Corporate-Family Conflicts and Disinterestedness: The Jones Day Disqualification in Vanderbilt Minerals

23 Min Read By: Kenneth A. Rosen

In Brief

  • In In re Vanderbilt Minerals, LLC, Jones Day was disqualified as counsel to a member of a corporate family in Chapter 11 where it had represented other members.
  • Outside bankruptcy, the question Vanderbilt raises is governed by Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7, 1.9, and 1.13. But Bankruptcy Code § 327(a) requires that counsel to a debtor in possession not hold/represent an interest adverse to the estate and be a “disinterested person.”
  • There are three features of § 327(a) that the ethics rules do not share. The protected party is the estate rather than the client, so client consent does not cure the conflict; the inquiry extends to prior representations of the debtor’s affiliates without regard to the consent that would resolve them under Rule 1.9; and the appearance of conflict is sufficient.
  • Vanderbilt does not hold that a firm may never represent a corporate family and then represent one member of it; it turned on the details of the relationship. Under § 327(a), the court treated the debtor’s interest in continuity of counsel as a factor but not one that could overcome a failure of disinterestedness.

In April 2026, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of New York declined to approve Jones Day as counsel to Vanderbilt Minerals, LLC, holding that a firm that had represented members of a corporate family for more than a decade could not continue as counsel to one of them in Chapter 11. The holding rests on § 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, but the problem is one that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the bar ethics committees, and the academic literature have addressed for thirty years under the heading of corporate-family conflicts. Corporate groups routinely use one outside firm across the parent, its subsidiaries, and its affiliates, and the arrangement holds until the interests of two family members diverge over an intercompany claim, an investigation, or the distress of one entity—at which point the firm’s familiarity with the family becomes the ground on which it may be barred from acting for one member against another. This article sets out that framework and then examines why it did not resolve In re Vanderbilt Minerals, LLC.[1] The answer lies in three features of § 327(a) that the ethics rules do not share: the protected party is the estate rather than the client, so client consent does not cure the conflict; the inquiry extends to prior representations of the debtor’s affiliates without regard to the consent that would resolve them under Rule 1.9; and the appearance of conflict is sufficient.

The Retention Decision

Vanderbilt Minerals filed Chapter 11 on February 16, 2026, facing more than 1,400 talc-related cases with more than 150 scheduled for trial during the year, and applied to retain Jones Day as debtor’s counsel under § 327(a).[2] As Chief Judge Wendy A. Kinsella’s April 27 memorandum decision recounts, the firm’s history with the Vanderbilt companies began in 2011, when it represented R.T. Vanderbilt Company and assisted with the restructuring that produced Vanderbilt Minerals and its parent, R.T. Vanderbilt Holding Company Inc.; and it thereafter represented the debtor, the parent, and certain nondebtor affiliates on corporate and governance matters.

Two engagements in the two years before the filing proved decisive. In October 2024, Jones Day represented Vanderbilt Minerals, the parent, and Vanderbilt Chemicals, LLC, in evaluating a transfer of the VEEGUM processing facility from Chemicals to Vanderbilt Minerals, which did not occur. In the spring of 2025, it advised Vanderbilt Minerals and its affiliates in a global netting exercise that left approximately $127.3 million owing from the parent to Vanderbilt Minerals, subject to reconciliation and offset. Jones Day ended its representation of the parent and affiliates in September 2025 and thereafter represented only Vanderbilt Minerals. By the petition date, an independent manager with separate counsel was responsible for investigating intercompany matters and negotiating a settlement under which the debtor would release intercompany claims in exchange for asset transfers, including the VEEGUM facility.[3]

The court found the separation insufficient. It found no misconduct, stated that it was “not questioning the competence or integrity” of the firm, and accepted that the independent manager had negotiated the settlement without the firm’s involvement. The difficulty was that the firm had advised entities on both sides of transactions now central to the estate, and the court held that it should not have to evaluate the merits of those transactions, or the debtor’s solvency when they occurred, to find the firm free of conflict. The independent manager, in the court’s words, did not “disentangle” a relationship that had run for more than a decade.[4]

