10 Tips for Avoiding Ethical Lapses When Using Social Media

You may be among the thousands of legal professionals flocking to social media sites like LinkedIn, Facebook, Twitter, or Google+ to expand your professional presence in the emerging digital frontier. If so, have you paused to consider how the ethics rules apply to your online activities? You should. Some of the ethical constraints that apply to your social media usage as a legal professional may surprise you. Moreover, legal ethics regulators across the country are beginning to pay close attention to what legal professionals are doing with social media, how they are doing it, and why they are doing it. The result is a patchwork quilt of ethics opinions and rule changes intended to clarify how the rules of professional conduct apply to social media activities. 

This article provides 10 tips for avoiding ethical lapses while using social media as a legal professional. The authors cite primarily to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) and select ethics opinions from various states. In addition to considering the general information in this article, you should carefully review the ethics rules and ethics opinions adopted by the specific jurisdiction(s) in which you are licensed and in which your law firm maintains an office. 

1. Social Media Profiles and Posts May Constitute Legal Advertising

Many lawyers – including judges and in-house counsel – may not think of their social media profiles and posts as constituting legal advertisements. After all, legal advertising is limited to glossy brochures, highway billboards, bus benches, late-night television commercials, and the back of the phonebook, right? Wrong. In many jurisdictions, lawyer and law firm websites are deemed to be advertisements. Because social media profiles (including blogs, Facebook pages, and LinkedIn profiles) are by their nature websites, they too may constitute advertisements. 

For example, the Florida Supreme Court recently overhauled that state’s advertising rules to make clear that lawyer and law firm websites (including social networking and video sharing sites) are subject to many of the restrictions applicable to other traditional forms of lawyer advertising. Similarly, California Ethics Opinion 2012-186 concluded that the lawyer advertising rules in that state applied to social media posts, depending on the nature of the posted statement or content. 

2. Avoid Making False or Misleading Statements

The ethical prohibition against making false or misleading statements pervades many of the ABA Model Rules, including RPC 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others), 4.3 (Dealing with Unrepresented Person), 4.4 (Respect for Rights of Third Persons), 7.1 (Communication Concerning a Lawyer’s Services), 7.4 (Communication of Fields of Practice and Specialization), and 8.4 (Misconduct), as well as the analogous state ethics rules. ABA Formal Opinion 10-457 concluded that lawyer websites must comply with the ABA Model Rules that prohibit false or misleading statements. The same obligation extends to social media websites. 

South Carolina Ethics Opinion 12-03, for example, concluded that lawyers may not participate in websites designed to allow non-lawyer users to post legal questions where the website describes the attorneys answering those questions as “experts.” Similarly, New York State Ethics Opinion 972 concluded that a lawyer may not list his or her practice areas under the heading “specialties” on a social media site unless the lawyer is appropriately certified as a specialist – and law firms may not do so at all. 

Although most legal professionals are already appropriately sensitive to these restrictions, some social media activities may nevertheless give rise to unanticipated ethical lapses. A common example occurs when a lawyer creates a social media account and completes a profile without realizing that the social media platform will brand the lawyer to the public as an “expert” or a “specialist” or as having legal “expertise” or “specialties.” Under RPC 7.4 and equivalent state ethics rules, lawyers are generally prohibited from claiming to be a “specialist” in the law. The ethics rules in many states extend this restriction to use of terms like “expert” or “expertise.” Nevertheless, many professional social networking platforms (e.g., LinkedIn and Avvo) may invite lawyers to identify “specialties” or “expertise” in their profiles, or the sites may by default identify and actively promote a lawyer to other users as an “expert” or “specialist” in the law. This is problematic because the lawyer completing his or her profile cannot always remove or avoid these labels. 

3. Avoid Making Prohibited Solicitations

Solicitations by a lawyer or a law firm offering to provide legal services and motivated by pecuniary gain are restricted under RPC 7.3 and equivalent state ethics rules. Some, but not all, state analogues recognize limited exceptions for communications to other lawyers, family members, close personal friends, persons with whom the lawyer has a prior professional relationship, and/or persons who have specifically requested information from the lawyer. 

By its very design, social media allows users to communicate with each other or the public at-large through one or more means. The rules prohibiting solicitations force legal professionals to evaluate – before sending any public or private social media communication to any other user – whom the intended recipient is and why the lawyer or law firm is communicating with that particular person. For example, a Facebook “friend request” or LinkedIn “invitation” that offers to provide legal services to a non-lawyer with whom the sending lawyer does not have an existing relationship may very well rise to the level of a prohibited solicitation. 

Legal professionals may also unintentionally send prohibited solicitations merely by using certain automatic features of some social media sites that are designed to facilitate convenient connections between users. For instance, LinkedIn provides an option to import e-mail address books to LinkedIn for purposes of sending automatic or batch invitations. This may seem like an efficient option to minimize the time required to locate and connect with everyone you know on LinkedIn. However, sending automatic or batch invitations to everyone identified in your e-mail address book could result in networking invitations being sent to persons who are not lawyers, family members, close personal friends, current or former clients, or others with whom a lawyer may ethically communicate. Moreover, if these recipients do not accept the initial networking invitation, LinkedIn will automatically send two follow up reminders unless the initial invitation is affirmatively withdrawn. Each such reminder would conceivably constitute a separate violation of the rules prohibiting solicitations. 

4. Do Not Disclose Privileged or Confidential Information

Social media also creates a potential risk of disclosing (inadvertently or otherwise) privileged or confidential information, including the identities of current or former clients. The duty to protect privileged and confidential client information extends to current clients (RPC 1.6), former clients (RPC 1.9), and prospective clients (RPC 1.18). Consistent with these rules, ABA Formal Opinion 10-457 provides that lawyers must obtain client consent before posting information about clients on websites. In a content-driven environment like social media where users are accustomed to casually commenting on day-to-day activities, including work-related activities, lawyers must be especially careful to avoid posting any information that could conceivably violate confidentiality obligations. This includes the casual use of geo-tagging in social media posts or photos that may inadvertently reveal your geographic location when traveling on confidential client business. 

There are a few examples of lawyers who found themselves in ethical crosshairs after posting client information online. For example, in In re Skinner, 740 S.E.2d 171 (Ga. 2013), the Georgia Supreme Court rejected a petition for voluntary reprimand (the mildest form of public discipline permitted under that state’s rules) where a lawyer admitted to disclosing information online about a former client in response to negative reviews on consumer websites. In a more extreme example, the Illinois Supreme Court in In re Peshek, M.R. 23794 (Ill. May 18, 2010) suspended an assistant public defender from practice for 60 days for, among other things, blogging about clients and implying in at least one such post that a client may have committed perjury. The Wisconsin Supreme Court imposed reciprocal discipline on the same attorney for the same misconduct. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Peshek, 798 N.W.2d 879 (Wis. 2011). 

Interestingly, the Virginia Supreme Court held in Hunter v. Virginia State Bar, 744 S.E.2d 611 (Va. 2013), that confidentiality obligations have limits when weighed against a lawyer’s First Amendment protections. Specifically, the court held that although a lawyer’s blog posts were commercial speech, the Virginia State Bar could not prohibit the lawyer from posting non-privileged information about clients and former clients without the clients’ consent where (1) the information related to closed cases and (2) the information was publicly available from court records and, therefore, the lawyer was free, like any other citizen, to disclose what actually transpired in the courtroom. 

5. Do Not Assume You Can “Friend” Judges

In the offline world, it is inevitable that lawyers and judges will meet, network, and sometimes even become personal friends. These real-world professional and personal relationships are, of course, subject to ethical constraints. So, too, are online interactions between lawyers and judges through social media (e.g., becoming Facebook “friends” or LinkedIn connections) subject to ethical constraints. 

Different jurisdictions have adopted different standards for judges to follow. ABA Formal Opinion 462 recently concluded that a judge may participate in online social networking, but in doing so must comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct and consider his or her ethical obligations on a case-by-case (and connection-by-connection) basis. Several states have adopted similar views, including Connecticut (Op. 2013-06), Kentucky (Op. JE-119), Maryland (Op. 2012-07), New York (Op. 13-39, 08-176), Ohio (Op. 2010-7), South Carolina (Op. 17-2009), and Tennessee (Op. 12-01). 

In contrast, states like California (Op. 66), Florida, Massachusetts (Op. 2011-6), and Oklahoma (Op. 2011-3) have adopted a more restrictive view. Florida Ethics Opinion 2009-20, for example, concluded that a judge cannot friend lawyers on Facebook who may appear before the judge because doing so suggests that the lawyer is in a special position to influence the judge. Florida Ethics Opinion 2012-12 subsequently extended the same rationale to judges using LinkedIn and the more recent Opinion 2013-14 further cautioned judges about the risks of using Twitter. Consistent with these ethics opinions, a Florida court held that a trial judge presiding over a criminal case was required to recuse himself because the judge was Facebook friends with the prosecutor. See Domville v. State, 103 So. 3d 184 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). 

6. Avoid Communications with Represented Parties

Under RPC 4.2 and equivalent state ethics rules, a lawyer is forbidden from communicating with a person whom the lawyer knows to be represented by counsel without first obtaining consent from the represented person’s lawyer. Under RPC 8.4(a) and similar state rules, this prohibition extends to any agents (secretaries, paralegals, private investigators, etc.) who may act on the lawyer’s behalf. 

These bright-line restrictions effectively prohibit lawyers and their agents from engaging in social media communications with persons whom the lawyer knows to be represented by counsel. This means that a lawyer may not send Facebook friend requests or LinkedIn invitations to opposing parties known to be represented by counsel in order to gain access to those parties’ private social media content. In the corporate context, San Diego County Bar Association Opinion 2011-2 concluded that high-ranking employees of a corporation should be treated as represented parties and, therefore, a lawyer could not send a Facebook friend request to those employees to gain access to their Facebook content. 

On the other hand, viewing publicly accessible social media content that does not precipitate communication with a represented party (e.g., viewing public blog posts or Tweets) is generally considered fair game. That was the conclusion reached by Oregon Ethics Opinions 2013-189 and 2005-164, which analogized viewing public social media content to reading a magazine article or a published book. 

7. Be Cautious When Communicating with Unrepresented Third Parties

Underlying RPC 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel), 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others), 4.3 (Dealing with Unrepresented Person), 4.4 (Respect for Rights of Third Persons), and 8.4 (Misconduct), and similar state ethics rules is concern for protecting third parties against abusive lawyer conduct. In a social media context, these rules require lawyers to be cautious in online interactions with unrepresented third parties. Issues commonly arise when lawyers use social media to obtain information from third-party witnesses that may be useful in a litigation matter. As with represented parties, publicly viewable social media content is generally fair game. If, however, the information sought is safely nestled behind the third party’s privacy settings, ethical constraints may limit the lawyer’s options for obtaining it. 

Of the jurisdictions that have addressed this issue, the consensus appears to be that a lawyer may not attempt to gain access to non-public social media content by using subterfuge, trickery, dishonesty, deception, pretext, false pretenses, or an alias. For example, ethics opinions in Oregon (Op. 2013-189), Kentucky (Op. KBA E-434), New York State (Op. 843), and New York City (Op. 2010-2) concluded that lawyers are not permitted (either themselves or through agents) to engage in false or deceptive tactics to circumvent social media users’ privacy settings to reach non-public information. Ethics opinions by other bar associations, including the Philadelphia Bar Association (Op. 2009-02) and the San Diego County Bar Association (Op. 2011-2), have gone one step further and concluded that lawyers must affirmatively disclose their reasons for communicating with the third party. 

8. Beware of Inadvertently Creating Attorney-Client Relationships

An attorney-client relationship may be formed through electronic communications, including social media communications. ABA Formal Opinion 10-457 recognized that by enabling communications between prospective clients and lawyers, websites may give rise to inadvertent lawyer-client relationships and trigger ethical obligations to prospective clients under RPC 1.18. The interactive nature of social media (e.g., inviting and responding to comments to a blog post, engaging in Twitter conversations, or responding to legal questions posted by users on a message board or a law firm’s Facebook page) creates a real risk of inadvertently forming attorney-client relationships with non-lawyers, especially when the objective purpose of the communication from the consumer’s perspective is to consult with the lawyer about the possibility of forming a lawyer-client relationship regarding a specific matter or legal need. Of course, if an attorney-client relationship attaches, so, too, do the attendant obligations to maintain the confidentiality of client information and to avoid conflicts of interest. 

Depending upon the ethics rules in the jurisdiction(s) where the communication takes place, use of appropriate disclaimers in a lawyer’s or a law firm’s social media profile or in connection with specific posts may help avoid inadvertently creating attorney-client relationships, so long as the lawyer’s or law firm’s online conduct is consistent with the disclaimer. In that respect, South Carolina Ethics Opinion 12-03 concluded that “[a]ttempting to disclaim (through buried language) an attorney-client relationship in advance of providing specific legal advice in a specific matter, and using similarly buried language to advise against reliance on the advice is patently unfair and misleading to laypersons.” 

9. Beware of Potential Unauthorized Practice Violations

A public social media post (like a public Tweet) knows no geographic boundaries. Public social media content is accessible to everyone on the planet who has an Internet connection. If legal professionals elect to interact with non-lawyer social media users, then they must be mindful that their activities may be subject not only to the ethics rules of the jurisdictions in which they are licensed, but also potentially the ethics rules in any jurisdiction where the recipient(s) of any communication is(are) located. Under RPC 5.5 and similar state ethics rules, lawyers are not permitted to practice law in jurisdictions where they are not admitted to practice. Moreover, under RPC 8.5 and analogous state rules, a lawyer may be disciplined in any jurisdiction where he or she is admitted to practice (irrespective of where the conduct at issue takes place) or in any jurisdiction where he or she provides or offers to provide legal services. It is prudent, therefore, for lawyers to avoid online activities that could be construed as the unauthorized practice of law in any jurisdiction(s) where the lawyer is not admitted to practice. 

10. Tread Cautiously with Testimonials, Endorsements, and Ratings

Many social media platforms like LinkedIn and Avvo heavily promote the use of testimonials, endorsements, and ratings (either by peers or consumers). These features are typically designed by social media companies with one-size-fits-all functionality and little or no attention given to variations in state ethics rules. Some jurisdictions prohibit or severely restrict lawyers’ use of testimonials and endorsements. They may also require testimonials and endorsements to be accompanied by specific disclaimers. South Carolina Ethics Opinion 09-10, for example, provides that (1) lawyers cannot solicit or allow publication of testimonials on websites and (2) lawyers cannot solicit or allow publication of endorsements unless presented in a way that would not be misleading or likely to create unjustified expectations. The opinion also concluded that lawyers who claim their profiles on social media sites like LinkedIn and Avvo (which include functions for endorsements, testimonials, and ratings) are responsible for conforming all of the information on their profiles to the ethics rules. 

Lawyers must, therefore, pay careful attention to whether their use of any endorsement, testimonial, or rating features of a social networking site is capable of complying with the ethics rules that apply in the state(s) where they are licensed. If not, then the lawyer may have no choice but to remove that content from his or her profile. 

Conclusion

Despite the risks associated with using social media as a legal professional, the unprecedented opportunities this revolutionary technology brings to the legal profession to, among other things, promote greater competency, foster community, and educate the public about the law and the availability of legal services justify the effort necessary to learn how to use the technology in an ethical manner. E-mail technology likely had its early detractors and, yet, virtually all lawyers are now highly dependent on e-mail in their daily law practice. Ten years from now, we may similarly view social media as an essential tool for the practice of law.

 

Words that Matter: Considerations in Drafting Preferred Stock Provisions

Pursuant to Delaware law, all capital stock, by default, is created equal unless the company’s certificate of incorporation provides for certain classes or series of preferred stock that enjoy special contractual rights, powers, and preferences over shares of another class or series of capital stock. While the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (the DGCL) permits a company to create preferred stock, it provides drafters of preferred stock provisions with no specific guidance as to the nature or form of the preferred stock’s rights and obligations. Similarly, Delaware case law imposes few express mandates other than to require that shares of preferred stock have preference over shares of common stock (which typically takes the form of a preference as to dividends and/or distributions upon liquidation of the company). 

With few requirements from the DGCL and Delaware case law, it is up to the drafter to set forth the particular terms, including the rights, powers, and preferences of the preferred stock. The terms of the preferred stock, particularly the economic rights, powers, and preferences, will be influenced by the context in which the preferred stock is being issued and the relative bargaining power of the company and its investors. The special rights, powers, and preferences typically associated with preferred stock consist of some combination of special dividends, liquidation, voting, redemption and/or conversion rights, and such rights, powers, and preferences must be clearly and specifically set forth in the company’s certificate of incorporation or in a certificate of designation (which has the effect of amending the company’s certificate of incorporation). For purposes of this article, a certificate of incorporation and a certificate of designation are referred to collectively as a “certificate of incorporation.” 

The interpretation of the special contractual preferences of preferred stock is primarily governed by the principles of contract law. In addition, preferred stock provisions must be interpreted in the context of the DGCL and the case law interpreting it. Drafters of preferred stock provisions are deemed to have been aware of and have an understanding of such applicable laws. If a preferred stockholder asserts a claim related to a contractual right, power, or preference of the preferred stock, Delaware courts will interpret such rights, powers, and preferences as contractual rather than fiduciary in nature. 

On the other hand, preferred stockholders have rights that are separate from those created by their contractual preferences. These separate rights are shared equally with the common stockholders and are fiduciary in nature. If a preferred stockholder asserts a claim related to a right that is not a preference, but instead is shared equally with the common stockholders, Delaware courts have suggested that both the preferred and common stockholders are owed fiduciary duties. For example, if preferred and common stockholders are entitled to vote on a certain matter, the directors’ duty to disclose all material information related to the matter extends to all of the company’s stockholders. If there is a divergence of interests between the holders of the preferred stock and common stock, however, it will generally be the duty of board of directors to prefer the interests of the common stockholders to those of the preferred stockholders. As a result, directors could be found to have breached their fiduciary duties if they favor the interests of the preferred stockholders under these circumstances. 

Accordingly, precise legal drafting is the key to ensuring that a preferred stockholder’s investment is adequately protected. The special rights, powers, and preferences of the preferred stock must be expressed clearly and will not be presumed. This article sets forth common drafting pitfalls of which drafters of preferred stock provisions should be cognizant. Most of these pitfalls can be avoided by remembering one simple concept when drafting preferred stock provisions: the special rights, powers, or preferences of preferred stock must be expressed clearly and will not be presumed or implied. 

