Tattletale: Supply-Chain Investigations and the Attorney-Client Privilege

Goods Tainted by Forced Labor

The global fight against child labor and forced labor has been led for decades by the International Labor Organization (ILO). The ILO’s most recent estimate is that 25 million people around the world, including millions of children, are currently subjected to forced labor.[1] Under U.S. law, section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930[2] prohibits the importation of merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured, wholly or in part, in any foreign country by convict, forced, or indentured labor. This law gave the U.S. Customs Service (now the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)) authority to seize commodities imported into the United States where forced labor was suspected to have been used anywhere in the supply chain.

The Tariff Act defines “forced labor” as “all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty for its nonperformance and for which the worker does not offer himself voluntarily.” Products of forced labor include goods that were produced by convicts and indentured laborers. The ILO defines forced or compulsory labor as service that involves coercion—either direct threats of violence or more subtle forms of compulsion under the menace of any penalty.[3] Goods made by child labor, defined as work that deprives children of their childhood, their potential, and their dignity and that is harmful to their physical and mental development,[4] are included in the forced-labor prohibition especially when combined with any form of indenture. Such tainted merchandise is subject to exclusion and/or seizure by the CBP, may lead to corporate criminal liability, and could even support prosecution of culpable employees individually.

The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (TFTEA) removed the “consumptive demand” exception to the United States Tariff Act of 1930,[5] which was a commonly exploited loophole to the prohibition against importing products of forced labor. Prior to the new provision, CBP used the law only 39 times since 1930 to apprehend goods tainted at some point from creation to delivery by forced labor. Since the passage of TFTEA, CBP has issued four new Withhold Release Orders (each a WRO) on specific goods from China.[6] Although 2017 saw more antidumping and countervailing duty orders and intellectual property rights protection activity under TFTEA,[7] there have been no published detentions to date, although CBP has pledged to the U.S. Congress that more import bans under section 307 are forthcoming.

Government agencies other than CBP are also authorized to investigate allegations that forced labor is used to produce goods imported into the United States. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), for example, investigates allegations of forced labor related to overseas manufacturing or mining of items that are exported to the United States. The Department of Labor (in consultation with the Department of State and Homeland Security) maintains and annually publishes a list of products that it believes are produced by forced labor, and this list is used to inform the U.S. State Department’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report.

CBP promises to hold goods and issue the dreaded WRO pending further investigation whenever the “information available reasonably but not conclusively indicates that merchandise” to be imported is subject to the anti-forced or indentured labor provision.[8] CBP has made it clear that the “some reasonable indication” standard for issuing a WRO allows it to base a decision on a risk assessment and does not require clear and convincing evidence. Enforcement actions can be triggered by anyone who reports suspicious activity to a CBP officer who then issues a report to the CBP commissioner. Goods can be detained with the commissioner’s issuance of a WRO even when information reasonably but inconclusively indicates that merchandise was made with forced labor. Once a shipment is seized by the CBP and subject to a WRO, the purchaser or importer must provide a detailed demonstration that the commodities were not produced with forced labor as proof of admissibility into U.S. markets. CBP will then decide whether to release shipments on a case-by-case basis. CBP actively seeks the help of NGOs with feet on the ground, and if CBP ultimately deems the gathered information sufficient to make a determination, the commissioner will publish a formal finding in the Customs Bulletin and in the Federal Register.[9]

Enhanced Internal Reviews and Disclosure

In response, responsible importers are taking steps to enhance their compliance measures. They are undertaking review of all products where they commonly act as the importer of record because that role automatically makes them responsible parties for dealings with CBP. Conducting supply-chain audits and performing supplier due diligence to be sure there is no forced labor at any level is clearly now part of good governance as well as corporate social responsibility. In fact, supply-chain audits and due diligence is a legal requirement for certain American companies and large international companies supplying goods and services (including goods and services online) to consumers in California and a growing number of countries outside of the United States.[10]

What is the proper course of action, however, if a company discovers goods tainted by forced labor as part of its compliance monitoring? Do the company’s legal obligations change before and after accepting those goods and incorporating the tainted ingredient into products placed in the U.S. markets? Certainly, a company that discovers goods tainted by forced labor should immediately consider terminating its supply-chain agreement with the offending importer or at least employ greater diligence before accepting delivery of future, possibly tainted goods at the port of entry. However, does the company have a legal obligation to report its findings to the port director or the commissioner of CBP?

Government contractors are bound by the False Claims Act’s mandatory disclosure rule, which provides that contractors must “timely disclose” whenever the contractor has “credible evidence” of certain criminal law violations or violations of the civil False Claims Act.[11] If the importer is member of the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism and part of the Importer Self-Assessment Program, it is expected to take action to mitigate risk and report noncompliance to CBP.

Self-disclosure under TFTEA still appears to be discretionary, however, at least for now. Revised CBP regulations invite “[a]ny person outside the CBP who has reason to believe that merchandise produced in the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) of this section [use of convict, forced, or indentured labor] is being, or is likely to be, imported into the United States may communicate his belief to any port director or the Commissioner to CBP.”[12] Nevertheless, if you ask a representative of the CBP’s Office of Trade whether a company’s discovery of forced labor violations must be reported to CBP, you will hear a resounding “Yes.” I know because I asked. Given the use of the “may” above, rather than “shall” in the new regulation, what is the basis of the CBP position?

CBP Expectations

Historically, CBP has operated under the twin principles of “informed compliance” and “shared responsibility,” placing the burden on the importer of record to make entries on the required forms correctly. Failure to make accurate statements with respect to imported goods can result in seized entries, lost import privileges, and civil and criminal penalties. The Department of Justice (DOJ) initiates action seeking criminal penalties by using statutory provisions related to customs matters (goods entering into the United States via fraud, gross negligence, or negligence,[13] goods that were falsely classified upon entry,[14] and entry of goods by means of false statements[15]) or, at its election, through noncustoms provisions (the use of federal provisions regarding the obstruction of justice,[16] the federal conspiracy statute,[17] money laundering,[18] smuggling,[19] and aiding and abetting[20]), with the noncustoms provisions supporting higher criminal penalties.

On October 2, 2016, the DOJ issued Guidance Regarding Voluntary Self-Disclosures, Cooperation, and Remediation in Export Control and Sanctions Investigations Involving Business Organizations. This Guidance memorialized the policy of the National Security Division (NSD) of the DOJ to encourage business organizations to voluntarily self-disclose criminal violations of the statutes implementing the U.S. government’s primary export control and sanctions regimes.[21] It sets forth the criteria that NSD, through the Counterintelligence and Export Control Section and in partnership with the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, uses in exercising its prosecutorial discretion in determining the possible inducements it can offer an organization to make a voluntary self-disclosure (VSD). For export control and sanctions cases, the Guidance also implements the September 9, 2015 Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates memorandum (Yates Memo) promoting greater accountability for individual corporate defendants and the November 2015 revisions to the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations set forth in the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual (USMA Principles).[22]

The Guidance only applies to export control and sanctions violations, however, and rests on the assumption that all criminal violations of U.S. export controls and sanctions harm the national security or have the potential to cause such harm. This threat to national security informs how the NSD and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices arrive at an appropriate resolution with a business organization and distinguishes those cases from other types of corporate wrongdoing, including violations of import controls. Unlike the exporter that finds itself in breach of export controls and sanctions, if an importer truly had no knowledge of the forced labor violations upon original acceptance of the goods, is the failure to report a subsequent discovery as a result of a comprehensive compliance program or audit a violation of law unto itself, or is the violation the failure to amend the original import paperwork?

Penalties for Misstatements to CBP

Federal law prohibits material false statements, acts, or omissions in connection with imports resulting from the importer’s negligence, gross negligence, or fraud.[23] Some typical examples of false statements, acts, or omissions made by importers with respect to goods include misclassifications, undervaluation, antidumping/countervailing duty order evasion, or improper country of origin declarations, but the prohibited activity could also include misstatements with respect to the absence of forced labor. Upon an importer’s discovery of any false statement made in its paperwork, disclosure before a CBP inquiry or issuance of a pre-penalty or penalty notice might be the suggested course of action, yet prior disclosure to CBP does not appear to be required under current law.

The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual section 9-28.900, “Voluntary Disclosures,” now states: “[T]he Department encourages corporations, as part of their compliance programs, to conduct internal investigations and to disclose the relevant facts to the appropriate authorities.” Although “a prosecution may be appropriate notwithstanding a corporation’s voluntary disclosure,” there are concrete, tangible benefits available to entities that do elect to self-disclose corporate misconduct. Where there is a finding of full cooperation and remediation, the corporation and its principals are eligible for a full range of consideration with respect to both charging and penalty determinations.[24]

Importers may look for guidance from the application of corporate compliance programs addressing audits for possible violations of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, as amended (FCPA).[25] The Securities and Exchange Commission clearly has taken the position that a company must self-report misconduct in order to be eligible for a deferred prosecution agreement or a nonprosecution agreement. Although there is no blanket affirmative duty to disclose an internal investigation, disclosure may be required if a publically traded company uncovers facts during the investigation that make prior disclosures false or misleading or material.

The DOJ has similarly clarified what is expected and how self-disclosure will vastly affect the ultimate resolution of any FCPA matter. On November 29, 2017, the DOJ announced a new FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy that formalizes the prior internal guidance, with a few slight revisions, and makes permanent the pilot program[26] established in 2016 to incentivize companies to self-report FCPA violations. The new policy went a step further than the pilot program by creating a rebuttable presumption that the DOJ will decline to prosecute, or impose any penalties on, companies that voluntarily self-disclose potential violations of the FCPA, fully cooperate with the DOJ investigation, and “timely and appropriately” remediate[27] with each of these elements defined in the new policy. Under the revised FCPA enforcement policy, the self-disclosure must be genuinely voluntary (i.e., prior to the “imminent threat” of disclosure or government investigation) and must be made within a “reasonably prompt time” after discovery of the violation. This creates some potential issues for the directors and officers of a company that learn of potential violations and seek to conduct an internal investigation to gather more information. Companies now have to be concerned that protected (and protracted) investigations may jeopardize their ability to make an effective voluntary disclosure. “Full cooperation” in DOJ terms may include deconfliction, which is a request by the government that a company’s legal team step back during an investigation in order to allow the government to interview witnesses first.

Even before the new FCPA policy, the DOJ’s Criminal Division’s Fraud Section released guidance on how it evaluates the effectiveness of a company’s corporate compliance program entitled Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs[28] (the Compliance Guideline). The Compliance Guideline sets forth 11 topics and questions investigators may ask when evaluating the adequacy of a compliance program to determine whether to bring charges and the scope of a negotiated plea or other agreements. One of the 11 factors to be taken into consideration is whether the company has implemented an effective and confidential reporting mechanism that can evaluate the risk level or seriousness of reports. Once a report of a compliance breach arrives, the company must timely respond to the complaint and, if appropriate, involve all levels of senior leadership up to the board of directors. In response to investigation findings which should be documented, when warranted, remediation capable of correcting the source of the violations must occur, and all individuals involved in the misconduct must be disciplined.

Should we anticipate a requirement of full cooperation in enforcement of national and international anti-forced labor initiatives? By analogy with FCPA initiatives, there is growing tension between (i) an importer’s need to comply with expanding international legal initiatives requiring supply-chain audits, due diligence, and periodic public reporting with remediation plans to combat the use of forced labor [29] and (ii) a decision not to report violations to CBP upon discovery. If for no other reason, the newly required public reports of efforts to combat forced labor, if complete and accurate, give CBP ample ground to initiate investigations not only with respect to the publically reported discovered violation, but all those that might have occurred at any time within the prior five-year statute of limitations.[30]

The official policy of CBP is clearly to encourage the submission of disclosures before enforcement authorities find violations. It certainly appears to be the case that parties who advise CBP of noncompliance before CBP or ICE discovers the possible noncompliance can expect reduced penalties (to as low as zero) where no fraud is involved. Valid prior disclosures can save the importer time and money, so assuming there is a decision to self-disclose after finding and publishing a report of a supply-chain violation, what should be disclosed and how?

