When Merger Review Turns Criminal

5 Min Read By: Creighton J. Macy, Craig Y. Lee

IN BRIEF

  • The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division (Antitrust Division) are responsible for enforcing federal antitrust laws.
  • Understanding the collaboration between the civil and criminal sections of the Antitrust Division is vital to attorneys and their clients subject to the merger review process.
  • Companies need to be increasingly aware of the risks that ordinary course documents present.

Of all the ways that a merger can go wrong, it is hard to think of a worse scenario than the deal falling apart and the parties being subject to a criminal investigation. Lawyers are constantly tracking and negotiating terms in an effort to close the deal. And in this push to finalize the transaction and meet the expectations of clients and various regulatory agencies, practitioners can be faced with potential ramifications far more serious to the business than they ever would have expected (or, at least, had hoped not to expect).

At its surface, antitrust can neatly be divided into civil and criminal matters. Civil matters involve merger review, civil non‑merger conduct review, and civil litigation. Criminal matters generally consist of investigating violations of price-fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation. Two U.S. agencies, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division (Antitrust Division), are responsible for enforcing federal antitrust laws. While the FTC is solely civil, the Antitrust Division is separated into civil and criminal enforcement sections. The Antitrust Division’s offices responsible for criminal enforcement are located in Washington, D.C., San Francisco, Chicago, and New York. Although these criminal offices have assigned territories, they are not bound by geography, as investigations often take place across the country and around the globe. The six civil sections of the Antitrust Division are all located in Washington and are divided by subject matter expertise.

But that separation of criminal and civil enforcement sections at the Antitrust Division does not create walls or silos. The different criminal offices often work together on large investigations and trials. Similarly, the size of many civil investigations requires pulling resources from the various civil sections, as well as from the Antitrust Division’s Appellate, International, and Competition Policy and Advocacy sections. But the collaboration does not end there. Coordination between the civil and criminal sections is the norm. Section managers meet regularly to discuss matters and often consult on an informal basis. Cross‑pollination occurs at the trial attorney level as attorneys are detailed to other sections for specific matters or periods of time. And understanding this collaboration between the civil and criminal sections is vital to attorneys and their clients subject to the merger review process. A recent case not only shows how in sync the Antitrust Division’s criminal and civil sections are, but also highlights the implications of that collaboration.

In December 2014, two packaged seafood companies announced their proposed merger. As is customary to the review process, the parties submitted documents to one of the Antitrust Division’s civil sections. What followed was anything but routine. However, based on the level of collaboration within the Antitrust Division, it should not have been unexpected.

From document review to charges for price-fixing

The Antitrust Division’s civil attorneys reviewed the documents submitted by the parties and uncovered information that raised concerns of price‑fixing. When the parties walked away from the deal on December 3, 2015, then-Assistant Attorney General Bill Baer’s statement in the press release made a veiled reference to their problematic documents. He said, “Our investigation convinced us—and the parties knew or should have known from the get-go—that the market is not functioning competitively today, and further consolidation would only make things worse.”

The parties’ abandonment of the deal did not end the Antitrust Division’s investigation. Instead, the civil attorneys conducting the merger review shared their findings with their criminal counterparts. A criminal section proceeded to open a price‑fixing investigation based on the shared materials. That investigation has borne fruit and is ongoing. To date, three individuals and one company have been charged for participation in a price‑fixing conspiracy. Criminal antitrust violations, such as price-fixing, have serious implications. Not only are the criminal penalties substantial, but companies can be subject to civil suits with treble damages (15 U.S.C. § 15.).

For individuals, the maximum penalties are 10 years in prison and a $1 million fine. For corporations, the maximum fine is $100 million. Fines for both individuals and corporations can exceed the statutory maximum amount by up to twice the gain derived or twice the loss by victims. See, e.g., Price Fixing, Bid Rigging and Market Allocation: An Antitrust Primer, Department of Justice Antitrust Division, available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/priceifxing-bid-rigging-and-market-al location-schemes (discussing the Sherman Act).

While it is not public what specific information was contained in the documents that raised the attention of the reviewing attorneys, or exactly how the process happened, the Antitrust Division did state that the criminal investigation was triggered by “information and party materials produced in the ordinary course of business.” Until more information is revealed, several questions remain, including whether similar criminal investigations based on documents submitted for merger review could be waiting to surface.

The packaged seafood matter is not the first criminal case to stem from a civil investigation and likely will not be the last. The hand‑in‑hand coordination between the civil and criminal sections of the Antitrust Division will continue. Companies need to be increasingly aware of the risks that ordinary course documents present, not just in impacting merger approval but also in criminal implications. Merger review does not exist in a vacuum. Once documents fall into the Antitrust Division’s (or FTC’s) hands, parties can expect that they will be closely reviewed with an eye toward both civil and criminal actions. Documents always tell a story—and attorneys need to be sure that the story told is one to support a proposed deal and not a criminal investigation.

Similarly, the FTC and Antitrust Division share a close working relationship. We will continue to explore and monitor the collaboration between those two agencies as well as with state attorneys general. We also plan to address the collaboration among competition agencies around the world. Stay tuned.

 

Craig Lee and Creighton Macy are antitrust partners in Baker McKenzie’s Washington, D.C., office. Prior to joining the firm, Craig served as assistant chief of Washington Criminal 1 and Creighton served as chief of staff and senior counsel at the Antitrust Division. All discussions of DOJ matters in this article are based on public information.  

By: Creighton J. Macy, Craig Y. Lee

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