When the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) approved the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA) in July 2006, they could not have predicted how imprudent the financial world would seem to nonprofit board members three years later. From the 2008 stock market crash and the collapse of mortgage-backed securities, to the discovery of Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, prudent managers of institutional funds held by nonprofit corporations and charitable trusts now contend with an investment environment that has been warped by optimistic illusions, fraud, and greed. The continued congressional scrutiny of nonprofits, spearheaded by Senator Grassley, as well as the Obama administration’s commitment to public institution transparency, also color the current financial culture in which nonprofit directors find themselves. Adding it all up, prudent nonprofit directors are in a fine pickle these days: shrinking investment assets, increased demand for charitable services and grants, increased scrutiny, and an untested new law.
The NCCUSL drafting committee worked hard to improve the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act (UMIFA) by modernizing endowment fund rules for fiduciaries. Indeed, UPMIFA does take into account important facts and circumstances for investment policies, spending policies, expense management, and delegation in ways that UMIFA did not. The business lawyer serving on a board in 2009 should be knowledgeable about the changes in the law at this particularly perilous time for investment management. The rules of the new UPMIFA regarding investment policies do not differ fundamentally from the rules under UMIFA, which was adopted in 35 states and the District of Columbia beginning in 1972. The spending policy rules are very different, though. The bright-line historic dollar-value floor on spending from an endowment fund that applied under UMIFA has been replaced with rules that allow invasion of principal and require the directors to be “prudent” under the facts and circumstances. In addition, many states have adopted a “presumption of imprudence” for spending rates in excess of 7 percent per year. The potential consequences of getting it wrong have many volunteer board members looking nervously for an exit. This article focuses on the new prudent spending rules being adopted as the states replace UMIFA with UPMIFA, in light of the prudent investment rules and today’s economic reality for institutions. After summarizing the relevant aspects of UPMIFA, I offer some observations about how board members can approach the difficult spending decisions that face them today.
Not surprisingly, the uniformity goal of UPMIFA has been a bit thwarted by the states; there are several variations on the theme. Table I shows the states that have adopted UPMIFA, the effective date, and whether the optional presumption of imprudence has been adopted. There are several other interesting aspects of UPMIFA that are not discussed at length in this article, including the new rules on investment expenses and the self-modification procedures for small, old funds. Helpful details about those aspects, as well as a nice history of UMIFA and UPMIFA, can be found at the Uniform Law Commission’s website on UPMIFA (www.upmifa.org).
Background
In addition to corporate law articulating standards of conduct generally, those states that have adopted UPMIFA apply specific rules to the directors’ duties governing the investment and expenditure of a nonprofit corporation’s investment assets. The spending rules apply only to invested assets held by a charitable institution subject to the donor’s instruction that the assets may not be wholly expended in one year. Thus, these rules do not apply to so-called quasi endowments or board-designated endowments, which are rainy-day funds set aside by a board, but not subject to donor restrictions. The UPMIFA spending rules do apply to assets that are intended to be held either for a stated term of years or for perpetual duration.
Investment Policies
UPMIFA requires that in managing and investing an institutional fund, subject to the intent of a donor expressed in a gift instrument, the board must consider
The charitable purposes of the institution and the purposes of the institutional fund.
General economic conditions.
The possible effect of inflation or deflation.
The expected tax consequences, if any, of investment decisions or strategies.
The role that each investment or course of action plays within the overall investment portfolio of the fund.
The expected total return from income and the appreciation of investments.
Other resources of the institution.
The needs of the institution and the fund to make distributions and to preserve capital.
An asset’s special relation or special value, if any, to the charitable purposes of the institution.
In addition, managers of institutional funds must not make fund management and investment decisions in isolation. With each decision, they are to consider the context of the institutional fund’s portfolio of investments as a whole and as a part of an overall investment strategy. The strategy must be based on risk and return objectives suited to the fund and to the institution. The board must diversify the investments unless the board members determine that, because of special circumstances, the purposes of the fund are better served without diversification. Subject to these standards, the directors can invest the endowment in any kind of property or type of investment.
The board may delegate to an external agent the management and investment of the endowment fund, but must act prudently and in good faith in selecting the agent and establishing the scope and terms of the delegation. The board must periodically review the agent’s actions. In the last 20 years, most nonprofits have come to rely substantially upon the recommendations of professional money managers, and the relevant statutes authorize the board to rely upon professional investment counsel’s advice. There are still some nonprofits whose board members feel comfortable working without professional investment advisors, although those are few and far between.
Spending Policies
UPMIFA also sets forth rules governing spending policies for endowment funds. Under UMIFA, the rules were fairly straightforward: as long as the institution did not invade the “historic dollar value,” any spending rate would be fine. UMIFA’s premise was that the sum of all contributions to a fund, which contributions were restricted by the donor to be held as an endowment, would peg the amount that could never be spent: the historic dollar-value floor. UMIFA did not include an inflation factor and did not specifically require the board to consider whether the purchasing power of the original gift would be preserved when making decisions about the spending rate. So long as the original contribution was never invaded, any amount of spending was permitted.
In some ways, UPMIFA provides considerably more flexibility. Within the boundaries of the donor’s intent as expressed in the gift instrument, an institution may spend or accumulate so much as the board determines is prudent for the uses, benefits, purposes, and duration for which the endowment fund is established. Of course, if the gift instrument states a particular spending rate or formula, that rate or formula will apply and the board has no discretion in determining the spending policy with respect to that particular fund, and UPMIFA does not alter the donor’s instructions. Otherwise, in making a determination to appropriate or accumulate assets in an endowment fund, the board members, acting in good faith, are to apply the prudent person standard, and consider, if relevant
The duration and preservation of the endowment fund.
The purposes of the institution and the endowment fund.
General economic conditions.
The possible effect of inflation or deflation.
The expected total return from income and the appreciation of investments.
Other resources of the institution.
The investment policy of the institution.
UPMIFA’s Big Idea on Spending
The big idea behind UPMIFA’s revision of the spending policy rules was to promote a total return approach to spending, akin to the total return approach to investments. Or, stated another way, spending policy decisions are the flip side of investment policy decisions: invest at a rate that over the long term will preserve the purchasing power of the principal and spend at a rate that over the long term will effect the donor’s intent to serve the charitable purpose each year. In the comments to section 4, the Drafting Committee noted that
[i]nstitutions have operated effectively under UMIFA and have operated more conservatively than the historic dollar value rule would have permitted. Institutions have little incentive to maximize allowable spending. Good practice has been to provide for modest expenditures while maintaining the purchasing power of a fund. Institutions have followed this practice even though UMIFA (1) does not require an institution to maintain a fund’s purchasing power and (2) does allow an institution to spend any amounts in a fund above historic dollar value, subject to the prudence standard. The Drafting Committee concluded that eliminating historic dollar value and providing institutions with more discretion would not lead to depletion of endowment funds. Instead, UPMIFA should encourage institutions to establish a spending policy that will be responsive to short-term fluctuations in the value of the fund. Section 4 allows an institution to maintain appropriate levels of expenditures in times of economic downturn or economic strength. In some years, accumulation rather than spending will be prudent, and in other years an institution may appropriately make expenditures even if a fund has not generated investment return that year. [Emphasis added.]
Unfortunately, the Drafting Committee did not articulate what should happen in the case of a catastrophic decline in value, as we have seen in the last year. Of course, the financial services industry has developed abundant quantitative models that will illustrate for a board the spending rate that would preserve the purchasing power using performance models developed over the last several decades. However, they will always footnote the idea that past performance does not indicate the results that will be obtained in the future. On the flip side, there are no models for institutional directors to rely on in determining the spending rate that will preserve the donor’s intent to serve the particular charitable program envisioned at the time of the gift. While it is relatively easy to assist a board in determining defensible investment and spending policies based on the recommendations of investment professionals who will readily advise on risk-adjusted asset allocations, the spending policy factors of UPMIFA require the board to focus also on qualitative decisions about the donor’s and the institution’s evaluation of intergenerational fairness, programmatic disruptions caused by dramatic changes in funding, inefficiencies created by stop-and-go funding approaches, and the fact that the needs may be greatest during the phase of the economic cycle that most dramatically reduces the investment earnings from the fund.
There is little guidance in UPMIFA or the comments about how a prudent board resolves this dilemma, but it is clear that if they get it wrong, the state’s attorney general can enforce the charitable interests of the public. The problem for directors is particularly acute in the states that adopted the “presumption of imprudence.” At the time this article went to press, nine states had adopted the presumption that a particular spending rate, stated as a percentage, is imprudent (see Table I). This rebuttable presumption in section 4(d) of UPMIFA provides that the “appropriation for expenditure in any year of an amount greater than 7 percent of the fair market value of an endowment fund, calculated on the basis of market value determined at least quarterly and averaged over a period of not less than three years immediately preceding the year in which the appropriation for expenditure is made, creates a rebuttable presumption of imprudence.” There is not, however, a “presumption of prudence” for any appropriation less than or equal to 7 percent.
Before delving into some practical discussions of board decision-making criteria, some ambiguity in the drafting of the presumption deserves discussion. The fair market value to which the presumption is to be applied is “calculated on the basis of market value determined at least quarterly and averaged over a period of not less than three years immediately preceding” the year of appropriation. In the comments to UPMIFA, the commissioners stated:
The period that a charity uses to calculate the presumption (three or more years) and the frequency of valuation (at least quarterly) will be binding in any determination of whether the presumptions [sic] applies. For example, if a charity values an endowment fund on a quarterly basis and averages the quarterly values over three years to determine the fair market value of the fund for purposes of calculating 7 percent of the fund. The charity’s choices of three years as a smoothing period and quarterly as a valuation period cannot be challenged. If the charity makes an appropriation that is less than 7 percent of the value, then the presumption of imprudence does not arise even if the appropriation would exceed 7 percent of the value of the fund calculated based on monthly valuations averaged over five years.
Most institutions do look back just three years in determining their spending policy, but given last year’s dismal performance, and in light of the comments to UPMIFA, the institutions may be better served if they amend their spending policy now and adopt a longer smoothing period with more frequent valuation dates. Using quarterly data from the last 10 years may suggest that a higher amount of appropriation is not imprudent. The statute does not articulate how often the board can revisit this decision, but clearly if the spending rate desired is at a rate that exceeds the ceiling in the presumption, the well-advised board may want to change its spending formula. On the other hand, many charities may not have an articulated formula for determining a payout rate, and so presumably the quarterly/three-year periods would apply by default.
In any event, consider the predicament of a charity that has only one permanent endowment fund, and that fund lost 30 percent of its value since December 31, 2007. Assume that for many years it had budgeted and spent each year, under the typical pre-UPMIFA spending policy, an amount equal to 5 percent of its asset value calculated at the close of each of the three immediately preceding fiscal years. Its investment policy had been designed to match the long-term historically achievable investment performance of 5 percent after expenses, but had not accumulated any earnings, so that the fair market value was equal to its historic dollar value. Let’s assume, for argument’s sake, that neither the donor nor her heirs are available to advise the board about intent, that the gift instrument is specific enough to indicate that the fund was intended to be maintained in perpetuity, but that there is no specific stated instruction for this turn of events.
As Scenario A of Table II illustrates, if the institution maintains the same spending rate, there is no further market decline, and the institution is able to generate the historic 5 percent return on its remaining capital, then the institution’s spending policy will be presumptively imprudent under UPMIFA by 2011, and the endowment will be depleted by about 2030.
Scenario B shows that if the institution immediately reduces its spending rate to match 5 percent of the principal after the dramatic market reduction, it can avoid falling into the presumptively imprudent range, particularly if the market returns to normal historic patterns for the same risk-adjusted asset allocation that the institution had in place before the market correction. Assuming that over the long term the board maintains the pre-2008 investment policy that generated, on average, annual returns of 5 percent, this institution will forever maintain a reduced spending rate.
If UMIFA applies, or if the board decides not to spend any amount until the corpus recovers, then the institution would not be able to support any charitable activities until the historic dollar value is recovered. Accordingly, applying the normal growth and investment assumptions, Scenario C shows that this will happen in 2018.
Several aspects of the three simplified scenarios in Table II merit comment. First, a board that wishes to maintain spending at the historic rate now has the option of doing so, in states that have adopted UPMIFA. If the state has adopted the rebuttable presumption of imprudence, the board will need to document why the current programmatic needs are so important (or, perhaps, are legally or contractually required) that the risk of depletion is acceptable. The board also should document a plan for restoring the principal amount, either by fund-raising, by adopting an investment policy that is more aggressive, or by implementing other revenue streams through related or unrelated business activities. Each of those approaches does, of course, entail myriad other business risks.
The board that adopts Scenario B is unlikely to face depletion; however, its charitable impact is permanently reduced. That board in principle accepts the lower funding model in perpetuity, since, absent fund-raising, aggressive investments, or other revenue streams, the programmatic spending is unlikely to ever return to pre-2008 levels. Note, however, that private foundation boards must adopt this model because they are required to distribute at least 5 percent per year, unless there are other revenue sources for meeting the minimum distribution requirement of section 4942 of the Internal Revenue Code.
The board that adopts Scenario C gets to take the next decade off from any grant-making activity while the corpus recovers. Its responsibilities will be limited to documenting how the decision to accumulate comports with donor intent and keeping close tabs on the investment performance. This board is unlikely to face attorney general scrutiny in states that have adopted UPMIFA because there is no corollary presumption of imprudence if there are no expenditures. If this board also believes that the corpus should be increased to keep up with inflation, the accumulation period will be even longer.
Summary
UPMIFA allows directors the freedom to choose whether to spend or accumulate, to adopt an investment policy that meets the intent of the endowment fund, and to apply their business judgment to management of the charity’s endowment assets without arbitrary limits. In those states that have adopted section 4(b) of UPMIFA, the presumption of imprudence challenges that freedom and may effectively induce institutions to dramatically reduce their spending rate. Few volunteer directors are keen to make decisions that are “presumed” to be imprudent. For those hearty souls with the desire to keep programs running despite dramatic losses, the best advice is to document thorough analysis of the human and programmatic costs of reducing spending, as well as any applicable laws or donor requests. At the same time, board members reconsidering the investment policies will need to maintain a growth orientation, which, given the events of the last 12 months, requires enormous fortitude and confidence.
Backdating is a much misunderstood and largely unexplored subject. It involves a wide range of conduct, some of which is an integral part of everyday law practice. To the layperson, backdating connotes wrongdoing. The propriety of backdating, however, depends upon its purpose and effect. Every lawyer should be capable of distinguishing legitimate backdating from improper backdating. Unfortunately, the dividing line is often far from clear.
Little guidance exists on backdating, notwithstanding its pervasiveness, the complexity of determining its propriety, and the serious consequences of a misjudgment. An indepth examination of the day-to-day backdating issues that most business lawyers face cannot be found in the literature. This Article begins to fill that void.
This Article explains the different meanings of backdating, explores the reasons why it is difficult to distinguish legitimate backdating from improper backdating, examines the impact of disclosure on the propriety of backdating, and develops an analytical approach to assist business lawyers in wrestling with the difficult situations most will confront in their daily practices. By illuminating the subject, it is hoped that this Article will begin a much-needed dialogue about backdating.
INTRODUCTION
Backdating describes a broad scope of conduct ranging from blatant fraud to the common practice of executing a document sometime after the event evidenced by the document occurs. Backdating is not right or wrong per se; rather, its propriety depends upon its purpose and effect. Whether a given instance of backdating is legitimate or improper is a complex, multifaceted question that frequently plagues lawyers.
Almost all business lawyers deal with situations where documents might be backdated. Some lawyers address these situations by carefully evaluating the legal, ethical, and moral issues each case presents; others respond to these situations in a more haphazard fashion. The stakes are high—lawyers who participate in improper backdating can be subject to disciplinary proceedings, civil claims, and even criminal prosecution.
Notwithstanding the pervasiveness and gravity of backdating, the literature is devoid of the much-needed dialogue to guide lawyers, judges, and disciplinary boards through this thicket.1 Attention has been focused on high profile backdating cases, like the recent options backdating scandal involving many large, publicly traded corporations.2 But no meaningful guidance exists as to the far more common day-to-day backdating questions stemming from clients of all sizes. Every lawyer should be equipped with the necessary tools to evaluate the propriety of these everyday backdating issues.
The goals of this Article are to illuminate the subject of backdating, alert lawyers to the necessity of evaluating every backdating situation with care, and provide an analytical approach to assist lawyers in resolving backdating questions. Part I defines backdating and explains the difference between backdating that fabricates and backdating that memorializes. Part II explains that the line between fabricating and memorializing is often unclear and that, even when that line can be discerned, it does not always separate improper backdating from legitimate backdating. Part III considers whether impropriety can be averted by disclosing backdating. Part IV delineates a set of problems to which the Article’s analysis is applied. Finally, Part V provides a series of guidelines intended to help lawyers navigate this minefield.
I. IS BACKDATING WRONG PER SE?
To the layperson, backdating connotes wrongdoing. It sounds like a bad thing. Backdating is just plain wrong—right?
In fact, backdating is neither right nor wrong, per se. Rather, its propriety depends upon its purpose and effect. Backdating can be utilized to perpetrate a fraud or it can be employed in legitimate commercial practice. Part I explores the different meanings of backdating and distinguishes backdating that fabricates from backdating that memorializes.
A. BACKDATING DEFINED
The meaning of the term “backdate” is far from clear. As one commentator has remarked:
It is difficult to generalize about exactly what backdating really is, since there have been significant variations in fact patterns. Indeed, much of the debate centers on which practices are legitimate and which are not.3
The dictionary is a logical starting point for establishing what backdating really means. And the dictionary is as far as one must go to realize that it is impossible to generalize about the propriety of backdating. Whether backdating is legitimate or improper depends upon the type of backdating involved and its potential effects.
Two principal definitions of the verb “backdate” emerge from the dictionary.4 One involves the action of assigning an event “to a date prior to that of actual occurrence.”5 The second involves dating a document “as of a time prior to that of execution.”6 The propriety of backdating depends largely on which of the two actions has occurred.7
To the layperson, the term “backdate” typically connotes an act of fabrication— the action described by the first dictionary definition (i.e., assigning an event “to a date prior to that of actual occurrence”). If an event actually occurred on February 11, 2008, and a lawyer drafted a document stating the event occurred on December 3, 2007, the document fabricates the date of the event. The fabrication might be intended to secure a tax benefit for the lawyer’s client at the expense of the government or an economic benefit from a private party not privy to the truth. Under these circumstances, the backdating facilitates wrongdoing and is clearly improper.8
Not all backdating, however, entails a fabrication. As the dictionary reveals, backdating also describes the practice of dating a document prior to the time it is executed.9 In these circumstances, the document might simply memorialize the prior event. As a matter of law, an event often occurs before the document evidencing the event can be executed.10 For example, if the event in question involves reaching an agreement, the intent of the parties may control that determination and such intent can be expressed long before the document evidencing the agreement is drafted and executed.11 When a document memorializes a prior event, the act of dating the document prior to the date of execution is not nefarious. Such dating is truthful because the event in question occurred on the earlier date. Indeed, the document would fabricate the date of the event if it indicated the event occurred on the execution date, rather than the earlier date on which the event actually transpired.12
In contrast to backdating that fabricates, backdating that memorializes is an integral part of daily law practice.13 Business lawyers routinely face situations where a document must be executed after an event has occurred. The remainder of Part I will illustrate the distinction between backdating that fabricates the time of an event and backdating that memorializes a prior event.
B. BACKDATING THAT FABRICATES
A rich body of case law confirms the impropriety of backdating that fabricates at the expense of a third party or in violation of a law. In the most egregious cases, the backdating fabricates an event that never happened.14 The same potential for impropriety exists, however, when the event described by the backdated document actually occurred, but subsequent to the date reflected in the document. These cases normally involve situations where the beneficiary of the backdating can reap an undeserved benefit at the expense of the government or some other third party only if the event occurred on the earlier date.15 The following are but a few examples of the many cases where the time of an event was fabricated to achieve such a benefit:
To protect real estate from the claim of a client’s creditor, an attorney back-dated a deed to make it appear that the property had been conveyed to the client’s controlled corporation before the creditor’s claim arose.16 The backdating attempted to accelerate the transfer of the real estate by the debtor to deprive the creditor of a recovery.17
To accelerate revenue to an earlier period on a company’s financial statements, the company backdated invoices to make it appear that the revenue occurred in the earlier period.18 The backdating made the company look more profitable and could have induced the purchasers of the company’s stock to pay an inflated price.19
To avoid liability under an employee health benefit plan, the president of a corporation amended the company’s selfinsurance plan to exclude coverage for motorcycle accidents and backdated the amendment to a date before an employee’s motorcycle accident had occurred.20 The backdating attempted to exclude from coverage a claim that had arisen prior to the amendment.21
To enjoy taxfree treatment on the sale of real estate contingent on the identification of replacement property within forty-five days of the sale, documents were backdated to treat the replacement property as having been identified within the forty-five day period.22 The backdating attempted to accelerate the identification date to support favorable tax treatment to which the seller was not entitled.23
To maintain the qualification of certain employee benefit plans, an attorney backdated documents making it appear certain plan amendments were completed in a timely manner.24 The backdating attempted to accelerate the amendments to avoid disqualification of the plan with the attendant adverse tax consequences.25
In many cases, attorneys have backdated documents to make it appear that their clients’ investments in property generating tax deductions were made at an earlier time.26 In each of these cases, the backdating attempted to accelerate the investment date to enable the clients to claim tax deductions to which they were not entitled.
All of the foregoing cases illustrate backdating that fabricated the time at which an event occurred to secure benefits to which the parties were not entitled. Such conduct is clearly wrongful. Consequently, attorneys who engage in or accommo-date this conduct may be subject to disciplinary action, civil liability, and criminal prosecution.
C. BACKDATING THAT MEMORIALIZES
When a document is drafted and executed after an event occurs but accurately reflects the earlier date on which the event actually transpired, the backdating is not a fabrication. Rather, the backdated document simply memorializes the earlier event.27 The act of memorializing is sometimes not even regarded as backdating.28
The legitimacy of memorializing emerges from some simple examples. Assume a lender issues a $5,000 check to a borrower on March 1, 2009, at which time the borrower agrees to repay the $5,000 with 5 percent interest in one year. The parties also agree that the borrower will execute a promissory note incorporating their arrangement. Sometime thereafter, the promissory note is drafted and the borrower executes the note. Quite clearly, the loan occurs on March 1 and the promissory note should bear that date even though the note is prepared and executed at a later time.
As another example of backdating that memorializes, consider a corporate action that requires the approval of the corporation’s board of directors.29 Assume the corporation’s directors convene a meeting in the presence of the corporation’s attorney at which time the directors verbally approve certain corporate actions.30 The minutes of the meeting might be drafted and executed weeks after the actual meeting. Nevertheless, the minutes should normally reflect the date of the meeting because that was the day the action was taken.
Courts have recognized the legitimacy of memorializing a prior act. For example, the Seventh Circuit articulated the clear distinction between backdating that fabricates to perpetrate a fraud and backdating that memorializes a prior event in United States v. Micke.31 There, the defendant, who claimed deductions stemming from a tax shelter investment on his 1982 tax return, asserted that documents executed in January 1983 memorialized an investment made in December 1982.32 Although the court affirmed a criminal fraud conviction, it explained that the backdating would have been legitimate had an agreement actually been reached in 1982:
The sole issue at trial was whether the deal had been agreed on in December or subsequently in January. If the former, the backdating was legitimate and the returns were not fraudulent; if the latter, the backdating and the returns were fraudulent.”33
The Tax Court has gone so far as to treat backdating intended to memorialize a prior agreement as evidencing the existence of that agreement. In Baird v. Commissioner,34 a taxpayer entered into a preliminary agreement to purchase property on August 29, 1970, and the deed was also dated August 29, 1970.35 The deed was not executed until October 28, 1970, however, and was not recorded until November 17, 1970.36 The taxpayer claimed ownership was transferred on the August 29 date stated on the deed.37 By contrast, the Internal Revenue Service claimed that ownership was not transferred until the deed was recorded on November 17.38
The Baird court agreed with the taxpayer that ownership was transferred when the preliminary agreement was reached on August 29, stating: “It is understandable that all the details and the formal documents would require some time for preparation.”39 Moreover, the court determined that the backdating served as evidence of the taxpayer’s intent to transfer the property on the earlier date: “The fact that the formal documents were all backdated to August 29, 1970, also supports the conclusion that the parties intended the transaction to be closed as of that date.”40 The Baird court effectively concluded that the backdating merely memorialized a prior event; in other words, the event in question (the transfer of ownership) had occurred on the date reflected by the backdated document.41
The Internal Revenue Service has also acknowledged the legitimacy of memorializing a prior event.42 In fact, the Internal Revenue Service recently affirmatively argued that a backdated document memorialized a prior event in Moore v. Commissioner.43 That case involved a dispute as to whether a majority member of a limited liability company transferred a 10 percent interest to a minority member in 1997 or in 2000. The document conveying the membership interest was dated January 1, 1997, but was not executed until July of 2000.44 Neither member apparently paid tax on the income attributable to the disputed 10 percent interest during the years at issue.45 The Commissioner attempted to tax the minority member claiming that the transfer occurred on the January 1, 1997, date stated on the document:
[The Commissioner] argues that the . . . agreement was the means of “formalizing” [the majority member’s] transfer of 10-percent membership interests in the LLC to [the minority members] effective January 1, 1997. . . . He argues that the . . . agreement was not “backdated”, i.e., it “was not a document . . . [attempting] to change the past or . . . to misrepresent the past”, but, rather, “was . . . created to formalize informal transactions that had occurred in the past”.46
In agreeing with the Commissioner, the court concluded that the purpose of the agreement was “to reduce to writing a prior oral understanding among the parties.”47 Thus, the backdated document merely memorialized the earlier event because the transfer of the membership interest had occurred on the date reflected by the backdated document.
Part I suggests that a clear line exists between backdating that fabricates and backdating that memorializes. If a document is dated prior to the occurrence of an event, the backdating fabricates and the potential for impropriety exists. By contrast, if the document is executed after an event occurred but accurately reflects the date of the event, the backdating merely memorializes and thereby reflects the truth. Sounds simple—but maybe not. Part II will explore why it is not always so easy to distinguish legitimate backdating from improper backdating.
II. WHY IS IT DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH LEGITIMATE BACKDATING FROM IMPROPER BACKDATING?
Determining whether a given instance of backdating is legitimate or improper can be complicated for three reasons. First, the line between fabricating and memorializing becomes unclear when ambiguous law governs the timing of an event or uncertain facts surround the event. Second, establishing that a given instance of backdating is a fabrication is not always determinative of its impropriety; such backdating can be innocuous when it does not compromise the rights of a third party or violate any law. Third, establishing that backdating memorializes does not necessarily establish its legitimacy; backdating that memorializes can mislead a tribunal and thereby expose a lawyer to sanctions. Part II explores the complexities associated with distinguishing legitimate backdating from improper backdating.
A. WHETHER BACKDATING FABRICATES OR MEMORIALIZES IS NOT ALWAYS CLEAR
It is easy to determine whether backdating fabricates or memorializes if one knows with certainty when the event in question occurred. If the event occurred on the date stated in the document, the backdating memorializes; if the event occurred subsequent to the date stated in the document, the backdating fabricates.48 The time at which a given event occurs can be uncertain, however, when the law governing the event is ambiguous or the facts are unclear.
1. Ambiguous Law Might Govern the Time of an Event
Although backdating issues can arise in a variety of contexts, two of the most common instances involve commercial agreements and property transfers. Whether backdating fabricates or memorializes in these situations depends upon (1) when an agreement is reached and (2) when a transfer of ownership occurs. The legal standards governing these events are difficult to apply and often yield unpredictable results.
a. When Does an Agreement Occur?
The question of when, as a matter of law, a contract arises is often uncertain. Generally, an agreement will evolve over time through a series of negotiations that may be oral and/or involve the exchange of writings.49 When such negotiations culminate in an agreement, the precise date on which the agreement is reached may not be apparent.