Since businesses are increasingly global, so too are enforcement actions in response to alleged corporate wrongdoing. A company that reports its internal finding of corporate wrongdoing may find itself the focus of not just one law enforcement body, but of many across the world. In addition to the possibility of multiple enforcement actions, a criminal investigation and/or civil proceedings initiated by the victims of forced labor can be devastating to a company’s operations and reputation. Accordingly, companies struggling to both satisfy the legal requirements of global anti-forced labor initiatives and to meet the timeliness and full cooperation criterion of protected self-disclosure must determine the appropriate scope of their disclosures even if an internal investigation is not complete. It is imperative for a company that has discovered forced labor in its supply chain to assess the potential consequences of strategies and tactics in multiple jurisdictions, preserving, to the greatest extent possible, the attorney-client privilege.

Attorney-Client Privilege

General counsel and general business practitioners throughout the United States let out a collective sigh of relief when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit granted a writ of mandamus and overturned the district court decision in United States ex rel. Barko v. Haliburton Co.[31] The district court in Barko had held that documents relating to an internal investigation were not protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.[32] In vacating the district court’s order to produce documents, the court of appeals insisted the lower court’s analysis failed to grasp the scope of the attorney-client privilege that protects confidential employee communications gathered by company lawyers in an internal investigation under the seminal Supreme Court case Upjohn Company v. United States.[33]

Three years and counting after the court of appeals decision in Barko, companies have continued to build and invest in robust compliance programs that include self-investigation of potential regulatory violations under the protection of the attorney-client privilege.

The increasing volume of electronic communications has not made an assessment of the scope of the attorney-client privilege in the world of internal audits any easier, however. Should the privilege apply when employees communicate with fellow employees and copy the company’s general counsel? Does such an e-mail implicitly seek legal advice and thus deserve privilege protection without an explicit request for legal guidance but with the mere inclusion of the lawyer as one of the recipients? In Greater New York Taxi Ass’n v. City of New York,[34] the magistrate found that some but not all of the e-mails at issue fit into the framework of privileged communications when the sender indicated that he was soliciting legal advice or that the communication implicated specific legal issues.[35] A similar case in the United Kingdom came to the opposite conclusion, however, holding that communications by corporate lawyers with third parties (including employees) who are not authorized to seek or receive legal advice, and therefore are not the “client” for privilege purposes, are not covered by legal advice privilege (LAP) or litigation privilege (LP), concepts akin to the U.S. attorney-client privilege.[36]

Keeping New York Taxi and other case law in mind, the best practice would be to adopt an aggressive policy in the hope of securing privilege status for as much of the audit results as possible. Officers of the investigating company should state in writing in advance of any e-mail or other communication that the person giving the initial formal instructions to an internal or external lawyer is authorized by the company to obtain legal advice on its behalf. Any employee and executive participating in an internal supply-chain audit or a specific review of a particular shipment should be directed to title all notes as “Attorney Work Product” and to always copy general counsel or outside counsel, as the case may be, as early as possible, explicitly stating that they seek legal advice in all such communications. In addition, companies and their legal advisers should consider the following practical steps in any forced labor inquiry and any decision making with respect to prior disclosure to minimize the risk of inadvertently waiving or losing the attorney-client privilege.

  • If in-house or outside counsel must obtain data from within the company, whether e-mails or documents, counsel should make clear and document that the collection and use of such information as part of the internal investigation is for the purpose of providing legal advice and counsel to the client company.
  • Counsel should advise in writing and orally those who collect information during the investigation of the confidentiality of the information and the fact that such information is being collected under the company’s privilege.
  • The record of the discovered facts should be labeled “Attorney Work Product” and include a statement that, on the information currently available, the drafter entertains a concern that the material gives rise to a real likelihood of a prosecution or other sufficiently adversarial proceeding against the company, and the purpose of the instructions to the lawyer is to give advice to the board (or executive, depending on the stage of the investigation) regarding such concern.
  • Counsel should indicate in writing also labeled “Attorney Work Product” whether, on the basis of the information initially provided, there would appear to be a reasonable anticipation of a proceeding by the CBP or some other governmental unit.
  • If a decision is made to proceed with interviews of personnel, in advance of any such interview counsel should inform the person(s) to be interviewed that the dominant purpose of the interview is to enable the lawyer to provide the company with advice regarding the likelihood of prosecution/litigation, and this statement by counsel should be included in the written record of the interview.
  • At every step, counsel and investigators must state unequivocally before any interview that the investigation is being conducted under the privilege, and that it is the company’s privilege so that waiver or any claim belongs to the company and not to any individual.
  • Counsel should record in writing within the attorney work product some form of qualitative assessment of what has been said by any person interviewed and his or her thoughts as to its importance or relevance to the legal advice sought.

Attorney-Client Privilege and FAR

An examination of the preservation of the attorney-client privilege under the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) might be helpful in this context. Part 22 of the FAR regulates the application of labor laws to government acquisitions. Subpart 22.1700- 1705, Combating Trafficking in Persons,[37] applies to all federal contracts and represents a policy prohibiting contractors, subcontractors, and their respective agents from conduct including, but not limited to, the following:

  • engaging in severe forms of trafficking in persons during the period of performance of the contract;
  • procuring commercial sex acts during the period of performance of the contract; and
  • using forced labor in the performance of the contract.

Pursuant to FAR Subpart 22.1705, “all solicitations and contracts” are required to include a clause requiring contractors to fully cooperate with the U.S. government by providing access to its facilities and staff to contracting/other responsible federal agencies. The agreed-upon access is to facilitate the federal agencies audits and other investigations to ascertain compliance with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 and any other law or regulation restricting the trafficking of persons, the procurement of commercial sex acts, and the use of forced labor.[38] The clause specifies that the requirement for full cooperation does not:

  • require the Contractor to waive its attorney-client privilege or the protections afforded by the attorney work-product doctrine;
  • require any officer, director, owner, employee, or agent of the Contractor, including a sole proprietor, to waive his or her attorney client privilege or Fifth Amendment rights; or
  • restrict the Contractor from—

(A) conducting an internal investigation; or

(B) defending a proceeding or dispute arising under the contract or related to a potential or disclosed violation.[39]

Content of Disclosure to CBP

Turning back to importers, once an internal audit uncovers products tainted by forced labor and a decision is made to proceed with a prior disclosure, the importer should be sure to follow up any verbal report to a CBP officer at every port of entry where the disclosed violation(s) occurred in writing within 10 days. The writing should indicate the importer’s name, address, and contact information and should be addressed to the commissioner of CBP with copies to each applicable port. The written disclosure should list all of the concerned ports, identify the class or kind of merchandise, identify the entry number(s), dates of entry, or drawback claims, and specify the previously believed absence of the use of forced labor as a material false statement. The disclosure should go on to include an explanation as to the true and accurate information or data with respect to labor that should and would have been provided if previously known. Every effort must be made to be sure the disclosure is as complete as possible. If necessary, to maximize the intended benefit of the disclosure, the disclosing importer must first determine whether its internal inquiry and resulting disclosure should look back five years to cover those violations, if any, not barred by the statute of limitations.

Notwithstanding the desire to be thorough in the disclosure, efforts can and should be made to preserve the attorney-client privilege to the extent possible. The U.S. International Trade Commission gives only approved parties to an investigation access to business proprietary information (BPI),[40] and even that access is subject to an administrative protective order (APO) designed to protect the confidentiality of the BPI.[41] Information that is privileged, classified, or “of a type for which there is a clear and compelling need to withhold from disclosure” is nevertheless exempt from disclosure and service under the APO.[42] There is a special procedure for a submitter of BPI to follow if he or she considers that any of the information falls within the exempt categories, requesting an exemption from general availability to the secretary.[43] The submitter must file multiple copies of the same documents claimed to be privileged, with their covers and pages clearly marked as to whether they are the “confidential” or “nonconfidential” versions, and the confidential business information must be clearly identified by means of brackets. All written submissions, except for confidential business information, will be made available for inspection by interested parties.

Contract Rights upon Discovery of Tainted Goods

The discussion above does not distinguish between a company’s pre- or post-acceptance discovery of the impermissible use of forced labor in the production or manufacture of goods. Should the company’s decision to report the infraction to the CBP depend upon the timing of the discovery?

If the supplier’s acts constitute the use of forced or child labor, and such acts are discovered by the would-be buyer before acceptance of the goods, disclosure to the CBP would, under such circumstances, not appear to be legally required under current U.S. law because there was no false or misleading information submitted to CBP by the importer. Referring back to the discussion above with respect to the CBP regulations use of the words “may communicate,” rather than the mandatory “shall communicate,” the regulations seem to pose no risk to a buyer that rejected such goods as nonconforming because there is no entry into U.S. markets attributable to that buyer. What if the buyer accepted identical goods from the same supplier historically (anytime in the five-year period of the statute of limitations)? If that is the case, and it probably will be more often than not, disclosure might be problematic, but nondisclosure may be worse. What if the prohibited acts of the supplier are discovered and disclosed by another, and CBP initiates an investigation of all buyers from that supplier in the prior five-year period? After all, once the tainted goods are revealed by another, such an investigation is likely low-bearing fruit for the CBP’s enforcement arm. In fact, a competitor that can secure the protections afforded by full cooperation would have every incentive to damage the brand and operations of less transparent companies in the same space.

If the discovery of the use of forced labor by the importer precedes acceptance of the goods delivered to a port, the importer must also be sure to evaluate its contract rights with its supplier to reject the goods as nonconforming. There will probably be a contractual obligation to notify the supplier of the importer’s discovery and rejection of goods. Although the contract might have a general reference to a supplier’s obligation to adhere to all applicable law, breach of applicable anti-forced labor laws may not be identified as a breach justifying rejection of the goods or termination of the contract. The importer may find itself in the impossible position of having to choose between violating TEFRA and breaching a contract with a supplier, with both alternatives posing operational and reputational risks.

The Uniform Commercial Code Subcommittee of the ABA Business Section is currently working on model contract clauses designed to protect the human rights of workers in international supply chains. By way of reference and incorporation into the supply contract, a breach of the anti-slavery, human trafficking, and human rights policies of the buyer/importer made known to the seller/supplier and required in the supplier’s performance can be deemed a clear material breach of the contract and support rejection of the tainted goods as nonconforming. Putting these provisions in supply contracts will provide support for a company’s desire to prove that it is complying with prevailing international legal developments to assure fundamental freedoms for all workers. Audit rights, if also included in the contract and utilized regularly, would assist the buyer/importer in its efforts to be vigilant in fighting forced labor throughout the supply chain.

The incorporation of such policies into the supply-chain contract will provide a framework for agreed-upon disclosure by an importer/buyer of the supplier/seller’s use of forced labor to CBP, SEC, California, the United Kingdom, France, and the general public. Without such explicit contractual provisions, an importer that discloses its supplier’s use of forced labor to third parties could arguably otherwise be subject to the supplier’s claim that the importer breached standard nondisclosure covenants by revealing confidential supplier information.

Such contractual incorporation of anti-forced labor and general human rights policies has yet another benefit. Contract provisions that refer to anti-forced labor and human rights policies and incorporate such policies throughout the supply chain will allow businesses to self-regulate. Self-regulation might just be more effective at preventing forced labor and other abuses of human rights than laws governmental agencies find difficult to enforce given their limited resources. Corporate policies, audits, and remediation plans that reflect a broad concern for all supply-chain workers could play an important role in prevention not only of forced labor, but also factory collapses and fires, unacceptable living quarters, sub-par medical care for accidents, shift break restrictions, and similar work-related hardships that do not rise to the level of forced labor as that term is defined in the beginning of this article.

