agreement shall be effective as of the effective time of the filing of the Company’s certificate of formation [or specify another date subsequent to the effective time of the filing of the Company’s certificate of formation upon which this Agreement will be effective].47
20. NO THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES
Except as contemplated by Section 14, nothing in this Agreement, express or implied, is intended to confer upon any person or entity, other than the parties hereto and their respective successors, any benefits, rights or remedies.
21. MISCELLANEOUS
Throughout this Agreement, nouns, pronouns and verbs shall be construed as masculine, feminine, neuter, singular or plural, whichever shall be applicable. All references to “Sections” and “Clauses” shall refer to corresponding provisions of this Agreement. The use of the term “including” or any similar term shall be deemed to mean “including, without limitation.” Any reference in this Agreement to any law, rule or regulation shall be construed as reference to the law, rule or regulation as it may have been, or may from time to time be, amended, revised or reenacted and any successor thereto. The headings of sections in this Agreement are intended for reference purposes only and shall be given no substantive meaning or any interpretive force.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has duly executed this Limited Liability Company Agreement as of the day and year first aforesaid.
[MEMBER]
_______________________________
Name:
The Company hereby executes this Agreement for the purposes of becoming a party hereto and agreeing to perform its obligations and duties hereunder and being entitled to enjoy its rights and benefits hereunder.48
[THE COMPANY]
By: ____________________________
Name:
Title:
Schedule 1
Name
Mailing Address
Agreed Value of Capital Contribution
_______________________
_______________________
$_____________________
* This form limited liability company agreement is one of two prepared by the LLCs, Partnerships and Unincorporated Entities Committee of the ABA Business Law Section. This form is designed for use where the only member is an individual and the other is designed for use where the only member is an entity. As a general rule, when there are two approaches to a given area, one of which is more complicated or detailed than the other, the more complicated or detailed approach is included in the entity member form and the simpler approach in this form. Thus, for example, the individual member form uses management by the member, that being the simplest and most straightforward management structure in a single-member limited liability company (an “LLC”), while the entity member form employs a manager-managed construct. Similarly, the entity member form includes an extensive list of powers of the LLC, while the individual member form simply includes only a general powers clause. This division is largely for organizational and instructive purposes. Generally speaking, these two approaches and the related provisions can be mixed and matched as the drafter deems appropriate for his or her individual situation. Thus, for example, one could have an individual as the member in a manager-managed form with no officers. Care should be taken, however, when mixing provisions of the two forms to be sure that any necessary conforming changes are made. Also note that neither form is intended to be used if the parties contemplate the possibility of there being more than one member or there being more than one person or entity having an economic interest in the LLC. In addition, neither form is intended to be used for a special purpose entity borrower in a structured financing transaction because these forms do not include a number of provisions, such as separateness covenants, that would typically be included in the LLC agreement of such an entity.
With regard to tax matters, this form is intended for use only for a domestic LLC (one formed under the laws of one of the states, not the laws of a foreign jurisdiction) that is not treated as a trust or corporation (including a corporation that makes an S election) for tax purposes and that has only a single economic member. Such an LLC should be disregarded for federal income taxes (see infra note 28). Because the LLC will be disregarded for federal tax purposes, contributions by, and distributions and payments (including compensatory payments and payments of interest) to, the member will be a matter of tax indifference, or non-events, to the member and the LLC. If the LLC is treated other than as disregarded for tax purposes, e.g., because it becomes a partnership through the addition of an additional economic member, it would become an entity for tax purposes separate from the member, and tax counsel should consider the economic interaction between the LLC and the member and make appropriate drafting changes.
It should be noted that a single-member LLC will not always be treated in the same way, and accorded the same rights, as a sole proprietorship or an individual, and, therefore, the decision to use a single-member LLC should be made in consideration of any relevant legal considerations. See, e.g., 3519–3513 Realty, LLC v. Law, 967 A.2d 954, 955 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2009) (interpreting a “statute [that] permits a landlord to remove a tenant if ‘[t]he owner of a building of three residential units or less seeks to personally occupy a unit’” and holding the statute inapplicable where a sole proprietor had transferred a building to his single-member LLC); Krueger v. Zeman Constr. Co., 758 N.W.2d 881, 887 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that “to have standing to assert a business-discrimination claim under [the Minnesota Human Rights Act] appellant must show both that respondent committed a discriminatory act in the performance of a contract and that [appellant]—not her limited liability company—has a contractual relationship with respondent”), aff ’d, 781 N.W.2d 858 (Minn. 2010). For a general discussion of separate entity effects, see CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW ¶ 5.05[1][e] (1994 & Supp. 2011).
Finally, this form is designed to comply with the requirements of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act and other applicable Delaware law. If any practitioner intends to utilize this form to organize a limited liability company under the laws of a jurisdiction other than Delaware, the limited liability company act and all other applicable laws of that jurisdiction will need to be carefully reviewed and compared to those of Delaware and, as needed, this form will need to be modified to conform with all applicable legal requirements and to ensure that the intent of the parties is carried out under the laws of the applicable jurisdiction.
1. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (2013) (defining a “limited liability company agreement” and providing that the agreement of a single-member LLC shall not be unenforceable by reason of there being only one person who is a party thereto).
2. The Delaware LLC Act sets forth requirements for the name of each domestic LLC, including the requirement that the name include “Limited Liability Company,” “L.L.C.,” or “LLC.” Id. § 18-102.
3. The Delaware LLC Act specifically reserves the ability to amend the Act from time to time and to have those amendments binding upon LLCs and their members, and all rights of members are subject to this reservation. Id. § 18-1106.
5. Under Delaware law, an LLC is formed at the time of filing of the certificate of formation or such later time and date as provided for therein, in each case assuming there has been substantial compliance with the requirements of section 18-201 of the Delaware LLC Act. Id. § 18-201(b). It should be noted that an LLC agreement is required under the Delaware LLC Act, but can be entered into before, after, or at the time of filing of the certificate of formation and that the LLC agreement can be made effective as of the formation of the LLC or at such other time as provided in or reflected by the LLC agreement. Id. § 18-201(d). If the person or entity intending to become the member of an LLC files the certificate of formation for the LLC and subsequently enters into the LLC agreement, care should be taken to make sure that no business is conducted by or on behalf of the LLC before the single member enters into the LLC agreement unless the LLC agreement is made effective as of the filing of the certificate of formation or as of a date before the commencement of business, in which case the provisions of the LLC agreement relating to the authority of the member will relate back to the filing date or such other date with respect to any actions taken after that date. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.02(1) (2006).
6. Although the Delaware LLC Act uses “authorized person” in a number of sections, see, e.g., id. §§ 18-201, 18-204, 18-208, the term is not defined. Consequently, it is prudent to provide either in the LLC agreement or through proper action by the member in the case of a member-managed LLC what person or entity is designated as an “authorized person” for purposes of the Delaware LLC Act.
7. The Delaware LLC Act requires that the certificate of formation state the name of the LLC and the address of the registered office and name and address of the registered agent for the LLC located in the State of Delaware. Id. § 18-201(a). Because these matters are required to be addressed in the certificate of formation, other than the name, they have not been included in this Agreement for the sake of simplicity and to avoid unintentional inconsistency.
8. There exists no requirement that there be, in addition to the member, another authorized person, and there is similarly no requirement that the member be an authorized person. The alternative formula herein set forth is for purposes of illustration.
9. The Delaware LLC Act provides that an LLC “may carry on any lawful business, purpose or activity, whether or not for profit, with the exception of the business of banking as defined in § 126 of Title 8.” Id. § 18-106(a). The purpose clause of an LLC agreement is significant because it delimits the activities in which the LLC may engage. The two basic approaches are to utilize a general purpose clause permitting the LLC to engage in any lawful activity (as is an optional approach set forth in this Agreement) or to utilize a specific purpose clause permitting the LLC to engage only in the specific activity for which it was formed and any necessary or incidental activities (as is an optional approach set forth in the entity member form). The benefit of the former clause is that the LLC has the power and authority to engage in any lawful activity that may present itself whether or not it was initially contemplated. Conversely, the benefit of the latter clause is that it restricts the authorized use of the LLC to previously agreed upon activities unless the purpose clause is amended. Since this form is designed for use as a single-member, member-managed LLC, there is little concern about restricting the LLC’s purpose. Therefore, this form adopts the broad purpose clause approach. Use of a narrow purpose clause also can affect the application of the business opportunity doctrine and limit the circumstances where the member or the manager would be deemed to be taking an opportunity. See also infra Section 15, which specifically eliminates the application of the doctrine to the member.
10. The Delaware LLC Act contains a broad recitation of the powers of an LLC, stating that:
A[n] [LLC] shall possess and may exercise all the powers and privileges granted by this chapter or by any other law or by its [LLC] agreement, together with any powers incidental thereto, including such powers and privileges as are necessary or convenient to the conduct, promotion or attainment of the business, purposes or activities of the [LLC].
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-106(b) (2013). This is in contrast with the approach taken in the Delaware General Corporation Law, wherein there is both a general and a specific listing of powers.
The powers clause of an LLC agreement is significant because, together with the governing statute, it establishes the power and authority of the LLC to act. The powers clause should conform to the purpose clause so that the LLC has the power and authority to accomplish its stated purpose. Thus, a broad powers clause should accompany a general purpose clause. Generally speaking, the powers clause provides that the LLC shall have all the power and authority to pursue its purpose, specifically lists each power and authority that may be necessary or desirable to pursue that purpose, or includes both general language and a specific list of enumerated powers. This Agreement adopts the simple approach of including only a broad powers clause. An example of the combined approach can be found in the entity member form.
12. Identifying what assets have been contributed to the LLC, and by negative implication what assets of the member have not been contributed, serves a variety of purposes. Initially, it determines the LLC’s capital base. Second, it defines those assets of the sole member that are not available (absent a successful effort to pierce the veil) to the creditors of the LLC. Third, in the event of a claim against the sole member, clear identification makes clear what assets are not (absent a successful reverse pierce) available to the creditor as no longer being the member’s property. See also infra note 24.
13. The two most common structures for management of a single-member LLC are management by the member (who may be designated a “managing member”) or management by one or more managers. This form addresses management by the member. As noted at supra note *, the companion entity member form provides for management by a manager.
14. Care should be taken in the execution of documents to respect the management structure of the LLC. Documents may be executed by the member, or, to the extent that the member delegates that authority pursuant to Section 5.1(iii), the delegatee. Since this form does not have a “manager” within the meaning of section 18-101(10) of the Delaware LLC Act, confusion could arise as to proper execution of documents on behalf of the LLC in the event a document is executed by a person or entity purporting to act as a “manager.”
15. The appointment of “officers” by an LLC is a matter of private ordering. Where the LLC’s business does not require active day-to-day management, the Member may not want to appoint any officers or other agents. Consequently, this form makes appointment optional. Notwithstanding the proviso that the authority of each person shall be limited to the written delegation, this proviso relates only to actual authority. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (2006). However, while appointed persons or entities will only have the actual agency authority set forth in this Agreement, they may nevertheless have apparent agency authority, including perhaps apparent authority to bind the LLC as a third party would reasonably ascribe to the titles given. See id. § 2.03.
16. This provision is intended to grant the member all of the power and authority necessary to manage the LLC, whether or not a specific power or authority is expressly set forth in this Agreement.
17. To the extent payments for services pursuant to Section 5.1(vii) were deemed to be distributions, those distributions would be subject to section 18-607(a) of the Delaware LLC Act. See infra note 29.
18. The single member should be cautioned that it is essential to observe all recordkeeping requirements and to keep the LLC’s funds entirely separate from those of the member to reduce the risk that a court will pierce the LLC veil if the LLC’s assets are insufficient to satisfy its liabilities. Although income tax law may treat a single-member LLC as a disregarded entity, its member should never disregard the LLC’s status as a stand-alone entity and should respect the LLC’s legal ownership of its own assets separate and apart from the individual’s own assets.
19. Under the Delaware LLC Act, except as may be otherwise provided in the LLC agreement, an LLC has perpetual duration. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-801(a)(1) (2013).
20. The dissolution provisions of Sections 6(ii)(b) and (iii) are designed to permit, but not require, the continuation of the LLC if an event occurs that causes the member to cease to be a member of the LLC under the Delaware LLC Act (e.g., by death), and the event would otherwise cause the LLC’s dissolution under the Delaware LLC Act. In this form, this is done by tracking the default language of the Delaware LLC Act to allow the member’s personal representative to agree to continue the LLC upon the occurrence of any event that terminates the continued membership of the member in the LLC. See id. § 18-801(a)(4) (providing that, unless an LLC agreement otherwise provides, the personal representative of the last remaining member may agree to continue the LLC and to the admission of a new member). “Personal representative” is defined in the Delaware LLC Act to mean, as to a natural person: the executor, administrator, guardian, conservator or other legal representative thereof. Thus, the intended effect of Section 6 is to permit the avoidance of any inadvertent dissolution of the LLC while leaving the member complete flexibility to dissolve the LLC at any time by written consent. It should also be noted that the Delaware Court of Chancery has held that a member may waive the right to judicial dissolution under section 18-802 of the Delaware LLC Act. See R&R Capital, LLC v. Buck Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, C.A. No. 3803-CC, 2008 WL 3846138 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008). Thus, waivers of the right to judicial dissolution are now frequently included in multi-member LLC agreements. However, in the context of a single-member LLC, as a practical matter, the remedy of judicial dissolution would be rarely invoked.
To the extent the member’s objective is to continue the LLC’s existence to the maximum extent possible, it would be typical to include a provision that provides for dissolution upon the written consent of the member, upon the entry of a decree of judicial dissolution under section 18-802 of the Delaware LLC Act, or upon the occurrence of any event that terminates the continued membership of the member in the LLC, but also provides that the personal representative be required to continue the LLC without dissolution upon the occurrence of an event to cause the member to cease to be a member of the LLC. See the dissolution section of the entity member form for an example of such a provision. In addition, the provision in this form that allows the personal representative to continue the LLC’s existence can be expressly overridden. If this is what the member desires, then the form must expressly negate that authority. Otherwise, the default rule set forth in section 18-801 of the Delaware LLC Act would govern. That section of the Delaware LLC Act provides that an LLC may (but is not required to) continue without dissolution when there are no members if, within ninety days after the occurrence of the event that terminated the continued membership of the last remaining member, the personal representative of the last remaining member agrees in writing to continue the LLC and to the admission of the personal representative of that member or his or her nominee or designee to the LLC as a member effective as of the occurrence of the event that terminated the continued membership of the last remaining member.
21. The Delaware LLC Act provides for the winding up of an LLC upon its dissolution setting forth, among other things, who conducts the winding up and certain specified powers of the persons conducting that activity. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-803 (2013). The Delaware LLC Act specifies the priority of the distribution of assets in the winding up of an LLC. Id. § 18-804. Generally, that requires distributions to be made first to creditors, then to members in satisfaction of liabilities for distributions, and thereafter to members first for the return of their contributions and second respecting their limited liability company interests.