The Professional Responsibility Framework

Outside bankruptcy, the question Vanderbilt raises is governed by Model Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.13 and the opinions and commentary built on them. Rule 1.13(a) supplies the entity theory: a lawyer retained by an organization represents the organization, not its constituents. Comment [34] to Rule 1.7 extends the principle to affiliates. A lawyer who represents a corporation does not by that fact alone represent its parent or subsidiary and is not barred from a representation adverse to an affiliate in an unrelated matter, subject to three exceptions: where the circumstances are such that the affiliate should also be considered a client, where the lawyer and the organization have an understanding that the lawyer will avoid representations adverse to affiliates, and where the lawyer’s obligations to either the organization or the new client are “likely to limit materially” the representation of the other.[5]

Comment [34] was added in the Ethics 2000 revisions and was drawn largely from American Bar Association (“ABA”) Formal Opinion 95-390, which remains the foundational treatment.[6] That opinion, issued over several dissents, rejected a per se rule in either direction and identified the circumstances in which an affiliate becomes a de facto client: where client and affiliate are effectively alter egos, where the lawyer has received confidential information from or about the affiliate while representing the client, and where a single legal department retains and supervises counsel for both. Even where the affiliate is not a client, the opinion continued, a representation may be barred if its financial effect on the client would compromise the lawyer’s judgment. Its prescription, repeated by ethics committees since, is a clear understanding at the outset as to which entities in the family are the lawyer’s clients or are to be treated as such for conflicts purposes.

The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers takes the same position, recognizing that a representation adverse to a client’s affiliate may require the client’s consent where its effect on the client would be material, and directing that conflicts among affiliates be analyzed on the basis that the entities are separate.[7] Charles Wolfram’s article on corporate-family conflicts, on which the New York City Bar later relied, describes the “no-affiliates” and “all-affiliates” positions as poles that each produce indefensible results and argues for a functional analysis centered on the client’s reasonable expectations of confidentiality and of a smooth working relationship with its counsel, and on the operational proximity between the lawyer’s work and the affiliate.[8] Later commentary reads Comment [34]’s reference to an “unrelated” matter as importing the substantial-relationship test such that a lawyer is barred from acting adversely to an affiliate in a matter substantially related to the work done for the client even where the affiliate was never a client.[9]

The point bears on Vanderbilt because the firm’s affiliate representations had ended before the petition. The current-client analysis of Rule 1.7 then gives way to Rule 1.9, which bars a lawyer from representing another person in the same or a substantially related matter adverse to a former client without the former client’s informed consent, and from using the former client’s confidential information to its disadvantage.[10] Under the ethics rules, the questions would have been whether representing the debtor in a case built around a settlement of intercompany claims was substantially related to advising the parent and affiliates on the netting exercise and the VEEGUM transfer, and whether the parent’s consent, which a settlement counterparty is ordinarily willing to give, resolved the matter. Courts applying the rules disfavor curing a conflict by dropping one client to keep another, under the so-called hot potato rule, though Comment [5] to Rule 1.7 permits withdrawal from one representation where unforeseeable developments, such as a change in corporate affiliation, create the conflict.[11] The framework turns on client identification, substantial relationship, and consent, and the parties themselves resolve most corporate-family problems within it.

Two further features of the Model Rules bear directly on the Vanderbilt facts. The first is the treatment of common representation. The VEEGUM evaluation and the netting exercise were matters in which the firm acted for several members of the family at once, and the comments to Rule 1.7 address that arrangement separately: the lawyer must remain impartial among the commonly represented clients; should advise each of them at the outset that information will be shared among them; and should advise them that, as between commonly represented clients, the attorney-client privilege ordinarily does not attach.[12] If the common representation fails because the clients’ interests cannot be reconciled, “[o]rdinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all of the clients.”[13] The joint matters in Vanderbilt had concluded before the interests diverged, so the governing rule is Rule 1.9, but the common-representation comments explain why confidential information, the usual concern of a former-client analysis, carries less weight within a corporate family. Information that the firm received in a joint engagement was shared among the affiliates by design, and what remains is the question of loyalty.