Pitiable working conditions suffered by employees of suppliers are not addressed in the scope of current legal requirements, whether national or international, so disclosure upon discovery is rarely, if ever, required. If such working conditions are violations of supplier contract requirements, however, mistreatment of workers could justify rejection (or threatened rejection) of the goods and/or termination of the contract, unless the contract breach is remedied by the offending supplier within the time period provided. The efforts of internal governmental units and NGO investigators would be supplemented across the world by thousands of internal auditors’ feet on the ground, and what has been pervasive for too long might finally change.

[1] ILO, Global Estimate of Modern Slavery: Forced Labour and Forced Marriage (2017) (excluding from the forced labor tally the 15 million girls and women subjected to forced marriage).

[2] 19 U.S.C. § 1307.

[3] See ILO, Forced Labour Convention (No. 29) (June 28, 1930) 39 U.N.T.S. 55.

[4] ILO, What is child labour, (last visited Apr. 9, 2018).

[5] See Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. 14-125, 130 Stat. 122 § 910(a); see also U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Repeal of the Consumptive Demand Clause.

[6] Soda ash, calcium chloride, and caustic soda from Tangshan Sanyou Group and its subsidiaries on March 29, 2016; potassium, potassium hydroxide, and potassium nitrate from Tangshan Sunfar Silicon Industries also on March 29, 2016; Stevia and its derivatives from Inner Mongolia Hengzheng Group Baoanzhao Agricultural and Trade LLC on May 20, 2016; and peeled garlic from Hangchange Fruits & Vegetable Products Co., Ltd. on September 16, 2016.

[7] A March 31, 2017 Executive Order on Establishing Enhanced Collection and Enforcement of Antidumping and Countervailing Duties and Violations of Trade and Customs Laws authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security, through the commissioner of CBP, to develop implementation plans and a strategy for interdiction and disposal of inadmissible goods and to develop persecution practices to treat significant trade law violations as a high priority. https://www.cbp.gov/trade/trade-community/programs-outreach/convict-importations.

[8] 19 C.F.R. § 12.42(e).

[9] Id. at § 12.42(f).

[10] See California’s Transparency in Supply Chain Act of 2012 (TSCA), Federal Acquisition Regulations §§ 52.222-256 (FAR), the UK Modern Slavery Act, the Netherlands Child Labour Due Diligence Law, France’s Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law, proposals for a corporate modern slavery reporting requirement in Australia and Pillar II of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UN Guiding Principles), and the Sustainable Development Goals (also referred to as Agenda 2030) launched on September 25, 2015.

[11] 48 C.F.R. § 52.203-13.

[12] 19 C.F.R. § 12.42(b).

[13] 19 U.S.C. § 1592.

[14] 18 U.S.C. § 541.

[15] Id. at § 542.

[16] Id. at § 1519 (“Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, . . . any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States . . . or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned no more than 20 years, or both.”).

[17] Id. at § 371.

[18] Id. at §§ 1956–57.

[19]  Id. at § 545.

[20] Id. at § 2.

[21] See Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778; International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1705.

[22] See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual 9-28.000, 9-28.900 (2015) (“[P]rosecutors may consider a corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure, both as an independent factor and in evaluating the company’s overall cooperation and the adequacy of the corporation’s compliance program and its management’s commitment to the compliance program.”).

[23] 19 U.S.C. § 1592.

[24] U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual 9-28.700, 9-28.800 (2017).

[25] 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, et seq.

[26] In an April 5, 2016 memorandum titled The Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan and Guidance, the DOJ rolled out a program under which companies could receive a reduction in criminal penalties of up to 50 percent, avoidance of a compliance monitor, and even a declination to prosecute. Since its inception through the end of November 2017, the leniency program yielded 30 voluntary disclosures, and the DOJ issued seven declinations. See DOJ’s Pilot Program Declinations.

[27] U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual 9-47.120, FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy (2017).

[28] U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Div. Fraud Section, Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (Feb. 8, 2017).

[29] Id.; supra note 10.

[30] 19 U.S.C. § 1621.

[31] See In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

[32] United States ex rel. Barko v. Haliburton Co., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2014).

[33] 449 U.S. 383 (1981).

[34] No. 13 Civ. 3089 (VSB) (JCF), 2017 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 146655 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2017).

[35] Id. at 34–35.

[36] Serious Fraud Office (SFO) v. Eurasian Natural Resources Corp. Ltd., [2017] EWHC (QB) 1017 (Eng.).

[37] 48 C.F.R. § 22.17.

[38] FAR 52.222-50(g)(1) (Mar. 2015).

[39] Id. at 52.222-50(g)(2).

[40] See U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, 19 C.F.R. § 201.6(a).

[41] Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(c)(1)(A); 19 C.F.R. §§ 201.6, 207.3, 207.7.

[42] Id.

[43] 19 C.F.R. §§ 201.6, 207.7(g).

M&A Antitrust Compliance—Issues before Signing and Pre-Closing

You’ve worked out the thousands of details necessary to close an acquisition, you’re getting close to the signing date, and then . . . your antitrust colleague asks whether the deal team considered the relevant antitrust issues that may stem from the acquisition.

Don’t wait until this question stops you in your tracks. To help you think through these important issues early, below is a practical guide—and best practices—to dealing with antitrust issues during the lifecycle of an acquisition. Of course, each transaction is different and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, thus we recommend you contact antitrust counsel early in the process so that he or she can provide proper guidance.

Counsel, we’re ramping-up the due diligence process; are there any antitrust issues that I need to keep in mind?

As soon as possible, you should discern the competitive relationship between the parties. This is a key point that directly influences the level of antitrust scrutiny in the contemplated deal under Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, which prohibits transactions in the United States that may “substantially” lessen competition. Other jurisdictions around the world have similar tests. In general, transactions among competitors will be viewed more critically by antitrust authorities than other transactions. To determine whether your client competes with its merger partner, you should ask questions such as whether the parties have competing products or services and whether they compete for the same types of customers.

In addition, important antitrust issues can arise in the due diligence process, particularly with respect to sharing competitively sensitive information (CSI) with your merger partner.[1] If you determine that the parties are competitors even in broad terms, your client must take precautions to protect the flow of CSI. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, prohibits a “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy” that unreasonably restrains trade. Information exchanges among competitors can therefore be risky under Section 1 because they may increase competitors’ (and to be clear, merging parties are considered competitors until they close the transaction) ability to collude or coordinate behavior that lessens competition between or among them. For instance, competitors exchanging price information could facilitate illegal coordination among them, and there are notable examples of competition enforcers finding instances of such facilitation when reviewing merger parties’ documents during the pendency of a review.[2]

Enforcement bodies around the world—including the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and European Commission (EC)—will investigate the improper sharing of CSI between competitors. They have made clear that the due diligence process does not provide a shield.[3] The most competitively sensitive information includes nonaggregated data relating to: (i) pricing, including information related to margins, discounts, and rebates; (ii) other confidential, customer-specific data for current or potential customers (i.e., relating to product plans or terms that will be offered); (iii) detailed research and development efforts or product forecasts; and (iv) other forward-looking, market-facing activities.[4] Although there are many categories of information that can be shared with fewer restrictions—such as balance sheets, aggregated and/or anonymized customer information, and operational systems—note that these are just examples of common categories of CSI and not an exhaustive list of information that should be monitored.

Given the importance of due diligence in evaluating the transaction, however, there are standard ways of sharing CSI that can limit antitrust risk involved in this process. For instance, CSI can be shared with outside counsel and other third parties assisting in the evaluation of the transaction to prevent a direct exchange between competitors. Further, certain CSI (e.g., relating to costs and prices) many times can be shared on an aggregated and historic level. Additionally, you can establish a clean team consisting of a small number of individuals within the organization to evaluate the CSI. Keep in mind that clean team members may need to be screened off from certain of their day-to-day responsibilities for a period, given the sensitive information they will learn. Regardless of how CSI is shared, it should be used only for the purpose of analyzing the potential transaction and only within a small group of individuals that must see it in order to properly diligence the potential acquisition. The most important thing with any protocol that is implemented is that it establishes a clear structure that limits who can see this information and how it can be used.

If an antitrust enforcement body believes there may have been an improper information exchange, it will likely open a separate investigation.[5] This will not only expose the parties to additional antitrust risk, which could include fines, but it could also lengthen any investigation related to the deal itself.

Counsel, the deal is moving forward; what else should the deal team be doing?

Given that a merger filing may be necessary, as explained below, it is never too early to remind members of the business team that their correspondence (including e-mails, voicemails, instant messages, text messages, handwritten notes, standalone documents, and presentations) regarding the deal may be evaluated by antitrust regulators. It is imperative that the business team members be factual and accurate in their communications because overstatements or hyperbole could be misinterpreted. Recent cases and statements from antitrust enforcers show that the U.S. government has relied heavily on the merging parties’ ordinary course documents when evaluating a transaction’s potential harm or filing a complaint to block a transaction. For instance, then-Acting Associate Attorney General and former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Bill Baer noted that the DOJ’s “assessments of competitive effects do not simply rely on quantitative evidence provided by expert testimony; we look at likely effects as shown by qualitative evidence, including party documents and industry and customer witness testimony.”[6] This is a trend that we have also noticed in cases with the EC in which the regulator will increasingly issue questions that focus solely on the merging parties’ internal documents.

Counsel, we’re negotiating the merger agreement; what about antitrust-related provisions in the agreement?

There are several antitrust-related deal points that can be addressed in the merger agreement itself, particularly where the deal carries antitrust risk. If the parties expect a lengthy regulatory review resulting in a divestiture or lawsuit to block the merger by an antitrust regulator, they can negotiate certain terms to alleviate some of that risk. For example, a “hell or high water” provision can be included that requires the parties to see the regulatory review process through litigation with the antitrust authorities and to use all or best efforts to get a deal cleared; a divestiture provision can be included that requires the buyer to divest certain assets in order to alleviate regulators’ concerns; or a termination fee provision can be included in the event that one or both of the parties decide against completing the acquisition because of regulatory concerns. Finally, and particularly for deals that may not close for an extended period of time due to antitrust scrutiny, your client should consider timing provisions, which specify a date by which the deal must be closed.

Counsel, it’s now time to consider the merger control process; what do we need to think about?

It is important to evaluate whether any antitrust-related filings are necessary as the deal progresses. In the United States, a deal can trigger a Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) filing obligation that requires the acquirer to pay a filing fee and provide certain documents to antitrust enforcers. The HSR filing requirements depend primarily on the value of the transaction and the size of the merging parties. Filings may also be required in many other jurisdictions around the world, with different filing tests or thresholds—including those relating to the parties’ turnover, asset values, and market shares. Antitrust counsel should be consulted early to manage the jurisdictional filing analysis.

Failure to comply with antitrust regulatory requirements can result in substantial fines. For instance, the EC has the authority to impose fines up to 10 percent of the aggregate worldwide turnover of the parties for failing to make a merger notification. In the United States, if a party is found in violation of the HSR Act,[7] 15 U.S.C. § 18a, it can be fined up to $40,000 per day.[8] Other jurisdictions (including Brazil, China, Canada, India, Japan, and Germany, among others) also have penalties for violation of applicable merger notification laws.

Finally, as noted above, some jurisdictions require the production of documents and the submission of accurate information as part of the filing. For instance, the U.S. antitrust bodies and the EC require the production of certain deal-related documents prepared by or for any officer or director. Failure to adhere to this requirement can result in penalties for the company. The DOJ, for example, imposed a $550,000 fine against a party for failure to provide required documents, even though the DOJ ultimately found that the deal did not pose any substantive antitrust issues.[9] In the EU, the EC fined Facebook EUR110 million for allegedly submitting misleading information in its acquisition of WhatsApp.[10] These cases provide an important reminder that filing requirements must be taken very seriously.