22. The Delaware LLC Act provides that a member may not be required to accept an in-kind distribution to the extent that the member’s percentage interest in the asset distributed exceeds the member’s interest in distributions from the LLC. Id. § 18-605. In the case of a single-member LLC, there is no opportunity for disproportionate distributions among the members.
23. Upon the completion of the process of winding up of an LLC (id. § 18-803), a certificate of cancellation of the certificate of formation is to be filed with the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware, whereupon the separate legal existence of the LLC is terminated. Id. §§ 18-201(b), 18-203.
24. As noted at supra note 12, practitioners preparing single-member LLC agreements and clients using single-member LLCs must take care to avoid veil piercing—a risk to which single-member LLCs may, in some cases, be substantially more susceptible than are multi-member LLCs. See also 2 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 19:1, at 407 n.1 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing the risk of informality in the operation of single-member LLCs giving rise to a “greater risk of piercing the entity veil”) Note, however, that it is generally recognized to be more difficult to pierce the corporate veil in Delaware than in many other jurisdictions because fraudulent or other similar wrongful conduct is usually required under Delaware law. See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 2.8 (2013); In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 738 F. Supp. 825, 838 (D. Del. 1990). In a veil-piercing claim against the member of a single-member LLC, a plaintiff may claim that because, in practice, the owners of small single-owner businesses (especially those owned by individuals as opposed to entities) often view all of their personal assets as being available to ensure their business success, the court should view all of the assets of the member of a single-member LLC as being at risk in the claim in question. The member of a single-member LLC should carefully segregate his or her personal assets from those belonging to the LLC. As to the importance of treating the assets of the LLC as distinct from those of the sole member (and vice versa), see Mobil Oil Corp. v. Linear Films, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 260, 268 (D. Del. 1989) (“A subsidiary corporation may be deemed the alter ego of its corporate parent where there is a lack of attention to corporate formalities, such as where the assets of the two entities are commingled, and their operations intertwined. An alter ego relationship might also lie where a corporate parent exercises complete domination and control over its subsidiary.”). In addition, if the LLC agreement specifically lists the amount of the member’s contributions and provides that no contribution shall be deemed to have been made to the LLC and no asset of the member shall be deemed to be at risk for claims against the LLC unless expressly listed as a contribution in the LLC agreement, that may help to counter the above argument by a creditor.
Delaware courts have applied the same standard for piercing the veil in respect of an LLC as they have in the corporate context. See, e.g., U.S. Bank N.A. v. U.S. Timberlands Klamath Falls, L.L.C., C.A. No. 112-N, 2005 WL 2093694 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30, 2005). To state a claim of veil piercing, a party “must plead facts supporting an inference that [a party] created a sham entity designed to defraud investors and creditors.” Id. at *1 (citing Crosse v. BCBSD, Inc., 836 A.2d 492, 497 (Del. 2003)). The inquiry is fact-intensive, and the court would consider several factors, including: “(1) whether the company was adequately capitalized for the undertaking; (2) whether the company was solvent; (3) whether corporate formalities were observed; (4) whether the [member] siphoned company funds; and (5) whether, in general, the company simply functioned as a façade for the [member].” Id. at *1.
25. The practitioner should consider what interest rate is appropriate for a specific transaction. In this regard, using a market based rate will lend support to the argument that the loan should be treated as such, and not be recharacterized as equity or be subordinated to debts owed to third-party creditors.
26. This formulation is intended to preserve claims by the member, vis-à-vis other creditors of the LLC, that additional funds provided by the member to the LLC were actually loans and, thereby, give the member equivalent rights and claims with respect its loan as are enjoyed by the LLC’s other unsecured creditors. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-107 (2013) (providing, inter alia, that a member may lend money to an LLC and, subject to other applicable law, have the same rights and obligations with respect to any such matter as a person who is not a member). Note, however, that those loans possibly may be subject to equitable subordination as well as to veil-piercing attacks. See also supra notes 12 & 24.
27. The rule of limited liability exists regardless of whether it is recited in the LLC agreement. The Delaware LLC Act provides:
Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, the debts, obligations and liabilities of a[n] [LLC], whether arising in contract, tort or otherwise, shall be solely the debts, obligations and liabilities of the [LLC], and no member or manager of an [LLC] shall be obligated personally for any such debt, obligation or liability of the [LLC] solely by reason of being a member or acting as a manager of the [LLC].
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-303(a) (2013). A member, as to some or all obligations of the LLC, may agree to be personally obligated. See id. § 18-303(b).
28. On January 1, 1997, the so called “Check-the-Box” classification regulations went into effect. Generally speaking, under those regulations, a single-member LLC will be, for purposes of federal income tax classification, a “disregarded entity.” Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2)(i) (as amended in 2014) (“Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph (c), a business entity that has a single owner and is not a corporation under paragraph (b) of this section is disregarded as an entity separate from its owner.”). For federal employment tax purposes (beginning in 2009), and for certain federal excise tax purposes (beginning in 2008), a “disregarded entity” is treated as separate from its owner. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2)(iv) (as amended in 2014) (employment taxes), -2(c)(2)(v) (as amended in 2014) (excise taxes). Under the original “Check-the-Box” regulations, a disregarded entity was disregarded for federal income, employment, and excise tax purposes. But see I.R.S. Notice 99-6, 1999-1 C.B. 321, obsoleted by T.D. 9356, 2007-39 I.R.B. 675 (Aug. 15, 2007) (elective treatment of disregarded entities for employment tax purposes before 2009). As a disregarded entity (sometimes referred to as a “Tax Nothing”), a single-member LLC so classified will not file an income tax return or itself report income, loss, deduction, or credit. Rather, those tax items will be incorporated into the tax return of and reported by the sole member of the single-member LLC. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (as amended in 2006) (“If the entity is disregarded, its activities are treated in the same manner as a sole proprietorship, branch, or division of the owner.”). If that sole member is an individual, those items will be reported on Schedule C (Profit or Loss from Business (Sole Proprietorship)), Schedule C-EZ (Net Profit from Business (Sole Proprietorship)), Schedule E (Supplemental Income and Loss), or Schedule F (Profit or Loss from Farming). A single-member LLC that would otherwise be treated as a disregarded entity may elect to be classified as a corporation. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2014). In most instances, that election is made on Form 8832. If the single-member LLC meets the requirements for being taxed as an S corporation, it may elect S corporation status on Form 2553. The regulations formerly required the single-member LLC to file both Form 2553 and Form 8832 in order to elect S corporation status, but under the 2005 amendments Form 2553 alone is now required. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(1)(v)(C) (as amended in 2006). A single-member LLC may not be classified as a partnership. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2006). Note that “Check-the-Box” applies only to “eligible entities” (i.e., business entities that are eligible to select a classification under the regulations). The vast majority of single-member LLCs, but not all, are eligible entities. A “corporation” formed under state or federal law is never an eligible entity. Other ineligible entities include insurance companies, banks, governmentowned entities, and certain foreign “per se” corporations. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1(a)(3) (as amended in 2011), 301.7701-2(b) (as amended in 2006), 301.7701-3(c)(1)(v) (as amended in 2006). Assuming a single-member LLC formed in the United States is an eligible entity, it has a default classification as a disregarded entity; it is not necessary that it “check a box” or file Form 8832. Protective elections are possible, but are rarely made except for certain foreign entities. For a general review of “Check-the-Box,” see GARY HUFFMAN, WILLIAM MCKEE, WILLIAM NELSON, JAMES WHITMIRE & ROBERT WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS ¶ 3.06 (4th ed. 2007). Note that the number of members under Delaware or other applicable state law is not necessarily the same as the number for federal income tax purposes. For example, the IRS has treated a two-member LLC as a single-member LLC for federal tax purposes. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-01-024 (Oct. 5, 2001). Conversely, the IRS might consider an LLC with only one member, but two or more holders of economic interests, to be a multi-member entity for tax purposes.
Keep in mind that, while for purposes of federal income tax classification a single-member LLC may be a disregarded entity without its own tax identity or obligations, certain states will impose entity-level taxes on it. States imposing an entity-level tax potentially applicable to single-member LLCs include: Alabama (net worth based “business privilege” tax imposed on LLCs, ALA. CODE § 40-14A-22(a) (LexisNexis 2011)); California (entity-level franchise fee and gross receipts-based fee, CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 17941, 17942 (West 2004 and Supp. 2014)); Illinois (1.5% personal property replacement tax based on net income, 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/205(b) (West 2012)); Kentucky (entity-level income tax imposed upon LLCs, LPs, and LLPs; minimum tax of $175 per annum; rates up to 7% of income with alternative minimum tax calculations based upon gross receipts and gross profits also required, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 141.010(24), 141.040(5) (West 2010 and Supp. 2013)); New Hampshire (LLCs doing business in the state are subject to a 5% tax on dividends and interest, an 8.5% business profits tax, and the 0.75% business enterprise tax, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. chs. 77, 77-AQ, 77-E-1 (LexisNexis 2009 and Supp. 2013)); Ohio (8.5% entity level tax imposed except where all owners give written consent to state tax jurisdictions, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5733.40, 5733.41 (LexisNexis 2014)); Pennsylvania (LLCs except certain professional LLCs subject to .699% capital stock and franchise taxes, 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8925 (West 2013)); Tennessee (excise tax of 6.5% of net earnings and franchise tax of $0.25 per $100 of net worth applied to LLCs, LLPs, and LPs, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-4-2105(a), 67-4-2106(a) (2013)); Texas (LLCs, as well as LPs, LLPs, and LLLPs, are subject to entity-level franchise tax, TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0002 (West 2008 and Supp. 2013)); Washington (all entities subject to business and occupations tax, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 25.05.500–25.05.570, 25.15.005–25.15.902 (West, Westlaw current with 2014 Legislation effective before June 12, 2014)). A state also may treat a single-member LLC as a separate entity for sales and use tax purposes, even if for income tax purposes the state follows the federal classification of the single-member LLC as a disregarded entity. See generally Bruce P. Ely, Christopher R. Grissom & William T. Thistle, State Tax Treatment of LLCs and LLPs—An Update, 56 ST. TAX NOTES 509 (May 17, 2010); see also JAMIE FENWICK, MICHAEL MCLOUGHLIN, SCOTT SALMON, PATRICK SMITH, ARTHUR TILLEY & BRIAN WOOD, STATE TAXATION OF PASS-THROUGH ENTITIES AND THEIR OWNERS app. tbl. 9 (2010) (Income and Franchise Taxes Imposed on Single-Member LLCs).
While a single-member LLC may have employees, for purposes of federal employment taxation the sole member was treated under the original Check-the-Box regulations as the employer with responsibility for the collection and remission of those levies. See Med. Practice Solutions, LLC v. CIR, 132 T.C. 125 (2009), aff ’d sub nom. Britton v. Shulman, No. 09-1994, 2010 WL 3565790 (1st Cir. Aug. 24, 2010); Littriello v. United States, 484 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007); McNamee v. United States, 488 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2007); Kandi v. United States, No. C05-0840C, 2006 WL 83463 (W.D. Wa. 2006); Notice 99-6, 1991-1 C.B. 321, obsoleted by T.D. 9356, 2007-39 I.R.B. 675 (Aug. 15, 2007); see also Thomas E. Rutledge & Scott E. Ludwig, The Sixth Circuit Affirms Littriello: “Check-the-Box” Classification Regulations Are Upheld, J. TAX’N, June 2007, at 325; Thomas E. Rutledge & Scott E. Ludwig, Second Circuit Affirms McNamee: Validity of Check-the-Box Regulations Again Confirmed, J. TAX’N, July 2007, at 32; Thomas E. Rutledge, The Dispute Over Check-the-Box, SMLLCs and Liability for Employment Taxes, J. PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES, July/Aug. 2007, at 19. However, effective January 1, 2009, the single-member LLC is treated as the “employer,” and the liability of the sole member for any failure to collect and remit employment taxes is determined under Code section 6672. T.D. 9356, 2007-39 I.R.B. 675 (Aug. 15, 2007).
The IRS found in Rev. Rul. 1999-5, 1999-1 C.B. 434 that an LLC which, for federal tax purposes, is disregarded as an entity separate from its owner is converted to a partnership when a second member purchases an interest in that LLC. Cf. Rev. Rul. 1999-6, 1999-1 C.B. 432 (tax consequences when multi-member LLC becomes single-member LLC).
29. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-601 (2013). Section 18-607(a) of the Delaware LLC Act provides that “[an LLC] shall not make a distribution to a member to the extent that at the time of the distribution, after giving effect to the distribution, all liabilities of the [LLC], other than liabilities to members on account of their limited liability company interests and liabilities for which the recourse of creditors is limited to specified property of the [LLC], exceed the fair value of the assets of the [LLC], except that the fair value of property that is subject to a liability for which the recourse of creditors is limited shall be included in the assets of the [LLC] only to the extent that the fair value of that property exceeds that liability. For purposes of this subsection (a), the term ‘distribution’ shall not include amounts constituting reasonable compensation for present or past services or reasonable payments made in the ordinary course of business pursuant to a bona fide retirement plan or other benefits program.” Id. § 18-607(a); see also Section 5.1(vii) of this Agreement. Section 18-607 applies to all distributions other than those made upon the winding up of an LLC, which are governed by Section 18-804. Note that while Section 10(i) of this Agreement is by its terms limited to the Delaware LLC Act, other limitations of Delaware law, such as the Delaware Fraudulent Transfer Act, and comparable laws of other jurisdictions, may also apply.
30. The default rule under the Delaware LLC Act is that, upon resignation, a resigning member is entitled to any distribution provided under the LLC agreement and if the LLC agreement does not so provide otherwise, a resigning member is entitled to receive, within a reasonable time after resignation, the fair value of the member’s limited liability company interest as of the date of resignation based upon that member’s right to share in distributions from the LLC. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-604 (2013). The first sentence of Section 10(ii) of this Agreement negates the effect of section 18-604 of the Delaware LLC Act in connection with a voluntary assignment because, as noted at infra note 32, it is assumed that consideration will be payable by the assignee to the assignor. Similarly, the effect of section 18-604 of the Delaware LLC Act is negated by the second sentence of Section 10(ii) of this Agreement in connection with an event that might be considered a deemed resignation of the member under the Delaware LLC Act, such as if he or she is adjudicated incompetent. This provision is included in this form based on the assumption that it would be in the best interest of the member and the LLC to preserve the value of the LLC by retaining all assets within the LLC and allowing the member’s personal representative to continue the LLC’s existence through application of Section 6 of this Agreement. However, as is the case with many of this Agreement’s provisions, the member is given the flexibility to make a different choice.
