This article is Part III of the Musings on Contracts series by Glenn D. West, which explores the unique contract law issues the author has been contemplating, some focused on the specifics of M&A practice, and some just random.

Somewhere in Scotland is the “Sheriffdom of South Strathclyde, Dumfries and Galloway.” And the sheriff (basically the same as a lower-court judge in the United States) of the Hamilton Sheriff Court in that sheriffdom recently issued a decision, Screwfix Direct Ltd. v. Paterson,^[1] that caught my attention.^[2] Although from an obscure (at least to me) court in Scotland, the case is based on traditional common-law principles that apply in the United States with regard to personal liability for entity-specific contracts. Corporate lawyers, whose clients regularly have deal professionals individually sign documents on behalf of limited liability entities, might want to pay attention.

Personal Liability in Screwfix

The dispute in Screwfix involved the efforts of a building materials supplier to collect overdue sums owed from one of its customers pursuant to a Trade Accounts Card Agreement between the supplier and the customer (“Agreement”). The supplier was Screwfix Direct Limited, trading under the name “Trade UK.” The customer was Paterson Restoration Limited (“Company”). James Paterson was a director and shareholder of the Company. Paterson signed the Agreement on behalf of the Company as its “director.” The Agreement seems to have been a standard form, and it stated that if the person opening the account was a limited company, “the form must be signed by a director.”^[3]

But paragraph f of the Agreement contained the following statement: “I, the director, agree to guarantee performance of all the company’s current and future financial obligations to Trade UK, including any subsequent increase/s in credit limit.”^[4] The Company subsequently became insolvent and was wound up. Trade UK, the supplier, then sought to recover all past due sums from Paterson personally pursuant to paragraph f.

Paterson only signed the Agreement once, as a director of the Company, and he clearly bound the Company as the named account holder to the Agreement. He did not sign separately to bind himself personally as a guarantor of the Agreement between Trade UK and the Company, and he was not a named party individually. So, Paterson defended the action brought by Trade UK on the basis that “the provision did not impose personal liability upon him as an individual [because] [h]e signed the Agreement solely in his capacity as a director and as such was committing only the company to the performance under the agreement.”^[5]

But Trade UK countered that paragraph f only made sense if Paterson were making a personal commitment because Paterson had already bound the Company without paragraph f, simply by signing on behalf of the Company as its director. Indeed, in paragraph c of the Agreement, Paterson had stated that he was “authorised to bind the account holder to this agreement by signing it.”^[6]

The sheriff agreed with Trade UK (citing Scottish cases in support) and rendered judgment in Trade UK’s favor against Paterson.

Does this seem fair to you? While the use of the personal pronoun “I” was clearly problematic, Paterson was not a party to the Agreement, only the Company was—so, in a sense, the only “I” or “you” was the Company. And Paterson signed only on behalf of the Company, as its director, not personally.

US Jurisdictions

Would this result occur in New York, Texas, or some other US state?

Well, let’s see. On very similar facts, Texas courts have repeatedly held that an officer signing on behalf of a corporate party to a contract can make themselves personally liable for the corporation’s obligation if there is language in the contract making the corporate signatory liable.^[7] “The fact that a person is under an agency relation to another which is disclosed does not prevent him from becoming personally liable where the terms of the contract clearly establish the personal obligation.”^[8] And sometimes that language is not as clear-cut as the “guarantee” language that was present in Screwfix. Simple statements such as “the undersigned agrees to personally pay” may be deemed sufficient.

That people signing in a corporate capacity could unwittingly be committing themselves to personal liability should make us all pause. So too should the reality that most of the time these are agreements that the corporate officers of our clients are signing without any real review.

New York has a more nuanced approach to these issues.

In Salzman Sign Co. v. Beck,^[9] the New York Court of Appeals refused to hold a corporate officer personally liable for the obligations of his corporate principal where he signed the agreement only in his corporate capacity. And this was despite the fact that the agreement, similar to the contract at issue in Screwfix, stated specifically that “[w]here the Purchaser is a corporation, in consideration of extending credit to it, the officer or officers signing on behalf of such corporation, hereby personally guarantee the payments hereinabove provided for.”^[10]

The court refused to find that language sufficient to make the corporate officer personally liable because

[i]n modern times most commercial business is done between corporations, everyone in business knows that an individual stockholder or officer is not liable for his corporation’s engagements unless he signs individually, and where individual responsibility is demanded the nearly universal practice is that the officer signs twice—once as an officer and again as an individual. There is great danger in allowing a single sentence in a long contract to bind individually a person who signs only as a corporate officer. In many situations the signing officer holds little or no stock and if the language of the agreement makes him individually liable his estate may be stuck for a very large obligation which he never dreamed of assuming. We think the better rule is the one used here—that is, that the statement in the contract purporting to bind the signing officer individually is not sufficient for Statute of Frauds purposes without some direct and explicit evidence of actual intent.^[11]

A federal court, considering liability of a signatory to a letter agreement, has described New York law on this issue as follows (case citations omitted):

Under New York law, an agent who signs an agreement on behalf of a disclosed principal will not be individually bound to the terms of the agreement “unless there is clear and explicit evidence of the agent’s intention to substitute or superadd his personal liability for, or to, that of his principal.” In assessing whether a signatory intended to be individually bound, the following five factors (the “Lollo factors”) should be examined: “length of the contract, the location of the liability provision(s) in relation to the signature line, the presence of the signatory’s name in the agreement itself, the nature of the negotiations leading to the contract, and the signatory’s role in the corporation.” In addition to these factors, the most obvious indicator of the signatory’s intent is the signature’s form. “‘[W]here individual responsibility is demanded the nearly universal practice is that the officer signs twice—once as an officer and again as an individual.’”^[12]

Finding Where the Line Is Drawn

New York is basically looking for more clear intent to be personally liable than Texas and some other jurisdictions. Even in Scotland, it appears that if the guarantee or personal undertaking language is not in the main body of the agreement, but rather in a set of separate terms and conditions incorporated by reference, the courts are inclined to refuse to find the necessary intent to be personally bound.^[13] And England long ago appears to have recognized that if one buries onerous terms in a lengthy form agreement, without highlighting those onerous terms to the person sought to be bound to them, they may well be held unenforceable: “a logical development of the common law into modern conditions [is] that . . . if one condition in a set of printed conditions is particularly onerous or unusual, the party seeking to enforce it must show that that particular condition was fairly brought to the attention of the other party.”^[14]

But it is far from clear where the line is to be drawn, even in the more nuanced approach offered by New York. There are plenty of decisions from other jurisdictions holding corporate officers personally liable for their company’s agreements on facts similar to Screwfix.^[15] And those corporate officers are, many times, just that—employed company officers, not owners of the enterprise. The fact remains that representatives signing contracts on behalf of limited liability entities must do more than merely ensure that they only sign in a representative capacity; they must also ensure that there is not any language in that agreement making them personally liable for the entity’s obligations based on that representative signature. Our private equity deal professionals, who sometimes become officers of portfolio companies, should be aware and act accordingly.

Ensuring (Hopefully!) a Signature Only in a Representative Capacity

While we are on the subject, let’s take a quick quiz on the correct manner of clearly indicating that you are signing only in your representative capacity on behalf of a limited liability entity.

Assume that a contract named a limited liability entity (“Private Equity LLC”) as the party and then an authorized representative of Private Equity LLC (“Sarah Deal Professional”) signed the contract with the following signature line:

_____________________________
Sarah Deal Professional
President, Private Equity LLC

True or False: This signature line clearly indicates that Sarah Deal Professional was only signing in her capacity as president of Private Equity LLC, and not individually?

If you answered “True,” thanks for playing, but the case law appears to lean decidedly in favor of this being false. Many cases would find that the language under the name Sarah Deal Professional that indicates she is president of Private Equity LLC is merely descriptio personae, a Latin phrase that simply means that the words “President, Private Equity LLC” only indicate who Sarah is but do not limit the capacity in which she signed. As a result, such a signature has been deemed sufficient to impose personal liability on the signatory, even without guarantee language like that at issue in Screwfix.^[16]

The best practice, therefore, is to always follow these guidelines:

The signature itself represents a clear indication that the signator is acting as an agent if: (1) the name of the principal is disclosed, (2) the signature is preceded by words of agency such as “by” or “per” or “on behalf of,” and (3) the signature is followed by the title which represents the capacity in which the signator is executing the document, e.g., “Pres.” or “V.P.” or “Agent.”^[17]

Thus, use the traditional formulation:

Private Equity LLC
By: _________________________
Name: Sarah Deal Professional
Title: President

But again, even this formulation may not save you from the Screwfix issue if there is language in the agreement making the entity representative personally liable—this formulation only works to avoid personal liability being imposed on those who simply fail to clearly indicate their limited capacity.^[18]

And finally, please ensure that the officers and deal professionals signing documents on behalf of limited liability entities use the full legal name of the limited liability entity as the named party, both in the body of the contract and in the signature line. Note that one of the rules of limiting liability for an agent acting on behalf of a limited liability principal is that the name of the principal has to be identified. If the limited liability entity operates divisions, or has an assumed name, contracts are often entered into in the name of those divisions or under that assumed name. Many cases have held that naming a division or trade name as the party, rather than the entity itself, using its actual legal name, is a failure to disclose the principal. As a result, the officer signing on behalf of that division or in that assumed name may incur personal liability.^[19]

As noted by one Texas court:

Regarding the liability on corporate contracts, officers of corporations are in the same position as agents of private individuals. That is, as is true of agents generally, officers of a corporation are not personally liable on the corporation’s contracts if they do not purport to bind themselves individually, they disclose their representative capacity, and they identify their principal. Even if Burris had filed an assumed name certificate with the Secretary of State and had filed a new assumed name certificate with the clerk of Travis County indicating Burris & Inscore Construction, Inc. was doing business as “B & S Construction, Inc.,” that would be immaterial to his personal liability because an agent has the duty to disclose the name of his principal, not just the principal’s assumed or trade name.^[20]

As if we didn’t have enough stuff to worry about.

1. [2024] S.C. HAM 1. ↑

2. The case came to my attention through a September 20, 2024, blog posting by the Scottish law firm of Brodies LLP. Sarah Wilson et al., Are You a Company Director? Could You Have Given a Personal Guarantee Perhaps Without Realising?, Brodies (Sept. 20, 2024). ↑

3. Screwfix, [2024] S.C. HAM 1, at para. 4. ↑

4. Id. ↑

5. Id. at para. 6. ↑

6. Id at para. 5, 7. ↑

7. See, e.g., Action Powersports, Inc. v. 1STEL, Inc., 500 S.W.3d 632 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2016); 84 Lumber Co., L.P. v. Powers, 393 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. App. Houston (1st Dist.) 2012); Taylor-Made Hose, Inc. v. Wilkerson, 21 S.W.3d 484 (Tex. App. San Antonio 2000). ↑

8. Am. Petrofina Co. v. Bryan, 519 S.W.2d 484, 487 (Tex. App. El Paso 1975). ↑

9. 176 N.E.2d 74 (N.Y. 1961). ↑

10. Id. at 75. ↑

11. Id. at 76. ↑

12. EQT Infrastructure Ltd. v. Smith, 861 F. Supp. 2d 220, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). ↑

13. See Montgomery Litho Ltd. v. Maxwell, [2000] S.C. 56, discussed in Brandon Hire PLC v. Russell, [2010] CSIH 76. ↑

14. Interfoto Picture Libr. Ltd. v. Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd., [1989] 1 Q.B. 433. ↑

15. See, e.g., Yellow Book Sales & Distrib. Co. v. Valle, 84 A.3d 1196 (Conn. 2014); Buffa v. Yellowbook Sales & Distrib. Co., 760 S.E.2d 644 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). ↑

16. See, e.g., Hubbard Fam. Tr. v. TNT Land Holdings, LLC, 9 N.E.3d 411, 424–25 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014). ↑

17. Id. ↑

18. For a discussion of the various means that can expose private equity deal professionals to personal liability, see Glenn D. West, Protecting the Private Equity Firm and Its Deal Professionals from the Obligations of Its Acquisition Vehicles and Portfolio Companies, Weil’s Glob. Priv. Equity Watch (May 23, 2016). ↑

19. See, e.g., Lachmann v. Hous. Chron. Publ’g Co., 375 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App. Austin 1964) (writ ref’d n.r.e.); Empire Off. Machs., Inc. v. Aspen Trails Assocs. LLC, 322 P.3d 424 (Mont. 2014); Bou-Matic LLC v. Legg, 843 N.W.2d 710 (Wis. Ct. App. 2014). ↑

20. A to Z Rental Ctr. v. Burris, 714 S.W.2d 433, 437 (Tex. App. Austin 1986) (writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also Restatement (Third) of Agency § 6.02 cmt. d (Am L. Inst. 2006) (noting that “an agent’s use of a trade name, which may be traced to its registered user through a search of public filings is not sufficient to disclose the principal’s identity”). But see TicketNetwork, Inc. v. Darbouze, 133 F. Supp. 3d 442, 453 (D. Conn. 2015) (“Because Charged.fm was the registered assumed name of a corporation, Plot Commerce, TicketNetwork had constructive notice that the principal with which it was dealing . . . was Plot Commerce. Accordingly, Mr. Darbouze cannot be held personally liable on the contract he signed, because he contracted on behalf of a disclosed corporation.”). ↑

On April 5, 2024, the ABA Business Law Section’s Corporate Laws Committee approved amendments to Section 2.02 of the Model Business Corporation Act (the “MBCA”) that permit a corporation to include in its articles of incorporation a provision limiting or eliminating the monetary liability of certain corporate officers.^[1] Prior to the amendments, the articles of incorporation could only provide exculpatory protection to directors. As discussed in this article, the officer exculpation now permitted under Section 2.02 is similar to the director exculpation already authorized by that section. New to the MBCA is a definition of the “officers” that may be exculpated. In defining “officer,” the amendments reinforce freedom of contract principles by providing a default list of the “officers” who may be exculpated while also allowing corporations to expand or contract that definition as needed.

Similar in nature to Delaware’s officer exculpation statute, the MBCA’s amendments provide a complementary template for jurisdictions that are considering amending their corporate code to provide exculpatory protection to officers.

Background

For over three decades, the MBCA has authorized corporations to include a provision in their articles of incorporation that limits or eliminates, with certain exceptions, the monetary liability of directors to the corporation and its shareholders.^[2] Commonly referred to as an exculpatory provision, this provision has protected directors from personal liability for monetary damages for breaches of the duty of care. Today, all states provide for some form of director exculpation in their corporate code. These statutes follow three different approaches—charter option statutes, self-executing statutes, and cap on money damages statutes—or some combination thereof.^[3] Section 2.02(b)(4) of the MBCA is a charter option statute, which permits corporations to adopt a charter provision that now provides for the exculpation of both directors and designated officers.^[4]

At the time director exculpation statutes were initially being adopted, limiting the liability of directors was viewed as vital to addressing a perceived director shortage resulting from the D&O insurance crisis and the Delaware Supreme Court’s groundbreaking decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom.^[5] Similar protection for officers, on the other hand, was generally viewed as unnecessary, and their inclusion in exculpation amendments was ultimately rejected in most states.^[6] Until recently, the topic of officer exculpation has remained largely dormant. Several recent developments surrounding officer liability, however, have led to renewed interest in exculpating senior management in a manner similar to that which exists for directors. First, Delaware amended its long-arm statute in 2003 to cover senior executive officers of Delaware corporations.^[7] Second, the Delaware Supreme Court, in its 2009 Gantler v. Stephens decision, held that officers owe the same fiduciary duties as directors.^[8] Finally, in response to several opinions from the Delaware courts clarifying the ability of shareholders to challenge merger transactions, officers are being named as defendants in M&A litigation with increasing frequency.^[9] Due to the lack of exculpatory protection, disclosure claims against officers in these lawsuits were allowed to survive while those same claims against corporate directors were dismissed based on exculpation provisions in the charter.^[10] In response to those developments, the Delaware legislature amended its corporate code in 2022 to permit exculpation of certain senior executive officers. Under the amendments, exculpated officers largely enjoy the same protection as directors with the exception that officers cannot be exculpated from derivative claims or claims brought by the corporation.^[11]

As was the case with the adoption of director exculpation, the Corporate Laws Committee watched these developments and considered whether, and how, to amend the MBCA to provide for officer exculpation.^[12] Earlier this year, the Committee adopted amendments to Section 2.02 permitting the articles of incorporation to include a provision exculpating certain officers.