The second feature addresses that question directly. ABA Formal Opinion 497 concluded that a lawyer’s attack on work that the lawyer performed for a former client, in the same or a substantially related matter, is materially adverse to that client under Rule 1.9(a) even where the former client is not a party to the later matter.[14] An investigation of intercompany claims by debtor’s counsel is in substance an inquiry into whether the netting exercise and the transfer analysis served the debtor, and the firm that advised on both would be asked to evaluate its own work. Rule 1.7 reaches the same point from the side of the current client, providing that a lawyer’s own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on the representation and that “if the probity of a lawyer’s own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice.”[15] The former-client conflict is imputed to every lawyer in the firm under Rule 1.10(a), so it cannot be avoided by staffing the debtor’s engagement with lawyers who did not do the affiliate work.[16] Both conflicts are nonetheless consentable in principle, by the former client under Rule 1.9(a) and by the debtor under Rule 1.7(b), and that is why the ethics framework left Jones Day a path that § 327(a) did not.

The New York Formulation

New York has addressed the question directly. The New York City Bar’s Formal Opinion 2007-3 asked whether a firm may accept a representation adverse to an affiliate of a current corporate client and, where the engagement letter does not resolve the question by excluding affiliates or through an advance waiver, answered with a three-part inquiry: whether the client has an objectively reasonable belief that the affiliate has become the firm’s client, by reason of the firm’s dealings with the affiliate or the overlap of personnel and infrastructure between the two; whether there is a significant risk that the firm’s representation of either client would be materially limited by its duties to the other; and whether the firm acquired confidences from the client or the affiliate that would be “so material to the adverse representation as to preclude the law firm from proceeding.”[17] Its factors for the first question, drawn from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York’s disqualification decisions, are shared directors, officers, and management; shared offices; a common legal department; shared corporate services; and integrated infrastructure. An earlier New York County Lawyers’ Association opinion had reached a similar conclusion under the former Code: a lawyer for a parent may act adversely to its subsidiary if neither entity reasonably believes the subsidiary is a client, the lawyer holds no confidential information of the subsidiary that could be used to its detriment, and the adverse action will not materially affect the parent.[18]

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision in GSI Commerce Solutions, Inc. v. BabyCenter, L.L.C. is the leading judicial statement of the same approach.[19] Blank Rome represented Johnson & Johnson in unrelated matters and undertook a representation adverse to its subsidiary BabyCenter. Starting from the rule that representing a corporation does not automatically make every affiliate a client, the court examined how the companies operated: BabyCenter depended on Johnson & Johnson for accounting, finance, human resources, and information technology; the two shared an in-house legal department; and Johnson & Johnson lawyers were involved in the underlying matter. On those facts, it treated parent and subsidiary as one client for the conflict before it, notwithstanding engagement documents disclaiming representation of affiliates absent separate agreement. The court did not hold affiliate provisions ineffective; it held that their effect depends on the language, the scope of any consent, and the facts when adversity arises.

New York’s rule text has recently moved closer to the Model Rule. Until late 2025, Rule 1.7(a) prohibited representation involving “differing interests,” a formulation carried over from the former Code. By joint order of the appellate divisions effective November 10, 2025, it was amended to adopt substantially the Model Rule’s structure, under which a concurrent conflict exists where one representation will be directly adverse to another client or where there is a significant risk that the representation will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person.[20] The comments to New York’s Rule 1.7 carry the affiliate principle of Model Rule Comment [34], and Rule 1.13 continues to treat the organization, and not its constituents, as the client.[21] Neither rule collapses a corporate family into a single client, and neither prevents a court from doing so on the facts. New York’s Comment [34A] adds guidance that the Model Rule lacks: whether a representation adverse to one affiliate will be materially limited by the firm’s representation of another “will often depend on whether there is a substantial relationship between matters or whether an affiliate has imparted confidential information to the lawyer in one representation that may be used in a manner detrimental to the interests of another affiliate in another representation.”[22]

Disinterestedness Under § 327(a)

Section 327(a) asks a different question. The statute requires that counsel to a debtor in possession not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate and be a “disinterested person,” a term § 101(14) defines to exclude anyone with an interest materially adverse to the estate by reason of any direct or indirect relationship to the debtor.[23] The Second Circuit has read “adverse interest” to include a predisposition under circumstances that render a bias against the estate, and has held that bankruptcy courts retain discretion to disapprove a retention on the facts of the particular case.[24]

Commentators have long questioned whether ethics rules premised on parties with fixed positions can govern a bankruptcy case, in which alliances among the debtor, its affiliates, and its creditors shift as the case proceeds.[25] Three features of the § 327(a) standard separate it from Rules 1.7 and 1.9.