31. As a general matter, this form takes a permissive approach to transfers and assignments of limited liability company interests by permitting all transfers and assignments. However, because this form is designed to be a single-member form where the LLC is disregarded for federal income tax purposes and because certain transfers and assignments can result in there being more than one member or one or more members and one or more economic interest holders, there are circumstances relating to certain transfers, as noted in the accompanying text and footnotes, where this Agreement should be amended. As also noted, however, it is thought preferable that purported transfers be permitted than that those transfers be rendered void even if conforming amendments are not made. In this regard, it should also be noted that “limited liability company interest” is a defined term in the Delaware LLC Act as “a member’s share of the profits and losses of [an LLC] and a member’s right to receive distributions of the [LLC’s] assets.” Id. § 18-101(8). Thus, as a general matter, a transfer of a limited liability company interest does not necessarily result in the transferee’s being admitted as a member with respect to the interest transferred, and this form takes the position that certain transfers will result in admission of the transferee while others will not. See, e.g., Achaian, Inc. v. Leemon Family LLC, 25 A.3d 800, 804−05 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“[I]t is clear that the default rule under the [Delaware LLC] Act is that an assignment of an LLC interest, by itself, does not entitle the assignee to become a member of the LLC; rather, an assignee only receives the assigning member’s economic interest in the LLC to the extent assigned.”).
32. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-702(b) (2013). Although LLC agreements will often have a requirement that they be executed by any successor member, that formality, if not complied with upon a full assignment, may give rise to an unintended dissolution of the LLC if the successor is not admitted due to an inadvertent failure to sign the LLC agreement. Section 11 provides that in connection with a voluntary assignment of all of the member’s interest the assignee will automatically be admitted as the successor member. The triggering event is the effectiveness of the assignment under applicable law. Thus, if a purported assignment was not accepted, the assignment would not become effective so the assignee will never become the successor member. Since it is assumed that in connection with a voluntary assignment, any consideration will be payable by the assignee to the assignor, Section 10 of this Agreement provides that, unless otherwise determined by the member, the assignor member will not be entitled to a resigning distribution in connection with a voluntary assignment, which would otherwise be the case under section 18-604 of the Delaware LLC Act as described at supra note 30.
33. Sections 11 and 13 contemplate that in connection with a partial transfer or assignment by the member of his or her limited liability company interest (other than in connection with a pledge or collateral assignment (see infra note 35)), the transferee or assignee of the interest will not be admitted as a member unless this Agreement is amended to reflect the changes necessary if there is more than one member, including the relative rights and duties of the members and the fact that the LLC would no longer be disregarded as an entity separate from its owner for federal income tax purposes (see supra note 28). However, it is important to note that this form does not take the approach of voiding any transfer that would cause there to be one or more economic interest holding assignees in addition to the member even though under those circumstances the LLC would no longer be disregarded as an entity separate from its owner for federal income tax purposes and certain of the provisions, such as the distribution provision, would no longer work as drafted. The distribution provision would presumably be interpreted to provide that distributions would be made to the member and to the economic interest holding assignees in proportion to their relative limited liability company interests. See Achaian, 25 A.3d at 806 (court and parties agreed that LLC agreement that referred to single member needed to be read to apply to multiple members once additional members were admitted even though LLC agreement was not amended). It is, of course, preferable that in connection with any partial transfer, appropriate amendments be made to this Agreement to reflect the new tax treatment of the LLC, the changes with respect to distributions, and other matters that will or may be affected by the transfer. Nonetheless, this form takes the approach that it is better to permit those transfers with their attendant consequences than to provide that they are null and void. There may be transactions, however, where an inadvertent or other transfer causes the LLC not to be disregarded as an entity separate from its owner for federal income tax purposes that the practitioner should consider including a provision that any such transfer would be void ab initio, at least if it is not done with the specific intention that the LLC would have a different tax status for federal income tax purposes. Under Delaware law, a contractual term that prohibits transfers will be enforceable, and a prohibited transfer may be invalidated. In re Conaway, C.A. No. 6056-VCG, 2012 WL 524190 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2012) (finding valid a limited partnership agreement’s restraint on alienation and invalidating a purported transfer in violation of the agreement).
34. In most cases, interests in an LLC are general intangibles and payment intangibles governed by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. To facilitate a pledge of the interests in an LLC in connection with a financing, it may be desirable to opt into coverage of Revised Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See generally Lynn A. Soukup, LLC and Partnership Interests as Collateral—The Alchemy of “Opting In” to Article 8, in SECURED TRANSACTIONS 2010: WHAT LAWYERS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT UCC ARTICLE 9, at 431 (PLI Com. L. & Prac., Course Handbook Series, 2010), available at 920 PLI/Comm 431 (Westlaw); see also Robert R. Keatinge, Taking and Enforcing Security Interests in Unincorporated Businesses, in LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITIES IN TIME OF CHANGE (ALI-ABA Mar. 12, 2002), available at VPC0312 ALI-ABA 245 (Westlaw); Robert R. Keatinge, Interests in Unincorporated Associations as Securities Under Article 8 of the UCC, in LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITIES IN TIMES OF CHANGE (ALI-ABA Mar. 12, 2002), available at WPC0312 ALI-ABA 361 (Westlaw). In that case, the LLC agreement (and the certificate representing the limited liability company interest in the case of a certificated interest) must expressly provide that the interests in the LLC will constitute securities for purposes of Article 8 of the UCC. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 8-103(c) (2013).
35. In connection with the pledge of the interests in an LLC, the practitioner should consider whether a lender foreclosing on the pledge has the right to become a substitute or additional member of the LLC or will simply be an assignee of a limited liability company interest. If the foreclosing lender is only an assignee, it will generally have no right to cause the LLC to make distributions or take other actions that may benefit its position. On the other hand, when a lender forecloses on a limited liability company interest and becomes the member of the LLC, it may assume liability, as the owner and operator of the LLC, for the LLC’s activities—past and present. The practitioner should note that Section 11 of this Agreement provides that a pledgee or collateral assignee shall have the rights provided for in the agreement controlling the pledge or collateral assignment (and as provided by other applicable law), so that if pursuant to that agreement the pledgee or collateral assignee has the right to become a member, it will be able to do so under this Agreement, but if under the applicable security agreement, it does not have the right to become a member, Section 11 of this Agreement does not otherwise provide it with that right. It should also be noted that in connection with a pledge or collateral assignment by the member of part of its limited liability company interest, if the applicable security agreement governing the pledge or collateral assignment provides that the pledgee or collateral assignee can become a member, the situation may arise where there are two members of the LLC or one member of the LLC and one economic interest holding assignee under this Agreement. That situation should be addressed in the applicable security agreement, possibly by including a form of amendment to this Agreement that would apply in the event of foreclosure. Even where that is not the case, this Agreement gives effect to the transfer and admission provisions of the applicable security agreement, based on the view that it is better to have the provisions of this Agreement be consistent with the rights accorded by the member to any pledgee or collateral assignee rather than to have them inconsistent. This form assumes that when a security interest is granted in a limited liability company interest under applicable law, including the Uniform Commercial Code, the holder of the security interest could cause the foreclosure and sale of the limited liability company interest subject thereto with the result that the purchaser, although not a member and not generally having the rights of a member, would have the right to receive any distributions that are payable in respect of the interest foreclosed upon and purchased. As noted at supra note 31, it is preferable that in connection with any partial transfer that could have this result, appropriate amendments be made to the LLC agreement to reflect the changes that will take effect. However, as with a voluntary transfer under Section 11, it is thought better to permit those transfers than to provide that they are null and void. In the event of the pledge or collateral assignment by the member of its entire LLC interest, the foreclosure on the pledge may result in the member’s ceasing to be a member of the LLC, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-702(b)(3) (2013), which could have the result of causing the dissolution of the LLC. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
36. Pursuant to the Delaware LLC Act, a member may resign from an LLC only at the time or upon the happening of the events specified in the LLC agreement, and, unless otherwise provided in the LLC agreement, a member may not resign from an LLC before the dissolution and winding up of the LLC. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-603 (2013). Thus, Section 12 provides that the member may resign from the LLC at the time he or she determines.
Also note Section 10(ii) of this Agreement (together with footnote 31) has been drafted to avoid the distribution requirement of section 18-604 upon the resignation of the member in the event of a voluntary assignment in full of his or her limited liability company interest.
37. The Delaware LLC Act provides a number of events that will cause a person to cease to be a member of an LLC unless they are modified in the LLC agreement or waived with the consent of all members. Id. § 18-304. Those events are a member’s making an assignment for the benefit of creditors, filing a voluntary petition for bankruptcy, being adjudged bankrupt or insolvent or having entered against that member an order for relief in a bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding, the filing of a petition or answer seeking the reorganization, arrangement, composition, readjustment, liquidation, dissolution or similar relief for the member or the admission or failure to contest a petition filed against the member in a proceeding of similar nature. Id. § 18-304(1). The last sentence of Section 12 is included to override the deemed cessation of membership of the member if the member files for bankruptcy or is otherwise involved in a specified bankruptcy event. Id. § 18-304.
38. The Delaware LLC Act, as a default rule, requires the consent of all incumbent members to the admission of a new member as a member. Id. §§ 18-301(b)(1), 18-702(a). This threshold may be modified in the LLC agreement.
39. The exculpation and indemnification provisions in Section 14 provide for broad exculpation and broad mandatory indemnification for the member irrespective of the capacity in which he or she is acting. These provisions also provide for exculpation and mandatory indemnification of the other identified “Covered Persons,” though those protections are not as broad as the coverage for the member. The practitioner should carefully consider the standards for exculpation and indemnification for the member as well as for all other “Covered Persons” and whether that indemnification should be mandatory or at the discretion of the member. Pursuant to section 18-1101(e) of the Delaware LLC Act, liabilities for breach of contract and breach of duties (including fiduciary duties) to an LLC or to another member or manager or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by an LLC agreement may be limited or eliminated, except that the LLC agreement may not limit or eliminate liability for a bad-faith violation of the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
40. The Delaware LLC Act specifically authorizes a member, manager, or liquidating trustee to rely, in good faith, upon certain records and information, including for purposes of making distributions to members and creditors. See id. § 18-406.
41. See id. § 18-1101(c) (duties (including fiduciary duties) to an LLC or to another member or manager or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by an LLC agreement may be expanded, restricted, or eliminated by that LLC agreement, except that LLC agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing); see also id. § 18-1104 (“In any case not provided for in this chapter, the rules of law and equity, including the rules of law and equity relating to fiduciary duties and the law merchant, shall govern.”). If an LLC agreement is completely silent regarding fiduciary duties, the Delaware LLC Act expressly incorporates Delaware’s rules of law and equity relating to default fiduciary duties of loyalty and care. See id. § 18-1104.
42. The Delaware LLC Act specifically authorizes an LLC to indemnify and hold harmless any member, manager, or any person from any claim or demand. Id. § 18-108. To indemnify a person for his or her own negligence, Delaware case law in the corporate context requires that intention to be specifically stated, and indemnification for willful misconduct is prohibited. See State v. Interstate Amiesite Corp., 297 A.2d 41, 44 (Del. 1972); James v. Getty Oil Co. (E. Operations), Inc., 472 A.2d 33, 38 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983); Warburton v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 321 A.2d 345, 346–47 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
43. This form provides for mandatory advancement. The drafter should consider whether mandatory advancement with respect to the member or other “Covered Persons” is appropriate in particular circumstances, keeping in mind that if advancement is discretionary, a decision to advance expenses could be viewed as an interested transaction that could be subject to higher judicial scrutiny. The drafter also should note that the treatment may differ between the member and other “Covered Persons.”
44. Note that this provision, which permits competition between the member and the LLC, constitutes a modification of default fiduciary duties under Delaware law. See Kahn v. Icahn, C.A. No. 15916, 1998 WL 832629 (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 1998). Also note that no officers were included in this section. Adding the officers (if any) to this provision may be appropriate under particular circumstances.
45. Although under Delaware law written agreements may be amended or modified by a course of dealing notwithstanding a provision that authorizes amendment only by written instrument (see, e.g., Council of Unitholders of Breakwater House Condo. v. Simpler, Civ. A. No. 89C-09-007, 1993 WL 81285, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. 1993); Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Asbury Park v. Pepsico, Inc., 297 A.2d 28, 33 (Del. 1972)), the better practice is to provide for written amendments so that the exact terms of the current LLC Agreement are always readily accessible to the member and to any third parties to whom it has been provided.
46. An LLC agreement as a contract of the member or members of the LLC does not necessarily terminate upon the termination of the LLC. Thus, termination of the LLC agreement is a topic that should be specifically addressed in the LLC agreement and this should include specifying when the LLC agreement terminates and what, if any, provisions survive the general termination, e.g., indemnity provisions.
48. Because an LLC may have obligations to perform under its LLC agreement, some practitioners will make the LLC a party to its LLC agreement or will provide for a form of joinder, as provided above. The Delaware Supreme Court, in Elf Atochem North America, Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286 (Del. 1999), held that even though an LLC had not executed its LLC agreement, the LLC was nevertheless bound by an arbitration and forum selection clause in the LLC agreement. The court recognized that the LLC had not signed the LLC agreement. However, it stated that the members were the real parties in interest and that the LLC was simply their joint business vehicle and, therefore, it would enforce the clause against the LLC. In 2002, the Delaware LLC Act was amended to make express that the LLC is bound by the LLC agreement. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (2013). It should be noted that other jurisdictions have reached a contrary result in cases that also considered the enforceability of an arbitration clause against an LLC that was not a party to its LLC agreement. See, e.g., Mission Residential, LLC v. Triple Net Props., LLC, 564 S.E.2d 888 (Va. 2008) (applying Virginia law; note, however, that this decision was overturned by an amendment to the Virginia Limited Liability Company Act); Trover v. 419 OCR, Inc., 921 N.E.2d 1249 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (relying on separate legal existence of LLC under Illinois law and distinguishing Elf Atochem in holding that LLCs were not bound by arbitration clauses in operating agreements that did not specify LLCs were parties and did not include LLCs as signatories); In re Am. Media Distribs., LLC, 216 B.R. 486, 487 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (LLC is not a party and therefore cannot assume LLC agreement); Bubbles & Bleach, LLC v. Becker, No. 97C 1320, 1997 WL 285938 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (applying Wisconsin law).
When it comes to ethical guidance, in-house lawyers get the short end of the stick. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the “Rules”), which most U.S. jurisdictions have adopted in some form, are more compatible with law firm practice than in-house work. Although a handful of Rules, such as Rules 1.11, 1.12, and 3.8, single out government lawyers for special attention, in-house lawyers are not so fortunate. Not only must they figure out how to adapt the Rules to a corporate environment for which many of those Rules were clearly not designed, but they must do so with little assistance from ethics opinions and CLE programs. (There are some notable exceptions, such as NYCBA Formal Op. 2008-2 (“Corporate Legal Departments and Conflicts of Interest Between Represented Corporate Affiliates”) and ABA Formal Op. 99-415 (“Representation Adverse to Organization by Former In-House Lawyer”). Yet, as noted below, even those opinions cannot address all of the unique complexities raised by in-house counsel conflicts of interest. Of the scores of ethics panels I have been invited to speak on over the years, only one was titled “Ethics for In-House Counsel.” In-house lawyers are like the proverbial “square pegs” trying to navigate the “round hole” of legal ethics.