The MBCA Amendments

As amended, Section 2.02(b)(4) authorizes a provision to be included in the articles of incorporation that limits or eliminates monetary liability for specified officers. In general, the protection afforded to officers under a Section 2.02 exculpation provision is similar to that which the MBCA already allows for directors. Like directors, officers may not be relieved of personal liability for (i) financial benefits received to which the officer is not entitled; (ii) any act or omission that intentionally inflicts harm on the corporation or its shareholders; or (iii) any act or omission that is an intentional violation of criminal law. In addition to these carve-outs, officers (but not directors) may not be exculpated for any claim by or in the right of the corporation (e.g., derivative proceedings). Essentially, under the amendments, a provision in the articles of incorporation may exculpate certain officers for breaches of the duty of care in direct claims brought by shareholders (which includes class actions), but not for claims brought by the corporation or in a shareholder derivative proceeding.

In connection with the exculpation amendments, a new subsection (f) was added to Section 2.02 that defines “officer.” This new definition applies only to the use of “officer” in Section 2.02(b)(4)’s exculpation and not to the use of “officer” elsewhere in the MBCA.^[13] The definition has three components to it. First, subsection (f) provides a statutory list of executive officers who are covered by default in an exculpatory provision: chief executive officer, president, chief operating officer, chief financial officer, chief legal officer, secretary, controller, treasurer, and chief accounting officer.^[14] Second, consistent with freedom of contract principles, subsection (f) allows the articles of incorporation to expand or contract the default list of enumerated officers or specify a procedure for doing so.^[15] Third, unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, the board of directors may, by way of resolution, exculpate other officers beyond those listed in the articles. The board may not, however, alter the exculpatory protection provided to the officers listed in the articles without amending that document. Thus, the MBCA allows a board of directors to tailor the definition of “officers” for exculpatory purposes to the specific needs of the corporation as they may vary from time to time, unlike the Delaware statute which defines the term “officer” in the statute itself.

Comparison to Delaware

The MBCA and Delaware’s General Corporation Law serve as the two principal blueprints for state corporate codes. In the case of officer exculpation, Delaware amended its statute two years prior to the final adoption of the MBCA’s amendments. Overall, Delaware and the MBCA provide similar exculpation protection to officers. One particular area of divergence, however, is the exact language used for the carve-outs for nonexculpable liability.^[16] Identical to the carve-outs for director exculpation, the MBCA’s language provides greater clarity than that of the Delaware statute through its use of more concrete and narrower exclusions. For example, contrary to Delaware’s statute, the MBCA’s exclusions avoid references to the “duty of loyalty” and “good faith” as bases for exclusion from exculpation, instead excluding “intentional infliction[s] of harm on the corporation or the shareholders” and “intentional violation[s] of criminal law.”^[17] Likewise, the MBCA carves out a narrower set of “financial benefits” to which a director or officer is not entitled, as opposed to Delaware’s “improper personal benefit.”^[18]

Another difference in the two statutes relates to the definition of the “officers” who can be exculpated. Delaware’s statute relies upon the definition of “officer” found in its long-arm statute^[19] while the MBCA has its own definition in the statute. Both Delaware and the MBCA identify the same list of executive officers to be included in the definition of “officer.” After the initial enumerated list of executive officers, Delaware looks to Securities and Exchange Commission filings and an individual’s consent to jurisdiction as the criteria for determining who is an “officer.”^[20] The MBCA, on the other hand, provides corporations with more flexibility to individually tailor inclusion in the “officer” definition through specific enumeration in the articles of incorporation or, alternatively, by a board resolution. By authorizing officer exculpation by a board resolution, the MBCA’s definition allows a board to be nimble in addressing officer exculpation on a case-by-case basis, when and if the need arises, without having to pursue the formal process of amending the corporation’s articles.

Officer Exculpation Trends

Corporate Charter Amendment Trends

Under both the MBCA and the Delaware amendments, an exculpation provision for officers must be set forth in the corporation’s charter. For existing corporations this means amending the charter through a statutorily required process that includes approval of the amendment by the board and the shareholders.^[21] For publicly traded corporations this also means satisfying federal securities laws requirements such as disclosures in a proxy statement. While the MBCA’s amendments are too new to have been adopted in more than one MBCA jurisdiction and thus there are no statistics for corporate adoptions in those states, there is a growing body of data on adoption rates by Delaware corporations.

Since Delaware’s adoption of its officer exculpation amendments, there has been a modest, but continually growing, number of public companies that have amended their charters. Overall, commentators have observed that these amendments are being approved by shareholders, with only a handful of proposed officer exculpation amendments failing due to shareholder turnout and a two-thirds supermajority vote standard for approval.^[22] To date, most of the officer exculpation amendments have been proposed at small-cap companies (under $2 billion market cap) and mid-cap companies ($2–$10 billion market cap).^[23] Commentators predict an increase in the number of large-cap companies (over $10 billion market cap) and dual class companies proposing officer exculpation amendments to their charters moving forward in light of three developments: (i) the clarification by Delaware courts that such amendments do not require a separate class vote of nonvoting shares for approval;^[24] (ii) the relative success in approving these amendments at smaller companies;^[25] and (iii) the limited impact that negative proxy advisor recommendations have had on the approval of such amendments.^[26]

State Statute Adoption Trends

Prior to Delaware’s amendment of its corporate code to provide for officer exculpation, only seven states had such a statutory provision.^[27] Around the same time that Delaware adopted its amendments, Pennsylvania amended its corporate statute to limit officer liability.^[28] Since that time, a number of additional states have amended or are considering amending their corporate codes to provide for officer exculpation. Both Oklahoma and Alabama have recently adopted officer exculpation amendments. The Oklahoma amendments are nearly identical to the language in Delaware’s statute^[29] while Alabama, which is an MBCA state, has adopted an amendment that is based on the MBCA language.^[30] As of the writing of this article, it remains to be seen how quickly other states will amend their corporate statutes to provide for officer exculpation as well as whether the MBCA’s or Delaware’s statutory language will serve as the prevailing model.^[31] Nevertheless, the adoption of the MBCA amendments as well as the increasing frequency and success of Delaware corporations in adopting officer exculpation charter amendments will likely spur calls for more jurisdictions to consider such changes.

A version of this article originally appeared in the Summer 2024 issue of the MBCA Newsletter, the newsletter of the ABA Business Law Section’s Corporate Laws Committee, under the title “Amendments to the Model Business Corporation Act Permitting Officer Exculpation.” Read the full issue and previous issues at the Corporate Laws Committee’s Model Business Corporation Act Resource Center.

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and not the University of Oklahoma College of Law. No legal advice is being given in this article.

1. See Corporate Laws Comm., Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act—Amendments to Section 2.02 Relating to Officer Exculpation, 79 Bus. Law. 801 (2024) (notice of approval on third and final reading); Corporate Laws Comm., Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act—Proposed Amendments to Section 2.02 Relating to Officer Exculpation, 79 Bus. Law. 125 (2023–24) (notice of approval on second reading). See generally, Model Business Corporation Act Resource Center, which includes the current and previous versions of the MBCA with the Official Comments, reports of the Corporate Laws Committee on proposed and adopted amendments of the MBCA, and other MBCA resource materials. ↑

2. See Model Bus. Corp. Act § 2.04(b)(4) (1990); Corporate Laws Comm., Changes in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act—Amendment Pertaining to the Liability of Directors, 45 Bus. Law. 695 (1990) (notice of approval on second reading). The director liability amendments were approved by the Corporate Laws Committee on the third and final reading on June 16, 1990. Corporate Laws Comm., Changes in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act—Amendment Pertaining to Liability of Directors, 46 Bus. Law. 319 (1990). ↑

3. See Corporate Laws Comm., 45 Bus. Law. at 696 (1990). ↑

4. Delaware’s approach to director exculpation is also a charter option statute. Thirty-one states have adopted the charter option approach to exculpation. See Bryn R. Vaaler, 2.02(b)(4) or Not 2.02(b)(4): That Is the Question, 74 Law & Contemp. Probs. 79, 82 n.19 (2011). ↑

5. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). See John Mark Zeberkiewicz & Robert B. Greco, Amendments to the DGCL Permit Officer Exculpation, 36 Insights, no. 10, Oct. 2022, at 3. ↑

6. It is clear that the decision to omit officers from early exculpation statutes was a deliberate one in Delaware and the MBCA. See Lewis S. Black, Jr. & A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, Analysis of the 1986 Amendments to the Delaware Corporation Law 312 (1986) (explaining the rationale for the exclusion of officers in the adoption of Section 102(b)(7)); Corporate Laws Comm., 45 Bus. Law. at 700 (1990) (explaining the rationale for the decision to omit officers from the MBCA’s original exculpation provision). It is less clear, however, that other jurisdictions approached the officer liability level of analysis when adopting their director exculpation statutes. See Dennis R. Honabach, Smith v. Van Gorkom: Managerial Liability and Exculpatory Clauses—A Proposal to Fill the Gap of the Missing Officer Protection, 45 Washburn L.J. 307 (2006). ↑

7. See 10 Del. C. § 3114 (2003); Del. Div. of Corps., Amendments to Corporate Law 2003 (June 30, 2003) (describing the rationale for the amendment). ↑

8. 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009). ↑

9. See Zeberkiewicz & Greco, supra note 5 (summarizing the case law developments that led to the officer exculpation amendments). ↑

10. See, e.g., Morrison v. Berry, 2019 WL 7369431 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2019). In Morrison the court noted that while the disclosure claims against the officers survived a motion to dismiss, an ultimate finding of liability for breach of the duty of care in making the disclosures would be unlikely. Id. at *24. ↑

11. See 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7) (2022). ↑

12. See James J. Hanks, Jr. & Larry P. Scriggins, Protecting Directors and Officers from Liability–the Influence of the Model Business Corporation Act, 56 Bus. Law. 3, 25 (2000) (describing the history of the MBCA’s director exculpation statute). ↑

13. See Model Bus. Corp. Act § 2.02, cmt 3.E. (2024). ↑

14. In addition, “[t]he use of ‘chief’ in the enumerated list of officers is intended to capture the principal officer, appointed or elected in accordance with section 8.40, performing the functions of such office irrespective of that officer’s title.” Id. ↑

15. The ability to expand or contract the statutory default list of officers by a provision in the articles is implied in the language of subsection (f)—“unless the articles of incorporation otherwise provide.” Model Bus. Corp. Act § 2.02 (2024). The Official Comment to Section 2.02 confirms this reading of the statute. See id. at cmt 3.E. (“That definition includes any individual identified in the enumerated list of officers, although the articles of incorporation may expand or contract this list or specify a procedure for doing so.”).
    ↑

16. For a comparison of the language in the MBCA’s and Delaware’s exculpation statutes, see the Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann., § 2.02, at 2-29 to 2-30 (5th ed. 2020); Vaaler, supra note 4, at 82–83. ↑

17. See Model Bus. Corp. Act § 2.02, cmt I. (2013); Vaaler, supra note 4, at 83; Hanks & Scriggins, supra note 12, at 28 (“By focusing on receipt of an improper financial benefit and intentional infliction of harm, section 2.02(b)(4) avoids many of the interpretive questions surrounding the definition of a breach of the duty of loyalty.”). ↑

18. See Model Bus. Corp. Act § 2.02, cmt 3.E. (2024) (stating that the “benefit must be financial rather than in less easily measured and more conjectural forms, such as business goodwill, personal reputation, or social ingratiation.”). ↑

19. See 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7) (2022) (“All references in this paragraph (b)(7) to an officer shall mean only a person who at the time of an act or omission as to which liability is asserted is deemed to have consented to service by the delivery of process to the registered agent of the corporation pursuant to § 3114(b) of Title 10 (for purposes of this sentence only, treating residents of this State as if they were nonresidents to apply § 3114(b) of Title 10 to this sentence.”); 10 Del. C. § 3114(b) (defining “officer” as “an officer of the corporation who (1) [i]s or was the president, chief executive officer, chief operating officer, chief financial officer, chief legal officer, controller, treasurer or chief accounting officer of the corporation at any time during the course of conduct alleged in the action or proceeding to be wrongful; (2) [i]s or was identified in the corporation’s public filings with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission because such person is or was 1 of the most highly compensated executive officers of the corporation at any time during the course of conduct alleged in the action or proceeding to be wrongful; or (3) [h]as, by written agreement with the corporation, consented to be identified as an officer for purposes of this section.”). ↑

20. Id. ↑

21. See 8 Del. C. § 242(b); Model Bus. Corp. Act § 10.03 (2024). For companies that are contemplating going public, these entities can incorporate an officer exculpation provision in the amended charter adopted in connection with the IPO or spin-off transaction. ↑

22. See Andrew J. Noreuil et al., Recent Developments in Delaware Officer Exculpation Charter Amendments, Mayer Brown Alert (Feb. 6, 2024) (reporting proposal and adoption rates as of the end of January 2024 for Delaware public companies included in any of the major indices). See also Douglas K. Schnell & Daniyal Iqbal, Lessons from the 2023 Proxy Season: Advance Notice Bylaws and Officer Exculpation, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (Sept. 5, 2023) (reporting on proposal and adoption rates as of July 24, 2023, for Delaware technology companies in the Lonegan Silicon Valley 150); Melissa Sawyer et al., Lessons from the 2023 Proxy Season, Sullivan & Cromwell Alert (Sept. 14, 2023) (reporting on proposal and adoption rates for meetings through H1 2023 at U.S. public companies). ↑

23. Noreuil et al., supra note 22. ↑

24. See In re Fox Corp./Snap Inc. Section 242 Litigation, C.A. Nos. 2022-1007, 2022-1032, 120 (Del. Jan. 17, 2024). ↑

25. See Noreuil et al., supra note 22. ↑

26. Id. See generally, Glass, Lewis & Co., United States 2024 Benchmark Policy Guidelines at 75 (recommending voting against proposals eliminating monetary liability for certain officers, unless compelling rationale for the adoption is provided by the board, and the provision is reasonable); Institutional Shareholder Services, United States Proxy Voting Guidelines, Benchmark Policy Recommendations at 25 (January 2024) (recommending a case-by-case consideration of the stated rationale and identifying a number of factors to be considered). ↑

27. Those states are Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Utah, and Virginia. In its Principles of Corporate Governance, the American Law Institute also recommended allowing a corporation’s charter to exculpate a director or officer. See Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations §§ 7.19-7.20 (1994). ↑

28. See 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1735 (amended on November 3, 2022; effective January 2, 2023). The Pennsylvania statute differs in several aspects from the Delaware exculpation provision (e.g., the limitation on liability in Pennsylvania can be in a shareholder-adopted bylaw as opposed to the charter). ↑

29. See 2024 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 120, Section 10 (S.B. 620) (2024). The Oklahoma amendments differ from Delaware and the MBCA in that they do not define “officer” for purposes of the exculpation statute. ↑

30. See Ala. Code § 10A- 2A-2.02 (amended May 17, 2024, effective Aug. 1, 2024). ↑

31. See Vaaler, supra note 4, at 82 (describing adoption trends for director exculpation statutes). Of note, thirty-six jurisdictions have corporate codes based on the MBCA, and it is reasonable to expect that they will adopt the MBCA’s officer exculpation language as they update their corporation codes over time. ↑

This article describes recent Delaware decisions that are relevant to the Model Business Corporation Act (the “MBCA”). These include several decisions addressing (i) the validity of governance provisions in agreements and (ii) the requirements for board of directors and stockholder approvals of merger agreements. In addition, this article describes legislation recently enacted in Delaware dealing with a number of the issues raised by these decisions.