Counsel, we’ve now signed; are there pre-closing issues that we should be aware of?

Many of the questions we get from our clients relate to the scope of proper conduct after the deal has been signed, but before regulatory approval and closing. At a high level, the rule is that the two merging parties are still separate companies and must act accordingly. That means that they cannot go to customers jointly and sell products of the future, combined company. They also cannot exchange CSI without proper safeguards in place, integrate research and development efforts, or make any public statements (in press releases or to investors) that would imply that the two companies are one.

The merging parties have every incentive to start selling the benefits of the deal to clients and investors as soon as it is signed, but antitrust regulators will focus on improper conduct in combining the two merging parties, known as “gun jumping,” before they have received a chance to review the acquisition. For example, in November 2016, the French Competition Authority fined telecommunications company SFR and its parent Altice EUR80 million for allegedly implementing two transactions before receiving regulatory clearance.[11] Two months later in the United States, the DOJ settled gun-jumping allegations stemming from Duke Energy’s acquisition of Osprey Energy Center. There, Duke allegedly took control over Osprey’s output as well as received the right to Osprey’s day-to-day profits and losses.[12]

There is, however, some pre-closing conduct that is permissible. For instance, it is permissible for your clients to tout to customers or investors the benefits of merging the two companies and to begin to plan for day one of the merged company, including discussions on how to combine corporate functions, but it is not permissible to actually combine them. Another way to address pre-closing issues, in addition to the continued assistance by outside counsel and other third parties, is to have an isolated integration clean team that has no market-facing responsibilities in either company. These clean teams have the ability to plan for integration but are not exposed to CSI from either of the merging parties. This best practice allows the parties to structure the interim period between signing and closing in a way that prevents CSI from ever traveling from one party to the other.

Finally, your clients will often be eager to announce the acquisition for a whole host of strategic reasons. In those instances, it is important to make clear in any public statement that regulatory approvals are pending and that closing will occur only after those approvals are obtained. This rule applies to shareholder calls and any other public forum where executives may be talking about the acquisition.

Counsel, we’ve got approval from the regulators; what’s next?

Once you receive approval from all necessary regulatory agencies, no further antitrust obstacles prohibit you from closing, so close! Regulatory approval often is the last hurdle before an acquisition can close, so it is not difficult to convince clients to do everything they must do in order to complete this step. Although limited, there is some antitrust risk while the companies are still separate even after any antitrust review of the deal has closed.[13] Once they have merged operations, however, the two companies are now one and cannot be liable under the antitrust laws aimed at illegal agreements between competitors.

[1] Of course, nonantitrust issues can arise during the due diligence process as well. For instance, the sharing of personally sensitive information can result in privacy concerns.

[2] See, e.g., Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Civil Investigations Uncover Evidence of Criminal Conduct, Division Update (Mar. 28, 2017); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Bosley, Inc. Settles FTC Charges That It Illegally Exchanged Competitively Sensitive Business Information With Rival Firm, Hair Club, Inc. (Apr. 8, 2013).

[3] The FTC in a recent blog post highlighted this point, noting that that agency “looks carefully at pre-merger information sharing to make sure that there has been no inappropriate dissemination of or misuse of [CSI] for anticompetitive purposes.” Holly Vedova et al., Fed. Trade Comm’n, Avoiding antitrust pitfalls during pre-merger negotiations and due diligence (Mar. 20, 2018).

[4] See, e.g., id.; see also Michael Bloom, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Information exchange: be reasonable, (Dec. 11, 2014); Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Group, 629 F.3d 697, 709–11 (7th Cir. 2011).

[5] The FTC highlighted this point in its recent blog post, noting that “if FTC staff uncover documents in their merger review indicating that a problematic exchange occurred, or that the parties may not have fully lived up to the protocols they established to protect confidential information, this may well result in FTC staff pursuing a separate investigation, potentially costing additional time and resources.” Vedova, supra note 4.

[6] Bill Baer, Acting Associate Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Acting Associate Attorney General Bill Baer Delivers Remarks at American Antitrust Institute’s 17th Annual Conference (Jun. 6, 2016) (emphasis added).

[7] Hart-Scott Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.

[8] See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Raises Civil Penalty Maximums to Adjust for Inflation (Jun. 29, 2016).

[9] Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Iconix Brand Group to Pay $550,000 Civil Penalty for Violating Antitrust Pre-Merger Notification Requirements (Oct. 15, 2007).

[10] Press Release, European Comm’n, Mergers: Commission fines Facebook €110 million for providing misleading information about WhatsApp takeover (May 18, 2017).

[11] See Press Release, Autorité de la concurrence (Republique Francaise), Gun jumping/Rachat de SFR et de Virgin Mobile par Numéricable – L’Autorité de la concurrence sanctionne le groupe Altice à hauteur de 80 millions d’euros pour avoir réalisé de manière anticipée deux opérations notifiées en 2014 (Nov. 8, 2016).

[12] See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Duke Energy Corporation for Violating Premerger Notification and Waiting Period Requirements (Jan. 18, 2017).

[13] For instance, as the FTC recently noted: “[companies] must also be conscious of the risks of sharing information with a competitor before and during merger negotiations—a concern that remains until the merger closes.” Vedova, supra note 4.

Technology Vendor Contracts and Accessibility: What Every Business Lawyer Should Know

What Is Digital Accessibility?

Digital accessibility is about the ability of people with disabilities to find, read, navigate, interact with, and create digital content. It is about people who use computers without being able to see a screen or hold a mouse, and it is about students who watch videos for school and pleasure who can’t hear or understand the audio.

Digital accessibility is achieved by meeting well-established and internationally accepted design standards and maintaining a culture of accessibility in business policies and processes.

Accessibility can be a team motivator, a source of creativity, and a business differentiator. It benefits not just people with disabilities, but aging boomers and anyone who prefers technology that is easy to navigate and use. In addition, digital accessibility is a civil right. Why? Because without it, people with disabilities are excluded from government services, employment, education, private sector offerings, and a host of other activities that happen online.

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) has required digital accessibility for decades. There has recently been an increase in lawsuits and administrative complaints about digital accessibility in virtually every sector of the economy. For these reasons, digital accessibility is something every business lawyer should understand.

This article cannot cover everything a lawyer must know to advise businesses about accessible technology, but a good starting point is vendor contracts. Even companies with a commitment to digital inclusion can run into trouble if they purchase inaccessible content or technology.

In a recent accessibility lawsuit in Florida, a plaintiff sued both the website owner and the vendor who “designed and hosted” the website. Gil v. Sabre Technologies, Inc. et al., 1:18-cv-20156 (S.D. Fla. 2018). In addition, a federal judge ruled in 2017 that a grocery chain’s inaccessible website violated the ADA. The decision, now on appeal, ordered Winn-Dixie to “require any third party vendors who participate on its website to be fully accessible to the disabled.” Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 3d 1315 (S.D. Fla. 2017).

The risk of inaccessible products and ADA lawsuits can be minimized by implementing basic smart practices in vendor contracts. We welcome feedback about other practices that have helped your clients stay ahead of the legal curve and offer technology that is available to everyone.

Smart Practices for Addressing Accessibility in Vendor Contracts

Adopt an Accessibility Policy

Before asking vendors to deliver accessible digital products, an organization needs its own accessibility policy. At a minimum, the policy should state the organization’s commitment to digital accessibility and the standard for accessibility. The most commonly used standard is the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 2.0 Level AA.

Other policies that build a strong accessibility foundation include putting accessibility in performance evaluations to hold employees accountable, ensuring all technologies (not just web) are covered, developing an effective training program, and having an efficient way for customers, employees, etc. to report barriers (and to fix them).

Include Accessibility Requirements in Requests for Proposals

Issuing an RFP for technology? Accessibility requirements must be included. Attach the organization’s accessibility policy, and be specific. Don’t just say the technology will “meet federal requirements.” List federal accessibility laws, such as the ADA and section 508 (federal procurement). For web content, specifically identify the applicable accessibility standard, e.g., WCAG 2.0 AA. In addition, list some disabilities as examples to ensure vendors know what is expected. A good resource is WebAIM’s People with Disabilities on the Web.

State the Requirements for Evaluating Accessibility

It is not enough to require accessibility. RFPs should specify how accessibility will be evaluated. Resources include the Web Accessibility Initiative’s Web Accessibility Evaluations Tools List and guidance for selecting tools. If a business is not sure what testing tool is best, ask what tool the vendor uses. The answer (or lack of one) will speak volumes.

Remember that 100-percent automatic (computerized) testing is not sufficient. RFPs should include requirements for user testing and require vendors to include disabled people in product testing. If possible, specify at what points in the development process disabled people should evaluate the product. Having users review a product early in the development cycle avoids costly fixes later. A review before delivery catches last-minute errors.

Evaluate Proposals for Accessibility

Insist that vendors provide accessibility information and be sure to read it and ask questions. Understand exactly what the vendor will do to ensure accessibility. In 2018, any vendor that says they’ve never worked with accessibility principles should be passed over. Vendors who provide seemingly strong accessibility answers should be questioned the same way vendors are evaluated for security and privacy issues. In other words, take it seriously and be specific. How do they know their product is accessible? What tests and standards did they use? Will they share test results?

Review VPATs with Care

Some vendors offer Voluntary Product Accessibility Templates (VPATs). If one is offered, it is important to read it and understand what it means. A vendor often will not answer the actual question for an accessibility standard or will give an unacceptable answer. For example, Section 508 requires that “At least one mode of operation . . . that does not require user vision shall be provided. . . .” The answer, “Support Line is available,” means the product is not accessible, and customers who can’t use the product online are expected to call someone who may or may not be able to help. Remember that a VPAT that says a product is “partially compliant” means it is “not compliant” in some respect. It’s up to your client to find out what that means and how to address it for their customers.

Put Accessibility in the Contract

Once a vendor is identified that can meet other criteria and deliver an accessible product, accessibility details must be spelled out. To avoid lawsuits and ensure all customers can use the business’s technology, make accessibility a contract term. Some specifics include the following:

  • state the accessibility standard (e.g., WCAG 2.0 Level AA);
  • state how and when the technology will be tested;
  • hold the vendor responsible if the product turns out not to be accessible by requiring the vendor to remediate barriers immediately, deliver a new product, return money paid, pay any damages and attorney’s fees incurred by the business, and/or pay any damages and fees the business must pay because of a complaint;
  • allow the business to do its own testing upon delivery, and require the vendor to remediate any identified accessibility barriers; and
  • given that accessibility defects may not be immediately apparent, specify vendor responsibility whenever a barrier needs remediation.
After the Ink Is Dried

Accessibility is not a “one and done” issue. It must be maintained and periodically evaluated. When problems arise, an efficient remediation system must be in place. Once a vendor has delivered an accessible product, here are some steps to prevent problems down the road:

  • when a customer or employee raises an accessibility problem, get the problem into the right hands and fix it as soon as possible;
  • train all customer-facing staff about the company’s accessibility policy and how to escalate to the appropriate person;
  • build a monitoring program that suits the size of the company to ensure accessibility is maintained, and train content creators (anyone who can post to the company’s website) to recognize, and use content management systems that flag, accessibility errors.

Finally, don’t keep a business’s accessibility commitment in the closet. Accessibility is a brand differentiator and a way to bring in more customers both with and without disabilities. Be explicit and transparent about accessibility efforts. It will make technology more usable for everyone.

A New Year, a New, Firmer DOJ: Recently Released Parameters for DOJ in False Claims Act Litigation

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) kicked off 2018 with two new resolutions to help clarify some enforcement and litigations policies, both of which are directly relevant to claims brought under the False Claims Act. The DOJ issued two internal memoranda in January 2018 that offer valuable insight into how the DOJ intends to prosecute, or opt to dismiss, pending and future civil enforcement actions.