The inability to discern the date on which an agreement is reached does not preclude the existence of a contract.50 Yet, when a document encapsulating the agreement is backdated to the date the parties believe their agreement was achieved, it might be difficult to determine whether the backdating fabricates or memorializes. If the agreement occurred on the earlier date, the backdating memorializes; if an agreement was not reached until a later date, the backdating fabricates.
Identifying the date on which an agreement is reached is further complicated when the parties reach a tangible preliminary agreement before arriving at a final agreement. In these situations, it is often unclear as to whether the preliminary agreement constitutes a step in the negotiation process or instead represents an agreement that is subsequently being formalized.51 If the preliminary agreement is merely part of the negotiation process, backdating the final agreement to the date of the preliminary agreement is a fabrication. By contrast, if the preliminary agreement constitutes a contract, the final agreement merely memorializes that contract. Not surprisingly, courts have reached different conclusions about the significance of preliminary agreements in factually similar cases.52
The presence of a contingency can also cloud the legal issue of when an agreement exists. A contingency might be seen as precluding a contract from arising (historically referred to as a “condition precedent”53) or, alternatively, as allowing a contract to exist but threatening its continuation (historically referred to as a “condition subsequent”54). Accordingly, when a document is backdated to a time before the contingency is resolved, the backdating is a fabrication if the contingency represents a condition precedent. In this situation, no contract would have existed at the earlier time. By contrast, if the contingency represents a condition subsequent, the backdated document simply memorializes a prior event. In these circumstances, the event in question, arriving at a contract, previously occurred. Unfortunately, the distinction between a condition precedent and a condition subsequent is far from clear. As one venerable commentator has remarked, “[E]ven the best of courts sometimes exhibit confusion in determining whether a condition is subsequent or precedent.”55 For all of the foregoing reasons, the law governing a backdated agreement can create confusion as to whether the backdating fabricates or memorializes.
b. When Is Ownership Transferred?
Backdating also commonly occurs in connection with the conveyance of property. Whether such backdating fabricates or memorializes depends upon when the transfer of ownership occurs. The principles of law governing the transfer of property ownership can be difficult to apply and may lead to uncertain results.
At first blush, the legal standard governing the point at which ownership is transferred seems reasonably clear.56 As a matter of property law, ownership of real estate is transferred when the deed is executed and delivered.57 Rather than focusing on property law, however, backdating cases typically involve the question of when ownership is transferred for purposes of the tax law.58 These cases generally involve the efforts of purchasers to claim deductions associated with property ownership from the earliest possible date.59 Although the transfer of legal title is relevant to the transfer of ownership for tax purposes, courts have often found that ownership of real property was transferred before the deed was delivered.60
In determining when ownership of property is transferred for tax purposes, the courts consider a variety of factors. These factors include the transfer of possession, the transfer of the economic benefits and burdens of ownership, the satisfaction of conditions precedent, the existence of uncertainty regarding the property, and the payment of the purchase price.61 Each of these factors presents additional complexity; for example, the transfer of possession does not necessarily occur at a single moment in time; the benefits and burdens analysis utilizes a variety of factors that can be weighed differently by different tribunals;62 and the existence of conditions precedent requires distinguishing meaningful conditions from insubstantial ones.63 The inconsistency with which courts apply these factors further complicates the determination of ownership.64 As one commentator recently remarked, “In sum, the law of tax ownership is vast, remarkably fragmented, and thoroughly confused.”65 Hence, one must pinpoint an event when the law establishing that event “is a patchwork of rules that appear to lack a unifying principle.”66
This section was not intended to offer a comprehensive analysis of the legal standards for determining when a specific event occurs. Its purpose is simply to highlight the ambiguity surrounding certain common legal standards that must be applied to make this determination. Regardless of how carefully a lawyer might analyze the law in these areas, uncertainty will often exist as to when the event in question actually occurred. When the timing of the event is unclear, determining whether the backdating fabricates or memorializes is no longer a simple matter.
2. Relevant Facts May Be Uncertain
Even when the relevant law is clear, the timing of an event will depend upon the particular facts and circumstances. Unfortunately, ambiguous facts frequently make it difficult to discern the precise time an event occurs. Often, traces of evidence will exist suggesting an event occurred prior to the time of formal documentation. If this evidence is sufficient to establish a fact, backdating the document memorializes the event. If the evidence is insufficient, however, the backdating might fabricate the time of the event. Factual uncertainty can result from ambiguous records, limits on one’s ability to recollect past observations, and reliance on the observations of others.
a. Ambiguous Records
Case law reveals that an ambiguous record can create uncertainty as to whether an event actually occurred before it was documented. For example, in In re Jagiela,67 an attorney drafted an agreement in September and October 1990 to share proceeds of a settlement judgment.68 The agreement was executed in October 1990 but backdated to August 18, 1988.69 The backdated agreement was based on an amalgamation of at least five documents drafted prior to August 18, 1988, and the attorney claimed the agreement “merely memorialized a prior oral agreement between the signatories made on or before August 18, 1988.”70
The Jagiela court found as follows: “It appears from the record that the backdated agreement may well have memorialized a prior oral agreement, at least to some extent.”71 The court nevertheless concluded the event did not occur on the earlier date and the attorney’s actions warranted discipline.72 Although Jagiela’s course of conduct appeared egregious,73 the court’s acknowledgment that the agreement “may well have” memorialized a prior oral agreement74 illustrates how conflicting evidence can create uncertainty as to the actual time of a specific event.75
b. Limits on One’s Ability to Recollect
The complexity presented by factual uncertainty is even more problematic than case law suggests. The cases reflect a static picture—the court has sifted through oral testimony and documents and created a snapshot of an event that may or may not be accurate. The accuracy of those findings is far from clear because no “omniscient observer” exists who witnesses all events and can relate the details of each event with perfect accuracy. Thus, it is necessary to rely upon human observation to establish when events occur.
Countless studies reveal that human recollection even by the most forthright individual under the best possible circumstances is far from accurate.76 Distortions in memory range from slight modifications of the actual event to the construction of memories of events that never occurred.77 Both internal sources and external influences at the time of encoding and retrieval of memories affect the accuracy of recollection.78 For instance, providing subsequent suggestions or new information can completely distort someone’s original memory.79 Considering that ideal circumstances rarely exist and that even a person with the best of intentions will likely resolve uncertainties in his or her favor in at least some cases,80 the prospect of discerning an accurate set of “facts” is often dim.
c. Reliance on the Recollections of Others
In many situations, a lawyer must deal with facts that the lawyer does not observe firsthand. Rather, the lawyer must rely on the recollections or statements of others. Such reliance poses a whole host of problems requiring difficult judgments to be made.
A lawyer is likely to have a unique relationship with each client. The lawyer might have a long history with some clients, dealing with them on a continuing basis and observing them in both business and social situations. Other clients will likely be newer, dealt with infrequently, and only in a professional capacity. If a history of interactions exists, the lawyer might be in a better position to judge the integrity of the client; however, an attorney’s ability to ascertain the veracity of any client’s words in a given case is likely to be limited.
Assume that a lawyer meets with a client on January 15, 2009, at which time the client indicates he purchased an interest in a partnership on December 15, 2008. If the purchase actually occurred on December 15, assume the client would be entitled to claim a significant amount of tax deductions on the client’s 2008 tax return. The client asks the lawyer to prepare documents dated December 15, 2008, evidencing the investment. The client and the seller of the investment will then execute the documents. What should the lawyer do?
Quite clearly, the lawyer should not prepare the documents unless the lawyer can confirm that the purchase actually occurred on December 15. By preparing the documents, the lawyer can be regarded as having made the judgment that the client’s statement is true.81 If the lawyer misjudges the client’s veracity, he or she could be subject to severe sanctions, including criminal prosecution, for participating in a fraudulent transaction. In attempting to evaluate the claims of the client, the lawyer should examine the cancelled check evidencing the investment, learn the identity of all parties present at the December 15 meeting, confirm that all such parties can verify the purchase terms that were agreed upon at that meeting, and secure any additional evidence demonstrating that an investment was actually made on December 15.
Depending upon the lawyer, dramatic variations will likely exist regarding how deeply the lawyer will dig for evidence, how closely the lawyer will examine the evidence, and how much uncertainty, if any, the lawyer will tolerate to be willing to draft the documents. Lawyers will likely rely heavily on past history with the client in judging whether the client’s story is true and the extent to which extrinsic evidence should be sought. If the matter involves a new client and no past opportunities to evaluate the client’s forthrightness exist, most lawyers will likely reject the request to draft the documents, unless strong independent evidence exists corroborating the client’s story. It will probably be much more difficult for the lawyer to reject the request of an existing client, particularly when a history of interactions exists that bolsters the lawyer’s confidence that the client is telling the truth.82 Even when such a history exists, however, the lawyer must recognize the limits on his or her ability to assess the client’s veracity in any given case.
There is no clear answer as to what the lawyer should do in this situation.83 If the client’s story is in fact true, the lawyer can draft the necessary documents to memorialize the transaction. In most cases, however, some degree of uncertainty will exist as to whether the story is true and as to how a tribunal would resolve the question.
Regardless of how carefully the lawyer assesses the facts, if the lawyer erroneously concludes that the client is telling the truth, the lawyer must be prepared to pay a heavy price for having participated in a fabrication that defrauded the government. Because these situations are very dangerous, the prudent lawyer will refrain from participating when any doubt exists about the truthfulness of the client’s story. Ambiguous facts frequently make it difficult for the lawyer to know precisely when an event occurred, thereby compromising the attorney’s ability to evaluate whether backdating fabricates or memorializes.
B. BACKDATING THAT FABRICATES CAN BE INNOCUOUS
Even when it can be determined that backdating fabricates rather than memorializes, uncertainty still might exist as to the propriety of the backdating. Whether backdating that fabricates is wrongful depends upon the purpose and effect of the backdating. In most cases, such backdating is improper because it is utilized to deceive a third party to extract an undeserved benefit.84 In other cases, however, such backdating might be utilized to implement an economic arrangement between two consenting parties where no intent exists to harm a third party, no third party’s rights are adversely affected by the backdating, and no law is violated. In the latter cases, the backdating can be innocuous.
As a matter of law, the parties to an agreement can make their agreement effective on whatever date they wish, provided no third party rights are compromised by the action.85 Hence, if a prospective employee who is to commence employment in March persuades her employer to pay her what she would have earned had she been employed since January, the parties may agree to that result by backdating their agreement to January 1 as long as no third party rights are compromised and no law is violated. Similarly, a landlord holding property in high demand might negotiate an agreement with a prospective tenant whereby, pursuant to a lease negotiated in March, the tenant agrees to pay the landlord the rents that would have been due for January and February had the lease begun in January. Here again, the parties might implement their agreement by backdating the lease provided no third party’s rights are compromised and no law is violated.86
Although the recent options backdating scandal clearly involved wrongdoing, litigation related to that scandal illustrates how backdating that fabricates can be innocuous. The scandal stemmed from the backdating of options issued by certain publicly traded corporations to a date when each company’s stock was trading at a lower price.87 By allowing the recipient of the option to purchase shares at the trading price on the earlier date, an economic benefit was conferred on the recipient.88 For example, assume that a company issues an option to purchase 1,000 shares of stock to an employee on December 15 when the market value of the employer’s stock is $100 per share. Further assume that the option permits the employee to purchase the shares at a price of $70 per share and is backdated six months to June 15 when the market value of the stock was actually $70. In effect, the employee enjoys a potential $30,000 benefit by virtue of being allowed to purchase stock with a value of $100,000 at a price of $70,000.89
As a general matter, no prohibition exists on the form of an employee’s compensation and nothing precludes the parties from utilizing a fiction to quantify the desired level of compensation.90 Presenting that fiction as fact to third parties, however, is clearly improper when doing so adversely impacts the rights of a third party or violates a law.91 The backdating of options was improper because the action was reported to regulatory authorities as if the options had actually been issued on the earlier date, thereby violating accounting rules, securities laws, and tax laws.92 But, as a federal district court recently clarified:
The practice of backdating a stock option occurs when persons responsible for the timing, pricing and/or approval of a stock option grant retroactively set the exercise price for the option based on a date other than the date on which the option was actually granted. . . . However, the practice is not improper, in and of itself, provided it is: 1) fully disclosed to necessary parties, including securities and tax authorities, corporate directors and shareholders;[93] 2) properly accounted for under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) in the company’s financial disclosures to shareholders, the SEC and other regulatory agencies; 3) correctly taxed at both the company and grantee levels; and 4) permitted under the company’s by-laws and/or shareholder-approved stock option plans.94
In essence, as long as an economic arrangement based on a fiction does not adversely impact the rights of third parties or violate any law, the use of a fiction to implement the economic goals of the parties can be innocuous.
The foregoing analysis reveals that backdating that fabricates can be innocuous only if the backdating has neither a bad purpose nor a bad effect. In most cases, it should be clear whether a bad purpose exists. If the backdating is utilized to deceive a third party in order to extract an undeserved benefit, the purpose is bad and the action is clearly improper.95 Alternatively, if the backdating is utilized to implement the economic interests of the parties to the arrangement with no intent to harm a third party, the purpose is not objectionable. Nevertheless, the backdating would still be improper if it adversely affected the rights of a third party or violated a law.
Determining whether the rights of third parties might be adversely affected by backdating can be extremely difficult for several reasons. First, in some cases, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to identify the universe of private rights that might be adversely impacted by the backdating. At a minimum, the interests of owners, investors, creditors, and employees must be considered. Second, in addition to private rights, the interests of all levels of government must be considered. Finally, even if all relevant private and public third parties can be identified, it can still be difficult to assess whether the backdating has an improper effect. For example, if the federal, state, or local taxation of one or more of the parties to the backdating is impacted by the fabrication, it might be difficult to assess whether the backdating results in illegal tax evasion.96 Consequently, although backdating that fabricates can theoretically be innocuous, it will often be difficult for the attorney to make this judgment.
Backdating that fabricates the date of an event might sometimes be the simplest way for the parties to implement an economic arrangement and minimize the resulting legal fees. In these situations, the client might exert pressure on the lawyer to utilize a fabricated date. It is critical, however, for the lawyer to realize that the absence of any bad intent on the part of the parties does not render the backdating innocuous. Unless the lawyer is confident that the fabricated date violates no law and does not adversely impact the rights of any third party, the lawyer should not succumb to the temptation posed by ease and economy.
When evaluating whether backdating that fabricates might adversely impact the rights of third parties, the lawyer should assume that every backdated document will be discovered by any interested third party. Regardless of how remote that prospect might seem, a future controversy can always arise and cause a back-dated document to surface. Hence, a lawyer should not participate in such back-dating unless the lawyer is prepared to defend the document in a truthful and forthright manner.
In sum, backdating that fabricates can be innocuous if the backdating has neither a bad purpose nor a bad effect. Before concluding the backdating is innocuous, the attorney must be extremely careful to assess whether the rights of any third party might be adversely impacted, or any law is violated, by the backdating. An attorney who fails to anticipate a harm that materializes could suffer severe consequences by participating in the backdating.
C. BACKDATING THAT MEMORIALIZES CAN BE PROBLEMATIC
In contrast to backdating that fabricates, backdating that memorializes is normally regarded as a legitimate practice. Often, it is not feasible to document an event contemporaneously with its occurrence. Rather, the event will be documented at a later time and the document will be backdated to the date the event actually occurred. Though this action may seem appropriate, the act of memorializing can expose a lawyer to sanctions if it supports the inference that the document was executed when the event occurred, rather than at a later time.
A classic example of problematic memorializing emerges from In re Stern.97 In Stern, an Illinois lawyer was censured for backdating a document that accurately reflected the date the event had occurred. Pursuant to a 1981 divorce, Stern was required to maintain health insurance for his ex-wife and children.98 On December 7, 1982, Stern procured a new health insurance policy that the insurance agent indicated would be effective immediately.99 As such, Stern permitted the old policy to lapse.100 When Stern’s ex-wife learned that the old policy had lapsed, she petitioned the court to find Stern in contempt for failing to maintain insurance.101 On January 10, 1983, Stern learned that the agent who sold Stern the new policy had been mistaken about its effective date and that a lapse in coverage had occurred.102
On January 11, 1983, the date on which Stern was to appear before the court, Stern allegedly told the insurance agent to prepare a letter on the agent’s stationery accurately stating that the agent had told Stern the new policy was effective on December 7.103 The January 11 letter was backdated to December 15.104 The agent brought the letter to court and showed it to Stern and Stern’s attorney.105 Stern’s attorney showed the letter to Mrs. Stern’s attorney who examined the insurance agent about the letter.106 The agent initially falsely testified that he had written the letter on December 15 but then admitted that the letter had been backdated.107 The Review Board of the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission found that Stern’s conduct violated disciplinary rules prohibiting “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,” “knowingly mak[ing] a false statement of law or fact,” and conduct “which tends to defeat the administration of justice or to bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute.”108
The Stern court agreed with the review board that Stern had violated disciplinary rules even though the letter in question merely memorialized a prior event. The court stated, “While the actual contents of the letter were true, an element of dishonesty and deceitfulness exists because of the false date the letter bore.”109 Moreover, the court rejected Stern’s argument that the evidence failed to establish an improper motive for the backdating. Rather, the court held that intent can be inferred from surrounding circumstances.110 Specifically, the court reasoned that the letter must have been created to strengthen Stern’s case because he directed that it be created and that it be brought to the court.111
The Stern case demonstrates that attorney disciplinary rules prohibiting dishonesty and deceit can potentially be violated even in the absence of any intent to do harm. The attorney disciplinary codes of most jurisdictions have rules similar to the Illinois rule applied in Stern that prohibit conduct involving “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”112 These rules do not generally address the lawyer’s mental state.113 The cases where attorneys have violated these rules typically involve blatant misconduct with respect to which the attorneys’ intent and improper motive are evident.114 Nevertheless, a violation of the rule might be established without direct proof of bad motive or intent.115
Although Stern suggests that backdating that merely memorializes a past event can cause a lawyer to be sanctioned for dishonest conduct, this threat should materialize only if the backdated document becomes the subject of legal proceedings.116 In the vast majority of situations, documents that memorialize events will never be seen by anyone other than the parties executing those documents and their advisors. Nevertheless, the possibility of a future controversy always exists and, therefore, any backdated document might someday appear before a court.117 The lawyer therefore must always be prepared to defend every backdated document in a truthful and forthright fashion.
Courts are likely to have little tolerance for any backdated document that can potentially mislead and adversely impact the integrity of the court’s fact-finding function. The lawyer who drafts such a document must therefore ensure that the document does not support the inference that it was executed on the date of the event when it was actually executed on a later date. Thus, whenever a document is intended to memorialize an event, the lawyer should have the foresight to make adequate disclosure of the backdating to deter any inference that the document was executed on the date of the event.118
Part II has demonstrated that it is often difficult to determine the propriety of backdating. In many cases, it will be unclear whether backdating fabricates or memorializes because complex law and ambiguous facts can cloud the time that the event actually occurred. Moreover, when backdating in fact fabricates the date of an event, the backdating might be innocuous if it neither adversely affects the rights of any third party nor violates any law. By contrast, backdating that in fact memorializes an event can be problematic if it supports the inference that the document was executed on the earlier date of the event. Part III will examine whether disclosure can eliminate the uncertainties that impact the propriety of backdating.
III. DOES DISCLOSING BACKDATING PROTECT AGAINST IMPROPRIETY?
As discussed in Part II, backdating, even in its most benign form, can potentially mislead a court or some other third party into believing a document was executed on an earlier date. To mitigate this possibility, backdating should always be disclosed. Part III examines the impact of disclosure and analyzes two disclosure methods; namely, identifying the date the document was executed and utilizing “as of” dating.
A. THE IMPACT OF DISCLOSURE
When a document memorializes an earlier event and, therefore, is backdated to the date of the event, the document might mislead a court or government agency into believing it was executed on the date the event occurred.119 This possibility should generally be foreclosed, however, when the backdated document reveals on its face that it was executed after the stated date of the event. Hence, disclosure should normally solve any potential problem posed by backdating that memorializes a prior event.
When a backdated document fabricates the time of an event but is not intended to harm a third party, the backdating is nevertheless improper if a third party’s rights are in fact compromised or a law is violated.120 If such backdating is disclosed, any third party with access to the document will have notice of the backdating. Such notice should, at least in some cases, mitigate the possibility of harm.121 In addition, the act of disclosing the backdating belies any intent to deceive because parties who intend to deceive would normally be expected to rely on subterfuge.122 Hence, it is also beneficial to disclose this form of backdating. Disclosure will not ensure the propriety of such backdating, however, because a third party could still be harmed by the backdating, or the backdating could violate a law, even when it is disclosed.123
B. HOW DISCLOSURE MIGHT BE MADE
Backdating might be disclosed by identifying the date on which the back-dated document was executed. Alternatively, disclosure might be made by dating the document “as of” an earlier date. This section will discuss these two forms of disclosure.
1. Identifying the Date of Execution
The most straightforward way of disclosing that a document was backdated would be for the document to identify the date on which it was executed. By disclosing the execution date, no one privy to the document could possibly believe the document was executed on an earlier date. The execution date, however, is often irrelevant to the timing of the event in question and disclosing that date can create unnecessary confusion about when the event governed by the document actually occurred.
As previously discussed, events often occur as a matter of law prior to the date on which the document evidencing the event is executed.124 In many cases, the actual date of the event will be unclear or the parties might have different views of that date. Nevertheless, the parties must agree on an effective date so that they have the same expectations about all terms of the arrangement that are dependent upon that effective date. Regardless of whether the actual date of the event is known or the parties establish an agreed upon effective date, it is unlikely that these dates will coincide with the date of execution. When the dates do not coincide, the execution date is irrelevant to the event governed by the document.
Identifying an irrelevant execution date can create needless confusion as to when the event in question actually occurred. For example, in Sweetman v. Strescon Industries, Inc.,125 a contract stated it was “made this 22nd day of April 1976.”126 The contract was not executed, however, until June 22, 1976, and that date apparently appeared after the signature.127 The issue before the court was whether an indemnification clause in the contract applied to an accident that occurred between those two dates (on May 25, 1976).128 The court stated:
The presence of two different dates creates an ambiguity which opens the matter to evidentiary proof that the date appearing at the beginning of the agreement should not control the inception of rights and liability thereunder.129
Hence, disclosing the date of execution in an agreement intended by the parties to be operative on an earlier date could jeopardize the parties’ objectives.130 At a minimum, it can create a legal issue that could be costly and time consuming to resolve.131
2. Utilizing “As Of” Dating
Identifying the execution date on a backdated document is not the only way of revealing that the document was executed subsequent to the date of the underlying event. Some other mechanism might be utilized to show that the document was backdated. As long as the document conveys on its face that is was executed subsequent to the document date, the risk that a third party will be misled should be minimized even if the specific date of execution is not identified.
Rather than identifying the date of execution, a common drafting practice for disclosing backdating is to qualify the date stated in the document with an “as of” or “effective as of” modifier.132 For example, rather than categorically stating an event occurred “on July 14, 2009,” the backdated document might state that the event occurred “as of July 14, 2009.” “As of” dating highlights the document was executed after the event occurred without creating potential confusion as to the actual or effective date of an arrangement.133
“As of” dating utilized in good faith should minimize the risk that a backdated document could mislead a third party. In light of the “as of” language, a third party should not be surprised that the document was executed subsequent to the “as of” date. The “as of” language normally belies any intent to hide the backdating and effectively invites any third party to whom the actual date of execution might possibly be relevant to inquire about that date. If the attorney is asked when the document was executed, he or she should of course disclose that date.
Tribunals have confirmed that “as of” dating belies any attempt to mislead— indeed, courts have gone so far as to regard the convention to be inconsistent with backdating. For example, in In re Blazina,134 the hearing board stated:
[I]t was considered by us, and weighed in favor of the Respondent that the amendments [to a partnership agreement] each say they are entered into “as of” a specific date and are signed “as of” that same date. As a result, if an amendment were typed up some time after the decision was made, the Respondent in fact did not backdate the document. The document would be backdated if . . . , the document stated “I have hereunto set my hand and seal this 14th day of September 1990” when in fact it was signed on a later date. That was not done on the documents at issue in the complaint.135
Similarly, in Moore v. Commissioner,136 the court stated as follows:
“[B]ackdating” generally involves an effort to make it appear that the document in question was executed on a date prior to its actual execution date; i.e., there is an effort to mislead the reader. That is not true of the . . . agreement [at issue], where the “effective as of” phrase makes clear that the intended effective date differs from the execution date.137
Hence, “as of” dating often serves as an optimal way of disclosing backdating.
Like any other drafting technique, “as of” dating can be employed to achieve illegitimate ends. If the time of an event is fabricated to reap an undeserved benefit by compromising the rights of a third party or violating a law, utilizing “as of” dating might serve to camouflage impropriety, rather than disclose conduct believed to be legitimate. In this situation, “as of” dating does not mitigate the wrongdoing.
For example, in United States v. Delaney,138 a Philadelphia tax lawyer was indicted for allegedly creating documents in 1998 dated “as of January 1, 1996” in which it appeared that certain partners in a tax shelter were liable for partnership debts.139 The apparent objective of the alleged backdating was to enable the partners to deduct approximately $15 million of the partnership’s 1996, 1997, and 1998 losses on their personal tax returns.140 The indictment stated that the lawyer “knew no such agreement had ever been reached” in 1996.141 If this allegation was true,142 the backdated document evidenced an event that never occurred and supported a violation of the tax laws.143
The press reporting of the Delaney case demonstrates significant misunder-standing about “as of” dating and disclosure. One source reported the following:
Local tax lawyers . . . expressed mixed feelings about filing a criminal indictment . . . based solely on the “as of” documents, saying it is a common practice. “The point of using the ‘as of’ language in an agreement is to say that the parties intended the agreement to be effective as of the date in question, even though it was, in all likelihood, executed on a later date,” a tax partner at a large Center City firm said. “While it is both unethical and illegal to tell the IRS that a document was signed before the date it actually was signed, it is not clear that giving the IRS a document dated ‘as of’ a particular date should be viewed as a representation that the agreement was actually signed on that date . . . . ” Another tax partner at a large firm said that standing alone, he does not believe that submitting an “as of” document to the IRS constitutes an indictable offense, but it is clearly not good practice. “Though it’s not the same as back-dating, there is an issue as to whether you are defrauding the government by implying through the document that it had been signed at a certain point,” the tax partner said.144
The lawyers quoted above seem to miss the fundamental point that “as of” dating is neither a legitimate nor illegitimate drafting technique per se.145 Rather, it is the ends to which the technique is employed that determine its propriety. Unless the in-dicted lawyer could have disproved the alleged facts, the backdating supported tax fraud. Hence, this would appear to have been a case where the fabrication was used for a “bad” purpose. Backdating of this type is improper regardless of whether or how it might be disclosed. The problem has nothing to do with “as of” dating—the same problem would exist if the actual date of execution had been identified. When backdating is utilized to deceive a third party or violate a law, it is clearly improper and disclosure of any form will not mitigate the wrongdoing.146
In sum, backdating should always be disclosed. Disclosure normally minimizes the risk that a third party will be misled into believing the document was executed on an earlier date. However, when backdating is utilized to mislead a third party, adversely affects the rights of a third party, or violates a law, disclosure will not cure the impropriety.
IV. PROBLEMS
To aid the reader in employing the analyses set forth in this Article, Part IV relates a series of hypothetical problems involving backdating. These fact patterns offer the opportunity to apply the principles previously discussed to concrete illustrations. A short discussion follows the facts of each problem.
PROBLEM 1
Facts: Employer and Employee verbally agree to an employment arrangement on January 15, 2009. A written agreement is subsequently drafted. The written agreement is dated “as of” January 15, 2009, and is executed by the parties on January 30. The agreement is governed by the law of State X which establishes that a contract arose on January 15, 2009.
Discussion: The written agreement memorializes an event that occurred on January 15, 2009. The fact that the written agreement was drafted and executed after January 15 is irrelevant to the timing of the event. Nevertheless, the “as of” reference should deter any third party from inferring that the document was executed on January 15.