Protecting Protective Provisions

Among the most highly negotiated contractual provisions related to preferred stock are the so-called “protective provisions,” which are contained in the certificate of incorporation and set forth a list of actions that the company cannot take without the prior consent of a specified percentage of the outstanding preferred stock. As its name implies, these provisions seek to protect the investment of the preferred stockholders from actions by the company that may dilute or diminish their investment. As some holders of preferred stock learned the hard way, however, the absence of a single phrase or the reliance on a general, catch-all provision can result in the elimination or circumvention of some or all of these highly negotiated protective provisions. 

Being “Benchmarked” 

The absence of the simple phrase “including by merger or otherwise” could ultimately result in the inapplicability of all of the preferred stock protective provisions through amendments effected by merger rather than through a direct amendment to the certificate of incorporation. In Benchmark Capital Partners, IV, L.P. v. Vague, 2002 WL 1732423 (Del. Ch. July 15, 2002), aff’d, 822 A.2d 396 (Del. 2003), Benchmark Capital Partners (Benchmark) purchased shares of preferred stock of Juniper Financial Corp. (Juniper) in exchange for certain provisions in Juniper’s certificate of incorporation to protect Benchmark’s investment. These protective provisions included the requirement that Juniper obtain Benchmark’s consent prior to taking any action that would “materially adversely change the rights, preferences and privileges” of Benchmark’s preferred stock. 

Several years later, when Juniper was in need of additional financing, Juniper and its potential investor proposed a transaction that would involve an investment of $50 million in financing in Juniper in exchange for shares of a new series of preferred stock of Juniper. In connection with the proposed transaction, Juniper initially considered amending its certificate of incorporation to permit the issuance of the new series of preferred stock, but reconsidered when it realized that Benchmark could invoke its protective provisions to block such action. Instead, to avoid Benchmark’s protective provisions, Juniper merged a wholly owned subsidiary with and into itself and, by virtue of the merger, amended and restated its certificate of incorporation. The amendments to the certificate of incorporation included the creation of a new series of preferred stock and the conversion of Benchmark’s existing preferred stock into a new series of junior preferred stock with diminished rights. 

In response, Benchmark filed suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery seeking to preliminarily enjoin the merger on the basis that Juniper failed to obtain the votes required by two of its protective provisions – a series vote of the holders of each series of existing preferred stock on the merger because the amendments would “materially adversely change the rights, preferences and privileges” of such series, and a class vote of the holders of existing preferred stock because Juniper “authorize[d] or issue[d], or obligate[d] itself to issue, any other equity security . . . senior to or on a parity with” the existing preferred stock. Juniper responded that Benchmark was not entitled to a series or class vote related to the merger because the adverse change to Benchmark’s rights was the result of a merger, as opposed to a direct amendment to the certificate of incorporation, and Benchmark’s protective provisions did not expressly apply to mergers. 

The court agreed with Juniper and held that protective provisions drafted to track Section 242(b)(2) of the DGCL (which provides holders of any class of capital stock with a class vote on an amendment to a certificate of incorporation that would “alter or change the powers, preferences, or special rights of the shares of such class so as to affect them adversely”) do not provide a class vote on a merger including one in which the certificate of incorporation of the surviving corporation is amended in the merger, absent an express provision of the certificate of incorporation to the contrary. Thus, because the protective provisions covering amendments to the certificate of incorporation did not include the phrase “including by merger or otherwise,” Juniper was able to amend its certificate of incorporation by virtue of merger to severely diminish Benchmark’s rights without Benchmark’s consent. 

Benchmark is consistent with decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court, including Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843 (Del. 1998), that provided a “path” for future drafters of preferred stock provisions. The Supreme Court noted that when a charter “grants only the right to vote on an amendment, alteration or repeal, the preferred have no class vote in a merger,” but when a charter “adds the terms ‘whether by merger, consolidation or otherwise’ and a merger results in an amendment, alteration or repeal that causes an adverse effect on the preferred, there would be a class vote.” As a result, drafters of preferred stock provisions should be cognizant of this “path” and draft protective provisions accordingly. 

Being “Crackered” 

Preferred stock provisions frequently provide that all shares of convertible preferred stock will convert automatically into shares of common stock upon the consent of the holders of a majority of the preferred stock. Where different series of preferred stock have different economic rights or protective provisions, holders of a series of preferred stock that do not own enough shares to block such an automatic conversion may lose their special economic rights or protective provisions if the holders of a majority of the preferred stock determine to convert the preferred stock into common stock. In Greenmont Capital Partners I, L.P. v. Mary’s Gone Crackers, Inc., 2012 WL 4479999 (Del. Ch. Sept. 28, 2012), the Delaware Court of Chancery considered whether, under Delaware law and the terms of the company’s certificate of incorporation, Mary’s Gone Crackers had the power to implement an automatic conversion of all of the shares of its Series A and Series B preferred stock into shares of common stock and subsequently to amend the certificate of incorporation to remove all references to the preferred stock (including its rights, powers, and preferences) without the consent of the holders of the Series B preferred stock. 

Under the company’s certificate of incorporation, a vote of the majority of the holders of the outstanding shares of Series A and Series B preferred stock (voting together) had the right to automatically convert their shares into shares of common stock. Because the holders of the Series A preferred stock (who enjoyed fewer benefits under the certificate of incorporation than the holders of the Series B preferred stock) owned a majority of the total shares of preferred stock, the holders of the Series A preferred stock had the ability to automatically convert all of the shares of the outstanding Series A and Series B preferred stock into common stock without the consent of the holders of the Series B preferred stock. In early 2012, Mary’s Gone Crackers solicited and received consents from a sufficient number of holders of the Series A preferred stock to effect the automatic conversion of all the shares of the company’s preferred stock into shares of common stock. 

A holder of the Series B preferred stock filed suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery claiming that the consent of the holders of the Series B preferred stock was required to effect the automatic conversion (and subsequently to amend the charter) based on certain protective provisions contained in the company’s certificate of incorporation, including consent rights over the company’s ability to take any action that would alter or change the powers, preferences, and rights of the Series B preferred stock. The court disagreed and held that the automatic conversion provision in the certificate of incorporation is a right of the holders of the preferred stock. Accordingly, the automatic conversion by the holders of a majority of the preferred stock to common stock was an effectuation of that right and was not an alteration or change to a right of the Series B preferred stock. The court noted that had the drafters of the preferred stock provisions intended for an automatic conversion to be subject to the consent rights of the holders of the Series B preferred stock, they could have expressly listed that right among the other consent rights of the holders of the Series B preferred stock. Because the holders of Series B preferred stock did not expressly bargain for the right to consent to any automatic conversion of the preferred stock, the holders of the Series A preferred stock were able to exercise the automatic conversion right and convert all of the shares of the preferred stock into common stock without the consent of the holders of the Series B preferred stock. 

What About Subsidiaries? 

When drafting preferred stock protective provisions that prevent the company from taking certain actions without the vote or consent of the holders of the company’s existing preferred stock, drafters should be aware that such provisions will not necessarily apply to any subsidiary of the company. Unless subsidiaries are specifically included within the scope of this protective provision, a subsidiary of the company could take actions that the company would otherwise be prevented from taking without the prior consent or vote of the preferred stockholders. For example, in In re Sunstates Corp. Shareholder Litigation, 788 A.2d 530 (Del. Ch. 2001), the Delaware Court of Chancery considered whether a preferred stock protective provision prohibiting the company from repurchasing its own shares when dividends were in arrears applied to purchases of the company’s stock by its subsidiaries. Consistent with prior decisions holding that the special rights of preferred stock must be expressed clearly, the court held that the relevant protective provision, which did not expressly provide that it applied to any subsidiary of the company, did not apply to purchases of the company’s stock by its subsidiaries. Further, the court noted that if the investors wished to prevent subsidiaries of the company from making such repurchases, they could have done so by including of the phrase “or permit any subsidiary of the company to take any such action.” 

“No Impairment” Clauses 

Protective provisions often include a “no impairment” clause, which typically provides that a company will not take any action that would impair the rights, powers, and preferences of the holders of the company’s existing preferred stock. In WatchMark Corp. v. ArgoGlobal Capital, LLC, 2004 WL 2694894 (Del. Ch. Nov. 4, 2004), the Delaware Court of Chancery rejected an argument that a “no impairment” clause operated as a gap filler to confer consent rights over actions that were not specifically addressed by the protective provisions in the certificate of incorporation. Delaware courts will not infer rights that are not expressly set forth in the certificate of incorporation, and thus “no impairment” clauses cannot be relied upon to provide protection that is not otherwise specifically granted. 

Consider Your Exit When You Enter 

In In re Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 2013 WL 4511262 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2013), the Delaware Court of Chancery noted that a typical investor’s investment timeframe is at odds with a company’s perpetual existence. Accordingly, investors whose investment horizon will require the company to engage in a liquidity event in a finite time period need to consider their exit strategy when they invest. If there is a divergence of interests between the holders of the preferred stock and common stock in a sale because, for example, all of the sale proceeds would go to the preferred stock and none of it would reach the common stock, it will generally be the duty of the board of directors to prefer the interests of the common stockholders to those of the preferred stockholders. In fact, directors could breach their fiduciary duties if they favor the interests of the preferred stockholders under these circumstances. In Trados, the court identified several contractual exit provisions to address the difficult fiduciary duty issues that can arise if such contractual exit rights are not present. These options include contractual drag-along rights requiring other stockholders to sell their shares to a purchaser if a majority of the stockholders approve the sale, put rights allowing the stockholder to put their stock to the company at a predesignated price after a fixed period of time, or a contractual agreement with the company to commence a sales process after a fixed period of time. Each of these options has limitations but, given the difficult fiduciary duty issues in the absence of such rights, consideration should be given at the time of investment to having a contractual exit strategy. 

Make Your Vote Count

In order to maintain control over their investment in the company, preferred stockholders often negotiate for certain special voting rights in exchange for their investment in the company. Any such voting rights must not only be clearly and specifically set forth, but they also must be carefully drafted to ensure that they are consistent with Delaware law and are included in the proper organizational document of the company. 

Set Forth Election and Voting Rights 

The most important voting right of preferred stockholders is often the right to designate a certain number of directors to the company’s board of directors. Under Delaware law, however, unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise, the majority of the stockholders of the company are entitled to elect all of the directors of the company. Thus, in order to provide preferred stockholders with the ability to designate a certain number of directors to the company’s board of directors, the election and voting rights of the preferred stockholders must be included in the certificate of incorporation. Election and voting rights of preferred stock that are only set forth in an investor rights agreement or a voting agreement and are not also included in a certificate of incorporation may not be specifically enforceable under Delaware law. 

Vacancies to be Filled in Same Manner as Appointed 

Many companies include a provision in their certificate of incorporation or bylaws that provides that any vacancy in a board seat may be filled by a majority of directors then in office. These provisions typically purport to apply regardless of whether the board seat was elected by a particular class or series of stock. It is not clear, however, that such a provision will work to fill a vacancy in a board seat that was elected by a particular class or series of stock. Section 223(a)(2) of the DGCL provides that, unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws, “[w]henever the holders of any class or classes of stock or series thereof are entitled to elect 1 or more directors by the certificate of incorporation, vacancies and newly created directorships of such class or classes or series may be filled by a majority of the directors elected by such class or classes or series thereof then in office, or by a sole remaining director so elected.” 

The inclusion of the permissive term “may” suggests that the procedure for filling vacancies and newly created directorships is merely permissive and is not exclusive of other mechanisms that may be set forth in the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws. Thus, vacancies in seats elected by the holders of a particular class or series of preferred stock may, unless expressly provided otherwise, be filled by other stockholders. Drafters should be aware of such potential issues and consider providing that any vacancies must be filled in the same manner as the director who was originally appointed to the board of directors and may not be filled in any other manner. 

Eliminate Common Stockholders’ Ability to Vote on Amendments to Preferred Stock Provisions 

Once preferred stock has been issued, regardless of whether it was created by a stockholder-approved amendment to the certificate of incorporation or by the board of directors in a certificate of designation pursuant to blank check authority, the terms of that series of preferred stock can only be altered by amending the certificate of incorporation under Section 242 of the DGCL, which requires the approval of all stockholders entitled to vote generally, including the common stockholders. Drafters of preferred stock provisions, however, can provide in the certificate of incorporation that common stockholders are not entitled to vote on any amendment to the certificate of incorporation that relates solely to the terms of one or more series of preferred stock, if the holder of such affected series is entitled to vote on the amendment. As a result, if the parties want to retain the flexibility to seek to change the terms of preferred stock without having to obtain the consent of the common stockholders, they must include a provision to that effect in the certificate of incorporation. 

Voting Agreements Should Include an Irrevocable Proxy 

In addition to the right to designate certain members of the company’s board of directors, preferred stockholders frequently enter into an agreement with the company and other stockholders to vote their shares for the election of certain designees to the company’s board of directors. Drafters of any such voting agreement should be aware that it may be difficult to enforce such an agreement (other than through costly litigation) if the voting agreement does not include an irrevocable proxy granting the holder of such proxy the power to vote the shares subject to the voting agreement in accordance with the terms of the voting agreement in the event that any party to the voting agreement fails to do so. 

Appraisal Rights for Preferred Stock 

As a general matter, holders of preferred stock have the same appraisal rights under Section 262 of the DGCL as the holders of common stock. Unlike common stock, however, the fair value of the preferred stock in an appraisal proceeding is based solely on the contractual rights granted to the preferred shares being appraised under the certificate of incorporation. As a result, the preferred stockholders are only entitled to rights that are clearly and expressly provided to them in the event of a merger in the certificate of incorporation and are not entitled to additional merger consideration through the appraisal process. 

Whether a preferred stockholder is entitled to a preference over the common stockholders in a sale of the company depends on the terms of the preferred stock. Often the preferred stock has specific provisions governing its rights in a sale of the company. In the absence of such specific provisions, however, preferences to which preferred stock may be entitled in a “liquidation, dissolution or winding up” of the company will not apply to a merger, particularly where the terms of the preferred stock expressly state that a merger will not be deemed to be a liquidation, dissolution, or winding up for purposes of the liquidation provisions of the preferred stock. In the absence of such specification, the preferred stock will be deemed to have no “preference” over the common stock in a sale and instead will be entitled only to pro rata treatment with the common stock. 

In determining the fair value of the preferred stock based on the certificate of incorporation, a Delaware court will not consider speculative or probable contractual features of the preferred stock. For example, in In re Appraisal of Metromedia International Group, Inc., 971 A.2d 893 (Del. Ch. 2009), the Delaware Court of Chancery rejected an argument by preferred stockholders that, in determining the fair value of the company’s preferred stock, the court should consider the preference of the preferred stockholders contained in the certificate of incorporation in connection with a redemption or liquidation because the preferred stockholders argued that it is likely that such an event could occur in the next few years. The court rejected the argument, noting that a redemption or liquidation of the preferred stock was too speculative, and determined that the preferred stockholders were only entitled to receive the amount per share as provided in the certificate of incorporation in the event of a merger. 

On the other hand, the court will consider nonspeculative contractual features of the certificate of incorporation in determining the fair value of the preferred stock. For example, in Shiftan v. Morgan Joseph Holdings, Inc., 57 A.3d 928 (Del. Ch. 2012), in the determining the fair value of the company’s preferred stock, the court took into account the economic reality that the preferred stockholders would have been entitled to mandatory redemption of their shares just six months after the merger. Therefore, even though the redemption had not (and would never) take place due to the merger transaction, the fact that, prior to the merger, the redemption was certain to occur in the near-term (within six months) was relevant to the court’s determination of value of the preferred shares in the merger transaction. 

Conclusion

As demonstrated by the examples set forth above, the precise words that drafters employ clearly matter in determining the special rights, powers, and privileges of preferred stock. Such rights must be set forth clearly in the certificate of incorporation and will not be presumed by a Delaware court if challenged. Accordingly, drafters should be familiar with the DGCL and the relevant case law and take great care to ensure that all of the desired provisions are clearly expressed and defined at the time of the preferred stockholders’ investment in the company.

 

Selling LLC Interests: The Tax Consequences May Not Be What You Expected

For a deal lawyer, few transactions are more commonplace than the sale of LLC interests. Sadly, the tax consequences of even some of the most routine of these sales can be stranger than any reasonable person would expect. This article touches on a few basic tax concepts, but in this area even some of the basics tend to evoke astonishment. The complexity of the tax aspects is no reason to shun LLCs. In situations where the client has a choice, the authors rarely recommend any other form of entity. However, business lawyers who work with these entities should be forewarned that the benefits can come at the price of often bewildering tax rules. 

The oddity of these tax principles becomes especially evident when comparing a simple sale of corporate stock with a sale of LLC units. We do not mean to suggest that the tax consequences of selling corporate stock are simple either. However, the rules on stock sales are generally more familiar to lawyers and, at least in most instances, tend to be more intuitive. 

Note that some LLCs actually are classified as corporations for tax purposes or are disregarded – additional grounds for complexity and confusion. But most LLCs are treated as partnerships for tax purposes and those are the only LLCs we are going to deal with here. 

A Simple Example

In 2010 Eva sells one of her shares of Paradise Inc. to Adam for $1,000. Paradise Inc. is a classic “C” corporation, subject to two levels of tax; it pays tax on its own income, and the shareholders pay additional tax when they receive dividends. Paradise Inc. pays some dividends out of its earnings. Paradise Inc. enjoys vigorous growth in value, and in mid-2012, Adam purchases one more share from Eva, this time paying $10,000. In early 2013, however, perhaps feeling some buyer’s remorse, Adam sells the second share for $10,000, the same amount he had paid for it. Since he sells the share at cost – and we’ll assume he had no transaction expenses – he recognizes no gain or loss. 

Now take the identical facts, except that Paradise is an LLC taxed as a partnership, rather than a corporation. It would be natural – but, as it turns out, quite misguided – to assume that LLCs are something like corporations, so that if Adam sells the second LLC unit for $10,000, he simply breaks even. But that is unlikely to be the case. 