Validity of Governance Provisions in Agreements

Delaware Decisions

Moelis Decision

In West Palm Beach Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Moelis & Company, 311 A.3d 809 (Del. Ch. 2024),^[1] the Delaware Court of Chancery held that certain pre-approval rights and board and committee composition provisions in a stockholder agreement entered into by the corporation with its controlling stockholder in anticipation of an initial public offering (“IPO”) by the corporation were facially invalid under Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (the “DGCL”), which provides that the “business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of the board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in [the DGCL] or the certificate of incorporation.” The Court held that those provisions infringed on the power of the board to manage the corporation’s affairs under the DGCL’s board-centric model of corporate governance.

The challenged stockholder agreement required the corporation to obtain the stockholder’s approval before taking various corporate actions and granted the stockholder extensive rights designed to ensure that he could elect a majority of the directors and that the composition of board committees would be proportionate to the number of the stockholder’s designees on the board. While the Court characterized the agreement as a “new-wave” stockholder agreement, rights of this kind are often found in agreements entered into in connection with debt and equity financings (including venture capital and private equity investments) and other commercial arrangements, as well as in settlement agreements with activists. The Moelis decision raises significant questions regarding the validity of these provisions when they are included in this kind of agreement. Because the decision is likely to be appealed, it may not be the last word from the Delaware courts on these issues.

The Court held that the pre-approval requirements in the Moelis agreement, viewed collectively, and some of the stockholder’s rights involving the composition of the board and its committees were facially invalid under Section 141(a). In addition, the Court held that the provisions related to the composition of board committees were also invalid under Section 141(c)(2), which vests the board with the authority to designate committees. The Court noted that most of the invalidated provisions (but not those relating to the composition of board committees or that are inconsistent with a mandatory feature of the DGCL) would have been valid if they had been included in the certificate of incorporation. This could have been accomplished by either (i) including them expressly in the certificate or by incorporating them by reference to an agreement as permitted by Section 102(d) regarding reference to extrinsic facts, or (ii) if the board is authorized to create new classes or series of stock (“blank check” authority), including them in a certificate of designation and issuing a single “golden” preferred share. An amendment of the certificate of incorporation would, of course, require stockholder approval, but a new class or series of stock could be created by the board alone if it has blank check authority.

The Court noted that, although Delaware is a contractarian state that favors private ordering, the ability to do so is subject to the limitations of the DGCL. The Court emphasized the need to differentiate between an agreement creating an internal governance arrangement and an external commercial contract that constrains board actions, like a credit agreement with restrictive covenants or an exclusive supply contract, while it also recognized the challenge in differentiating between the two. The Court identified several factors that indicate that an agreement creates an “internal governance” arrangement, including whether it arose out of an obvious commercial exchange and whether the purpose of the restrictions was to allocate governance rights. However, the Court did not specify how those factors should be weighted, other than that all of them are matters of degree and none are essential. It then indicated that once a contractual provision appears to be part of the corporation’s internal governance arrangements, a court must assess whether the provision prevents or limits in a substantial way the ability of the directors to use their own best judgment and make decisions in managing the corporation’s affairs. Applying these standards, the Court had no problem concluding that the Moelis stockholder agreement involved an internal governance arrangement that was not tied to any underlying commercial transaction and finding that most of its provisions violated Section 141 and were invalid. The Court found, however, that several provisions in the agreement that related to the rights of the stockholder to nominate board members and for the corporation to use its best efforts to cause them to be elected were valid.

Wagner Decision

Following the Moelis decision, the Court of Chancery, in Wagner v. BRP Group, Inc., 2024 WL 2741191 (Del. Ch. May 28, 2024), found invalid provisions in another pre-IPO stockholder agreement, as it was initially executed, that required pre-approval by the controlling stockholder of (i) any significant decision regarding a senior officer because it contravened Section 141(a) and Sections 142(b) and (e), (ii) any charter amendment because it contravened Sections 141(a) and 242, and (iii) certain significant transactions, most involving the corporation’s sole operating subsidiary, because it violated Section 141(a). Wagner differed from Moelis, however, because following the filing of the lawsuit, the parties modified the challenged stockholder agreement to provide that the stockholder would approve any action that a committee of the independent directors unanimously determined in good faith was in the best interest of the corporation. The Court considered the effect of the modification on the validity of the governance provisions. Although it recognized that the unanimity requirement permitted any one committee member to block a determination, since the DGCL permits bylaws to establish procedural limitations, like high vote and even unanimity requirements for a corporate action,^[2] the Court held that the committee mechanism was sufficient to overcome the invalidity under Section 141(a), but not the invalidity of the senior officer provision under Section 142 or the pre-approval requirement for charter amendments under Section 242.

N-able Decision

After the legislation described below was enacted and before it became effective, the Court of Chancery decided Seavitt v. N-able, Inc., 2024 WL 3534476 (Del. Ch. July 25, 2024), which involved similar issues to those in Moelis and Wagner regarding the validity of a pre-IPO stockholder agreement with controlling stockholders that contained pre-approval covenants and board and committee composition and director removal provisions. Like Moelis and Wagner, the Court found many of the provisions facially invalid in violation of the DGCL, an issue that was not resolved by the legislation because agreements subject to litigation at the legislation’s effective date were excluded from coverage under the legislation. As a harbinger of issues that can arise under the new legislation, the Court suggested that provisions in a stockholder agreement modifying the requirement for stockholder approval under the DGCL or permitting identified stockholders to remove directors might not be valid under the legislation because those provisions would not have been permissible in the certificate of incorporation.

Unlike in Moelis and Wagner, some of the provisions in the N-able certificate of incorporation stated that they were “subject to” the stockholder agreement. That raised the issue whether (as characterized by the Court) “this laconic prepositional phrase” effectively incorporates the stockholder agreement into the charter by reference under Section 102(d) of the DGCL. Not surprisingly in view of this characterization, the Court held that the reference was not sufficient to incorporate the agreement into the charter and, moreover, indicated that a private agreement cannot be incorporated into a charter, which is a foundational public document, noting that the statute only authorizes incorporation of “facts ascertainable” outside the charter.^[3]

Delaware Legislation

In response to the uncertainties created by the Moelis decision, legislation has been enacted in Delaware to add a new clause (18) to Section 122 of the DGCL to give corporations the power, notwithstanding Section 141(a), to enter into governance agreements—like the ones in Moelis, Wagner, and N-able—that include approval rights and board composition provisions that otherwise could be included in the certificate of incorporation.^[4] The legislation, which encountered some criticism, principally from academics and some in the Delaware judiciary, became effective on August 1, 2024, and applies retroactively except to litigation begun before that date. Section 122(18) eliminates some of the uncertainties for Delaware corporations arising from the Moelis, Wagner, and N-able decisions, but interpretive issues in applying the new provision, such as the scope of agreements authorized under it and how those agreements mesh with fiduciary duties, will need to be considered.

Relevance for the MBCA

Although the Moelis, Wagner, and N-able decisions apply to Delaware corporations, their reasoning could be applied to business corporations formed in other jurisdictions that have provisions similar to Section 141, such as Section 8.01 of the MBCA. Whether other states will follow the reasoning in the Moelis, Wagner, and N-able decisions is not certain. Unlike Delaware, many state corporation statutes, such as those based on the MBCA, expressly permit stockholder agreements, in addition to provisions in the charter, to vary the director management norm. Typically, however, the stockholder agreements authorized by a statute like Section 7.32(b) of the MBCA require that all stockholders be a party to the agreement.^[5] Some jurisdictions, including Delaware, have close corporation provisions that permit stockholder agreements. A court might read these provisions to exclude stockholder agreements among less than all of the stockholders as permitted vehicles for varying the director management norm, and if so, the issues raised by Moelis, Wagner, and N-able could be even more difficult in those jurisdictions. On the other hand, a court could preferably read these provisions as nonexclusive for these purposes. The ABA Corporate Laws Committee is currently considering how, if at all, to respond to the Moelis, Wagner, and N-able decisions and the recent Delaware legislation.

In deciding whether governance provisions that do not have the benefit of the Delaware legislation may be validly included in an agreement, practitioners should consider whether the provisions limit the authority and exercise of discretion by the board of directors. In the case of an agreement with these limitations, practitioners should then determine whether those provisions are external commercial contractual arrangements or are internal governance arrangements to be tested against the statutory provisions like Section 141 of the DGCL and Section 8.01 of the MBCA and other provisions of the applicable corporation statute. The Court of Chancery distinguished traditional commercial contracts from the agreements in Moelis, Wagner, and N-able, which were not tied to any underlying commercial transaction and were designed to address corporate governance in an extensive way, thus constituting an “internal governance” arrangement. Accordingly, traditional commercial credit agreements with institutional lenders and securities purchase agreements with equity investors that contain customary restrictive covenants associated with protecting the credit or the investment should not be viewed as an internal governance arrangement. The dividing line is not clear between these customary agreements and agreements with extensive protective and governance provisions that fall between these two.

Analyzing provisions implicated by the Moelis, Wagner, and N-able decisions and giving legal opinions on the validity of those provisions, especially outside of Delaware, may be problematic, and the need to do so should be weighed in the context of the specific transaction. If practitioners are concerned about the validity of provisions in an agreement, they could redraft the provisions, for example by including a fiduciary duty out^[6] or similar exception, or they could include some or all of the provisions in the charter, either through an amendment or, if authorized, in a certificate of designation creating a new class or series of stock that becomes part of the charter. Section 102(d) of the DGCL permits certain provisions of the certificate of incorporation to “be made dependent upon facts ascertainable outside such instrument, provided that the manner in which such facts shall operate upon such provision is clearly and explicitly set forth therein,” and Section 2.02(d) of the MBCA permits such provisions to be “made dependent upon facts objectively ascertainable outside the articles of incorporation” if the requirements of Section 1.20(k) of the MBCA are met, one of which authorizes reference to terms of an agreement to which the corporation is a party.^[7] Even when governance provisions are included in a corporation’s charter, however, they still should be analyzed to ensure that they are of a type permitted to be included in the charter. For example, as noted above, limitations on the board’s authority to designate committees under Section 141(c) can raise issues, as can provisions that are inconsistent with a mandatory feature of the DGCL.

Actions to Approve Mergers and Other Fundamental Changes

Delaware Decision

In Sjunde AP-fonden v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 2024 WL 863290 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2024) (corrected Mar. 19, 2024), the Delaware Court of Chancery declined to grant a motion to dismiss a complaint challenging the approval of a merger, which serves as reminder to practitioners of the importance of strictly following the requirements to approve a merger under Section 251 of the DGCL. These requirements relate to the need for a sufficiently final merger agreement to be approved by the board of directors and to the contents of the notice that must be sent to the stockholders when soliciting their approval of the merger.

In Delaware an essentially final merger agreement must first be approved by the board. The key question addressed by the Court in Activision was what “essentially final” means. The plaintiff argued for the execution version to be approved, while the defendants asked the Court to recognize the market practice of submitting a draft or near-final form to the board for approval. The Court held that, at least for purposes of dealing with the motion to dismiss, in order to comply with Section 251(b) of the DGCL, the board had to approve an essentially complete version of the merger agreement. It then went on to conclude that the plaintiff adequately pled that the merger agreement approved by the board was not essentially complete because it omitted the name of the company being acquired, the merger consideration, a disclosure letter that qualified a number of provisions of the agreement, the disclosure schedules called for by the agreement, and the surviving corporation’s charter^[8] and because the board delegated a decision on the amount of the dividends that the acquired company may pay prior to closing to an ad hoc committee of the board. The defendants may be able to establish at trial that the board had before it some of the omitted information, such as the name of the company to be acquired and the merger consideration. The Court recognized as an open issue whether the disclosure schedules were essential, but the Court’s decision indicates that a merger agreement that the board approves, to be essentially complete, must be close to being the execution version.

The Court then examined whether the information required under Section 251(c) to be included in the notice of the stockholder meeting was satisfied. It acknowledged that the notice purported to provide a copy of the merger agreement by referring to the exhibit to the accompanying proxy statement, but the Court determined that the merger agreement provided with the notice did not satisfy Section 251(b) because, among other things, it omitted the surviving corporation’s charter.^[9] The Court also ruled that the notice did not satisfy the alternative permitted under Section 251(c) of containing a brief summary of the merger agreement because, although the proxy statement sent with the notice contained a summary of the merger agreement, the proxy statement was not part of the notice.^[10]

Finally, the Court ruled that the board’s delegation to a committee to finalize the provision of the merger agreement permitting the payment of certain pre-closing dividends by the target was invalid because under Section 141(c) a committee cannot approve on its own matters for which stockholder approval is required under the DGCL, such as approval of a merger agreement.^[11]

Delaware Legislation

The recently enacted Delaware legislation^[12] includes provisions to address the issues identified by the Activision decision. It adds a new Section 147 to the DGCL to recognize that the board of directors can approve a merger agreement and other agreements requiring board approval in substantially final form, not necessarily the final form, and can ratify a previously approved agreement before a filing is made with the Secretary of State. Also, Section 232 dealing with notices to stockholders is amended to provide that any materials included with, or attached to, a notice to stockholders, like a proxy statement, is considered to be part of the notice. In addition, (i) a new Section 268(a) is added to eliminate the need for the certificate of incorporation of the surviving corporation to be attached to the merger agreement or approved by stockholders of the target where those stockholders will not become stockholders of the surviving corporation, as is the case for an all cash reverse triangular merger, and (ii) a new Section 268(b) is added to make clear that disclosure letters and schedules are not part of the merger agreement and therefore, as a statutory matter, do not need to be approved by the board.^[13]

Relevance for the MBCA

The Activision decision highlights the importance of strict compliance with notice and approval requirements, even after enactment of the Delaware legislation, under both Delaware law and the law of other relevant jurisdictions. Those requirements, which are not limited to mergers, differ among jurisdictions, and thus the particular jurisdiction’s law needs to be carefully reviewed. For example, under Section 11.04 of the MBCA a “plan of merger” meeting the requirements of Section 11.02(d) must first be adopted by the board and then, with certain exceptions, approved by the stockholders; if approval is to be sought at a meeting, the notice of the meeting shall “contain or be accompanied by a copy or summary of the plan,” in some cases with a copy or summary of the surviving entity’s governing documents.^[14] It is common, at least in states outside of Delaware, to structure mergers using both a transactional agreement, usually called a merger agreement or acquisition agreement that describes the transaction and contains representations, covenants, conditions to closing and other provisions, and a separate plan of merger that is typically attached as an exhibit to the transactional agreement. The plan of merger is typically a relatively short document that contains only the terms and conditions of the merger as required by the corporation statute, which in MBCA jurisdictions are those set forth in Section 11.02(d). Only the plan of merger needs to be submitted to stockholders for adoption in those jurisdictions. The statutory pattern in Delaware is somewhat different, and that difference may account for a difference in practice and the Court’s rulings in Activision. Section 251(b) of the DGCL requires that the board approve an agreement of merger and declare its advisability and that the agreement of merger be executed by the corporation and submitted to the stockholders for approval. Under the MBCA, the plan of merger need not be executed by the corporation, and as long as there is a plan of merger approved by the board and the stockholders, the transactional agreement signed by the parties to the merger need not be submitted to or approved the stockholders.

This piece originally appeared in the Summer 2024 issue of the MBCA Newsletter, the newsletter of the ABA Business Law Section’s Corporate Laws Committee. Read the full issue and previous issues, including previous articles in the Recent Decisions Relevant to the MBCA series, at the Corporate Laws Committee’s Model Business Corporation Act Resource Center.

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and not his law firm or clients. No legal advice is being given in this article.