The first is the identity of the protected party. The ethics rules protect clients and former clients, and a conflict is ordinarily cured by their informed consent. Section 327(a) protects the estate and its creditors, who are not parties to the engagement and cannot consent to it. The objectors in Vanderbilt were the United States Trustee and the creditors’ committee, and the parent’s willingness to see its former counsel act for the debtor was immaterial to that inquiry.[26]

The second is the treatment of prior representations. The ethics rules confine the former-client inquiry to substantially related matters and confidential information. The Second Circuit’s In re AroChem Corp. decision framed the § 327(a) inquiry as one into present interests, not past ones, but Judge Martin Glenn’s decision in In re Black & White Stripes, LLC held that prior representation of a debtor’s principals could disqualify proposed general bankruptcy counsel, reasoning that a firm retained for all of the debtor’s interests must be able to marshal estate assets and pursue estate claims without doubt as to its faithfulness.[27] Judge Kinsella followed that reasoning. The court did not find that any specific piece of work created a present adverse interest; it was enough that the parties would never know whether the firm’s advice had favored the affiliates over the debtor.[28]

The third is the appearance standard. The Model Rules abandoned the former Code’s Canon 9 injunction against the appearance of impropriety, and the Scope note to the New York Rules states that a violation of a rule does not necessarily warrant disqualification.[29] However, disinterestedness doctrine has retained the appearance standard. The Vanderbilt court quoted the Southern District of New York’s observation that “[t]he duty to avoid even the appearance of impropriety is a persistent theme in disinterestedness cases” and that doubt is ordinarily resolved in favor of disqualification; and it added that a mass tort case, in which the creditors are individuals alleging injury and death rather than commercial counterparties, requires a process “devoid of any appearance of conflict.”[30]

Disclosure under Bankruptcy Rule 2014 is the mechanism through which these differences are enforced. The rule requires a verified statement of the applicant’s connections with the debtor, its creditors, and other parties in interest, and the court relies primarily on that disclosure in determining qualification under § 327.[31] Jones Day’s initial statement described its affiliate work in general terms; the netting exercise and the VEEGUM transfer emerged through the committee’s objection and its examination of the firm’s witness at the hearing.[32] The court did not treat the omission as an independent ground for disqualification but counted it among the facts that made the firm’s position untenable. Under the ethics rules, the firm and its clients decide among themselves what to disclose; under § 327(a), disclosure runs to the court and to parties in interest, including objectors positioned to test its completeness.

Engagement Letters and the Limits of Drafting

Every authority discussed above treats the engagement letter as the primary safeguard: Formal Opinion 95-390 recommends a clear understanding at the outset as to which family members are clients, the New York City Bar’s opinion begins by asking whether the engagement letter excludes affiliates or contains an advance waiver, and GSI Commerce acknowledges the importance of affiliate provisions even while looking past one.[33] The rules also permit advance consent to future conflicts, within limits. Comment [22] to Rule 1.7 provides that a general and open-ended consent ordinarily will be ineffective, and ABA Formal Opinion 05-436, which withdrew the more restrictive Formal Opinion 93-372, concluded that an advance waiver is more likely to be effective where the client is an experienced user of legal services, is independently represented, and consents only to conflicts in matters unrelated to the current representation. The opinion adds that advance consent cannot be effective if the conflict that later materializes is nonconsentable, and that it does not by itself permit the use of the client’s confidential information against it.[34] Scholarship has questioned the enforceability of general advance waivers, and one proposal would confine them to conflicts arising from a specified matter and exclude substantially related matters, except as among jointly represented clients.[35]

Drafting has two limits. The first, illustrated by GSI Commerce, is that an affiliate exclusion or advance waiver operates within the ethics rules and yields to the facts when adversity arises. The second, exposed by Vanderbilt, is that an engagement letter allocates consent among clients, and § 327(a) does not turn on consent. A parent may agree that the firm represents only the subsidiary, waive future adversity, and consent to the firm acting for the subsidiary after the parent relationship ends—but none of that binds the United States Trustee, the creditors’ committee, or the court. An affiliate provision can therefore identify the firm’s clients and record their consent for purposes of Rules 1.7 and 1.9, but it cannot establish disinterestedness.