The primacy of the traditional law firm model is reflected in the terminology used throughout the Rules. For example, the conflict of interest rules provide that an individual lawyer’s conflict is imputed to all other lawyers “associated in a firm.” Rule 1.10(a) (emphasis added). What constitutes a “firm”? In common parlance, a firm generally means a private entity comprised of attorneys who provide legal services to outside clients. Yet, Rule 1.0(c) defines a “firm” or “law firm” as “a lawyer or lawyers in a law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.” (emphasis added). Thus, corporate legal departments (and by extension in-house lawyers) are simply appended to the definition of a law firm, despite the fundamental differences between those two practice models. This lack of delineation can raise bewildering questions for in-house lawyers who try to apply the Rules to their own conduct.
Again, the conflict of interest rules provide a ready example. As noted above, individual conflicts are imputed to all lawyers “associated in a firm.” In many cases, the clients can waive the imputed conflict, but some conflicts are unwaivable under Rule 1.7(b). In a law firm context, this does not usually present an insurmountable obstacle. A client with an unwaivable conflict can hire another law firm. But what does a corporation do when its general counsel or other in-house lawyer has an unwaivable conflict – short of firing them? One may argue that such a scenario is impossible, because only current client conflicts under Rule 1.7 are unwaivable. Because a corporate in-house lawyer represents only one client at a time – the corporation – he or she can never have a conflict under Rule 1.7, so the argument might go. This reasoning ignores the realities of the modern business world. As corporate family structures grow in complexity, in-house lawyers face an unprecedented array of potentially conflicting client interests. The same legal department may provide legal advice and services to the parent company, wholly-owned subsidiaries, indirect subsidiaries, and other corporate affiliates and constituents. Just figuring out who your client is at any particular time can be a daunting proposition for an in-house lawyer. See Rule 1.0(c), Cmt. [2] (noting that “[t]here can be uncertainty [for in-house lawyers] as to the identity of the client,” because, “it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed”).
To make things more complicated, the legal and business interests of corporate affiliates are not always aligned. See Rule 1.13, Cmt. [10] (noting that “[t]here are times when the organization’s interest may be or become adverse to those of one or more of its constituents”). For example, if a multinational conglomerate decides to spin off a litigation burdened subsidiary, the legal interests can become extremely complex, particularly if the general counsel has been directing the litigation up to that point. Strategic decisions made by the subsidiary in the litigation may adversely affect the parent company’s restructuring plans. How much authority should the parent company have to control the general counsel’s litigation decisions about the subsidiary before the spin-off? Conversely, does the general counsel – who arguably has a duty of loyalty to both parent and subsidiary – have to consider how his or her decisions today might impact the future prospects of subsidiary after the spin-off? How do the parent and subsidiary negotiate issues that will continue to impact the litigation after the spin-off, such as indemnification obligations or ownership of the attorney-client privilege? While the parent company might wish to retain control of privileged communications that occurred between the subsidiary and in-house counsel before the spin-off, the subsidiary would want to take the privilege with it. The general counsel can wind up torn between two clients that were once in harmony. See, e.g., Simon M. Lorne, “Losing the Privilege When the Subsidiary is Sold,” Business Law Today (January 2014) (discussing some of the ethical implications of for in-house counsel when a corporation sells a subsidiary).
One way to address this dilemma is to retain independent outside counsel for the subsidiary to protect its interests in the spin-off. See NYCBA Formal Ethics Op. 2008-2 (noting that, in a spin-off transaction, “it is wise for the parent to secure for the subsidiary outside representation”). The problem is that the outside counsel has to report to someone in the company and, usually, that someone is the general counsel. Even if the subsidiary has its own in-house counsel, that person often reports up the corporate ladder to the general counsel for the parent company. Although a solution could be fashioned involving informed waivers, limited scope representations, screening mechanisms, and independent legal advice, see id., these scenarios raise thorny questions for in-house lawyers who (unlike law firm practitioners) are inextricably intertwined with their corporate clients.
Even after the spin-off, the general counsel’s troubles may not be over. Now, the subsidiary is a former client under Rule 1.9. See ABA Formal Op. 99-415 (noting that, the conduct of in-house counsel “for purposes of former client conflicts of interest is governed, as is that of all other lawyers, by Model Rule 1.9”). If litigation were to arise between the parent and its former subsidiary, it may create another conflict of interest for the general counsel. If the subsidiary refuses to waive the conflict, this could preclude the general counsel from representing the company in connection with the litigation and – by imputation – anyone else in the legal department. (See Sidebar: “A New York Solution”) If so, that leaves no one in the legal department to communicate with outside litigation counsel and direct the litigation strategy. Requiring a company to defend or prosecute a lawsuit without the assistance of its own legal department creates an unnecessary impediment to the attorney-client relationship. It is difficult to see how this outcome benefits clients, i.e., those whom the conflict rules are intended to protect.
The emphasis on law firm practice permeates other aspects of the Rules. (See Sidebar: “Other Considerations.”) For example, a former in-house lawyer who was starting up his own solo practice approached me with what should have been a straightforward question: is he ethically permitted to list his former corporate employer on his LinkedIn profile? The lawyer was befuddled by the text of a New York advertising rule, which stated, in relevant part, “an advertisement may include information as to . . . names of clients regularly represented, provided that the client has given prior written consent.” New York Rules of Prof’l Conduct (“New York Rule”) 7.1(b)(2). Although not expressly stated, this rule suggests that lawyers may not include in their advertisements names of clients who are either not regularly represented or do not give consent. The lawyer’s question highlights the dual nature of the relationship between a company and its in-house counsel: the company is both the lawyer’s full-time employer and the lawyer’s client – a nuance that is not always recognized in the ethics rules. It probably would not occur to most former in-house lawyers that listing their employment history on their LinkedIn profile, marketing materials, or resume might constitute a technical violation of their particular state’s advertising rules. As with the imputation rules, this advertising restriction reflects a view of the attorney-client relationship that is premised on the law firm model, rather than the in-house model.
On the bright side, there is at least one area where in-house lawyers have received some personalized attention: most states now permit out-of-state lawyers to serve their corporate employers as in-house counsel. This has not always been the case. Up until 2011, for example, it was unclear whether out-of-state lawyers working as in-house counsel in New York were violating criminal statutes that prohibited the unlicensed practice of law. Not only that, but any New York lawyer that assisted an unlicensed in-house lawyer could be aiding the unauthorized practice of law in violation of New York Rule 5.5(b). This problem was finally – some might say belatedly – resolved when New York adopted an in-house counsel registration rule that permitted out-of-state lawyers to serve as in-house counsel for companies in New York. Recently, New York further expanded opportunities for in-house lawyers by permitting registered in-house lawyers to provide pro bono services in New York state.
Conclusion
Like law firm practitioners, in-house lawyers will confront a wide range of ethical issues over the course of their careers. Unlike law firm practitioners, in-house lawyers have fewer clear guideposts to help them navigate the ethical landscape. Ethics committees can help by developing more creative solutions to the ethical challenges faced by in-house lawyers, such as representing corporate affiliates or navigating conflict of interest and imputation rules. Arguably, the people who are best situated to answer these questions are in-house lawyers. Yet, in my experience, ethics committees are disproportionately populated with law firm practitioners. In order to address these challenges, more in-house lawyers should consider joining ethics committees and other associations that develop policies, promulgate ethics rules, and issue ethics opinions. Getting involved is the best way to get your voice heard. The alternative is to spend your professional life as a square peg in a round hole.
A New York Solution
Even after the spin-off, the general counsel’s troubles may not be over. Now, the subsidiary is a former client under Rule 1.9. If litigation were to arise between the parent and its former subsidiary, it may create another conflict of interest for the general counsel. If the subsidiary refuses to waive the conflict, this could preclude the general counsel from representing the company in connection with the litigation and – by imputation – anyone else in the legal department.
This problem may be solved in New York state by reference to Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1977) and its progeny. Under the reasoning of these cases, clients who were jointly represented by a lawyer have no expectation of confidentiality as between them. As a result, the lawyer may be free to take sides in a subsequent dispute between those clients, even where the current dispute is “substantially related” to the former representation. Although these authorities may provide some comfort to in-house lawyers who face disqualification claims by former corporate affiliates, many jurisdictions do not follow New York’s interpretation of the “substantially related” test.
Other Considerations
This article does not purport to be an exhaustive treatment of all aspects of the Rules, but merely provides several illustrative examples. The analysis can become even more complicated when the in-house lawyer wears multiple hats (as many do), serving as legal counselor, business advisor and – in some cases – even as a business partner. See NYCBA Ethics Op. 2007-1 (noting that “in-house counsel often play multiple roles in an organization, including purely business roles,” which may affect how the Rules apply to them). For example, ethical rules that prohibit lawyers from charging or collecting “excessive” legal fees, such as New York Rule 1.5(a), create unforeseen perils for in-house lawyers who are partially compensated with corporate stock options that could appreciate in value beyond the original expectations. A compensation agreement that was reasonable when it was made may become excessive over the course of years or decades. And establishing the right to cash in on those stock options may involve the difficult – if not impossible – task of determining what portion of the compensation was for legal services as compared with business-related services.
On January 14, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Daimler AG v. Bauman, et al., No. 11-965, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). Daimler addressed the question of whether the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment precluded the district court from exercising jurisdiction over the defendant, given the absence of any California connection to the parties and events described in the complaint. Plaintiffs invoked only the court’s general or all-purpose jurisdiction. California, they urged, is a place where the foreign defendant may be sued on any and all claims against it, wherever in the world the claims may arise. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that a court may not exercise jurisdiction over a foreign corporation for conduct that took place entirely outside of the United States, unless the corporation’s affiliations with the state in which the suit is brought are so constant and pervasive as to render it essentially at home in the forum state.
Background
Twenty-two Argentinian residents filed a complaint in the Northern District of California against DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft (Daimler), a German company that manufactures Mercedes-Benz vehicles in Germany. The complaint alleged that during Argentina’s 1976–1983 “Dirty War,” Daimler’s Argentinian subsidiary collaborated with state security forces to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill certain Mercedes-Benz Argentina workers, among them the plaintiffs or persons closely related to the plaintiffs. Jurisdiction over the lawsuit was predicated on the California contacts of a Daimler subsidiary in the United States that distributes automobiles in California.
Daimler moved to dismiss the action for want of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiffs argued that under the court’s general or all-purpose jurisdiction, California was a place where Daimler may be sued on any and all claims against it, wherever in the world the claims might arise. The plaintiffs further argued that jurisdiction over Daimler could be founded on California contacts made by Mercedes-Benz USA (MBUSA), the Daimler subsidiary that distributes automobiles in California. Plaintiffs asserted MBUSA should be treated as Daimler’s agent for jurisdictional purposes. The district court granted Daimler’s motion to dismiss; the court declined to attribute MBUSA’s California contacts to Daimler on an agency theory, concluding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that MBUSA acted as Daimler’s agent.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that plaintiffs had not shown the existence of an agency relationship of the kind that might warrant attributing MBUSA’s contacts to Daimler. The plaintiffs petitioned for rehearing; the panel then withdrew its initial opinion and instead ruled that the agency test was satisfied and considerations of “reasonableness” did not bar the exercise of jurisdiction. Daimler petitioned for certiorari.
The Supreme Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that exercises of personal jurisdiction, like the one asserted in this case, are barred by due process constraints on the assertion of adjudicatory authority. The Court distinguished between general or all-purpose jurisdiction, and specific or conduct-linked jurisdiction. Only general jurisdiction was at issue in this case. The Court previously held in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011),that a court may assert jurisdiction over a foreign corporation “to hear any and all claims against [it]” only when the corporation’s affiliations with the state in which suit is brought are so constant and pervasive “as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.” Examples of such affiliations include the corporation’s place of incorporation and principal place of business. The Court noted that the place of incorporation and principal place of business offer predictability, as each is only a single locale, and thus is easily ascertainable.
The Daimler Court clarified Goodyear, however, noting that Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business. Instead, Goodyear included those places as examples of all-purpose forums. Nonetheless, the Court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that general jurisdiction should be found in all states where a corporation engages in substantial, continuous, and systematic business. Instead, general jurisdiction is found only where a corporation’s affiliations with the state are so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in the forum state.
Applying Goodyear, the Court concluded that Daimler is not “at home” in California, and cannot be sued there for injuries the plaintiffs attributed to Mercedes-Benz Argentina’s conduct in Argentina. Neither Daimler nor MBUSA is incorporated in California, nor does either entity have its principal place of business there. As the Court noted, “[i]f Daimler’s California activities sufficed to allow adjudication of this Argentina-rooted case in California, the same global reach would presumably be available in every other state in which MBUSA’s sales are sizable. Such exorbitant exercises of all-purpose jurisdiction would scarcely permit out-of-state defendants “to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.”
The Court further rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on an agency theory. The Ninth Circuit’s agency analysis derived from circuit precedent considering principally whether the subsidiary performs services that are sufficiently important to the foreign corporation that if it did not have a representative to perform them, the corporation’s own officials would undertake to perform substantially similar services. The Ninth Circuit thus reasoned that MBUSA’s services were “important” to Daimler, as gauged by Daimler’s hypothetical readiness to perform those services itself if MBUSA did not exist. The Supreme Court criticized this approach, nothing that this inquiry “stacks the deck,” for it will always yield a pro-jurisdiction answer: anything a corporation does through an independent contractor, subsidiary, or distributor is presumably something that the corporation would do by other means if the independent contractor, subsidiary, or distributor did not exist. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s rationale was inconsistent with Goodyear. The Supreme Court left open, however, whether other exercises of agency theory can form a basis for general jurisdiction. Specifically, the Court noted, but did not opine on whether a subsidiary’s contacts can be imputed to its parent when the former is so dominated by the latter as to be its alter ego.
Impact
This case should provide some assurance to large corporate entities that a lawsuit based on entirely foreign activities will not be permitted in a state other than the corporation’s principal place of business or place of incorporation, or other state where the corporation is “at home.” Attorneys should look to the district and circuit courts for guidance on where, in addition to an entity’s place of incorporation and principal place of business, an entity will be amenable to general jurisdiction.
This decision leaves open important questions, including whether agency theory, in general, is a proper means to general jurisdiction, and whether general jurisdiction may be found where a subsidiary is a parent’s alter ego.
In the Halliburton case, the United States Supreme Court is expected to reconsider the ruling in the decision of Basic Inc. v. Levinson that, twenty-five years ago, adopted the fraud-on-the-market theory, which has since facilitated securities class action litigation. We seek to contribute to this reconsideration by providing a conceptual and economic framework for a reexamination of the Basic rule, taking into account and relating our analysis to the Justices’ questions at the Halliburton oral argument.
We show that, in contrast to claims made by the parties, the Justices need not assess the validity or scientific standing of the efficient market hypothesis; they need not, as it were, decide whether they find the view of Eugene Fama or Robert Shiller more persuasive. Classwide reliance, we explain, should depend not on the “efficiency” of the market for the company’s security but on the existence of fraudulent distortion of the market price. Indeed, based on our review of the large body of research on market efficiency in financial economics, we show that, even fully accepting the views and evidence of market efficiency critics such as Professor Shiller, it is possible for market prices to be distorted by fraudulent disclosures. Conversely, even fully accepting the views and evidence of market efficiency supporters such as Professor Fama, it is possible for market prices not to be distorted by fraudulent disclosures. In short, even assuming the Court was somehow in a position to adjudicate the academic debate on market efficiency, market efficiency should not be the focus for determining classwide reliance.