1. In a prior decision, West Palm Beach Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Moelis & Company, 310 A.3d 985 (Del. Ch. 2024), the Court held that laches and ripeness did not apply where there is an alleged violation of a statute. ↑

2. See Section 141(c)(4) of the DGCL. ↑

3. The Court distinguished Colon v. Bumble, Inc., 305 A.3d 352 (Del. Ch. 2023), which upheld super-voting power granted to stockholders identified in a stockholder agreement on the grounds that the identified stockholders were ascertainable facts outside of the charter as permitted by Section 151(a). See Stanley Keller, Delaware Court of Chancery Approves Differential Voting Within Same Class, In Our Op. (ABA Bus. Law Section Legal Ops. Comm.), Fall 2023 (Vol. 23, No. 1), at 17–18. ↑

4. S.B. 313, 152nd Gen. Assemb., An Act to Amend Title 8 of the Delaware Code Relating to the General Corporation Law, 84 Del. Laws ch. 309 (enacted on July 17, 2024). ↑

5. The MBCA uses the term “shareholders,” but for consistency this article follows the DGCL usage of “stockholders.” ↑

6. The question of whether a fiduciary out alone will validate certain governance provisions in a stockholder agreement could be an issue in Dollens v. Goosehead Ins., Inc., C.A. No. 2022-1018-JTL (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 2022), in which the plaintiffs challenged a stockholder agreement as being in violation of Section 141(a). A proposed settlement involving amendments to the stockholder agreement has been agreed to by the parties to the litigation and is pending approval. The amendments narrow the governance provisions and add fiduciary outs for the board. The notice of the proposed settlement is available from plaintiff’s counsel. ↑

7. As noted above, the question of whether and the extent to which the terms of an agreement may be incorporated by reference in a certificate of incorporation pursuant to Section 102(d) of the DGCL is addressed in N-able. ↑

8. The Court’s reference to Section 251(b) requiring the surviving corporation’s charter to be included in the merger agreement does not appear to be apt because the requirement of Section 251(b)(4) applies only to a consolidation. For a merger, Section 251(b)(3) requires only a statement that the surviving corporation’s charter shall be its charter, unless it is to be amended or restated, in which event that shall be stated. ↑

9. Id. ↑

10. The Court noted that Section 251 did not contain the amendments to Sections 228 on stockholder consents and 242 on certificate of incorporation amendments that permit notice of internet availability of proxy material to satisfy the merger agreement notice requirement. An alternative that could have satisfied Section 251 would have been for the notice to have referred to the summary of the merger agreement in the proxy statement instead of referring just to the merger agreement attached as an exhibit to the proxy statement. ↑

11. An application has been filed with the Court of Chancery to validate the merger at issue in the Activision decision under Section 205 of the DGCL. The MBCA has similar provisions to validate defective corporate acts and stock issuances in Subchapter E of Chapter 1 (Sections 1.45–1.52). ↑

12. Supra note 4. ↑

13. The Delaware legislation also adds a new Section 261 to address the holding in Crispo v. Musk, 304 A.3d 567 (Del. Ch. 2023), regarding remedies for breaches of a merger agreement by recognizing a provision in the agreement that allows a target company to seek damages, including lost stockholder premium, for a breach by the acquirer and, if so provided, to retain such damages. It also allows the stockholders, by approving the merger agreement, to appoint a stockholder representative to enforce their rights under the merger agreement. ↑

14. If appraisal rights under Chapter 13 of the MBCA are available, additional information is required. ↑

This article is Part II of the Musings on Contracts series by Glenn D. West, which explores the unique contract law issues the author has been contemplating, some focused on the specifics of M&A practice, and some just random.

In a Delaware Court of Chancery decision earlier this year, Labyrinth, Inc. v. Urich,^[1] Vice Chancellor Zurn likened the not-uncommon busted cross-reference in a stock purchase agreement (“SPA”) to the misunderstood orders that led to the disastrous Charge of the Light Brigade during the Crimean War in 1854.

Lord Raglan’s order was to “advance rapidly to the front—follow the enemy and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns.”^[2] But which front and what guns? From Lord Raglan’s vantage point high on the cliffs above the battle, his orders were perfectly clear. He could see the “captured guns” that he wanted recaptured being carried away by the enemy nearby. However, from the vantage point of the recipient of the orders, Lord Lucan, the only guns that he could see were at the end of the long valley in a fortified position. And, thus, “[i]nto the valley of Death [r]ode the six hundred.”^[3]

According to Vice Chancellor Zurn, the SPA in dispute in Labyrinth was “rife with blunders and omissions.”^[4] Using as a cautionary tale the bad decision made by Lord Lucan in hastily interpreting an ambiguous order, Vice Chancellor Zurn refused to choose between “two reasonable interpretations . . . [and] just charge on.”^[5] Instead of resolving the matter on a motion to dismiss, the matter must now be resolved through an expensive trial, with a full “factual inquiry to determine the parties’ intent.”^[6]

And what were these “blunders and omissions”? Well, there were really only two significant ones, and they both involved “contractual signals to nonexistent provisions”^[7]—that is, busted cross-references.

The Busted Cross-References in Labyrinth

The first busted cross-reference involved the signature block for an individual party to the agreement. In that signature block, there was a reference to “Section 7.5” as being one of only two sections of the SPA to which the signatory was agreeing to be bound. The problem was that there was no Section 7.5 in the agreement. There was a Section 6.7.5, which seemed pretty clearly to be the section that the agreement intended to reference. However, Vice Chancellor Zurn concluded:

Perhaps the parties meant Section 7.5 to be Section 6.7.5; perhaps the parties intended something entirely different. The ambiguity, while perhaps so minor as to be a typo, requires a greater factual inquiry to determine the parties’ intent. It is here that I refrain from charging “forward” with the “Light Brigade.”^[8]

The second busted cross-reference was even more problematic.

The exclusive remedy provision (Section 8.9) read as follows:

Subject to Section 10.12, the parties acknowledge and agree that their sole and exclusive remedy with respect to any and all claims for any breach of any representation, warranty, covenant, agreement or obligation set forth herein or otherwise relating to the subject matter of this Agreement, shall be pursuant to the indemnification provisions set forth in this Section 8. In furtherance of the foregoing, except with respect to Section 10.12, each party hereby waives, to the fullest extent permitted under Law, any and all rights, claims and causes of action for any breach of any representation, warranty, covenant, agreement or obligation set forth herein or otherwise relating to the subject matter of this Agreement it may have against the other parties hereto and their Affiliates and each of their respective Representatives arising under or based upon any Law, except pursuant to the indemnification provisions set forth in this Section 8. Nothing in this Section 8.9 shall limit any Person’s right to seek and obtain any equitable relief to which any Person shall be entitled pursuant to Section 10.12.^[9]

The plaintiffs were seeking injunctive relief to prevent violations of certain of the post-closing covenants set forth in the SPA. Once again, however, the provision referred to a section that did not exist—there was no Section 10.12. Instead, there was a Section 9.12, which provided as follows:

Each of the parties acknowledges and agrees that the other parties would be damaged irreparably in the event that any of the provisions of this Agreement were not performed in accordance with their specific terms or were otherwise breached or violated. Accordingly, each of the parties covenants and agrees that, without posting bond or similar undertaking, each of the other parties shall be entitled to an injunction or injunctions to prevent breaches or violations of the provisions of this Agreement and to the remedy of specific performance of this Agreement and the terms and provisions hereof in any action, suit or proceeding instituted in any court as specified in Section 9.8 having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, in addition to any other remedy to which such party may be entitled, at law or in equity. Each party further covenants and agrees that, in the event of any action, suit or proceeding for specific performance in respect of such breach or violation, it shall not assert that a remedy at law would be adequate.^[10]

So, again, Vice Chancellor Zurn was faced with a busted cross-reference. While she thought it likely that the reference to Section 10.12 was intended to be a reference to Section 9.12, and that the blunder had probably resulted from a section of the agreement being deleted at some point, she could not conclude so at the motion to dismiss stage: “I will not yet say the SPA precludes injunctive relief, but without greater factual confidence, neither will I say the SPA permits it.”^[11]

Say What You Mean and Mean What You Say

Obviously, more care should have been taken in checking these cross-references before finalizing the SPA. But here are a few tricks that could have helped (other than using Word’s auto cross-reference feature, which may or may not always be reliable). First, if you ever need to delete a section, just delete the text of the section (not the section number itself) and replace the deleted text with “[intentionally deleted]”—then nothing like the 10.12 becoming 9.12 could happen. Second, I always bolded or underlined cross-references; it makes them easier to spot when you are proofing. And last, I always included parenthetical section titles with my cross-references. Thus, even if I left off the “6” in 6.7.5, if the section title was “Noncompetition Agreement,” it would probably be easy enough for the court to see the obvious intent if the reference to Section 7.5 was stated as “Section 7.5 (Noncompetition Agreement).”

Some may think this is all hyper-technical silliness. But such is the life you have chosen. The objective theory of contracts requires that courts determine what parties intended by their contracts from the words used in them. Courts assume that what you meant by your contract is what the contract actually says. So, make sure that your contract actually says what you mean. Words matter, and cross-references matter.

Let’s be careful out there.

1. No. 2023-0327-MTZ, 2024 WL 295996 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2024). ↑

2. The Order That Launched the Charge of the Light Brigade, 1854, Nat’l Army Museum (last visited Nov. 5, 2024). ↑

3. Alfred, Lord Tennyson, The Charge of the Light Brigade, Poetry Found. (last visited Nov. 5, 2024). ↑

4. Labyrinth, 2024 WL 295996, at *1. ↑

5. Id. ↑

6. Id. at *21. ↑

7. Id. at *1. ↑

8. Id. at *21. ↑

9. Id. at *22 (emphasis added by court). ↑

10. Id. (emphasis added by court). ↑

11. Id. ↑

From large language models like ChatGPT to image generation tools like DALL-E, artificial intelligence (“AI”) has undeniably become part of the public consciousness—providing utility, amusement, and commercial opportunities for individuals and companies alike. Amid their popularity for creating text based on user prompts in fun and novel ways, AI chatbots have also proven useful as quasi search engines—scraping and synthesizing vast quantities of data to respond to a variety of inquiries and requests in a clear and concise manner.

This functionality blurs the line between traditional search engines, such as Google or Yahoo, which typically provide links to websites, and content creators—raising questions about the nature of information retrieval and synthesis. Such a shift in functionality has elicited scrutiny about whether these tools might be considered “information content providers” under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“Section 230”),^[1] the federal law that (in relevant part) governs the moderation of online content by interactive computer service providers and immunizes them from most lawsuits based on third-party content. As a result of this evolution, providers of AI technology, particularly AI search engines, may find themselves potentially exposed to greater liability than their Internet-age predecessors.

The Emergence of a New Type of Generative AI

Technology companies and users alike are increasingly recognizing and embracing generative AI’s capabilities in the search space. Google quickly capitalized on its search engine prowess and unveiled an “AI Overviews” feature, which now sits atop many Google search queries.^[2] And just recently, OpenAI opened its “SearchGPT” for closed beta testing, launching it as “a temporary prototype of new AI search features that give you fast and timely answers with clear and relevant sources.”^[3]

By way of illustration, when a user types a prompt into Google such as “what is the role of a lawyer?” a traditional search would simply generate a list of links to informative third-party websites with relevant information. Today, Google AI Overviews will generate a narrative answer above that list; in one search of the example prompt by the authors, it explained, “Lawyers, also known as attorneys, counselors, or counsel, are licensed professionals who advise and represent clients in legal matters. Their role is to provide legal counsel and advocacy for individuals, businesses, and government organizations.” An accompanying quasi-footnote link points readers to its source material (in this example, the ABA website^[4]).

Under the hood, both Google’s AI Overviews and OpenAI’s SearchGPT operate on similar principles: They use large language models to process and synthesize information from web searches they perform. These models are already trained on diverse Internet content, including not only reputable sources but also user-generated content and potentially unreliable information. When a query is received, the AI rapidly scans its knowledge base and retrieves relevant, up-to-date information from the Internet or relevant index of consistently updated Internet data. The AI then identifies the most relevant details and generates a response using its language model, which predicts the most probable text based on the query and all information available to it at the moment of execution. Oftentimes, the same prompt will result in a different response, which is generally true of generative AIs due to their use of stochastic optimization algorithms. These algorithms incorporate controlled randomness into the process of generating answers for problems that rely on probabilities.

However, this process is not infallible. AI models can sometimes conflate facts from different sources, misinterpret context, place too much weight on a particular source to the detriment of others, or fail to distinguish between reliable and unreliable information. These possibilities in the context of search engine functionality can lead to the propagation of misinformation, ranging from harmless misconceptions to potentially dangerous advice, all presented with the same air of authority as accurate information. Examples have cropped up since AI Overviews was unveiled by Google in July that have subsequently caused the feature’s incorporation to be partially rolled back by the company.^[5] For example, after a user complained that their car’s blinker wasn’t making an indicator noise, AI Overviews suggested the user change their blinker fluid. The problem with this advice? Blinker fluid doesn’t exist and is an inside joke among car connoisseurs.^[6] Further, these systems may occasionally “hallucinate”—generating plausible-sounding but entirely fabricated information—especially when dealing with queries outside their training data or when attempting to bridge gaps in their knowledge.

But the potential for harm goes further than bad advice about car maintenance. Generative AI search engines also risk the proliferation of defamatory content by responding to a user’s query with misleading or blatantly false characterizations of real people. By way of illustration, one anecdote reported that in response to a query about cheating in chess, Google’s AI Overviews produced a response stating that chess grandmaster Hans Niemann had admitted to cheating by using an engine or chess-playing AI when playing against the world’s top chess player, Magnus Carlsen.^[7] The problem? Niemann hadn’t admitted to cheating against Carlsen, and in fact had vociferously denied any wrongdoing, including filing a $100 million lawsuit against those who had accused him of cheating.^[8] The misleading response from Google AI Overviews was likely paraphrased from statements made by Niemann about prior online games when he was much younger. But given the predictive mechanics of Google Overviews’s AI, that context was absent from the response.

When an AI search engine promulgates inaccurate, misleading, or tortious content, who should be liable for the fallout? Google’s AI Overviews and OpenAI’s SearchGPT present unique challenges to the traditional understanding of online platforms’ roles and responsibilities. These search-integrated AI tools operate on a spectrum between traditional search engines and creative content producers. Unlike standard AI chatbots, which primarily generate responses based on preloaded training data, or traditional search engines that merely display preexisting information, these tools actively retrieve, synthesize, and produce content using information from the Internet in real time. This real-time integration of web content allows these AI search tools to create new, synthesized content from multiple sources.

As a result, these tools are increasingly taking on the role of a content creator rather than a neutral platform. This shift may have implications for the platforms’ legal liability, as it poses the question: Are providers of these AI services akin to a publisher, acting as a neutral conduit for information, or are they more analogous to an author, exercising discretion, albeit algorithmically, to generate unique content? As we explore Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and its implications, this distinction will be crucial in understanding the potential legal challenges these new AI tools may face, and the consequences for consumers harmed by their content.

Background on Section 230

Section 230 was enacted at the beginning of the Internet’s social media era to encourage innovation by protecting interactive computer service providers from liability stemming from tortious content posted by third parties on their platforms. Under Section 230, the provider will be liable only if it “contribute[s] materially” to the alleged unlawfulness published on the platform.^[9] Section 230’s protections apply specifically when the provider “merely provides third parties with neutral tools to create web content.”^[10]

These standards have been applied to protect interactive computer service providers from liability for the publication of tortious content on their platforms. For example, in Blumenthal v. Drudge, the District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the plaintiff’s defamation claim against AOL for its publication of an allegedly defamatory Internet article written by codefendant Matt Drudge.^[11] The Court concluded that AOL’s role in disseminating the article (providing the Internet service platform upon which the article was published) fell under Section 230’s protective umbrella. The Court explained that, in enacting the statute, Congress “opted not to hold interactive computer services liable for their failure to edit, withhold or restrict access to offensive material disseminated through their medium.”^[12] Because AOL had not authored the article, but instead only served as an intermediary for the allegedly injurious message, the Court concluded that the Internet service provider was immune under Section 230.

Neutral Intermediary or Content Contributor: Where Will Generative AI Land?

Against this backdrop, it becomes evident that generative AI search engines do not fit squarely within the existing legal framework, as they potentially occupy the roles of Internet platform and content creator simultaneously. On the one hand, a service like Google AI Overviews isn’t authoring articles in the traditional sense. But on the other hand, Google AI Overviews does more than merely provide a medium through which information can be funneled. How courts view that activity will be critical for whether generative AI search engines fit within the limitations of Section 230 immunity.