The Cost to the Estate

Judge Kinsella acknowledged that Jones Day’s institutional knowledge and the learning curve facing successor counsel weighed in favor of retention on the case’s compressed schedule, but she denied the retention nonetheless, noting the committee’s concern that the compression may have been “of the Debtor’s own purposeful making.”[36] Conflict analysis is conventionally treated as counsel’s professional responsibility problem, but a disqualification after the petition date is a continuity problem that the estate absorbs. The weight the court gave those costs marks a further departure from the ethics framework. Outside bankruptcy, the Second Circuit has been reluctant to disqualify counsel because disqualification “has an immediate adverse effect on the client by separating him from counsel of his choice” and because such motions “are often interposed for tactical reasons,” and it has generally confined the remedy to conduct that tends to “taint the underlying trial.”[37] Under § 327(a), the court treated the debtor’s interest in continuity of counsel as a factor to be weighed but not one that could overcome a failure of disinterestedness.

The Scope of the Holding

Vanderbilt does not hold that a firm may never move from representing a corporate family to representing one member of it; Judge Kinsella recognized that firms commonly represent multiple affiliates outside bankruptcy and often end those representations when a filing becomes probable.[38] Nor does it make an independent fiduciary with separate counsel ineffective; the court did not question the manager’s independence or the settlement he negotiated.[39] The holding turned on the combination of a decade of representation, recent work on the intercompany transactions at the center of the case, incomplete initial disclosure, and a mass tort creditor body. The holding also did not depend on the merits of the transaction at the center of the conflict. The creditors’ committee and the United States Trustee attacked the settlement as an indirect release of the kind barred by Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P.,[40] yet the court approved it from the bench on April 22, 2026, holding that the released alter-ego claims belonged to the estate and that creditors’ direct claims were preserved.[41] Jones Day was disqualified even though the settlement between the debtor and the firm’s former clients survived scrutiny.

Vanderbilt thus marks the point at which the corporate-family framework ceases to govern. Ending the affiliate representations, installing an independent fiduciary with separate counsel, and confining the firm to the debtor’s side of the table are the steps that the framework prescribes, and they were not enough, because § 327(a) asks whether the estate’s creditors will have grounds to doubt the firm’s loyalty, and the answer does not depend on whether that loyalty is in fact divided.


  1. In re Vanderbilt Minerals, LLC, No. 26-60110 (WAK) (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2026). ↑

  2. Memorandum Decision and Order on Application to Employ and Retain Jones Day, In re Vanderbilt, No. 26-60110 (WAK) [hereinafter Retention Decision]. ↑

  3. Id. at 3–5, 7. ↑

  4. Id. at 11–14. ↑

  5. Model Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.13(a), r. 1.7 cmt. [34] (Am. Bar Ass’n 2026). ↑

  6. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 95-390 (1995). On the derivation of Comment [34] from the opinion, see Kristen Salvatore DePalma & Emily V. Burton, Engaging with the Realities of the Corporate Family, 12 Del. L. Rev. 133, 134, n.7 (2011) (quoting the ABA Reporter’s Explanation of Changes). ↑

  7. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 121 cmt. d & illus. 6–7, § 131 cmt. d (2000). ↑

  8. Charles W. Wolfram, Corporate-Family Conflicts, 2 J. Inst. for Study of Legal Ethics 295 (1999); see also Charles W. Wolfram, Ethics 2000 and Conflicts of Interest: The More Things Change, 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 27, 49 (2002) (discussing Comment [34]). ↑

  9. DePalma & Burton, supra note 6, at 138. ↑

  10. Model Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.9(a), (c); N.Y. Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.9(a), (c) (2026). ↑

  11. See Model Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.7 cmt. [5] (withdrawal from one representation may be permitted where a conflict arises from unforeseeable developments, such as a change in corporate affiliation); N.Y. Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.7 cmt. [5]; DePalma & Burton, supra note 6, at 152–53 (discussing the hot potato rule and its exceptions). ↑

  12. Model Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.7 cmts. [29]–[31]. ↑

  13. Id. cmt. [29]. ↑

  14. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 497 (2021) (conflicts involving materially adverse interests). ↑

  15. Model Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.7(a)(2), cmt. [10]. ↑

  16. Model Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.10(a); N.Y. Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.10(a). ↑