PROBLEM 2
Facts: Same as Problem 1, but the agreement is governed by the law of State Y. Under State Y law, the contract arose on January 30, 2009, the date the agreement was executed.
Discussion: The written agreement fabricates the date of the event. Thus, the backdating is improper unless it was not intended to harm a third party, does not adversely affect the rights of any third party, and does not violate any law.
PROBLEM 3
Facts: The personnel policies of Employer state that anyone employed on January 1 who works for a full calendar year is eligible for a bonus. On January 15, 2009, Employer and Employee agree to an employment arrangement pursuant to which Employee is to be compensated at a level that would include the 2009 bonus Employee would have received had his employment commenced on January 1. Employer could legitimately have conferred this economic benefit by increasing Employee’s salary or by creating a new bonus plan. Instead, Employer backdates the employment contract to January 1 to allow Employee to receive a bonus for 2009 under the existing plan. Employer does not intend to harm a third party by this action.
Discussion: The employment agreement fabricates the date of the event (i.e., the commencement of Employee’s employment). Although Employer could have legitimately conferred the benefit in other ways and did not intend to harm a third party, the backdating is improper unless no third party’s rights are adversely affected and no law is violated.
PROBLEM 4
Facts: Same as Problem 3, however, Employer’s bonus plan covers ten other employees and requires that any amount set aside for bonuses shall be divided equally among all covered employees at yearend.
Discussion: The agreement fabricates the commencement date of Employee’s employment. The rights of third parties are compromised by the backdating because participation by Employee means that the other participants will get a lesser share of the amount set aside for bonuses (i.e., each of the other participants will receive 1/11 of the bonus money if Employee is included and 1/10 of the bonus money if Employee is not included). As such, the backdating is improper.
PROBLEM 5
Facts: Sole Shareholder of Closely Held Corporation (“CHC”) would like Key Executive to come to work for CHC. CHC is a C corporation for federal tax purposes.147 To attract Key Executive, Sole Shareholder agrees on January 1, 2009, to give her 10 percent of his CHC stock. On that same date, Key Executive and CHC enter into an employment agreement which makes no reference to the CHC stock. In December, it is discovered that the paperwork to transfer 10 percent of Sole Shareholder’s shares to Key Executive was never completed. The paperwork is completed on December 31, 2009, and the transfer documents are dated “as of” January 1, 2009.
Discussion: If, as a matter of law, Sole Shareholder’s January 1, 2009, agreement to transfer 10 percent of her stock to Key Executive caused Key Executive to become the owner of the shares on that date, the December paperwork merely memorializes the transfer. By contrast, if the transfer of ownership of the shares does not occur until December 31, 2009, the backdating fabricates the date of the transfer. In this event, the backdating is improper unless it was not intended to harm a third party, does not adversely affect the rights of any third party, and does not violate any law.
PROBLEM 6
Facts: Same as Problem 5, but CHC is an S corporation for federal tax purposes.148 As such, the income of CHC is taxed proportionately to its shareholders on each day of the year.149 Because the parties treat the stock transfer as occurring on January 1, 90 percent of CHC’s 2009 income is reported on Sole Shareholder’s 2009 tax return and the remaining 10 percent of CHC’s 2009 income is reported on Key Executive’s 2009 tax return.
Discussion: If, as a matter of law, the transfer of ownership occurred on January 1, the December paperwork memorialized the transfer. But if the transfer of ownership does not occur until December 31, the backdating fabricates the date of transfer and is improper because it supports erroneous tax reporting. Specifically, if the transfer of ownership did not occur until December 31, Sole Shareholder would be responsible for reporting 100 percent of the S corporation’s 2009 income.150
PROBLEM 7
Facts: General Partnership (“GP”) is treated as a partnership for federal tax purposes and uses the calendar year for tax reporting.151 As such, the income of GP is taxed directly to its partners in accordance with their partnership agreement.152 On January 1, 2009, GP has two partners (Partner A and Partner B) who have always shared profits and losses equally. On January 1, 2009, the partners agree to amend their agreement to cause Partner A to be entitled to 2/3 of GP’s 2009 profits. However, the paperwork to implement this amendment is not completed until December 31, 2009, and is dated “as of” January 1, 2009. The parties treat the amendment as effective on January 1, 2009. As such, 2/3 of GP’s 2009 profits are reported on Partner A’s tax return and 1/3 of GP’s 2009 profits are reported on Partner B’s tax return.
Discussion: If, as a matter of law, the amendment to the partnership agreement is effective on January 1, 2009, the December paperwork merely memorializes the amendment. But if the amendment is effective on December 31, 2009, the December paperwork fabricates the date of the amendment. The fabrication does not violate federal tax law because, under these circumstances, the partnership agreement can be retroactively amended to January 1, 2009, until April 15, 2010.153 Consequently, even if the amendment did not occur until December 31, 2009, it would be permissible for the partners to report GP’s 2009 income in accordance with the agreement reached on that date. Nevertheless, the backdating would still be improper unless it was not intended to harm a third party, does not adversely affect the rights of any third party, and does not violate any other law.
PROBLEM 8
Facts: On December 29, 2009, a new client asks attorney to prepare a deed reflecting the client’s desire to make a gift to the client’s daughter of certain real estate. In January 2010, attorney prepares the deed and sends it to client. The deed is signed by the client but no date is inserted. When attorney brings the missing date to client’s attention, client asks attorney to insert “as of December 31, 2009,” the date on which he says he told his daughter about the gift. No extraneous in-formation suggests the gift was actually made on December 31, 2009.
Discussion: The attorney has no evidence the gift was made on December 31, 2009, and contrary evidence exists because the attorney knows the deed was executed after that date. Moreover, the attorney has no past experience with the client that might prove helpful in assessing the client’s veracity. Thus, it appears the client is requesting the attorney to fabricate the date of the transfer of ownership which would violate state law and could adversely impact the rights of a third party.154 Hence, the backdating would be improper.
PROBLEM 9
Facts: Same as Problem 8, but assume that the attorney has worked with the client for many years and that all of client’s past actions have reflected integrity.
Discussion: Although it will likely be harder for the attorney to say “no” in this situation, it remains prudent to reject the request because no extrinsic evidence exists that the gift was in fact made on December 31. Acceding to the client’s wishes could cause the attorney to be participating in a fabrication that violates state law and compromises the rights of a third party.155
PROBLEM 10
Facts: Same as Problem 8, but client indicates the gift was made on December 1, 2009, and requests that the lawyer insert “as of December 1, 2009” on the deed. In addition, objective evidence exists that the daughter had actually assumed the benefits and burdens of ownership of the real estate on December 1. Specifically, she moved onto the property, paid the real estate taxes, and began to improve the property with her own funds.
Discussion: After verifying the facts and applying the facts to the relevant law, the lawyer might conclude that the backdating memorialized a gift that occurred on December 1.156 If the lawyer’s conclusion is correct, the backdating is legitimate. Otherwise, the backdating would be a fabrication that violates state law and could compromise the rights of a third party in which case the backdating would be improper.157
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the foregoing discussion, the following analysis should be employed whenever a lawyer is confronted with a backdating situation:
The lawyer should initially assess whether the backdating in question involves: (i) a fabrication intended to deceive or harm a third party; (ii) a fabrication utilized to achieve the goals of the parties involved where no intent exists to deceive or harm a third party; or (iii) the memorialization of a prior event.
An attorney should never participate in backdating that fabricates the time of an event when the backdating is intended to deceive or harm a third party.
Even when no intent exists to deceive or harm a third party, a lawyer should not participate in backdating that fabricates if the backdating could adversely affect the rights of a third party or violates a law. Lawyers should be extremely cautious about this form of backdating because it will often be difficult to identify all third parties who might be harmed and to assess whether the rights of any of these parties might be violated.158
If the backdating is intended to memorialize a prior event, the lawyer must confirm that the event in fact occurred on the earlier date. If the event is governed by ambiguous legal standards, a disciplined analysis should be undertaken to determine the actual time of the event. In all cases, the lawyer should critically evaluate all the evidence before reaching a conclusion as to when the event occurred and carefully document the facts establishing the event. If, after taking these actions, the lawyer remains uncertain as to when the event occurred, the lawyer must realize that the backdating could be a fabrication and evaluate its propriety on that basis.
An attorney should never assume a backdated document will remain private. The possibility of a controversy always exists and any backdated document might someday appear before a court, government entity, or some private party who was not privy to the backdating. Thus, the attorney should not participate in the backdating unless he or she is prepared to defend the legitimacy of the document in a truthful and forthright manner.
Backdating should always be disclosed. In the case of backdating that memorializes, utilizing “as of” dating should normally minimize the risk that a third party will be misled into believing that the document was executed on the earlier date, without creating confusion about the effective date of the document. In the case of backdating that fabricates where no intent to harm a third party exists, disclosure can provide notice to third parties who otherwise might be harmed, as well as reinforce the lack of any intent to deceive. Disclosure will not ensure the propriety of such backdating, however, because a third party could still be harmed by the backdating, notwithstanding the disclosure.
CONCLUSION
In an ideal world, backdating would never occur. No lawyer would ever be asked to fabricate the time of an event and every event would be documented contemporaneously with its occurrence. In the real world, however, backdating questions cannot be avoided.
Certain forms of backdating are an integral part of the practice of law. Events can and must be documented after the fact so long as it can be established that the event actually occurred at the earlier time. Moreover, backdating utilized to implement the economic objectives of private parties can potentially be innocuous if the backdating is not intended to harm a third party, and does not in fact compromise the rights of any third party or violate any law. Although these standards are easy to state, they are often difficult to apply.
Whenever a backdating question arises, it is critical for the lawyer to confront the issue and to understand exactly what he or she is being asked to do. The lawyer should never assume that any backdating situation is harmless. Instead, careful thought and analysis is necessary in every case to ensure the propriety of the action. The consequences of an error in judgment can be severe.
It is high time to remedy the dearth of guidance that exists with respect to backdating. Both legal academics and practitioners have an important role to play in educating lawyers to deal with this pervasive issue. Hopefully, this Article will begin that process.
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* Jeffrey L. Kwall is the Kathleen and Bernard Beazley Professor of Law and Director of the Tax LL.M. Program, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. B.A., Bucknell University; M.B.A., The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School. Former Chair of the Federal Taxation Committee of the Chicago Bar Association.
Stuart Duhl is a Partner, Harrison & Held, LLP, and an Adjunct Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. B.S., Northwestern University; J.D., Northwestern University School of Law; LL.M. (Taxation), John Marshall Law School. Former Chair of the National Conference of Bar Examiners; Former President of the Illinois Board of Admissions to the Bar.
The authors thank Shelly Banoff, John Breen, Jenny Brendel, Mike Duhl, Vic Fleischer, Jim Grogan, Stan Meadows, Bill Popkin, Anne-Marie Rhodes, Adam Rosenzweig, and Bob Wootton for commenting on drafts of this Article. The views expressed are solely those of the authors. We also received helpful comments at a workshop at Loyola University Chicago School of Law. We thank our student assistants Olivia Seagle, Diane Crary, Robert Grignon, Andrew Katsoulas, Richard Kienzler, Becky Lauber, and David Pritzker. Thanks also to Loyola University Chicago School of Law for research support.
1. The issue is touched upon in Sheldon Banoff, Unwinding or Rescinding a Transaction: Good Tax Planning or Tax Fraud?, 62 TAXES 942, 980 (1984). None of the leading professional responsibility case-books devote much, if any, attention to backdating. See, e.g., STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 401–02 (7th ed. 2005); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., SUSAN P. KONIAK, ROGER C. CRAMTON & GEORGE M. COHEN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING (4th ed. 2005); THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (9th ed. 2006); DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 537–39 (4th ed. 2004); MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ, RICHARD C. WYDICK, REX R. PERSCHBACHER & DEBRA
LYN BASSETT, PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS (8th ed. 2007). Even the leading tax ethics books offer very limited coverage. See, e.g., BERNARD WOLFMAN, JAMES P. HOLDEN & KENNETH L. HARRIS, STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE § 502.2.2, at 414–16 (6th ed. 2004); BERNARD WOLFMAN, DEBORAH H. SCHENCK & DIANE RING, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 259–60 (4th ed. 2008).
2. Stock options generally allow executives and key employees of publicly traded corporations to buy employer stock at the trading price on the day the option is issued. The options backdating scandal involved dozens of public corporations that backdated options to an earlier date when the company’s stock was trading at a lower value thereby allowing the recipients to buy the stock at a bargain price. See generally Victor Fleischer, Options Backdating, Tax Shelters, and Corporate Culture, 26 VA. TAX
REV. 1031, 1037 (2007); Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, Does Backdating Explain the Stock Price Pattern Around Executive Stock Option Grants?, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 271 (2007); Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT. SCI. 802 (2005); David I. Walker, Unpacking Backdating: Economic Analysis and Observations on the Stock Option Scandal, 87 B.U. L. REV. 561 (2007).
3. Robert W. Wood, Tax Effects of the Stock Options Backdating Flap, 115 TAX NOTES 137, 137 (Apr. 9, 2007).
4. The term “backdate” is defined as “predate,” and the term “predate” as “antedate.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 158, 1785 (1986) (defining “backdate” and “predate” respectively). Several definitions are offered for “antedate.” Id. at 91. The definitions set forth in the text accompanying notes 5 and 6 are the most relevant to this discussion.
7. Both actions could occur in the same situation. Specifically, a document dated prior to the date of execution might also assign an event to a date prior to when the event occurred. For purposes of this Article, the two actions are treated as mutually exclusive.
8. See infra Part I.B (discussing backdating that fabricates at the expense of a third party or in violation of a law).
10. See infra Part I.C (discussing backdating that memorializes).
11. See infra Part II.A.1.a (discussing when, as a matter of law, an agreement is reached).
12. In cases where the act of execution causes the relevant event to occur, however, backdating the document would necessarily fabricate the date of the event. See, e.g., U.S. Projector & Elecs. Corp. v. Comm’r, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 549, 553–54 (1969) (finding that the act of executing a rescission agreement fixed petitioner’s liability to return funds previously received, thus determining the timing of a tax deduction).
13. See Fleischer, supra note 2, at 1038 (acknowledging “the innocuous sort of ‘as of’ dating that lawyers engage in every day as a matter of practical necessity”).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 231–32 (4th Cir. 1997) (involving an attorney’s effort to conceal a client’s assets from the Internal Revenue Service by backdating promissory notes to make it appear that the client was obligated to repay certain unconditionally received amounts); Quick v. Samp, 697 N.W.2d 741, 743 (S.D. 2005) (involving a malpractice suit against an attorney who back-dated a document to make it appear that a corporation had assigned its rights under a contract to the corporation’s sole shareholder because the attorney had erroneously named the shareholder, rather than the corporation, as the plaintiff in a breach of contract lawsuit against a third party); Medieval Attractions N.V. v. Comm’r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 924, 936–44 (1996) (involving an effort to claim tax deductions by backdating documents to make it appear that intangible property had been transferred to a related party so that payments to the related party could be treated as tax deductible royalties); In re Boyd, 430 N.W.2d 663, 663–64 (Minn. 1988) (involving an attorney’s effort to avoid the expense and inconvenience of probate by backdating a deed conveying real property from a client’s deceased father to the client who forged her father’s name on the deed); State ex rel. Counsel for Discipline of Neb. Sup. Ct. v. Rokahr, 675 N.W.2d 117, 120–21 (Neb. 2004) (involving an attorney who, after a trust for which the client had served as a trustee terminated, backdated an easement to secure access by the client’s children to property previously held in the trust); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Shaffer, 785 N.E.2d 429, 429–30 (Ohio 2003) (involving an attorney’s effort to avoid the expense of guardian-ship for a client’s incapacitated grandmother by backdating a power of attorney to a date prior to the grandmother’s stroke—to which the client forged the grandmother’s signature).
15. See generally Moore v. Comm’r, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1275, 1284 (2007) (“[E]ach of the . . . cases petitioners cite in support of their argument that courts uniformly disregard (and may even find fraudulent) backdated documents involves taxpayer efforts to use those documents solely in order to achieve a tax result dependent upon timely action by the taxpayer, where the time to act had already passed.”).
16. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass’n v. O’Donohoe, 426 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Iowa 1988) (involving an attorney who was disciplined for making a false statement of fact on a document filed for public record, thereby misleading opposing counsel and the general public).
18. U.C. Castings Co. v. Knight, 754 F.2d 1363, 1370–71 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that the “jury could have found that one of the motives for the [backdating] practice was continuously to record income from the future and thus to increase profits shown so that when Universal should be offered for sale, its profits record would appear better than it really was”).
20. Confer v. Custom Eng’g Co., 952 F.2d 41, 42–43 (3d Cir. 1991) (involving backdating that occurred after a corporation learned it was liable for coverage because both an oral modification and a subsequent written modification were insufficient to change the terms of the plan).
22. Dobrich v. Comm’r, No. 98-70693, 1999 WL 650572, at *2–3 (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 1999) (involving a taxpayer’s attempt to defer gain on the sale of real estate pursuant to Internal Revenue Code section 1031).
24. Berger v. United States, 87 F.3d 60, 61–62 (2d Cir. 1996) (involving an employee benefits attorney who filed documents indicating his clients’ pension plans were amended in a timely manner where the plans were actually amended after the deadline thereby causing the affected plans to lose qualified status for some years).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Solomon, 825 F.2d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir. 1987) (involving the back-dating of tax shelter documents to precede the date on which the law was changed); United States v. Drape, 668 F.2d 22, 24–25 (1st Cir. 1982) (involving a taxpayer whose attorney, in 1977, backdated the taxpayer’s investment in a coal mining tax shelter to December 15, 1976, to generate deductions for the taxpayer’s 1976 tax return); Popkin v. Comm’r, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 294, 295–96 (1988) (involving a taxpayer who entered into leases, providing for the payment of advance royalties, that were backdated to precede the date the income tax regulations were amended to disallow the deduction of advance royalties), aff’d, 899 F.2d 21 (11th Cir 1990); Fried v. Comm’r, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1300 (1989) (involving another party in Popkin case), aff’d, 954 F.2d 730 (11th Cir. 1992); In re Spear, 774 P.2d 1335, 1338 (Ariz. 1989) (involving an attorney/CPA who advised his client to purchase property in November 1983 from a partnership and then backdated the contract of sale to March 31, 1983, so the client could claim additional depreciation deductions); Fla. Bar v. Adler, 505 So. 2d 1334, 1335 (Fla. 1987) (involving an attorney who backdated a tax shelter investment to avoid a change in the tax law (enactment of the “atrisk” rules) that caused non-recourse obligations to no longer provide tax deductions for investors); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass’n v. Bauerle, 460 N.W.2d 452, 452–53 (Iowa 1990) (involving an attorney who was instructed by a client in 1982 to backdate a partnership agreement to January 1, 1981, to enable the client to claim additional depreciation deductions).
27. Parties accused of fraudulently backdating documents often defend themselves by claiming that the backdating merely memorializes a prior event. See, e.g., Medieval Attractions N.V. v. Comm’r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 924, 959 (1996) (“Petitioners attempt to justify backdating as a common practice to memorialize agreements.”); Herman v. Zatzkis, 632 So. 2d 302, 303–04 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (involving a divorce case in which the husband (Ralph) attempted to increase retroactively the fee paid to his attorney-brother with a backdated letter where “Ralph and his attorneys contend[ed] that the letter represents only a written memorialization of what had always been the oral fee arrangement between Ralph and his brother”).
29. Various corporate actions require approval of the board of directors. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (2005).
30. In the case of a closely held corporation, director approval will normally be effectuated by unanimous consent, rather than a meeting. See, e.g., id. § 8.21(a) (providing that “action . . . by the board of directors may be taken without a meeting if each director signs a consent describing the action”).
41. Note that the Internal Revenue Service bore the burden of proof in Baird because the issue of ownership was raised late in the proceedings. See id. at 124. It is uncertain whether the court would have found that ownership was transferred on the earlier date if the taxpayer had borne the burden of proof.
42. See Crystal Tandon, ABA Tax Section Meeting: Fraud Referral Program Paying Off, IRS Official Says, 111 TAX NOTES 777, 777 (May 15, 2006) (“Asked about whether backdated documents in themselves raise scrutiny, [IRS Criminal Investigation Division Chief Nancy] Jardini said that legitimate memorialization of a transaction after the fact is not CI’s concern.”).
43. See Moore v. Comm’r, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1275, 1283 (2007).
45. The court inferred that the majority member (Dr. Joffe) did not report the income from the disputed 10 percent membership interest because “[p]etitioners’ failure to question Dr. Joffe with respect to his returns or require him to produce those returns raises an inference that they would reflect Dr. Joffe’s belief that he, in fact, possessed a 68-percent membership interest [rather than a 78 percent interest] as of January 1, 1997.” Id. at 1285.
48. If the event occurred prior to the date stated in the document, a fabrication would also exist. That situation involves postdating, a subject beyond the scope of this Article.
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 27 cmt. a (1981) (“Parties . . . often . . . before the final writing is made . . . agree upon all of the terms which they plan to incorporate therein. This they may do orally or by exchange of several writings.”).
50. U.C.C. § 2-204(2) (2002) (“An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found even though the moment of its making is undetermined.”).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 27 (1981) (“Manifestations of assent that are in themselves sufficient to conclude a contract will not be prevented from so operating by the fact that the parties also manifest an intention to prepare and adopt a written memorial thereof; but the circumstances may show that the agreements are preliminary negotiations.”).
52. Compare Finley v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. 95-7055, 1996 WL 80380, at *2 (10th Cir. 1996) (involving a preliminary letter agreement treated as effective—even though the final settlement agreement differed in many ways—because “[t]he Settlement Principles reflected in the final document . . . remained unchanged. Additional terms were collateral or immaterial matters which did not affect the formation of a contract.”), with Debreceni v. Outlet Co., 784 F.2d 13, 18–19 (1st Cir. 1986) (involving a preliminary agreement that was expressly subject to the execution of definitive documents where the court stated, “Even if we were [willing] to accept [the claim that the later, definitive agreement is] retroactively binding [between the parties to the contract], we are unwilling to go a step further and hold that parties to a contract can make it retroactively binding to the detriment of third persons not party to the contract.”).
53. Compare 13 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 38:4, 38:7 (4th ed. 2000 & Supp. 2007) (focusing on a condition precedent to the existence of contract), with City of Haverhill v. George Brox, Inc., 716 N.E.2d 138 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (focusing on a condition precedent to liability under an existing contract).
54. See 13 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 53, § 38.10, at 413 (noting that conditions subsequent are generally only subsequent in form and tend to be conditions precedent to the duty of immediate performance).
55. Id. at 414 (noting that the terminology has been abandoned for the most part); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 reporter’s note (1982) (introducing the more contemporary distinction between express and implied conditions).
56. In certain cases, the standard and its application are clear. See, e.g., United States v. Solomon, 825 F.2d 1292, 1295–96 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that because “patents could be assigned only in writing,” defendant’s claim that parties had entered into an oral agreement was irrelevant).
57. See EDWARD H. RABIN, ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL & JEFFREY L. KWALL, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN PROPERTY LAW 901–18 (5th ed. 2006). The issue of when ownership is transferred can be complex even under property law because of the passage of equitable title at the time of the agreement of sale. Under the doctrine of equitable conversion, when the purchaser and seller enter into a contract for the sale of land, the purchaser becomes the equitable owner of the land and the seller retains legal title until closing occurs. Id. at 1127–47.
58. The determination of tax ownership has generated significant litigation. Richard E. Marsh, Tax Ownership of Real Estate, 39 TAX LAW. 563, 564–65 (1986). These cases are not limited to real property. See, e.g., H.J. Heinz Co. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 570 (2007) (stock ownership); Georgiou v. Comm’r, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1341 (1995) (stock ownership).
59. See supra note 26 and text accompanying notes 34–41. When income, rather than a deduction, is at issue, the purchaser can be expected to argue that ownership was transferred at a later date. See, e.g., Moore v. Comm’r, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1275, 1282 (2007).
60. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 86 F.2d 637, 638–39 (2d Cir. 1936); Baird v. Comm’r, 68 T.C. 115, 119–28 (1977); Pomeroy v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 1716, 1724–26 (1970).
61. See Alex Raskolnikov, Contextual Analysis of Tax Ownership, 85 B.U. L. REV. 431, 460–65 (2005). See also Banoff, supra note 1, at 980 (“[O]ne should consider backdating a document only where the dating is consistent with the parties’ intent. In such case, it is, of course, necessary for the parties to allocate the benefits, and suffer the burdens, of ownership as of that earlier date, i.e., give economic effect to the earlier date.”).
62. Burdens of ownership include the risk of loss and liability for real estate taxes while benefits usually include the right to use the property, the profits from that use, and any appreciation in the value of the property. See Marsh, supra note 58, at 575.
63. See Raskolnikov, supra note 61, at 463–64 (discussing that when “a meaningful condition precedent has not been fulfilled, the contract . . . will remain executory,” while “an insubstantial condition will not delay the sale”).
75. See also Pittsburgh Realty Inv. Trust v. Comm’r, 67 T.C. 260, 280–81 (1976). This case involved a factual question as to whether a corporate liquidation occurred on September 30, 1968—resulting in no tax liability—or on October 4, 1968—resulting in a significant tax liability. Id. at 278–79. Ul-timately, the court determined that the liquidation occurred on the later date, notwithstanding the existence of documents suggesting the liquidation occurred on the earlier date. Id. at 280. These documents included the deed conveying the corporation’s property to its shareholders, the closing sheet, the IRS Form 966, and the articles of dissolution filed with the state. Id.
76. Daniel L. Schacter, Kenneth A. Norman & Wilma Koutstaal, The Cognitive Neuroscience of Constructive Memory, 49 ANN. REV. OF PSYCHOL. 289, 290 (1998) (noting that since 1932 psychological studies have indicated that memory is not an exact reproduction of events, rather it is a constructive process that can be distorted).
77. See Giuliana Mazzoni & Manila Vannucci, Hindsight Bias, The Misinformation Effect, and False Autobiographical Memories, 25 SOC. COGNITION 203, 208–09 (2007).
78. See Valerie F. Reyna, Robyn Holliday & Tammy Marche, Explaining the Development of False Memories, 22 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 436, 441–42 (2002). See also Mazzoni & Vannucci, supra note 77, at 211 (stating that factors such as familiarity, plausibility, and memorability of an event as well as social variables can cause people to have biased recollections and false memories).
80. See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. OF GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 178 (1998).
81. In an analogous situation, a lawyer who prepares a will for a testator of uncertain ability can be regarded as having made the judgment that the testator is competent.
82. Most lawyers will likely be concerned about the loss of future business from an existing client whose credibility is being questioned.
83. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.37 (2008) (Circular 230) (stating a practitioner should not give tax advice that “unreasonably relies upon representations . . . of the taxpayer or any other person [and] does not consider all relevant facts that the practitioner knows or should know”); id. § 10.33 (listing best practices, which include “evaluating the reasonableness of any assumptions or representations”). But see Louis Mezzullo, College of Tax Counsel Criticizes Sweep of Circular 230 Amendments, 2005 LEXIS TNT 111–18 ( June 10, 2005) (criticizing section 10.37 of the Circular 230 Regulations as “vague in its application” and opining that “[p]ractitioners should not be required to independently verify that the facts and statements provided by a client are correct if they appear to be reasonable”).