The case of Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, illustrates how courts have assessed the “contributor” versus “neutral tool” dichotomy for Section 230 immunity purposes. In that case, the Court held that the website operated by the defendant had not acted as a neutral tool when the website did not “merely provide a framework that could be utilized for proper or improper purposes” but instead was directly involved in “developing the discriminatory [content].”^[13] Specifically, the defendant “designed its [website’s] search and email systems to limit [roommate] listings available to subscribers based on sex, sexual orientation and presence of children,” and “selected the criteria used to hide listings.”^[14] The Court reasoned that “a website operator who edits in a manner that contributes to the alleged illegality . . . is directly involved in the alleged illegality and thus not immune” under Section 230.^[15]

By contrast, in O’Kroley v. Fastcase, Inc., the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Section 230 barred a defamation lawsuit against Google’s presentation of its search results.^[16] In that case, the plaintiff argued that based upon the manner in which its search results were displayed, “Google did more than merely display third-party content” and was instead “responsible” for the “creation or development” of the content.^[17] The Court disagreed, noting that although Google “performed some automated editorial acts on the content, such as removing spaces and altering font,” its alterations did not “materially contribute” to the allegedly harmful content given that “Google did not add” anything to the displayed text.^[18]

Here, the functionality of Google AI Overviews functionality is arguably more akin to the Roommates platform than Google’s display of search results in O’Kroley. AI Overviews collects and curates preexisting information authored by other sources, synthesizing it to form a narrative response that is (in theory) directly responsive to the user’s query. In this regard, Google AI Overviews is analogous to an academic researcher reporting on preexisting literature in a review article. While the individual studies cited aren’t the researcher’s original work, the synthesis, analysis, and presentation of that information constitute a valuable and original contribution in the form of an academic survey. Similarly, AI Overviews’s curation and synthesis of information, while based on existing sources, results in a unique product that reflects its own algorithmically “analytical” process.

Because of the way generative AI works, even when there are independent sources of information being used to generate Google AI Overviews’s narrative answer, the response is promulgated by Google, rather than the independent sources themselves. While one might argue that AI Overviews is deciding which third-party content to include or exclude—similar to traditional search engines—AI Overviews’s role goes beyond that of an editor. In other words, Google isn’t merely a conduit for other sources of information or simply filtering which content to display; Google is serving as the speaker—essentially paraphrasing the information provided by the independent sources and sometimes doing so imperfectly. Simply put, Google’s editorial role is more substantive than merely changing the font or adding ellipses.

The following example illustrates Google AI Overviews’s editorial functionality, and how it can take seemingly innocuous content on the Internet and edit it to convey a message that could pose harm to the public. In May, Google AI Overviews went viral for suggesting its users ingest one serving of rock per day since, according to AI Overviews, rocks are “a vital source of minerals and vitamins that are important for digestive health”: “Dr. Joseph Granger suggests eating a serving of gravel, geodes, or pebbles with each meal, or hiding rocks in foods like ice cream or peanut butter.”^[19] Google’s cited source was ResFrac Corporation, a hydraulic fracturing simulation software company, which had reposted^[20] an article by The Onion,^[21] a well-known satirical news organization that publishes fictional, humorous articles parodying current events and societal issues. Pictured in the Onion article was an advisor to ResFrac, explained ResFrac in its repost.

Authors’ reproduction of a Google AI Overviews response about eating geodes.

But much was left out by Google AI Overviews, including the important contextual clues that would tip a reader off to the satirical nature of the original content. For instance, the article states that sedimentary supplements “could range in size from a handful of dust to a medium-sized 5-pound cobblestone,” and that rocks should be hidden “inside different foods, like peanut butter or ice cream” to mask the texture. So, while the original content was lifted from the ResFrac post and properly cited, the meaning and intent were substantially altered in a way that goes beyond a neutral publisher’s alteration (e.g., changing font or adding punctuation). Google AI Overviews is unambiguously advocating for rock consumption—a position that, if adhered to, could undoubtedly cause real harm. If applied, Section 230’s umbrella of immunity would allow Google AI Overviews to escape liability for harm caused by its dissemination of this nonsensical position.

The Potential Repercussions of Section 230 Application to New AI Search Engines

Under traditional Section 230 principles, the plaintiff may be barred from suing interactive computer service providers for tortious speech but nevertheless can seek to recover from the original creator of the harmful content. For example, in the Drudge case discussed above, the plaintiff was barred from suing AOL but was permitted to continue the case against the original author of the defamatory article. Articulating this principle, the Fourth Circuit has opined that Section 230 immunity does not mean “that the original culpable party who posts [tortious content] would escape accountability.”^[22]

But no such parallel accountability exists in the generative AI search engine context. Simply put, there may not be an “original creator” to take the blame for the publication of harmful content. Consider the example of AI Overviews recommending eating rocks discussed above. The Onion’s original article was published as, and intended to be, purely satirical. Indeed, when ResFrac reposted the article, there was no indication that it was intended to be taken literally or was being provided as medical advice. Neither The Onion nor ResFrac was negligent or reckless in publishing the article, and the article’s language only became potentially harmful when reframed and relied upon, without proper context, by Google AI Overviews. In other words, the “original creator” would not be the tortfeasor—AI Overviews would be. If applying Section 230 immunity, a plaintiff harmed by Google AI Overviews’s advocacy for rock consumption would be left without recourse.

Similarly, in the context of defamation, a plaintiff harmed by a libelous generative AI search engine result would be left without recourse. Generally, to bring a cause of action for defamation, the plaintiff must establish the following: (1) a false statement purporting to be fact; (2) publication or communication of that statement to a third person; (3) fault amounting to at least negligence; and (4) damages or some harm caused to the reputation of the person or entity who was the subject of the statement.^[23] But how can a plaintiff allege negligence or an intent to defame when the original publications from which the defamatory search result were taken were not defamatory in the first place? In the chess player example discussed above, the available information online was only defamatory when it was taken out of context and mischaracterized by the generative AI search engine. Thus, the original speakers—i.e., the sources from which the search engine pulled its information—were neither negligent nor intentionally defamatory in publishing the content. As a result, a defamed plaintiff would be unable to establish the elements of their case against the “original speaker.”

These scenarios further highlight why generative AI search engines don’t fit neatly within the existing Section 230 framework, and the legal principles underlying the statutory framework.

A recent and tragic case out of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals illustrates the serious harm that algorithmically generated content can cause, and the way in which courts are attempting to grapple with the issue of accountability. In Anderson v. TikTok, Inc., at issue was the question of whether TikTok could rely on Section 230 immunity to dismiss a lawsuit brought by the estate of a child who accidentally died while performing a TikTok trend known as the “Blackout Challenge.”^[24] Videos depicting the challenge were shown to the child via the TikTok “For You Page” or “FYP”—a feature of the app that relies on algorithmic curation to recommend a “tailored compilation of videos” to the user based on data about their interests and characteristics.^[25] The plaintiff argued that TikTok should be held liable for recommending and promoting Blackout Challenge videos to minors’ FYP through its algorithm.^[26]

The Third Circuit agreed with the plaintiff, concluding that TikTok’s algorithmic recommendations via the FYP constituted “expressive activity” not immunized under Section 230.^[27] The Court explained that because the TikTok algorithm “‘[d]ecid[ed] on the third-party speech that [was] included in or excluded from a compilation—and then organiz[ed] and present[ed] the included items’ on users’ FYPs,” the recommendation was the “first-party speech” of TikTok.^[28] Simply put, because TikTok’s algorithm curated an individualized FYP for each user, the platform served not merely as conduit for third-party information, but instead, created unique, expressive content.

Although the case did not involve a generative AI search engine like Google AI Overviews, the Third Circuit’s analysis is instructive as to the way in which courts may apply traditional Section 230 jurisprudence to algorithmically generated content. Indeed, the Third Circuit’s reasoning is easily extendable to the content generated by generative AI search engines that, like the FYP generated by TikTok, curate unique content in response to user activity.

Conclusion

Given its characteristics and capabilities, AI search engines such as Google AI Overviews should be categorized as “material contributors” rather than “neutral tools” under the Section 230 analytical framework. We reach this conclusion given that generative AI search engines actively synthesize information from multiple real-time sources, determine relevance and importance of such information, and generate new content that goes beyond mere aggregation and indifferent publication. Under such circumstances, the technology functions far more like an academic curating and paraphrasing her research findings than a neutral message board or conduit for information. This nuanced characterization may seem slight but could have meaningful implications for both developers of AI technology and those who may be harmed by it.

If the opposite conclusion is reached, and Section 230 immunity applies, those who are harmed by AI-generated search results would be left with little to no recourse. Unlike traditional Section 230 immunity, which leaves the door open for recovery from the original tortious speaker, the potential harm caused by AI search engine results can typically be traced back to only one source—the AI algorithm itself. It’s easy to imagine a world in which Google AI Overviews produces a search result that’s missing context or mischaracterizes the original content in a manner that is either negligent or defamatory. But with Section 230 immunity, AI companies would face no consequences for irresponsible development of their models and injured plaintiffs would have no “original speaker” to blame for their injuries. This lack of accountability could lead to proliferation of misinformation and harmful or defamatory content, as companies prioritize speed and efficiency over safety.

On the other hand, if generative AI search engines aren’t protected under Section 230, the AI ecosystem may become more restrained. It’s important to remember that the primary motivation behind the passage of Section 230 was to “preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet”—i.e., to ensure that innovation would not be stifled by the fear of liability.^[29] These principles are equally, if not more applicable, in the context of AI. AI companies might feel pressured to rein in their advancements to avoid content creator liability while the ongoing AI arms race incentivizes them to push those boundaries.

The tension between innovation and legal liability is exacerbated by the absence of comprehensive AI regulation clearly defining the contours and applicability of Section 230 immunity in the context of generative AI. This dearth of regulation may remain the status quo for the foreseeable future, as congressional attempts to regulate AI have largely fallen flat in recent years. There have been two notable, but unsuccessful, efforts to address the issue posed by generative AI with regard to Section 230 immunity. In March 2023, Senator Marco Rubio introduced legislation to amend Section 230.^[30] The proposed legislation would classify platforms that amplify information using an algorithm as “content providers” with respect to the information they promulgate via AI. This amendment would impose liability on those platforms for the content amplified algorithmically or by some other automated processes. In June 2023, Senator Josh Hawley introduced a bill that would waive immunity under Section 230 for claims and charges related to generative artificial intelligence, which was defined to mean “an artificial intelligence system that is capable of generating novel text, video, images, audio, and other media based on prompts or other forms of data provided by a person.”^[31] Both bills died in the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. And although the Biden administration issued an executive order addressing the federal regulation of AI, the action did nothing to answer the question of whether Section 230 immunity should be applied to content generated by AI.^[32]

Given these circumstances, it seems likely that courts, rather than legislators, will take the lead in defining the limits of Section 230’s applicability to generative AI technology. Leaving such a complex task to judges and lawyers—most of whom are likely not technological experts in artificial intelligence—may lead to unpredictable, undesirable, and inconsistent results. For example, while the Third Circuit may view algorithmic curation as “expressive activity,” courts in other parts of the country may adopt a different approach, resulting in a patchwork of protection for those harmed by tortious content generated and promulgated by artificial intelligence.

Generative AI search engines highlight the need for a more nuanced approach to online content regulation in a world where generative AI exists. These tools challenge our traditional understanding of content creation and distribution, with their ability to synthesize and generate novel content from multiple sources under the guise of unlimited information access and apparent expertise. Without appropriate legislation or regulation that balances innovation and liability, we risk creating an AI landscape that neither companies nor individuals can navigate safely or effectively.

1. 47 U.S.C. § 230. ↑

2. Liz Reid, “Generative AI in Search: Let Google Do the Searching for You,” The Keyword (blog), Google, May 14, 2024. ↑

3. “SearchGPT Prototype,” OpenAI, July 25, 2024. ↑

4. “What Is a Lawyer?,” Division for Public Education, American Bar Association, September 10, 2019. ↑

5. Nico Grant, “Google Rolls Back A.I. Search Feature After Flubs and Flaws,” New York Times, June 1, 2024. ↑

6. Rory Carroll, “Google’s AI Search Is Telling Car Drivers to Consider Changing Their Blinker Fluid,” Quartz, May 20, 2024. ↑

7. Matteo Wong, “Google Is Turning Into a Libel Machine,” The Atlantic, June 21, 2024. ↑

8. Id. ↑

9. Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F.Supp.2d 1193,1196 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (under Section 230, a website will be liable only if it “contribute[s] materially” to the alleged unlawfulness, not when it “merely provides third parties with neutral tools to create web content”); Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that Section 230 immunity applies when “the website operator [is] merely a passive conduit” for the publication of the allegedly defamatory content). ↑

10. Goddard, 640 F.Supp.2d at 1196. ↑

11. 992 F.Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998). ↑

12. Id. at 49. ↑

13. Fair Housing Council at 1172. ↑

14. Id. at 1169. ↑

15. Id. ↑

16. 831 F.3d 352 (6th Cir. 2016). ↑

17. Id. at 355. ↑

18. Id. ↑

19. Toby Walsh, “Eat a Rock a Day, Put Glue on Your Pizza: How Google’s AI Is Losing Touch with Reality,” The Conversation, May 27, 2024. ↑

20. “Geologists Recommend Eating At Least One Small Rock per Day,” ResFrac Corporation, May 19, 2021, updated May 2024. ↑

21. “Geologists Recommend Eating At Least One Small Rock per Day,” The Onion, April 13, 2021. ↑

22. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). ↑

23. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (Am. Law Inst. 1977). ↑

24. 116 F.4th 180 (3d Cir. 2024). According to the Court’s opinion, the “Blackout Challenge” encouraged users “to choke themselves with belts, purse strings, or anything similar until passing out.” Id. at 182. ↑

25. Id. at 182. ↑

26. Id. ↑

27. Id. at 184. ↑

28. Id. ↑

29. Bennett v. Google, LLC, 882 F.3d 1163, 1165 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)). ↑

30. Disincentivizing Internet Service Censorship of Online Users and Restrictions on Speech and Expression Act (“DISCOURSE Act”), S. 921, 118th Cong. (2023–2024). ↑

31. A bill to waive immunity under section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934 for claims and charges related to generative artificial intelligence, S. 1993, 118th Cong. (2023–2024). ↑

32. “Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence,” Exec. Order. No. 14110, 88 Fed. Reg. 75191 (Oct. 30, 2023). ↑

This article is Part I of the Musings on Contracts series by Glenn D. West, which explores the unique contract law issues the author has been contemplating, some focused on the specifics of M&A practice, and some just random.

Golfers the world over are familiar with the famous “Arnold Palmer”—not just the actual human golfer but also the drink consisting of half tea and half lemonade. AriZona Beverages has been selling its “Big Can” of “Arnold Palmer” drinks (as well as its many other flavors of iced tea) prepriced for retail at just 99 cents per can since 1998. How has the company done that? Well, according to a recent trial court decision out of the New York Supreme Court of Nassau County, AriZona Beverages USA, LLC v. Evercore, Inc.,^[1] part of the secret has been that it has been able to ensure “that [it is] supplied with [its] requirements of beverage cans by reliable suppliers at the contracted price.”^[2] Those “Big Cans” are critical, and there are apparently only two suppliers of those cans west of the Mississippi: Ball Corporation and VoBev, LLC.

The Evercore decision arose out of a

special proceeding . . . seeking narrow pre-action discovery of the identity of the entities and/or individuals who [AriZona Beverages] claim[s] have aided and abetted and conspired with EVERCORE to tortiously interfere with the supply of Big Cans (and other size cans) to [AriZona Beverages] and tortiously induce VoBev, LLC to breach its March 2023 Can Supply and Production Agreement with [AriZona Beverages].^[3]

The case highlights the potential consequences of violating a confidentiality obligation in a target’s material contract as part of the target’s sales process.

Case Background

Evercore was the investment banker for VoBev in connection with a potential sale of VoBev, and, as “is common in the industry, EVERCORE hosted an electronic data room to facilitate due diligence by a third party (‘Party A’) on VoBev.”^[4] One of the documents uploaded to that data room was the March 2023 Can Supply and Production Agreement between AriZona Beverages and VoBev (“Can Supply Agreement”). The Can Supply Agreement apparently contained confidentiality obligations that prohibited disclosure of its terms to a third party without AriZona Beverages’ approval.