  17. N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Pro. & Jud. Ethics, Formal Op. 2007-3 (2007). ↑

  18. N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n Comm. on Pro. Ethics, Op. 684 (1991). ↑

  19. GSI Com. Sols., Inc. v. BabyCenter, L.L.C., 618 F.3d 204, 210–13 (2d Cir. 2010). ↑

  20. Joint Order of the Departments of the Appellate Division Amending 22 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 1200, Rules 1.0, 1.7, 1.8, 1.11, 1.12, 2.4, 4.1, 5.4, 5.5, 6.5, 8.1, and 8.3 (Nov. 5, 2025, effective Nov. 10, 2025); N.Y. Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.7(a) (as amended), reproduced in NYSBA, New York Rules of Professional Conduct (2026). ↑

  21. N.Y. Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.7 cmts. [34]–[34B], r. 1.13(a). ↑

  22. Id. r. 1.7 cmt. [34A], reproduced in NYSBA, supra note 20. ↑

  23. 11 U.S.C. §§ 327(a), 101(14)(C). ↑

  24. In re AroChem Corp., 176 F.3d 610, 621, 623 (2d Cir. 1999); In re Vouzianas, 259 F.3d 103, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2001). ↑

  25. Nancy B. Rapoport, Turning and Turning in the Widening Gyre: The Problem of Potential Conflicts of Interest in Bankruptcy, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 913 (1994). ↑

  26. See Retention Decision, supra note 2, at 1–2, 5–6 (describing the United States Trustee objection and the Uniform Commercial Code objection). ↑

  27. See In re JMK Constr. Grp., Ltd., 441 B.R. 222, 229 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (the adverse-interest test “is not retrospective”), cited in Retention Decision, supra note 2, at 9; In re Black & White Stripes, LLC, 623 B.R. 34, 51–52 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020) (Glenn, J.), discussed in Retention Decision, supra note 2, at 9–10. ↑

  28. Retention Decision, supra note 2, at 12 (“The parties will never know if Jones Day made recommendations that benefited Chemicals or Holdings over the Debtor and then moved to the Debtor’s side of the table.”). ↑

  29. N.Y. Rules of Pro. Conduct, at Scope ¶ [12] (2026). The Model Rules contain no counterpart to Canon 9 of the former Code; the pre-2002 comment to Model Rule 1.9 called the appearance-of-impropriety standard “question-begging,” and the 2002 revisions dropped the comment as unnecessary. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Alleged Conflicts of Interest Because of the “Appearance of Impropriety,” 33 Hofstra L. Rev. 1141, 1146 (2005). ↑

  30. Retention Decision, supra note 2, at 13–14 (quoting In re Angelika Films 57th, Inc., 227 B.R. 29, 38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d, 246 B.R. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)). ↑

  31. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014(a); Retention Decision, supra note 2, at 11 (quoting In re Granite Partners, L.P., 219 B.R. 22, 35 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998)). ↑

  32. Retention Decision, supra note 2, at 7, 11. ↑

  33. GSI Com. Sols., Inc. v. BabyCenter, L.L.C., 618 F.3d 204, 212–14 (2d Cir. 2010); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 95-390 (1995); N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Pro. & Jud. Ethics, Formal Op. 2007-3, pt. IV (2007) (prophylactic measures); see also N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Pro. & Jud. Ethics, Formal Op. 2006-1 (2006) (advance waivers). ↑

  34. Model Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.7 cmt. [22] (Am. Bar Ass’n 2026); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 05-436 (2005) (withdrawing Formal Op. 93-372). ↑

  35. Nathan M. Crystal, Enforceability of General Advance Waivers of Conflicts of Interest, 38 St. Mary’s L.J. 859 (2007); see also Richard W. Painter, Advance Waiver of Conflicts, 13 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 289 (2000). ↑

  36. Retention Decision, supra note 2, at 10–11. ↑

  37. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y.C. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 678 (2d Cir. 1976)). ↑

  38. Retention Decision, supra note 2, at 13. ↑

  39. Retention Decision, supra note 2, at 13–14. ↑

  40. Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 603 U.S. 204, 226–27 (2024); Retention Decision, supra note 2, at 6. ↑

  41. Memorandum Decision on Motion to Approve Global Settlement, In re Vanderbilt Minerals, LLC, No. 26-60110 (WAK), at 3, 9–11 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2026) (No. 491) (memorializing oral ruling of Apr. 22, 2026); see also Retention Decision, supra note 2, at 5 n.13. ↑

By: Kenneth A. Rosen

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