We put forward an alternative approach that is focused on the existence of fraudulent distortion. We further discuss the analytical tools that would enable the federal courts to implement our alternative approach, as well as the allocation of the burden of proof, and we explain that a determination of fraudulent distortion would not usurp the merits issues of materiality and loss causation. Questions asked by some of the Justices at the oral argument suggest that such an alternative approach might appeal to the Court.
The proposed approach avoids reliance on the efficient market hypothesis and thereby avoids the problems with current judicial practice argued by petitioners (as well as those stressed by Justice White in his Basic opinion). It provides a coherent and implementable framework for identifying classwide reliance in appropriate circumstances. It also has the virtue of focusing on the economic impact (if any) of the actual misstatements and omissions at issue, rather than general features of the securities markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Halliburton case, now before the U.S. Supreme Court, promises to be of fundamental importance to securities class action litigants.1 The questions presented in this case are twofold: first, whether the Court should overrule or substantially modify the holding of Basic Inc. v. Levinson2 to the extent that it recognizes a presumption of classwide reliance derived from the fraud-on-the-market theory; and, second, whether the defendant may prevent class certification by introducing evidence that the alleged misrepresentation did not distort the market price of its security. The fraud-on-the-market theory is premised on the idea that the price of a security traded in an “efficient” market will reflect all publicly available information about a company; accordingly, a buyer of the security may be presumed to have relied on that information in purchasing the security. The Basic decision has shaped securities litigation over the past twenty-five years, and its expected reexamination could thus be consequential for this area of the law for years to come.
In this paper we provide a conceptual and economic framework for a reexamination of the Basic rule. To this end, we assess the large body of work on market efficiency in financial economics and bring it to bear on the current debate over the fraud-on-the-market presumption. In this literature, a market can be considered efficient with respect to an information set if it is impossible to make abnormal returns by trading on the basis of that information set. Our analysis leads to the following conclusions regarding the questions presented in Halliburton:
(i) Basic should be substantially modified so as to ensure that class certification in terms of the reliance inquiry does not turn on the “efficiency” of the market in which the security trades—or, more generally, on the validity of the “efficient market hypothesis.” Rather, it should turn on the existence of “fraudulent distortion”—that is, on whether a misstatement affected (and was thus reflected in) the security’s market price.3
(ii) Given that the existence of fraudulent distortion should determine classwide reliance, defendants would always have, as would plaintiffs, the ability to introduce evidence concerning the existence of such distortion.
More important than our answers to the questions presented is, of course, our reasons. Our answers are a function of what we consider to be three fundamental points that should set the conceptual and economic framework within which these questions should be explored:
First, and most crucially, whether a court certifies a securities class action should not depend on a judicial assessment of the “efficient market hypothesis.” Nor should it depend on whether a court deems the market in a particular security (or at a particular moment in time) to be “efficient.” It is unnecessary for the Supreme Court, or for the federal courts more generally, to assess whether conditions of market efficiency obtain in general or in the case of a given company in particular. In short, the Supreme Court does not have to determine whether it finds the view associated with Eugene Fama or the view associated with Robert Shiller (both recipients of the 2013 Nobel Prize in economics for their work on this subject) more persuasive. The answer to Chief Justice Roberts’ question “How am I supposed to review the economic literature and decide which of you is correct on that?” asked at oral argument is therefore simply that there is no need for the Court to make such a decision.4
To show that an assessment of market efficiency should not be decisive for determining whether potential members of a securities class action are similarly situated in terms of reliance, we explain what the standard tests for efficiency in financial economics are and why they should not be used for assessing classwide reliance. We review the key types of evidence that have been put forward to question market efficiency and show that, even fully accepting the views and evidence of efficiency critics such as Professor Shiller, it is possible for market prices to be distorted by fraudulent disclosures. Conversely, we demonstrate that, even fully accepting the views and evidence of market efficiency supporters such as Professor Fama, it is possible for market prices not to be distorted by a given fraudulent disclosure. In short, even assuming that the Court is in a position to adjudicate its relative merits, the debate on market efficiency in financial economics should not be the focus in determining classwide reliance.
Second, the economic issue that should be the focal point of judicial inquiry into whether potential class members are similarly situated in terms of reliance is whether fraudulent distortion of a security’s market price exists. If it does exist, there will be a certain class of investors who are similarly situated in terms of the reliance inquiry.5 As we will point out in the course of our discussion, questions asked by the Justices at the Halliburton oral argument seemed to reflect a possible interest in adopting such an approach.
Consider a scenario in which a materially misleading statement inflated the market price of a security so that the price was higher than it would have been but for the fraudulent statement, and suppose that a class of investors purchased the stock at a price that, unknown to them, was fraudulently distorted. It is appropriate for these investors to rely on the market price not being fraudulently distorted, and in such a scenario, they are similarly situated to the extent that the market price was in fact fraudulently compromised.6 The existence of such fraudulent distortion—the price being different than it would have been in the absence of the fraud—should be key for assessing classwide reliance. Whether fraudulent distortion exists can be assessed directly and should not be decided by assessing whether the efficient market hypothesis generally holds true or whether the market for the particular security was efficient.
While the proposed rule, with its focus on fraudulent distortion, represents a meaningful modification of Basic, it retains the Basic Court’s recognition that misstatements and omissions can affect (and thereby get reflected in) market prices and that this can produce classwide consequences. At the same time, as we explain, our modification addresses the concerns expressed by Justice White in his Basic opinion: among other things, it does not place general reliance on contestable economic theories, and it makes no assumptions about the “true value” of a security.7
Third, the rule we propose would avoid some of the significant administrability and implementation problems that have afflicted the federal courts’ practice in this area. Because the courts have thus far had to provide a yes/no answer to whether the market for a given security is efficient, significant problems of over-and under-inclusion have arisen.8 As we explain, a focus on fraudulent distortion would avoid much of the administrability problems lower courts have struggled with when applying Basic. Furthermore, as we document, there are standard and sound methods drawn from the academic finance and accounting literature for ascertaining whether a disclosure resulted in a distortionary price impact (a toolkit that should displace the current exclusive focus on the Cammer factors, which test for market efficiency).9
In addition, we discuss the allocation of the burden of proof. The proposed modified rule could place that burden on plaintiffs, requiring them to prove the existence of fraudulent distortion, or it could require defendants seeking to prevent class certification to demonstrate the lack of such a distortion. Either allocation of the burden of proof would be consistent with our approach and analytical framework.
Finally, we explain that a class certification test based on the presence (or absence) of fraudulent distortion would not usurp the merits issues of materiality and loss causation. A finding of fraudulent distortion, and hence classwide reliance, would not determine whether the allegedly false statement was material and whether such a statement caused plaintiffs’ losses.
While our paper was first circulated ahead of the briefing of the case (and was indeed cited by the main briefs of each of the sides10), we have revised the paper to reflect the questions raised at the oral argument. These questions highlight the potential relevance of our analysis to the Court’s decision, and we remark throughout on how our analysis is related to the questions raised.
Encouragingly, the focus of the Halliburton oral argument very much focused on the possibility of adopting a fraudulent distortion approach in lieu of a test based on whether the market was “efficient.” For instance (and perhaps most tellingly), Justice Kagan at oral argument asked counsel for Halliburton
so you are not relying anymore on the notion that the efficient markets hypothesis has been undermined. That is not one of the three points that you’re making . . . . You just say Halliburton has never said that market prices, has never contested that market prices generally respond to new material information. So you are agreeing with that, that market prices generally respond to new material information?11
Consistent with a fraudulent distortion approach, defense counsel answered, “Cited at that general—general level, we don’t disagree with it.”12 Justices Alito, Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Roberts also asked related questions at oral argument further exploring the issue of fraudulent distortion.13
The remainder of our analysis is organized as follows. Part II provides an assessment of the academic literature on efficient markets and why the issue of market efficiency should not be determinative of classwide reliance. Part III discusses our alternative approach—its formulation, relation to Basic, implementation, administrability, and design. Part IV concludes.
II. MOVING AWAY FROM THE EFFICIENT MARKETS DEBATE
In this part, we show that the federal courts need not assess the validity of the efficient market hypothesis. We apply the large body of work on efficient markets in the financial economics literature to the debate over Basic’s fraud-on-the-market presumption. We explain that even fully accepting (and many do not) the basic criticisms of market efficiency found in the financial economics literature does not imply that investors were necessarily dissimilarly situated in terms of the economic impact of an alleged misstatement of the market price. Nor does fully accepting the validity of the efficient market hypothesis necessarily indicate the existence of a fraudulent distortion of market prices. The answer to whether investors were similarly situated in terms of classwide reliance should not be decided simply by reference to the efficiency of market prices in general or to the company’s security in particular.
A.THE FOCUS ON THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS
There is a longstanding debate in financial economics concerning the efficient market hypothesis. The literature on the subject is voluminous, with much of it highly technical in nature. Indeed, the Nobel Prize Committee chose to award the 2013 prize to two researchers who have very different views on the subject: Eugene Fama and Robert Shiller.14
Critics of market efficiency, including Professor Shiller, stress evidence that they believe proves that markets are generally inefficient, whereas supporters of market efficiency, including Professor Fama, question that evidence and the interpretation of it and instead stress evidence that markets are generally efficient. The Nobel Prize Committee, by choosing to recognize researchers who tend to be associated with different sides of the debate, recognized the importance of the work done by both supporters and critics of market efficiency.
The parties to the Halliburton case likewise take different views on the state of the debate, and each asks the Supreme Court to accept its view. The petition for certiorari, for instance, states that “scholarly consensus now teaches that even in such well-developed markets, stock prices do not efficiently incorporate all types of information at all times.”15 Similarly, the Chamber of Commerce in its brief claims that Basic relies “on unquestioned adherence to a court-sanctioned efficient-market theory that today’s economists increasingly reject.”16 By contrast, the brief in opposition states that the “semi-strong efficient market hypothesis . . . continues to enjoy widespread support among economists.”17 This focus on the current scientific status of the efficient market hypothesis is understandable given that Justice Blackmun’s Basic decision references the concept of market efficiency at several key junctures.
It is worth noting that while the two sides take different overall views in the debate, they both invited the Court to form a judgment on the state of the evidence for the efficient market hypothesis. They did so by relying on and citing largely secondary sources that purport to support their overall assessment. Indeed, neither of the main merits briefs engages directly with the key empirical evidence and relate this evidence to the question of classwide reliance.
By contrast, our analysis below is based on such an engagement. On the basis of our assessment of the academic research on efficient markets, we explain why the future of classwide reliance in securities litigation should not depend on which party—Professor Fama and other researchers generally associated with the efficient market hypothesis or Professor Shiller and similarly minded researchers—the Supreme Court finds more persuasive.
B.WHAT MARKET EFFICIENCY MEANS TO FINANCIAL ECONOMISTS
The Basic opinion stresses that prices in an efficient market reflect information and that, in such a market, alleged misrepresentations might distort prices relative to what they would be in the absence of such misrepresentations.18 The tendency of prices to respond to new information is indeed an implication of an efficient market. But to financial economists, the property of efficiency is not equivalent to mere responsiveness to information (such as misrepresentations).
According to the original definition put forth by Professor Fama in his seminal 1970 paper, “[a] market in which prices always ‘fully reflect’ available information is called ‘efficient.’”19 Equivalently, as Michael Jensen explained eight years later in another famous paper, a market can be considered efficient with respect to an information set if it is impossible to make abnormal returns by trading on the basis of that information set.20 If the market is efficient with respect to the publicly available information set, it is semi-strong efficient.21
On a similar note, Professor Burton Malkiel defines an efficient market as one that does “not allow investors to earn above-average returns without accepting above-average risks.”22 Or, to turn to a recent paper on the subject, “to test for an efficient market, one only needs to show that there are no arbitrage opportunities nor dominated securities with respect to an information set.”23 In other words, if there are abnormal stock returns that would accrue from trading using a particular information set, the market is not efficient with respect to— that is, has not “fully reflected”—that information (at least with respect to the time period during which the abnormal returns would be generated).24
In this sense, one can say that inefficient stock prices are therefore “inaccurate” in that they do not fully impound all the value implications of information, as evidenced by the subsequent abnormal returns that can be generated using that information. That is, when the market is efficient, current prices must be such that no profit opportunities—abnormal returns—are left on the table.
Needless to say, an enormous amount of the academic literature on efficient markets has focused on whether there are abnormal returns associated with various trading strategies using a particular information set (such as all publicly available information). There are now thousands of studies in this vein, many of which— but by no means all—postdate the 1988 Basic decision.25 For our purposes, the critical question is whether the absence or presence of arbitrage opportunities (the key criterion for market efficiency) should determine class certification.
Our answer is that it should not. As we explain in Section C below, the presence of arbitrage opportunities (and thus market inefficiency) does not preclude the possibility of fraudulent distortion of market prices and thus classwide reliance. Conversely, as we explain in Section D, the general absence of arbitrage opportunities (and thus market efficiency of the relevant security) does not imply the existence of fraudulent distortion of prices and classwide reliance.
C.ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES DO NOT IMPLY ABSENCE OF FRAUDULENT DISTORTION
Let us start by examining the ways in which critics of the efficient market hypothesis claim to have found flaws in this theory. We wish to emphasize at the outset that these claims are contested in the academic literature. Our goal in this section is simply to ask whether even fully accepting these claims somehow affects one’s judgment whether classwide reliance exists. We proceed by discussing three important strands of the academic critique of efficient markets: (i) market overvaluation/long-run return predictability, (ii) excessive volatility, and (iii) market underreaction to information.
As a recent survey of the academic literature on efficient markets explains, “A long history lies behind the idea that asset returns should be impossible to predict if asset prices reflect all relevant information.”26 One of the earliest formal demonstrations of this idea can be found in Paul Samuelson’s 1965 paper Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly. Professor Samuelson ties this idea to a lack of arbitrage, explaining that the lack of return predictability “means that there is no way of making an expected profit by extrapolating past changes in the futures price, by chart or any other esoteric devices of magic or mathematics.”27
While a number of papers have in fact found that returns are generally unpredictable (or only modestly predictable) in the short run,28 a substantial body of research comes to the opposite conclusion with respect to long-term return predictability. Professor Shiller argues that an investor could in fact earn higher returns by buying stocks at times in which the price-to-dividend ratio (price divided by the stock’s current dividend) is historically low and by selling stocks when this ratio is high.29 And, on a similar note, John Campbell and Professor Shiller report that price-to-earnings (P/E) ratios (with earnings averaged over time) can predict long-term stock returns, with high P/E ratios indicating low future returns and low P/E ratios indicating high future returns.30
In short, according to this research, abnormal returns might be possible by betting against the market when it is high and going long when the market is low. A number of papers have built on this work, attempting to identify predictors of long-term stock returns.31 To critics of market efficiency, this body of evidence suggests that, at certain times, the market inefficiently overvalues stocks (as evidenced by a high price-to-dividend or high P/E ratio), and so returns over the longer term are suppressed.