AriZona Beverages was concerned that Party A may have been Ball Corporation, which AriZona Beverages believed was trying to acquire VoBev and then seek to terminate the Can Supply Agreement. AriZona Beverages had been separately involved in arbitration proceedings with Ball Corporation concerning the alleged undersupply of cans by Ball Corporation pursuant to a supply agreement between AriZona Beverages and a company that Ball Corporation had previously acquired (and, in fact, AriZona Beverages had prevailed in that arbitration and obtained a judgment against Ball Corporation for more than $14.5 million, with additional potential disputes still to come).^[5] In addition, AriZona Beverages apparently was informed that a purported representative of Ball Corporation had been seen at VoBev’s plant with a copy of the confidential information memorandum related to VoBev’s proposed sale in hand. According to AriZona Beverages,

if [AriZona Beverages] [is] unable to obtain the Big Cans under the Can Supply Agreement [it] will suffer millions in damages and Ball [Corporation] will gain leverage over the supply “. . . especially if VoBev is sold to Ball and/or Ball causes VoBev to terminate its Supply Can Agreement with [AriZona Beverages] as part of any transaction.”^[6]

Evercore claimed that, even though it was in control of the data room, it was not permitted to reveal the name of Party A, or anyone else who may have had access to the data room, because of the terms of a nondisclosure agreement (“NDA”) that was entered into between VoBev and each party that was given access to the data room, including Party A. One would assume that the NDA permitted disclosure of otherwise confidential information, like the names of the parties seeking data room access, if it was required by virtue of a court order.

Court Ruling

The court found that AriZona Beverages had “brought forth sufficient information to confirm that the Can Supply Agreement is crucial to [AriZona Beverages’] business and the breach of the requirement of non disclosure permitting other part(ies) to obtain confidential and proprietary information must be addressed through the disclosure sought herein.”^[7] In addition, the court specifically found that the acts complained of by AriZona Beverages “could conceivably form the basis of a cause of action including, but not limited to, tortious interference with contract.”^[8]

Accordingly, the court ordered Evercore “to disclose the identity of each entity or individual to whom it provided access to the data room . . . [or] supplied a copy of the Can Supply Agreement or otherwise disclosed its terms.”^[9]

And this seems like a straightforward holding. Uploading the Can Supply Agreement to the data room would appear to constitute a violation of most confidentiality obligations regarding the disclosure of an agreement’s terms. As such, AriZona Beverages is presumably entitled to know who had access to that data room to access how it may have been damaged by that apparent violation. The fact that Evercore may have separately been under a confidentiality agreement with the bidders not to disclose their names was irrelevant to AriZona Beverages’ claim related to the violation of the Can Supply Agreement’s confidentiality obligations.

The situation that arose in Evercore should serve as a reminder that sell-side diligence in readying a company for sale is as important as buy-side diligence. Violating a confidentiality obligation in a material contract of the target could have serious consequences. Indeed, in an English case decided a few years ago, Kason Kek-Gardner Ltd. v. Process Components Ltd.,^[10] the disclosure of a target’s intellectual property license agreement to a potential buyer, in violation of the license’s confidentiality obligation, was deemed sufficient to permit the counterparty to terminate the target’s license.

Practical Considerations

But wait, some may say: How exactly can you disclose the terms of a material contract of a target to a potential buyer, which understandably needs to know those terms if it is to acquire the target, when those terms are specifically prohibited from being disclosed to any third party without the consent of the counterparty? Well, obviously, you can seek the counterparty’s consent to such disclosure—but what if that is not practical or is inopportune given the need to disclose the terms when it still may not be clear that any sale will actually occur?

If the potential buyer enters into an NDA promising not to disclose anything it learned about the target during due diligence, isn’t that a sufficient safeguard to avoid violating the underlying confidentiality obligation in the target agreement? The answer seems to be no. We all learned long ago that when you agree with a friend to keep something in confidence, disclosing that confidence to another friend who promises not to further disclose the confidence is still a violation of your original agreement to keep that confidence.

It remains to be seen whether AriZona Beverages was actually damaged by the alleged violation of the Can Supply Agreement’s confidentiality agreement. But regardless, there are no easy solutions to how to address confidentiality obligations in a target’s material agreements when setting up a data room on the sell side, or even in preparing the confidential information memorandum—but these confidentiality obligations do need to be addressed. Unless there is an actual exception to the material contract’s confidentiality obligation that permits disclosure in connection with a potential sale of the target, one should not assume that one will be implied,^[11] particularly if one of the potential buyers is a competitor to the target or to one of the counterparties to the target’s confidential, material agreements.

1. No. 608480/2024 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Cnty,. Aug. 27, 2024). ↑

2. Id. at 2. ↑

3. Id. ↑

4. Id. at 3. ↑

5. AriZona Beverages USA, LLC v. Ball Corp., 2023 WL 5334376 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2023). ↑

6. Evercore, No. 608480/2024, at 2. ↑

7. Id. at 3–4. ↑

8. Id. at 3. ↑

9. Id. at 4. ↑

10. [2017] EWCA (Civ) 2132, at paras. 56–61. The license agreement specifically provided that the agreement could be terminated by either party “immediately by written notice to the other in the event of . . . any material [non-remediable] breach by the other party of any of its obligations under the Agreement.” And a “breach of the confidentiality obligations under clause 10” was deemed to “constitute[] a non-remediable material breach.” Id. at para. 48. ↑

11. Id. at paras. 49–55. This suggests that there needs to be more care in the initial drafting of these important portfolio company contracts. Just as an unconsidered anti-assignment or change of control provision in a target’s material contract could constitute an “exit blocker,” a confidentiality provision in that target’s material contract, with no exemptions that permit limited disclosure in connection with a potential sale, could also end up being an “exit blocker.” For those unfamiliar with the term, exit blocker is an expression used in the private equity industry to describe a provision contained within a material contract of a portfolio company that effectively makes a sale of that portfolio company extremely difficult without obtaining the consent of the counterparty to that material contract. ↑

The process of creating a privilege log has evolved significantly over the past few decades. As former U.S. Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck remarked,

When I got on the bench in 1995, the privilege logs in a typical case [were] two to three pages, maybe 50–100 entries. Now the privilege logs are like little novels, and there may be 10,000 or more entries. That is very expensive and is often useless to the other side in figuring out what is or isn’t privileged.^[1]

His observation highlights the critical need for well-crafted, efficient privilege logs that serve the needs of all parties in litigation without becoming burdensome or unclear. This article will outline the federal rules guiding privilege logs, explore the different types of privilege logs, and provide best practices to create comprehensive and manageable logs.

Federal Rules Guiding Privilege Logs

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) do not use the term privilege log or otherwise spell out procedures for logging privileged documents. Instead, FRCP 26(b)(5)(A)(ii) requires parties who withhold documents on the grounds of privilege to provide sufficient detail about those documents so the opposing party can assess the privilege claim. Specifically, the rule states that the withholding party must “describe the nature” of the documents, communications, or tangible things withheld “in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the claim.”

Types of Privilege Logs

The absence of strict procedural guidance leaves much room for interpretation, prompting the emergence of various types of privilege logs tailored to different legal contexts.

A. Traditional Privilege Logs

The traditional privilege log is the most detailed and burdensome form. It requires a line-by-line description of each document, including the author, recipients, date, and a description of the subject matter sufficient to explain the claim of privilege. Traditional logs are often time-consuming and expensive to produce, particularly in large-scale litigation involving thousands of documents. Despite their complexity, they provide the most thorough level of detail, making them common in high-stakes litigation.

B. Metadata Privilege Logs

A metadata log simplifies the process by providing only the metadata extracted from withheld documents—such as date, author, recipients, file type, and document title—without including a narrative description.^[2] These logs streamline the process by automating much of the data entry, reducing time and costs. However, the lack of a detailed narrative can leave privilege claims vulnerable to challenges, particularly when more context is needed to substantiate the privilege.

C. Categorical Privilege Logs

Categorical logs group documents into broad categories based on shared characteristics (e.g., all emails between specific parties during a certain date range). Instead of providing a line-by-line description, the log assigns a common description of privilege to an entire group of documents.^[3] This method is particularly useful in large-scale litigation and is often negotiated between parties to reduce the burden of creating a traditional log. While categorical logs are efficient, they can be problematic if the descriptions lack sufficient detail to justify the privilege.

Best Practices for Creating an Effective Privilege Log

Given the varying complexity and scope of privilege logs, attorneys should follow several best practices to ensure that their logs meet the legal requirements and facilitate smooth litigation.

1. Negotiate Privilege Log Requirements Early

To avoid disputes down the line, it is critical for parties to meet and confer to come to a mutual decision on privilege log requirements at the beginning of discovery. Ideally, this will take the form of a written document such as an electronically stored information (“ESI”) agreement or privilege review protocol. Procedures for privilege review and parameters for privilege logs can also be incorporated into broader e-discovery protocol documents. Documenting the privilege review process early puts the parties in a better position to provide and receive the information needed to properly assess privilege claims for a particular matter. This collaborative decision can also help prevent misunderstandings and costly discovery disputes later in the litigation process.

2. Check Local Rules

While many courts leave the issue to the parties, some have significant privilege log requirements. Some jurisdictions have local rules that dictate the format or content of privilege logs, so it is important for counsel to learn these requirements early in the litigation process. For example, New York State courts strongly promote categorical logs through local rules.^[4] Tailoring your privilege log to meet local court requirements ensures compliance and reduces the risk of objections.

3. Choose the Right Type of Privilege Log

The parties should decide whether to use a traditional, metadata, or categorical privilege log, depending on the case’s complexity and the volume of documents. 

4. Agree on Required Fields for the Privilege Log

To comply with FRCP 26(b)(5)(A)(ii), the log must contain sufficient information to allow the receiving party to understand the basis for the claim. Agreement should be reached on which fields to include in a privilege log. At a minimum, the log should contain the date of the document, the author and recipients, the privilege asserted, and a brief description of the privileged content. In addition to these basic fields, parties should consider including more specific details based on the scope and complexity of the case, such as document type, document Bates number or unique identifier, and purpose of the communication.

5. Include Clear Descriptions of Privilege

Clearly denoting the basis for the privilege is essential. In addition to the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine, be prepared to discuss and include other relevant privileges, such as common interest, doctor-patient, accountant-client, and priest-penitent privileges, depending on the case and jurisdiction. Accurate privilege descriptions reduce the likelihood of challenges and ensure that the withheld information is properly protected.

6. Establish Date Ranges

Parties should agree on a relevant date range for logging privileged documents. Typically, attorney-client communications postdating the filing of the complaint are not logged unless the case involves ongoing conduct relevant to the claims. Establishing clear parameters around which communications must be logged can significantly reduce the burden on both parties.

7. Consider Redaction Instead of Withholding

Redacting privileged content, particularly in email strings—instead of withholding entire documents—can preserve context and reduce disputes. Often, the author, recipients, and dates of emails are not privileged. By redacting, it preserves so-called parent-child relationships, and the face of the document provides most of what one would otherwise have to log, save for the nature of the privilege asserted. Whether redaction is an appropriate aspect of a privilege review process depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.

8. Assess Attachments Separately

Attachments to privileged emails are not automatically privileged. Each attachment must be independently assessed for privilege claims. Failing to do so can result in nonprivileged documents being improperly withheld, leading to challenges.

9. Utilize Name Normalization

Normalization refers to writing a person’s name the same way each time it appears on the log. This normalization reduces confusion and makes it easier for the opposing party to review the log. For instance, all variations of “John Smith” (e.g., “J. Smith,” “[email protected]”) should be standardized to a single format throughout the log.

10. Be Transparent with Third-Party Communications

When third parties are involved in communications, assess whether disclosure to those third parties waives privilege. Privilege claims involving third-party recipients are frequently challenged, so proactively identifying these parties can help prevent future disputes.

11. Coordinate the Timing of Production

Privilege logs are typically produced after the final document production. Agreeing to a specific deadline, such as thirty to sixty days after production, can prevent unnecessary administrative burdens and ensure completeness. Rolling logs are administratively inefficient as there may be corrections, omissions, or documents that need to be clawed back.

Conclusion

Preparing a privilege log is a fundamental aspect of the discovery process in litigation. While there is no one-size-fits-all approach, understanding the numerous considerations can help attorneys create effective and compliant logs.

Disclaimer: The content is intended for general informational purposes only and should not be construed as legal advice. If you require legal or professional advice, please contact an attorney. 

1. Isha Marathe, Overheard at Legalweek 2024: Legal Tech’s Thoughts, Worries and Excitements, Law.com (Feb. 5, 2024). ↑

2. The Sedona Conf., The Sedona Conference Commentary on Privilege Logs 35 (Feb. 2024) (public comment version). ↑

3. Id. at 31. ↑

4. N.Y.C. Bar, Guidance and a Model for Categorical Privilege Logs (last visited Oct. 8, 2024). ↑

In the realm of corporate restructuring, the parties, attorneys, and judges typically have a singular focus on dollars: maximizing recoveries for creditors and the equitable distribution of assets. But is bankruptcy really all about the bottom line? And does focusing solely on financial outcomes limit our understanding of corporate responsibility? We have had occasion twice (most recently in a virtual Earth Day panel^[1]) to explore these questions alongside colleagues in the insolvency world, and we lay out some of our discussion in written form below.

Bankruptcy Cases Frequently Involve Noneconomic Issues

Bankruptcy professionals know that insolvency situations are not always about the bottom line. Consider the following list of recent, high-profile cases where noneconomic concerns were the focus of attention:

• Purdue Pharma: The infamous opioid manufacturer’s bankruptcy proceedings spotlighted public health and accountability, both retrospectively and prospectively.
• The Diocese Cases, Boy Scouts of America, and USA Gymnastics: These proceedings involved claims of sexual abuse and failure of oversight, the obligations of religious and charitable organizations, and the need for transparency, responsibility, and reform.
• The Weinstein Company: This case illustrated the interplay between corporate governance and accountability in light of longstanding, prebankruptcy allegations of abuse and misconduct.
• Alex Jones/Free Speech Systems: The controversial Internet personality’s bankruptcy raised thorny questions about accountability for the spread of misinformation and whether bankruptcy should be an occasion for maximizing value or preventing further harm.
• FTX: Here, the role of government regulators loomed large, with scholars questioning whether the government overstepped its role by forcing FTX into bankruptcy prematurely.^[2]

These examples (and others too numerous to list) force us to acknowledge that bankruptcy proceedings often extend beyond financial recovery.^[3] As a result, we should, at a minimum, consider the social and ethical ramifications of corporate missteps.

It’s Not All Mass Torts and Bad Actors

To be clear, the bigger picture goes beyond bad actors. Bankruptcy proceedings also encompass noneconomic concerns when enterprises committed to “doing good while doing well,” especially nonprofit entities and benefit corporations, end up in bankruptcy court.

The leadership of many for-profit entities now commit their endeavors to profit-making through the lens of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) metrics.

CSR is a collective term covering corporate citizenship and all aspects of nonfinancially focused corporate initiatives. Historically, the term has almost exclusively been used to describe optional corporate activities that generate positive goodwill, such as employee volunteer programs and charitable contributions. At its core, CSR refers to a company’s commitment to ethical behavior and contributions to economic development while improving the quality of life for employees, their families, local communities, and society at large.

ESG, on the other hand, is focused more on risk management and less on voluntary programs. The term “ESG” was coined in 2004 in a UN Global Compact report,^[4] and the goal of ESG was to manage the nonfinancial risks and opportunities inherent in a company’s day-to-day activities. The three pillars within an ESG framework are as follows:

• The Environmental Pillar: What impact (positive or negative) does the company have on the environment? Considerations include environmental risks and opportunities, reducing carbon footprint, and opportunities related to the use and development of clean energy.
• The Social Pillar: What impact does the company have on society generally? Considerations include labor relations, human rights, safety, community impact, product integrity, privacy, and employee morale.
• The Governance Pillar: How is the company run? Considerations include board and senior management diversity, board independence, executive compensation, reporting and disclosure, and internal controls (e.g., related to bribery, corruption, political contribution policies, and cybersecurity).

Similarly, we see more focus on noneconomic concerns with benefit corporations,^[5] a type of legal entity with a statutory mandate to balance the pursuit of profit against a general or specific “public benefit,” which could be generating a positive impact on society, the environment, or local workers. Unlike their nonprofit cousins, however, benefit corporations can distribute profits to shareholders. Notable examples include Patagonia, Warby Parker, and Allbirds.