LLC Basis in Constant Flux

One reason the sale of LLC interests is so complicated is that a member’s basis in an LLC interest changes so frequently. The amount that Adam pays for the units is only the starting point, and adjustments have to be taken into account to determine Adam’s basis. To a large extent, the reason the adjustments are needed is that the LLC does not pay tax on its own income. Instead, the members pay tax on the income as the LLC earns it, whether or not they receive distributions from the LLC. To determine which member is taxable on which portion of the income, the tax rules require an allocation of the income among the members. The allocation – which is essentially an accounting entry – increases a member’s basis, but the member generally is taxable on it even if the member receives no distribution. Conversely, when losses are allocated, the member suffers a decrease in basis but may be entitled to deduct a loss. Distributions reduce the members’ basis, offsetting the effect of income allocated. Contributions increase basis. Borrowing by the LLC is also allocated among the members, and each member’s share of that debt increases basis, even if such member has no liability on the debt. Each member receives an annual “Schedule K-1” from the LLC informing the member of these various adjustments. 

To make things simpler, let’s assume that the LLC incurred no debt, suffered no losses, received no capital contributions, and distributed to the members exactly the same amounts as it allocated to them. With these assumptions, Adam’s basis in his LLC interest should be the amount he paid to acquire the interest, just as his basis in the corporate stock was the purchase price. But even with these assumptions, other complications await. 

The “Blended” Tax Basis of LLC Units

Adam has a separate basis in each share of Paradise Inc. When he sells the second block of shares for what he paid, he has no gain or loss; it does not matter what he paid for the first block. Not so with Paradise LLC units. Adam’s basis in the different LLC units is blended or pooled; the division of his LLC interest into separate units has no significance under the tax rules. 

Adam paid a total of $11,000 for his LLC units ($1,000 in 2010 and $10,000 in 2012). His basis in half the LLC interest therefore is only $5,500. When he sells half his LLC interest for $10,000, he recognizes $4,500 of income. This is so regardless of which unit he chooses to sell. 

Thus, Adam has $4,500 more gain on selling the LLC unit than on selling the corporate stock. This is the result despite our assumption that Adam’s basis in both Paradise Inc. stock and Paradise LLC units equaled the purchase price, and even though in both cases the pricing of the transactions was the same. This does not mean LLCs are disadvantageous. If Adam had understood the relevant rules, some tax planning and restructuring might have served him well. For example, redemptions of LLC units can be tax-free in situations where comparable redemptions of corporate shares would be taxable. But Adam must understand the tax rules in order to see what alternatives might work better for him. 

Capital Gain or Ordinary Income Depends on LLC Assets

We turn next to the character of Adam’s gain – is it ordinary income, capital gain, or a mixture? The answer will be important given the current tax rules. For individuals, the maximum tax rate on ordinary income is often nearly 20 percentage points higher than on long-term capital gain. But to determine which rates apply, we need to know the makeup of the LLC’s assets. 

While the sale of LLC interests often results in capital gain, there are very large exceptions. To the extent the gain is attributable to so-called “hot assets” – i.e., inventory items and “unrealized receivables” of the LLC – Adam will recognize ordinary income instead of capital gain. While the first category seems straightforward, the latter category is a technical category that frustrates both tax and non-tax practitioners. In general, “unrealized receivables” refers to items that have not been taxed yet. For example, an account receivable of a medical practice that has not been included in income is an unrealized receivable. The definition, however, also extends to more esoteric concepts such as depreciation recapture. 

It is generally much easier to figure out the character of gain on the sale of corporate stock. There is no need to examine the assets of the corporation because the tax rules don’t “look through” the corporation to its assets. Adam knows whether he has ordinary income or capital gain on selling Paradise Inc. stock without regard to the assets the corporation holds. 

Let’s make another simplifying assumption about Paradise LLC: all its assets are “cold,” and so Adam’s gain on selling his units is entirely capital. 

Adam’s Gain Is Partly Long-Term and Partly Short-Term

Under current law, for the seller to get a favorable tax rate on capital gain, the asset must be held longer than one year. Gain on capital assets held for shorter periods is still considered capital gain, and may sometimes be advantageous, but the advantages do not include any break on the tax rate. Short-term capital gain and ordinary income are taxed at the same rate. 

Adam acquired his first unit in Paradise LLC more than a year before the sale, but he sold the second unit, which was held less than a year. However, just as the division of Adam’s LLC interest into units was ignored in determining the amount of his gain, that division is also ignored in determining his holding period (assuming Paradise LLC is not publicly traded). Under the tax rules, Adam simply sold half his interest in the LLC – from the tax viewpoint the attempt to separate his interest into two units has no effect. Adam’s holding period is divided, but the division ignores the existence of units. It turns out, in our simplified example, that 50 percent of his gain is short-term and 50 percent long-term. 

In comparison, if Adam had recognized any gain on the sale of his second share of Paradise Inc. stock, all the gain would have been short-term. So in that instance the LLC holding period rule would have been more favorable. The rule for splitting the holding period of LLC interests may help or hurt, depending on the situation. The important point is to be aware of the rule and plan accordingly. 

No Automatic Qualification for Most Favorable Rate

If Adam had recognized capital gain on the sale of Paradise Inc. stock, he could have determined his maximum tax rate without inquiring about the assets that the corporation happened to have. He would have qualified for the 20 percent maximum rate on long-term gain, although his short-term gain would have been considered ordinary income taxable at a maximum rate of 39.6 percent. (These rates do not include the 3.8 percent “Medicare” tax that went into effect in 2013, or any state and local taxes.) 

The maximum long-term capital gain rate on the sale of LLC interests by individuals is generally 20 percent, just as it is on corporate stock. However, if the LLC holds depreciable real property, then a 25 percent maximum rate may apply to at least some of the gain. If any of Adam’s long-term capital gain on the sale of his LLC units is attributable to “collectibles” – such as art, antiques, metals, gems, stamps, or coins – held by the LLC, the maximum rate increases to 28 percent. 

Some Issues Between Adam and the Buyer

The buyer of Adam’s LLC unit – call her Lilith – will start with a cost basis of $10,000, equal to the fair market value of the unit she just purchased. This is a reasonable result as far as it goes, but it may obscure the potential problems discussed below. (If Paradise LLC had any debt, Lilith’s basis might start off higher than $10,000, but we have stipulated that the LLC is debt free.) 

For example, suppose that the LLC had earned a significant amount of income shortly before Lilith acquired her unit, and had distributed the proceeds to Adam, Eva, and any other members at the time. Since Lilith did not enjoy any benefit from that income, it would not seem fair to require her to pay tax on it. However, if she is not careful, she may be stuck with part of that tax bill. 

As noted above, the tax rules require the LLC’s income to be allocated to its members. Under one allocation method the income is prorated – smoothed out as if the income had been earned each day of the year. Under that method, Lilith is allocated a portion of the income for the year based on the number of days she has been a member. It is irrelevant whether the income is earned before or after she buys in, or whether she gets the slightest benefit from the income. It is easy to construct examples where the new member bears catastrophic tax liability – perhaps more than her total purchase price – on income that she had no share of. Distortions of this kind do not arise on the sale of classic “C” corporations. Note that under our facts it is the buyer who is harmed by this distortion. In some instances, however, it would be the seller who suffers – for example, if Paradise LLC had incurred a significant loss before the sale, Lilith might be allocated some portion. 

The way to prevent such distortions is to “close the books” as of the date that interests in the LLC change. If the books of Paradise LLC close when Adam sells units to Lilith, then Lilith would not be allocated any of the income arising before the sale. The LLC agreement may leave the choice between proration and closing the books to the buyer and seller, but it need not. It is possible that the LLC agreement will limit or even eliminate one or the other of the two methods. Adam and Lilith need to examine the LLC agreement. 

Closing the books solves one kind of problem, but it fails to resolve another common but perhaps less obvious concern. When Lilith bought her units from Adam, the basis that the LLC had in its assets was likely quite low, much lower than fair market value. The difference between the low basis that the LLC has in its assets and the fair market value basis that Lilith has in her interest in the LLC may cause Lilith to be unfairly taxed. Tax practitioners refer to this as an “inside/outside” basis difference. Lilith has a high basis in her LLC interest (her “outside basis”), but her corresponding share of LLC assets has a low basis (her “inside” basis). For a variety of technical reasons, these types of differences can cause tax inefficiencies. 

Here is an example of the problem.  Suppose that the day after Lilith’s arrival the LLC sells the bulk of its assets for $27,000, and that all $27,000 is gain (i.e., these assets had a zero basis). If Lilith owns one-third of the LLC at the time, she is allocated $9,000 of taxable income. The LLC chooses to distribute $9,000 to Lilith, but – because the LLC has disposed of most of its assets – the value of her LLC declines from $10,000 to $1,000. Lilith plainly has not enjoyed $9,000 of income since acquiring her interest in the LLC. The value of her interest in the LLC did not grow between the time she acquired the interest and the time the LLC sold its assets. In reality, Lilith has simply received back $9,000 of her $10,000 investment. However, the tax rules fail to recognize that reality, and charge her with tax on $9,000 of income, unless the parties take action to alleviate the problem. 

There is a tax election that can resolve this problem. When the election functions as intended, the basis of Lilith’s share of the LLC’s assets is increased and she avoids any consequences of an inside/outside basis difference. Critically, however, the election is made by the LLC, and not by Lilith. Depending on the terms of the LLC agreement, Lilith may or may not be able to require the LLC to have the election in place when needed. The availability of the election is an important consideration for Lilith when she is deciding whether to buy Adam’s units. The units may be less valuable if the election cannot be put in place. 

More Trouble Areas

This article is not intended to provide a definitive survey of tax issues that need to be considered in confecting a sale of an LLC interest. However, in addition to the issues already mentioned, practitioners need to be aware of the following: 

Technical Terminations 

A sale of 50 percent or more of the LLC interests in a 12-month period can cause a “termination” of the LLC for tax purposes, even though the LLCs continuity as a business entity under state law is in no way impaired. While the real world consequences are often not dramatic, for some LLCs (particularly those which own property that qualifies for accelerated depreciation), the results may be significant. 

Deemed Debt Relief 

As noted, one component of a member’s basis in her LLC interest is her “share” of the LLC’s debt. For tax purposes, when a member sells an interest in an LLC, the actual consideration received is artificially adjusted by an amount equal to the change in her share of LLC debt. Depending on the details of the LLC debt and whether she sells all or a portion of her interest in the LLC, these rules can significantly complicate the amount of gain or loss she will have to recognize. 

Differing Types of LLC Interests 

If a member holds different classes of interests in an LLC (e.g., common and preferred units), the sale of one class and not the other can make application of the pooled basis rules even more complicated. In fact even when two LLC units are nominally of the same class, there may be differences between them. Whereas the sale of one of Adam’s two identical LLC units required him to assign half of his total basis to the unit that was sold, the same result does not obtain if the two units have different rights and economics. In that case, it will generally be necessary for Adam to determine the fair market value of both classes. 

Redemptions 

Economically, there is little difference between selling an interest in an LLC and having the LLC redeem such an interest. However, such transactions introduce a number of new issues, particularly if the LLC makes a noncash distribution to effectuate the redemption, which can create unintended consequences. 

Conclusion

Tax issues are messy. No one would hold up the tax consequences of buying and selling stock of corporations as a model of simplicity and clarity. In our experience, however, the tax treatment of stock sales rarely elicits the kind of shock that comparable sales of interests in LLCs – that is, LLCs classified for tax purposes as partnerships – often arouses. Corporations cannot compete with many of the tax advantages that LLCs offer. However, the gap between what most lawyers would expect, and what the tax rules actually require, is larger in the case of LLCs than corporations. While it is never a good idea to rely solely on intuition in anticipating the tax consequences of a transaction, intuition is often especially unreliable when dealing with LLCs.

Avoiding Adverse Tax Consequences in Partnership and LLC Reorganizations

Once parties decide to combine the assets and liabilities of two or more partnerships or limited liability companies (LLCs) taxed as partnerships or to divide such an entity into more than one entity, they are generally left to choose the form that provides the most advantageous tax results. State law grants partnerships and LLCs the power to merge with other entities. Such entities may join assets and liabilities through a state-law merger, or they may structure the combination through an asset transfer. An asset transfer often provides the greatest tax planning flexibility and may limit the exposure any resulting entity has to one of the transferring entity’s liabilities. Because states do not provide for statutory divisions, all divisions of partnerships and LLCs occur through asset transfers. Both partnerships and LLCs can be partnerships for tax purposes, so this article refers to them collectively as tax partnerships.           

The tax rules provide that all mergers and divisions of tax partnerships will follow either an assets-over or assets-up form. An assets-over merger occurs when a terminating entity contributes all of its assets and liabilities to the continuing entity in exchange for interests in the continuing entity, and the terminating entity then distributes those interests to its members in complete liquidation. An assets-up merger occurs when a terminating entity distributes all of its assets and liabilities to its members in complete liquidation, and the members then contribute them to the continuing entity in exchange for interests in the continuing entity. An assets-over division occurs when one entity contributes some of its assets to a new entity in exchange for all of the interests in the new entity, and then distributes the interests in the new entity to some or all of its members. An assets-up division occurs when one entity distributes some of its assets to its members, and the members then contribute them to a new entity in exchange for interests in that entity. Diagrams of both types of mergers illustrate different flows of property. 

If the parties to a merger or division of a partnership or LLC do not carry out the reorganization in one of those two forms, tax law will treat the transaction as an assets-over reorganization. Although the end result of such transactions may be the same from a non-tax standpoint, the form of a transaction may significantly affect the tax treatment of the parties. This article focuses on how the form of a merger of partnerships or LLCs can trigger gain and affect the basis the resulting entities have in assets. Divisions can raise similar issues.           

The rules governing contributions to and distributions from tax partnerships apply to reorganizations of tax partnerships. Tax law recognizes that members of tax partnerships own interests in those entities, and the members take tax bases in those interests. The basis in a tax partnership interest is known as the “outside basis.” The law also recognizes that tax partnerships own property and have bases in such property. The basis a tax partnership has in property is known as the “inside basis.” If a person contributes property to a tax partnership in exchange for a tax partnership interest, neither the person nor the tax partnership will recognize gain or loss on the contribution. The basis the person had in the property will become the basis the tax partnership takes in the property and the basis the person will take in the tax partnership interest. The tax rules also provide that any built-in gain or loss that exists at the time of contribution of property, when triggered, must be allocated to the person who contributed the property to the tax partnership. A simple example illustrates these rules.           

Sabeel contributes Worn Warehouse and Fabio contributes $650,000 of cash to form Saio LLC, a tax partnership. At the time of contribution, Worn Warehouse was worth $450,000 and Sabeel had a $150,000 basis in it. Sabeel takes a $150,000 outside basis in his 41 percent interest in Saio LLC, and Fabio takes a $650,000 outside basis in his 59 percent interest in Saio LLC. Saio LLC takes a $150,000 basis in Worn Warehouse. At the time of contribution, Worn Warehouse had a $300,000 built-in gain ($450,000 fair market value minus $150,000 basis). If Saio LLC were to sell Worn Warehouse immediately after contribution and recognize the $300,000 of built-in gain, it would allocate the entire amount of gain to Sabeel, the person who contributed it. The diagram represents Saio LLC’s tax situation after formation. 

The distribution rules can affect the tax consequences of a reorganization. The distribution rules provide generally that neither the tax partnership nor any of its members recognize gain or loss on distributions. If the distribution is a liquidating distribution, the distributee member takes a basis in distributed property equal to the distributee member’s outside basis. If the distribution is not a liquidating distribution, the distributee member takes a basis in the distributed property equal to the property’s inside basis. An example illustrates this rule. 

Margot, Sarah, and Kristalia are equal members of Marali LLC, a tax partnership. Margot’s outside basis in her Marali LLC interest is $350,000, Sarah’s is $250,000, and Kristalia’s is $150,000. Each of their interests are worth $350,000. Marali LLC owns four assets, all of which it purchased: Raw Land worth $350,000 with a $200,000 basis, Stonecrest Building worth $175,000 with a $100,000 basis, Stonehenge Building worth $175,000 with a $100,000 basis, and BigCorp stock, which are marketable securities, worth $350,000 with a $350,000 basis. 

Marali LLC distributes Stonecrest Building to Sarah. Because the distribution does not liquidate Sarah’s interest in Marali LLC and the inside basis in the distributed asset was less than her outside basis, she would take Stonecrest Building with a basis equal to the $100,000 basis Marali LLC had in it immediately prior to the distribution. Assume alternatively that Marali LLC distributes both Stonecrest Building and Stonehenge Building to Sarah in complete liquidation of her interest in Marali LLC. Because the distribution is in complete liquidation of her interest, Sarah would take a basis in the distributed property that equals her $250,000 outside basis (a basis of $125,000 in each building). Thus, under these facts, the basis of the buildings increases when the distribution is in complete liquidation of Sarah’s interest. Because the buildings are depreciable, Sarah is able to take depreciation deductions using the larger basis, if the distribution is in complete liquidation of her interest. (Note, however, that if the tax partnership has made a Section 754 election, it would have to make a downward adjustment to the basis of its remaining assets to account for the basis step up on distribution.) 

Two major exceptions apply to the general nonrecognition rule that applies to distributions. First, a member generally recognizes gain if the tax partnership distributes money or marketable securities to a member and the amount of the money or the fair market value of the securities exceeds the member’s outside basis. A member can recognize loss on a cash liquidating distribution if the cash distribution is less than the member’s outside basis. Second, a distribution of property with built-in gain or a distribution to a person who contributed property with built-in gain can trigger that built-in gain, if the distribution takes place within seven years after the contribution. An example illustrates the first exception. 

Assume now that Marali LLC distributes the BigCorp stock to Kristalia in complete liquidation of her interest in Marali LLC. Because BigCorp stock is a marketable security, Kristalia would recognize gain on the distribution to the extent the value of the stock exceeds her outside basis. Her outside basis is $150,000, and the fair market value of the stock is $350,000, so Kristalia would recognize $200,000 of gain on the distribution. Kristalia would take a $350,000 basis in the stock. Notice that if Marali LLC had distributed the stock to Margot, who has an outside basis of $350,000, she would have recognized no gain on the distribution, and she would have taken a $350,000 basis in the stock. Thus, the distribution to Margot would not trigger gain recognition. The application of these basis rules illustrates that the type of distribution and the person to whom a tax partnership distributes property may affect the tax treatment of a distribution. The rules can therefore affect the tax treatment of a reorganization. 