We should note that this conclusion is contested in the literature; supporters of market efficiency have interpreted these findings as being consistent with market efficiency.32 For our purposes, however, what is important is that, even if we fully accept these results and their interpretation by efficiency critics, they do not imply the absence of classwide reliance. This can be demonstrated through a simple hypothetical:
Market Overvaluation Hypo: The market is in a time of overvaluation, with the average P/E ratios being 20 and the historical average P/E ratio being only 15. An average P/E ratio firm falsely tells the market that it has $2 of earnings while in fact the firm has only $1 of earnings. This is a pleasant surprise to the market as, prior to the misstatement, it had been expecting only $1 of earnings. As a result of the misstatement, the stock price doubles from $20 to $40 (given the doubling of earnings being reported). A month later the truth comes out and the stock drops from $40 back to $20. Over the next several years, the firm’s stock return from a historical perspective is low as its P/E ratio of 20 falls closer to the historical average of 15.
It is quite difficult to see why classwide reliance should turn on the fact that the market’s current P/E ratio represents overvaluation or the fact that future returns for the market, and for this particular firm, might be lower (or perhaps even negative) as a result of the P/E ratio drifting back toward the historical average over time. And yet it is this type of issue that is often discussed (and debated) in the academic literature on market efficiency.
2.Excessive Volatility
Professor Shiller famously asked in a 1981 paper whether stock prices move too much to be justified by subsequent changes in dividends.33 His paper puts forward evidence suggesting that the answer is yes—there is excessive volatility in stock prices. The purported deviation from efficient pricing caused by excessive volatility could then imply an arbitrage opportunity.34 To be sure, this answer has been contested and has generated a substantial and still ongoing academic debate on the issue.35
But suppose that markets are inefficient, as stock prices do fluctuate excessively. With this supposition, we return to the hypothetical firm that misstated its earnings:
Excessive Volatility Hypo: A firm falsely tells the market that it has $2 of earnings while in fact it has only $1 of earnings. Prior to the misstatement, the market had been expecting $1 of earnings, but the misstatement causes the stock price to double from $20 to $40 (given the doubling of earnings being reported). Thereafter, the price fluctuates randomly for no reason whatsoever between $38 and $42 every single hour of the trading day for the next month. A month later, the stock price drops back to $20 when the truth is revealed about the firm’s true earnings, and the price subsequently continues to fluctuate randomly between $19 and $21 every hour.
As with our market overvaluation hypothetical, it is very difficult to see why excessive volatility should determine classwide reliance. To be sure, the excessive volatility created opportunities for some trading profits. Throughout the considered one-month period, the security’s price was subject to a fraudulent distortion that would have a classwide impact on the purchasers of the stock.
3.Market Underreaction
One final strand of the inefficient market literature we mention is the issue of market underreaction to information. In the securities class action context, one is often focused on (false) positive information, such as our hypothetical firm reporting the “good” news that it has $2 of earnings. Thus, for purposes of our discussion, we now focus on market underreaction to positive information. With market underreaction, the market does not fully price the impact of the good news immediately. In the longer run, however, the information does eventually get impounded into the stock price. This can lead to “momentum” in stock prices—that is, an initial positive stock price return followed by further positive stock returns.36
We return once again to the hypothetical firm that misstated its earnings, now assuming market underreaction.
Market Underreaction Hypo: A firm once again falsely tells the market that it has $2 of earnings while in fact it has only $1 of earnings. Prior to the misstatement, the market had been expecting $1 of earnings. Upon word of the “good” news, the stock price initially increases from $20 to $35 and, over the coming week, increases another $5 up to $40. A month later, when the truth is revealed about the firm’s true earnings, the stock price drops back to $20.
As per the standard definition of market efficiency in financial economics, this is a case in which the market is clearly inefficient; the slow, gradual response of the market price to the disclosure enabled one to make $5 by buying the stock right after the disclosure and selling the stock when it reached $40. Although an arbitrageur could conceivably make abnormal returns, it is still the case that any investor who purchased the stock after the false representation (but before the corrective disclosure) paid an additional $15 or $20 as a result of the fraudulent distortion.
D.ABSENCE OF ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES DOES NOT IMPLY FRAUDULENT DISTORTION
Suppose one rejects the various criticisms of efficient markets explored in Section C and instead adopts the view that markets are generally efficient and that any deviations from efficiency are modest and fleeting. It is worth noting that even among supporters of the efficient market hypothesis, it is uncontested that markets cannot be perfectly efficient.37 As Professor Fama explained in his survey of the efficient market literature: “the extreme version of the market efficiency hypothesis is surely false. . . . Each reader is . . . free to judge the scenarios where market efficiency is a good approximation . . . and those where some other model is a better simplifying view of the world.”38
As we illustrate below, through the use of two new hypotheticals, it is entirely possible that, even in the context of a generally efficient market, a misstatement might have no distortive impact on the market price. In short, the assumption of an efficient market should not lead one to conclude that fraudulent distortion necessarily occurred. Whether fraudulent distortion did occur remains an empirical question that needs to be addressed.
1.Public and Transparent Misstatement with No Fraudulent Distortion
Even in a market that is generally efficient, fraudulent statements, even ones that are clearly noticed by investors and analysts, might not have a price impact and thus might not fraudulently distort the market price. To see this, consider the following hypothetical:
Public and Transparent Misstatement with No Price Impact Hypo: Suppose an internet firm, which is closely followed by analysts (and with all the Cammer factors clearly indicating that its stock trades in an “efficient” market), discloses to the market its recent quarterly earnings. Several days later, the firm falsely discloses that the number of visitors to its website (“internet eyeballs”) increased in the last quarter some 75 percent. Analysts carefully ask the company about the internet eyeball number and what it might mean for firm profitability. On the date of the misrepresentation there is no price reaction. When the misrepresentation is later revealed, there is likewise no price reaction.
In this hypothetical, we would conclude that there is no classwide reliance given the lack of a price reaction associated with the misstatement regardless of the “efficiency” of the market. One could, of course, ask why there was no price reaction. Perhaps the market did not view this information as important, and so the fact that the information was misstated is also unimportant. Perhaps all that matters to the market is quarterly earnings, which had been earlier released to the market. Or perhaps the market for some reason simply did not believe the firm when it released the internet eyeball figure. At the end of the day, however, the reason for the lack of a price reaction is not central to the classwide reliance question. What should be determinative of that question is the absence of fraudulent distortion.
2.Buried and Opaque Misstatements
As we noted earlier, even strong supporters of the efficient capital market hypothesis agree that this hypothesis is at most an approximation of market conditions and that modest arbitrage opportunities might arise because some information in unusual circumstances might not get quickly and fully reflected in market prices. One possible reason is that some information might be buried and opaque and thus not readily absorbed and fully analyzed by investors. Consider the following hypothetical:
Buried and Opaque Information Hypo: Suppose a firm, in a publicly available report on its environmental policies (with this specific report being of very limited general interest), misstates some aspect of its financials. The misstatement is contained in a footnote and is written in a convoluted fashion. Further suppose that neither the misstatement nor a subsequent disclosure that the footnote was incorrect is associated with a price reaction.
As before, we would conclude that, given the lack of a price reaction associated with the misstatement, there is no classwide reliance. The reason underlying the lack of a price reaction may be unknown. It may be that although the market is generally efficient, this particular unusual disclosure, in context, reflects a modest deviation from efficiency. Or perhaps the disclosure is not important to the market given other information available. But again, while the reasons might be helpful in understanding why there was no price reaction, it is the fact that there was no price reaction that is determinative.
E.A FINAL REMARK ON THE MARKET EFFICIENCY DEBATE
Abstracting for a moment from the specific positions taken in the academic debate on market efficiency, one can ask a different question: Why has the debate continued unabated over the course of decades? One possible answer is a statistical one: the power of statistical tests sometimes used to test market efficiency is low, making it difficult to arrive at definitive proof one way or another.39 A related answer goes back to an issue originally identified by Professor Fama in his 1970 paper: the joint hypothesis problem in testing for efficient markets. Andrew Lo describes the joint hypothesis issue in the following way:
[T]he Efficient Markets hypothesis, by itself, is not a well-defined and empirically refutable hypothesis. To make it operational, one must specify additional structure, e.g., investors’ preferences, information structure, business conditions, etc. But then a test of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis becomes a test of several auxiliary hypotheses as well, and a rejection of such a joint hypothesis tells us little about which aspect of the joint hypothesis is inconsistent with the data.40
The joint hypothesis issue suggests that, for the foreseeable future, reasonable financial economists could well be expected to hold divergent views on the extent to which markets are generally efficient. Fortunately, as we have discussed at length above, courts need not worry about this issue. Thus, our analysis directly responds to a question that Chief Justice Roberts pointedly asked at the oral argument: “How am I supposed to review the economic literature and decide which of you is correct on that?”41 This analysis indicates that there is absolutely no need whatsoever for the Court to attempt to make such a decision.42
Assessing the extent to which the evidence supports the efficient market hypothesis, then, should not affect the judgment as to the existence of classwide reliance. Rather, we recommend that, going forward in determining classwide reliance, courts focus on whether the alleged misstatement resulted in fraudulent distortion, an inquiry that does not turn on providing a definitive yes/no answer to the market efficiency question.
As we have documented, the Justices at the Halliburton oral argument spent a significant amount of time exploring the merits of adopting a fraudulent distortion approach. It is to the fraudulent distortion alternative to the traditional focus on “efficient” markets that we now turn.
III. GOING FORWARD
A.REFORMULATING BASIC: FRAUDULENT DISTORTION
A showing of market efficiency is currently the key precondition to invoking Basic’s fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance. The Supreme Court in Amgen (decided last year) described the Basic fraud-on-the-market test of reliance in the following way:
The fraud-on-the-market premise is that the price of a security traded in an efficient market will reflect all publicly available information about a company; accordingly, a buyer of the security may be presumed to have relied on that information in purchasing the security. . . . Thus, where the market for a security is inefficient, . . . a plaintiff cannot invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption.43
This rule can be viewed as consisting of three propositions:
(A1)The price of a security traded in an efficient market will reflect all publicly available information about a company;
(A2)Accordingly, a buyer of the security in an efficient market may be presumed to have relied on public information in purchasing the security; and
(A3)Where the market for a security is inefficient, a plaintiff cannot invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption.
We propose replacing these three propositions with the following three propositions (the text below bolds the changes made to (A1)–(A3) to produce the three new propositions):
(B1)The price of a security traded in an efficienta public market will reflect allsome publicly available information about a company;
(B2)Accordingly, a buyer of the security in an efficienta public market may be presumed to have relied on public information in purchasing the security on the market price not being fraudulently distorted,i.e., not being different from what it would have been absent thedisclosure deficiency; and
(B3)Where the market price for a security is inefficientnot fraudulentlydistorted, a plaintiff cannot invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumptionclasswide reliance presumption.
The difference between our approach and that of the Basic rule can be viewed by noting the changes made in the three propositions. Our formulation of (B1) avoids the use of the term “efficient market,” whose existence, we have shown, should not be decisive for determining classwide reliance. What is key is that the prices of securities in public markets are affected—and thereby reflect—some (but not necessarily all) public information. The key question is not whether all public information affects market prices but whether the public information that is the subject of the litigation under consideration had such an impact.
Our formulation of (B2) again avoids the use of market efficiency that leads to the markets reflecting all public information. We limit classwide reliance to buyers’ reliance on the market price of a security not being fraudulently distorted— that is, reliance on the market price not being impacted by (and thus reflecting) misstatements and omissions that produced a price different from what it would have been in the absence of fraud. It is appropriate for an investor engaged in a security transaction to rely on the market price not being fraudulently distorted— whether or not market pricing happens to be consistent with some arbitrage profits being left unexploited (perhaps as a result of long-run return predictability, excessive volatility, or market underreaction).44
Our formulation of (B3) follows from the centrality of fraudulent price distortion. The issue of whether there is a class of investors similarly situated in terms of reliance should turn on whether there is fraudulent distortion: where such distortion does not exist, classwide reliance does not arise. Which side should have the burden of proof with respect to the existence of fraudulent distortion is an issue that we discuss in Section E. As we will explain, allocation of the burden of proof to either plaintiffs or defendants would be consistent with our approach and analytical points.
We would like to stress that propositions (B1)–(B3) should be acceptable to individuals reasonably taking different views on the validity of the efficient market hypothesis. These propositions are fully consistent with the views and evidence of both academic supporters and critics of the efficient market hypothesis alike.
Indeed, at the Halliburton oral argument, both the defendants and plaintiffs (who disagree as to the validity of the efficient market hypothesis) did agree that material information generally impacts security prices in public markets. 45 Or as Justice Kennedy noted to defense counsel at the Halliburton oral argument, an approach based on fraudulent distortion “does seem to me to be a substantial answer to your economic analysis to the . . . challenge you make to the economic premises of the Basic decision.”46
To illustrate this point of commonality, we return to our hypothetical firm that misstates earnings in market conditions involving market inefficiency. In all three hypotheticals—market overvaluation, excessive volatility, and market underreaction—the misstatement is assumed to have had a substantial distortionary impact. This assumption is consistent with each of the three types of market inefficiency being assumed. Classwide reliance exists in these hypotheticals as investors’ reliance on the market price is in fact compromised by fraudulent distortion.
For our hypothetical firm that misstates earnings in market conditions involving generally efficient markets, the absence of fraudulent distortion leads to the opposite conclusion: that no classwide reliance exists. In short, the existence or absence of market inefficiencies (arbitrage opportunities) simply does not line up with whether classwide reliance exists.
We would also like to emphasize that our reformulation of the Basic rule addresses the criticisms put forward by Justice White in his well-known opinion in the Basic case. Justice White expressed concern that “with no staff economists, no experts schooled in the ‘efficient-capital-market hypothesis,’ no ability to test the validity of empirical market studies, we are not well equipped to embrace novel constructions of a statute based on contemporary microeconomic theory.”47 The proposed modified rule does not depend on assessing the soundness of competing views in financial economics.
Our fraudulent distortion approach also addresses another concern expressed by Justice White when he opined that classwide reliance should not depend on the assumption that investors believed at time of purchase, or at any other time, that the market price reflected in some sense “true value” (whatever meaning one wants to ascribe to this somewhat elusive phrase). This concern was echoed at the Halliburton oral argument where defense counsel noted that “[m]any investors such as hedge funds, rapid fire, volatility traders, index fund investors, sophisticated value investors have investment strategies that do not rely on the integrity of the market price whatsoever.”48 Under our approach, market prices need not be relied on or assumed by investors to reflect true value. Fraudulent distortion merely turns on whether the market price is different from what it otherwise would have been absent the fraud.49
B.FRAUDULENT DISTORTION AND THE LOGIC OF BASIC
Our recommendation to change the judicial focus from issues of market efficiency to those of fraudulent distortion, while representing a substantial reformulation of Basic, is nevertheless broadly consistent with what we see as the driving impetus for Basic’s fraud-on-the-market approach: the desire to focus on situations in which market prices are distorted by misrepresentations in a way that significantly distorts market pricing. In this vein, the Basic Court stated that the Securities Act of 1934 was based “on the premise that securities markets are affected by information, and enacted legislation to facilitate an investor’s reliance on the integrity of those markets.”50 We hasten to add that, as we point out in Section E when discussing the allocation of the burden of proof using a fraudulent distortion approach, our approach is also consistent with incorporating judicial concerns over strike suits and class certification generating unwarranted settlement value.