On January 25th, the DOJ issued a brief memorandum limiting the use of agency guidance documents in civil enforcement cases where the government seeks to impose penalties or to recover money lost to fraud or misconduct, including False Claims Act cases, which often arise from government contracts in health care, construction, and defense services. The memorandum builds on a position statement issued by the DOJ in November 2017 in which the Attorney General announced that the DOJ was prohibited from enforcing as law any agency guidance documents that have the effect of changing the law or creating additional standards. The earlier statement makes clear that agency guidance—which is intended to provide advice illustrating the agency’s application or interpretation of the law—does not create binding legal obligations or requirements and cannot be treated as law by the DOJ.

The January 25th memorandum expands the restriction on the DOJ’s use of its own guidance to also restrict its use of other agencies guidance, clearly stating that the DOJ “may not use its enforcement authority to effectively convert agency guidance documents into binding rules.” Consistent with this policy, it instructs that the DOJ may no longer rely on a defendant’s failure to comply with guidance documents as a way to prove that the defendant violated the statutes or regulations discussed in those guidance documents. However, it draws a practical distinction: the DOJ remains free to use a defendant’s acknowledgment of guidance documents to show that the defendant had knowledge of the applicable law.

Although this policy will shape the DOJ’s prosecution in all civil enforcement cases, it is specifically noted that it applies in False Claims Act cases in which the DOJ alleges that a defendant knowingly committed fraud where it certified, falsely or incorrectly, its compliance with material statutory or regulatory requirements. This likely references the U.S. Supreme Court’s June 2016 decision in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar et al., which recognized an implied false certification theory as a basis for False Claims Act liability and has since been the subject of significant attention in courts across the country.

The January 25th memorandum comes on the heels of another internal communication from the DOJ Civil Division’s Fraud Section on January 10th, which sheds new light on the DOJ’s decision-making process in asking courts to dismiss qui tam False Claims Act cases that, for any number of reasons, should be dismissed without further investigation or litigation.

Prompted by the record number of qui tam actions filed in recent years that have strained the limited government resources, the January 10th memorandum emphasizes the DOJ’s “important gatekeeper role” in preserving resources, protecting government interests, and avoiding unfavorable precedent caused by weak cases. Although the False Claims Act contains a dismissal provision that explicitly gives the DOJ the power to seek to dismiss a case over the objection of a relator (who stands to gain financially if their lawsuit leads the government to recover money), the DOJ historically has been hesitant to do so. This memorandum, however, encourages DOJ attorneys to consider not only their power to seek dismissal, but also their responsibility to do so.

With that directive in mind, the memorandum offers practical guidance on how the DOJ anticipates analyzing cases. Although the dismissal provision does not set forth a standard of review, most courts have adopted one of two standards, both offering considerable deference to the DOJ’s decision; one grants it an “unfettered right” to seek dismissal, whereas the other requires a “valid government purpose” for dismissal. Given that the dismissal provision is also silent as to any specific grounds for dismissal, the memorandum next presents a list of seven reasons that the DOJ has cited in seeking dismissals over the last three decades:

  1. Curbing Meritless Qui Tams
    Although rarely cited (often because the DOJ’s investigation is not exhaustive enough to declare the case completely frivolous), a case’s lack of legal or factual merit is appropriate grounds for dismissal even if the DOJ extends the relator a grace period to come up with a stronger case.
     
  2. Preventing Parasitic or Opportunistic Qui Tams
    The dismissal power may weed out qui tam cases that provide no new information or duplicate an existing investigation. This will prevent the relator from receiving a windfall recovery that would otherwise come out of the government’s (the public’s) share. 
     
  3. Preventing Interference with Agency Policies and Programs
    Seeking dismissal is appropriate where a qui tam delays or interferes with a program or policy that the government wishes to promote or pursue, particularly where the alleged FCA violation was based on a program the government intends to modify or reform.
     
  4. Controlling Litigation Brought on Behalf of the United States
    Dismissal may prevent a weak qui tam case from prejudicing the DOJ’s efforts in other cases as a result of adverse precedents, contradictory rulings, or complicated settlements.
     
  5. Safeguarding Classified Information and National Security Interests
    Themere potential for or risk of inadvertent disclosure of classified information is considered sound reason to seek dismissal from the court.
     
  6. Preserving Government Resources
    Dismissal may be based on the fact that the government’s expected recovery is less than its expected costs, including the opportunity costs of not pursuing a better case.
     
  7. Addressing Egregious Procedural Errors
    Where the relator has fumbled fundamental procedural requirements in a way that prejudices the government’s enforcement efforts, the DOJ should consider seeking dismissal.

The memorandum offers other advice regarding how to responsibly exercise the dismissal provision, including reiterating that the seven reasons listed are not exhaustive or exclusive grounds; in fact, the DOJ urges its attorneys to assert multiple and alternative legal grounds for dismissal. Its final recommendation is to proactively warn relators with defective or problematic cases about the probability of declination or dismissal because voluntarily dismissal by the relator is the common resolution after declination.

Extraterritorial Scope of GDPR: Do Businesses Outside the EU Need to Comply?

The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) will come into effect on May 25th of this year. Although the GDPR has been a hot topic for some time in Europe, it has only recently received attention from companies outside the European Union (EU).

As the implementation date nears, many organizations outside the EU are wondering whether they are required to comply with the GDPR if they do not have a physical presence within the EU. Although the answer will largely depend on the specific activities of each organization, there are good reasons to believe that compliance with the GDPR may be required for many.

Territorial Scope of GDPR

Article 3(1) of the GDPR applies to EU-based organizations engaged in the processing of personal data (i.e., any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person) belonging to EU data subjects. However, Article 3(2) goes a step further by extending the territorial scope of GDPR to organizations that are not physically established in the EU. The GDPR provides that the rules apply to a “controller” or “processor” who is not established in the EU and is engaged in processing of personal data of EU subjects. (A “controller” is an entity that, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means for the processing of personal data. On the other hand, a “processor” is an entity that processes personal data on behalf of the controller. In some countries, such as the United States and Canada, local privacy laws do not make the same distinction between a controllers and processors.) Specifically, the GDPR will apply:

  • where the processing relates to the “offering of goods or services” to European data subjects regardless of whether payment is required), or
  • where the behavior of European data subjects within the EU is monitored.

There is no clear guidance as to what constitutes an “offering of goods or services” under Article 3. According to Recital 23, a case-by-case analysis must be conducted in order to determine whether a given activity can be deemed to be an offering of goods or services. Ultimately, the key is to determine whether the data controller or the processor intends to offer goods or services in the EU.

With respect to the second part of the test, behavior monitoring occurs when a natural person is “tracked on the Internet.” This includes the use of personal data to profile a natural person, particularly in order to inform decisions an organization makes about a particular individual by analyzing or predicting her or his personal preferences, behaviors, and attitudes.

European Representative

Where an organization not based in the EU—acting either as a data controller or processor—is subject to the GDPR, it will be required under Article 27 to designate a European representative. This representative is meant to receive communications addressed to the controller by the EU data-protection supervisory authorities and by data subjects.

It is noteworthy that Article 25 exempts controllers from this obligation under certain circumstances: if the processing is occasional, does not include the large-scale processing of “special categories of data,” and is “unlikely to result in a risk for the rights and freedoms of individuals, taking into account the nature, context, scope and purposes of processing.” Within this framework, “special categories of data” include those that reveal racial or ethnic origin, political or religious beliefs, or genetic, biometric, or health data.

Key Takeaways

The GDPR was intentionally drafted to ensure that it applies not only to EU-based organizations, but also to organizations based outside of the EU that handle the personal data of EU data subjects. Given the ubiquity of digital commerce, many organizations outside the EU—acting as a controller or processor—are likely subject to the GDPR as a result of the expanded territorial scope under Article 3.

If they have not already done so, organizations outside the EU should review their digital activities to determine whether they are actually subject to the GDPR and, if so, develop and begin the implementation of a GDPR compliance roadmap.

What the Supreme Court’s Whistleblower Decision Means for Companies

In Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, the Supreme Court of the United States defined the class of individuals protected by the anti-retaliation provision contained in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank). The Court held that to constitute a protected “whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank, a person must first “provid[e] … information relating to a violation of the securities laws” to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, or the Commission). Any company that retaliates against such a whistleblower is potentially subject to damages and injunctive relief.

By incentivizing putative whistleblowers to report alleged misconduct directly to the SEC, the Court’s decision may result in more SEC investigations that occur before companies have had an opportunity to investigate internally. Because of the importance that the SEC places on its whistleblower program, companies should expect the SEC to continue to focus on investigations involving claims of retaliation, as well as continuing to focus on possible violations of Exchange Act Rule 21F-17. (The rule prohibits “any action to impede an individual from communicating directly with the Commission staff about a possible securities law violation, including enforcing, or threatening to enforce, a confidentiality agreement […] with respect to such communications.)

Statutory Whistleblower Protections

Both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley) and Dodd-Frank protect putative whistleblowers from retaliation. Sarbanes-Oxley protects all “employees” who report misconduct to a federal regulatory or law enforcement agency from retaliation, including the SEC, Congress, or any “person with supervisory authority over the employee.” By contrast, Dodd-Frank defines whistleblower as “any individual who provides … information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”

Notwithstanding the statutory definition of whistleblower in Dodd-Frank, SEC regulations implementing Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions do not require reporting to the SEC. The SEC regulations define whistleblower for purposes of Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation protections to include persons who report internally, as long as they report to a supervisor or to a person working for the employer who has authority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct.

The differences between the whistleblower protections in Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank are significant because the statutes offer different paths to whistleblowers seeking redress for retaliation. Under Sarbanes-Oxley, whistleblowers cannot bring an action in federal district court unless they first exhaust their administrative remedies. Specifically, Sarbanes-Oxley requires an employee to file a complaint with the Department of Labor (DOL) within 180 days of the retaliation or learning of the retaliation. Only if the DOL fails to issue a final decision within 180 days after the whistleblower filed the administrative complaint may the whistleblower then file an action in federal district court alleging retaliation under Sarbanes-Oxley. On the other hand, Dodd-Frank permits whistleblowers to file complaints in federal court without first pursuing an administrative action. Dodd-Frank also extends the statute of limitations from Sarbanes-Oxley’s 180 days to a default limitation period of six years.

Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank also authorize different awards to prevailing whistleblowers. Under Sarbanes-Oxley, prevailing whistleblowers are entitled to reinstatement, back pay, and litigation fees and costs, as well as other special damages. Under Dodd-Frank, prevailing whistleblowers can obtain not only reinstatement and litigation fees and costs, but also double back pay. (Dodd-Frank does not provide for special damages beyond litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney fees.)

The Somers Action

Paul Somers, a former vice president for Digital Realty Investment Trust, Inc. (Digital Realty), filed suit in federal district court, asserting a claim of whistleblower retaliation under Dodd-Frank. Somers alleged that Digital Realty terminated his employment shortly after he reported suspected violations of securities laws to senior management. Somers did not report his suspicions about violations to the SEC, nor did he file an administrative complaint within 180 days of his termination.

Digital Realty moved to dismiss Somers’ claim, arguing that Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protections were not available to Somers because he had only reported internally, and had not provided any information to the SEC. The district court denied Digital Realty’s motion, finding the statutory scheme ambiguous and according deference to the SEC’s broad regulatory definition of whistleblower. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision on interlocutory appeal. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit sided with the Second Circuit (which had likewise upheld the SEC’s regulatory definition) and disagreed with the Fifth Circuit (which had held that Dodd-Frank only protects employees who first report to the SEC).