The second exception to the general nonrecognition rule is a bit more complicated because it requires tracking the movement of property with built-in gain. Returning to the first example, if instead of contributing Worn Warehouse and cash to Saio LLC, Sabeel had simply sold Worn Warehouse to Fabio, Sabeel would have recognized gain on the transaction. Tax law prevents Sabeel and Fabio from using Saio LLC to effect a tax-free property transfer by imposing anti-mixing bowl rules. Those rules provide that if a tax partnership distributes property with a built-in gain within seven years after the contribution, the person who contributed the property must recognize the remaining unamortized built-in gain. Thus, if within seven years after Sabeel contributed the property to Saio LLC, it had distributed the property to Fabio, Sabeel would have to recognize gain on that distribution in an amount equal to the remaining unamortized built-in gain at the time of the distribution. 

The rules also provide that if a tax partnership distributes “other” property to a member who, within the last seven years, contributed built-in gain property to the tax partnership, the distributee member may recognize gain. Consequently, if Saio LLC were to acquire other property and distribute it to Fabio within seven years after he contributed Worn Warehouse, the distribution could trigger gain recognition for him. A distribution within two years after Sabeel contributes Worn Warehouse could also have a presumption of taxable gain under the disguised sale rules. Thus, distributions can trigger gain recognition, if they occur with respect to contributed property. Because mergers and divisions of tax partnerships include distributions, the parties to such transactions must be aware of these potential consequences. The rules also apply to property that is contributed as part of a reorganization. 

The partnership tax merger and division rules coupled with the rules about contributions and distributions often allow parties to tax-partnership reorganizations to choose from the various restructuring alternatives to manage the tax bases of property and perhaps avoid triggering gain recognition. An example illustrates this point. Assume that the members of Saio LLC and Marali LLC agree to combine their two entities. Following the combination, Sabeel and Fabio will own 52 percent of the resulting entity, so Saio LLC will be the continuing entity. If the parties structure the transaction as a state-law merger, tax law will treat the transaction as an assets-over merger with Marali LLC transferring its assets to Saio LLC for a 48 percent interest in Saio LLC. Marali LLC would then distribute the Saio LLC interests to Margo, Sarah, and Kristalia in complete liquidation. The bases of Marali LLC’s assets would carry over to Saio LLC upon contribution, and Marali LLC would take a $750,000 basis in the Saio LLC interests, which equals to the aggregate basis it had in the assets it transferred. Because the distribution of Saio LLC interests is a liquidating distribution, Margo, Sarah, and Kristalia would each take basis in their interests in Saio LLC equal to their respective bases in Marali LLC. 

With an assets-over merger, the transfer from the terminating entity to the continuing entity generally starts the seven-year clock on the anti-mixing bowl rules (unless the ownership of the terminating entity and the resulting entity are identical). Consequently, the anti-mixing bowl rules should apply to the assets that Marali LLC was deemed to contribute to Saio LLC. As a result, a distribution of Raw Land, Stonecrest Building, or Stonehenge Building to either Sabeel or Fabio would trigger gain recognition to Margo, Sarah, and Kristalia. Additionally, Saio LLC must allocate the built-in gain on Worn Warehouse to Sabeel. The contribution of the Marali LLC assets to Saio LLC also creates built-in gain in those assets that Saio LLC must allocate to Margo, Sarah, and Kristalia. It would allocate the built-in gain in the same manner that Marali LLC would have allocated the gain had it sold the property for cash. 

If the parties instead structure the combination of entities as an assets-up merger, Marali LLC would distribute its property to Margo, Sarah, and Kristalia. They would then each contribute the assets that they hold in exchange for a 16 percent interest in Saio LLC. The tax rules do not require Marali LLC to distribute the property pro rata to the members. Consequently, they can decide which assets they would like to distribute to which member. The parties should manage the distribution in a manner that avoids gain recognition to the extent possible and places basis on property in a manner that provides the greatest future tax advantage. (Note that disproportionate distributions can create ordinary income, if a tax partnership has inventory or unrealized receivables, which is not the case with this set of facts.) Recall that the distribution of the BigCorp stock would trigger gain recognition to the distributee to the extent that the value of the stock exceeds the distributee’s outside basis. Consequently, if Marali LLC distributes the stock to Sarah, she would recognize $100,000 of gain on the distribution, and if it distributes the stock to Kristalia, she would recognize $200,000 of gain on the distribution. To avoid that gain recognition, the parties may agree that Marali LLC will distribute BigCorp stock to Margo, whose outside basis equals the value of the stock, so she would not recognize any gain on the distribution. Margo would take a $350,000 basis in the stock. 

Next, the parties must determine how they will distribute the Raw Land and the two buildings. Because the buildings are depreciable, the parties would most likely prefer to have as much basis as possible go to the buildings to increase the depreciation deductions that Saio LLC will be able to take. Therefore, the parties may agree to distribute the buildings to Sarah, so she would take a $125,000 basis (one-half of her $250,000 outside basis) in each of the buildings. That leaves Kristalia to take the Raw Land with a $150,000 basis. The members would then contribute the property to the Saio LLC in exchange for their respective interests. Saio LLC would take the bases that the members have in the respective assets, and the members would each take a basis in their respective Saio LLC interests equal to the bases they had in the distributed assets. 

This example illustrates that the form of the transaction can affect the tax consequences to the parties and the allocation of basis among the assets. The assets-up form moves basis from Raw Land to the buildings. This appears to be a good result from an overall perspective, but it changes the tax standing of some of the members. For example, the Raw Land would have a $200,000 built-in gain after the merger. Because Kristalia is the contributing member, all of that gain would be allocated to her, if Saio LLC were to sell or distribute the Raw Land. She thus bears that entire $200,000 gain, which otherwise would have been allocated equally among the members of Marali LLC. Sarah also benefits from a smaller built-in gain in the buildings, and Kristalia appears to avoid the built-in gain in those assets entirely. 

This one example illustrates that the form a merger of two LLCs can raise interesting tax issues. The example focuses on how parties may avoid potential gain recognition on the transaction and how they can manage the bases of properties that are part of a merger. Tax-partnership divisions would raise similar issues. And other facts would also raise different issues. Mergers and divisions of tax partnerships therefore raise many issues, which may provide a planning opportunity for the careful planner or could be a pitfall for the unwary. Advisors can choose what variation to provide for their clients.

The Past and Future of Bitcoins in Worldwide Commerce

Virtual currency is not new. It has been around since the early 2000s in virtual world websites like Second Life and online role-playing game sites like World of Warcraft, where virtual currency is “earned” by completing virtual quests. But neither Linden Dollars earned in Second Life nor Facebook credits earned on Farmville could be spent outside of their restricted virtual worlds, even though some could be exchanged for dollars (or other real world currencies) on third-party websites. The bitcoin is changing this landscape. Some hail it as “the next great step in Internet and global currency.” (Although “bitcoin” is capitalized by some writers; the author elects to treat the word generically and use the lower case throughout.)

Bitcoin started in 2008 with a self-published white paper by a group of computer geeks using the fictitious name “Satoshi Nakamoto.” A bitcoin is essentially just a snippet of code, based on an algorithm first identified in the Nakamoto white paper. In 2009, the Bitcoin Network was established and actual bitcoins were first issued and its evolution since has been swift. Practitioners in cyberspace or commercial finance law need at least a working knowledge of this digital currency which has no borders and is unregulated by any governmental authority or central bank.

A central purpose of bitcoin according to Nakamoto was to reduce transaction costs incurred when parties validate transactions and mediate disputes. To that end, the bitcoin system is based on open source computing. Bitcoin users cooperate to validate transactions either by running a program implementing the bitcoin protocol on an individual’s own computer or by creating an account on a bitcoin website to run the protocol. Although creators of bitcoins originally used them for Internet-related tasks, like trading bitcoin for programming help, the currency has gained increasing acceptance in broader contexts.

The early use of bitcoin in online drug markets and casinos gave it a somewhat tarnished reputation. But bitcoin increasingly is used in legitimate commerce. Thus, early this year, Coinbase, a bitcoin payment processor, reported selling $1 million in bitcoins in one month at more than $22 each. Later, venture capitalists began pouring millions into startups that focus on bitcoins. In July 2013, the Winklevoss twins (of Facebook fame), having formed an electronically traded fund called the “Winklevoss Bitcoin Trust,” filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to sell shares in the trust to the public.

Creating Bitcoins

Bitcoins are created by “mining.” Bitcoin miners engage in a set of prescribed complex mathematical calculations in order to add “blocks” to the “block chain,” which is a transactional database shared by all nodes participating in the bitcoin system. The full block chain contains every transaction ever executed in bitcoin, starting with the very first one which is called the “genesis block.” This allows determination of the value belonging to each address at any point in time. Miners who succeed in adding a block to the block chain automatically receive a fixed number of bitcoins as a reward for their effort.

Space does not permit a detailed description of the mining process, but in essence a miner maps an input data set (i.e., the block chain plus a block of the most recent Bitcoin Network transactions and an arbitrary number called a “nonce”) to a desired output data set of predetermined length (the “hash value”), using Nakamoto’s algorithm. The miner then “solves” a new block by repeating this computation with a different nonce until hash of a block’s header having a value not more than the current target set by the Bitcoin Network is generated. Because each unique block can only be solved and added to the block chain from one source, all individual miners and mining pools in the Bitcoin Network are competing. Such competition spurs them to constantly increase their computing power in order to improve their ability to solve for new blocks. A miner can only build onto a block (referencing it in blocks the miner creates) if it is the latest block in the longest “valid” chain. A chain is valid if (1) it starts with the genesis block and (2) all of the blocks and transactions within the chain are valid.

A proposed block is added to the block chain once a majority of the nodes on the Bitcoin Network confirms the miner’s work. In addition to new bitcoins, the successful miner receives any transaction fees paid by transferors whose transactions are recorded in the block. This process has been described as a “mathematical lottery,” where miners with greater processing power (i.e., ability to make more hash calculations per second) are more likely to succeed. Because the method for creating new bitcoins is mathematically controlled, the total bitcoin supply grows at a pre-set, limited rate. The fixed reward for solving a new block is currently 25 bitcoins per block, but will decrease to 12.5 bitcoins per block around the year 2017. The number of bitcoins in existence will never exceed 21 million, and bitcoins cannot be devalued through excessive production unless the Bitcoin Network’s source code and the underlying protocol for bitcoin issuance are changed.

The targets established by the Bitcoin Network constantly increase in difficulty, meaning that miners constantly need more expensive processing power to compete. Early on, a bitcoin could be bought for 25 cents on an exchange, and a miner with just a laptop’s CPU could make a handful of new bitcoins a day. Computers now are specially designed solely for bitcoin mining, and the newest rigs use an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) built specifically to execute the hash operation. This bitcoin “arms race” led to a 2013 venture funding of $200 million in the maker of high-end servers designed specifically for producing bitcoins, with the deal also including the maker of state-of-the-art microchips to power the hardware.

The current mining protocol makes it increasingly difficult to solve for new blocks as computer processing power dedicated to mining increases (in order to maintain a 10-minute per block average). Because the difficulty in finding valid hash values has grown exponentially since the first block was mined, one individual can no longer mine bitcoins successfully. Mining “pools” have formed, in which multiple miners combine their processing power. When pool members solve a new block, they allocate the reward according to the processing power each contributed to the solution. Such pools give participants access to smaller, but steadier and more frequent, bitcoin payouts. The Wall Street Journal reported on November 6, 2013, that the speed of bitcoin mining was now 40 times faster than in January 2013. It was estimated in August 2013 that about 11.5 million bitcoins were in existence, with the amount steadily increasing. Estimates are that 90 percent of the 21 million bitcoin limit will have been produced by 2020.

The Bitcoin Network is designed so as to decrease the reward for adding new blocks to the block chain over time. Ultimately, miners will need to be compensated in transaction fees in order to provide adequate incentives for miners. (However, as of publication of this article, transaction fees still accounted for but 1 percent of miners’ total revenues.)

Trading For Bitcoins

To buy or sell bitcoins, one must have Internet access to the Bitcoin Network, where such transactions are consummated within seconds. Double-spending of any single bitcoin is avoided by having the user give information on the transaction to the Bitcoin Network of the transaction, which uses the block chain to memorialize every bitcoin transaction.

A bitcoin trader first installs on a computer (or mobile device) a software program allowing the trader to generate a digital “wallet” for storing bitcoins. The wallet can either be stored in the trader’s own computer or hosted on a third-party website. The trader then connects to the Bitcoin Network and engages in the purchase, sale, and receipt of bitcoins. A trader can have an unlimited number of digital wallets, each with a unique address and verification system consisting of both a “public key” and a “private key.” Because the system relies upon peer-to-peer networking and cryptography, it is a distributed model resistant to central control. The private key, used to authorize bitcoin transactions, has no information about the user, although the transactions are traceable by means of the public key. The result is that the address of a bitcoin is traceable on an individual’s own computer, but ownership of each address remains anonymous.

One way to buy bitcoins is to identify someone willing to sell bitcoins, then offer to buy them with conventional currency. Once a price is set, the seller transfers the bitcoins to the buyer’s wallet. Another and more organized way is to use a bitcoin exchange. As with conventional currency exchanges, price is usually not individually negotiated, but instead based on the aggregate supply of and demand for bitcoins in the system. While using an exchange adds to the transaction cost, it is both more efficient and better monitored.

There are estimated to be approximately 12 currency exchanges around the world where consumers and businesses can trade bitcoins for local currency. Because the technology is open source, new services are created almost every week. Among the more active are Mt. Gox in Japan, BitBox and Bitstamp in the United States, and Bitcurex in Poland. Banks like Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs reportedly visit bitcoin exchanges up to 30 times a day. Bitcoin exchanges are not problem-free: Mt. Gox in Tokyo, the largest exchange, reported in 2013 that its services had been disabled for hours by an Internet “denial-of-service” attack. Mt. Gox said attackers wait until the price of bitcoins reaches a certain value, then sell, destabilize the exchange, wait for panic-selling to cause the bitcoin price to drop to a certain amount, then stop the attack and start buying as much as they can. Such volatility caused bitcoin to rise from roughly $5 in June 2012 to a high of $266 in April 2013, before dropping to $108 in May 2013.

Using Bitcoin in Day-to-Day Commerce

A retail customer can pay in bitcoin by using a smartphone to scan a barcode provided by the retailer. Retailers see an advantage in avoiding credit card fees that can run as high as 3 percent, compared to less than 1 percent for bitcoins. Moreover, bitcoin transactions are final, whereas credit card charges can be disputed. This kind of advantage helped BitPay, Inc., of Atlanta in 2012 sign up more than 8,000 merchants worldwide to accept bitcoins and to set what was then a new record for bitcoin payment processing, with orders and payments from 17 different countries such as Belgium, Russia, and Poland. Since bitcoin is a currency run by those who use it, a bitcoin’s value is determined by the marketplace; in other words, a bitcoin is worth whatever someone will take for it.

Venture Capital and Bitcoin

Startups focused on marketing bitcoin services have attracted increasing interest from venture capitalists. For example, in 2013, venture firms invested more than $2 million in OpenCoin, Inc., and $5 million in Coinbase, which operates an online service allowing users to buy and store bitcoin in a digital wallet and pay merchants for goods and services. Coinbase claimed some 116,000 members who had converted $15 million of real money into bitcoin, and dollar conversions increasing by about 15 percent a week. The San Francisco venture firm Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers reports that it is exploring bitcoin-related investments and has reviewed over two dozen companies.

Electronically-Traded Funds

As noted earlier, the Winklevoss twins filed a registration statement with the SEC in 2013 for their “Winklevoss Bitcoin Trust,” an ETF. The filing, which contains over 17 pages of “Risk Factors,” observes that (1) the value of bitcoins is determined by the supply of and demand for bitcoins in the bitcoin exchange market, as well as the number of merchants that accept them, and (2) bitcoins have little use in real-world retail and commercial markets compared with their “relatively large use by speculators.” Columnist Chuck Jaffe opined that the twins face a long, uphill battle just to get their fund to market, adding that “chances are good it will still be viewed for years as a granular, niche fund – more like one specializing in Bulgarian stocks than with mainstream applications.”

Regulatory Issues

Bitcoin faces a number of unresolved regulatory issues. They involve FinCEN, the U.S. Department of Justice, the SEC, and state regulators of money service businesses (MSBs). As mentioned earlier, FinCEN this year issued regulatory guidance classifying digital payment systems like bitcoin as “virtual currencies,” on the basis they are not legal tender under any sovereign jurisdiction. While opining that a user of virtual currency is not an MSB and hence not subject to federal MSB regulation, FinCEN went on to state that U.S. entities that generate “virtual currency” (including bitcoins) could be deemed MSBs if the virtual currency were sold for “real currency or its equivalent.” Thus, miners of bitcoin within the United States may need to register and comply with federal MSB regulations if they sell bitcoins for dollars. American Banker online has asserted that at least three U.S. bitcoin exchanges elected to shut down as a result of FinCEN’s guidance. FinCEN’s director stated that its guidance aims to protect digital currency systems from abuse and ensure that information is available to prosecute “criminal actions,” and is not aimed at everyday bitcoin users.

In May 2013, the Department of Homeland Security seized an account controlled by Mt. Gox on the theory that the Japanese exchange was operating as an unlicensed MSB. Mt. Gox subsequently registered with the U.S. Treasury as an MSB. The various regulatory issues surrounding bitcoin has prompted bitcoin enterprises to form a self-regulatory group called the “Committee for the Establishment of the Digital Asset Transfer Authority,” which intends to set technical standards aimed at preventing money-laundering and insuring compliance with laws.

Fifty states also have laws regulating MSBs. Several, including California and New York, have reportedly warned companies involved in bitcoin that they may be violating such laws. Indeed, the California Department of Financial Institution already has in its files a detailed letter from a law firm on behalf of the Bitcoin Foundation, arguing that California’s law, the Money Transmission Act, has no application to bitcoins.

Turning to securities laws, in July 2013, the SEC filed a civil action in federal court in Texas, charging an individual and his company with using a bitcoin-based Ponzi scheme to defraud investors. The SEC alleged that the founder and operator of Bitcoin Savings and Trust had offered and sold bitcoin-denominated investments through the Internet using the monikers “Pirate” and “pirateat40.” The company allegedly received 700,000 bitcoins from investors valued at more than $4.5 million, based on the average price of bitcoin when the investments were sold.