More specifically, it is worth noting in this connection that at some points, the Basic decision’s discussion of the fraud-on-the-market presumption strongly points in the direction of fraudulent distortion. For instance, the Basic Court explains, “Any showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance.”51 Certainly a lack of price distortion should sever the link between the market price in a security transaction and the misrepresentation (and ignoring the potentially confusing reference to a “fair” market price).
Indeed, one of the examples the Court gives of an instance where the “link” would be severed involves a scenario in which “the market price would not have been affected by [the] misrepresentation.”52 The Basic Court also explains, “For purposes of accepting the presumption of reliance in this case, we need only believe that market professionals generally consider most publicly announced material statements about companies, thereby affecting stock market prices.”53 To ask whether the misrepresentation actually affected the stock price is precisely the fraudulent distortion inquiry we recommend.
In discussing circumstances in which classwide reliance will exist, there is an important doctrinal issue that bears special mention (and was referenced in the Basic decision) that has received insufficient attention in the discussion over Halliburton. As it currently stands, the Basic fraud-on-the-market presumption is potentially available in securities cases involving misrepresentations (or cases “primarily” involving misrepresentations). There is another, separate presumption of classwide reliance available in Rule 10b-5 litigation pursuant to the Court’s decision in Affiliated Ute.54 Under Affiliated Ute, investors are automatically entitled to a presumption of reliance (with no showing of market efficiency) if the allegations “primarily” involve omissions. The Basic Court explains that the AffiliatedUte presumption makes sense as “requiring a plaintiff to show a speculative state of facts, i.e., how he would have acted if omitted material information had been disclosed . . . would place an unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden on the Rule 10b-5 plaintiff who has traded on an impersonal market.”55
We agree that proving what one would have done had a certain disclosure been made could well be speculative and therefore difficult in many instances. But there is no reason in principle why the fraudulent distortion approach should not apply equally in an omission case. The issue of whether the disclosure deficiency is an omission or misrepresentation should be the same: Did the disclosure deficiency result in fraudulent distortion?
Given this, the sound approach would be to remove the separate presumption of reliance currently available in cases “primarily” involving omissions. The issue should still be the question of fraudulent distortion. This unified approach would have the added benefit of removing the often arbitrary distinction between cases “primarily” involving omissions versus misrepresentations (and the gamesmanship that can go along with attempting to be on the desired side of the line).56
C.A KEY ADVANTAGE OF FOCUSING ON FRAUDULENT DISTORTION
Before discussing how courts could actually apply a fraudulent distortion test, we first highlight a key advantage of our approach over the current practice of focusing on market efficiency. The Halliburton petitioners as well as various commentators have stressed the problems that result from providing a definitive yes/ no answer as to whether the security trades in a market that is generally efficient. Our approach avoids these problems because it is focused on whether the specific misrepresentation(s) at issue in the litigation resulted in fraudulent distortion.
Under Basic, courts are tasked with determining whether the market in the security is generally efficient. In answering this question, they employ an open-ended multifactor test. Typically invoked in this context is the five-factor Cammer test for market efficiency.57 Other factors have been used as well.58 As the First Circuit explained in Polymedica, “Many factors bearing on the structure of the market may be relevant to the efficiency analysis, and courts have wide latitude in deciding what factors to apply in a given case, and what weight should be given to those factors.”59
This open-ended inquiry then leads to a binary answer: the market is deemed to be either efficient or inefficient. Commentators and the petitioners in Halliburton have highlighted the inherent difficulties in this kind of inquiry, one of which is that efficiency is a continuum rendering a yes/no answer potentially arbitrary.60 Indeed, in our market efficiency hypotheticals in Part II.D, the market is generally, but not necessarily perfectly, efficient.
The other problem, which to us is the most central, is that the focus on market conditions in general, as well as in situations having little or nothing to do with the case under consideration, leads to a serious problem of over- and under-inclusion. In our hypothetical firm that misstates earnings, there is fraudulent distortion even though the market is inefficient. And in our hypotheticals involving misstatements made when the market is generally efficient, there is no fraudulent distortion. The former would be an example of under-inclusion and the latter an example of over-inclusion resulting from the focus on market efficiency. In considering this problem, it is worth bearing in mind that a market might be relatively efficient along some dimensions, while being less efficient along different dimensions.
In contrast to the market efficiency approach, our fraudulent distortion approach focuses on the actual issues presented by the litigation. Thus, if a company is trading in a market in which there are significant deviations from efficiency but the evidence shows fraudulent distortion in the situation actually at issue in the litigation, our approach would result in classwide reliance. Conversely, if a company is trading in a market that is generally efficient but the evidence shows no fraudulent distortion resulting from the alleged misstatement, our approach would lead to a denial of class certification. Thus our approach would avoid the above problems of over- and under-inclusion, problems that are the inherent result of the current market efficiency approach. As defense counsel at Halliburton’s oral argument acknowledged, “[T]he question should be whether the market price was distorted . . . this would remedy some of Basic’s under-inclusiveness and over-inclusiveness.”61
The over- and under-inclusion issue is a function of the fact that the focus on providing a simple yes/no answer to the question of efficiency does not line up with whether there is a class of investors similarly situated in terms of the economic impact resulting from market prices being fraudulently distorted. Our approach does. Of course, the question remains how to determine whether fraudulent distortion exists. It is to that question we now turn.
D.IDENTIFYING FRAUDULENT DISTORTION
In this section, we discuss briefly the availability of financial econometric tools for putting forward evidence regarding the presence or absence of fraudulent distortion. Parties would be able to use such tools to establish or rebut, depending on the allocation of the burden of proof on the issue, fraudulent distortion associated with the alleged misrepresentation or omission. A full analysis of these tools is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, to highlight the nature of the fraudulent distortion approach—an approach that would lead to a more focused and manageable analysis—we note three potential tools drawn from the relevant academic literature. As we explain below, our analysis highlights that the tools available for implementing a fraudulent distortion approach are not limited to the type of event studies that were significantly discussed at the Halliburton oral argument.
(i) Event Study at Time of Misrepresentation: An event study, perhaps the most ubiquitous analytical tool used in all of corporate finance, is a potentially powerful method for establishing fraudulent distortion.62 If the misstatement was a surprise to the market, such as the case when our hypothetical firm told the market that its earnings were $2 when the market expected only $1, a statistical analysis of whether the market price reacted upon learning of the information could be probative of whether fraudulent distortion exists. Again, a finding of a reaction is consistent with some specific forms of inefficiency commonly discussed in the academic literature, notably long-run return predictability.63 Likewise, a failure to find a price reaction is consistent with generally efficient markets.64
At the oral argument, Justices seemed to pay significant attention to the possible use of event studies at the time of misrepresentation to assess the presence of fraudulent distortion. For instance, Justice Kennedy asked about requiring event studies at the class certification stage.65 Justice Alito asked about the accuracy of event studies in identifying the impact of a disclosure.66 Chief Justice Roberts asked whether an event study would be more difficult than establishing efficiency in a typical case.67 On a similar note, Justice Kennedy asked whether requiring event studies would be costly.68
Given the level of interest concerning the use of event studies expressed at oral argument, we emphasize two related points. First, testing for fraudulent distortion does not simply reduce to conducting an event study at the time of the misrepresentation. The set of econometric tools that can potentially be used is broader, as we will shortly document.
Second, there are situations in which an event study at the time of misrepresentation will be of limited utility. If the misstatement was a so-called confirmatory lie—that is, a misstatement made so as to meet market expectations—then a failure to document a price reaction to it would not be expected even assuming the misstatement had a fraudulent impact. In such a situation, the confirmatory lie might prevent a stock price drop that would have occurred had the truth been told. Other analytical tools are needed to address this type of situation.
(ii) Event Study at Time of Corrective Disclosure: Another potential use of an event study would be to measure whether there was a price reaction when the market learned the truth about the misstatement—that is, at the time of a corrective disclosure. This could be relevant to the question of whether the misstatement at the time it was made resulted in fraudulent distortion (even if it was a confirmatory lie). To be sure, there might well be a number of issues surrounding the use of an event study in this manner, which need to be addressed for such an approach to be convincing, such as whether the market relevance of the information changed between the misrepresentation and the corrective disclosure.69
(iii) Forward-Casting: Another potential analytical tool, with a long tradition in the finance and accounting literature, is forward-casting.70 The basic idea is to estimate (i) the difference between how much the market would have been surprised if the truth had been told, relative to how surprised the market actually was given what was allegedly misreported; and (ii) what would have been the expected market price reaction (if any) to this level of surprise, given price reactions to similar types of disclosures (by the same firm or comparable firms).
To fix ideas, assume the misrepresentation is a confirmatory lie concerning earnings. In such a situation, an event study at the time of misrepresentation would likely not be informative as to fraudulent distortion. By measuring price reactions when the market had actually been surprised in the past when firm earnings were released, one can still estimate what the market reaction would have been had the market been told the truth. Alternatively, one could estimate price reactions for comparable firms when they reported earnings surprises. Using these estimates, one might be able to estimate the expected price impact (if any) of the misrepresentation in question.
E.PRESUMPTIONS: ALLOCATING THE BURDEN OF PROOF
We have thus far suggested that (i) classwide reliance should depend on the presence of fraudulent distortion, not market efficiency; (ii) an important advantage of the fraudulent distortion test is to focus attention on the actual issues at stake in the case; and (iii) there are well-established analytical tools available for determining the presence or absence of fraudulent distortion. In this section, we briefly discuss the issue of presumption—that is, allocating the burden of proof on the fraudulent distortion issue.
We do not take a position regarding which side should bear the burden of proof on fraudulent distortion. The burden of proof (i.e., the issue of presumptions) can be allocated to either the plaintiffs or the defendants (with the other side having the ability to rebut) with the focus nevertheless remaining squarely on fraudulent distortion. The Basic Court itself justified the adoption of its presumption of fraud-on-the-market reliance based on “considerations of fairness, public policy, and probability, as well as judicial economy.”71 A particular allocation of the burden of proof does not follow from our analytical framework and its focus on fraudulent distortion; it should thus be based on other considerations or analyses.
Perhaps the most commonly invoked practical and policy-type consideration by courts and some commentators are the concerns over strike suits and unwar-ranted settlement value generated by class certification. These concerns could lead one to prefer allocating the burden of proof to the plaintiffs on the fraudulent distortion issue. Indeed, Justice White in his Basic decision expressed these very concerns.72 Even with the burden allocated to the plaintiffs, the defendants could of course present rebuttal evidence.
On the other hand, the conclusion that such concerns are already adequately addressed could lead one to place the burden of proof on the defendants (with the plaintiffs having the ability to rebut).73 The Basic Court itself, in adopting a presumption of reliance, appears to have been motivated by its conclusion that the goals of the Securities Act of 1934 would best be served by lightening the evidentiary burden placed on the plaintiffs on the issue of reliance in the context of impersonal secondary market transactions.
Regardless of which side has the burden of proof, our analysis in this paper provides a clear answer to the second question presented in the petition for certiorari: defendants should be allowed to introduce, already at the class certification case, evidence on the absence of fraudulent distortion. By enabling this issue to be explored at the class certification stage, our proposed approach would prevent class litigation from proceeding past the certification stage (and potentially resulting in the extraction of a settlement) if fraudulent distortion does not in fact exist. This is yet another advantage of our approach.
F.RELATIONSHIP OF FRAUDULENT DISTORTION TO MERITS ISSUES
Finally, in this section, we discuss the sequence of judicial decisions that would be made under our proposed approach. Specifically, would a finding of classwide reliance under our proposal necessarily imply a finding of materiality, an issue that the Court held in Amgen to be a merits issue? And, on a related note, would a finding of classwide reliance under the proposed approach necessarily imply a finding of loss causation, an issue that the Court in its 2011 decision in Halliburton held also to be a merits issue? These are questions that commentators on our paper and the fraudulent distortion approach it supports have asked.74 As we explain below, the answer to both questions is no. We first address the question of materiality and then turn to loss causation.
1.Materiality
Under our proposed approach, a finding of fraudulent distortion would not entail that materiality necessarily exists and thus would not make consideration of the subject of materiality unnecessary at the merits stage (i.e., at summary judgment and trial). Consider the following hypothetical:
Mining Hypo: A U.S. company has a gold mine in Australia. The CEO of the company visits the mine and talks with the company’s geologists. Upon arriving back in the United States, the CEO is asked on television about the gold mine’s prospects. The CEO says, “I have talked with my geologists and I feel great about the gold mine.” The stock price of the company, which has been consistently flat (as was the market and industry) until the broadcasting of the CEO’s statement, jumps 10 percent immediately following the broadcast of the statement. It turns out (much later) that production of gold will not be possible at the gold mine. Plaintiffs establish (or the defendant fails to rebut) that the CEO’s allegedly false statement had an impact on the stock price.
Under our proposal there would be classwide reliance in the mining hypothetical. But at the merits stage there would still be the issue of whether the statement was materially misleading. The factual issue would be what exactly was told to the CEO by the company’s geologists. How favorable or unfavorable was this information concerning the gold mine? And did this information render materially misleading the CEO’s statement that “I have talked with my geologists and I feel great about the gold mine.”75 A finding that the statement had an impact on the stock price would thus not resolve, and would leave to the merits stage, the fact-intensive issue of materiality, i.e., whether the statement involved a materially misleading statement, raised by the hypothetical.
2.Loss Causation
In commentary reacting to the Halliburton oral argument, a leading law firm observed that a fraudulent distortion approach “stands in obvious tension with the Court’s ruling on a related issue in Halliburton I.”76 On a similar note, a finding of fraudulent distortion would not entail that loss causation exists and thus would not make consideration of the subject of loss causation unnecessary at the merits stage (i.e., at summary judgment and trial). Consider the following hypothetical:
FDA Approval Hypo: A firm makes an allegedly false statement that the FDA will likely approve its medical device. The stock price, which prior to the statement has been completely flat (as was the market and industry), immediately jumps 10 percent in the aftermath of the statement. Plaintiffs establish (or the defendant fails to rebut) that the firm’s allegedly false statement had an impact on the stock price.77
In our hypothetical, plaintiffs have, by assumption, established classwide reliance under our approach. The issue of loss causation would still be very much left unresolved, however. There has been no showing in our hypothetical that the fraudulent distortion resulted in any economic losses to plaintiffs. In DuraPharmaceuticals, the Court explained: “[I]n cases such as this one (i.e. fraud-on-the-market cases), an inflated purchase price will not itself constitute or proximately cause the relevant economic loss [for loss causation purposes] . . . . [I]f, say, the purchaser sells the shares quickly before the relevant truth begins to leak out, the misrepresentation will not have led to any loss.”78
Thus, merely purchasing at a fraudulent distorted price simply does not establish that the economic losses that one is seeking damages for were caused by the alleged fraud.79 This is entirely consistent with the fact that price impact is typically a necessary (but not sufficient) condition to establishing loss causation if loss causation is understood as economic losses caused by the dissipation of inflation (initially introduced by a misrepresentation) by a corrective disclosure. Justice Kagan noted at the Halliburton oral argument that “if you can’t prove price impact, you can’t prove loss causation and everybody’s claims die.”80
Therefore, under the proposed approach, the important merits issues of materiality and loss causation would not be usurped by a finding of fraudulent distortion at the class certification stage.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have provided a framework for thinking about the connection between market conditions and class action securities litigation. Our analysis can provide a useful framework for the current rethinking of Basic reliance and class certification in securities litigation.