Digital Realty sought review of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to decide whether Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions extend to individuals who have not reported a violation of the federal securities laws to the SEC.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

In a unanimous opinion with two concurrences, the Supreme Court agreed with Digital Realty and held that to sue under Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions, a person must first “provide information relating to a violation of the securities laws” to the SEC. The Justices agreed that Dodd- Frank’s statutory definition of whistleblower is unambiguous, and that the SEC’s regulatory definition had impermissibly broadened the statute. The Court explained that Dodd-Frank’s statutory definition describes “who is eligible for protection” and advances Dodd-Frank’s overarching purpose of encouraging employees to report suspected securities violations to the SEC.

Significance

By restricting who can qualify as a whistleblower to persons who first provide information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the SEC, the Supreme Court’s decision in Digital Realty may incentivize employees to report suspected violations of securities laws directly to the SEC instead of internally.

Companies should not interfere with employees’ efforts to report information to the Commission. However, companies frequently design and implement their internal reporting mechanisms, policies, and training to encourage internal reporting of compliance matters, including potential violations of federal securities laws. Such internal reporting mechanisms generally enable companies faced with internal allegations of compliance failures to investigate, respond, and remediate—and to assess whether self- reporting to the SEC is appropriate—without a simultaneous SEC investigation.

When the Commission interpreted Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions not to require reporting to the SEC, it noted that “reporting through internal compliance procedures can complement or otherwise appreciably enhance [the Commission’s] enforcement efforts … .” The SEC argued that its interpretation of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions to cover those who only report internally would help companies, by discouraging employees from bypassing internal mechanisms and taking their reports directly to the Commission in the first instance. Digital Realty may change those employees’ calculus. Now, those same employees may lean toward reporting to the SEC directly—so as to take advantage of Dodd-Frank’s retaliation protections—instead of relying on a patchwork of state laws or the more cumbersome Sarbanes-Oxley procedures for recovery for retaliation.

Such a response would continue the trend of increased reporting to the SEC. The SEC has stated that “[t]he whistleblower program has had a transformative impact on enforcement,” and the program continues to grow, with ever-increasing reports and awards. In 2017, for example, the SEC received 4,400 tips, an increase of nearly 50% since FY 2012, and the SEC ordered awards totaling nearly $50 million dollars to 12 individuals.

Digital Realty may result in the SEC receiving even more reports about possible violations from whistleblowers, and potentially reports of lesser quality. A purported whistleblower needs only a “reasonable belief” that the information he or she is providing to the Commission relates to a “possible” violation of the federal securities laws in order to qualify for Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions. Before Digital Realty, whistleblowers who believed they had information about a possible violation of federal securities laws, but were not fully confident in their belief, may have been inclined to report internally. Now those persons may forego reporting internally in favor of reporting to the Commission in the first instance.

Digital Realty may also prompt the Commission to attempt to expand the ways employees can provide information to the SEC and therefore qualify as whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank. Dodd-Frank expressly authorizes the SEC to establish the “manner” in which a whistleblower may provide information to the Commission. In response to concerns voiced by the Solicitor General that employees who, for example, give testimony to the SEC may not qualify as whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank’s statutory definition, the Supreme Court expressly noted that “[n]othing in today’s opinion prevents the agency from enumerating additional means of SEC reporting.” Accordingly, the Commission may articulate expansive means through which an employee can provide information to the SEC for the purposes of Dodd-Frank, which could have the effect of further incentivizing employees to report externally.

Supreme Court Holds Section 546(e) Safe Harbor Does Not Apply to All Transfers Made Through Financial Institutions

At the end of February, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its unanimous decision in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., holding that 11 U.S.C § 546(e), which creates a safe harbor against the avoidance of certain transfers made “by or to (or for the benefit of)” financial institutions, does not apply merely because the challenged transfer is completed through a financial institution. This holding effectively overrules prior decisions of the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits that had adopted a more expansive view of the safe harbor protection.

In reaching its conclusion, the Court focused heavily on the text of the statute, instructing courts to focus their analysis on the “end-to-end transfer” the trustee seeks to avoid rather than any individual transaction the transfer comprises. By way of example, the Court found that Section 546(e) would not prevent a trustee from avoiding a transfer between two non-financial institutions (“A→D”), even where that transfer was effectuated through financial institutions as intermediaries (“A→B→C→D”).

The decision is the Supreme Court’s first to address the safe harbors under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. As a result, although the specific holding of Merit may not be directly applicable to the rights of financial counterparties under qualified financial contracts, the case may affect how lower courts interpret the safe harbors more generally.

Background

In 2003, two racetracks, Valley View Downs, LP and Bedford Downs, both sought to operate racinos (combination horse track casinos). However, the operation of racinos required a harness-racing license, and, at the time, Pennsylvania had only one such license available. Rather than compete with Bedford Downs for the license, Valley View acquired all of Bedford Downs’ shares for $55 million in a cash-for-stock agreement.

To finance the acquisition, Valley View borrowed funds from a lending bank and several other lenders. At closing, the lending bank transferred the acquisition price to another bank, which acted as the escrow agent. Then, the escrow bank transferred cash payments to the shareholders of Bedford Downs, including $16.5 million to Merit Management Group.

Although Valley View was awarded the harness-racing license, it failed to acquire the gambling license it needed to operate the racino, resulting in a bankruptcy filing. FTI Consulting, Inc., trustee of the debtor’s litigation trust, subsequently sought to avoid the $16.5 million transfer to Merit as a constructively fraudulent transfer under Section 548(a)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Merit moved to dismiss the trustee’s action, arguing that the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbors immunized the transfer from claims of constructive fraudulent conveyance. Specifically, Merit pointed to Section 546(e), which bars a bankruptcy trustee from avoiding under Section 548(a)(1)(B) (among other provisions) a settlement payment or transfer in connection with a securities contract if the settlement payment or transfer is “made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution” or another kind of entity listed in Section 546(e). (See also 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (including “commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, financial participant, or securities clearing agency” as covered entities.)

The trustee did not dispute that the transfer of $16.5 million was a settlement payment or a transfer in connection with a securities contract. However, it challenged that the transfer was “by or to” a “financial institution” or other entity listed in Section 546(e) because neither Valley View nor Merit was such an entity. Merit responded that neither Valley View nor Merit needed to be such an entity in order for the transfer to fall within the protections of Section 546(e) because the lending banks and escrow bank were “financial institutions” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, and the $16.5 million was transferred by the lending bank and both by and to the escrow bank. The district court agreed with Merit and dismissed the trustee’s claims.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed and held that Section 546(e) does not protect transfers “that are simply conducted through financial institutions (or other entities named in Section 546(e)), where the entity is neither the debtor nor the transferee but only the conduit.”

In addition to focusing on the “ambiguous” text of Section 546(e), the Seventh Circuit focused its purpose, stating that “the safe harbor’s purpose is to protect the market from systemic risk and allow parties in the securities industry to enter into transactions with greater confidence—to prevent one large bankruptcy from rippling through the securities industry.” By contrast, the case before it presented no systemic risk concerns.

As the Seventh Circuit acknowledged, its holding was a departure from the views of a number of its sister circuits. The Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits have held that Section 546(e) applied even where the financial institution acts merely as a conduit. (See In re Quebecor World (USA) Inc., 719 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2013); Contemporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost, 564 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2009); In re QSI Holdings, Inc., 571 F.3d 545 (6th Cir. 2009); In re Resorts Int’l, Inc., 181 F.3d 505 (3d Cir. 1999); In re Kaiser Steel Corp., 952 F.2d 1230 (10th Cir. 1991).

The Supreme Court’s Decision

In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Sotomayor, the Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s decision, concluding Section 546(e) does not apply to the trustee’s attempt to avoid the transfer between Valley View and Merit. In coming to this conclusion, the Court did not address the question often framed in safe harbor litigation: whether Section 546(e) should apply where a financial institution is a “mere conduit” or intermediary to a transfer. Nor did the Court find the language of Section 546(e) ambiguous, as the Seventh Circuit did, nor did it engage in a policy-driven analysis, as employed by other courts.

Instead, the Court reframed the question and adopted the arguments of the trustee in holding that the only relevant transfer for purposes of the safe harbor is the transfer that the trustee seeks to avoid, which in this case was the “end-to-end” transfer (i.e. A→D) and that courts should not “look to any component parts of the overarching transfer” (i.e. A→B→C→D).

The Court’s analysis opened with a review of the text of Section 546(e), which begins with “[n]otwithstanding section 544, 545, 547, 548(a)(1)(B), and 548(b) of this title.”  According to the Court, this language makes it clear that the safe harbor is nothing more than an exception to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. The Court found that “by referring back to a specific type of transfer that falls within the avoiding power, Congress signaled that the exception applies to the overarching transfer that the trustee seeks to avoid,” and not any individual transaction that transfer comprises. (This reading was further supported by the final clause of Section 546(e), which creates an exception to the exception for actually fraudulent transfers under Section 548(a)(1)(A).)

Continuing its textual analysis, the Court next seized on Section 546(e)’s language that the trustee may not avoid “a transfer that is” a settlement payment or made in connection with a securities contract (emphasis in original). In the Court’s view, this “dispels [any] doubt” that the statute’s focus is the overall transfer rather than its constituent parts, because the statute focuses only on transfers that are settlement payments or made in connections with securities contracts, not transfers that “involve” or “comprise” them. Thus, the Court held, “the transfer that the trustee seeks to avoid [is] the relevant transfer for consideration of the § 546(e) safe harbor criteria.”

Responding to concerns expressed at oral argument that this approach could allow a trustee to sidestep Section 546(e) by creatively defining the “relevant transfer,” the Court cautioned that a trustee “is not free to define the transfer that it seeks to avoid in any way it chooses,” but instead must satisfy the criteria set out in the Bankruptcy Code. This would leave a defendant free to argue that a trustee failed to properly identify an avoidable transfer, “including any available arguments concerning the role of component parts of the transfer.”

In arriving at its interpretation of Section 546(e), the Court rejected a number of counterarguments. First, the Court rejected Merit’s suggestion that the 2006 addition of “(or for the benefit of)” language in Section 546(e) demonstrated Congress’s desire to legislatively overrule In re Munford, Inc., in which the Eleventh Circuit held that Section 546(e) was inapplicable where financial institutions served as mere intermediaries. After observing that Merit cited no authority for this contention, the Court pointed to the avoidance provisions in the Bankruptcy Code that include the language “(or for the benefit of),” reasoning that Congress may have added that phrase in 2006 to bring Section 546(e) in line with other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 

The Court also addressed Merit’s argument that the statute’s inclusion of securities clearing agencies, the definition of which includes “an intermediary in payments or deliveries made in connection with securities transactions,” demonstrates that Congress intended Section 546(e) to be interpreted without regard to an entity’s beneficial interest in the transfer. Merit argued that that to hold otherwise would render portions of the statute “ineffectual or superfluous.” Rejecting this contention, the Court determined that if a trustee sought to avoid a transfer “made by or to (or for the benefit of)” a securities clearing agency that would otherwise be covered by Section 546(e), the safe harbor would bar such an action regardless of whether the securities clearing agency was acting as an intermediary. Contrary to Merit’s assertion that this interpretation would render portions of the statute superfluous, the Court found that its “reading gives full effect to the text of § 546(e).”

Finally, the Court briefly turned to the underlying purpose of Section 546(e). Merit argued that Congress intended the statute to be a broad, prophylactic measure to protect the securities and commodities markets and that it would be antithetical to that purpose for its application to depend on “the identity of the investor and the manner in which it held its investment,” rather than “the nature of the transaction generally.” The Court showed little interest in analyzing the purpose of the safe harbor, stating that even if this were the type of case in which the Court would consider statutory purpose, the statute flatly contradicted Merit’s position, because it specifically targeted transfers “by or to (or for the benefit of)” financial institutions. The Court suggested that if Congress had intended Section 546(e) to apply to transfers made “through” a financial institution, rather than simply by or to or for the benefit of, it would have included language to that effect. Thus, Merit’s argument amounted to disagreement with Section 546(e) itself.