84. See supra Part I.B (illustrating when backdating that fabricates is improper).
85. See 2 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 53, § 6:61, at 895 (“[I]t seems clear that, where the parties themselves agree that a contract between them should be given effect as of a specified date, absent the intervention of third-party rights, there is no sound reason why that agreement should not be given effect.” (emphasis added)). Courts often acknowledge and follow this rule. See, e.g., Viacom Int’l Inc. v. Tandem Prods. Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1264, 1270 (S.D.N.Y 1974) (stating, “as a general rule[,] when a written contract provides it shall be effective ‘as of’ an earlier date, it generally is retroactive to the earlier date”), aff’d, 526 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1975); Du Frene v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 231 Cal. App. 2d 452, 458 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (finding that an agreement applied to an accident occurring on November 6, where the agreement stated it was “approved and accepted” as of November 4, even though it was dated November 15 and presented for signature on November 22); Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Ring, 286 S.E.2d 1, 3 (Ga. 1982) (stating that “the effective date of a contract is not the date of execution where the contract expressly states that its terms are to take effect at an earlier date”); Buffalo Police Benevolent Ass’n v. Buffalo, 114 Misc. 2d 1091, 1092–93 (Erie Co. Ct. 1982) (treating a collective bargaining agreement as effective on its stated effective date of July 1, 1980, notwithstanding the court’s acknowledgment that execution did not occur until February 10, 1982, and that the “parties were without an agreement from July 1, 1980, to February 10, 1982”). Cf., e.g., Pittsburgh Realty Inv. Trust v. Comm’r, 67 T.C. 260, 280 (1976) (stating that “[i]n a business context, where both parties to a transaction are agreed, the custom of backdating documents or dating them ‘as of’ a prior date may be acceptable”); SEC v. Solucorp Indus. Ltd., 197 F. Supp. 2d 4, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that “[w]e do not dispute that certain contracts may be legitimately backdated”). The Supreme Court has tacitly approved of a dating pattern appearing to involve a fabrication. See Comm’r v. Phila. Transp. Co., 174 F.2d 255, 256 (3d Cir. 1949), aff’d per curiam , 338 U.S. 883 (1949). This case involved a corporation that did not come into existence until January 1, 1940, but issued bonds dated January 1, 1939, bearing interest from that date. Id. at 255. The court acknowledged this dating occurred “for reasons best known to management,” sanctioned the corporation’s deduction of the 1939 interest in 1940, and determined that the corporation was satisfying its own obligation, not that of another party. Id. at 256.
86. Retroactivity is a two-edged sword, however. If retroactivity harms the parties involved, courts have been willing to enforce the harm. See, e.g., Am. Cyanamid Co., 286 S.E.2d at 2–3 (involving an indemnification agreement that was executed on July 15, 1975, but was held to be effective “as of July 1, 1975”—the effective date stated in the agreement. This caused American Cyanamid to be held liable for the death of an employee five days before the agreement was executed.); Diamond Int’l Corp. v. Glad, 330 N.W.2d 526, 526–27 (S.D. 1983) (involving a partnership agreement restated in October 1978 to convert Glad’s status from a limited partner to a general partner retroactive to March 1978, pursuant to which Glad was held responsible for a claim that arose in September 1978 when he was a limited partner).
88. By treating the options as having been awarded on an earlier date when the stock price was lower, the options are “in the money” on the date they are actually received. See Fleischer, supra note 2, at 1036–39; Walker, supra note 2, at 570–73.
89. [$100 per share value x 1,000 shares]-[$70 per share price x1,000 shares] = $30,000.
90. The statement in the text assumes that no relationship exists between employer and employee that might activate regulatory rules restricting their arrangement.
91. See supra Part I.B (illustrating when backdating that fabricates is improper).
93. See infra Part III for a discussion of the relevance of disclosure to the propriety of backdating.
94. In re Computer Sciences Corp., No. CV 06-05288, 2007 WL 1321715, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2007) (emphasis added). See Fleischer, supra note 2, at 1034 n.7 (acknowledging that options backdating would be “perfectly acceptable” under the conditions set forth by the In re Computer Sciences Corp. court, though “I have yet to hear about any companies that followed this path”).
95. See supra Part I.B (illustrating when backdating that fabricates is improper).
96. In this regard, all types of taxes must be considered, including income taxes, transfer taxes, and property taxes.
108. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Each of these disciplinary rules has been codified in substantial part by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, one or the other of which has been adopted by most states. See AM. BAR ASS’N & BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1:3 (2008). Model Rule 8.4(c) and its corollary DR 1-102(A)(4) prohibit attorneys from engaging in “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” Id. § 101:401. Model Rule 3.3(a)(1) and its corollary DR 7-102(A)(5) prohibit attorneys from “knowingly mak[ing] a false statement of fact or law [to a tribunal].” Id. § 61:301. Model Rule 8.4(d) and its corollary DR 1-102(A)(5) prohibit attorneys from engaging in “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Id. § 101:501.
112. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2006). Model Rule 8.4(c) has been adopted by each of the forty-seven states that have adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and a similar rule is employed by the minority of states that have adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. See ABA & BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, supra note 108, §§ 1:3, 101:401.
113. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct define “fraud” as “conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(d) (2006). States that have adopted the Model Rules similarly require that the attorney have a “purpose to deceive” to sustain a fraud charge. See, e.g., ARIZ. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.0(d); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Terminology; PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.0(d). The Model Rules shed no light on the requisite mental state for dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation, and the law varies from state to state. Compare Florida Bar v. Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249, 1252 (Fla. 1999) (“In order to find that an attorney acted with dishonesty, misrepresentation, deceit or fraud, the Bar must show the necessary element of intent.”), with Parese v. Statewide Grievance Comm., No. CV88-0348079, 1993 WL 137568, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993) (stating that “[t]here is no requirement under rule 8.4(c) that the prohibited misrepresentation be intentional . . . ; in general, legal liability for misrepresentations rests on false statements made either intentionally or negligently” (emphasis added)).
114. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Adler, 505 So. 2d 1334, 1335 (Fla. 1987) (disciplining attorney for back-dating documents to precede a change in the law that eliminated certain tax deductions). See also In re Brown, 766 N.E.2d 363, 364 (Ind. 2002) (disciplining an attorney for forging his client’s signature on a check and stealing a portion of his client’s settlement); In re Perrini, 662 N.Y.S.2d 445, 448 (App. Div. 1997) (disciplining attorney for backdating letter submitted to bankruptcy court because he failed to file timely proof of claim); In re Graham, 503 N.W.2d 476, 477 (Minn. 1993) (disciplining attorney for submitting backdated documents to the bankruptcy court to conceal his assets from creditors).
115. Even in Illinois, the jurisdiction where Stern was decided, some confusion exists about the standard. See In re Howard, No. 96 CH 531, 1998 WL 772167, at *8 (Review Bd. of the Ill. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n June 4, 1998) (“[While Rule 8.4(a)(4)’s statement] that ‘a lawyer shall not engage in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation’ . . . appears to be aimed at intentional acts of deception, our review of relevant cases provides no clearcut statement as to the requirements of the rule. Some cases have premised a violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4) on a finding of dishonest motive. Conversely, this Board has stated that ‘a violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4) can be found even without proof that anyone was actually deceived’ and ‘malice is not an element the [a]dministrator must prove.’” (citations omitted)).
116. The American Bar Association has suggested that an attorney be admonished for submitting false statements to a court that cause little or no harm or adverse consequences to a party. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, Standard 6.14 (1992).
117. For example, a party who originally consented to the arrangement might have second thoughts resulting in a dispute that causes the backdating to surface. See, e.g., Moore v. Comm’r, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1275, 1284–85 (2007) (discussing dispute between members of LLC as to when a transfer of membership interests occurred).
118. The mechanics of disclosure are explored in Part III.
119. See supra Part II.C (discussing how backdating that memorializes can be problematic). See, e.g., Herman v. Zatzkis, 632 So. 2d 302, 304 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (“[The parties] contend that the letter represents only a written memorialization of what had always been the oral fee arrangement . . . . They argue that the court should not ascribe bad faith and fraud to the failure to disclose the fact that the letter was backdated. . . . The date on the letter was a material issue and we find that there was an affirmative duty to disclose whether asked or not.”); In re Jagiela, 517 N.W.2d 333, 335 (Minn. 1994) (“It appears from the record that the back-dated agreement may well have memorialized a prior oral agreement, at least to some extent. The back-dated agreement, however, was given to opposing counsel . . . , submitted to the . . . court, and testified to by various parties. . . . [The attorney] did not inform the court or opposing counsel of the back-dating of the agreement. Thus, there is clear and convincing evidence of [the attorney]’s misconduct with regard to the agreement.”).
120. See supra Part II.B (discussing backdating that fabricates).
122. Cf., e.g., Cipparone v. Comm’r, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1492, 1498 (1985) (“Any conduct, the likely effect of which would be to mislead or conceal, is indicative of fraud.”); The Curious Capitalist, blog. com/curious_capitalist/2007/03/actually_holman_stockoption_ba.html (Mar. 7, 2007, 15:49 EST) (“Actually, Holman, Stock-Option Backdating Is Never Ok”) (“Backdating is, by its very definition, not disclosing what you’re doing.” (emphasis in original)).
123. Backdating utilized to deceive a third party is per se improper and disclosure will not mitigate the wrongdoing. In fact, the purported disclosure of such backdating might actually reflect an effort to impede authorities from ascertaining the truth. See infra notes 138–46 and accompanying text.
124. See supra Part II.A.1 (exploring how a contract can exist and ownership of property can be transferred before corresponding documents are executed).
126. Id. at 1321 (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Id. After discussing the April 22 effective date, the court states that “a later date does appear following the signature.” Id. at 1322. That “later date” was presumably the June 22 execution date but this is not clear.
130. See also Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Ring, 286 S.E.2d 1, 2–3 (Ga. 1982) (involving a contract dated “as of July 1, 1975” where one party inserted the July 15, 1975, execution date next to his signature, resulting in the trial court determining that “the two dates on the contract created an ambiguity which was appropriate for the jury to resolve”); Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Lanco Scaffolding Co., 716 N.E.2d 130, 133 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (affirming in dicta that the appearance of multiple dates “might create ambiguity or confusion as to a different effective date for the contract” even though only one date appeared in the contract at issue).
131. The research for this Article revealed only three backdating cases where the date of execution was disclosed. See Pittsburgh Realty Inv. Trust v. Comm’r, 67 T.C. 260, 268 (1976) (involving a stock purchase agreement disclosing the execution date as follows: “10-4-68 (as of 9-30-68)”); Sweetman, 389 A.2d at 1321 (involving a contract stating it was “made this 22nd day of April 1976” and that it was executed on June 22, 1976); Am. Cyanamid Co., 286 S.E.2d at 2(involving a contract dated “as of July 1, 1975” where one party inserted the July 15, 1975, execution date next to his signature). The absence of cases involving disclosure of the date of execution could mean either that the practice rarely occurs or that litigation rarely occurs when the date of execution is identified.
132. This technique might also be utilized when it is difficult or impossible to gather all parties together to execute a document at one time. Geographic differences or strained relationships might make it impractical for everyone to convene in one place. Hence, a document might be executed in counterparts at different times and places. In these circumstances, the “as of” date can establish a specific time for the event.
133. To guard against any inference that the “as of” date reflects the execution date, a clause could be added stating: “The date on this document shall not be construed to imply that the document was executed on that date.”
138. No. 2:02-cr-00134-BMS (E.D. Pa. filed Mar. 5, 2002).
139. Amended Indictment at 4, United States v. Delaney, No. 2:02-cr-00134-BMS (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2005) [hereinafter “Amended Indictment”].
140. See id. at 3. See also I.R.C. § 704(d) (2000) (limiting partner’s deduction of partnership losses to partner’s basis in partnership interest); id. § 752(a) (allowing partner to augment basis in partnership interest for partnership liabilities with respect to which partner bears a risk of loss).
142. The evidence supporting the government’s view included the following: “In or about April 1998, defendant [lawyer] advised one of the . . . partners that he would keep the false guarantees dated ‘as of August 25, 1995’ hidden in his desk drawer and not provide them to [one of the limited partners].” Id. at 7.
143. The attorney pled guilty and was sentenced to six months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Criminal Docket Report at nos. 20, 34, United States v. Delaney, No. 2:02-cr-00134-BMS (E.D. Pa. filed Mar. 5, 2002).
144. Jeff Blumenthal, Tax Bar Debates Merits of Jacobs Indictment, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 7, 2002, at 1.
145. The quoted lawyers might not have been aware of the fact that the Delaney case apparently involved the alleged fabrication of an event that never occurred. Their comments seem to be contemplating the use of “as of” dating in situations intended to memorialize a prior event.
146. See also Melnick v. Comm’r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 741, 748 (2006) (involving a transaction where the documents suggested a “willingness to manipulate the relevant chronology in a way that does not enhance the credibility of petitioner’s evidence” where the court found that “[t]he ‘effective as of’ dating and backdating of relevant documents impede our review of the substance of the transactions . . . and lead us to conclude that the chronology reflected by those documents is not credible”).
147. A C corporation is a corporation not governed by Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 1361(a)(2) (2000). As such, a C corporation is treated as a separate taxpaying entity and subject to a corporate-level tax on its income. See id. § 11. In addition, the shareholders of a C corporation are normally taxed on dividends and other corporate distributions. See id. §§ 301, 302, 331 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
148. An S corporation is governed by Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code. See id. § 1361(a)(1) (2000). As such, the income of the S corporation is generally taxed directly to its shareholders, and no additional tax is normally imposed when earnings are distributed to shareholders. See I.R.C. §§ 1366– 68 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007); but see I.R.C. §§ 1374–75 (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (imposing corporate-level taxes on certain S corporations that were formerly C corporations).
149. See I.R.C. §§ 1366, 1377 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007). 150. Id. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1377-1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 2006) (treating seller of S corporation stock as owner of the shares for the day of disposition).
151. A partnership for tax purposes is an unincorporated enterprise governed by Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 761(a) (2000); see generally I.R.C. §§ 701–61 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007). The income of a partnership is taxed directly to its partners and no additional tax is normally imposed when partnership profits are distributed to the partners. See I.R.C. §§ 702, 705, 731, 733 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
152. See id. §§ 702, 704. For purposes of this Problem, assume that all agreed to allocations have “substantial economic effect.” See id. § 704(b) (2000).
153. See id. § 761(c) (defining partnership agreement as incorporating all amendments made by the fifteenth day of the fourth month after the close of the tax year); Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(c) (as amended in 1997) (allowing the partnership agreement to be modified with respect to a taxable year after the close of that taxable year but before the filing date for the partnership return). The government can be adversely affected when partners retroactively allocate income or deductions if the partners are taxed at different rates. See Moore v. Comm’r, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1275, 1284 (2007) (“A retroactive increase in [two members’] shares of LLC profits would have necessarily resulted in a retroactive decrease in [another member’s] share of those profits. Thus, aside from possible tax rate differentials among . . . the individuals (unsupported by any evidence in the record), the [Internal Revenue Service] . . . is indifferent as regards [to] the respective profit shares of each.”). Limits exist on the ability of partners to allocate retroactively profits and losses for any year in which a change in a partner’s interest in the partnership occurs. See I.R.C. § 706(d) (2000).
154. For example, daughter might have included the property as an asset on a December 31, 2009, financial statement that a bank relied on in granting daughter a loan.
156. See supra Part II.A.1.b (discussing when, as a matter of law, ownership is transferred).
157. See supra Problem 8. Problems 8–10 also raise the issue of whether the deed could be properly notarized under these circumstances, a subject beyond the scope of this Article.
158. The lawyer should also realize that this form of backdating might be enforced to the detriment of a party to the backdating. See supra note 86. Unless those parties agree to bear this risk, the lawyer could also be subject to claims by those parties.
Civil liability for aiding and abetting provides a cause of action that has been asserted with increasing frequency in cases of commercial fraud, state securities actions, hostile takeovers, and, most recently, in cases of businesses alleged to be supportive of terrorist activities. The U.S. Supreme Court, in its 1994 decision in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, ended decades of aiding and abetting liability in connection with federal securities actions. However, the doctrine since has flourished in suits arising from prominent commercial fraud cases, such as those concerning Enron Corporation and Parmalat, and even in federal securities cases some courts continue to impose relatively broad liability upon secondary actors. This article reviews Central Bank and its limitations, before turning to an analysis of the elements of civil liability for aiding and abetting fraud. The article then similarly identifies and analyzes the elements of liability for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, which predominantly concerns professionals, such as accountants and attorneys, that are alleged to have assisted wrongdoing by their principal. The analysis then examines aiding and abetting liability in the context of particular, frequently-occurring, factual matrices, including banking transactions, directors and officers, state securities actions, and terrorism. The article concludes by summarizing emerging principles evident from judicial decisions applying this very flexible and potent source of civil liability
I. Introduction
Allegations of corporate fraud and misdealing pervade the commercial marketplace. In a sequence that has become familiar, exposure of the primary fraud perpetrator leads swiftly to bankruptcy for a company later revealed to have been technically insolvent for months or years prior to the disclosure. When the debacle is reported, the bankrupt’s former auditor, investment bank and outside counsel know litigation soon may be at their door, even though they were not the primary actors in the alleged fraud. The principal concern? Secondary liability—increasingly based on the theory that the secondary actor aided and abetted fraud or other misconduct by the primary actor.
Liability for aiding and abetting is a doctrine with ancient roots that has sprouted new and significant offshoots during the last twenty years. During the 1980s the doctrine increasingly ensnared auditors and other professionals alleged to have facilitated misconduct by their clients. Significant relief for many securities industry participants came in 1994 when the U.S. Supreme Court, in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., held there is no cause of action for aiding and abetting violations of the Securities Exchange Act.1 But while one important basis for liability was cut off, claims of aiding and abetting, in areas such as breach of fiduciary duty, commercial fraud, and state law securities liability, steadily have increased. And terrorism, with its myriad facilitators and statutes providing compensation for victims, is a development that very soon may transform aiding and abetting law.
This article examines the current state of the law of civil liability for aiding and abetting, prefaced by a discussion of the doctrine’s origin in criminal law. Because of the still rippling effect of Central Bank, that 1994 opinion is analyzed, and the scope of its effect discussed. The hub of the article is an explanation of the legal elements of the civil causes of action for aiding and abetting fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, respectively. Whether there are four elements required for the tort, or potentially five or six, depends on the judicial forum, as will be shown. The article then shifts perspective and concludes with a discussion how the outcome may depend on the factual matrix and role of the defendant. We find that attorneys may have less to fear than corporate officers, for example, and, as the law develops, we see that terrorists’ associates may be subject to far-reaching liability.
Aiding-abetting law has adapted to emerging business torts and new variations of commercial misconduct though if it is part of a legal trend there is no unifying theme—other than adaptability itself. This article posits no such theme, but synthesizes common elements where they exist and identifies the doctrine’s many variations.
II. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS
Civil liability for aiding-abetting pre-existed such well-established doctrines as joint and several liability and product liability, as well as the modern concept of a duty of professional loyalty (which is now a frequent context for aiding-abetting claims). The antiquity of aiding-abetting liability has interested the courts in various important decisions, on occasion subtly deployed in support of broadened liability,2 while on other occasions leading to the conclusion that against the historical background a statute that fails to specify aiding-abetting liability cannot be deemed implicitly to provide for it.3 Consequently, the doctrine’s origins remain relevant even now.
A. ORIGIN IN CRIMINAL LAW
Criminal liability for aiding and abetting was codified in the sixth century by the Roman emperor Justinian,4 and in Anglo-American law has its origin in the ancient doctrine concerning accessories to crime.5 At common law, the inquiry concerning the liability of accessories to crime was plagued by “intricate” distinctions.6 Persons might be charged with a felony as: (i) principals in the first degree who actually perpetrated the offense; (ii) principals in the second degree who were actually or constructively present at the scene of the crime and aided and abetted its commission; (iii) accessories before the fact who aided and abetted the crime, although not present when it was committed, or; (iv) accessories after the fact who rendered assistance after the crime was complete.7
Though there is no federal common law of crimes, Congress in 1909 enacted what is now 18 U.S.C. § 2, a general aiding and abetting statute applicable to all federal criminal offenses.8 Under the statute, all those who knowingly provide aid to persons committing federal crimes, with the intent of facilitating the crime, are themselves committing a crime.9
In the civil liability context, secondary liability arising from concert of action, though probably incorporating some element of conspiracy between the primary and secondary actor, can be traced back at least 400 years.10 In the United States, liability for lending encouragement or aid to a tortfeasor is reported in cases appearing at least from the mid-nineteenth century.11 Many of the early reported cases of civil liability purely for aiding and abetting (that is, without any element of conspiracy) are said to have concerned “isolated acts of adolescents in rural society.”12
B. DISTINGUISHED FROM CONSPIRACY
Aiding-abetting and conspiracy have been regarded as “closely allied forms of liability.”13 However, a conspiracy generally requires an agreement as well as an overt act causing damage.14 Aiding and abetting does not require any agreement, but rather assistance given to the principal wrongdoer.15
Nevertheless, common to both conspiracy and aiding-abetting is “concerted wrongful action.”16 Because of this commonality, it has (erroneously) been said that evidence that would permit a reasonable finder of fact to conclude that defendants conspired to breach a duty necessarily must support a determination that defendants aided and abetted it by knowingly and substantially participating in a breach of such duty.17 However, an agreement with another to perpetrate wrongdoing is not the same thing as actively facilitating the act, and thus proof of mere agreement does not give rise to traditional aiding-abetting liability.18
Unlike a conspirator, an aider and abettor does not “‘adopt as his or her own’” the tort of the primary violator.19 Instead, the act of aiding and abetting “is distinct from the primary violation; liability attaches because the aider and abettor behaves in a manner that enables the primary violator to commit the underlying tort.”20 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has distinguished conspiracy from aiding and abetting by observing that a conspiracy consists of “concerted action by agreement” while aiding and abetting is “concerted action by substantial assistance.”21 To illustrate: When in baseball a pitcher strikes out a hitter the putout is the product of a prearranged conspiracy between the pitcher and the pitcher’s manager; by contrast, when fans heckle to distract the batter they do so absent any bilateral agreement and thus are aiding and abetting the pitcher, not conspiring with him.
Aiding and abetting is, in some instances, easier to establish than conspiracy. For example, while California law holds that one may not be subject to liability for conspiracy unless one owed a preexisting duty to the plaintiff, no such requirement exists with respect to aiding and abetting liability.22
C. NATIONWIDE ACCEPTANCE OF CIVIL LIABILITY FOR AIDING AND ABETTING
Of the jurisdictions that have addressed the doctrine of civil liability for aiding and abetting as set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS section 876(b), thirty permit a claim for aiding and abetting in some context.23 The Central Bank Court observed that courts in Georgia, Maine, Montana and Virginia had declined to recognize a cause of action for aiding and abetting fraud.24 Commentators have perceived a trend toward increased recognition,25 which probably is either (i) the inexorable progression (or expansion) of tort liability, (ii) the result of an increased perception that fraud actors often rely on accessories to perpetrate large-scale, complicated schemes, or (iii) both.
III. THE CENTRAL BANK DECISION: NO AIDING AND ABETTING CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
The current state and likely future development of the body of law of aiding and abetting cannot properly be understood without an analysis of the 1994 decision that performed a dramatic amputation: Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.26 There, the Supreme Court held that Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act does not create or support a private cause of action for aiding and abetting securities fraud.27 The reasoning of the decision has since been held applicable to other federal statutes, such as RICO, though it has been less persuasive in connection with state law remedies, including state “Blue Sky” laws.28 While the Central Bank decision provoked some controversy when it was decided, it generated considerably more seven years later when it came to light that secondary actors, such as Arthur Anderson, LLP, had played critical roles in facilitating multi-billion dollar securities frauds.
A. PRE-CENTRAL BANK FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW JURISPRUDENCE
One of the most important elements of Rule 10b-5 pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act is its statement of the proscribed conduct. Rule 10b-5 sets forth separately articulated proscriptions for fraud, deceit, misleading statements and fraudulent “devices,” “schemes” and “artifices.”29 Each subsection of the Rule prohibits slightly different conduct in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. The second subsection prohibits the making of a material misstatement or omission.30 The first and third subsections prohibit a person from employing a fraudulent device and engaging in conduct that “operates or would operate as a fraud.”31
Prior to Central Bank, a significant number of federal courts in nearly every circuit had held that an aider-abettor was subject to civil liability under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.32 Such liability was described as having been grounded in tort law, and as a “logical and natural complement” to the private right of action under section 10(b), furthering the “maintenance of a post-issuance securities market that is free from fraudulent practices.”33 Consequently, entities such as financial advisors to corporations,34 auditors of a brokerage firm,35 accounting firms providing tax opinions on which investors relied,36 corporate insiders interested in the sale of securities of a parent company,37 and corporations themselves38 had been held subject to potential liability for aiding and abetting federal securities fraud. Perhaps because of the agreement among federal circuits as to aiding and abetting liability for securities fraud, the issue did not reach the Supreme Court until nearly sixty years after enactment of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.
B. REASONING OF CENTRAL BANKOPINION
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly . . . (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest to the protection of investors.”39 Aiding and abetting was not, however, expressly made unlawful in the 1934 Act.
In Central Bank, the majority opinion observed that Congress had not enacted a general civil aiding and abetting statute, “either for suits by the Government (when the Government sues for civil penalties or injunctive relief ) or for suits by private parties.” The Court held that when Congress enacts a statute under which a person may sue and recover damages from a private defendant for the defendant’s violation of some statutory norm, one cannot presume Congress intended to create a cause of action for aiders and abettors.40 And while Congress had amended the securities laws more than once during a period when courts were interpreting section 10(b) to cover aiding and abetting, the Court regarded this alleged “acquiescence” as “inconclusive evidence” of what Congress intended.41
The Court, did, however, speculate as to policy reasons why Congress may not have wished to allow for aiding and abetting liability:
[T]he rules for determining aiding and abetting liability are unclear, in “an area that demands certainty and predictability.” [citation omitted]. That leads to the undesirable result of decisions “made on an ad hoc basis, offering little predictive value” to those who provide services to participants in the securities business . . . . Because of the uncertainty of the governing rules, entities subject to secondary liability as aiders and abettors may find it prudent and necessary, as a business judgment, to abandon substantial defenses and to pay settlements in order to avoid the expense and risk of going to trial.42
Accordingly, “newer and smaller companies may find it difficult to obtain advice from professionals . . . .” Further, “the increased costs incurred by professionals because of the litigation and settlement costs under 10b-5,” the Court commented, might be “passed on to their client companies, and in turn incurred by the company’s investors, who were the intended beneficiaries of the statute.”43 Further, Congress had declined to enact a general statute to authorize public or private civil suits against aiders and abettors.44
Therefore, in a decision often regarded as unfortunate in public policy terms because of the apparent upsurge in large-scale commercial misconduct subsequently associated with it—though its interpretation of the Securities Exchange Act remains largely unscathed45—the Court held there is no cause of action under section 10(b) for aiding and abetting securities fraud.46
C. POST-CENTRAL BANK SECURITIES FRAUD LIABILITY
Significantly, the Central Bank Court explained that the absence of aiding-abetting liability under Section 10(b) did not mean secondary actors were insulated from liability under the securities laws. Any individual or company who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under Rule 10b-5.47 In Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation),48 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that corporate advisors can be deemed “participants” in a fraud if they created transactions with the knowledge that those transactions might mislead investors.49
Seeking recourse against companies that often are the only solvent entities among those responsible for their losses, plaintiffs increasingly have alleged “primary liability” for conduct which, some have contended, the judicial system previously considered a secondary (that is, aiding and abetting) violation.50 It has been said in this regard:
Arguably, many of the recent “scheme” cases are attempts to revive aiding and abetting under a different name. Under the scheme theory, a person who substantially participates in a manipulative or deceptive scheme can incur primary liability, even if the fraudulent statements linking the scheme to the securities markets are made by others. But this sounds like a reformulation of the “substantial assistance” element of an aiding and abetting claim.51
It has, however, been observed that during the thirty years in which aiding-abetting liability was recognized, courts generally failed to establish clear distinctions between conduct giving rise to aiding-abetting liability and conduct giving rise to primary liability.52
In the decade following Central Bank, plaintiffs alleging inadequate disclosure by a securities issuer not uncommonly have included claims that third party professionals knowingly or recklessly assisted or participated in the preparation of an issuer’s alleged misrepresentations or omissions. Such conduct, plaintiffs maintain, is sufficient for a violation of Rule 10b-5 even after Central Bank, because the violator was a primary offender (even if others were more directly responsible).53
The controversy concerns a distinction between claims that professionals “knowingly provided ‘substantial assistance’ to the issuer in preparing allegedly misleading communications to investors (which constitutes aiding and abetting) and claims that professionals knowingly ‘participated’ in the making of those communications (which plaintiffs have claimed to be sufficient for an independent violation).”54 Certainly, primary responsibility for a violation of Rule 10b-5 contemplates more than simple assistance in the dissemination of misstatements and omissions.55 For example, an outside accountant probably only aids and abets a violation of Rule 10b-5 if the accountant merely physically compiles and delivers placement memoranda to a brokerage firm, even if this is done after an officer of the issuer tells the accountant the memoranda contains material misstatements.
The Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits apply a relatively strict “attribution” test that requires the “making” of a statement. These courts have held that a secondary actor cannot incur liability under Rule 10b-5 for a statement not attributed to that actor at the time of its dissemination. Mere “review and approval” is not sufficient.56 The Second Circuit has explained that because “‘[r]eliance only on representations made by others cannot itself form the basis of liability’ ” for securities fraud, “a secondary actor cannot incur primary liability under the Act for a statement not attributed to that actor at the time of its dissemination.”57 The Third Circuit, moreover, has held that a securities fraud plaintiff must allege “a more exacting threshold of scienter—‘a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud . . .’”58 Failing that, the plaintiff must alternatively show “‘highly unreasonable (conduct) involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care’ . . . which presents a danger of misleading buyers and sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.”59
The Ninth Circuit has followed a less rigorous standard—the “substantial participation test”—under which actors may be primarily liable under section 10(b) for statements attributable to others if the actor “significantly participated” in generation of the statement.60 In In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Securities Litigation, it was alleged, sufficiently to state a claim, that the accountants and underwriters knowingly had “assisted” in defrauding investors in violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by issuing a misleading securities prospectus.61 Notably, in Newby v. Enron Corp., the district court relied substantially on a liability standard urged by the SEC.62 There, the SEC stated that primary Section 10(b) liability can attach to secondary actors if they created fraudulent documents, irrespective of whether misrepresentations to the public were publicly attributable to the secondary actor. The district court applied this test and denied motions to dismiss brought by Arthur Andersen, the Vinson & Elkins law firm, and others.63 The “substantial participation” test arguably bears a resemblance to traditional aiding and abetting liability though it requires participation in the actual offense, whereas aiding and abetting liability does not.
After Global Crossing, Worldcom and Enron followed one another in alarming fashion (having been foreshadowed by less celebrated but hardly less fraudulent schemes involving Sunbeam Corporation, Bennett Funding, Inc., and others), some predicted Congress soon would act to “restore” aider-abettor liability to section 10(b).64 Congress has not done so, however, notwithstanding the arguably indispensable role played by bond underwriters, accountants and law firms in the perpetuation of certain securities frauds. Imposition of liability on those actors for securities fraud is left, therefore, to state securities acts, and common law principles of aiding and abetting, the requisites of which are discussed below, both in the context of securities violations and other misconduct.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS OF CIVIL LIABILITY FOR AIDING AND ABETTING
Aiding and abetting liability concerns, to a significant extent, a particular state of mind. The plaintiff must show whether the defendant intended to facilitate wrongdoing. However, the analysis may, in a departure from general tort principles, consider not merely intent, but motive. Did the alleged aider-abettor have a noteworthy, perhaps undue, pecuniary interest in the consummation of the fraud or misdealing?
More broadly, the judicial decisions explore what the defendant knew regarding the misconduct, for none would argue that one who has unwittingly held the door for the bank robber intended to aid and abet through such assistance. And assistance (when knowledge of the misconduct is shown) also receives a careful inquiry, which differs from the usual tort analysis in that such “assistance” need not proximately cause any injury, in the traditional sense; rather, it must meet standards unique to aiding and abetting liability principles, as discussed below.
A. AIDING AND ABETTING FRAUD
Under the law of most states, a party may be regarded as an “aider and abettor of fraud if the following requirements are satisfied:65
(1) the existence of an underlying fraud;
(2) knowledge of this fraud on the part of the aider and abettor, and;
(3) substantial assistance by the aider and abettor in perpetration of the fraud.66
It also has been held that one may be subject to aiding-abetting liability if one “gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and the person’s own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.”67
An aider and abettor of a fraud is regarded as equally responsible, in terms of civil liability, with the perpetrators of the scheme. However, because aiders and abettors, unlike conspirators, do not agree to commit, and are not subject to liability as joint tortfeasors for committing, the underlying tort, they may be subject to liability irrespective of whether they owed to the plaintiff the same duty as the primary violator.68
1. Existence of Underlying Fraud
The plaintiff must allege and prove that it has been defrauded or otherwise victimized by tortious conduct by one other than the aiding-abetting defendant. If the claim is for aiding and abetting fraud, then the elements of fraud must be alleged with the requisite specificity,69 though the other elements of aiding and abetting ordinarily are subject to a liberal notice pleading standard, pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.70
Because the primary actor may not be party to the case, establishing the primary wrong may be a particular challenge.71 The plaintiff may need independently to build the case against the perpetrator for fraud while at the same time establishing its liability claim against the defendant. The plaintiff ’s task is of course simplified where the defendant, as sometimes it must, is compelled to admit the underlying misconduct was fraudulent.72
2. Aider-Abettor’s Knowledge of the Fraud
In order adequately to plead “knowledge” (or scienter) in an aiding and abetting fraud claim, it has been held the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support a “strong inference of fraudulent intent.”73 Plaintiffs may support such an inference (i) by alleging facts showing a motive for participating in a fraudulent scheme and a clear opportunity to do so, or (ii) by identifying circumstances indicative of conscious behavior.74
In one case, for example, a bankrupt company alleged that an ex-director of another company (Bioshield) had aided and abetted the acts of a current officer (Moses) in subverting a planned merger.75 Moses and the ex-director, Elfersy, originally were officers of Bioshield, the prospective partner to the merger. Moses allegedly had fraudulently represented to plaintiff that Bioshield’s board (including Elfersy) had approved the merger.76 Prior to the consummation of the merger, however, Elfersy quit Bioshield, and ultimately voted his shares against the merger. Plaintiff sued Elfersy individually for having aided and abetted alleged fraud by Bioshield in the merger negotiations.
However, the only evidence cited by plaintiff in its opposition to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was the fact that Elfersy had continued to do some work for Bioshield after his resignations from the Board of Directors and as an officer. (Elfersy had continued to advise Bioshield concerning patent, technological and scientific matters). The court concluded that no reasonable juror could draw from that fact an inference that Elfersy was aware of Moses’s alleged misstatements concerning the prospects of the merger, or that Elfersy and Moses even discussed the proposed merger. Furthermore, though Elfersy may have had his own economic interests in mind that was not alone sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement.77
More expansive holdings, however, abound. Courts have found direct proof of scienter, or facts sufficient to permit the requisite inference, to have been evidenced by (a) knowledge of wrongdoing, (b) motive on the part of the alleged aiderabettor, or, occasionally, by (c) reckless disregard by the aider-abettor of information that it was facilitating wrongful acts, as discussed more fully below.
(a) Knowledge of Wrongdoing
Commentators have stated that the knowledge of wrongdoing requirement means the aider-abettor must do more than merely provide assistance: he or she must have known the nature of the act being assisted. “The defendant’s knowledge that he is providing assistance or encouragement to another’s action by no means establishes the defendant must also possess knowledge that the other’s act is wrongful (the ‘factual knowledge’ requirement).”78 Thus, for example, one who happened to promote a fraudulent investment scheme without knowledge the scheme is fraudulent, hoping to secure commissions, ordinarily is not subject to liability. The Fifth Circuit has stated that “[a] remote party must not only be aware of his role, but he should also know when and to what degree he is furthering the fraud.”79
Knowledge of the fraud must be pled by stating how the defendant knew of the wrongdoing. It has been held that a complaint must contain factual allegations either stating directly or implying that those dealing with the tortfeasor knew or should have known the tortfeasor was breaching a duty to the victim.80 Allegations that defendants “have aided and abetted and are aiding and abetting” the defendants, accompanied only be a broad characterization of the transaction as a “plan or scheme,” have been deemed insufficient.81 Rather, courts look for defendant’s usage of “atypical” business procedures, as well as prolonged involvement with the fraud actor, and motive.
In bank fraud cases, defendant’s use of atypical banking procedures is a judicially recognized basis for an inference of “knowledge” the bank is aiding another’s misconduct. In a leading case, Neilson v. Union Bank of California, N.A.,82 the complaint adequately pled knowledge by alleging the banks utilized atypical banking procedures to service the perpetrator’s accounts, raising an inference they knew of the Ponzi scheme and sought to accommodate it by altering their normal ways of doing business. “This supports the general allegations of knowledge.”83 The court rejected the bank’s argument that the complaint did not allege that the bank knew particular victims were being defrauded, given that the complaint alleged the banks must be deemed to have known that the perpetrator was defrauding all his clients.84 This conclusion is consistent with the Second Circuit’s view, that “[p]roof of a defendant’s knowledge or intent will often be inferential.”85
For insight into the “knowledge” prong, the facts in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Leahey Construction Co.86 are instructive. There, Keybank was found liable for aiding and abetting its borrower’s defrauding of a surety, Aetna. The borrower had fraudulently induced Aetna to act as its surety by obtaining a four-day loan from Keybank in order to mislead Aetna into believing that the capitalization requirements for issuance of Aetna’s bond had been met. The court found that the requisite knowledge on the part of the bank was shown by the following circumstances:
1. The bank had known the principal for five years and on several occasions had assisted the principal in obtaining loans for bonding purposes;
2. The bank understood that the principal’s entrance into commercial construction would “require[ ] special bonding” and that as a result the principal had been “putting funds into the business”;
3. The bank’s own documents revealed that prior to issuance of the subject loan it was informed by the principal that the purpose of the loan was “to obtain approval from a new bonding company”;
4. A bank memo revealed that even though the loan was classified as a thirty-day agreement, the principal intended to repay it just two days after the month-end that the surety was examining for credit purposes.87
Notably, the four-day loan in Leahy was an unusual transaction and thus easily gave rise to an inference the bank knew what was going on. Courts have held that: “A party who engages in atypical business transactions . . . may be found liable as an aider and abettor with a minimal showing of knowledge.”88
A contrasting result is found in Ryan v. Hunton & Williams,89 where plaintiffs failed adequately to plead “actual knowledge” by Chase Manhattan Bank of its depositor’s Ponzi scheme notwithstanding allegations that (1) Chase suspected the perpetrator was running an “advance fee scheme”; (2) Chase knew the perpetrator had defrauded it on another matter, and; (3) Chase had shut down the account of a cohort of the perpetrator because of a bounced check. “Allegations that [Chase] suspected fraudulent activity,” the court held, “do not raise an inference of actual knowledge” of the fraud.90 Similarly, knowledge on one’s part of past misconduct by the fraud actor, without more, ordinarily will not give rise to liability for rendering assistance.91
Substantial familiarity over an extended period with the course of conduct relating to the scheme at issue also may support a reasonable inference of “knowledge.” In Jaguar Cars, Inc. v. Royal Oaks Motor Car Co.,92 the alleged aider-abettor’s son directed the fraudulent scheme, but it was the father’s “experience and active participation in the . . . dealership, combined with the extent of the fraud,” that presented a sufficient basis for imposition of aiding-abetting liability.93 The evidence of the father’s control over the dealership, included his having (1) spent significant time there, (2) reviewed the financial statements, and (3) discussed the dealership’s operations on a daily basis with his son, “the architect” of the fraudulent scheme “combined with evidence of the pervasive nature of the fraudulent scheme.”94 These facts allowed the jury to find the father liable for aiding and abetting the predicate acts of mail fraud.
In Leahey, the court observed that there is “no conflict between the position that an aider and abettor must have actual knowledge of the primary party’s wrongdoing and the statement that it is enough for the aider and abettor to have a general awareness of its role in the other’s tortious conduct for liability to attach.”95 However, allegations that a bank (which had financed a fraud actor) merely “suspected” fraudulent activity would not satisfy the actual knowledge requirement.96 And “actual knowledge” is not established by the mere allegation of the aider-abettor’s knowledge that an audit was not conducted properly.97
(b) Relevance of Motive
An inference supporting requisite scienter (knowledge of the fraud) on the aider-abettor’s part may be established by facts showing a motive for participating in the fraudulent scheme and the clear opportunity to do so.98 Thus, in criminal law, for example, knowledge of wrongdoing may be inferred on the part of one who lends a car to a bank robber if the facts show the individual solicited an inordinate amount of money in exchange for lending the car.99 Aiding and abetting gross negligence was held actionable, for example, in a case where the defendants were attorneys who had advised an S&L institution that later failed.100 In that case the court ruled that whereas mere unknowing participation in another’s wrongful act does not subject one to liability the requirement of knowledge may be less strict where the alleged aider and abettor derives “benefits” (such as attorney’s fees) from the wrongdoing.101
California courts have suggested that, in addition to the conventional elements for aiding-abetting, a plaintiff also must allege the defendant participated in the breach for reasons of its own financial gain or advantage.102 In Neilson, however, the court held that statements in prior decisions—to the effect that a true aider-abettor is one “reaping the benefit”—should not be regarded as adding an element to the tort.103 Rather, the financial gain emphasized in aiding-abetting decisions is evidence the aider-abettor knew of and substantially assisted the primary violator’s breach of fiduciary duty.104 A profit motive supports an inference of knowing participation, but is not itself an element of the tort.
(c) “Reckless Disregard” Equating to “Awareness” of Misconduct
A literal “actual knowledge” standard may be overly restrictive given the inherent difficulty of pleading the state of mind of a defendant.105 So, it occasionally has been held that, unlike a cause of action for conspiracy, the knowledge requirement for aiding and abetting liability may be satisfied by proof that a defendant acted recklessly.106 Where facts are known to the defendant from which the conclusion objectively follows that a fraud is being perpetrated (and assisted by defendant), aider-abettor liability may exist even if the defendant lacked “actual knowledge.”107 It is questionable, however, whether reckless disregard satisfies the “knowledge” requirement under New York law, at least outside of cases in which the actor owed the plaintiff a fiduciary duty.108 Federal cases in New York, home to the financial industry, not infrequently have gravitated toward insulating financial institutions and professionals from charges of having facilitated financial fraud.109
“Reckless disregard,” in jurisdictions other than New York, has been found where the actor was “deliberately indifferent” to the propagation of the fraud scheme.110 “Reckless disregard” is not, however, evidenced by “mere suspicion,” but rather requires proof the aider-abettor ignored obvious “danger signals.”111 In this regard, it has been held that even if a defendant “should have discovered” the fraud and could have done so by duly exploring financial questions, liability will not attach absent recklessness.112
In Geman v. Securities Exchange Commission,113 a brokerage firm began an undisclosed practice of executing trades as principal with its brokerage customers. The firm without notice ceased reporting to its customers trades executed as “principal” and customers later sued on the ground the trades had been concealed from them and disadvantaged them.114 The Court observed that Geman, the alleged aider-abettor, “clearly was aware of the cessation of reporting under the former system and, with his extensive background and experience, surely knew that an alternative reporting practice [to disclose the trades on which the brokerage acted as purchaser of customers’ securities] was necessary (which he does not deny).” Notwithstanding this awareness, Geman “took no steps to ensure that— or inquire whether—[the firm] was making alternative arrangements to satisfy record keeping obligations.” Geman’s simple “inaction,” which the court regarded as “reckless,” was sufficient to support the finding that he willfully aided and abetted the firm’s record keeping violations.115
Similarly, where a bank’s cashiers “cashed so many checks for such large amounts without verification” from the owner of a currency exchange, that evidence could support a finding that the cashiers, but not the owner (who had safeguarding procedures in place which his employees disregarded), acted recklessly.116 Defendants cannot, it is plain, rely on an “ostrich defense,” even where plaintiff finds it difficult or impossible to allege facts showing conscious appreciation of a particular wrongdoing against a specific victim.
3. “Substantial Assistance”
Mere knowledge of the underlying misconduct is insufficient to give rise to aider-abettor liability.117 The aider-abettor must also knowingly facilitate commission by the principal actor of the primary fraud. Generally speaking, the most common reason for failure on the part of plaintiffs seeking to establish aider-abettor liability for fraud is the absence of sufficient facts to demonstrate that the defendant “substantially assisted” the fraud.
Commentary to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 876 identifies five relevant factors for evaluating whether encouragement or assistance was “substantial.” Traditional factors include: (1) the nature of the act encouraged; (2) the amount and kind of assistance given; (3) the defendant’s relation to the tortious actor, and; (4) the defendant’s state of mind.118 In addition to these criteria, some courts have indicated another factor: the “duration of the assistance provided.”119 These factors may establish “affirmative assistance”—the surest basis for liability—or may indicate aiding of fraudulent concealment or “wrongful inaction,” which are less certain predicates for liability, as discussed below.
(a) Affirmative Assistance
Some courts have set the standard for “affirmative assistance” relatively high. For example, a federal court in New York has held that even “affirmative actions of opening [bank accounts for the perpetrators], approving various transfers, and then closing the accounts on the basis of suspected fraud, without more, do not constitute substantial assistance.”120 In Leahey, by contrast, the court found that Keybank’s making of a questionable loan enabled the fraud principal to “verify” to the surety that he had complied with its first funding request, thereby establishing an indispensable level of credibility the primary actor required to obtain a bond from plaintiff.121 Thus, for some courts even the mere act of lending money or otherwise transacting business with the fraud actor may give rise to aider-abettor status if the institution knows the loan or other transaction will assist the fraudulent scheme.122
Affirmative assistance also has been deemed adequately pled where a weather derivatives trading company knowingly agreed to pay any proceeds obtained under dummy policies in order to conceal from an insurer the existence of reinsurance policies.123 There, aiding and abetting was adequately alleged with respect to a broker who, apart from being the perpetrator of the scheme, also was a principal owner and chairman of the alleged aider and abettor. Similarly, in Unicredito, aider-abettor liability adequately was premised on allegations that financial institutions helped form the various special purpose entities and financing structures that were used to hide Enron’s debt.124 By contrast, relatively few decisions have found affirmative assistance to exist where the affirmative acts of the defendant consist solely of providing financing.125 Usually, courts require evidence that the alleged aider-abettor wished to bring about the fraud and sought by its actions to make it succeed: “Mere negative acquiescence in the fraud is insufficient.”126
Recently the Second Circuit decided Sharp International Corp. v. State Street Bank and Trust Co.,127 a case that concerned efforts by a lender to extricate itself from bad loans extended to the alleged fraud actors, former officers of Sharp International. There, the complaint pled five acts by State Street Bank and Trust Company that were alleged to satisfy the standard of either inducement or rendering aid to the breach of duty, which consisted of a scheme to cause new and unwitting lenders to lend sums to Sharp, thus concealing debt and perpetuating a fraud on Sharp’s noteholders.128
State Street Bank allegedly had demanded that Sharp, its borrower, obtain new sources of financing to retire the State Street debt. However, the court held that the demand for repayment of a bona fide debt was not, alone, a “corrupt inducement that would create aider and abettor liability.”129 But Sharp’s trustee in bankruptcy further alleged the bank had concealed its knowledge of the fraud of Sharp, elected not to foreclose on the loan, and avoided the noteholders’ repeated attempts to contact the bank in order to discuss the Sharp credit. Nevertheless, the court held that all of these allegations were merely omissions or failures to act. “Substantial assistance occurs when a defendant affirmatively assists, helps conceal or fails to act when required to do so, thereby enabling the breach to occur.”130
Sharp’s trustee in bankruptcy did allege one affirmative act; namely, that State Street Bank participated in the fraud by providing contractually required consent: the bank gave Sharp its express written consent to the noteholders’ purchase of an additional $25 million of subordinated notes. When it gave this consent, it allegedly knew the noteholders were purchasing these notes in reliance on Sharp’s fraudulent representations concerning the accuracy of its financial statements. The bank also allegedly knew that absent its consent, the transaction would not be consummated. The court held, however, that the bank’s consent was mere “forbearance”; it did no more than remove a contractual impediment the bank had the right to invoke or not in its own interest.131 In language that manages to be enigmatic yet revealing, the court explained:
The nub of the complaint is that State Street knew that there would likely be victims of the [Sharp officer’s] fraud, and arranged not to be among them. On the one hand, this seems repugnant; on the other hand, [the] discovery that Sharp was rife with fraud was an asset of State Street, and State Street had a fiduciary duty to use that asset to protect its own shareholders [from the consequences of its own bad loan], if it legally could. One could say that State Street failed to tell someone that his coat was on fire or one could say that it simply grabbed a seat when it heard the music stop. The moral analysis contributes little.132
The allegations amounted to nothing more, the Court concluded, than that State Street Bank was “in a position to blow the whistle on the [Sharp officers’] fraud, but did not; instead, State Street arranged to extricate itself from the risk.”133
Why the Sharp noteholders’ allegations do not describe aiding and abetting of fraud was not fully explained by the court. “Moral analysis” aside, the allegations described some degree of knowing facilitation by State Street of the Sharp officers’ fraud, though perhaps in circumstances the court regarded as protected by State Street’s obligation to protect its shareholders’ interests. It may also have been important to the Second Circuit that there was no allegation of “atypical barking procedures,” nor special services, provided in order to assist the fraud.
“Substantial assistance” also may take the form of inducement.134 “Inducement” is “[t]he act or process of enticing or persuading another person to take a certain course of action.”135 Thus, if one persuades the perpetrator to engage in misconduct one may be subject to liability even if that is the only act done in furtherance of the fraud.136 Few defendants will slip up and reveal evidence of inducement, so inducement cases are rare, though highly effective when they can be supported.
The duration of the defendant’s involvement with the primary actor may weigh in favor of liability. Where the fraud has involved a course of conduct occurring over an extended period of time or a series of transactions, it may not be necessary to include detailed allegations of the facts of each transaction of the fraudulent scheme.137 “The length of time an alleged aider-abettor has been involved with a tortfeasor almost certainly affects the quality and extent of their relationships and probably influences the amount of aid provided as well; additionally, it may afford evidence of the defendant’s state of mind.”138 Of course, an extended period of contact without assistance of wrongdoing weighs against liability.139
(b) Aiding Concealment
Most successful fraud claims involve active misrepresentations, as opposed to concealment, because many jurisdictions do not recognize fraudulent concealment absent a duty to disclose or other special circumstances.140 Where, however, a defendant has encouraged another to rely on the defendant (or on the perpetrator), concealment legally may be equivalent to misrepresentation, and in such cases aider and abettor liability may follow, though under a different analysis.
For example, in 2003, in connection with the Enron scandal, a United States district court sitting in New York issued the first decision holding financial institutions potentially culpable with respect to the Enron Ponzi scheme. In Unicredito, the court held “substantial assistance” was adequately pled where the plaintiffs alleged that financial institutions knowingly participated in and helped structure the transactions “that enabled Enron to distort its public financial statements, specifically with respect to Enron’s revenues and its ratio of balance sheet debt to balance sheet capital.”141 These actions aided Enron’s efforts to conceal from its fraud victims debts that should have been reflected on Enron’s balance sheet. The Unicredito decision cogently recognizes that some types of structured financing arrangements may play an indispensable role in facilitating corporate fraud.142
(c) Enabling Fraud to Proceed by Failing to Speak When Obligated
Mere inaction, even with knowledge of another’s wrongdoing, usually is insufficient to give rise to aider-abettor liability. However, an important exception exists when the circumstances gave rise to a duty to warn, advise, counsel, or instruct the plaintiff.
Courts have stated that in certain cases of fraud aiding-abetting status may not depend on whether the party assisted the primary tortfeasor by direct advice or support, but on whether the actor was obligated to disclose or halt another’s wrongdoing discovered in the performance of customary business activities. For example, where the defendant breached a governmentally imposed (and public) obligation to disclose information to the Internal Revenue Service, which was alleged to have caused plaintiff to be misled, the defendant was subject to liability as aider and abettor.143 However, a law firm’s failure to disclose its client’s insolvency and inability to fulfill future obligations did not create liability for aiding and abetting fraud. Given that the law firm had no duty to disclose the information, its silence was not “substantial assistance” under Massachusetts law.144
In most jurisdictions, aider-abettor status based solely on non-disclosure by the defendant probably can be established only when the defendant had a confidential or fiduciary relationship with the victim. “Absent a confidential or fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and the aider and abettor, the inaction of the latter does not constitute substantial assistance warranting aider and abettor liability.”145 Thus, a lending institution, at least one court has said, ordinarily has no duty to disclose merely based on its status as a lender.146
One group of investors alleged, in the context of federal securities law, that a surety for an investment trust owed the investors a duty of disclosure (the breach of which gave rise to aider-abettor status).147 However, the court declined to hold such a duty existed where (1) the parties had relatively the same access to the information to be disclosed; (2) the financial benefit and risk was roughly equivalent, and (3) the defendant was not aware plaintiff was relying on it to provide the information.148
(d) Sliding Scale Approach
In civil aiding-abetting cases, the Second Circuit employs a “sliding scale approach,” effectively requiring a higher degree of intent when the level of assistance is slight.149 “The sliding scale, or in-tandem, analysis has been proposed as a way of dealing with the difficulty of proving the knowledge and substantial assistance elements.”150 Where all that is alleged is “mere inaction,” the intent requirement “scales upward,” and plaintiffs have the additional burden of showing that the assistance rendered by such inaction is “‘both substantial and knowing,’ in other words, ‘there must be something close to an actual intent to aid in fraud’ . . .”151
This analysis has been said to require that “the second and third elements of the test for civil aiding and abetting liability be analyzed in tandem.”152 “In tandem” signifies that where there is relatively good proof of the defendant’s general awareness of the alleged wrongful activity, then relatively less evidence of substantial assistance may be required, and vice-versa.153 A number of courts, in addition to those in the Second Circuit, have employed the “sliding scale” analysis.154
4. Causation
Causation is an essential element of an aiding and abetting claim. “Substantial assistance” requires the plaintiff to plead that the actions of the aider-abettor “proximately caused” the harm on which the primary liability is predicated.155 However, such causation has been interpreted to mean the injury was “a directly reasonably foreseeable result of the conduct.”156 Some courts have held the plaintiff must demonstrate the aider and abettor provided assistance that was a substantial factor in causing the harm suffered.157 But courts have not generally held that there must be an indisputable “but for” relationship between (i) the assistance rendered, and (ii) the harm to plaintiff.
Loss causation also will need to be established between the primary fraud and the victim’s losses.158 Thus, if plaintiff ’s harm was not proximately caused by the primary actor’s wrongdoing, no further inquiry is needed.
B. AIDING AND ABETTING BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
Fiduciary duties exist on the part of such persons as attorneys, trust administrators, and director and officers.159 Such parties are often claimed to have failed to uphold their duties of loyalty. Consequently, while fraud constitutes the largest source of aiding and abetting claims, breaches of fiduciary duty are close behind. As is not infrequent in the case of fraud, the perpetrator of the breach of fiduciary duty may be an individual or small company with little resources, whereas the aider-abettor may be a large institution with deep pockets.
In order to recover for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) a fiduciary duty on the part of the primary wrongdoer, (2) a breach of this duty, (3) knowledge of the breach by the alleged aider and abettor, and (4) the aider and abettor’s substantial assistance or encouragement of the wrongdoing.”160 Eighteen states have recognized a cause of action for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty.161
Below we discuss the “knowledge” and “substantial assistance” elements in the context of breach of fiduciary duty cases.
