Corporate Parents: Your Children Need an Accountant Too!

7 Min Read By: Scott F. Hessell

In Brief

  • Companies should expressly name each of their subsidiaries in engagement letters with accounting firms. An omitted subsidiary may be unable to sue for accounting malpractice, even if it relied on the accountant’s work and suffered harm, but low-cost governance measures can preserve litigation options.
  • Accounting firms routinely argue their professional duty of care runs only to the contracting party. Some courts agree, though some allow claims from related parties.
  • Several states have enacted statutory privity laws that create significant barriers to claims, where entities cannot sue accountants unless they are expressly identified in the engagement agreement.
  • Explicitly including a subsidiary in a contractual relationship allows it to take advantage of the longer statute of limitation deadlines for contract claims as compared to torts, giving it more time to discover and pursue accounting errors.

Cheeky title aside, executives, in-house counsel, and board members of “parent” corporations should ensure that every corporate “child” is specifically named in engagement letters with accounting firms. Three risks arise when subsidiaries are omitted:

  1. accountants will argue they owe no duties to any entity who did not specifically engage them, defeating malpractice claims at the pleading stage;
  2. a growing number of states have enacted statutory privity requirements that bar all claims asserted by parties lacking a direct contractual relationship; and
  3. without a written contract, a subsidiary may have to rely on tort claims with shorter limitations periods rather than longer contractual limitations periods.

This article addresses each of these hurdles and offers a straightforward solution. Although it may seem counterintuitive or perhaps illogical, especially for holding companies without their own operating assets, naming each subsidiary in the engagement agreement can foreclose an accounting firm’s commonly asserted defenses.

Common Law Duties of Care

A professional engaged to serve a corporation must meet the applicable professional standards of care. A recurring question is whether that duty runs only to the contracting party or also to related parties, such as officers, directors, and subsidiaries. In Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931), Justice Cardozo rejected an absolute bar based on privity but required the accountant to know that third parties would rely on its work. Thereafter, many jurisdictions adopted a test: permitting claims by parties in near-privity or those known to the accountants. See Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 543 (1985).

Other jurisdictions use the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 third-party beneficiary approach and impose liability on professionals for the benefit of the person for whom the accountant knows the information is intended. See Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 145–46 (N.J. 1983); Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 767–73 (Cal. 1992). Even there, firms routinely argue that their duty runs only to the contracting party.

Other jurisdictions apply a “balancing” test, weighing the engagement’s intended effect on the third party, foreseeability of harm, and closeness between the conduct and injury. Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958); see Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378, 383 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). Still others apply ordinary negligence principles when reliance is reasonably foreseeable. See Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361, 365–66 (Wis. 1983).

Thus, common law privity duties remain murky: courts weigh facts, apply exceptions, and sometimes find duty without a direct contract between the professional and corporate affiliates.

Uniform Accountancy Acts and Statutory Privity Defenses

In response to the lack of clarity in common law, accounting and professional organizations (and their insurers) have successfully lobbied state legislatures to foreclose intended beneficiaries of their work. Where enacted, no amount of reliance, misconduct, or damages overcomes the absence of a qualifying engagement. Therefore, a corporate subsidiary, investor, purchaser, and shareholder omitted from the engagement letter may face a locked courthouse door. See E. Dickerson & Son, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 825 A.2d 585, 589 (N.J. 2003); FDIC v. Ernst & Young LLP, Civil Action No. 20-1259, 2024 WL 247076, at *8 (E.D. La. Jan. 23, 2024).

For example, Louisiana’s Accountancy Act (“LAA”) provides that no person may sue for professional services unless the person is in privity of contract or the licensee knew that the client’s primary intent was to benefit or influence that particular claimant. La. Rev. Stat. § 37:91. Similar statutes exist in Arkansas, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, New Jersey, Utah, and Wyoming.[1] These statutes generally bar claims absent direct privity or specific knowledge that the work was intended to benefit or influence the claimant. Actual reliance does not cure the defect.