Having concluded that the proper focus is on the transfer the trustee seeks to avoid, and that the transfer at issue in the instant case was the purchase of Bedford Downs’ stock by Valley View from Merit, the Court concluded that “[b]ecause the parties do not contend that either Valley View or Merit is a “financial institution” or other covered entity, the transfer falls outside of the § 546(e) safe harbor.

Implications

The Court’s decision is likely to have a significant impact on the application of the safe harbors to avoidance actions and related litigation.

  • The Court’s heavy focus on “the transfer that the trustee seeks to avoid” as the relevant transfer will cause debtors or trustees to strategically frame avoidance actions in order to limit the scope of the safe harbor. As the Court acknowledges, however, they will continue to be constrained by the scope of avoidance powers granted in the Bankruptcy Code. We therefore expect more aggressive litigation tactics, especially by out-of-the-money creditor constituencies.
  • The availability of the Section 546(e) safe harbor in leveraged buyouts and other stock acquisitions will be more limited. In many instances the courts will not have to focus on the distinction between public and private sales because they will not need to reach the question of whether a transfer is a settlement payment or in connection with a securities contract. The decision will likely have substantially less relevance to more traditional applications of the safe harbor (i.e. cases involving transfers made to financial institutions and other covered entities as principals).
  • By interpreting the federal safe harbors more narrowly, the Court’s decision will make state law-based workarounds less relevant. Recently, there have been a number of cases in which bankruptcy estates, particularly in the LBO context, have abandoned fraudulent conveyance‑based avoidance claims to allow a creditor trust to bring state law-based fraudulent conveyance claims outside of the federal safe harbor. Now that Merit has limited the scope of the safe harbor in the LBO or acquisition contexts, there is less incentive to take this state law approach.
  • The Court chose not to rely on the policy‑based arguments relating to the existence or non-existence of “systemic risk” to markets. Instead, the Court focused on the text of Section 546(e).

It remains to be seen what effect the Court’s decision will have on other safe harbor disputes, including, for example, what constitutes a qualified financial contract covered by the statute. These issues were not before the Court in Merit, but will obviously continue to be important.

De Facto Merger: The Threat of Unexpected Successor Liability

It is an article of faith among transactional practitioners that an entity seeking to acquire another entity without being saddled with its liabilities does so by acquiring assets. As a general proposition, that method works. “Most jurisdictions, including Massachusetts, follow the traditional corporate law principle that the liabilities of a selling predecessor corporation are not imposed upon the successor corporation which purchases its assets. . . .” Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC, 451 Mass. 547, 556, 887 N.E.2d 244, 254 (2008) (quoting Guzman v. MRM/Elgin, 409 Mass. 563, 566, 567 N.E.2d 929, 931 (1991)). There are however, four important exceptions to the general rule. An asset transfer may carry with it successor liability where, “(1) the successor expressly or impliedly assumes the liability of the predecessor, (2) the transaction is a de facto merger or consolidation, (3) the successor is a mere continuation of the predecessor, or (4) the transaction is a fraudulent effort to avoid liabilities of the predecessor.” Id.

The possibility that exposure to successor liability will flow from an express assumption of liability is no doubt self-evident to attorneys guiding clients through an asset acquisition. Moreover, most practitioners are aware of the concerns that emerge under the Massachusetts fraudulent transfer statute. See G.L. c. 109A § 5. In addition, “mere continuations” will not be hard to recognize. A mere continuation “envisions a reorganization transforming a single company from one corporate entity into another.” Milliken & Co., 451 Mass. at 556 (quoting McCarthy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 410 Mass. 15, 21–22, 570 N.E.2d 1008, 1012 (1991)).  “The indices of a ‘continuation’ are, at a minimum: continuity of directors, officers, and stockholders; and the continued existence of only one corporation after the sale of its assets.” McCarthy, 410 Mass. at 23. It will not surprise most attorneys that shuffling the deck chairs will not be enough to shake free of liabilities of an enterprise continued under a nominally new entity.

The de facto merger, however, has fuzzier boundaries. Much like the alter ego analysis, found in My Bread Baking Co. v. Cumberland Farms, 353 Mass. 614, 233 N.E.2d 748 (1968), the de facto merger doctrine calls on courts to consult multiple specified factors to determine if there has been a de facto merger; however, “[n]o single factor is necessary or sufficient to establish a de facto merger.” Cargill, Inc. v. Beaver Coal & Oil Co., 424 Mass. 356, 360, 676 N.E.2d 815, 818 (1997). That is to say, the absence of any one factor will not preclude a finding of de facto merger, and, in some cases, the presence of some amount of each factor would not compel a finding of de facto merger.

Where successor liability is found to exist by virtue of a de facto merger, the successor entity stands in the shoes of the predecessor and is fully responsible for its liabilities, which can include liability for multiple damages under G. L. c. 93A. Milliken & Co., 451 Mass. at 565. Counsel advising a client in advance of an asset acquisition must confront the alchemy of these multiple factors to assess (or, maybe guess) whether the cumulative quantum of the factors is small enough to shake free from the acquired entity’s obligations, or substantial enough to expose the client to the liabilities from which it sought shelter. (Several other states have adopted some version of the de facto merger doctrine, with varying degrees of rigor applied in assessing the multiple factors. John H. Matheson, Successor Liability; 96 MINN. L. REV. 371.387-91 (2011). Delaware, for example, has a restrictive version of the doctrine that applies only where all assets of the predecessor are acquired, the purchase compensation is stock, and there is an agreement to acquire liabilities. Magnolia’s at Bethany, LLC v. Artesian Consulting Engineers Inc. No. CIV.A. S11C-04013ESB, 2011 WL 4826106, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 19, 2011)). Several courts have noted that the analysis for successor liability is largely uniform among the states but, nonetheless, a thicket. U.S. v. General Battery, 423 F.3d 294, 301 (3d Cir. 2005). “Beneath a veneer of uniformity, the ‘entire issue of successor liability . . . is dreadfully tangled, reflecting the difficulty of striking the right balance between the competing interests at stake.’” Id. (citing EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 944 (7th Cir. 1988)).

The factors considered in the analysis are whether:

(1) there is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller corporation so that there is continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets, and general business operations; . . . (2) there is a continuity of shareholders which results from the purchasing corporation paying for the acquired assets with shares of its own stock, . . . (3) the seller corporation ceases its ordinary business operations, liquidates, and dissolves as soon as legally and practically possible, and . . . (4) the purchasing corporation assumes those obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of normal business operations of the seller corporation.

Cargill, Inc., 424 Mass. at 359–60. Whether the transaction is used to defeat creditors’ claims is also a factor. Milliken & Co., 451 Mass. at 556. The de facto merger doctrine is equitable in nature and, therefore, subject to equitable defenses. Id.

There has been some elasticity layered into these factors. For example, although the doctrine originally assumed application to transactions where shares were exchanged for assets, the shareholder component can now be met where the shareholders of the former entity paid to acquire their shares in the acquiring entity and may be satisfied with a small percentage of ownership in the acquiring entity. Cargill, Inc., 424 Mass. at 361 (12.5 percent of shares acquired satisfied the shareholder component); General Battery, 423 F.3d at 306—307 (4.5 percent held to be enough, as “[t]he continuity of shareholders element is designed to identify situations where the shareholders of a seller corporation retain some ownership interest in their assets after cleansing those assets of liability.”). In one decision, the court ruled that the shares received by the owners of the predecessor entity did not have to be shares of the acquiring entity, but could instead be shares of the acquirer’s parent entity, at least where the purchaser was a wholly owned subsidiary of the parent. In re Acushnet River, 712 F. Supp. 1010, 1017 (D. Mass. 1989). Formal dissolution of the predecessor is not required to establish the discontinuation of the prior business. Cargill, Inc., 424 Mass. at 361. The predecessor in Milliken continued in business for a period after the sale of its operating assets to manage and lease out substantial real estate assets. Milliken & Co., 451 Mass. at 559-60. (The operational assets had transferred and the “selling” entity continued only as a landlord. The formal dissolution, originally a component of the de facto merger doctrine was not formally met, but the selling entity did not continue in its prior business.) Factors that indicate a continuation of the predecessor’s business include whether the successor entity continued the general business of the predecessor, used some of the same personnel to continue the business, and acquired assets from the predecessor (including customer lists) to continue the business. Id. at 360-61. See also Lanee Great Plastic Co., LTD v. Handmade Bow Co., No. SUCV200705245, 2010 WL 6650330, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 26, 2010). Satisfaction of the fourth prong, assuming obligations necessary for business continuation, does not require taking on all obligations of the predecessor, but only those necessary to continue business uninterrupted. In Cargill, the court found it enough that the party acquiring assets assumed certain obligations such as paying creditors that agreed to continue to do business with the “successor,” assuming executory contracts, assuming service contracts, and assuming delivery obligations to customers with credit balances. Cargill, Inc., 424 Mass. at 361. As the court noted, “[e]ach case must be decided on its specific facts and circumstances. Id. at 362.

Purchase of a predecessor’s assets is a necessary predicate to finding a de facto merger, but how much of its assets must be acquired can be an open question. Recent decisions have held that the asset acquisition must be extensive in order for the de facto merger doctrine to apply. “Our decisions addressing successor liability have recognized consistently that successor liability depends on a transfer of all, or substantially all, assets from predecessor to successor.” Premier Capital, LLC v. KMZ, Inc., 464 Mass 467, 475, 984 N.E.2d 286, 292 (2013). The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) cited to the Milliken, Guzman, and Cargill cases referenced above, to support the contention that its decisions have included the “all or substantially all” qualification. Those cases do not actually articulate that principal, although it might be inferred from Cargill. (Guzman concerned a doctrine, accepted in some states, pursuant to which successor liability can arise from continuing to manufacture a line of product previously manufactured by a different manufacturer. The SJC in Guzman rejected the doctrine.) In Milliken, however, the predecessor retained its real estate assets, which represented nearly 25 percent of the pre-transaction value of the predecessor. Milliken & Co., 451 Mass. at 556. This factor did not preclude the court from finding a de facto merger. Id. Perhaps after Premier Capital, acquiring three-quarters of the predecessor’s assets will not be enough to satisfy the “all or substantially all” requirement, or perhaps Milliken defines what “substantially all” means.

(One court concluded that two entities in combination may succeed to the business of a predecessor so as to establish a de facto merger. Lanee Great Plastic Co., LTD v. Handmade Bow Co. No. SUCV200705245, 2010 WL 6650330, at *5 (Mass. Super. Dec. 26, 2010).

Passage of time may camouflage the risk of successor liability rather than shield an acquirer from its grasp. The General Battery case makes that point. See General Battery, 423 F.3d at 294. There, General Battery merged with Exide Corporation in 2000, making Exide undisputedly a successor to General Battery’s liabilities. Id. at 295. Shortly after that merger, the United States Environmental Protection Agency brought claims against Exide for liability of the long-defunct Price Battery Corp., a corporation from which General Battery had acquired assets in 1966. Id. Applying the four-prong test described above, the Third Circuit concluded that General Battery was Price’s successor and heir to its environmental liability. Id. at 309. When Exide merged with General, it became responsible for that liability. Id. The court in General Battery purported to be deciding based on federal common law, even though it used the four-pronged analysis adopted by most states. Id. at 305. Although the acceptance of the 4.5 percent share ownership as satisfaction of the second prong might be a leniency driven by the remedial statute to which the court was giving effect, there is no reason to think that the passage of time would serve as better protection in the state court. If the entity that incurred a liability were a predecessor to the entity on which a third party seeks to impose liability, there is no reason the passage of time would change that. Knowing the acquisition history of an acquisition target is an important goal of the pre-acquisition due diligence.