1. Knowledge
Knowledge on the part of the aider-abettor that a fiduciary relationship was being breached can adequately be pled by allegations that a fiduciary relationship existed, that the defendant knew of it, and that the defendant knew it was being breached.162 In the context of aiding and abetting, having “knowledge” of the underlying misconduct has been held to mean “[a]n awareness or understanding of a fact or circumstance; a state of mind in which a person has no substantial doubt about the existence of a fact.”163
One court rejected a “constructive knowledge” standard in the context of aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, and required instead the following instruction:
[T]o act knowingly means to act with actual knowledge. This means that [plaintiff ] must prove [defendant] knew two things: That [defendant] owed a fiduciary duty to [plaintiff ], and that [defendant] was breaching that duty. It is not enough for [plaintiff ] to show that [defendant] would have known these things if it had exercised reasonable care.”164
The court noted, however, that plaintiff is not required to show the defendant acted with an intent to harm the plaintiff.165
A notable recent breach of fiduciary duty case, employing a relatively liberal standard, is Higgins v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.166 This dispute arose out of the merger, announced in April 2005, between the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and Archipelago Holdings, LLC, through which the New York Stock Exchange would become a publicly traded company. Plaintiffs alleged that the terms of the merger agreement heavily and unfairly favored existing shareholders of Archipelago over the NYSE owners.167
The CEO of NYSE, defendant Thain, was allegedly self-interested in the merger, based on his financial involvements with defendant Goldman Sachs, a brokerage house that also was a major shareholder in Archipelago. It was alleged that Thain slanted the proposed merger agreement in favor of Archipelago for the ultimate benefit of Goldman Sachs and himself (as a large Goldman Sachs shareholder).168
Plaintiffs noted that Goldman Sachs was retained by both the NYSE and Archipelago to act as a “facilitator” in exploring a potential combination, and to provide various financial services, notwithstanding that Goldman Sachs had substantial relations with Archipelago. The decision to retain Goldman Sachs to advise NYSE in the merger was approved by the NYSE board and by CEO Thain, who refused to recuse himself from the decision despite his close ties to Goldman Sachs and his fiduciary duties to the NYSE, which, according to the complaint, prohibits directors from deliberating in a matter in which they are personally interested.169 Plaintiffs alleged that in order to structure a deal that benefited Archipelago, Goldman Sachs provided “substantial assistance” to NYSE defendants in breaching their fiduciary duties by exerting its influence through Thain, its former CEO, as well as through a former NYSE Director and current Goldman Sachs CEO and other Goldman Sachs-affiliated NYSE directors who were “overly accommodating” to Goldman Sachs in order to structure a deal that benefited Archipelago.170
Goldman Sachs contended that it was insulated from charges of aiding-abetting breach of fiduciary duty by an “engagement letter,” which stipulated that the NYSE “understands and acknowledges that [Goldman Sachs is] rendering services to the [NYSE] and to Archipelago in connection with a Transaction. [NYSE] understands that potential conflicts of interest or a perception thereof, may arise as a result of our rendering services to both the Company and Archipelago.”171
The court rejected Goldman Sachs’ argument, holding that the disclosure of the conflict by no means compels the conclusion that Goldman Sachs did not aid and abet the NYSE defendant’s breach of fiduciary duty, as alleged by plaintiffs.172 Ironically, the letter established Goldman Sachs’ knowledge of the conflicts; and those conflicts may of course have constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. The court deemed legally sufficient plaintiffs’ allegations that Goldman Sachs substantially assisted the NYSE in breaching its fiduciary duties by “exerting its influence through its former CEO, Thain, and other Goldman Sachs-affiliated directors, in order to structure a deal that benefited Archipelago.”173
“Knowledge” that an insider was breaching his or her fiduciary duty to the company requires a relatively high level off awareness. “Red flags” may not be enough. A recent and illustrative case of “red flags” involved a precious metals trading company that had opened a revolving line of credit with the defendant bank, secured by an inventory of precious metals. The bank knew the trading company was in the business of selling precious metals as a dealer, and had other knowledge of how the trading company’s president disposed of assets (ultimately leading to the company’s demise), but, according to the court, lacked knowledge of the president’s breach of duty.174
The complaint alleged that when the defendant bank decided to end its own metals financing program, it had looked for alternative lenders to assume the loans it had extended to dealers. The plaintiff trading company was urged by brokers, who may or may not have been acting at the bank’s behest, to become a successor lender with respect to the bank’s existing borrowers. The trading company agreed, and ultimately assumed approximately 200 of the bank’s loans so that by 1993 it had a total loan balance of $17.5M and, importantly, should have held $24.4M in collateral posted by those lenders. However, the company’s president, Clark, secretly had been misappropriating these assets, selling off the precious metal collateral in the company’s daily operations, according to the complaint.175
As these “take-out” loans were paid off by the trading company, the bank disposed of the collateral, per directions from Clark, typically returning it to the control of Clark (ostensibly acting for the trading company). Clark sold all or nearly all of the metals the bank transferred to the trading company, frequently to purchase additional loans from the bank, as well as metals futures contracts. However, when the price of silver rose in 1993, the company lost a large sum, was unable to purchase enough metals to replace the collateral it had sold, and filed for bankruptcy.176
The trading company’s trustee in bankruptcy sued the bank, alleging it had aided and abetted Clark’s breach of fiduciary duty to the company. The court held, however, that the trustee needed to come forward with evidence to show the bank “knew” Clark was breaching a duty owed to the company. Though it was undisputed the bank knew the company was in some manner disposing of the metals it was acquiring, the bank’s senior officers testified, apparently persuasively, that they were unaware Clark had been misappropriating the collateral metals. They pointed out: (i) the company was a metals dealer which regularly traded metals, and; (ii) the bank had no reason to believe the company had not otherwise covered its positions (for example through futures contracts). The trustee contended the bank knew the company was selling the metals and was close to insolvent, and that the bank knew the silver metals market was volatile and typically full of unscrupulous lenders.177
While the court conceded such evidence could have raised “red flags,” that circumstance was not conclusive: the bank “owed no duty” to the company. “In the absence of any duty, proof of actual knowledge is required.” And absent knowledge of the scheme or breach, the bank “could have had no intent to further either.”178
A plaintiff alleging aider-abettor liability should plead the defendant knew the principal’s conduct contravened a fiduciary duty at the time it occurred.179 In an ERISA case, for example, a plaintiff was required to show
not only that when [the ERISA Fund] was paying defendant’s invoices, it was tapping the Plaintiff ’s reserve account (rather than a general operating or legal defense account), but also that the Defendants were or should have been aware of the particular internal bookkeeping account [the Fund] was drawing on to pay them, and that such payment constituted a breach of [the Fund’s] fiduciary duty.180
Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege scienter (the requisite state of mind) where, according to the complaint, a management company falsely had represented to investors: that it had reviewed prices charged by the fund company it managed to ensure their consistency with market values; that defendant was vested generally with “management and control” of the fund company; that it had the authority to require the fund company to adhere to applicable laws; that it undertook risk management services for the fund company; that it communicated with the individual defendants, and that it knew about the fund company’s fiduciary obligations to investors.181 Even viewed collectively, the court held, those facts did not “permit an inference that [the management company] had actual knowledge of the alleged fraud.”182
Nevertheless, unlike an action based on conspiracy, aiding and abetting liability may, according to several decisions, be satisfied by proof that a defendant acted recklessly.183 And as in fraud cases, aiding and abetting may be shown inferentially, such as by the existence of a conflict of interest and encouragement on the part of the aider-abettor to the actor to negotiate contracts that were prejudicial to plaintiff,184 though, seemingly incorrectly, it also has been held that “[w]hat is clear from all the cases and the RESTATEMENT is that there is not a lower level of culpability or scienter for aiding and abetting than for the underlying tort.”185
2. Substantial Assistance
“Substantial assistance” in aiding-abetting breach of fiduciary duty cases may be easier to establish than in fraud cases. For example, substantial assistance has been evidenced by mere advice by attorneys to a company president on how he might “warehouse premiums” so he could purchase illicit off-shore insurance policies.186 Similarly, where counsel for a partnership failed to inform a principal of material business dealings, counsel was subject to aider-abettor liability.187 And where a bank lent sums to the fiduciary (a trust) knowing the loan was made for purposes of misleading a plaintiff creditor, the lender was liable to the plaintiff.188
The relative ease of alleging “substantial assistance” in breach of fiduciary duty cases is noteworthy, and likely stems in part from the high level of duty owed by the fiduciary. Because of this elevated duty, when a secondary actor renders assistance the nexus between assistance and harm to the plaintiff frequently is apparent, or should be.
V. FACTUAL MATRICES IN WHICH AIDING-ABETTING CLAIMS ARE COMMON
Aiding and abetting doctrine is reasonably well defined; however, close analysis reveals nuances that may be distinct to a particular fact pattern. Greenmail cases, for example, have a body of law practically their own, as in such cases the “assistance” is often pronounced, though evidence of “knowledge” frequently is more debatable. Given such distinctions, there is much to be learned from a comparative discussion of aiding and abetting law from the standpoint of some noteworthy fact-patterns. There are no over-arching themes common to the varying relationships and circumstances. Rather, aiding-abetting doctrine has tended more to adjust to the particular relationship in question than to crystallize around immutable principles.
A. ATTORNEYS
Certain courts have adopted the principles of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS section 876(b) to subject to liability attorneys who have aided a client in the client’s breach of duty to a third party.189 As discussed above,190 the threshold for substantial assistance appears markedly lower in breach of fiduciary duty cases where a professional, such as an attorney, is the alleged secondary actor.
In Reynolds v. Schrock, the court held that a jury could find aiding-abetting liability where plaintiff alleged the attorney, having drafted the settlement agreement between the partners and knowing the partners owed each other fiduciary duties, nonetheless advised one partner to breach her duty to the other, then helped her conceal that breach, and received over $130,000 for his role in the transaction that constituted the breach.191 By contrast, however, an attorney’s advice to the client outlining the range of options and the consequences that might flow from them, does not give rise to secondary liability if, after hearing the advice, the client chooses upon her own to engage in conduct that results in a breach of duty.192 Substantial assistance or encouragement of the client’s breach of fiduciary duty needs to rise to “affirmative conduct that actually furthers the client’s breach of fiduciary duty, done by the attorney with knowledge that he or she is furthering the breach.”193
Recently, the Third Circuit undertook a careful analysis of the “substantial assistance” prong of aider-abettor liability, in a case concerning the aftermath of the financial demise of automotive entrepreneur John DeLorean.194 DeLorean owed fees for legal services, and ultimately the creditor law firm sued him, seeking a substantial judgment. As attachable funds seemingly were either non-existent or elusive, the chief asset targeted by the creditor law firm was DeLorean’s country estate, the 430-acre “Lamington Farm.” However, the alleged aider-abettor, DeLorean’s new law firm, had prepared a Memorandum of Life Lease in which “Genesis,” the purported title holder of Lamington Farm, acknowledged a preexisting life lease created in 1987 between DeLorean, as lessor, and DeLorean, as guardian for his children, as lessee.195
At this point, the alleged machinations became somewhat convoluted. The complaint alleged that the defendant law firm created the life lease memorandum after entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff (the creditor law firm). The plaintiff alleged the life lease was a fiction and that the defendant law firm knew it was, having created it in support of a wrongful attempt to obstruct plaintiffs’ enforcement of their judgment against DeLorean.196
Two weeks before DeLorean was to be deposed in connection with disposition of his assets, the defendant law firm recorded the purported life lease memorandum with the Somerset County Clerk. The firm subsequently misrepresented to the clerk that the order had the effect of dissolving a prior order in favor of plaintiffs that had set aside DeLorean’s fraudulent conveyance of Lamington Farm to Genesis. The clerk relied on this deceptive letter and entered on the public record erroneous marginal notations in that regard.197
After the creditor law firm obtained a writ of execution from the U.S. District Court that included personal property (and DeLorean’s shares in a Nevada corporation (CRISTINA)), DeLorean’s counsel contacted counsel for DeLorean Cadillac, which was controlled by DeLorean’s brother. (DeLorean Cadillac had obtained a writ of execution against DeLorean.) DeLorean Cadillac’s attorney agreed to a request not to contact the creditor law firm concerning furniture described in the writ, which John DeLorean was removing to a warehouse owned by DeLorean Cadillac. Nor did the defendant law firm disclose to the Court when they moved to vacate plaintiffs’ writ that DeLorean had delivered the CRISTINA shares to the marshal to facilitate the execution by DeLorean Cadillac on its writ.198
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, taking all of this in, observed that, unlike in a conspiracy case, plaintiffs did not need to plead “shared intent.” Civil liability for aiding and abetting arises when one knows the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty “and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself . . . .”199 Because the defendant law firm knew DeLorean was seeking to perpetuate a fraud on his creditor, the firm’s extensive involvement and assistance in the scheme subjected it to liability as aider-abettor.
The attorney aider-abettor decisions draw a line between the mere rendering of advice to a wrongdoer, on the one hand, and actively misleading or affirmative conduct directed toward a third party on the other. The attorney, as counselor, almost certainly will receive better protection than the attorney who acts as the public and active agent of a wrongdoer.
B. BANKING TRANSACTIONS
Financial institutions are among those entities most frequently charged with aiding and abetting fraud. Because modern banks provide an array of valuable, and frequently innovative, financing services, banks often are regarded as having been a “partner in crime” with a company the bank may have considered merely a “borrower” or “customer.” The factual elements frequently recurring in bank fraud cases include, most notably: (i) financing, through a series of transactions, of a fraudulent enterprise over an extended duration; (ii) the bank’s use of actual or alleged “atypical” banking practices, and; (iii) an ultimate bankruptcy (or absconding with funds) by a borrower or client of the bank.
In Chance World Trading E.C. v. Heritage Bank of Commerce,200 plaintiff Chance World undertook to invest in a related business venture (Construction Navigator) by placing $200,000 in an account at Heritage Bank. The investing agreement limited use of the funds to technical development, and required the signatures of all three of Construction Navigator’s principals for withdrawals. However, one of the principals of the venture allegedly misappropriated funds to pay her personal salary, office rent, and other general corporate expenses not related to the Company’s chartered purpose.201
To effectuate this misappropriation, the alleged primary actor had opened a second account at Heritage Bank. This account did not require signatures of all three of the company’s principals. The fraud actor then transferred funds from the original account into the new account. The bank permitted the withdrawal without requiring the authorization of the other principals.202
Chance World sought to establish the bank knew the fraud actor was misappropriating the $200,000 investment based on the following facts: (1) the bank had been informed that Chance World provided the financial backing for Construction Navigator, a start-up company; (2) the bank understood that Chance World was the source of the first $200,000 in Construction Navigator’s money market account; (3) the bank was in possession of the Chance World/Construction Navigator “term sheet”; (4) the bank had learned Chance World was buying 51% of the total shares of Construction Navigator; (5) the Construction Navigator charter, as well as California law and the conditions of the bank account itself barred withdrawals in excess of $100,000 where the authorization was by but one officer, and (6) the bank permitted Construction Navigator to open a corporate banking account without any advance corporate resolution authorizing such action.203
Nevertheless, the court observed that the term sheet only contained in very general terms the substance of the agreement between Chance World and Construction Navigator and, importantly, contained no restrictions on Construction Navigator’s use of funds. As a matter of California law, the court held, the violation by the bank of its own internal policies and procedures, without more, is insufficient to show a bank was aware of fiduciary breaches committed by customers.204 The court held that Chance World needed to produce evidence that Heritage Bank had actual knowledge of the fraud actor’s crimes; it could not rely on inferences drawn from “sloppy work” by the Bank.205
In another case, in May 2003 Allied Irish Banks, PLC filed suit in the Southern District of New York against Bank of America and Citibank.206 Allied sought to recover for losses incurred by its then subsidiary, Allfirst, between 1997 and 2002 by a rogue foreign exchange trader, John Rusnak. Rusnak had hid his losses for several years by booking fictitious trades and manipulating Allfirst’s internal controls. He pled guilty to bank fraud and was sentenced to seven and one-half years in prison, according to the Complaint.
Allied has alleged that Citibank and Bank of America: (1) carefully tailored their reporting to Allfirst to omit information concerning Allfirst’s profits and losses, mark-to-market positions, and risks; (2) were persuaded not to seek margin from Rusnak, which would have disclosed his trading losses; (3) provided to Rusnak $200 million in funding disguised as the proceeds of Rusnak’s foreign exchange trading; (4) executed $170 million in trades that helped Rusnak undermine Allfirst’s controls but had no business purpose, and; (5) doctored trade confirmations to cover up Rusnak’s fake trades. The unusual procedures allegedly helped to avoid detection by Allfirst’s internal controls.207
Rusnak allegedly persuaded the banks to utilize unusual trading “recaps,” which omitted information concerning the price of Rusnak’s positions, the risk, or its current mark-to-market value. The confirmation also excluded transfer activity and profit and loss information. Because of Rusnak’s unusual requests concerning documentation, “BofA and Citibank knew or should have known that Rusnak wanted to hide material information from Allfirst,” according to the complaint.208
Further, Bank of America allegedly executed currency trades with Rusnak that were disguised loans. For payment of a small premium on a call option that could never be exercised, Rusnak received $120 million in funds (a premium on a put option) coupled with future liability well in excess of that amount on the put option to Bank of America. In March 2001, Bank of America allegedly paid Allfirst $74.9 million for a “put option” on $230 million worth of yen with an exercise date of March 7, 2002.209 Though it created a short-term gain, the transaction created an unbalanced long-term liability, according to the complaint.210
The Court held the complaint properly stated a claim for aiding and abetting fraud.211 Bank of America’s actual knowledge of the fraud was adequately pled based on the allegations Rusnak told the bank he wanted information omitted from daily trade confirmations, monthly reports, and communications between the bank and Allfirst “because he sought to conceal such information from his employer.”212 “Substantial assistance,” in the form of “deliberate concealment” properly was pled by alleging the bank concealed information by withholding it, and by “actively and deliberately altering documents.”213
Bank of America was also the subject of aiding-abetting charges in In Re Parmalat,214 where it contended that the breach of fiduciary duty at issue merely concerned a supposed duty owed to Parmalat’s stakeholders. Because, according to Bank of America, Parmalat owed no such duty to its stakeholders, there could have been no breach of fiduciary duty (and thus no liability for aiding and abetting). The court disagreed, holding that the complaint adequately had alleged that the bank aided insiders in breaching duties the insiders owed to Parmalat.215
Bank of America was alleged to have assisted Parmalat affiliates’ managers in “structuring and executing a series of complex, mostly off-balance sheet, financial transactions that were deliberately designed to conceal Parmalat’s insolvency.”216 According to plaintiffs, Bank of America’s knowing assistance ensured that Parmalat’s financial statements were false and misleading, which resulted in Parmalat’s bankruptcy.217
Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that in 1997, Bank of America had entered into an $80 million five-year credit agreement with one of Parmalat’s Venezuelan subsidiaries. The parties did not disclose a side letter that gave Bank of America additional guarantees, a $120,000 “arrangement fee” and interest beyond the publicly disclosed rate. According to plaintiffs, that transaction made Parmalat appear healthier and more creditworthy than, as Bank of America allegedly knew, Parmalat really was.218
In addition, in 1998, Bank of America allegedly entered into an $80 million eight-year credit agreement with two of Parmalat’s Venezuelan subsidiaries and a $100 million credit agreement with a Brazilian subsidiary. These loans were secured by cash deposits made by an Irish Parmalat subsidiary in the entire amounts of their respective loans. The Irish subsidiary obtained the funds through issuance of eight-year notes to institutional investors in the U.S. in private placements arranged by Bank of America. Consequently, the funds from investors flowed to South American subsidiaries; Bank of America took no risk and, when Parmalat’s troubles surfaced in December 2003, Bank of America foreclosed on the collateral. The fact that the loans were secured by cash put up by Parmalat was not disclosed publicly. Thus, the purchasers of the eight-year notes did not know they were contributing collateral for Bank of America loans. Nor, importantly, did the purchasers of Parmalat’s stock know that Parmalat had approximately $180 million less available cash than its financial statements indicated. Again, side letters increased the fees and interest payable to Bank of America and were not disclosed, further distorting Parmalat’s financial picture. Also, the actual purpose of the Venezuelan loans was to extinguish debt under the December 1997 agreement with Bank of America, rather than as the public disclosure indicated, “to fund import/ export activities by the Venezuelan companies,” according to the complaint.219
Bank of America also allegedly structured a set of transactions pursuant to which a Brazilian Parmalat subsidiary issued $300 million of privately placed debt that was “disguised as an equity investment.” To accomplish this, Bank of America formed two special purpose entities that bought $300 million of stock in the Brazilian entity, whereupon the SPEs issued four-year notes purchased by (i) Bank of America, (ii) U.S. institutional investors, and (iii) another Parmalat subsidiary. The Brazilian entity accounted for $130 million of the $300 million as “equity.” In December 1999, a Bank of America employee educated Parmalat “how to describe the transaction in a press release so that it would appear to be equity rather than debt,” according to the complaint.220
Furthermore, Bank of America allegedly made a succession of loans to Parmalat subsidiaries while simultaneously executing a supposed interest rate swap agreement with Parmalat’s African subsidiary. The “swap” required Bank of America, in effect, to pay $5.2 million each year to a Swiss bank account “ostensibly owned by Parmalat Africa.” The ostensible purpose of the swap was cancelled out by side letters, which required Parmalat Chile and Parmalat South Africa to pay Bank of America additional interest on their loans roughly equating to Bank of America’s yearly $5.2 million installments to Parmalat Africa’s “ostensible bank account.” And, the account was not Parmalat Africa’s; rather, allegedly, it “has been linked to Bank of America officials.”221
In addition, the swap agreements were not actually swaps, according to the complaint: they specified no currency or interest rate exchanges and offered the counter-parties no ability to hedge. The complaint alleged the agreements were nothing more than a device for Parmalat to make illicit payments to Bank of America officials.222
Bank of America did not deny that the complaint sufficiently alleged that it aided and abetted actual breaches of fiduciary duty. Rather, Bank of America characterized the claim as one of aiding and abetting a breach of duty owed to Parmalat’s shareholders—to whom the Bank argued Parmalat owed no duty. The court held that this argument was entirely beside the point: the complaint alleged the banks aided insiders in breaching duties the insiders owed to Parmalat.223 Thus, the complaint properly alleged aiding-abetting liability as a matter of law.
Aiding and abetting charges have been brought by one bank against another. In Rabobank Nederland v. National Westminster Bank,224 the plaintiff, who funded a “take out” of another bank’s (“the debtor”) interest in a credit facility, alleged the debtor’s officers breached their fiduciary duty by approving the debtor’s funding of over $600,000 for the purchase of almond farms for no consideration to the almond farm entities they controlled, and approving the debtor’s entry into long-term leases at above-market rates.225 The claim was premised on law holding that a debtor’s officers and directors owe to a successor (or take-out) lender a fiduciary duty to preserve the debtor’s corporate assets for the benefit of its creditors (including the take-out lender).226
The complaint alleged the original lender aided and abetted this breach by loaning $1.2 million to a particular trust that purchased the almond farms property while knowing that several debtor’s officers had formed the almond farm entities. The loan was made for the express purpose of acquiring the almond acreage; and the original lender “knew or should have known” that the individual defendants could not develop the almond farms without draining additional funds from the debtor. Construing these allegations “broadly,” the court found they supported the “inference” that the original lender knew its loan to the trust assisted the officers and directors of the debtor in their breach of fiduciary duties to the take-out lender.227
The original lender, however, contended that because it did not owe the same fiduciary duties as the debtors, it could not face liability for aiding and abetting their breach of fiduciary duty. The appellate court held this theory was erroneous because it essentially treated the cause of action identically to one for conspiracy, where a duty is owed directly by the defendant. By contrast, “[a] party need not owe any fiduciary duty, let alone the same fiduciary duty, to be subject to liability for aiding and abetting another’s breach.”228
In Neilson v. Union Bank of California, N.A.,229 a private money manager (Slatkin) allegedly set up investment funds as part of a classic Ponzi scheme: “i.e., he used monies paid by later investors to pay artificially high returns to initial investors, with the ultimate goal of attracting still more investors.”230 Investors alleged the banks “rubber-stamped” false information Slatkin gave to them and treated the client accounts as “one common pool of fungible and liquid assets.”231 They alleged the banks “knew or should have known that Slatkin was operating a Ponzi scheme, and that without the assistance provided by the banks, Slatkin’s Ponzi scheme could not have succeeded.”232
The court observed that while under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, fraud must be pled with specificity, “‘[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mood of a person may be averred generally.’”233 Nevertheless, the pleader must allege the nature of the information the defendant possessed; that is, “actual knowledge of the primary violation.”234 In Neilson, the complaint pled that “the banks knew [the primary actor, Slatkin] was committing fraud and was breaching his fiduciary duties to class members,” and that each bank “actively participated in Slatkin’s Ponzi scheme with knowledge of his crimes.” These allegations, notably supported by use of “atypical banking procedures to service Slatkin’s accounts,” adequately stated the “knowledge” requirement for aidingabetting breach of fiduciary duty.235
Clearly, the more a bank knows about its borrower’s business the greater the exposure to the bank in the event that “business” proves to have been a fraud scheme. Equally important is the number of financing transactions and extent of time over which the bank has furthered the borrower’s objectives. And, as previously observed, the use of “atypical” banking procedures is considered very strong evidence of scienter.
C. BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEES’ ACTIONS
A common fact-pattern involves a bankrupt corporation that formerly operated as a fraudulent enterprise. In bankruptcy, after ringleaders in upper management have been thrown out, the bankruptcy trustee not infrequently discovers that third-parties, such as suppliers, accountants or law firms, appeared to have facilitated the fraud.236 Bankruptcy trustees in this position have sought recourse against these alleged aiders-abettors.
However, when the bankrupt corporation joined with a third party in defrauding its creditors, the trustee cannot recover against the third party for the damage to the creditors. “A bankruptcy trustee has no standing generally to sue third parties on behalf of the estate’s creditors, but may only assert claims held by the bankrupt corporation itself . . . .”237 The in pari delicto defense may be raised in aiding-abetting actions brought by the bankruptcy trustee when a participant in illegal, fraudulent or inequitable conduct (here, the trustee) seeks to recover from another participant in that conduct. Under those circumstances, the parties may be deemed in pari delicto, and the “law will aid neither, but rather, will leave them where it finds them.”238 For example, a claim against investment banks for aiding and abetting fraud by shareholders’ representatives was subject to dismissal where the “essence” of the claims was a failure to tell others at the now-bankrupt company “what the shareholders-representatives already knew.”239
However, in bankruptcy, the in pari delicto doctrine applies primarily to the trustee as representative of the “debtor” under Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, and not necessarily to the trustee in its status as “creditor.” As “creditor,” the trustee is not stepping into the shoes of the debtor company, but is assuming the status of hypothetical lien creditors who were not party to the breach of fiduciary duty.240 Section 544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, the rights and powers of a “creditor that extends credit to the debtor . . . and that obtains . . . a judicial lien on all property on which a creditor on a simple contract could have obtained such a judicial lien, whether or not such a creditor exists.”241 Thus, in Anstine v. Alexander,242 the trustee had standing to bring aiding-abetting claims, given that any hypothetical judgment lien creditor would have had standing to sue the company’s attorneys for malpractice causing injury to the company or for the president’s breach of duty to his company. “Such a lien creditor would also have a cause of action against anyone who aided and abetted that breach of fiduciary duty.”243
The availability of the in pari delicto defense in the case of creditors of a bankrupt estate depends upon the jurisdiction, with the Ninth Circuit, based on equitable considerations, restricting the defense, and the Second and Third Circuits, relying on their interpretation of Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, giving the defense broad sway.244
D. CORPORATE AFFILIATES
Separate corporate entities in the same family of entities under common control or controlling one another may be alleged to be perpetrator and aider-abettor, respectively. However, complexities arise when some affiliates are alleged to be primarily and others secondarily responsible. Subsidiaries are ordinarily treated as independent corporate entities; however, in reality they are sometimes “mere vehicles” through which an improper scheme is effectuated.245 In Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp.,246 former minority shareholders of the Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp. presented such a case. Olin Corporation, Hunt’s majority shareholder was named as defendant. The plaintiffs claimed that “since Olin allegedly breached its fiduciary duty in connection with a merger and Olin Acquisition was the corporate vehicle through which the merger was consummated, the subsidiary was a knowing participant liable for its parent’s breach.”247 The court rejected the contention, though only because “no allegation [was ever made] that Olin Acquisition even existed at the time the merger proposal was presented to Hunt.”248
It has been held that a corporation had requisite guilty knowledge and knowingly rendered substantial assistance in connection with securities fraud by a corporately separate “family business,” where the family that committed the fraud owned and controlled the defendant corporation.249 In that circumstance, the defendant corporation was deemed to possess the knowledge held by the company that primarily committed the fraud.250
E. DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
Directors and officers of a company owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders.251 A rival, or corporate raider, may become liable for aiding and abetting breach of that duty should the rival or takeover suitor induce an officer of the company to act disloyally. In “greenmail” cases, the putative acquiring company may be exposed to liability after seeking to persuade the directors and officers to make business decisions that are antithetical to the company’s interests in an attempt to fend off a takeover (that might be in the shareholders’ interest).252
Allegations of a “street sweep” scheme, to defeat a hostile takeover, formed the subject of aiding-abetting claims in Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.253 There, the board approved a dividend allegedly to finance a stock purchase by the company’s largest corporate shareholder. That shareholder, if permitted, intended to acquire a sufficient share of the company to prevent the hostile tender offeror from acquiring a controlling share.254 When the directors enacted a standstill agreement that bound the corporate shareholder to vote its shares for the company’s director nominees, “it severely restricted” the shareholder’s ability to dispose of its stock free of the standstill restrictions. “That agreement operated to entrench the [Company’s] Board” and thus went beyond the reasonable goals of limiting a shareholder’s ability to acquire a majority share.255 This was a violation of the company’s directors’ duties, and given that the shareholder, as a contracting party, obviously knew of the “entrenchment effect” of those provisions, the shareholder “aided and abetted” that violation.256
Another legally viable aiding-abetting claim alleged that officers caused the company to “deepen its insolvency,” to the prejudice of the plaintiff creditors, by “wrongfully prolonging the company’s existence through the incurrence of spurious debt,” largely by allowing sales on credit to an affiliated entity that they knew was becoming insolvent.257 Applying New Jersey law, the court held that such allegations met the standard that (1) there had been a wrongful act in an underlying securities violation, (2) the alleged aider-abettor knew it, and (3) the aider-abettor “knowingly and substantially participated in the wrongdoing.”258
As discussed above,259 the in pari delicto defense often will bar claims by the bankruptcy trustee, including claims based on misconduct by the bankrupt entity’s former officers and directors. However, in In re Parmalat,260 the plaintiff sought to avoid the in pari delicto defense by alleging the officers and directors had been acting strictly for themselves in “looting” Parmalat. The court agreed: “By any standard, theft from a corporation by insiders is self-dealing by the insiders,” not in the interest of the company, and thus the insiders’ knowledge is not imputed to the company.261
F. GREENMAIL
“Greenmail” typically refers to the payment by a publicly traded company of a premium over market price to a “corporate raider” to repurchase the raider’s shares of stock in the company. Corporate raiders, or takeover artists, may threaten a takeover of a company, thereby jeopardizing the job security of directors and officers (who may believe they will be ousted under the raider’s regime). Such directors and officers have a duty to disregard that personal risk. Should those directors and officers, aiming to preserve their power and perks, cause the company to overpay to buy back the raider’s shares in order to defeat the takeover, they may have breached their fiduciary duty to the company’s shareholders. If the raider intends this result, the raider (or “greenmailer”) may be liable to shareholders of the target company as an aider and abettor. The entity pursuing the takeover must offer consideration to the company, not to officers at the company.