Plainly, the expectation for businesses to act responsibly has escalated. Customers, employees, investors, and other stakeholders increasingly expect it and often demand it. While some may disagree, we think those business principles should continue through insolvency and should remain no less important inside bankruptcy than they are outside it. Of course, we recognize the challenge in shifting even the slightest focus toward noneconomic concerns when that shift may naturally reduce the current focus on maximizing value for creditors. But perhaps that is the wrong way to look at this problem.

Rethinking What We Mean When We Maximize “Value”

Instead, perhaps we should rethink what bankruptcy professionals mean when we say we maximize “value.” Traditionally, the principal role of a trustee, debtor in possession, or creditors’ committee in bankruptcy has been to maximize monetary value. And indeed, bankruptcy’s “turn to market value” over the last several decades, as Professors Roe and Simkovic have helpfully sketched out,^[6] has had a positive effect on our industry, with chapter 11 cases moving more quickly and efficiently. But that is no reason to turn a blind eye to broader questions of reputational value, community impact, and long-term sustainability.

In bankruptcy, these issues can manifest through various channels:

• Stakeholder Engagement: Ensuring that all stakeholders are considered in restructuring plans, from employees facing job loss to victims seeking accountability.
• Reputation Management: Maintaining an organization’s reputation in the wake of bankruptcy, which can be profoundly affected by its actions and commitments to social responsibilities.
• Long-Term Sustainability: Considering how the business can not only emerge from bankruptcy but do so in a manner that positions it for sustainable, ethical growth in the future.

Committees and Conflicts

Even so, bankruptcy professionals must be careful to operate within their role, with a keen eye for potential conflicts. When monetary recovery and nonmonetary values diverge, some creditors may focus primarily on financial returns, while others may push for recognition of nonmonetary benefits—such as regulatory relief, enhanced corporate governance, or more robust reporting practices.

One of us has pointed out that the Bankruptcy Code already authorizes courts to appoint committee members for their unique perspectives, or to appoint a special committee, like a benefit committee.^[7] Beyond that, we may want to get creative. In certain cases, out-of-the-money (OOM) committees could play an enhanced role, offering a critical voice for stakeholder interests that extend beyond financial recovery.

Conclusion

In most bankruptcy cases, noneconomic concerns are ancillary or subordinate considerations. Yet, they are integral to the ethical landscape of corporate responsibility. With the new wave of interest in hybrid models, this approach to corporate governance will increasingly spill over into the insolvency world. Balancing the demands of creditors with the interests of multiple stakeholders presents a complex challenge, but one that can ultimately lead to more sustainable and responsible corporate practices. With this shift, bankruptcy professionals and courts will be compelled to consider how best to integrate CSR and ESG principles into the fabric of their practices. Only through this lens can we hope to redefine what “value” or “success” means in the context of corporate restructuring.

This is a question worth exploring as we strive to create a more ethically grounded and socially responsible business insolvency environment.

1. A video recording of the panel is available to ABA Business Law Section members here: “Bankruptcy Committees: It’s All About The Bottom Line. Or Is It?” ↑

2. See Jonathan C. Lipson & David A. Skeel, FTX’d: Conflicting Public and Private Interests in Chapter 11, 77 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2025). ↑

3. For example, Professors Pamela Foohey and Christopher Odinet analyze in depth how debtors can use bankruptcy as a “tool for silencing.” Pamela Foohey & Christopher K. Odinet, Silencing Litigation Through Bankruptcy, 109 Va. L. Rev. 1261 (2023). ↑

4. See, e.g., Dan Byrne, What Is the History of ESG?, Corp. Gov. Inst. (last visited Sept. 30, 2024); UN Glob. Compact, Who Cares Wins (2004). ↑

5. For a discussion of how benefit corporations might deviate from the typical path through bankruptcy, see Christopher D. Hampson, Bankruptcy & the Benefit Corporation, 96 Am. Bankr. L.J. 93 (2022). ↑

6. Mark J. Roe & Michael Simkovic, Bankruptcy’s Turn to Market Value, 92 U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2025). ↑

7. Christopher D. Hampson, Bankruptcy Fiduciaries, 110 Iowa L. Rev. (forthcoming 2025). ↑

The MAC Cup II law student M&A negotiation competition has launched! Sixty-four student teams from forty-six schools across the US and Canada are squaring off in multiple qualifying rounds to join the “Final Four” in-person championship in Laguna Beach, California, and to win awards for best agreement mark-ups, all while learning to advocate their (made-up) clients’ positions.

The ABA Business Law Section’s M&A Committee launched the inaugural MAC Cup last year, with Nada Abousena and Grace Baer of American University taking top honors in front of the membership of the M&A Committee and a panel of invited judges. The M&A Committee has expanded this year’s MAC Cup to include more teams, more negotiations, and more awards, with continued access for students to M&A practitioners and professional M&A resources, promising to make the MAC Cup the premier hands-on transactional learning experience for law students with a passion for M&A.

“We’re giving law school students opportunities to learn about and apply M&A negotiation skills, like the litigation opportunities they get during the more traditional moot court,” said Mike O’Bryan, immediate past chair of the M&A Committee. “We want students to think about M&A as a significant part of their legal careers and to develop some practical skills to get them started.”

Nada Abousena and Grace Baer of American University Washington College of Law, coached by David Albin, won the inaugural MAC Cup in January 2024. Photo by Baldemar Fierro.

Building on Past Success

This year’s participation figures highlight the growing importance and reach of the competition.

“This year, we had eighty-nine applications,” said Thaddeus Chase, a member of the M&A Committee subcommittee that runs the MAC Cup. “This represents a 75 percent increase in submissions. And our targets will be even more aggressive for MAC Cup III.”

Other members of the MAC Cup subcommittee are O’Bryan, Wilson Chu, Glenn West, Tom Romer, Caroline Shinkle, and Sacha Jamal. All are members of the M&A Committee and practicing M&A attorneys, though Romer recently left the practice to form Dexterity, a digital negotiation platform designed for M&A (and now hosting the MAC Cup documents). Curtis Anderson, a professor at BYU Law School and former practicing outside and in-house M&A counsel, also is on the subcommittee and brings experience in organizing law school competitions.

“This year, by expanding the field, we’ve provided more students/law schools the opportunity to gain experience from the competition and the chance to compete,” said Chase. “It allows for more students to become connected and build a network across law schools and the M&A Committee. We’ve also built in the wrinkle that students may need to switch sides (i.e., from Buyer to Seller or from Seller to Buyer) with a week’s notice—we think this pushes students to think critically and drives home the point that the best outcome for a deal is usually somewhere in the middle (not everyone wins every point/issue).”

Learning New Skills

What do students learn?

M&A concepts; critical thinking; understanding the meaning of a “win” in M&A transactions; and the knowledge that this competition is not done in isolation: students can leverage the advice, guidance, and support of participating legal practitioners.

“The synergy between the law students and our members (whether as judges or coaches) is really dynamic and reflects the M&A Committee’s commitment to provide practical training to a new generation of M&A lawyers,” said Caroline Shinkle, a subcommittee member who has witnessed the excitement and rewards of this competition.

“Without a doubt, there is a level of seriousness that permeates student participation,” said Shinkle. “And yet this seriousness is tempered by the excitement created by the coaches and judges—generating a level of interaction rarely seen at this level.”

2024’s winners were announced at the M&A Committee’s annual meeting in Laguna Beach after facing off in a mock negotiation in front of attendees. Photo by Baldemar Fierro.

The Challenge of a Competitive Path

For students to make the “Final Four” is an indication of their hard work and negotiation skills—but also the strategic planning and coping skills needed to survive all phases of the competition.

The MAC Cup II schedule is intense:

• Initial issues list and Acquisition Agreement mark-up due: October 21, 2024
• First Open Round: October 26–27, 2024 (virtual)
• Second round issues list and Acquisition Agreement mark-up due: October 30, 2024
• Second Open Round: November 2–3, 2024 (virtual)
• Elite 8 Quarterfinal Negotiation Matches: January 25, 2024 (virtual)
• Semifinals: January 30, 2025 (in person), Laguna Beach, California
• Finals: January 31, 2025 (in person), Laguna Beach, California

Opportunities for Lawyers

The competition provides opportunities for M&A practitioners to work with the students as judges or coaches. For the MAC Cup II, while the qualifying rounds are completed, lawyers still can act as judges in the virtual “Elite Eight” or the in-person “Final Four” rounds in January—if you’re interested, contact Thaddeus Chase (at [email protected]). In the longer run, there also will be opportunities for lawyers to recruit competitors and to coach or judge in next year’s MAC Cup III.

“At each stage, from initial issue spotting through final negotiations, students benefit from the legal talents of M&A Committee members who serve as judges and coaches,” said Romer.

Wendy Li and Alexis Brugger of University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, who took second place in 2024, were coached by Debra Gatison Hatter. Photo by Baldemar Fierro.

Line Up to Be a Part of MAC Cup II

An impressive list of sponsors has already lined up to be part of MAC Cup II: M&A supporting companies Thomson Reuters, Hotshot, and Dexterity, and law firms Sullivan & Cromwell, Ropes & Gray, McDermott Will & Emery, Freshfields, Goodwin, Morrison Foerster, and Morris James. And the list is only getting longer!

“The sponsors have recognized that transactional skills have been sadly lacking in law student graduates. We’re changing that with the opportunities provided by the MAC Cup,” said Wilson Chu, former M&A Committee chair. “The transactional skills learned by students are invaluable.”

As the excitement leading up to the Laguna championship heats up, it has been proven, once again, that the BLS M&A Committee is at the forefront in its commitment to improving the knowledge and skills of law students throughout the nation.

Contractual covenants not to compete, or “noncompetes,” restrict “a man’s natural right to follow any trade or profession anywhere he pleases and in any lawful manner.”^[1] Delaware courts “frown on or disfavor restrictive covenants,” particularly in employment contracts, but such provisions have historically been enforced.^[2] While the applicable standard has remained nominally consistent, recent case law suggests that these provisions are being scrutinized more closely.

The Reasonableness Test

Delaware courts “do not mechanically enforce or deny noncompetes but closely scrutinize[] them as restrictive of trade.”^[3] A noncompete will be enforced only if it “(1) [is] reasonable in geographic scope and temporal duration, (2) advance[s] a legitimate economic interest of the party seeking its enforcement, and (3) survive[s] a balancing of the equities.”^[4]

These requirements must be reviewed “holistically and in context.”^[5] As Vice Chancellor Laster explained,

[a] court must not tick through individual features of a restriction in isolation, because features work together synergistically. For example, “a court must consider how the temporal and geographic restrictions operate together” because the “two dimensions necessarily interact.” A covenant that restricts employment in a similar industry for two years might be reasonable if it only applies within a single town or county, and vice versa. All else equal, a longer restrictive covenant will be more reasonable if geographically tempered, and a broader restrictive covenant will be more reasonable if temporally tailored.^[6]

When a noncompete is entered into in connection with the sale of a business, the court must still evaluate its reasonableness, but the “inquiry is less searching than if the covenant had been contained in an employment contract.”^[7]

The fact-intensive nature of this inquiry does not lend itself to bright-line tests; however, the case law has revealed some common themes.

Geographic Scope

“[T]he reasonableness of a covenant’s scope is not determined by reference to physical distances, but by reference to the area in which a covenantee has an interest the covenants are designed to protect.”^[8] Courts have found noncompetes to be reasonable when limited to the areas where a company does business.^[9] Provisions that apply beyond the company’s area of operations, have worldwide or nationwide application, or include the company’s affiliates or subsidiaries have been heavily criticized.^[10]

While nationwide or worldwide restrictions are often considered overbroad, courts have enforced them when they are entered into in connection with the sale of a business.^[11]

A lack of geographical restrictions is unusual, but it does not render the restriction unenforceable per se.^[12] If the other aspects are reasonable, Delaware courts may still enforce the noncompete.^[13]

Duration

As a general matter, the longer a restrictive covenant applies, the narrower its geographic and subject matter scope must be.^[14] Delaware law does not provide a specific reasonable duration. Noncompetes lasting two years are the most commonly approved.^[15] However, Delaware courts have found that restrictions lasting one year and three years were reasonable.^[16]

In Ainslie v. Cantor Fitzgerald, Limited Partnership, the Delaware Court of Chancery found that a four-year noncompete contained in a partnership agreement was unreasonable, but it suggested that such a duration may be “in the range of reasonable” if the scope of the restriction were appropriately narrowed.^[17]

Delaware courts have upheld longer durations when the provision arises in connection with the sale of a business or stock.^[18]

Legitimate Economic Interest

Like the other aspects of this analysis, the existence of a legitimate economic interest is highly fact intensive. In evaluating the alleged economic interest, courts have considered a variety of factors, including (i) the employee’s exposure to confidential information, proprietary technology, and other trade secrets; (ii) the level of training and skill that was required to perform the work; and (iii) the employee’s general role with the company.^[19]

The specificity of the applicable language is also important. Vague terms such as similar to or substantially the same as when referring to the company’s business have been found to be too vague to demonstrate a legitimate economic interest.^[20] Noncompetes prohibiting conduct that directly competes with, or is similar to, the business of the company, and only the company, have been found to be enforceable.^[21]

Finally, the breadth of the restriction is also considered. As the court in Fortiline, Inc. v. McCall held, a broader restriction requires a broader legitimate interest. Noncompetes that cover a company’s affiliates or that broadly define a company’s business have been routinely rejected as not being “tailored to the employee’s role while employed.”^[22]

Delaware courts have held that protecting a company’s goodwill, confidential information, customer base, and/or competitive advantage gained through the employee’s efforts may each be a legitimate economic interest.^[23] The identity of a company’s referral sources may be protectable provided that those sources are not transient in the industry.^[24] A company’s desire to prevent its employees from working directly for its clients (known as disintermediation) may constitute a legitimate economic interest in appropriate circumstances.^[25]

However, courts have rejected claims that a noncompete was necessary when the interests being protected were “vague and everyday concern[s],”^[26] including that (i) the employee was generally “responsible for many . . . customer relationships,”^[27] or involved in “finding deals and fostering relationships” with customers;^[28] (ii) the employee would be able to use the technical expertise or general industry knowledge they gained while employed by the company against it;^[29] and (iii) the employee could use an important certification the company paid for them to get against it.^[30]

Balancing of the Equities

Finally, Delaware courts balance the company’s interest in preventing competition with the harm that would befall the employee if the covenant were enforced.