We have shown that the focus on market efficiency by the Halliburton parties is misplaced. The standard tests for deviations from market efficiency as they are practiced in financial economics should not be decisive for securities litigation. Whether market prices leave money on the table for arbitrageurs should not determine class certification. Fully accepting the view of efficiency critics does not preclude the existence of fraudulent distortion of market prices and classwide impact in some cases; and, conversely, fully accepting the view of efficiency supporters does not imply that fraudulent distortion and classwide impact exist in any particular misstatement case. Encouragingly, questions asked by the Justices at the Halliburton oral argument suggest that the Court might indeed elect to avoid choosing between the competing views concerning the market efficiency hypothesis put forward by the parties.81
Our analysis leads to the conclusion that the Basic rule should be reformulated to make the existence of classwide reliance dependent on the presence of fraudulent distortion of the market price. The focus on fraudulent distortion would retain some key aspects of the Basic approach and its concern about the classwide impact that can be produced when market prices are distorted. At the same time, the modified rule would address key problems with the Basic rule and concerns expressed by Justice White in his Basic opinion and reflected in the briefing and oral argument in Halliburton.82
We further explain how using fraudulent distortion can potentially be identified using standard financial methods. This includes, but is in no way limited to, the use of event studies at the time of misrepresentation. Using the fraudulent distortion criterion would address the over- and under-inclusion problems inherent in the market efficiency approach that the federal courts have thus far pursued in applying Basic. Our approach would also screen out at the class certification stage frivolous cases in which market prices were not distorted by the alleged disclosure deficiency. Furthermore, we explain how the Court can use the allocation of the burden of proof so as to reflect its views concerning excessive class action litigation. Finally, we explain that our approach would not involve resolving the merits issues of materiality and loss causation at the class certification case. We hope that this framework of analysis will prove useful for the reexamination of Basic and fraud-on-the-market theory.
_____________
* William J. Friedman and Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance and Director of the Program on Corporate Governance, Harvard Law School.
** Greenfield Professor of Securities Law, Harvard Law School. We would like to thank Paul Ferrillo, Joseph Grundfest, Laura Posner, Alex Rinaudo, Atanu Saha, Leo Strine, and Norman Veasey for helpful comments. In the interest of disclosure, we note that each of the authors have been involved as an expert in securities litigation matters on both the side of plaintiffs and the side of defendants.
1.The lower court decision can be found at Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 718 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2013).
3.We wish to emphasize that, in this paper, we are not addressing the purely legal question of whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation, “actual reliance” is a necessary condition for establishing “reliance” for Rule 10b-5 purposes. For a discussion of these issues, see Joseph A. Grundfest, Damages and Reliance Under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 69 BUS. LAW. 307 (2014).
5.We assume throughout our paper that the investors in question did not actually know that the representation was false.
6.The issue of fraudulent distortion is explicitly raised in the second question presented, is referenced at various points in the Basic opinion itself (as we discuss), and is reflected in the academic literature on securities class action litigation. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: PriceDistortion After Halliburton, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 895 (2013); Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty:Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151; Jonathan R. Macey, Geoffrey P. Miller, Mark L. Mitchell & Jeffry M. Netter, Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and Extending theReach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017, 1021 (1991) (discussing disconnect between market efficiency and price impact).
7.We note that Justice Thomas’s dissent in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & TrustFunds pointed out that “Justice White’s concerns remain valid today, but the Court has not been asked to revisit Basic’s fraud-on-the-market presumption.” 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1208 n.4 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
8.For a reference to the binary nature of the current “efficiency” inquiry and to issues this might raise, see id. at 1197 n.6 (majority opinion); id. at 1208 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
9.The Cammer factors are five factors courts look to in determining whether a market is “efficient.” See infra note 57 and accompanying text for further discussion.
13.E.g., id. at 31–32 ( Justice Alito); id. at 22 ( Justice Breyer); id. at 9 ( Justice Ginsburg); id. at 17 ( Justice Kennedy); id. at 21 (Chief Justice Roberts).
14.The third recipient, Lars Hansen, is not as strongly associated with a general position on this issue.
15.Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 13-317 (U.S. Sept. 9, 2013).
16.Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and National Association of Manufacturers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 6, Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 13-317 (U.S. Oct. 11, 2013).
17.Brief in Opposition at 37, Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 13-317 (U.S. Oct. 11, 2013).
18.Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988) (“Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress’ premise that the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations.”).
19.Eugene F. Fama,Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN.383, 383 (1970) [hereinafter Fama,Efficient Capital Markets].
20.Michael C. Jensen,Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 95(1978).
21.SeeFama,Efficient Capital Markets,supranote 19, at 383.
22.SeeBurton G. Malkiel,The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 59, 60(2003).
23.Robert A. Jarrow & Martin Larsson, The Meaning of Market Efficiency, 22 MATHEMATICAL FIN. 1, 2 (2012).
24.This definition is in line with the explanation of efficiency provided by the Supreme Court in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 n.4 (2013) (citing RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 330 (10th ed. 2011) (“[I]n an efficient market, there is no way for most investors to achieve consistently superior rates of return.”)).
25.It is worth noting that important academic work questioning the efficiency of the securities markets predates the 1988 Basic opinion; such work includes that of Professor Shiller (and others) on excessive stock price volatility and market overvaluation, which served as a basis for the Nobel Prize award and is discussed below.
26.This is a quotation from the thoughtful and detailed 56-page survey of the academic literature (discussing some 220 academic papers and books) on asset pricing. See 2013 ECON. SCIS. PRIZE COMM. OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACAD. OF SCIS., SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND ON THE SVERIGES RIKSBANK PRIZE IN ECONOMIC SCIENCES IN MEMORY OF ALFRED NOBEL 2013: UNDERSTANDING ASSET PRICES 9 (2013) [hereinafter NOBEL SURVEY], available athttp://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2013/advanced-economicsciences2013.pdf. The survey includes a discussion of the work of Nobel Laurates Eugene Fama, Lars Hansen, and Robert Shiller in the context of the overall academic literature on efficient markets.
27.Paul A. Samuelson,Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, INDUS. MGMT. REV.,Spring 1965, at 6, 44.
28.For research documenting some modest level of short-run predictability, see generally ANDREW W. LO & A. CRAIG MACKINLAY, NON-RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET (1999) (finding short-run return predictability for certain stock indexes); see also Andrew W. Lo & A. Craig MacKinlay, Stock MarketPrices Do Not Follow Random Walks: Evidence from a Simple Specification Test, 1 REV. FIN. STUD. 41 (1988).
29.Robert J. Shiller,Stock Prices and Social Dynamics, 1984 CARNEGIEROCHESTERCONF. SERIES ONPUB. POL’Y457.
30.John Y. Campbell & Robert J. Shiller,The Dividend-Price Ratio and Expectations of Future Dividends and Discount Factors, 1 REV. FIN. STUD. 195 (1988); John Y. Campbell & Robert J. Shiller,Stock Prices, Earnings, and Expected Dividends, 43 J. FIN. 661 (1998).
31.See generally JOHN COCHRANE, ASSET PRICING (2001). These papers are also discussed at NOBEL SURVEY, supra note 26, at 17−20.
32.See, e.g., Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 59, 65 (2003) (“These findings are not necessarily inconsistent with efficiency. Dividend yields of stocks tend to be high when interest rates are high, and they tend to be low when interest rates are low. Consequently, the ability of initial yields to predict returns may simply reflect the adjustment of the stock market to general economic conditions.”); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1583 (1991) [hereinafter Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II] (“The predictability of stock returns from dividend yields (or E/P) is not in itself evidence for or against market efficiency.”).
33.Robert J. Shiller,Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to Be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 421 (1981);see alsoRobert J. Shiller,The Use of Volatility Measures in Assessing Market Efficiency, 36 J. FIN. 219 (1981).
34.It is worth noting that tests of excessive volatility are mathematically equivalent to certain tests of long-run return predictability. John H. Cochrane, Volatility Tests and Efficient Markets: A ReviewEssay, 27 J. MONETARY ECON. 463, 471 (1991); see also NOBEL SURVEY, supra note 26, at 17.
35.For instance, Terry A. Marsh & Robert C. Merton argue, in Dividend Variability and VarianceBounds Tests for the Rationality of Stock Market Prices, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 483 (1986), that if (i) firms smooth dividends over time and (ii) firm earnings follow a geometric random walk, then the efficient market hypothesis actually predicts the results documented by Shiller. For further papers in this literature, see, for example, Alan Kleidon, Variance Bounds Tests and Stock Price Valuation Models, 94 J. POL. ECON. 953 (1986); John Y. Campbell & Robert J. Shiller, Cointegration and Tests of PresentValue Models, 95 J. POL. ECON. 1062 (1987); NOBEL SURVEY, supra note 26, at 15–17, 30–33.
36.For some papers on this topic, see Harrison Hong & Jeremy C. Stein, A Unified Theory ofUnder-reaction, Momentum Trading, and Overreaction in Asset Markets, 54 J. FIN. 2143 (1999); Kent Daniel, David Hirshleifer & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Investor Psychology and Security Market Under-and Over-reactions, 53 J. FIN. 1839 (1998); Nicholas Barberis, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, A Model of Investor Sentiment, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 307 (1998); see also NOBEL SURVEY, supra note 26, at 41. As with our other purported examples of market inefficiency, findings of market underreaction have been challenged in the literature. See, e.g., Eugene Fama, Market Efficiency, Long-term Returns, and Behavioral Finance, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 283 (1998).
37.On the impossibility of perfectly efficient markets, see Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 222 (1980).
38.Fama,Efficient Capital Markets: II,supranote 32, at 1575.
39.One early paper exploring this topic is Lawrence J. Summers, Does the Stock Market RationallyReflect Fundamental Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591 (1986); see also Robert F. Stambaugh, Discussion, 41 J. FIN. 601 (1986).
40.Andrew W. Lo, Efficient Market Hypothesis, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 12 (L. Blume & S. Durlauf eds., 2d ed. 2007).
42.Some amicus briefs submitted to the Court expressed views that are consistent with this conclusion. The brief of the solicitor general correctly stated that “whatever the state of academic debate . . . there is widespread agreement on the basic point that public disclosure of material information generally affects the prices of securities traded on efficient markets.” Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 25, Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 13-317 (U.S. Feb. 5, 2014).
On a similar note, an amicus brief on behalf of financial economists (including Professor Fama) explained, “[E]conomists do not generally disagree about whether market prices respond to new material information. In particular, there is little doubt that the stock price will increase reasonably promptly after favorable news about a company is released and decline after unfavorable news.” Brief for Financial Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 25, Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 13-317 (U.S. Feb. 5, 2014).
43.Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1190 (2013).
44.Again, we are assuming throughout that the investor, when engaged in the security transaction, does not know the representation is false.
47.Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 253 (1998) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48.See Halliburton Transcript, supra note 4, at 7–8.
49.Indeed, one could argue that in conditions of market inefficiency, stock prices do not represent “true value” in the specific sense that, going forward, abnormal returns can be obtained using a particular information set. In our market underreaction scenario, for instance, the initial fraudulent impact of the misrepresentation is an underestimate of the full fraudulent impact (hence leaving profits on the table for a would-be arbitrageur who can take advantage of this fact).
54.Affiliated Ute Citizens of the State of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); see also In reMerrill Lynch Auction Rate Sec. Litig., 704 F. Supp. 2d 378, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). For a recent example of the use of Affiliated Ute to certify a class, see In re Dynex Capital, Inc., 1:05-cv-01897-HB-DCK (S.D.N.Y.).
56.In crafting a complaint, plaintiffs currently have to trade off between obtaining the benefit of enjoying the Affiliated Ute presumption by bringing an omissions case and the cost of having to establish a legal duty to disclose the omitted information.
57.The Cammer factors are (1) the stock’s trading volume, (2) the number of analysts that followed and reported on the stock, (3) the number of market makers, (4) the eligibility to file an S-3 Registration Statement, and (5) the reaction of the stock price on unexpected new events. See Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286−89 (D.N.J. 1989).
58.In the well-known case of Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467 (N.D. Tex. 2001), the court identified three additional market efficiency factors to be used in determining reliance: market capitalization, bid-ask spreads, and the percentage of shares held by the public. Id. at 474.
59.In re Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2005).
60.For a discussion of this issue, see Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten, Market Efficiency,Crashes, and Securities Litigation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 443 (2006).
62.We will not spend time discussing the well-known mechanics of conducting an event study. See generally JOHN Y. CAMPBELL, ANDREW W. LO & A. CRAIG MACKINLAY, THE ECONOMETRICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 150–81 (1997). On the issue of how to calculate abnormal stock price dollar movements rather than stock return movements, see Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, Event Study Analysis: Correctly Measuring the Dollar Impact of an Event (Apr. 18, 2011) (unpublished manuscript available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1814236).
63.The identification of the economic and statistical pre-conditions for employing an event study is beyond the scope of this paper.
64.Jonathan R. Macey, Geoffrey P. Miller, Mark L. Mitchell & Jeffry M. Netter, Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017 (1991) (discussing as well using an event study at time of misstatement to determine price impact).
69.See generallyAllen Ferrell & Atanu Saha,Forward-casting 10b-5 Damages: A Comparison to Other Methods, 37 J. CORP. L. 365 (2012).
70.See generally id.; Esther Bruegger & Frederick C. Dunbar,Estimating Financial Fraud Damages with Response Coefficients, 35 J. CORP. L. 11 (2009).
71.Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988).
72.Id. at 262 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I suspect that all too often the majority’s rule will lead to large judgments, payable in the last analysis by innocent investors, for the benefit of speculators and their lawyers.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Similar concerns have been expressed as recently as in Amgen.
73.Pre-Amgen this was the position of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. See In reSalomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 483 (2d Cir. 2008) (“the burden of showing that there was no price impact is properly placed on defendants at the rebuttal stage”).
75.There is also the materiality issue of puffery, whether the statement is immaterial as a matter of law given that it arguably constitutes normal corporate optimism (an issue that would presumably be dealt with at the motion to dismiss stage).
79.One common way to try to establish loss causation is to attribute the economic losses to the dissipation of fraudulent distortion resulting from a corrective disclosure. See Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, The Loss Causation Requirement for Rule 10b-5 Causes of Action: The Implications of Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 63 BUS. LAW. 163 (2007).