Assessing the likelihood that a transaction will be deemed a de facto merger can be particularly difficult where the principal assets of the predecessor are intangible, such as a service entity or a business for which the principal assets are intellectual property.

Take, for example, a financial consulting firm whose principal assets are goodwill and client relationships. Owners and principals of a struggling firm may seek to be employed by a more successful competitor. Those “acquired” owners engage in negotiations to be hired by the “acquirer,” promising to bring with them “all or substantially all” of their client base. Top management and some employees (important to the newly hired executives’ ability to service clients) from the acquired firm are hired by the “acquirer,” which agrees to pay the employees’ salaries going forward and honor accrued vacation. Those managers are offered the opportunity to buy into the “acquirer” and are given executive titles—and maybe board seats.

They close down their former business and serve their previous client base from their new offices in the acquirer’s suite. If one adds to the mix the fact that the “predecessor” entity was faced with liabilities, such as client suits, that they endeavor to leave behind, the transaction hits many of the benchmarks for a de facto merger set out in the governing authority.   In a fact pattern such as the above, a service provider, believing it was only engaging in hiring new executives, might find itself branded a “successor” and learn that it must answer for the liabilities that contributed to the demise of its new employees’ entity.

The de facto merger doctrine presents circumstances where the flexibility of equity creates a double-edged sword.  On the one hand, it gives the courts the ability to address the clever culprit who devises novel transactions to preserve its business while shaking free of liabilities for which, in fairness, it should answer. On the other, it leaves counsel advising on the structure of an asset acquisition with a measure of uncertainty as to which liabilities may piggyback onto the assets transferred. Unexpected successor liabilities can arise from an asset acquisition. Given the ad hoc nature of the de facto merger analysis, and its fact-driven character, it will at times be difficult to predict when a transaction may stand the risk of being held to be a de facto merger.

The Risk Retention Rule: LSTA’s Victory and What It Means for CLOs and Other Securitizations

In its February 9, 2018 decision The Loan Syndications and Trading Association v. Securities and Exchange Commission and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System  (Court Decision), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (DC Circuit) overruled the decision of a United States District Court and decided that collateral managers for open market collateralized loan obligation transactions (open-market CLOs ) are not subject to the risk retention requirements of Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) and the risk retention regulation (Regulation) promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) and other regulators (collectively with the SEC and the Board, the Agencies) thereunder. Only the SEC and the Board (Defendants) were defendants in the litigation. The decision will not result in a change in the law until after the period for appeal within the DC Circuit has passed or any such appeal process has concluded. 

The Court Decision

The Court Decision was rendered by a panel (Panel) of three judges of the DC Circuit: Circuit Judge Brett Kavanaugh; Senior Circuit Judge Douglas Ginsburg; and Senior Circuit Judge Stephen Williams, who wrote the opinion. The opinion analyzed Section 941, which requires the Agencies to issue regulations:

to require any securitizer to retain an economic interest in a portion of the credit risk for any asset that the securitizer, through the issuance of an asset-backed security, transfers, sells, or conveys to a third party.

Section 941 further defines a “securitizer” as:

(A) an issuer of an asset-backed security; or

(B) a person who organizes and initiates an asset-backed securities transaction by selling or transferring assets, either directly or indirectly, including through an affiliate, to the issuer… 

The Panel was considering an appeal, filed by The Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA), of a District Court decision issued on December 22, 2016, rejecting a challenge to the Regulation and upholding the Agencies’ conclusion in the Regulation that the collateral manager of an open-market CLO is the party required to comply with risk retention requirements of Section 941 as detailed in the Regulation.

The Panel concluded that to be a “securitizer” under clause B , an entity would have to have had a possessory or ownership interest in the assets that it then transferred, directly or indirectly, to the issuer. The Panel rejected the argument that a person could come within the definition merely by causing the transfer to the issuer without itself ever having had any ownership interest in the transferred assets. Accordingly, because the collateral manager of an open-market CLO only directs and consummates asset acquisitions on behalf of the issuer through open market purchases, it would not be a securitizer and therefore would not be subject to the risk retention requirements. Although the decision did not address whether the issuer of an open-market CLO may still be a securitizer pursuant to clause A, the discussion in the opinion indicated that, in the view of the Panel, the Regulation effectively eliminated the issuer from the definition.

Note that the Court Decision would not apply to a transaction where the assets come from a financial institution or asset manager involved in the organization and initiation of a securitization with its own assets (balance-sheet CLO). The Court Decision did not specifically address, and it therefore remains unclear, whether risk retention requirements would apply to transactions in which a portion of the assets acquired in the open market are first acquired by the collateral manager in order to meet certain requirements for European Union risk retention; to so-called “call and roll” transactions in which assets in one open-market CLO are transferred into a new comparable securitization transaction; or to a securitization of assets acquired in the open market but held by a party other than the issuer under a warehousing arrangement prior to securitization.

Effective Date; Appeal Period

The Court Decision will not become effective until after a period has passed without appeal within the DC Circuit, or an appeal process has been successfully completed. In the event the Defendants decline to appeal the Court Decision within 45 days after the date the decision was issued (the 45th day in question being March 26, 2018), the decision will become effective on or shortly after April 2, 2018, when the DC Circuit issues its mandate finalizing the decision and the Regulation (insofar as it imposes risk retention requirements on collateral managers of open-market CLOs) will be vacated when the District Court enters a judgment consistent with that mandate.

Alternatively, the Defendants may petition the Panel to rehear its decision or petition all of the active judges of the DC Circuit for a rehearing en banc or both. In that case, the Court Decision would not become final until late April 2018, at the earliest, or several months after that, at the latest. The DC Circuit may summarily deny the Defendants’ petition for rehearing without further briefing a few weeks after the Defendants file their petition, but if the DC Circuit grants the Defendants’ petition or requests additional briefing, the Court Decision may not be finalized for several months after that.

In addition to or instead of filing a petition for rehearing in the DC Circuit, the Defendants could petition the US Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. In that case, the Defendants must file their certiorari petition within 90 days of the Court Decision or denial of a petition for rehearing by the DC Circuit, whichever is later. The Defendants’ certiorari petition would thereafter take 44 days to brief and several additional weeks to decide. However, because a certiorari petition does not, by itself, stay the DC Circuit’s issuance of the mandate finalizing the Court Decision, unless the Defendants petition the DC Circuit for rehearing or successfully move to stay the mandate pending a response to their certiorari petition to the Supreme Court, the Court Decision could nevertheless become effective as early as April 2, 2018.

The foregoing are only a few of the possible appeal scenarios. The Defendants’ and the courts’ choices in the next few weeks will be critical for attempting to determine the timing of an effective date for the Court Decision. Until the appeal process is completed, there can be no assurance that the Court Ruling will stand.

The Regulation, to the extent applicable to collateral managers of open-market CLOs, remains effective until vacated by the District Court as directed by the Panel. The District Court will not have jurisdiction to vacate the applicability of the Regulation to collateral managers of open-market CLOs until the DC Circuit issues its mandate after the Defendants have exhausted their appellate rights (or the Defendants are unsuccessful in staying the mandate pending a petition for writ of certiorari).

A final decision in the DC Circuit will bind the Agencies, and accordingly there would be no opportunity for a contrary decision in the Court of Appeals of another Circuit absent further rulemaking action by the agencies.

Impact on Open-Market CLOs

If and when the portion of the Regulation applicable to collateral managers of open-market CLOs is effectively nullified, absent new regulations, open-market CLOs generally would not appear to be subject to the requirements of risk retention. This would appear to be the case since (i) the statutory requirement, on its face, is dependent on an implementing regulation being in effect, (ii) the portion of the Regulation imposing such requirements on collateral managers of open-market CLOs will have been invalidated and (iii) under the remaining active components of the Regulation, no other party to a typical open-market CLO would constitute a “securitizer” as that term was interpreted by the Panel. In respect to outstanding open-market CLOs, a collateral manager currently holding such a risk retention interest would accordingly appear to no longer be required to retain that interest under the Regulation. Any collateral manager would, however, continue to be subject to the terms of any applicable transaction documents, which may continue to restrict the disposition, hedging and financing of such risk retention interest.

The Agencies would be free to promulgate new regulations consistent with the ruling, although it is not clear upon which other open-market CLO transaction party the Agencies might attempt to impose an alternative risk retention obligation, or what would be the statutory basis for doing so—possibly, the Agencies could promulgate interpretations that impose risk retention obligations on the issuer pursuant to clause A of Section 941 quoted above, and impose certain requirements on equity holders thereof or others to give substantive effect to such obligations. The procedural posture and timing of any new regulation is also not clear at this time, and it is not known if the Agencies might seek to issue interpretative guidance in the interim (or what form or substance any such guidance might take).

Possible Impact of Court Decision on Other Types of Securitizations

Although the Court Decision specifically addressed only the treatment of collateral managers of open-market CLOs, the analysis of the Court Decision may be equally applicable to a number of other asset classes. For example, the Panel’s argument may be applied to the following:

  • Sponsors of resecuritizations in which the underlying securities are acquired by the issuer in open market transactions rather than from a person holding such securities prior to the securitization who is involved in the securitization transaction;
  • Managers of commercial paper conduits that acquire assets in the open market or directly from their customers; and
  • Sponsors of conduit securitizations that acquire the assets directly from third party originators rather than hold any such loans on balance sheet.

In each case, it would be essential that the issuer acquire the underlying assets directly from third parties, and that the organizer and initiator of the securitization transaction or program not be included in the chain of title. Removing the manager or sponsor of any of these securitizations as a securitizer would, of course, increase the risk that one or more parties transferring assets to the issuer would be characterized as securitizers. That risk would likely be substantially reduced to the extent that the assets so transferred themselves constituted asset-backed securities separately subject to risk retention (as is often the case with resecuritizations or commercial paper conduits).

The Court Decision relied on an interpretation of the language of Section 941, and rejected several policy arguments made by the Agencies, including the concern that the decision would create a loophole for many securitizations that were intended to come within the Regulation but could be structured in a way to come within the open-market CLO model. The Panel recognized the concern, but nevertheless concluded that “[p]olicy concerns cannot, to be sure, turn a textually unreasonable interpretation into a reasonable one.” The opinion further stated that any loophole so created “is one that the statute creates, and not one that the agencies may close with an unreasonable distortion of the text’s ordinary meaning.”

Notwithstanding the clear conclusions stated in the Court Decision, it should be recognized that the Court Decision, in what is arguably dicta, offered reasons why the decision was appropriate for open-market CLOs, which might be used by other courts to distinguish the case in making a comparable decision with respect to other asset classes that do not have a number of the features that are present in open-market CLOs. The Panel in particular noted the following with respect to open-market CLOs:

  • The loans are generally large loans, limited in number (typically up to 100 to 250 loans), from companies that are public companies or for which credit information is otherwise available to investors, providing transparency not always available in other asset classes.
  • The loans are often portions of larger syndicated loans involving multiple parties as originators.
  • The loans are generally of a type actively traded in a secondary market.
  • The collateral manager is generally compensated in whole or in part with incentive compensation, and therefore in effect has skin in the game through its compensation structure. As such, it operates much like a mutual fund (which, though not stated in the opinion, is viewed as not subject to risk retention).
  • Open-market CLOs performed relatively well during the financial crisis.

Assuming the Court Decision is not appealed, or is upheld on appeal, there will be a desire to extend its applicability to other types of securitizations, to the extent they can be structured in a manner similar to open-market CLOs. In light of the foregoing, transaction participants would need to conduct a thorough analysis of all the facts and circumstances present in any given transaction, and a careful consideration of the regulatory uncertainties involved, before relying on an extension of the Court Decision’s rationale as a basis for not complying with the risk retention requirements in other types of securitizations.