The recent case law suggests that this balance focuses on an employee’s ability to earn a living and the role the employee played in the company. Given Delaware’s concern for employees’ well-being, it is not surprising that courts have been critical of provisions that will prevent a person from earning a living.^[31] The role that the employee had with the company is also an important factor. Given the typically disparate bargaining power between a company and its employees, noncompetes with lower-level employees are routinely rejected as unreasonable. However, Delaware courts have been less critical of provisions applying to senior executives who received significant compensation or who were critical to the negotiation of the transaction that led to the creation of the noncompete.^[32]

The “Blue Pencil” Rule

As a court of equity, the Delaware Court of Chancery in the past has revised the scope and/or duration of a noncompete.^[33] But this process, known as using a “blue pencil,” has been criticized and rarely applied in recent years. As Vice Chancellor Laster explained in Sunder Energy, LLC v. Jackson,

revising an overbroad restrictive covenant creates a no-lose situation for employers because businesses can draft the covenant as broadly as possible, confident that the scope of the restriction will chill some individuals from departing. If someone does challenge the provision, then the worst case is that the court will blue-pencil its scope so it is acceptable. It also enables employers to extract benefits at the expense of employees by including unenforceable restrictions in their agreements.^[34]

In Labyrinth, Inc. v. Ulrich, the court denied a motion to dismiss because, even though the ten-year-long restrictive covenant was overbroad in several ways, the fact that the employee was personally and deeply involved in negotiating the covenant in connection with the sale of his business “may conceivably present a rare instance where equity and public policy might require blue penciling.”^[35]

Contractual Provisions Regarding Reasonableness

The “reasonableness” analysis cannot be avoided via contractual provisions. Companies may attempt to contract around the reasonableness requirement by including provisions pursuant to which the employee (i) agrees that the restrictions are reasonable, (ii) waives any defense that they are not, and (iii) agrees that a court may modify the provision if it is deemed unreasonable as drafted. However, Delaware courts have repeatedly held that such provisions are ineffective and do not relieve the court of its obligation to determine the reasonableness of the provision.^[36]

“Forfeiture for Competition” Provisions Recently Upheld

As the Delaware Supreme Court recently explained in Cantor Fitzgerald, Limited Partnership v. Ainslie, so-called “forfeiture for competition” provisions are not evaluated for “reasonableness.”^[37] Forfeiture for competition provisions are contract provisions that relieve the company of obligations to pay an employee deferred financial benefits if the employee breaches a noncompetition provision in the contract. As the Delaware Supreme Court held in Cantor, such provisions “stand on different footing” than noncompetes because they do not “limit a [person’s] ability to compete or otherwise obtain employment.”^[38] Unlike noncompetes, forfeiture for competition provisions are “a condition precedent that excuses [the company] from its duty to [make future payments] if the [employee] fail[s] to satisfy a condition to which they agreed to be bound in order to receive a deferred financial benefit.”^[39] As a result, forfeiture for competition provisions are not reviewed for reasonableness but rather enjoy the “court’s deference on equal footing with any other bargained-for-term” in a contract.^[40]

Statutory Limitations

Even if the provision satisfies the reasonableness standard, Delaware law prohibits the use of noncompetes in some narrow circumstances. By way of example, noncompetes between physicians that restrict the physician’s right to practice medicine in a particular area or for a particular time period are void (although provisions requiring the payment of money damages for a breach of such provision are enforceable).^[41]

Other states have gone even further than Delaware and enacted statutes prohibiting or strictly limiting the enforceability of such provisions.^[42]

The FTC’s Effort to Ban the Use of Noncompetes

Earlier this year, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) issued a final rule (“Final Rule”) that, subject to certain specific exceptions, made it a violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act for employers to enter into new noncompete agreements with workers of any level on or after September 4, 2024 (“Effective Date”).^[43] However, the Final Rule was barred from taking effect, and its future is uncertain.

Under the Final Rule, noncompetes in effect on the Effective Date are only enforceable against employees considered to be “Senior Executives”—that is, those in a “policy-making position” who meet or exceed a minimum compensation requirement.^[44] If an employee does not qualify as a Senior Executive, existing noncompetes are no longer enforceable. The Final Rule imposes strict time limits for companies to notify non–Senior Executives of that change.

While the Final Rule is a broad prohibition, there are several limitations and exceptions. First, it only applies to noncompetition provisions in employment contracts; it does not apply to noncompetes entered into in connection with the bona fide sale of a business or a franchise. Second, it does not prohibit causes of action for breaches of a noncompete that occurred prior to the Effective Date. Finally, enforcement of a noncompete does not violate the Final Rule if the company has a good-faith basis to believe that the Final Rule does not apply to that situation.

The Final Rule did not go into effect on September 4, 2024, as expected. On August 20, 2024, Judge Ada Brown of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas issued a permanent injunction setting aside the Final Rule and declaring that it “shall not be enforced or otherwise take effect on September 4, 2024, or thereafter.”^[45] Litigation regarding enforceability of the Final Rule is ongoing. Therefore, it remains possible that the Final Rule, or some modified version thereof, may still become law.

In sum, while Delaware is a contractarian state that defers to people’s right to privately order their affairs, that deference is tempered when a contract restricts a person’s ability to work. Noncompete agreements (unlike forfeiture for competition provisions) are judged by a “reasonableness” standard. Reasonableness, however, does not lend itself to a bright-line test, but requires analysis of several interrelated considerations—the agreement’s geographic scope and duration, the existence of a legitimate economic interest, and a balancing of the equities. While no one factor is determinative, Delaware courts have issued some guideposts (discussed above) and made it clear the concept is so important that parties cannot contract around the inquiry and that courts are hesitant to change an otherwise unenforceable contract. The time may come that the FTC’s final rule goes into effect and companies are prohibited from entering into noncompetes altogether. However, until then business leaders and legal practitioners must ensure that noncompetes are “reasonable” if they are to be enforced under Delaware law.

1. Labyrinth, Inc. v. Ulrich, 2024 Del. Ch. LEXIS 78, at *52 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2024). ↑

2. Id. ↑

3. Labyrinth, 2024 Del. Ch. LEXIS 78, at *52. ↑

4. Id. at * 52–53. ↑

5. Sunder Energy, LLC v. Jackson, 305 A.3d 723, 753 (Del. Ch. 2023). ↑

6. Id. ↑

7. TriState Courier & Carriage, Inc. v. Berryman, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 43, at *41 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 2004). ↑

8. Weichert Co. of Pa. v. Young, 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170, at *12 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7, 2007). ↑

9. See, e.g., id. (twenty-five miles from the company’s main operations); TriState Courier & Carriage, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 43, at *43 (anywhere the company operated or has operated for the previous three years); All Pro Maids, Inc. v. Layton, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 116, at *17–18 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2004) (limited to the specific zip codes where the majority of the company’s clients are located); Kan-Di-Ki, LLC v. Suer, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 191, at *69 (Del Ch. July 22, 2015) (the twenty-three states the company operated in); COPI of Del., Inc. v. Kelly, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 136, at *12 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 1996) (within twenty miles of the company’s operations). ↑

10. See, e.g., Fortiline, Inc. v. McCall, 2024 Del. Ch. LEXIS 317, at *9–10 (Del. Ch. Sept. 5, 2024) (finding a noncompete unreasonable because it applied at least nationwide); Hub Grp., Inc. v. Knoll, 2024 Del. Ch. LEXIS 250, at *23 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2024) (finding a noncompete unreasonable because it applied to the contiguous United States and potentially Canada, Mexico, and India, including geographic locations that the employee had no responsibility for); Labyrinth, Inc. v. Ulrich, 2024 Del. Ch. LEXIS 78, at *52 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2024) (a noncompete was overbroad because it spanned the areas in which both the company and its affiliates operated); Sunder Energy, 305 A.3d at 754–56 (rejecting a noncompete that applied to forty-six states when the employee only operated in Texas); Centurion Serv. Grp., LLC v. Wilensky, 2023 Del. Ch. LEXIS 354, at *8–10 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2023) (finding a noncompete was unreasonable because it applied to any “area” in the United States or abroad in which the company was operating or was planning to operate); Intertek Testing Servs. NA, Inc. v. Eastman, 2023 Del. Ch. LEXIS 66, at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 16, 2023) (a restrictive covenant applying anywhere in the world was overbroad because the company operated primarily in Texas); Kodiak Bldg. Partners, LLC v. Adams, 2022 Del. Ch. LEXIS 288, at *18–20 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 2022) (rejecting a noncompete that included the states of Idaho and Washington and anywhere within one hundred miles of any other location served by the company or its affiliates); FP UC Holdings, LLC v. Hamilton, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110, at *15–17 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2020) (rejecting a provision applying anywhere in the United States the company operates or may operate). ↑

11. See, e.g., Centurion Serv. Grp., 2023 Del. Ch. LEXIS 354, at *10 (“[T]his Court has enforced non-competes with a nationwide scope, but only in instances where the competing party agrees, in connection with the sale of a business, to stand down from competing in the relevant industry anywhere for a stated period of time after the sale.”); see also Brace Indus. Contracting, Inc. v. Peterson Enters., Inc., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 229, at *7 (Del. Ch. Aug. 28, 2015) (a restriction covering the entire United States and Canada was appropriate in connection with the sale of a business because the entity that was sold did business worldwide); O’Leary v. Telecom Res. Serv., LLC, 2011 Del. Super. LEXIS 36, at *1 (Del. Super. Jan. 14, 2011) (upholding a nationwide restrictive covenant entered into in connection with the sale of a business because the business operated across the nation). ↑

12. See Del. Express Shuttle v. Older, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 124, at *45 (Del. Ch. Oct. 23, 2002). ↑

13. See, e.g., id. at *41–51 (enforcing a three-year noncompete that lacked a geographical restriction because it was expressly negotiated by the parties immediately before it went into effect and the restricted territory was implicitly limited to places the company could and did serve from its Newark, Delaware, facility); Rsch. & Trading Corp. v. Pfuhl, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 234, at *12 (Del. Ch. Nov. 18, 1992) (enforcing a one-year noncompete that lacked a geographical limitation because the company enjoyed widespread goodwill and the relief sought was narrow in scope). ↑

14. Sunder Energy, 305 A.3d at 753. ↑

15. See, e.g., Weichert Co. of Pa. v. Young, 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7, 2007); All Pro Maids, Inc. v. Layton, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 116 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2004); TriState Courier & Carriage, Inc. v. Berryman, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 43 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 2004); Del. Express Shuttle, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 124; COPI of Del., Inc. v. Kelly, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 136 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 1996). ↑

16. See RHIS, Inc. v. Boyce, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 118, at *23–24 (Del. Ch. Sept. 26, 2001) (upholding a one-year restriction); Rsch. & Trading Corp., 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 234, at *31 (upholding a one-year restriction); Faw, Casson & Co. v. Cranston, 375 A.2d 463, 469 (Del. Ch. 1977) (a three year noncompete was reasonable but only to the extent it applied in northern Delaware). But see Fortiline, Inc. v. McCall, 2024 Del. Ch. LEXIS 317, at *2, *10 (Del. Ch. Sept. 5, 2024) (holding that a one-year noncompete was overbroad); Del. Express Shuttle, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 124, at *54 (a three-year noncompete was unreasonable). ↑

17. Ainslie v. Cantor Fitzgerald, Ltd. P’ship, 2023 Del. Ch. LEXIS 22, *41 (Del. Ch. June 4, 2023), rev’d on other grounds, Cantor Fitzgerald, Ltd. P’ship v. Ainslie, 312 A.3d 674 (Del. 2024). ↑

18. See, e.g., Kan-Di-Ki, LLC v. Suer, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 191 (Del Ch. July 22, 2015) (upholding a five-year noncompete covering twenty-three states entered into in connection with the sale of the company); O’Leary v. Telecom Res. Serv., LLC, 2011 Del. Super LEXIS 36 (Del. Super. Jan. 14, 2011) (upholding a four-year noncompete covering the entire United States entered into in connection with the sale of the company); Hough Assocs. v. Hill, 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 5 (Del. Ch. Jan. 17, 2007) (upholding a noncompete in a stock purchase agreement that applied for five years following the date of the agreement or three years after the employee left the company, with a geographic scope of fifty miles). But see Labyrinth, Inc. v. Ulrich, 2024 Del. Ch. LEXIS 78 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2024) (rejecting a ten-year noncompete contained in a stock purchase agreement). ↑

19. See Elite Cleaning Co. v. Capel, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1105, at *26–27 (Del. Ch. June 2, 2006). ↑

20. Hub Grp., Inc. v. Knoll, 2024 Del. Ch. LEXIS 250, at *25 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2024); Del. Express Shuttle, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 124, at *48–50; Norton Petroleum Corp. v. Cameron, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 32, at *12 (Del. Ch. Mar. 5, 1998). ↑

21. See, e.g., Gener8, LLC v. Castanon, 2023 Del. Ch. LEXIS 380 (Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 2023); Lyons Inc. Agency Inc. v. Wilson, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 317, at *15 (Del. Ch. Sept. 28, 2018); Kan-Di-Ki, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 191; TriState Courier & Carriage, Inc. v. Berryman, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 43,*43 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 2004); All Pro Maids, Inc. v. Layton, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 116 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2004); COPI of Del., Inc. v. Kelly, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 136 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 1996); Faw, Casson & Co., 375 A.2d at 468–69. ↑

22. Fortiline, Inc. v. McCall, 2024 Del. Ch. LEXIS 317, at *7 (Del. Ch. Sept. 5, 2024); see also Labyrinth, 2024 Del. Ch. LEXIS 78, at *53–54; Sunder Energy, LLC v. Jackson, 305 A.3d 723, 753 (Del. Ch. 2023); Centurion Serv. Grp., LLC v. Wilensky, 2023 Del. Ch. LEXIS 354, at *8–10 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2023); Frontline Techs. Parent, LLC v. Murphy, 2023 Del. Ch. LEXIS 336 (Del. Ch. Aug. 23, 2023); Kodiak Bldg. Partners, LLC v. Adams, 2022 Del. Ch. LEXIS 288, at *18–19 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 2022) (rejecting a provision applying to the business of the company and its affiliates). ↑

23. See Fortiline, 2024 Del. Ch. LEXIS 317, at *6; Rsch. & Trading Corp. v. Pfuhl, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 234, at *12 (Del. Ch. Nov. 18, 1992). ↑

24. RHIS, Inc. v. Boyce, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 118, at *20–21 (Del. Ch. Sept. 26, 2001). ↑

25. Elite Cleaning Co. v. Capel, 2006 Del. Ch LEXIS 105, at *23–24 (Del. Ch. June 2, 2006). ↑

26. Hub Grp., Inc. v. Knoll, 2024 Del. Ch. LEXIS 250, at *30 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2024); Centurion Serv. Grp., 2023 Del. Ch. LEXIS 354, at *10–11. ↑

27. Hub Grp., 2024 Del. Ch. LEXIS 250, at *30. ↑

28. Centurion Serv. Grp., 2023 Del. Ch. LEXIS 354, at *10–11. ↑

29. Bernard Pers. Consultants, Inc. v. Mazarella, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 137 (Del. Ch. Aug. 28, 1990). ↑

30. RHIS, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 118, at *17–18. ↑

31. Sunder Energy, LLC v. Jackson, 305 A.3d 723, 757–58 (Del. Ch. 2023) (finding a provision was unenforceable because, among other things, it barred the employee from participating in any business that sells to any homeowner in any states where Sunder did business . . . [meaning the employee] could not take a job at a Best Buy . . . or a McDonalds”); Centurion Serv. Grp., 2023 Del. Ch. LEXIS 354 (criticizing the impact of the provision on the employee’s ability to work). ↑

32. See, e.g., Labyrinth, Inc. v. Ulrich, 2024 Del. Ch. LEXIS 78, at *52 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2024); Sunder Energy, 305 A.3d at 753. ↑

33. See, e.g., Del. Express Shuttle, Inc. v. Older, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 124 (Del. Ch. Oct. 23, 2002) (adjusting the duration of a noncompete from three years to two years); Faw, Casson & Co. v. Cranston, 375 A.2d 463, 468–69 (Del. Ch. 1977) (revising the geographic reach of a noncompete). ↑

34. Sunder Energy, 305 A.3d at 753. ↑

35. Labyrinth, 2024 Del. Ch. LEXIS 7, at * 53–56. ↑

36. See e.g., Ainslie v. Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P., 2023 Del. Ch. LEXIS 22, at *36, rev’d on other grounds, Cantor Fitzgerald, Ltd. P’ship v. Ainslie, 312 A.3d 674 (Del. 2024) (“[T]he fact Plaintiffs signed an agreement stipulating to its own reasonableness does not insulate that agreement from a reasonableness review under Delaware law.”); Kodiak Bldg. Partners, LLC v. Adams, 2022 Del. Ch. LEXIS 288, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 2022) (“[L]anguage stating its restrictive covenants are reasonable, and waiving a defense that they are not, does not preclude this Court from performing the reasonableness analysis our law mandates.”). ↑

37. Cantor, 312 A.3d 674. ↑

38. Id. at 689. ↑

39. Id. at 687. ↑

40. Id. at 691. ↑

41. Del. Code tit. 6, § 2707 (2024); see also Del. Code tit. 6, § 4914 (prohibiting the use of noncompetes in motor vehicle franchise agreements); Del. Code tit. 24, § 4109 (2023) (prohibiting a requirement that a home inspector trainee be required to execute a noncompete with a supervising inspector). ↑

42. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 8-1-190(a) (2015); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16600 et seq. (2024); and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-1603 (2024). ↑

43. 16 C.F.R. §§ 910.1, 910.2 (2024). ↑

44. Id. ↑

45. Ryan LLC v. FTC, No. 3:24-cv-986 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2024). ↑