The SEC claims the company was a “sham” where bitcoins from new investors were used to pay interest of up to 7 percent per week to existing investors and also to cover investor withdrawals. The SEC further alleges that the founder diverted investors’ bitcoins to trade for his own account on a bitcoin exchange and to trade for dollars in order to pay personal expenses. Such acts are alleged to violate the anti-fraud and registration provisions of Sections 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and SEC Rule 10b-5.

Criminal Issues

Two federal criminal indictments in 2013 have somewhat tarnished the bitcoin image. An indictment of Liberty Reserve, S.A., a Costa Rican currency exchange, and seven of its executives by a grand jury, alleged that operators of the exchange used bitcoin to run a $6 billion money-laundering operation in violation of Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act and provided a central hub for criminals trafficking in everything from stolen identities to child pornography. Prosecutors asserted that Liberty Reserve’s trading in bitcoin provided the kind of anonymous and accessible banking infrastructure increasingly sought by criminal networks, which they said “heralds the arrival of the cyber age of money laundering.”

Finally, October 2013 saw the federal government indict and shut down the “Silk Road,” an online marketplace where millions of bitcoins allegedly were swapped for drugs and black market products. As news of the shutdown spread, bitcoin values tumbled, initially dropping by about 20 percent (or close to $500 million) before turning around. On the Bitstamp exchange, bitcoins dropped from about $125 to $90 before climbing back to $115. Values on the Mt. Gox exchange dropped from $140 to $109 before returning to $128. The government simultaneously arrested Ross William Ulbricht, who allegedly operated the Silk Road website using the alias “Dread Pirate Roberts,” and who now faces drug trafficking, money laundering, and hacking charges. The FBI filed an affidavit in the case which asserts that digital currency is not just used in the black market, but can serve criminal purposes because of the ease of moving money anonymously.

The Future . . .?

The economist Paul Krugman stated earlier this year that, unlike gold or paper fiat currencies, bitcoin derives its value solely from a self-fulfilling expectation that others will accept it as payment. Herb Jaffe cited a Morningstar analyst as having called the Winklevoss ETF “a total gimmick,” that bitcoins are very illiquid, and that the current trading infrastructure “is riddled with security/efficiency problems.” Others see bitcoin as a major development in virtual currency. Robin Harris on ZDNet asserts that bitcoin or something like it is not going away, observing that dollar/gold convertibility ended in 1971 and floating exchange rates have prevailed since. There are many areas where the future of bitcoin is yet to be developed: Is it an investment? How will transactions be taxed? What will be the effect of China’s recent entry into the bitcoin market? In 2014, we can expect some answers, but also many new questions.

Maintaining the Privilege: A Refresher on Important Aspects of the Attorney-Client Privilege

The attorney-client privilege is the backbone of the legal profession. It encourages the client to be open and honest with his or her attorney without fear that others will be able to pry into those conversations. Further, being fully informed by the client enables the attorney to provide the best legal advice. 

The privilege is in play on a daily basis, whether litigated in court or serving as a background consideration in how best to advise the client while maintaining confidences. Even in business transactions, it is critical to maintain the privilege as unseen conflicts may result in litigation down the road where attorney-client communications become of interest to an opponent. 

Yet the privilege’s many nuances easily result in loss of the privilege when the attorney does not pay close attention to the details of the communication. Because it is easy to overlook these nuances, especially in the daily life of a business lawyer more focused on negotiating the next deal rather than drafting a privilege log, this article first outlines the fundamental requirements of the privilege. The article then answers two questions that may arise in the business context: (1) whether the attorney-client privilege extends to drafts, and (2) whether the privilege applies to communications with former employees of the client corporation. 

Before addressing the requirements of the privilege, it is important to distinguish the work product protection. Work product protection, which is provided for in Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, applies to documents and tangible things as well as intangible work product such as an attorney’s mental impressions created “in anticipation of litigation.” If the work product is prepared because of the prospect of litigation, it will be protected from discovery unless the opposing party can show substantial need. For in-house counsel and business lawyers whose focus is not on litigation, work product protection is not likely to apply. Nonetheless, every lawyer should be aware that it may afford protection not offered by the attorney-client privilege in the event litigation is on the horizon. 

The Privilege Only Protects Legal Advice

To invoke the attorney-client privilege, the proponent must establish a communication between attorney and client in which legal advice was sought or rendered, and which was intended to be and was in fact kept confidential. While both communications from client to attorney and from attorney to client are protected, the privilege protects only the fact that information was communicated and does not preclude disclosure of the underlying facts conveyed in those communications. 

This means a client can never protect facts simply by incorporating them into a communication with the attorney. For instance, a client might provide the attorney with details of its transactions with another business over the past 10 years, including dates and costs, to help the attorney draft a new contract with the business. In future litigation, the client would not have to answer any questions about what was said to the attorney or what language the attorney recommended, but the client could not refuse to give the date of a prior transaction simply because that fact was discussed with the attorney. Likewise, raw data from internal investigations or financial analyses cannot be withheld, though the substance of the communications regarding those topics could not be compelled. 

Communications will only be privileged if the party sought, and the attorney rendered, legal advice. Because the privilege is contrary to the judicial goal of bringing relevant evidence to light, it is construed narrowly and protects only those disclosures necessary to obtain informed legal advice which might not have been made absent the privilege. 

For attorneys who may counsel their clients on business matters as well as legal matters, this requirement is not always easy to meet. If the work could have been performed by an individual with no legal training, the attorney has not been consulted in a professional capacity. Thus, the privilege does not protect communications where the attorney serves the client solely as a business advisor. Under the totality of the circumstances, the attorney’s guidance must have been sought because of a need for legal advice. 

For instance, in Visa U.S.A., Inc. v. First Data Corp., attorneys for Visa were involved in reviewing and editing an analysis of the risks and concerns of entering a new private arrangement for transactions, which was transmitted to the board to assist in its decision whether to agree to the arrangement. Although attorneys gave input on the draft materials, the court found that the documents were initially created by Visa’s consultants because of business purposes to aid Visa in making a business decision as to the arrangements, and the analysis would have been undertaken even if no attorneys were involved. 2004 WL 1878209 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2004). Similarly, in Craig v. Rite Aid Corp., after noting that “courts have eschewed broad claims of privilege premised upon the involvement of in-house counsel in multi-participant corporate restructuring processes, in favor of a far more narrowly tailored and fact specific analysis of privilege claims,” the court held documents seeking feedback from in-house counsel and senior management on a draft proposal relating to business restructuring not privileged as no clear legal advice was sought. 2012 WL 426275 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2012). 

The privilege will not apply where information is shared between attorney and client without any request for legal counsel. Technical drawings forwarded to an attorney have been found to retain their non-privileged status in patent litigation, as have e-mails between a company’s executives related to business decisions which copy but do not solicit advice from in-house counsel. Discussions between an attorney and client in furtherance of the client’s lobbying goals, which might summarize legislative meetings or report on lobbying activities, are also generally unprotected, though advice that requires legal analysis of legislation, such as interpretation or application of the legislation to fact scenarios, would still be protected. 

However, where the client seeks legal advice which by its nature relates to business concerns, the privilege still applies. This was the case when the communications at issue concerned tax consequences of a possible reorganization and whether those consequences should affect the structure of corporate realignment, advice as to legality of the sale of the corporation, and tax advice with respect to alternative forms of employee compensation. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 1983, 731 F.2d 1032, 1037 (2d Cir. 1984). 

These principles highlight the need for the attorney to be aware of the role he or she is playing – the privilege may exist as to one conversation when donning the hat of legal advisor and disappear in the next, where business advice is sought. To ensure privilege is maintained, the attorney should try to keep the roles from overlapping by offering legal advice and business advice separately when possible, be clear when legal advice is being rendered, and make sure the client understands that simply forwarding confidential information to the attorney does not make it privileged. If the client needs a contract to be reviewed for business concerns (e.g., financial analysis) as well as legal implications, advise the client to send separate e-mails to the finance team and the legal team rather than sending a general request for review to everyone in a single e-mail. The more explicit the request and rendering of legal advice, the easier it will be to assert the privilege. 

The Communication Must Be Confidential

To be privileged, the communications must also reasonably be intended as confidential. This means that the communication must not be shared with any third party. However, with a corporate client, the attorney’s discussions with an employee may generally be shared with other non-attorney employees where information is sought at the attorney’s direction or the attorney’s legal advice is relayed. A party’s assertions that the communications were intended to be confidential will not satisfy the burden; the court will look to the circumstances to determine the intent. 

One important exception to this strict confidentiality requirement is the “common interest” doctrine. The doctrine, an extension of the attorney-client privilege, applies where (1) a communication is made to a third party who shares a common legal interest, (2) the communications are made in furtherance of that legal interest, and (3) the privilege is not otherwise waived. This rule applies to the work product privilege as well, so work product shared with a third party who has a common interest does not necessarily lose its protection. 

While there must be some shared interest, courts disagree as to the commonality required to assert the privilege. Some courts require that the parties have identical interests in order for the doctrine to apply. For instance, a bank and the insurer to whom the bank extended letters of credit were held not to have sufficiently common interests in a lawsuit brought by the bank against the re-insurer who allegedly failed in providing the bank with security on the letters of credit. In structuring the credit agreement, the bank and the insurer were involved in a “collaborative effort” but ultimately each party was interested in making the terms of the transaction favorable to itself. The interests were not identical at the time of the negotiations, so the bank could not invoke the privilege as to communications related to the letter of credit agreements. Bank of America, N.A. v. Terra Nova Ins. Co. Ltd., 211 F. Supp. 2d 493, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 

Other courts apply the common interest doctrine even after acknowledging the parties may have adverse interests in substantial respects. In Chapter 11 bankruptcy, a debtor in possession and the committee of creditors may have different interests, but they share a duty to maximize the debtor’s estate. Based on this shared duty, communications between the debtor, the debtor’s counsel, and the committee related to legal strategies for a potential adversary proceeding to set aside a transfer of the debtor’s property remained privileged. In re Mortgage & Realty Trust, 212 B.R. 649 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997). 

In any event, the shared interest must be a legal interest, not simply a commercial interest, and the parties must cooperate to further a joint legal strategy. In In re FTC, in-house counsel for Rexall reviewed materials prepared by its advertising agency and discussed potential legal objections to the materials with the ad agency to assist in creating lawful ads that would not be rejected. 2001 WL 396522 (S.D.N.Y. April 19, 2001). The FTC thereafter sued Rexall for alleged false claims for one of its products and sought discovery of the draft advertising materials from the ad agency. Though legal advice was clearly given, the court found that the shared commercial interest in the success and legality of the ad campaign did not equate to a coordinated legal strategy sufficient to invoke the common interest doctrine. The in-house counsel and ad agency had not worked together to respond to the FTC’s investigation; their joint efforts were limited to ensuring the ads were compliant. 

Communications shared with financial advisors or made during arms’-length business negotiations have also been found not privileged, even when concerns about potential litigation are voiced, where the parties’ ultimate goal is to develop and further a business strategy. 

Finally, because the common interest doctrine is merely an extension of the attorney-client privilege rather than an independent privilege, and the attorney-client privilege logically requires a communication between the attorney and client, some courts hold that the common interest doctrine does not apply to communications between two parties when an attorney is not also involved. 

Privileged information should be disseminated as little as possible, even by employees within the same company. Clients who seek to share information with consultants, advisors or other businesses should be informed that doing so will likely waive any privilege as to that information unless it enables them to pursue a joint legal strategy. Further, the client should be warned against disclosing privileged information to third parties when no attorney is present. 

Does the Privilege Apply to Drafts?

An important consideration when working toward a final product with the client is whether the drafts and underlying documents could be unearthed by adversaries somewhere down the road. This issue often arises in the context of business documents, tax returns or regulatory filings. 

As explained above, the privilege will not apply to a draft where legal assistance is not provided. The court will look at whether the primary motivation for the attorney’s involvement was the need for legal advice or because of business concerns. Thus, while documents related to tax returns are not privileged when the attorney provides accounting services in simply preparing the returns, those same documents may be privileged if an attorney uses them to provide legal advice as to whether the client should file an amended return. In the corporate context, draft proposals and draft reports created for the board which do not clearly provide legal advice have been held not privileged. 

Even where the communications at issue relate to legal advice, the party asserting the privilege has the burden of establishing that they were intended to remain confidential. This can be an uphill battle when the client intended the final product to be shared with a third party. 

Indeed, some courts take the view that if any version of the document is intended to be shared with a third party, that communication as well as all underlying documents (including preliminary drafts and any attorney’s notes containing material necessary to the preparation of the document) become discoverable. The theory is that because the client ultimately intended to publish some version of the content in the draft, the client could not have intended it to be confidential. 

Alternatively, denial of the privilege as to drafts may be based on the “subject matter” waiver. By voluntarily disclosing the final version, the client waives the privilege as to the substance of the communication, including the underlying details of the information ultimately published. Drafts and documents relied on in preparation of an estate tax return, a draft bankruptcy form, and drafts of proposed SEC filings have been held not privileged based on this reasoning. 

On the other hand, the argument can be made that the client must have intended the underlying documents and drafts to remain confidential and that is the precise reason the drafts themselves were not shared with a third party. Otherwise the draft would have been the final shared product. In Iowa Pac. Holdings, LLC v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., business negotiations between the parties broke down, resulting in a suit for breach of an oral contract and promissory estoppel. In rejecting Iowa Pacific’s demand for National Railroad’s drafts of the contract at issue, the court held that a draft contract prepared by the attorney contains information shared between attorney and client which entitles it to protection. 2011 WL 1527599, *4 (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2011). Ultimately, these courts believe that the purpose of the privilege will be hindered if clients and attorneys cannot freely exchange information via preliminary drafts. 

Under this approach, there is a further split as to how far the privilege extends. The more protective stance calls for the privilege to be applied to all drafts and underlying documents, even as to information eventually disclosed to third parties in the final version (as long as the draft itself is not shared). Others courts extend the attorney-client privilege to cover only those portions of the draft not actually published to third parties, requiring redaction where the draft and final version are not identical. 

Of course, drafts and underlying documents created because of impending litigation, such as draft complaints and draft affidavits, could constitute work product even if not covered by the attorney-client privilege. Such drafts have been afforded protection even when the final version is filed because they reflect the mental processes and opinions of the attorney. 

The split in authority as to when drafts are privileged is disconcerting considering the vast amount of documents lawyers are asked to review before they are published to third parties. The moral here is to be aware that any documents prepared or notes made on the way to the final version may end up in the hands of a future adversary, and consider the potential impact on the client during the drafting process. 

Are Communications with Former Employees Protected?

Another question addressed by courts with increasing frequency is whether privilege attaches to communications between the attorney and the corporate client’s former employees which take place either during or after employment. 

The starting point here is Upjohn v. United States, in which the Supreme Court analyzed the scope of the privilege when the client is a corporation. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). The Court rejected the “control group” theory, which limits privilege to communications between the attorney and senior management with the authority to bind the corporation, in favor of the “subject matter test.” Under that test, the privilege extends to any employee regardless of position as long as the communication is made to the attorney at the direction of corporate superiors, the information concerns matters within the scope of the employee’s corporate duties, and the employee is aware the communication serves the purpose of enabling the attorney to provide the corporation with legal advice. 

While providing a framework for analyzing privilege as to current employees, the Court explicitly refused to consider whether the privilege could extend to former employees. However, Justice Burger, in his concurring opinion, said that he would extend the privilege to include communications where “an employee or former employee speaks at the direction of management with an attorney regarding conduct or proposed conduct within the scope of employment.” 

Courts have had no trouble reaching a consensus on the view that the attorney-client privilege continues to protect privileged communications occurring during the period of employment, even after the employment relationship ends. 

But the existence of privilege as to communications between a corporation’s attorney and a former employee taking place after employment terminates is not so clear. The situation often arises when the client corporation becomes involved in litigation concerning matters that took place during the former employee’s employment and the corporation’s attorney wants to prepare the former employee for deposition. Most courts appear to agree that communications post-employment may be privileged if they relate to the employee’s conduct and knowledge obtained during employment and are limited to the facts of the current litigation. 

The issue was covered in depth in Peralta v. Cendant Corp., 190 F.R.D. 38 (D. Conn. 1999). There, a former employee brought an employment discrimination suit upon his termination. Cendant Corporation’s counsel discussed the underlying facts of the case and Cendant’s position with Peralta’s former supervisor, who was no longer employed by the corporation, prior to the former supervisor’s deposition. Peralta sought to uncover the details of that communication, but the court held the communication privileged, recognizing that “the attorney-client privilege is served by the certainty that conversations between the attorney and client will remain privileged after the employee leaves.” 

Importantly, the court held that the privilege applied only insofar as the nature and purpose of the communications were to learn facts related to Peralta’s termination while the former supervisor was still employed. Conversation related to facts developed during the litigation, such as testimony of other witnesses which the former supervisor would not have known during employment or matters that could change the former supervisor’s testimony, would not be privileged. 

The vast majority of federal courts considering this issue follow Peralta’s reasoning. Still, a few courts have rejected the extension of the privilege to former employees. They argue that former employees are not the client and share no identity of interest in the outcome of the litigation with the corporation. Therefore such communications should be treated no differently from communications with any other third-party fact witness. These courts criticize the Peralta line of cases for failing to consider the requirement from Upjohn (including Justice Burger’s concurring opinion) that the employee or former employee speak with the attorney at the direction of management – something a former employee rarely satisfies. The principle underlying the attorney-client privilege (i.e., encouraging the client’s honesty by ensuring privacy) is not served if the former employee is no longer a representative of the client, for instance where the former employee has independent counsel and interests adverse to the company. 

While the communications could potentially be protected work product to the extent the attorney’s mental impressions and legal theories are involved, courts are also split on whether this doctrine applies to communications with former employees. 

For example, in Domingo v. Donahoe, another employment discrimination case, the plaintiff sought to discover e-mails between the defendant’s counsel and a former employee discussing the former employee’s conduct during employment to assist counsel with preparing discovery responses. 2013 WL 4040091, *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2013). Although the court made no decision on whether attorney-client privilege applied, it held that work product protection applied because the e-mails containing questions from counsel and the employee’s responses could potentially reveal counsel’s thought processes. 