In seeking to establish liability on the part of the greenmailers, shareholders have alleged that the corporate directors breached their fiduciary duty to shareholders by incurring harmful debt and by paying the price of a targeted stock repurchase.262 For example, in 1984, Saul Steinberg and Associates acquired more than two million shares of Walt Disney Productions.263 Interpreting this action as an initial step in a takeover action, the Disney directors countered by acquiring a new company (Arvida) and thereby assuming $190 million in debt. Three months later the Disney directors repurchased all of the Steinberg shares for approximately $77 a share, which included a premium over the market price. This repurchase, which the court categorized as greenmail, was financed through increased borrowing. With the new combined borrowing, corporate debt rose to two-thirds of equity. This action harmed the shareholders because it negatively affected the corporation’s credit rating and stock prices.264
In reviewing a lower court decision to issue an injunction, which, in effect, imposed a constructive trust on the profits of the repurchase, the court of appeals concluded that at the trial on the merits Steinberg could be held liable as an aider and abettor in the breach of fiduciary duty. Steinberg “knew or should have known” Disney was borrowing the $325 million purchase price. From his previous dealings with Disney, including an aborted purchase of Arvida, he knew the increased debt load would negatively affect Disney’s credit rating and the price of its stock.265 The argument that Steinberg had actual knowledge of harm flowing to Disney shareholders was strengthened by the fact that Steinberg, while still a shareholder, had brought his own derivative action in an attempt to block an acquisition of Arvida and the assumption of $190 million in debt. These facts suggested that Steinberg knew that the actual harm to shareholders exceeded the benefits.266
In Gilbert v. El Paso. Co.,267 shareholders of the target corporation (El Paso) brought a class action. The putative acquirer, Burlington, had made a tender offer of $24 per share. The offer contained several conditions (“outs”) which Burlington had the option to use. El Paso’s Board initially opposed the offer, claiming the $24 price was inadequate; however, El Paso’s shareholders evidently liked the offer, which represented a premium over market price because it was oversubscribed.
Surprisingly, to outsiders, the conflict suddenly became amicable. Burlington and El Paso announced they had an agreement. A new tender offer was announced at the same price, but for fewer shares. Some of El Paso’s Directors were granted golden parachutes. The agreement allegedly had the effect of reducing the amount of the participation from the first to the second offer, thus denying the shareholders the premium for all shares tendered under the first offer.268
The court was able to infer that several conspiracy scenarios were possible. Under each, Burlington’s superior bargaining position, was crucial. Burlington responded that its duty to its shareholders obligated it to get the best price possible, and that the transaction was an arm’s length one. According to Burlington, “pursuit of the best available price in negotiations with opposing management can be undertaken without regard to the target management’s fiduciary obligations to its shareholders.”269
The court disagreed, ruling that if participation in a breach of duty occurred, there could have been no arm’s length deal: “Thus, although an offeror may attempt to obtain the lowest possible price for stock through arm’s length negotiations with the target’s board, it may not knowingly participate in the target board’s breach of fiduciary duty by extracting terms which require the opposite party to prefer its interests at the expense of the shareholders.”270
Offering terms that afford special consideration to board members is a clear path to aider-abettor liability. When terms hold value that inures exclusively, or even disproportionately, to officers and directors, courts have not found it difficult to infer the offeror knew it was inducing a breach of fiduciary duty to shareholders.
G. RICO
Based on Central Bank, it has been suggested that civil aiding and abetting liability under RICO appears to be traveling a path toward extinction. “[A] private cause of action for aiding and abetting a RICO violation cannot survive the Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank . . . . ,” according to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.271 The Third Circuit has observed that the Central Bank court quoted directly from the text of the federal securities laws in abolishing all future civil aiding and abetting claims under § 10(b).272 The Third Circuit and other courts have applied the reasoning of Central Bank to RICO and concluded the statute does not provide for aiding and abetting liability.273 Nevertheless, state RICO laws, which may be more expansively construed than federal statues, may permit aiding and abetting actions.274
H. STATE LAW SECURITIES ACTIONS
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 both contain explicit savings clauses that preserve state authority with regard to securities matters.275 Consequently, courts long have recognized aiding-abetting liability in connection with securities actions brought pursuant to state law.276
The Texas Securities Act, for example, establishes both primary and secondary liability for securities violations.277 An “aider” is defined as “[a] person who directly or indirectly with intent to deceive or defraud or with reckless disregard for the truth or the law materially aids a seller, buyer or issuer of a security.”278 The Texas Supreme Court has held in this context that “reckless disregard” requires that the aider be aware of the primary violator’s improper activities. Thus, a broker’s mere disregard for internal procedures that would have brought the fraud to light was, without more, insufficient to give rise to secondary liability.279
Post-Central Bank, much of the law of aider-abettor liability is developing in state courts, including under state securities statutes. This environment likely will produce a rich, and varied, body of decisional law.
I. TERRORISM
The Federal Anti-Terrorism Act provides civil remedies for victims of international terrorism, stating: “Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reasons of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors or heirs, may sue therefore in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees.”280 While funding that indirectly reaches terrorist organizations itself may not, depending on the circumstances, always be sufficient to constitute an act of international terrorism under the Act, assistance that meets the definition of aiding and abetting terrorism does give rise to liability under the Act.281
In Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute and Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, the court found that section 2333 can give rise to aiding and abetting liability because it provided for an express right of action for plaintiffs, and it was reasonable to infer that Congress intended to allow for aiding-abetting liability.282 Further, the history of section 2333 showed Congress had intended to make applicable general tort principles. Moreover, Congress expressed its intent to “render civil liability at least as extensive as criminal liability in the context of terrorism cases.” Given that criminal actors are subject to aiding-abetting liability under section 2339B,283 civil liability should attach as well.284
Lastly, the court observed that Congress’ intent to thwart financing of terrorism cannot be met unless liability extends beyond those directly involved in the acts of terrorism: “if we failed to impose liability on aiders and abettors who knowingly and intentionally funded acts of terrorism, we would be thwarting Congress’ clearly expressed intent to cut off the flow of money to terrorists at every point along the causal chain of violence.”285 In Boim, therefore, plaintiffs were permitted to attempt to prove that the defendants “knew of Hamas’ illegal activities, that they desired to help those activities succeed, and they engaged in some act of helping the illegal activities.”286
In early 2005, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled on a host of motions filed by defendants in In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001,287 a multidistrict proceeding consolidating actions brought by victims and insurance carriers for injuries and losses arising from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack. Citing Boim, the court observed that aider-abettor liability under the Anti-Terrorism Act required “general knowledge of the primary actor’s conduct.”288 Therefore, absent allegations that a defendant, for example, knew its charities were supporting terrorism, certain of the aiding-abetting claims against defendants were deemed insufficient as a matter of law.289
A second round of motions, decided in November 2005, dismissed several additional defendants largely on the same basis, but ruled that claims that alleged “material support,” in the form of financial transactions with al Qaeda, could be maintained under section 2339A.290 Further, the court denied the motion to dismiss of a defendant who was alleged to be affiliated with al Qaeda operatives and to have aided al Qaeda by arranging for the delivery of a battery for a satellite phone used by Osama bin Laden.291 This litigation is ongoing in the Southern District of New York.
Also late in 2005, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York agreed with Boim that section 2333 “does not limit the imposition of civil liability only to those who directly engage in terrorist acts.”292 U.S. citizens, estates, survivors and heirs of United States citizens, who had been victims of terrorist attacks in Israel, have sued a Jordanian bank, alleging the bank had provided financing and support to agents of terrorist organizations, such as Hamas. In ruling that the Anti-Terrorism Act allowed for aiding-abetting liability, the court distinguished Central Bank on the basis that in enacting the Anti-Terrorism Act Congress had expressed a desire to “import general tort law principles,” including aiding and abetting liability.293 Congress also had expressed an intent to make civil liability at least as expansive as criminal liability. Moreover failing to allow aiding and abetting liability would be “contrary to Congress’ stated purpose of cutting off the flow of money to terrorists at every point along the chain of causation.”294
The court, applying the fact pleading standard pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), held the plaintiffs’ allegations properly pled aiding and abetting liability. Plaintiffs had alleged the bank had facilitated terrorism chiefly by (1) creating a death and dismemberment plan for the benefit of Palestinian terrorists, and (2) knowingly provided banking services to Hamas (a designated terrorist organization) and its fronts. The allegations supported the inferences that (i) the bank would supply needed financial services to organizations that would themselves carry out terrorist acts, which constituted “substantial assistance,” and (ii) that administration of the benefit plan encouraged terrorists to act.295
The court rejected the bank’s protestation that plaintiffs needed to show knowledge as to each specific terroristic act. Aiding and abetting violations of the AntiTerrorism Act require only knowledge “that the organization to which material support is provided is designated or is engaged in terrorist activities . . . .”296 Nor, for purposes of “causation,” did plaintiffs need to prove that acts of “assistance” caused a particular injury from terrorism: the creation of an incentive to commit such acts, generally, imposes secondary liability. The court did conclude that for purposes of the Anti-Terrorism Act, allegations of recklessness would fall short of the statutory standard.297
VI. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of civil liability for aiding and abetting warrants, and promises to receive, expansive treatment in the context of suits for personal injuries resulting from terrorism that has been assisted by its financiers and others facilitators. Tort liability expanded during the twentieth century in large part to provide a measure of civil deterrence for defendants regarded, in isolated instances, as having put the public at risk.298 The public risk from a single act of terrorism may vastly exceed the risk created by corporate negligence or distribution of defective products.
More generally, aiding and abetting liability is in the process of achieving broad acceptance as a doctrine uniquely suited to address wrongdoing that occurs in transactional matrices that as of the year 2006 frequently are of breathtaking complexity. The former centerpiece of aiding-abetting liability—suits against facilitators of federal securities fraud—was removed by the Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in Central Bank.299 But the doctrine itself has flourished, perhaps in part because of the attention it received when Central Bank was followed within seven years by massive financial scandals.
As of this writing, the larger scandals temporarily have subsided (though this may well be a temporary lull preceding the demise of one or two large hedge funds).300 The scandal cases, including those involving Enron and WorldCom, have contributed with other aiding and abetting case law addressing conventional financial fraud and commercial misconduct to produce a body of law that has helped to refine the law of aiding-abetting civil liability.
This refinement is particularly evident in connection with the test for “knowledge of wrongdoing,” where recognized fact patterns have emerged as predictive of liability or nonliability (as the case may be).301 Recent court decisions have shown that use of “atypical” banking procedures are a critical signifier of “knowledge” and thus potential liability.302 Motive has emerged as a significant factor in favor of showing unlawful scienter, though motive is not, or should not be, itself an element of liability.303 It has become equally plain that even with knowledge of wrongdoing one may stand by, absent the existence of some affirmative duty or other special circumstances, and allow another to be defrauded by one’s own client or customer.304 Also, decisions, particularly those concerning terrorism, have held that “causation” usually requires only that the harm caused by the principal actor was a reasonably foreseeable result of the aider-abettor’s assistance.305
The increase in well-considered decisional law is timely. Based on apparent trends in the number of reported decisions, aiding-abetting cases are increasing in frequency. From its beginning as an obscure civil doctrine concerned with “isolated acts of adolescents in rural society”306 to a modern liability doctrine flexible enough to provide remedies for bank fraud, greenmail, and terrorism, civil liability for aiding and abetting has evolved because of the special need for recourse where the wrongdoer had the assistance of important allies.
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* Member, Cozen O’Connor, Philadelphia, Pa., where he is Chair of the Firm’s Financial Risk Transfer Practice Group. Mr. Mason is a member of the Financial Institutions Litigation Committee of the Business Law Section of the American Bar Association, and the Excess, Surplus Lines and Rein- surance Committee of the Tort, Trial and Insurance Practice Section of the American Bar Association, and is Editor-in-Chief of the TORT, TRIAL AND INSURANCE PRACTICE LAW JOURNAL. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not of Cozen O’Connor or its clients.
2. See Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 583 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
3. See generally Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 182–83.
4. See Book 47, Title 2, Corpus Juris Civilis (“Anyone who assists a thief is not always himself a manifest thief; hence it happens that he who furnished assistance is liable for non-manifest theft, and he who was caught in the act is guilty of manifest theft of the same property.”).
5. 1 M. Hale, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 615 (1736), cited in United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938).
6. 2 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 231 (1883), cited in Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 15 (1980).
8. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 332, 35 Stat. 1088, 1152.
9. Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613 (1949). As such, under the 1909 Act, and under the law of most states, an accessory to a crime is subject to criminal liability even if the principal actor is acquitted. Standefer, 447 U.S. at 20.
10. See Sir John Heydon’s Case, 11 Co. Rep. 5, 77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (1613).
11. See generally Bird v. Lynn, 10 B.Mon. 422, 49 Ky. 422 (Ky. Ct. App. 1850) (Defendant who said that a child, who “sauced” defendant, deserved to be whipped, may be subject to liability for a whipping the child received but only if defendant incited such act desiring that it occur); Brown v. Perkins, 83 Mass. 89 (1861) (defendant subject to liability if it were to be found he encouraged crowd of women armed with hatchets to ransack liquor store).
12. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 947–53 (9th Cir. 2002), opinion vacated and rehearing in banc granted, 395 F.3d 978, 979 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is ordered that this case be reheard by the en banc court pursuant to Circuit Rule 35-3. The three-judge panel opinion shall not be cited as precedent by or to this court or any district court of the Ninth Circuit, except to the extent adopted by the en banc court.”), on rehearing en banc, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (district court opinion vacated and case dismissed with prejudice pur- suant to parties’ stipulation).
13. Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., N.A., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
22. Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 459–60 (Cal. 1994).
23. See Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters and Cement Masons Local No. 395 Pension Trust Fund, 38 P.3d 12, 23 (Ariz. 2002); Saunders v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 446 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Holmes v. Young, 885 P.2d 305, 308 (Col. Ct. App. 1994); Feen v. Benefit Plan Adm’rs, Inc., No. 406726, 2000 WL 1398898, *10–11 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2000); Pipher v. Burr, No. C.A. 96C-08-011, 1998 WL 110135, *9–10 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 1998); Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477–78 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Tew v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 728 F. Supp. 1551, 1568–69 (S.D. Fla. 1990), amended on reconsideration, 741 F. Supp. 220 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Sanke v. Bechina, 576 N.E.2d 1212, 1218–19 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991), appeal denied, 584 N.E.2d 140 (Ill. 1991); Heick v. Bacon, 561 N.W.2d 45, 51–52 (Iowa 1997); Emig v. Am. Tobacco Co., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 379, 386 (D. Kan. 1998); Hart Enterp., Inc. v. Cheshire Sanitation, Inc., No. 98-416-P-H, 1999 WL 33117189, *3 (D. Me. Feb. 22, 1999); Alleco, Inc. v. Harry & Jeanette Weinberg Found., Inc., 665 A.2d 1038, 1049 (Md.1995); Kurker v. Hill, 689 N.E.2d 833, 837 (Mass. Ct. App. 1998); Echelon Homes, LLC v. Carter Lumber Co., 683 N.W.2d 171 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d in part, 694 N.W.2d 544 (Mich. 2005); Casino Res. Corp. v. Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc., No. 98-2058ADM/AJB, 2002 WL 480968, *13 (D. Minn. March 22, 2002); Joseph v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 624, 629–30 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Invest Almaz v. Temple-Inland Forest Prods. Corp., 243 F.3d 57, 82-82 (1st Cir. 2001) (New Hampshire); Judson v. People’s Bank and Trust Co., 134 A.2d 761 (N.J. 1957); GCM, Inc. v. Ky. Cent. Life Ins. Co., 947 P.2d 143, 147–48 (N.M. 1997); Koken v. Steinberg, 825 A.2d 723 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003); Hirsch v. Penn. Textile Corp., Inc. (In re Centennial Textiles, Inc.), 227 B.R. 606, 611 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993); Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 112–13 (Nev. 1998); Mc- Millan v. Mahoney, 393 S.E.2d 298, 300 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Leahey Constr. Co., Inc., 219 F.3d 519, 533–34 (6th Cir. 2000) (Ohio); Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788, 792–93 (Or. 1999); Groff v. Maurice, C.A. No. 86-3808, 1993 WL 853801, *3 (R.I. Super. April 7, 1993); Future Group, II v. Nationsbank, 478 S.E.2d 45, 50 (S.C. 1996); Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. United Am. Bank of Memphis, 21 F. Supp. 2d 785, 795 (W.D. Tenn. 1998); Estate of Hough ex rel. LeMaster v. Estate of Hough ex rel. Berkeley County Sheriff, 519 S.E.2d 640, 648–49 (W. Va.1999); Winslow v. Brown, 371 N.W.2d 417, 421–23 (Wis. Ct. App.1985), rev. denied, 378 N.W.2d 291 (Wis. 1985). Courts in three other states have held that the viability of such claims remains an open question. See Unity House, Inc. v. N. Pac. Invests., Inc., 918 F. Supp. 1384, 1390 (D. Haw. 1996); Daniel Boone Area Sch. Dist. v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 187 F. Supp. 2d 400, 413 (W.D. Pa. 2002); Shinn v. Allen, 984 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998).
24. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 181–82. See Premier/Georgia Mgt. Co., Inc. v. Realty Mgt. Corp., 613 S.E.2d 112 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005); FDIC v. S. Prawer & Co., 829 F. Supp. 453, 457 (D. Me. 1993) (in Maine, “[i]t is clear . . . that aiding and abetting liability did not exist under the common law, but was entirely a creature of statute”); Meadow Ltd. Partnership v. Heritage Sav. & Loan Assn., 639 F. Supp. 643, 653 (E.D. Va. 1986) (aiding and abetting tort “not expressly recognized by the state courts of the Commonwealth of Virginia); Sloane v. Fauque, 784 P.2d 895, 896 (Mont. 1989) (aiding and abetting tort liability is issue of “first impression” in Montana).
25. See generally Ronald M. Lepinskas, Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability in Illinois, 87 ILL. B.J. 532, 533 (Oct. 1999).
29. To implement § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, Title I § 10, 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j), in 1942, the SEC adopted Rule 10b-5, which provides, in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . . (a) [t]o employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud; (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005).
30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2005). See Robert S. DeLeon, The Fault Line Between Primary Liability and Aiding and Abetting Claims Under Rule 10b-5, 22 J. CORP. LAW 723, 729 (1997).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a), (c) (2005). “The first and third subsections of Rule 10b-5, which use the verbs ‘employ’ and ‘engage,’ have narrower meanings than the second subsection.” DeLeon, supra note 30, at 728. For statements or omissions, “make” can mean to “create,” to “bring into being,” to “compose” or “write,” to “give rise to,” or to “cause to be announced.” Id at 729. “Accordingly, to the extent a defendant can be said to ‘employ’ a fraudulent device or ‘engage’ in fraudulent conduct in the preparation of issuer disclosures, that conduct arguably is captured by Rule 10b-5’s prohibition on ‘making’ misstatements or omissions.” Id.
32. See, e.g., Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983); IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980); Monsen v. Consol. Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799–800 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978); Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 496–497 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 936 (1992); Fine v. American Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 300 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. dismissed, 502 U.S. 976 (1991); Moore v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 303 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Moore v. Frost, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987); Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 947 (7th Cir. 1989); K & S P’ship v. Cont’l Bank, N.A., 952 F.2d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1205 (1992); Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991); Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir. 1992); Schneberger v. Wheeler, 859 F.2d 1477, 1480 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1091 (1989). The only court not to have squarely recognized aiding and abetting in private section 10(b) actions prior to Central Bank did so in an action brought by the SEC, see Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev’d on other grounds, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), though it suggested that such a claim was available in private actions. See Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 35–36 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
33. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
34. Zatkin v. Primuth, 551 F. Supp. 39 (S.D. Cal. 1982).
35. Resnick v. Touche Ross & Co., 470 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
36. Sandusky Land, Ltd. v. Uniplan Groups, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
37. In re Caesar’s Palace Sec. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
38. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 680–81 (corporation alleged to have assisted improper actions of brokerage firm).
40. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 182. Instead, Congress had taken a “statute-by-statute approach to civil liability for aiding and abetting.” Id. In statutes such as the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1)(2000), the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §504(h) (2000), and the Packers and Stockyards Act, ch. 64, § 202, 42 Stat. 161 (1921) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 192(g)), Congress had been “quite explicit” in imposing aiding and abetting liability. In contrast, in connection with Securities Exchange Act violations, it had neither in 1934 nor since employed express language to impose such liability. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 182–83.
41. Id. at 186 (“[O]ur observations on the acquiescence doctrine indicate its limitations as an expression of congressional intent.”) (quoting Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990)).
43. Id. at 189. The Court observed that on the other hand there were policy arguments in favor of aiding and abetting liability. “The point here, however, is that it is far from clear that Congress in 1934 would have decided that the statutory purposes would be furthered by the imposition of private aider and abettor liability.” Id. at 189–90.
45. While commentators, supported by abundant evidence, have identified Central Bank as one factor leading to the encouragement, during the 1990s, of misconduct by accountants and other players in the financial industry, e.g., Scott Siamas, Primary Securities Fraud Liability for Secondary Actors: Revisiting Central Bank of Denver in the Wake of Enron, Worldcom, and Arthur Andersen, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 895, 897 (2004), critics of Central Bank have had less success exposing any genuine error in the reasoning of that opinion. Most commonly, commentators emphasize the Court’s over- ruling of nearly thirty years of lower court precedent dating back to 1966, e.g., Tauine, M. Zeitzer, In Central Bank’s Wake, RICO’s Voice Resonates: Are Civil Aiding and Abetting Claims Still Tenable?, 29 COLUM. J.L.& SOC. PROBS. 551, 557 (1996), a point that may only beg the question why courts deciding cases closer in time to enactment of the 1933 and 1934 acts seemingly did not perceive any cause of action for aiding and abetting.
51. Daniel L. Brockett, Line Between Primary and Secondary Liability Still Blurred in Securities Cases, 50 FED. LAW. 29, 32 (Aug. 2003).
52. See Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 721 n.2 (2d Cir. 1997). Until recently, however, most courts adhered to a “bright line” test pursuant to which a party cannot be liable unless it directly made the offending statement to the public. Wright v. Ernst & Young, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999); In re MTC Elec. Tech. Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated in part on reconsideration, 993 F. Supp. 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
53. DeLeon, supra note 30, at 732 (citing Knapp v. Ernst Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431, 1440–41 (9th Cir. 1996); O’Neil v. Appel, 897 F. Supp. 995, 1000 (W.D. Mich. 1995)).
54. DeLeon, supra note 30, at 730 (citing SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1996)).
65. A “liberal notice pleading” standard should govern aiding-abetting claims, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). See Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 579–80 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
66. Unicredito Italiano SpA v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 288 F. Supp. 2d 485, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Gabriel Capital, L.P. v. Nat. West Fin., Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 491, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (financial institutions subject to liability for assisting Enron Ponzi scheme)).
67. Fiol v. Doellstedt, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308, 312 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Saunders v. Superior Ct., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 446 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(c) (1979).
70. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), cited in Picinich v. United Parcel Service, 321 F. Supp. 2d 485, 517 (N.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Linde, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 579–80.
71. See PROSSER & KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS §§ 322–24 (1984).
72. See generally In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 383 F. Supp. 2d 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); cf. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 (human rights violations by foreign government). In Unocal, the court applied a slightly modified version of the RESTATEMENT test, given the international nature of the controversy. 395 F.3d at 951.
73. In re AHT Corp., 292 B.R. 734, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff ’d, 123 Fed. Appx. 17 (2d Cir. 2005).
78. Nathan Isaac Combs, Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability, 58 VAND. L. REV. 241, 291 (2005).
79. Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 95 (5th Cir. 1975), cited in Combs, supra note 78, at 291.
80. Ronald A. Brown, Jr., Note, Claims of Aiding and Abetting a Director’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty— Does Everybody Who Deals with a Delaware Director Owe Fiduciary Duties to that Director’s Shareholders?, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 943, 956 (1990) (citing numerous unpublished cases).
81. See generally Javitch v. First Montauk Financial Corp., 279 F. Supp. 2d 931 (N.D. Ohio 2003).
83. Id. at 1120–21 (citing Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Leahey Constr. Co., 219 F.3d 519, 536 (6th Cir. 2000)); Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 459 (8th Cir. 1991); Woods v. Barnett Banks of Ft. Lau- derdale, 765 F.2d 1004, 1010 (11th Cir. 1985); Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 87 (5th Cir 1975)).
84. Neilson, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1122 n.70 (“While it may ultimately prove to be the case that the Banks did not know Slatkin had investors other than the account holders, the court must, for purposes of this motion, accept as true the allegations to the contrary contained in plaintiffs’ third amended complaint.”).
85. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman & Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978), amended, 1978 WL 4098 (2d Cir. May 22, 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
88. Leahey, 219 F.3d at 536 (citing Camp. v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 459 (8th Cir. 1991) and Wood- ward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[I]f the method or transaction is atypical . . . , it may be possible to infer the knowledge necessary for aiding and abetting liability.”)); see also Neilson, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1120.
91. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Dealy, 911 F.2d 1096, 1100 (5th Cir. 1990) (an investor in a limited partnership could not escape liability under an indemnification it owed to the surety, holding that the mere contention that the surety may have known the general partner had engaged in prior securities law violations was insufficient to establish that the surety was an aider or abettor).
105. “[T]he very nature of fraud tends to be sneaky, behind-the-scenes, and indirect . . .” Robert A. Prentice, Locating that “Indistinct” and “Virtually Nonexistent” Line Between Primary and Secondary Liability under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. REV. 691, 732 (1997).
106. See Tew v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 728 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1990), amended on reconsideration, 741 F. Supp. 220 (S.D. Fla. 1990); see also Levine v. Diamanthusel, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir.1991); FDIC v. First Interstate Bank of Des Moines, N.A., 885 F.2d 423, 432–33 (8th Cir. 1989).
107. See generally Javitch v. First Montauk Fin. Corp. 279 F. Supp. 2d 931, 941 (N.D. Ohio 2003).
108. See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 382 F. Supp. 2d 549, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Primavera Familienstifung v. Askin, 130 F. Supp. 2d 450, 507 n. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), amended on reconsideration, in part, 137 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
109. See, e.g., In re Citigroup, Inc. Sec. Litig., 330 F. Supp. 2d 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
110. Commodity Futures Trading Corp. v. Sidoti, 178 F.3d 1132, 1136 (11th Cir. 1999) (aiding and abetting occurred though decision to hire sales personnel exclusively from various companies with histories of sales practice fraud coupled with absence of training or attempt to restrain practices).
111. Abbott v. Equity Group, Inc., 2 F.3d 613, 623 n.33 & 626 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom, 510 U.S. 1177 (1994).
112. See generally In re IKON Office Solutions, Inc., 277 F.3d 658, 673 (3d Cir. 2002).
120. Ryan v. Hunton & Williams, No. 99-CV-5938 ( JG), 2000 WL 1375265, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); accord Abbott v. Equity Group, Inc., 2 F.3d 613, 623 n. 33 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom, 510 U.S. 1177 (1994) (merely acting as surety and bonding agent for fraud perpetrator was, “even if substantial . . . merely ‘grist of the mill.’ ”). In connection with the Bennett Funding equipment-leasing Ponzi scheme, investors alleged that Sphere Drake Insurance Co. had aided and abetted the perpe- trators. See In re Bennett Funding Group, Inc., 258 B.R. 67 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). There, it was alleged that a reinsurer assisted the perpetrators in deceiving investors by issuing reinsurance subject to a hidden indemnity owed to it by the insured. This arrangement allegedly created an illusion of financial protection that helped persuade investors to participate in Bennett’s investment proposals.
122. Leahey, 219 F.3d at 535; Rolf, 570 F.2d at 48; see also Linde, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 582 (financing provided to known terrorist subjects bank to aiding-abetting liability).
123. Diamond State Ins. Co. v. Worldwide Weather Trading LLC, No. 02 Civ. 2900 LMM GWG, 2002 WL 31819217, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2002).
149. See McDaniel v. Bear Stearns & Co., 196 F. Supp. 2d 343, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Martin v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 639 F. Supp. 931, 934–35 (D. Md. 1986).
150. Combs, supra note 78, at 268 (citing Josephine Willis, Note, To (B) or Not to (B); The Future of Aider and Abettor Liability in South Carolina, 51 S.C.L. REV. 1045, 1056 (2000)). Combs criticizes the premise of the “sliding scale” test and calls into question its logic. Id.
153. Id. (citing In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d 1484, 1495 (8th Cir. 1997)).
154. E.g., In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d at 1495; Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman & Flom, 601 N.W. 2d 179, 188 (Minn. 1999).
155. Cromer Finance Ltd. v. Berger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 452, 470 (S.D. NY 2001).
156. Id. (quoting Kolbeck v. LIT Am., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 240, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
157. Neilson, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1135; Metge v. Bachler, 762 F. 2d 621, 624 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom, 474 U.S. 1057, 1072 (1986) (must be a “ ‘substantial causal connection between the culpable conduct of the alleged aider and abettor and the harm to the plaintiff[,]’ . . . or a showing that ‘the encouragement or assistance is a substantial factor in causing the resulting tort’ ”).
158. See Primavera Familienstifung v. Askin, 130 F. Supp. 2d 450, 503 n.54 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), amended on reconsideration, in part, 137 F. Supp 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
159. See generally, Bondi v. Citigroup, Inc., No. BER-L-10902-04, 2005 WL 975856, at *18 (N.J. Super. Law Div. 2005).
160. E.g. AmeriFirst Bank v. Bomar, 757 F. Supp. 1365, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
161. Casey v. U.S. Bank Assoc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 401, 405-06 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Holmes v. Young, 885 P.2d 305, 308 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1097 (Del. 2001); Nerbonne, N.V. v. Lake Bryant Int’l Properties, 689 So.2d 322, 325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Thornwood, Inc. v. Jenner & Block, 799 N.E.2d 756, 768–69 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003), appeal denied, 807 N.E.2d 982 (Ill. 2004); Kuhlman Elec. Corp. v. Chappell, Nos. 2003-CA-001232-MR, 2004-CA-000633-MR, 2005 WL 3243498, at *8 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2005.); Cacciola v. Nellhaus, 733 N.E.2d 133, 139 (Mass. Ct. App. 2000); Carson Fischer, PLC v. Standard Fed. Bank, Nos. 248125, 248167, 2005 WL 292343, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2005), rev’d in part, 2006 WL 1303137 (Mich. May 12, 2006); Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 186–87 (Minn. 1999); Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Lighthouse Fin., No. 04 CVS 1523, 2005 WL 1995410, at *7 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 13, 2005); Bondi v. Citigroup, Inc., No. BER-L-10902-04, 2005 WL 975856, at *18 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 28, 2005); Fate v. Owens, 27 P.3d 990, 997–98 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001), cert. denied, 27 P.3d 476 (N.M. 2001); Shearson Lehman Bros. Inc. v. Bagley, 614 N.Y.S.2d 5 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); Future Group II v. Nationsbank, 478 S.E.2d 45, 50 (S.C. 1996); Chem-Age Indus., Inc. v. Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756, 773–76 (S.D. 2002); Toles v. Toles, 113 S.W.3d 899, 917 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003); Halifax Corp. v. Wachovia Bank, 604 S.E.2d 403, 412–14 (Va. 2004); Lenticular Europe, LLC ex rel Van Leeuwen v. Cunnally, 693 N.W.2d 302, 309 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005). Georgia does not recognize a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty. Monroe v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 602 SE 2d 219, 224 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). There are conflicting decisions concerning Pennsylvania law. Compare Adena, Inc. v. Cohn, 162 F. Supp. 2d 351, 357 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (predicting Pennsylvania would recognize a claim for aiding-abetting breach of fiduciary duty) with Daniel Boone Area School Dist. v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 187 F. Supp. 2d 400, 413 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (concluding adoption of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6876 would “expand” Pennsylvania law).
162. Metro. Trans. Auth. v. Contini, No. 04-CV-0104 DGTJMA, 2005 WL 1565524, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2005).
163. In Re Lee Memory Gardens, Inc., 333 BR 76, 81 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2005) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 888 (8th Ed. Rev. 2004)).
167. The NYSE reportedly settled with the group, agreeing to undertake a fresh opinion on the deal. In December 2005, the merger was approved by a vote of NYSE members. See http://www.secinfo.com/drDX9.z1b2.htm (last visited, May 23, 2006).
168. Higgins, 806 N.Y.S.2d at 344. The discussion here relates to the allegations in plaintiff ’s complaint.
183. Tew, 728 F. Supp. at 1568; Andreo v. Friedlander, Gaines, Cohen, Rosenthal & Rosenberg, 660 F. Supp. 1362, 1367 (D. Conn. 1987); cf. OSRecovery, Inc. v. One Groupe, Int’l, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 2d 357, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
184. Gen. Cable Corp. v. Highlander, No. 1:05-CV-00083, 2005 WL 2875380, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 2, 2005).
185. Sompo Japan Ins., Inc. v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, No. 03 CVS 5547, 2005 WL 1412741, *4 (N.C. Sup. Ct. June 10, 2005). In Sompo, the court concluded that knowledge of the underlying fraud (plus assistance) was prerequisite to aiding-abetting fraud and because, in the court’s view, these elements duplicated a fraud claim, aider-abettor liability was superfluous. The court made a fairly obvious error. Fraud arises from the making of a misrepresentation or the commission of some other deception, whereas aiding-abetting may involve a degree of assistance that in no way (by itself ) deceives anyone.
187. Cacciola, 733 N.E. 2d at 139–40. There, however, counsel had an independent duty to the partnership. Id. at 137.
188. Rabobank Nederland v. Nat’l. Westminster Bank, Nos. A104604, A104632, A106145, 2005 WL 1840108, at *9–11 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2005).
189. E.g., Reynolds v. Schrock, 107 P.3d 52 (Or. Ct. App. 2005), appeal allowed, 124 P.3d 1248 (Or. 2005); Morganroth & Morganroth v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, P.C., 331 F.3d 406, 412, 414 (3d Cir. 2003); Thornwood, Inc. v. Jenner & Block, 799 N.E. 2d 756 (Ill. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, 807 N.E.2d 982 (Ill. 2004); Cacciola v. Nellhaus, 733 N.E.2d 133, 136, 139–40 (Mass. Ct. App. 2000); Kurker v. Hill, 689 N.E.2d 833, 837 ( Mass. Ct. App. 1998); Noel v. Hall, No. Civ. 99-649-AS, 2000 WL 251709, at *7 (D. Or. Jan. 18, 2000), on reconsideration, 2000 WL 1364227 (D. Or. Sept. 15, 2000). A trustee’s attorney may be liable for a trustee’s breach of the trust if the attorney “knew or should have known that he was assisting the trustee to commit a breach of trust.” AUSTIN WAKERMAN SCOTT AND WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 326.4 (4th ed. 1989) (emphasis added).
236. See generally Tanvir Alam, Fraudulent Advisors Exploit Confusion in the Bankruptcy Code: How In Pari Delicto Has Been Perverted to Prevent Recovery for Innocent Creditors, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 305, 306–08 (2003).
237. In re M. Silverman Laces, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 6209 (DC), 2002 WL 31412465, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2002) (trustee could not sue bank for allegedly acting in concert with the debtor’s share- holders and principals to defraud the creditors, because the debtor itself could not file such a suit).
243. 128 P.3d at 254; but see Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir. 2001) (creditors’ committee had standing to pursue “deepening insolvency claim on behalf of debtor corporations” but defense of in pari delicto barred claim).
244. See Alam, supra note 236, at 306–08. Section 541 provides that all legal and equitable causes of action belong to the estate, 11 U.S.C. §541(a)(1), which, some courts hold, situates all trustees’ actions in the shoes of the bankrupt company. Alam, supra note 236, at 306–08.
262. Marcia L. Walter, Aiding and Abetting the Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Will the Greenmailer Be Held Liable?, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1271, 1272 (1989).
273. See, e.g., Jubelirer v. MasterCard Int’l, 68 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1054 (W.D. Wis. 1999); Touhy v. Northern Trust Bank, No. 98 C 6302, 1999 WL 342700, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. May 17,1999) (“Thus, even though this court must construe RICO liberally . . . this court cannot ignore the clear indication by Congress in failing to reference 18 U.S.C. § 2 in the language of § 1962(c) as well.”); Sorrano v. New York Life Ins. Co., No. 96 C 7882, 1999 WL 104403, *7–8 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 1999); In re Lake States Commodities, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 1461, 1475 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Pennsylvania Ass’n of Edwards Heirs v. Rightenour, 235 F.3d 839, 843–44 (3d Cir. 2000); Ling v. Deutsche Bank, No. 04 CV 4566 (HB), 2005 WL 1244689 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2005); Hayden v. Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, 955 F. Supp. 248, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Following the reasoning in Central Bank, this Court declines to create a private right of action for aiding and abetting a RICO violation. Nowhere in the text of Section 1962 is there any indication that Congress intended to impose aiding and abetting liability for a violation of the RICO statute.”); Dep’t of Econ. Dev. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 924 F. Supp. 449, 475–77 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Wuliger v. Liberty Bank, N.A., No. 3:02 CV 1378, 2004 WL 3377416 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 4, 2004); In re MasterCard Int’l, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468, 494–95 (E.D. La. 2001), aff ’d, 313 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2002).
274. See Bondi v. Citigroup, Inc., No. BER-L-10902-04, 2005 WL 975856, *24 (N.J. Super. Law Div. Feb. 28, 2005), leave to appeal granted, 878 A.2d 850 (N.J. 2005).
276. State v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 599 P.2d 777, 784 (Ariz. 1979), overruled in part, State v. Gunnison, 618 P.2d 604 (Ariz 1980); In re LTV Steel Co., Inc., 333 B.R. 397, 414–15 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005).
277. Adderly, 168 S.W. 3d at 839 (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. ART. 581-33A(2) (Vernon Supp. 2004–05)).
290. In re: Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F. Supp. 2d 539, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). These claims met the statutory standard for “material” support of terrorism.
291. Id. at 567. Cozen O’Connor represents certain insurers in connection with this litigation.
292. Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 582 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
293. Id. at 583 (citing Boim, 291 F.3d at 1018–21). The court, citing Boim, further observed that in Central Bank the court was addressing an implied right of action (private securities fraud suits), not an express right of action such as that provided by the Anti-Terrorism Act. Id.
300. See More Heat on Hedge Funds: Regulators are Probing Trades by Managers With Inside Access, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE (Feb. 6, 2006), available at www.BusinessWeek.com (last visited, Feb. 13, 2006).
Whistle-blowers, take heart. The Supreme Court is on your side. And that certainly includes those reporting health-care fraud.
In recent years, the federal government has turned to a Civil War era statute to attack health-care fraud and other types of fraud committed against taxpayer dollars. That statute, the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. ? 3729 et seq., permits the United States to recover treble damages and penalties of up to $10,000 per knowing false claim, and allows private whistle-blowers to sue in the name of the United States and recover sizable bounties.
In a critical decision in May, the Supreme Court for the first time addressed whether the False Claims Act’s whistle-blower provision withstands scrutiny under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. In Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens , 120 S. Ct. 1858, 146 L. Ed. 2d 836 (2000), the court confirmed the continued viability of this tool by holding that whistle-blowers do have standing to pursue claims under the FCA. After addressing this issue, the court did, however, hold that whistle-blowers may not sue states under this statute and left unclear whether the federal government could pursue those claims.
Stevens is basically good news for the FCA in that a recurring and troubling constitutional challenge to whistle-blower suits has been resolved. Left in place is a powerful, financial incentive that brings considerable fraud to light. However, the ruling also narrows the universe of fraud that will be brought to the attention of the Department of Justice, while containing language that likely will serve as ammunition for future defense challenges to FCA proceedings. This article discusses the expected effect of this decision in the context of the FCA’s history.
The False Claims Act permits either the federal government or a private party acting on the government’s behalf (a qui tam plaintiff, relator or colloquially, whistle-blower) to sue any “person” for damages and penalties caused by “knowing” false claims for government funds. The qui tam plaintiff can receive a share of any recovery. The government may assume control of the whistle-blower’s case, but if it does not, the whistle-blower may proceed on his or her own.
Although enacted in 1863, the FCA was used sparingly before the late 1980s. Courts had barred whistle-blower suits if the information were already known to the government. In addition, several federal circuit courts had imposed high standards of proof and scienter, requiring “clear and convincing evidence” and “intentional” false claims.
Congress removed these roadblocks in 1986. The amended FCA authorized whistle-blowers to bring FCA suits regardless of whether the government already was aware of the fraud, so long as they were “original sources” of any allegations that had been publicly disclosed.
Congress also specified that the burden of proof had to have the usual civil “preponderance of the evidence” standard and clarified that the act authorized suits against (1) the “ostrich with its head in the sand” who submits false claims with recklessness or with deliberate ignorance of their truth or falsity, and (2) those paid by third parties receiving federal funds under grants or contracts.
In addition, Congress raised the possible award for a proper qui tam plaintiff in cases taken over by the government from a maximum of 10 percent, to a guaranteed 15 to 25 percent of the recovery (depending on their contribution to the success of the action.) Congress also increased the government’s remedies from double to treble damages, and from $2,000, to $5,000 to $10,000 for each false claim.
It is important to note that Congress signaled its intent that the law be used to combat health-care fraud. The Senate Judiciary Committee explained that the law “is intended to reach all fraudulent attempts to cause the government to pay out sums of money or to deliver property or services . . . A false claim for reimbursement under the Medicare, Medicaid or similar program is actionable under the act.” S. Rep. No. 99-345 at 9.
As a direct result of the 1986 amendments, the government saw a tremendous increase in qui tam filings. The number rose from 33 in fiscal year 1987 to 483 in fiscal year 1999. By February 2000, the United States had recovered more than $3.5 billion through FCA qui tam cases, with $550 million of this amount having been paid to the private whistle-blowers who brought the cases. Initially, the greatest percentage of these recoveries involved defense-contract fraud. This changed as the magnitude of the health-care fraud problem became apparent.
In 1992, the General Accounting Office released a report estimating that 10 percent of provider billings to Medicare were fraudulent. In 1993, Attorney General Janet Reno set health-care fraud as one of her top priorities. Subsequently, in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Congress provided more than $150 million in new health-care fraud enforcement funds for the DOJ and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for FY 1997, and 15 percent more each year thereafter until 2003 (assuming the government recovered at least as much in multiple damages and penalties in health-care fraud cases.)
By 1993, recoveries in FCA cases against health-care providers began climbing significantly, and, in 1997, surpassed the government’s recoveries from defense contractors. In Fiscal Year 1997, the government brought in almost $1 billion in False Claims Act judgments and settlements in the area of health-care fraud alone. By February 2000, more than half of the $3.5 billion that Justice had recovered under the amended qui tam provision since 1986 came from cases alleging fraud against HHS.
Most of the FCA cases in the health-care area have targeted private insurance companies, clinical laboratories, hospitals and other providers, although the government has also investigated the conduct of state agencies and state-owned medical facilities.
Examples of the latter cases include United States ex rel. Zissler v. University of Minnesota ($32 million settlement of grant-fraud claims) and United States ex rel. Kready v. University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio ($17.2 million settlement of allegations that the teaching hospital violated Medicare rules on billing for faculty doctors). (Also note Department of Justice press releases concerning additional settlements with state-owned teaching hospitals in the so-called “Physicians at Teaching Hospitals” or “PATH” project; and, U.S. ex rel. Denoncourt v. New York State Department of Social Services ($27-million settlement resolving claims that New York submitted false claims for funds to train Medicaid and other social service workers).
Since 1992, there have been dramatic increases in the size of recoveries in individual health-care fraud cases, both by the government and by whistle-blowers. After a $111-million settlement with National Health Laboratories in 1992, additional record settlements were reached with Smith-Kline Beecham Clinical Laboratories ($325 million), Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Illinois ($140 million), and National Medical Care ($375 million). In several health-care cases, whistle-blowers received more than $5 million of the government’s money.
On Nov. 13, 1999, the New York Times reported that Medicare spending had dropped for the first time in the history of the program, and that “efforts to rein in fraud” were at least partially responsible for the decline.
The government’s aggressive and very successful enforcement program was met by allegations by the hospital industry that the government was improperly and overzealously enforcing the statute, and prompted repeated defense challenges to the constitutionality of the whistle-blower provision.
The American Hospital Association (AHA) was particularly aggrieved by the department’s “national initiatives” that targeted violations of Medicare billing rules, and launched a grassroots campaign to persuade Congress to create new FCA defenses for health-care providers. The AHA was not successful, largely because the Senate recognized that the FCA effectively addresses a serious national problem. Nonetheless, to respond to the criticisms, in June 1998, Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder issued “Guidelines on the Use of the FCA in Civil Health Care Fraud Cases” to formalize policies on using the FCA, and, in doing so, provided the Senate with a viable alternative to amending the FCA.
Meanwhile, various court challenges to the FCA’s qui tam provisions were winding their way through the courts, mostly without success. By the fall of 1999, five courts of appeals had rejected the argument that relators lacked “standing” under Article III of the U.S. Constitution to bring claims on behalf of the government. Three courts of appeals had held that qui tam suits did not violate the “take care” clause in Article II, and the “separation of powers” doctrine, which gave the executive branch the power to decide how to enforce the laws, while the opposite conclusion was reached by one circuit in Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital, 196 F.3d 514, reh’g en banc granted, 196 F.3d 561 (5th Cir. 1999).
The Supreme Court finally put the Article III standing issue to rest in Stevens. Stevens is a qui tam suit filed by Jonathan Stevens against his former employer, the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources. Stevens claimed that Vermont had submitted false claims in connection with EPA-administered grant programs. The state had challenged the suit under the 11th Amendment, and on the ground that a state is not a “person” who can be sued under the FCA.
Before reaching Vermont’s challenges, the court determined sua sponte to address the threshold issue of whether relators had Article III standing to bring qui tam actions. Justice Scalia’s opinion for the court ruled that whistle-blowers do have standing because the bounty provision for relators operates as a partial assignment of the government’s damages claims under the FCA. Scalia noted “the long tradition of qui tam actions in England and the American colonies,” and concluded that the partial assignment suffices to give qui tam plaintiffs the “injury in fact” required for standing to sue in federal court. (120 S.Crt. at 1863)
This resolution of one constitutional question is qualified by Footnote 8, which states that two other constitutional issues remain open, specifically whether qui tam suits could pass muster under the Article II “take care” clause and the “appointments” clause of Article II, Section 2, which vests the president with exclusive power to select the government’s principal officers. (120 S.Crt. at 1865)
Proceeding to the central issue, the majority then held that qui tam plaintiffs may not sue states under the FCA. The majority applied to the FCA’s text the court’s “long-standing interpretive presumption that ‘person’ does not include the sovereign” and examined whether the statute’s liability provision (which imposes liability on “any person”) contained any “plain statement” that the term “person” includes states. (120 S.Crt. at 1866) The majority concluded that relators may not sue states because the FCA’s provisions “far from providing the requisite affirmative indications that the term ‘person’ included states for purposes of qui tam liability, indicate quite the contrary.” Id. at 1870.
The majority also noted that, “the current version of the FCA imposes damages that are essentially punitive in nature, which would be inconsistent with state qui tam liability in light of the presumption against imposition of punitive damages on governmental entities.” Id. at 1869. In doing so, the court for the first time found the FCA’s remedies to be punitive on their face.
Scalia seemingly took pains to limit the majority’s ruling to “private” FCA actions (that is, those initiated by qui tam relators.) He consistently used the term “qui tam” or “private” when referencing the suits at issue, and in a footnote distinguished Supreme Court holdings that authorize federal suits against states. Id. at 1866, n. 9. Moreover, Justices Ginsburg’s and Breyer’s concurring opinion explained that, “the clear statement rule applied to private suits against a state has not been applied when the United States is a plaintiff,” and commented that the majority’s decision left open the issue of whether the government may sue states under the FCA. Id. at 1871.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is not at all clear that the Supreme Court would authorize government FCA actions against states if the issue were squarely before it. The court not only held that the FCA lacks “affirmative indications” that Congress meant for the law to be used against states, it also concluded that the statutory language affirmatively indicates the contrary.
With regard to the most far-reaching issue decided by the court — whether whistle-blowers may sue at all under the FCA — Stevens is great news for the federal government’s health-care fraud enforcement efforts. The court’s resolution of the Article III standing question eliminates an issue that has bedeviled qui tam actions for years.
In finding Article III standing, the court affirmed the constitutionality of a masterfully crafted statute that turns silent witnesses into government informers. Moreover, the court put to bed an argument that has repeatedly delayed the resolution of qui tam cases and also handicapped the government’s efforts to expeditiously recover dollars lost to Medicare and other fraud. However, not all the possible constitutional challenges to the qui tam provision have been resolved, as Scalia’s Footnote 8 expressly stated.
Stevens’ main holding that private individuals cannot sue states under the FCA likely will adversely affect Uncle Sam’s ability to recover damages from state entities committing fraud on federal programs. While there may well be litigation to determine whether the court’s ruling affects municipal entities and state-owned medical facilities as well as state governing bodies, within the category of affected cases, Stevens will have unfortunate, chilling effects.
In the first instance, the government will be less likely to learn of the frauds involving states since whistle-blowers have lost the financial incentive to report such matters. In addition, the ruling may discourage federal agencies from pursuing these cases because of the legal uncertainty as to whether the government has a cause of action.
Finally, the court’s conclusive statement — bereft of any empirical analysis — that the FCA imposes damages “that are essentially punitive in nature” is likely to spawn litigation in a number of areas. For example, this language may be cited in support of challenges under the “double-jeopardy” clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution in instances in which the government elects both to allege violations of the FCA and prosecute a provider under a criminal law.
The double-jeopardy clause provides that no “person [shall] be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb” and bars successive criminal punishments for the same offense. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 98-99 (1997). Under certain circumstances, a civil sanction can be deemed criminal punishment for purposes of the double-jeopardy clause. Id..
The court’s characterization of the FCA as “essentially punitive” also may be cited in support of challenges to FCA actions under the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against “excessive fines.” This clause applies to penalties so long as they are “punitive in part” (United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 329, n. 4, and 331, n. 6 (1998)), and applies whether the penalties are criminal or civil (see, for example, United States v. Ahmad, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11728, at 31, n.4).
However, there are responses to these constitutional arguments if they arise in litigation. With regard to double jeopardy, even if the government uses a traditional criminal law along with the FCA to address the same offense, a court nonetheless could find that the FCA’s damages are not a “criminal penalty” subject to the constraints of the double-jeopardy clause since “only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980).
Courts must resolve the question of whether a civil remedy is, in fact, a criminal penalty, through an analysis of seven factors. See Hudson, supra, 522 U.S. at 99-100. While several of these factors examine whether the sanction is considered punishment, several other factors, including whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, and whether a purpose other than punishment is assignable to it, point to a conclusion that the FCA’s damages and penalties are not “criminal” punishment.
The government also could answer the excessive-fines argument on its merits. A court may only find a “penalty” subject to the excessive-fines clause to violate the clause if it is “grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.” United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334. This analysis is case-specific and fact-intensive. In Bajakajian, the Supreme Court reviewed a forfeiture of $357,144 from a traveler who failed to declare that he was transporting more than $10,000 out of the United States. The court found an Eighth Amendment violation. The court noted that his offense was an isolated “reporting” offense unconnected to other illegal activities, and caused minimal harm, “no fraud on the U.S.” and “no loss to the public fisc.” Id. at 337-39.
Recently, the Fourth Circuit distinguished Bajakajian in a case involving an elaborate, long-running, currency-transaction reporting scheme that was related to customs and tax fraud, and put at risk numerous players. Ahmad, supra.
Health-care fraud cases often involve thousands of relatively small claims submitted over a period of years. Defendants conceivably could be liable for FCA penalties many times in excess of the actual damages since the penalties could be assessed at the statutory maximum of $10,000 per claim plus treble damages even when the amounts of the individual claims are much less than $10,000. But unlike Bajakajian, such cases ordinarily involve persistent misconduct, damage to the federal treasury, and considerable societal harm, and so, under Ahmad’s rationale, heavy penalties are more likely to survive an Eighth Amendment challenge.
Moreover, the government can avoid both the double-jeopardy and excessive-fines arguments through careful prosecutive and litigation choices. Since the double-jeopardy clause prohibits successive prosecution only for the “same offense,” the double-jeopardy issue will not even arise if the criminal prosecutors either (1) charge a provider with an offense that does not include knowing, false claims as elements, or (2) prosecute the provider for specific health-care claims not covered in the allegations in the civil action. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (setting forth “same elements” test).
With regard to excessive fines, the government can and does refrain from reflexively seeking statutory penalties in addition to treble damages for every false claim. In fact, it rarely seeks penalties in negotiated settlements — which are how civil FCA disputes are usually resolved.
Stevens has not resolved all the questions about the FCA’s use, and some of its language may be used in future challenges to the statute. But the court has resolved the Article III standing question and in doing so has sent a strong signal that this useful statute will remain important in fighting health-care fraud.
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