Applying these statutes, courts have disagreed about primary intent or specific knowledge. Freeman, Freeman and Salzman, P.C. v. Lipper, 349 Ill. App. 3d 677, 682 (2004) (claim permitted because reports addressed plaintiffs); cf. Yadlosky v. Grant Thornton, L.L.P., 120 F. Supp. 2d 622, 634 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (claim barred because investors were not identified). But some state laws go further. In Illinois, for example, the accountant’s knowledge that its work was intended by the client to benefit a particular claimant is not enough to establish liability; the accountant must also specifically name the intended beneficiary in writing to the client and send written confirmation to the non-client claimant. 225 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 450/30.1.

Kansas likewise requires identification in writing. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 1-402. Thus, a subsidiary’s protection depends on the accountant agreeing to specifically identify the claimant in writing. Critics argue that these shields can leave injured parties without a remedy. But unless narrowed or repealed, the burden falls on the corporate client to resolve privity by contract before trouble arises.

Longer Contractual Statutes of Limitation

Professional malpractice claims may originate in both tort and contract, but a written engagement generally provides the longer limitations period for contract claims. Written contract statute of limitations often run four to six years, versus two to three years for negligence. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2) (six years); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(6) (three years); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 337(1) (four years); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 339(1) (two years).

Accounting errors may surface years later, upon an IRS audit, transaction, or restated financial statement. Without privity, a subsidiary may be limited to pursuing recovery in tort and its shorter period. Establishing a contractual relationship with the accountant maximizes the subsidiary’s available recovery period.

An Easy Solution: Require that engagement letters with professional firms include all subsidiary entities as clients.

A simple and cost-effective way to avoid privity and limitations issues is to ensure that each engagement letter expressly names every subsidiary. This can be accomplished in four related steps.

First, list each subsidiary by its full legal name and specify that the firm’s duties run independently to each named entity. Generic references to “affiliates” or “related entities” may be insufficient. The list should appear in the engagement itself or an attached schedule, not merely in an informal understanding. This avoids later disputes over whether a generic reference included a particular entity.

Second, include an express acknowledgment that the firm’s professional duties extend to each named subsidiary and that each is an intended beneficiary with independent standing to bring claims. This directly addresses the “primary intent” requirement in the LAA and similar statutes, satisfying the statutory prerequisites at the engagement’s outset. The acknowledgment should also state that each named subsidiary may enforce the engagement and is not merely an incidental recipient of the work.

Third, when a subsidiary is formed or acquired, amend the engagement letter or execute a supplemental letter by name. A clause naming “future subsidiaries” may help, but enforceability varies, so the safest practice is a contemporaneous update. Counsel should not assume that a future-subsidiary provision automatically creates duties to an entity formed later. Cf. Parrott v. Coopers & Lybrand, L.L.P., 95 N.Y.2d 479, 484 (2000) (engagement terms define the accountant’s duty; absent evidence that the accountant knew its work would be used for a particular purpose by a particular party, no duty arises).

Finally, counsel should periodically review all professional engagement letters for coverage gaps, including those for accounting, audit, tax, and other professional firms serving the corporate structure. The review should confirm that each current entity appears in the letter, that new entities are added promptly, and that the firm’s acknowledgment matches the intended scope of work. An audit of existing letters, together with a template making subsidiary coverage standard, can eliminate the risk at minimal cost.

* * *

In-house counsel and board members overseeing companies with engagement letters that omit subsidiaries should: (1) audit all current engagement letters with accounting and other professional firms; (2) identify every subsidiary or affiliate not named as a party; (3) direct the relationship partner or firm administrator to execute an amendment adding each omitted entity and acknowledging independent duties to it; (4) present any refusal to the board as a risk factor in evaluating the relationship; and (5) adopt a policy requiring new subsidiaries to be added within thirty days of formation or acquisition, with compliance reported through regular governance review. These low-cost governance measures protect shareholder value and preserve litigation options if the company suffers professional malpractice. They also create a clear record that the board addressed a preventable litigation risk as part of its fiduciary oversight.


The views and opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of Sperling Kenny Nachwalter, LLC, its attorneys, or its current or former clients.


  1. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-302; 225 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 450/30.1; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 1-402; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2962; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-25; Utah Code Ann. § 58-26a-602. ↑

By: Scott F. Hessell

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