However, the same courts that refuse to consider the former employee as part of the attorney-client relationship between the corporation and counsel find that sharing the attorney’s mental impressions with the former employee, a third party who is not a client, waives work product protection. 

While counsel should be confident that confidential communications with a current employee will remain protected if the employee leaves the company, they must also pay attention to Peralta’s limits on the privilege for post-employment conversations. Only those communications whose “nature and purpose” were for counsel to learn facts related to a legal action that the former employee was aware of as a result of his or her employment are privileged. Post-employment discussions should not go into any details regarding strategy or status of the ongoing litigation, which would open the door to attacks on privilege and invite the court’s scrutiny. 

Conclusion

Because the privilege is in derogation of the search for truth, courts will only apply it when the requirements are clearly met. The burden then falls on attorneys to stay up-to-date on the intricacies of the privilege and pass on their knowledge to clients who all too often make incorrect assumptions regarding the privilege’s scope. 

Clearly labeling written communications seeking or rendering legal advice, separating legal advice from responses to business concerns or other matters, and limiting dissemination of privileged information to only those who need it will go a long way to maintaining the privilege. It may also help to remind the client that communications do not become privileged simply because it is shared with an attorney, but privileged status may be lost when shared with third parties, even inside the company or with business partners. While these may seem like common sense tips, the amount of litigation on the attorney-client privilege suggests that the guidelines are not so easy to follow on a daily basis. The bottom line is that the attorney-client privilege requires diligence by both the attorney and client to ensure its protection. 

Risky Business: “Bring-Your-Own-Device” and Your Company

Smartphones and tablets are everywhere. Largely prompted by Apple, Samsung, and Google’s consumer-centric marketing strategies, people are spending more and more money on the latest and fastest mobile devices, upgrading them almost constantly, and integrating them into every part of their lives. A large part of that integration is work-related. Employees use their own devices to manage work calendars, view and respond to e-mail, take notes at meetings, and almost anything else they would ordinarily do at their in-office workstation. Allowing employees to bring their own devices to work is no longer a trend; it has become a business necessity. As a result, an increased number of personally owned devices are making their way onto company networks, and it is undeniable that the bring-your-own-device (BYOD) phenomenon is here to stay.

 

BYOD presents companies with a myriad of new risks and challenges, and lawyers need to understand the issues involved in order to provide quality advice to clients as it relates to information management. The most important thing every corporate attorney and outside counsel advising clients on information governance and BYOD needs to understand is this: the biggest risk with BYOD is data loss. An effective BYOD program and policy should emphasize security and contain clear instructions on what behaviors and activities are permitted on personally owned devices that have access to corporate information systems. However, most companies do not have the information architecture, hardware infrastructure, or resources to protect and secure all the data flowing through networks filled with different operating systems, applications, and devices – many of which, by the way, are widely dispersed and access internal corporate data via unsecure Internet connections. In order to fill this gap, companies are turning to Mobile Device Management (MDM) service providers to equip themselves with software tools and security solutions to protect the devices and data on their networks. Installing MDM software can help mitigate a lot of the technical risk associated with allowing employees to access company data on their own devices. For example, it is common for MDM solutions to allow a company to encrypt data on mobile devices, remotely lock and wipe devices, know the location of the device in real time, enforce a PIN policy, access personal data and contacts, and track user activity. While these capabilities address many of the security risks associated with BYOD, they also create problems related to employee rights and privacy.

Monitoring privately-owned devices creates a significant policy dilemma for companies and it raises a lot of legal questions for attorneys. If your client monitors too much, it can be seen as invading employee privacy, and in some parts of the world, may even be breaking the law. If it does not monitor and control enough, it places the company’s data at a huge risk. Balancing these two seemingly opposing interests is the single greatest challenge to successfully implementing a BYOD program, and it is the role of legal counsel and in-house lawyers to make sure this implementation is done within the law, transparently, and without exposing the company to unnecessary legal risk. So, as an attorney, when a company you represent or work for informs you that it is interested in investing in technical solutions such as MDM to address security risk factors associated with BYOD, you should be prepared to respond that along with a technical solution, and in fact, ahead of it, it will be necessary to create a comprehensive BYOD policy that is transparent, easy to understand, and sufficiently detailed to help protect the company from unwanted regulatory scrutiny and litigation and to avoid the privacy pitfalls that can arise with the rollout of a BYOD program. 

As briefly described above, MDM software gives companies a lot of power to control and manipulate the devices their employees use to access corporate data. Before they deploy any type of MDM, counsel should advise their clients to create a training program to educate employees about the scope and capabilities of the software. Every single person employed by your client should consent to MDM software installation before installation and should understand exactly what information is collected, how the MDM software is used, which capabilities are enabled, what happens during an incident, and what the employees’ expectations are upon termination of employment. Security incident procedures must also be spelled out in your client’s BYOD policy. For example, the BYOD policy must clearly explain what will happen if an employee reports a missing smartphone. Will the device be auto-locked? Will the company attempt to locate it using geo-location? Will the device be wiped completely? Will the employee’s access rights be restricted? To avoid confusion and provide a framework for incident response, all these procedures should be spelled out in writing in the BYOD policy and provided ahead of time so employees do not encounter any unexpected results or surprises. Lawyers will have to work hand-in-hand with the CIO and the IT department to ensure that the BYOD policy accurately reflects and considers all of the capabilities of the MDM solution being deployed. 

There are also several notices that must be incorporated into an effective BYOD policy. For example, employees must be made aware of all “passive” or “background” security measures in effect on their devices. If your client is going to track user activity on its employees’ devices, they must be told exactly what is being tracked and how that information is being used and stored by your client. If the client is tracking the location of the device via MDM software or other means, the BYOD policy must also describe how location data is used and who has access to it and why. The best and most transparent way to increase monitoring of activity on privately-owned devices is to provide notice and ask for permission. When drafting a BYOD policy, it is “smart lawyering” to explain each process in detail and ask for specific consent. 

Consent is a key component to any successful BYOD policy and BYOD program because it empowers your client to govern and monitor the activity of its employees’ privately-owned devices without appearing to be secretive or deceptive. Here is a good rule of thumb: advise your clients never to install anything on any employee’s personally-owned device without obtaining consent first. If a new feature is added that changes the way monitoring occurs, revise the BYOD policy and have employees acknowledge that they understand the changes. If (not really if, but when) it is discovered that your client has been engaged in any clandestine activity or secret monitoring of an employee’s privately-owned device, it will almost certainly lead to conflict, disapproval, and possibly litigation. For example, in a case that went all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, a California police officer sued his police department after he discovered that they had collected and reviewed personal text messages he sent from an employer-issued device. The Court, in City of Ontario, California v. Quon, ruled that the Fourth Amendment rights of a government employee had not been violated when the contents of his personal text messages – which were sent from a government-issued device – were reviewed in the course of an investigation. However, the Court expressed restraint in saying that its decision was deliberately narrow because “a broad holding concerning employees’ privacy expectations vis-à-vis employer-provided technological equipment might have implications for future cases that cannot be predicted.” Further, the Court stipulated for purposes of its discussion that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages sent on the government-issued device. The implications of this reasoning for purposes of BYOD are significant because it is fair to assume that if a reasonable expectation of privacy exists on a government-issued device, then at least the same or an increased expectation of privacy will exist for a device the employee personally owns. In addition to the Supreme Court chiming in on digital privacy in the workplace, several state legislatures have passed laws requiring employers to notify employees when monitoring their electronic communications. See Del.Code Ann., Tit. 19, § 705 (2005); Conn. Gen.Stat. Ann. § 31-48d.  

The threat of “spillage” or information leaking out of the confines of the company’s protected network is another significant challenge with BYOD. In order to prevent spillage, IT departments want to have the option and capability to wipe devices or destroy data at any time. Lawyers must caution clients against such broad control of and access to personally-owned devices because wiping or destroying data on any device with or without the consent of the owner is a very risky proposition. For example, if wiping a device deletes the owner’s media library containing thousands of dollars worth of movies and music, is your client then responsible for the loss of property? What if a device is reported lost, gets wiped, and then is found the next day in a safe location? Is your client responsible for helping recover all of the wiped personal information? As employees become more aware of their own risks associated with BYOD, it will become more difficult for companies to implement security solutions that grant them widespread control over their devices. Companies will be forced to make uncomfortable compromises and lawyers will have to play a lead role in helping them decide what their risk tolerance is for both the loss of corporate data and the possibility of violating their employees’ privacy. 

One countermeasure that can be employed to reduce the risks associated with device control and device-wide wipes is “sandboxing.” Sandboxing is a form of software virtualization (via MDM software) that allows programs to run in an isolated virtual environment on a device. MDM software can then manage the sandboxed portion of the device only and encrypt and wipe data inside the sandbox as necessary. For sandboxing to be effective, the data in the sandbox must stay in the sandbox, but unfortunately, that is not always the case. Two close cousins of BYOD – BYOA (bring your own app) and BYOC (bring your own cloud) – are making it increasingly difficult for companies to employ sandboxing methods to safeguard data. BYOA includes all of the “wild” apps on your client’s employees’ devices. These apps are impossible to control and it would be extremely difficult – both legally and logistically – to know, let alone regulate, what apps employees should and should not install on their devices. BYOC presents an even more complex problem. In many instances, people use cloud services on mobile devices without even knowing it. For example, many smartphones back up data to the cloud automatically and tons of apps operate in their own proprietary clouds or interface with multiple clouds at once. With this level of cross-pollination taking place, it is impossible to prevent at least some data from leaking onto a third-party cloud. And when your client’s corporate data is stored on or travels through a third-party cloud, you must consider it compromised. 

An often-overlooked challenge with BYOD is legal discovery. If your client is engaged in litigation or involved in some other type of legal proceeding, an employee’s device may become discoverable. This presents significant legal problems. People store all sorts of private information on their mobile devices, ranging from healthcare information, financial data, search results, and contact lists to family photos, social media profiles, and personal passwords. Some of this information, such as healthcare information, is legally protected, but may nonetheless be made public during the discovery process. Something as seemingly innocuous as a missed call may reveal private information if it is discovered that the call came, for example, from a psychiatrist’s office. As you can see, the privacy concerns surrounding incidental or non-relevant disclosures as a result of discovery that involves BYOD are considerable. On the other hand, if it is the employee who is in litigation and he or she turns over a device for discovery, sensitive company information may be compromised in the process. Worse yet, if your client were to attempt to wipe a device subject to discovery, the punitive legal consequences may be significant. It is important for counsel to emphasize the dangers of BYOD in the discovery process to clients because it is very likely to be overlooked if not considered at the outset. 

BYOD presents some surprising but inevitable challenges as well. For instance, no matter how hard they try, companies will never be able to ensure that only pre-approved and authorized persons have access to their employees’ devices. For example, if an employee takes his or her iPhone into an Apple store for repair, he or she has to give the device password to the technician, and in many cases has to leave the phone in the store overnight or ship it to a remote location. If your client handles financial data or healthcare data as part of its business, just leaving an iPhone at the Apple store may be considered a data breach and trigger reporting requirements. As explained above, the use of third-party apps is also problematic. For instance, many people use tools such as Siri or other personal assistant apps to send e-mails, make calendar appointments, etc. Apple stores (in the cloud) everything you tell Siri for two years. Therefore, without intending to, employees may be sharing sensitive information with unauthorized parties simply by using the common features on their phone or tablet. 

Implementing a BYOD program is a choice, but failing to do so may result in decreased employee satisfaction, lower performance, increased costs, and loss of competitiveness. Many of the risks associated with BYOD can be mitigated or avoided by implementing MDM solutions and encryption solutions. But as you have just read, these solutions themselves create a series of new challenges. It is up to counsel to help their clients navigate the legal hurdles involved in implementing a BYOD program and to help them develop a BYOD policy and BYOD program that combines technology solutions with clear and comprehensive policies and procedures to help safeguard sensitive data, remain respectful of employee rights and privacy, and defend against litigation. Because the rules of the game are not clear, and because technology continues to evolve at breakneck speed, litigation is inevitable in this field and BYOD will be at the forefront of the controversy. By investing in new technology and implementing comprehensive and commonsense policies that are understandable and transparent, you can help your clients mitigate some of the exposure that has become necessary to remain competitive in the marketplace.

SEC Lifts Ban on General Solicitation in Private Placements to Accredited Investors

On July 10, 2013, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted rule changes eliminating the prohibition against general solicitation and advertising in private securities offerings conducted under Rule 506 of Regulation D and Rule 144A under the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act). The Rule 506 private placement safe harbor is the most widely used exemption from Securities Act registration and is relied upon by many private issuers (i.e., companies that issue and sell their securities, including start-up and emerging companies, EB-5 programs, private equity funds, venture capital funds, and hedge funds) in connection with their capital raising activities. The new rules, which mark a radical departure from longstanding law governing private placements and which are aimed at providing greater and more efficient access to capital markets, implement a congressional mandate under Section 201(a) of The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, the so-called JOBS Act. 

The amendments approved by the SEC create new Rule 506(c), which provides an additional “safe harbor” exemption from registration for securities offerings marketed using general solicitation and general advertising (together, referred to as “general solicitation”), provided that: 

  • all of the ultimate purchasers of securities are, or are reasonably believed by the issuer to be, “accredited investors” (as defined under applicable SEC rules) at the time of sale, and
  • the issuer takes reasonable steps to verify that each purchaser is an accredited investor. 

Alternatively, private issuers may choose to forgo marketing to the general public and continue to rely on Rule 506’s existing regulatory framework. 

In a companion release also issued on July 10th, the SEC adopted amendments to Rule 506 that disqualify issuers from relying on Rule 506 if certain “felons and other bad actors” participate in the Rule 506 offering, as mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. 

Market participants and consumer advocates have voiced concerns that lifting the ban on general solicitation in private offerings could adversely affect the investing public and could lead to an increase in fraudulent activity aimed at unqualified investors. In response to these concerns, and in order to enhance the SEC’s ability to monitor and evaluate changes in the private offering market and developing practices in Rule 506 offerings, the SEC also proposed a series of amendments to Rule 506 and Form D (i.e., the form filed with the SEC for claiming a registration exemption). If adopted, these amendments would impose significant new filing and disclosure requirements on Rule 506 private offerings, particularly those conducted with general solicitation. The proposed rule changes are expected to draw significant comments, including concerns about costs versus benefits, the potential chilling effect on the use of general solicitation in private offerings and the resulting frustration of the JOBS Act’s central purpose of facilitating capital formation. 

The final rules and related amendments approved by the SEC will become effective on September 23, 2013 (60 days after publication in the Federal Register). The SEC has yet to issue proposed rules permitting so-called “crowd funding” offerings and transactions as mandated under the JOBS Act. 

A summary of the new rules, as well as observations regarding practical implications for issuers and market participants regarding these rules, follows. 

Rule Changes Permitting General Solicitation in Private Offerings

Summary of New Rule 506(c)

Rule 506 of Regulation D is a non-exclusive safe harbor rule adopted in 1982 under Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act, which exempts offers and sales of securities by an issuer “not involving any public offering” from the registration requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act. Under current law, it is a requirement of most private placement exemptions from the registration requirements of the Securities Act, including Rule 506 and (in the view of the SEC’s staff) Rule 144A, that issuers are prohibited from using any form of general solicitation when conducting an unregistered offering of their securities. This restriction has been interpreted broadly to prohibit all public marketing efforts and outlets in an issuer’s capital raising activities, including, among others, publicly accessible websites and social media, media broadcasts (such as radio and television advertisements), newspaper advertisements, mass e-mail campaigns, and public seminars and meetings. 

Under new Rule 506(c), issuers will be permitted to use general solicitation in private securities offerings made under Rule 506, provided that the following conditions are met:

  • all purchasers of securities in the offering must be “accredited investors,” either because they fall within one of the enumerated categories of accredited investors under applicable SEC rules or because the issuer reasonably believes that they do, at the time of the sale of securities, and
  • the issuer must take “reasonable steps to verify” that each purchaser of its securities is an accredited investor. 

The SEC stated in its adopting release that whether the steps taken by an issuer to verify the accredited investor status of a purchaser are “reasonable” requires a principles-based, objective determination in the context of the particular facts and circumstances of each purchaser and transaction. This is an independent procedural requirement which must be satisfied even if all purchasers are in fact accredited investors. Factors that issuers should consider in making this determination include (1) the nature of the purchaser and the type of accredited investor that it claims to be, (2) the amount and type of information that the issuer has about the purchaser, and (3) the nature of the offering (such as the manner in which the purchaser was solicited to participate in the offering and the terms of the offering, including the minimum investment amount). 

These factors are interconnected, and may require more, or less, consideration depending upon the specific facts and context. For example, an issuer that solicits new investors through a website accessible to the public or through a widely disseminated e-mail or social media solicitation would likely be obligated to take greater measures to verify accredited investor status than an issuer that solicits new investors from a database of pre-screened accredited investors created and maintained by a reasonably reliable third party, such as a federally registered broker-dealer or investment adviser. Furthermore, if the minimum investment amount in the offering is sufficiently high such that only accredited investors could reasonably be expected to meet it, and the investment is made with a direct cash investment that is not financed by the issuer or any other third party, these factors would be relevant in determining what additional steps should reasonably be taken to verify a purchaser’s accredited investor status. 

Regardless of the particular steps taken, given that the issuer bears the burden of proving that the exemption from registration is available, the SEC cautioned in its adopting release that issuers should retain adequate records documenting the steps taken to verify that a purchaser is an accredited investor. In addition, the SEC stated that: 

[we do] not believe that an issuer will have taken reasonable steps to verify accredited investor status if it, or those acting on its behalf, required only that a person check a box in a questionnaire or sign a form, absent other information about the purchaser indicating accredited investor status. 

Thus, the relatively common practice in which prospective investors complete a suitability questionnaire, or sign a form or agreement, self-certifying as to accredited investor status, will not by itself satisfy the “reasonable steps to verify” standard, at least not for natural person investors. 

