Current Month (October 2026)
Where Should U.S. Companies Base Their Asia M&A Platforms?
By Sachin Java and Pingshan Li
The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s October 22, 2026, proposal to update its Outbound Investment Security Program under the Comprehensive Outbound Investment National Security (“COINS”) Act gives U.S. companies reason to revisit their Asian acquisition structures. The proposal covers semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum, high-performance computing, and hypersonics, adds biotechnology, and reaches U.S. persons’ controlled foreign entities, so a holding company’s location cannot be separated from its underlying investments.
The regional holding company a U.S. buyer selects can materially affect deal execution, financing, governance, tax, and exit flexibility. The best platform supports the buyer’s investment corridor, investor base, and operating model, not merely the first target’s location. Singapore, Hong Kong, the Dubai International Financial Centre (“DIFC”), and Abu Dhabi Global Market (“ADGM”) are the principal neutral options. None eliminates target-country approvals or diligence.
Singapore: The Default Asia-Pacific Platform
Singapore is often the default choice for establishing an Asia-Pacific acquisition platform. Its well-developed common law–based judicial system, robust dispute resolution infrastructure, deep financial services market, transparent and low taxation, and regional headquarters role make it a natural fit for transactions spanning China, Southeast Asia, India, and Australia. A Singapore holding company can accommodate regional management, centralized treasury functions, IP ownership, and add-on acquisitions. Foreign ownership is generally unrestricted, though limitations apply in regulated sectors such as banking, insurance, broadcasting, and defense. Singapore’s Significant Investments Review Act imposes notification requirements for acquisitions of control in designated entities. For many U.S. buyers, Singapore is the strongest all-purpose choice.
Hong Kong: The Greater China Gateway
Hong Kong remains a leading option for investment strategies centered on Greater China, North Asia, or Hong Kong capital markets. It enjoys preferential treatment from the Chinese central government in taxation, judgment recognition, and currency exchange controls, making it uniquely qualified to host the overseas holding structure of choice for mainland China deals. Its common-law system and sophisticated M&A ecosystem continue to make it familiar to U.S. counsel. Private M&A documentation and governance concepts are generally recognizable, and public transactions can be implemented through a takeover offer or scheme of arrangement under the Hong Kong Takeovers Code. With that said, a Hong Kong holding company with People’s Republic of China subsidiaries, China-based data, or material mainland operations can bring PRC requirements regarding merger control, foreign investment, cybersecurity, and data transfer into the transaction.
Dubai International Financial Centre: The Bridge Between the Middle East and North Africa, India, and Asia
DIFC is compelling where an Asia strategy overlaps with Middle Eastern investors, India, or regional financial services activity. Its common-law framework is familiar to U.S. buyers negotiating shareholder agreements, financing documents, and governance arrangements. DIFC is a structuring location, and subsidiaries in onshore United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, or India remain subject to those jurisdictions’ merger-control, licensing, and regulatory requirements.
Abu Dhabi Global Market: A Private Capital Alternative
ADGM should be considered alongside DIFC where the transaction involves institutional capital, sovereign investors, or private equity. Its legal system gives direct precedential value to English common law. Like DIFC, ADGM does not eliminate the need to evaluate the legal regimes governing the acquired business’s actual operations.
Key Takeaways
For most U.S. acquirers, platform choice should follow investment strategy. Select the location after mapping the target group’s ownership, revenue, licenses, workforce, data, and markets, but before committing to a long-term acquisition architecture. The question is where to build a durable regional platform that supports the next transaction and every one that follows.
Pizza, Beer, and Bad Buy-Sell Notices: Delaware Chancery Court Reinforces Strict Compliance with an LLC’s Buy-Sell Procedures
By Shawn Garrett, Garrett PLLC; and Nicholas Perkins, Garrett PLLC
On October 16, 2026, the Delaware Court of Chancery decided Blue Fire Capital, LLC v. Lindeman, a fight between the two 50% members of Pies & Pints Development Partners, LLC (“PPDP”), the majority owner of the Pies & Pints craft pizza and beer chain. Both members claimed they had the right to buy out the other under the buy-sell provision in the operating agreement of PPDP. The Court held that neither could, because there had been no valid offer.
The operating agreement contained a buy-sell clause allowing either member to make a written offer at a stated price, which was both an offer to buy the other member’s interest and an offer to sell theirs. The offeree had sixty days to accept either option. On March 10, 2021, R&M Advisors, LLC (“R&M”) sent Blue Fire Capital, LLC (“Blue Fire”) a letter titled “Notice of Buy/Sell Offer.” This letter referenced the operating agreement, but it improperly labeled R&M the “Buyer” and Blue Fire the “Seller”; offered $1.3 million for Blue Fire’s interest; and did not offer to sell R&M’s interest. R&M’s notice introduced several other obligations, including indemnification and releases, not mentioned in the operating agreement.
On April 30, Blue Fire purported to accept what it called R&M’s offer to sell, at the proposed $1.3 million valuation, while declining the release terms. R&M’s position was that Blue Fire had not accepted either offer within the sixty days, which gave R&M the right to purchase. Alternatively, R&M argued that Blue Fire’s letter itself was an offer, and that R&M accepted it. More than two years later, Blue Fire sued, and both parties moved for summary judgment.
The court rejected all arguments. The operating agreement provided that no offer is subject to the clause “unless such offer is both an offer to sell . . . and an offer to purchase.” The Court held that R&M’s original letter only offered to buy, so it never properly triggered the clause. The court also refused to read in an “implied” offer to sell, noting that the release terms made no sense with the roles reversed. That left Blue Fire nothing to accept, and Blue Fire’s own letter had the same issue that R&M’s had. Neither member was bound to sell, and because neither prevailed, each side had to bear its own attorneys’ fees.
The court acknowledged that R&M’s later letters suggested that it meant to make a buy-sell offer, but intent was not enough. R&M “failed to accomplish its intent because it did not comply with the plain language of” the clause. Here, a missing offer to sell had left both sides, more than five years later, with no buyout under the operating agreement and paying their own legal fees.