“Reasonable Steps to Verify” Accredited Investor Status 

In response to comments seeking specific guidance on how an issuer can reliably verify accredited investor status, the SEC included in the Rule 506 amendments a non-exclusive list of four verification methods deemed to satisfy the required “reasonable steps” standard as applicable to natural person purchasers (as long as the issuer or person acting on its behalf does not have knowledge that a potential investor is not an accredited investor): 

Income Test. If the potential purchaser’s accredited investor status is premised on meeting the (accredited investor) income test – i.e., for a natural person, income exceeding $200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income with a spouse exceeding $300,000 for those years, and a reasonable expectation of the same income level in the current year – reasonable verification can be established by reviewing copies of any IRS form that reports the person’s income (e.g., a Form W-2, Form 1099, Schedule K-1 or a copy of a filed Form 1040) for the two most recent years, and by obtaining a written representation from the person that he or she reasonably expects to meet the required income level during the current year. 

Net Worth Test.  If the potential purchaser’s accredited investor status is premised on meeting the (accredited investor) net worth test – i.e., for a natural person, individual net worth, or joint net worth with the person’s spouse, that exceeds $1 million at the time of the purchase, excluding the value of such person’s primary residence – reasonable verification can be established by reviewing certain specific documents, dated within the prior three months, and by obtaining a written representation from the person that all liabilities necessary to make a determination of net worth have been disclosed. For assets, the issuer may rely on bank statements, brokerage statements and other statements of securities holdings, certificates of deposit, tax assessments and appraisal reports issued by independent third parties; and for liabilities, a credit report from at least one of the nationwide consumer reporting agencies is required. 

Third Party Confirmation.  An issuer is also deemed to satisfy the verification requirement by obtaining written confirmation from one of the following persons that it has taken reasonable steps within the prior three months to verify the accredited status of the purchaser (and has determined that the purchaser is accredited): an SEC-registered broker-dealer or investment adviser, a licensed attorney, or a certified public accountant. An issuer may be entitled to rely on accredited investor verification by other persons – if the third party takes reasonable steps to verify that potential purchasers are accredited and has determined that they are accredited – so long as the issuer has a reasonable basis to rely on the verification. 

Prior/Existing Investor Confirmation.  For any person who purchased securities in an issuer’s Rule 506 offering as an accredited investor before the effective date of Rule 506(c) and who continues to own such securities, the issuer is deemed to satisfy the verification requirement by simply obtaining a bring-down certification from such person at the time of sale that he or she still qualifies as an accredited investor. 

Private Offering Safe Harbor and “Reasonable Belief” Standard Continue 

New Rule 506(c) leaves the traditional, existing safe harbor under Rule 506 unchanged, and redesignates it as Rule 506(b). Thus, issuers that do not wish to avail themselves of the opportunity to conduct their securities offerings using general solicitation may continue to offer their securities in reliance on the traditional safe harbor under Rule 506(b). Rule 506(b) permits sales of securities (with no limit as to dollar amount), without registration, to an unlimited number of accredited investors and up to 35 non-accredited investors who satisfy certain “sophistication” requirements (i.e., knowledge and experience in financial and business matters so as to be capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment), if the required resale limitations are imposed, any applicable information requirements are satisfied and other conditions of the rule are met. If an issuer does not engage in any general solicitation, it will not be required to take reasonable steps to verify (under the new standards) the accredited investor status of its purchasers. However, as discussed further below, once a general solicitation has been made to potential investors in an offering, the issuer is precluded from relying on the Rule 506(b) safe harbor in that offering. 

In addition, in its adopting release, the SEC reiterated its position that the “reasonable belief” standard in the definition of accredited investor in Rule 501 of Regulation D is unchanged by the new amendments to Rule 506. In this regard, as long as an issuer takes reasonable steps to verify that a purchaser is accredited and has (and those acting on its behalf have) a reasonable belief that the purchaser is accredited, the issuer would not lose its ability to rely on Rule 506(c) if it is later discovered that the purchaser was not in fact an accredited investor. 

Changes to Form D 

Issuers relying on Regulation D’s safe harbor exemptions are required to file a Form D with the SEC no later than 15 calendar days after the first sale of securities in the offering. In connection with the rule changes, Form D is being amended by adding a new check box for issuers to indicate whether they are using general solicitation under the Rule 506(c) safe harbor (or instead are relying on Rule 506(b)). Issuers may not check both boxes. In addition, Form D will be amended to require issuers claiming a Rule 506 exemption to confirm that the offering is not disqualified from reliance on the Rule 506 exemption (see the discussion below regarding the new felon and “bad actor” disqualification rules). It should be noted that the SEC, on the same day it issued its final rules, issued certain proposed amendments to Form D that would condition prospective reliance on Rule 506(c) on complying with expanded Form D filing requirements. 

Rule 144A Clarification 

A Rule 144A offering involves a primary offering of securities by an issuer to one or more financial intermediaries in a transaction exempt from registration under Section 4(a)(2) or Regulation S under the Securities Act, followed by the resale of those securities to qualified institutional buyers (QIBs) in reliance on Rule 144A. QIBS, in general terms, are entities, owned entirely by accredited investors, which own and invest, on a discretionary basis, at least $100 million in securities; for a registered broker-dealer, the threshold is $10 million. In order to qualify for the exemption in existing Rule 144A, offers as well as sales must be made to QIBs. Thus, under current law, it’s not clear whether issuers and sellers may permissibly offer securities under Rule 144A to investors which are not QIBs, which effectively prohibits the use of general solicitation in such offerings. An amendment to Rule 144A under the new rules confirms that securities may be offered to persons other than QIBs (i.e., they may be offered via general solicitation), as long as the securities are sold only to persons that the seller reasonably believes are QIBs. 

Disqualification of Offerings Involving Felons and Bad Actors 

Separately, in a companion release also issued on July 10 and as mandated under Section 926 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the SEC also adopted rule changes adding a felon and “bad actor” disqualification provision applicable to offerings conducted under Rule 506 of the Securities Act. Under this amendment, the Rule 506 registration exemption will not be available for any securities offering, regardless of whether the offering is made using general solicitation under Rule 506(c), if the issuer or any other “covered person” (including directors, executive officers, other officers involved in the offering, general partners and managing members, 20 percent beneficial owners, promoters, placement agents, and persons compensated for soliciting investors) had a “disqualifying event” during a specified time period. The list of disqualifying events is broad, and includes certain securities-related felonies and misdemeanors, SEC cease-and-desist orders barring future violations of specified securities laws, suspensions from registration with national securities exchanges or national securities associations such as FINRA and other regulatory disciplinary actions. The rule does not apply if the issuer can show that it did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, that a covered person with a disqualifying event participated in the offering. In its adopting release, the SEC noted that the steps an issuer should take to satisfy the reasonable care standard – including reasonable factual inquiry into whether any disqualifications exist – will vary according to the particular facts and circumstances of the “bad actor” and the offering. Additionally, the SEC may grant waivers from disqualification under certain circumstances, including a change of control and absence of notice and opportunity for hearing. The rule applies only to disqualifying events that occur after its effective date, but disqualifying events that occurred prior to the effective date must be disclosed to investors at a reasonable time prior to the securities sale date. 

Regulation S Offshore (and Concurrent) Offerings 

Many private securities offerings are made concurrently (side-by-side) to the U.S. domestic market under Rule 506 or Rule 144A and to non-U.S. investors in reliance on Regulation S, a safe harbor for offers and sales of securities made outside the United States. These safe harbors are important when U.S. and non-U.S. companies, including EB-5 programs, engage in multi-country securities offerings in which the U.S. portion of the offering is conducted in accordance with Rule 506 or Rule 144A and the non-U.S. (offshore) portion is conducted in reliance on Regulation S. One requirement of a Regulation S offering is that there be no “directed selling efforts” in the United States, a concept similar in some respects to general solicitation (or “conditioning of the market” where the securities will be sold). In its adopting release, the SEC confirmed that concurrent (offshore) non-U.S. offerings that are conducted in compliance with Regulation S will not be integrated with domestic U.S. offerings that use general solicitation and are otherwise conducted in compliance with Rule 506 or Rule 144A, as amended.

Proposed Rules Regarding Form D and Exempt Offering Filing and Disclosure Requirements

In view of lifting the ban on general solicitation, the SEC, in proposed rules published for public comment on July 10, proposed a number of investor protection requirements applicable to Rule 506 private offerings, particularly those conducted with general solicitation. These provisions, in the words of the SEC, are intended to enhance the SEC’s ability to evaluate the development of market practices in Rule 506 offerings and to address concerns that may arise given that issuers are permitted to engage in general solicitation under the new rules. The proposed rule changes cover a variety of significant topics and proposed new requirements, including an expansion of the information required to be included in Form D, new “advance” and “closing” Form D filing requirements, mandated legends and disclosure requirements (particularly regarding offerings using general solicitation), disqualification from the ability to rely on Rule 506 for a failure to make compliant Form D filings and a temporary rule requiring submission of written solicitation materials (where general solicitation is used) to the SEC on a non-public basis. The SEC’s proposing release also includes a request for public comment on the “accredited investor” definition and thresholds. As noted above, the proposed rules (extensive discussion of which is beyond the scope of this article) are expected to draw significant comments, including concerns about costs versus benefits, the potential chilling effect on the use of general solicitation in private offerings and the resulting frustration of the JOBS Act’s central purpose of facilitating capital formation. 

Effective Date; Limitations; No Fallback Exemption

The final rules and related amendments described above are effective on September 23, 2013 (60 days following publication in the Federal Register), and the proposed rules provide for a 60-day public comment period (which ends on September 23, 2013). Accordingly, Rule 506 and Rule 144A remain unchanged at present (until September 23), and issuers should continue to comply with the existing requirements of such rules (including Rule 506’s prohibition on general solicitation). 

Importantly, the elimination of the prohibition on general solicitation under the new rules applies only to private offerings meeting the requirements of Rule 506(c), and not to other private offerings made under Section 4(a)(2) generally, under the so-called “private resale” exemption or under any other registration exemption other than Rule 144A. In this regard, issuers unable to rely upon the Rule 506 safe harbor that seek instead to qualify under the Section 4(a)(2) statutory exemption for private offerings should tread very carefully (with the advice of securities counsel), since the scope of that exemption as interpreted by the SEC and the courts is substantially more limited and less clearly defined than under Rule 506, and a failure to qualify could lead to possible SEC enforcement action and would possibly trigger rescission rights in favor of investors. As the SEC made clear in its final rules adopting release, issuers engaging in general solicitation in a securities offering in the U.S. face significant consequences if they rely on the new Rule 506(c) exemption but fail to meet the “reasonable steps to verify” accredited investor status standard; in such a case, they will not be able to rely on the statutory exemption provided by Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act and thus likely would be left without any exemption from – and would consequently be in violation of – the Securities Act’s registration requirements.

Practical Implications for Issuers and Market Participants

The introduction, for the first time, of the ability to engage in general solicitation in Rule 506 and Rule 144A offerings is expected to have a significant impact on the way that certain issuers approach and market their private placements. The new rules present the opportunity for issuers (including start-up and emerging companies, EB-5 programs, and private investment funds) and their advisors to reach potential investors beyond their traditional relationships and networks, and to take advantage of a wide variety of state-of-the-art, broadly-inclusive and instantaneous communication and marketing tools and platforms, including through newspaper, television and radio advertisements, and via relatively inexpensive Internet-based media. Electing to go the general solicitation route, however, will come at a price. Issuers and their advisers (and, in the case of private investment funds, their sponsors) should bear in mind the increased responsibilities for due diligence with respect to verifying accredited investor status of potential investors and assuring that offering participants and other covered persons are not felons or bad actors subject to a disqualifying event, and should keep a watchful eye on the currently proposed rules and other rulemaking initiatives as these markets and offering practices, as well as SEC enforcement priorities and actions, develop and evolve. Some practical implications for issuers and market participants to consider include: 

Many issuers will likely stick with the known, existing regulatory regime (and no general solicitation) for now.  Current private offering practices, designed to prevent any form of general solicitation, are well understood and practiced by sophisticated issuers, their owners, advisors (including private placement agents registered as broker-dealers), and other market participants. The SEC has made clear that issuers may continue to rely on the existing regulatory framework (redesignated as Rule 506(b)) and conduct private offerings precisely the way they are being conducted today, provided that no general solicitation is used. Complying with the final and proposed rules (and other possible rulemaking) will significantly increase regulatory burdens and costs associated with compliance – including increased due diligence, verification of accredited investor status and more robust Form D disclosure requirements. Accordingly, initially (and until the regulatory “dust” settles), it is likely that many issuers – and particularly private investment fund issuers – and their advisors will forego general solicitation flexibility in favor of conducting their offerings under the current regulatory regime (i.e., the existing safe harbor exemption under Rule 506(b)). 

Taking reasonable steps to verify accredited investor status; due diligence and record keeping; third party verification services.  Issuers choosing to engage in general solicitation will be required to take “reasonable steps to verify” that each purchaser of securities in a Rule 506(c) offering is an accredited investor.  Having a person check a box on a questionnaire or sign a form or agreement is not sufficient to verify accredited investor status, absent other information about the purchaser. The issuer has the burden of demonstrating that its offering is entitled to an exemption from registration, and thus should retain all records evidencing its “reasonable steps to verify.” As a best practice, issuers should review with counsel their offering and subscription documents and practices, and fund sponsors and placement agents should also review their due diligence investigation protocols and private offering and other policies and procedures, including how best to document and verify that each purchaser qualifies in view of the factors discussed above. Among other things, consideration should be given to maintaining a detailed list of the steps taken and materials reviewed for each prospective purchaser. In addition, it is anticipated that a robust and dynamic “industry” of third-party verification service providers (regarding accredited investor status) may develop, and compete, to participate in and facilitate this process. Verification services will likely be offered by (among others) affiliates of placement agents, investment advisers, and other investment “matchmakers” who also compete for investment offering deal flow. Providing reliable verification regarding potential investors’ accredited investor status, via a safe, trusted, and user-friendly access point to personal and financial information, will be important, both from a compliance and marketing point of view. 

Addressing investor privacy concerns.  Issuers who choose to take advantage of the new general solicitation rules must request personal and private financial information from potential investors, or must find some other acceptable way to demonstrate and document that each purchaser qualifies as an accredited investor (see discussion above regarding third-party verification service providers). Requesting such information, or obtaining other verifications concerning personal financial (including income and net worth) data, will raise privacy and data security concerns and may deter potential investors from participating in Rule 506(c) private offerings. 

Offerings involving felons and bad actors disqualified from using Rule 506; due diligence on covered persons and disqualifying events.  In view of the new felon and “bad actor” disqualification rules, and the reasonable care exception to the rule, issuers and placement agents will need to adopt and implement due diligence and verification procedures and practices to ferret out whether the issuer, any placement agent or any other covered person is, or during the applicable look-back period was, subject to a “disqualifying event.” Registered broker-dealer firms and their employees are often subject to certain disqualifying events and thus will not be able to promote or assist with Rule 506 offerings without an SEC waiver. Issuers should consider adding appropriate additional questions to D&O questionnaires, requiring 20 percent or greater owners to complete questionnaires, and requiring placements agents, compensated finders, their personnel, and other covered persons to provide appropriate contractual representations. Judgment searches and review of broker-dealer compliance and other public records should also be conducted. Placement agents, broker-dealers and private fund advisors should adopt and implement new and more robust protocols and procedures in light of the rule changes, including (1) making sure their “houses are in order” (and that they, their affiliates and personnel are not subject to a “disqualifying event”), and (2) reviewing and revising, with their counsel, their due diligence requests and activities, disqualification protocols, form of placement agent agreement and other documents to address and conform to the requirements of the new rules. 

Potential unintended consequences of general solicitation offerings.  For issuers choosing to take advantage of the new general solicitation rules, careful consideration should be given to what information should be included in the marketing effort and what impact, positive or negative, the general solicitation may have on the image or credibility of their company and management team, or on the company’s customers, vendors, or employees, or its ability to attract accredited investors. Information accessible on an issuer’s website in advance of and during a private offering is deemed to be part of the general solicitation. Once marketing information is “out there,” despite confidentiality notices and precautions, the publicity (and related communications) may take on a life of its own, whether or not the subject offering is ultimately successful. 

Antifraud rules continue to apply. The new rules do not incorporate any exemption from traditional anti-fraud rules under the securities laws, including under Section 10(b) of and Rule 10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (and related sanctions for making false or misleading statements in connection with securities offerings). Issuers and their agents should carefully review and consider the form, content, and distribution of all marketing, advertising, and solicitation information and materials, however communicated or accessible (including via website and social media outlets). Issuers should expect the SEC to be vigilant in surveying the market for examples of improper conduct to target for enforcement action. 

Having a high degree of confidence in the success of an offering sold solely to accredited investors before any general solicitation.  Once an issuer commences any general solicitation activities, if it is later unable to meet the requirements of Rule 506(c) (including the “reasonable steps to verify” accredited investor status standards and assuring that all purchasers are accredited investors), it may be left without any exemption from the Securities Act’s registration requirements, and thus be unable to pursue or close any private offering of securities for some time. In addition, start-up, early stage, and other issuers that may need frequent access to private investment capital will need to be careful to avoid possible “integration” of offerings conducted within a six-month period – for example, when an offering to friends, family and known persons (including non-accredited investors and without general solicitation, under the traditional Rule 506(b)) is planned to be conducted concurrently with or following one or more offerings to other investors (using general solicitation, under new Rule 506(c)). 

Regulatory “Soup” – watch for additional related, perhaps significant, private offering reforms.  In embarking upon this new era of securities offering reform, the SEC will monitor closely the impact of its rule changes, and developing market practices, in the private, exempt offering arena. The proposed rules discussed above signal the SEC’s desire, while implementing congressional mandates, to craft “speed bumps” and safeguards for the protection of investors (including by requiring new, rather extensive filing and disclosure requirements in offerings sold entirely to accredited investors). In addition, for startup and early stage companies seeking to raise capital in relatively small amounts from a wide audience, the SEC has yet to issue proposed rules to permit “crowd funding” offerings and transactions (as mandated under the JOBS Act). Issuers and their advisors will need to assess carefully the new rules, proposed rules, and future rulemaking efforts – and the associated costs, burdens, potential liabilities, and other consequences – as they consider and plan for their capital raises and related offering alternatives.

Negotiating Private Equity Fund Terms: The Shifting Balance of Power

The balance of power has shifted from the investment managers who create private equity funds to the pension plans and other folks with money that invest in the private equity asset class.

Investors now have the upper hand in negotiating fund agreements, and they are itching to exert their newfound bargaining power. Many are unhappy with the high fees and poor performance of their existing investments; and annoyed by the governance transgressions and shoddy reporting practices of the problem child in which they have invested.

The ILPA Principles

The publication by the Institutional Limited Partners Association (ILPA) of recommended best practices for structuring private equity funds (ILPA Principles) is an effort by the leading industry organization to shift negotiating leverage in favor of investors.

The ILPA Principles recommend a significant retooling of the key terms in the limited partnership agreements used to establish private equity funds, all in an effort to more closely align managers’ pay with performance. This alignment is the value driver in the private equity business model. Given proper incentives, fund managers can lead in economic recovery by doing what they do best—restructuring underperforming businesses by motivating management, imposing cost efficiencies, and divesting noncore assets.

The ILPA Principles provide guidance on recommended deal terms in three distinct areas: management fees and profit sharing, governance and conflicts of interest, and reporting obligations.

Management Fees and Profit Sharing

The first major area in which the ILPA Principles make detailed recommendations is with respect to management fees, transaction fees, and carried interest. These are the three ways that fund managers are compensated under the private equity model. Under the original “2 and 20” model, managers receive a 2 percent management fee on committed capital and 20 percent of the profits made on investments.

Management Fees. One of the big issues this year is management fee percentages. Management fees have fallen in recent years as a percentage of assets under administration and are now being pushed into the 1.5 percent range. Nevertheless, they can be extremely lucrative to fund managers because of the economies of scale in operating a larger fund. Allowing managers to profit from management fees in advance of generation of economic return to investors distorts incentives, encouraging managers to maximize fund size rather than perform.

The ILPA Principles state that management fees should be set on the basis of a disclosed fee model that reflects the manager’s budgeted expenses to cover professional and staff salaries, rent, and operating and overhead expenses.

Management fees should step down significantly (50 percent) after the investment period or after the manager closes a successor fund, with fees from that point on calculated on invested rather than committed capital.

Transaction Fees. Transaction fees are another problem area addressed by the ILPA Principles. Fund managers typically provide an array of services to portfolio companies. These services can generate significant advisory fees to directors, consultants, and advisors.

In recent years, there has been a clear shift in the market away from a 50-50 sharing of these transaction fees between general partners and limited partners, with 80-100 percent now being credited against management fees. The ILPA Principles approve of this trend. They recommend that 100 percent of transaction fees go to the fund as this reduces the conflict inherent in managers working for companies in which the partnership they are managing holds an investment.

Carried Interest. Profit-sharing formulas are the principal tool used in private equity funds to align interests and drive incentives. Typically, the manager receives its profit participation through a “carried” interest share of fund profits, so called because the manager is not required to pick up a corresponding share of the fund’s costs. The mechanics governing payment of the carried interest are set out in something called a distribution “waterfall,” which describes the sequence in which proceeds from the sale of portfolio companies are distributed between the general partner and the limited partners.

The “Return All Capital First” Approach. The ILPA Principles recommend a “return all capital first” approach to carried interest waterfalls. In this model, common in Europe, the general partner does not receive payout of its carried interest until investors have received back all of their contributions, including the amount invested in both realized and unrealized investments, together with management fees and other expenses of the fund.

In addition, the ILPA Principles recommend that carry should not be paid on ordinary income generated by portfolio companies. Also, it should be calculated net of withholding tax regardless of whether investors are eligible for offsetting tax credits.

The ILPA Principles further suggest that carried interest should be streamed predominately to the professional staff responsible for the success of the fund, who should be prohibited from transferring those interests.

The U.S. House of Representatives recently passed legislation that, if also passed in the Senate, would hit the pocketbooks of fund managers by taxing carried interest as ordinary income. In response, managers are negotiating “gross up” provisions to hold them whole or are trying to insert language allowing them to restructure their funds if tax laws change. Sensibly, the ILPA Principles recommend that all such efforts to pass on the economic effect of tax law changes to limited partners be resisted.

The Deal-by-Deal Approach. In North America, the current market standard for payment of carried interest is the manager-friendly deal-by-deal waterfall. The general partner’s carried interest is paid out on a deal-by-deal basis as soon as the fund begins generating profitable exits from investments.

This approach has two problems. First, the early payment of carry takes money off of the table and is a drag on investor returns. Second, it creates the need to include complicated claw-back provisions in the limited partnership agreement.

Claw Back. Where the deal-by-deal carry waterfall is used, the ILPA Principles recommend that the limited partnership agreement include detailed claw-back provisions requiring the general partner to pay back profit distributions if losses subsequently arise from the sale of portfolio companies or from asset write-downs.

The ILPA Principles include detailed recommendations for such claw-back clauses:

  • all realized portfolio losses and all write-downs on unrealized investments should be recovered before any distributions;
  • all fees and expenses should be recovered before any distributions, not just a portion of total expenses equivalent to the proportion that such distribution is of total invested capital;
  • there should be significant carried interest escrows (30 percent or more);
  • there should be joint and several liability of the fund’s management team and their family trusts for the claw-back repayment obligation;
  • paybacks should occur within two years of the date that the liability arises;
  • paybacks should be gross of taxes, even if the manager is left in a negative cash position because a refund is not available or there is a mismatch of capital gains and ordinary income; and
  • the fund’s independent auditors should certify all carried interest calculations.

Management Investment. Another way to align manager and investor interests is to require that the management team have significant “skin in the game.” Accordingly, the ILPA Principles suggest that managers should make a significant (3.5-5 percent) investment of their own money in each fund that they manage.

The ILPA Principles suggest that this “management profits” interest should be paid in cash rather than by way of set-off against management fees. Given that this approach is tax inefficient compared to waiving management fees, it is unlikely that the ILPA approach will find favor among managers.

Improving Fund Governance

The second major thrust of the ILPA Principles is in the area of fund governance and accountability. These are topics very much on the minds of fund investors.

Too frequently in the past, portfolio managers have chosen to invest in funds managed by the hottest fund managers without paying sufficient attention to how the fund is governed and deals with conflicts of interest.

In the current economic environment, this has changed. Investors are looking for ways to say no to funding proposals. With increasing frequency, they are deciding not to reinvest in a manager’s new funds (so-called re-ups) for reasons other than a poor performance track record: for example, because they are unimpressed by the fund’s governance and reporting practices.

Conflicts of Interest. Fund agreements too frequently fail to address conflicts of interest in a comprehensive fashion. For example, many agreements require only that the general partner disclose conflicts of interest at the end of each year rather than seek advance consent to conflicts prior to their occurrence.

This can result in the indignity for an investor of standing by and watching helplessly as a less-than-scrupulous manager abuses the fund by cherry-picking the best investment opportunities for itself or for its successor funds, or by using the fund to prop up companies held by other funds managed by the manager. The ILPA Principles recommend that all conflict-of-interest and self-dealing transactions be predisclosed and preapproved by the fund’s limited partner advisory committee.

The Role of LP Advisory Committees. The ILPA Principles recommend an enhanced role for limited partner advisory committees, or LPACs. In 2010, expect a continuation on the trend toward greater reliance on LPACs made up of representatives of the “big dogs”—the largest investors in a fund.

Key responsibilities of an LPAC include oversight of conflicts of interest and the valuation of investments. Other duties may include waiving certain investment restrictions and approving new management hires.

The ILPA Principles provide useful guidance for best practices with respect to the formation of LPACs and meeting protocols that every LPAC should be adopting.

Fiduciary Duties. The ILPA Principles are premised on the notion that limited partnership agreements should reinforce rather than dilute the fiduciary duties of general partners to limited partners. Self-dealing and conflicts of interest should not be tolerated. Unfortunately, the language in fund agreements has often fallen short.

The ILPA Principles recommend that investors push back against inappropriate terms such as provisions that allow the general partner to reduce all fiduciary duties to the fullest extent allowed by law. They also recommend that general partner behavior constituting “gross negligence, fraud or willful misconduct” be excluded from the protections of indemnification and exculpation clauses, even if the governing law would permit it.

Style Drift. The ILPA Principles recommend that investors guard against style drift (managers digressing from their investment strategies) by clearly and narrowly outlining the investment strategy of the fund. The investment strategy should encourage time and industry diversification and set specific concentration limits. Deviations from the investment strategy should be permitted only if the LPAC consents.

No-Fault Divorce Terminations. Many fund agreements permit termination of a manager “for cause” only by some extremely high majority (e.g., 85-95 percent) following a nonappealable judicial decision. This is often unworkable. It may be difficult to prove cause even where the manager’s conduct is egregious; and it may be impossible to assemble a required majority of outraged limited partners.

The ILPA Principles recommend that the limited partners, by simple majority (and not by the super majority, which is the current market standard), should have the right to suspend or terminate the commitment period. Two-thirds majority in interest of limited partners should have the right to remove the general partner or terminate the fund under the “no fault divorce” provisions of the limited partnership agreement without cause; for example, if they do not see the returns they expected.

Key Man Provisions. The experience and performance track record of a manager’s professional team are among the most important factors considered by investors in deciding to invest in a private equity fund. Yet it is not uncommon for key management personnel to leave a fund manager, particularly if the fund is underwater and management feels that there is little prospect of ever earning their carried interest.

The ILPA Principles recommend that the result of the departure of a key person should be severe: the automatic suspension of the commitment period, which becomes permanent unless the limited partners vote by two-thirds majority in interest within 180 days to reinstate it.

A similar result should apply in the event of a breach of fiduciary duties, material breach of the limited partnership agreement, bad faith, or gross negligence. Perhaps even more importantly, investor rights should be triggered upon a preliminary nonappealable determination, not by a final court decision.

Limits on Indemnification. Fund agreements usually contain indemnification and give back obligations requiring limited partners to return prior distributions in various circumstances. For example, in today’s buyer-friendly deal environment, private equity funds selling their portfolio companies are often required to provide exhaustive indemnities for breach of representations and warranties in the purchase agreement. Where a buyer invokes these indemnification rights, limited partners may be required to give back prior distributions.

The ILPA Principles recommend that indemnification be capped in amount and limited in duration. A typical clause would cap the obligations available at the level of remaining unfunded commitments plus 25-50 percent of distributions received for a period of two years from the date of distribution.

Extension of Fund Term.Currently, the venture funds established in the years leading up to the technology industry collapse of 2001 are reaching the end of their 10-year terms. Many are lingering on with a residual portfolio of illiquid investments in private companies that have not generated exit opportunities.

The ILPA Principles recommend that maturing funds be wound up after no more than one one-year extension. This is good advice and should encourage investors to make the tough but pragmatic decision to write off low prospect residual investments rather than continue to pay fees and expenses of maintaining losing investments.

Improving Information Flows

The third major topic addressed by the ILPA Principles relates to reporting and information flows. Bad reporting practices by fund managers are an irritation to investors in private equity funds.

A diligent and resourceful portfolio manager can usually cobble together most of the required information by asking questions at annual and quarterly meetings, at LPAC meetings, and by way of repeated special requests. This is less than ideal. Traditional limited partnership agreements do not have expansive information rights and tricky confidentiality obligations make robust information flow difficult to come by.

The ILPA Principles provide detailed recommendations on general partner reporting. Investors should be provided detailed information about all activities of the manager, including all of its consulting arrangements and other dealings with portfolio companies and information about its economic arrangements with its principals, placement agents, and third-party investors. Investors should receive regular limited partnership financial statements; quarterly schedules of fund-level leverage, including commitments; details of fund expenditures; and contact information for the other investors. Investors should receive detailed valuations of portfolio companies (along with a discussion of the valuation methodology) as well as selected financial performance information including earnings, burn rates, and debt levels on a quarterly and annual basis. Investors should receive details of fee and carry calculation with each distribution and annual internal rate of return calculations (with a description of the methodology for determining the internal rate of return).

Conclusions

Portfolio managers devote a disproportionate amount of their time and effort to the administration of investments governed by poorly negotiated or poorly drafted fund agreements. Poorly drafted economic terms drag on return performance and misalign incentives. Inadequate governance clauses and poorly drafted reporting provisions make it hard to deal with conflicts and other abuses, or to gather the information needed to assess performance.

The release of the ILPA Principles, together with the severely reduced flow of institutional money into new funds, should increase the bargaining power of limited partners in negotiating fund terms and help remedy these historical problems.

Some of the terms recommended by the ILPA Principles, particularly those dealing with fees and carry, deviate from current market norms and are unlikely to be welcomed by managers. Nevertheless, expect investors to assert their bargaining power on these issues and for fund managers with less than stellar performance records to agree to more investor-friendly terms.

Also, expect that the publication of the ILPA Principles will hasten the shift in market norms that has already been occurirng toward better governance and conflict-of-interest terms and improved reporting provisions.

The ILPA Principles rightfully point the way toward reestablishing investor confidence in private equity as an attractive asset class, for the ultimate benefit of both investors and managers.

Walking the Tightrope: Limiting Fraud Claims Based on Extra-Contractual Statements and Omissions

 For decades, courts around the country have struggled with whether to enforce, and how to interpret, contractual disclaimers that limit liability for fraud based on extra-contractual statements and omissions. These disclaimers – typically referred to as “anti-reliance clauses” or “non-reliance clauses” – most often take the form of a representation by one or both of the parties disclaiming reliance on statements made outside the four corners of the agreement. Sophisticated parties typically include anti-reliance clauses in negotiated agreements to establish what information they did and did not rely upon when entering into the transaction. These provisions are also used as a means to eliminate the threat of tort claims (namely, fraud) based on oral statements that are not reduced to a representation within the definitive agreements. Anti-reliance provisions are particularly important for sellers: although indemnification deductibles and caps define the scope of a party’s post-closing liability for breaches of contractual representations, the same often will not apply to tort-based claims premised on extra-contractual statements. As a result, selling parties are particularly motivated to eliminate the potential for fraud-based claims to the greatest extent possible. 

In certain states (e.g., California), courts have declined to enforce such clauses based on a finding that they are against public policy. In other states (e.g., New York), courts have enforced anti-reliance clauses, but only under certain factual circumstances, and even then, such provisions are subject to strict scrutiny in determining whether they bar the specific claims alleged by the plaintiff. In Delaware, courts have held that clear anti-reliance clauses limiting fraud claims based on misrepresentations made outside of the agreement are generally enforceable, but such provisions will not bar fraud claims based on intentional misrepresentations within the agreement. Two recent decisions from the Delaware Court of Chancery, however, serve as important reminders that the Delaware courts will strictly construe non-reliance clauses and will not infer contractual limitations on the parties’ ability to bring fraud claims. In light of these recent cases, sophisticated parties to commercial agreements, including non-disclosure agreements and purchase and sale agreements, would be well-advised to take additional care when drafting anti-reliance clauses so as to give full effect to the parties’ bargain regarding the ability to rely on extra-contractual statements (or omissions therefrom) in making fraud claims. 

Enforceability of Anti-Reliance Clauses

In the seminal case of Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F&W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032 (Del. Ch. 2006), the Delaware Court of Chancery established that anti-reliance clauses are enforceable to bar fraud claims under Delaware law so long as the plaintiff clearly disclaims reliance on statements or promises made outside of the contract. The court also held, as a matter of Delaware public policy, that a party cannot fully absolve itself from liability for intentional misrepresentations within a purchase agreement. 

Abry Partners involved a group of entities associated with a private equity firm that purchased all of the equity of a portfolio company indirectly owned by another private equity firm. After the closing, the buyers sought to rescind the purchase agreement based on allegedly false representations in the contract and extra-contractual statements. The sellers, however, contended that the claims were precluded because the purchase agreement contained, among other things, an anti-reliance clause and a provision purporting to make indemnification the parties’ sole remedy for misrepresentations in the agreement. Specifically, the purchase agreement contained the following anti-reliance clause: 

[Buyers] acknowledge[] and agree[] that neither the [target] nor [the sellers] has made any representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the [target or its subsidiaries] or as to the accuracy or completeness of any information regarding the [target or its subsidiaries] furnished or made available to [the buyers], except as expressly set forth in this Agreement . . . and neither the [target] nor [the sellers] shall have or be subject to any liability to [the buyers] or any other Person resulting from . . . [the buyers’] use of, or reliance on, any such information or any information, documents or material made available to [the buyers] in any ‘data rooms,’ ‘virtual data rooms,’ management presentations or in any other form in expectation of, or in connection with, the transactions contemplated hereby. 

In addition, the purchase agreement’s indemnification provisions capped the sellers’ liability for misrepresentations and precluded the buyers from bringing claims for rescission. 

The court indicated that the anti-reliance clause would – if given legal effect – preclude the buyers’ claims. Importantly, the court stated that anti-reliance clauses are generally enforceable under Delaware law so long as they pertain only to representations outside of the agreement. The court explained, however, that a standard integration clause on its own will not bar a party from bringing suit based on fraudulent extra-contractual representations; the applicable clause must contain explicit anti-reliance language through which the party contractually promises that it is not relying upon statements outside the contract in deciding to sign the agreement. Explaining the policy basis for its holding, the court noted that if it failed to enforce such provisions, it would create a “double liar” scenario – allowing the plaintiff to prevail on its fraud claim by effectively sanctioning the plaintiff’s own fraudulent conduct (i.e., its false assertion in a written contract that it was not relying on extra-contractual representations). 

Following its general discussion on the enforceability of anti-reliance clauses, the court in Abry Partners then examined the extent to which a contracting party can limit its liability for claims based on false representations within an agreement. Recognizing that Delaware has a general policy against immunizing fraud, the court held that parties may only insulate a seller from liability (or preclude rescission claims) for false statements of fact in an agreement that are not intentionally made. However, if a seller intentionally misrepresents a fact in a contract – that is, if a seller lies – Delaware’s public policy would not permit the enforcement of a contractual provision limiting the buyer’s remedy to a capped damages claim. 

The Delaware Supreme Court did not address the enforceability of anti-reliance clauses under Delaware law until five years later in RAA Management, LLC v. Savage Sports Holdings, Inc., 45 A.3d 107 (Del. 2012). In RAA, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of claims made by RAA Management, LLC, an investment firm, against Savage Sports Holdings, Inc., a privately-held sports equipment manufacturer. RAA, once a potential bidder for Savage, alleged that Savage fraudulently misled RAA regarding the existence of certain material liabilities and claims against Savage, and as a result, RAA incurred $1.2 million in due diligence and negotiation costs that it allegedly would not have incurred had RAA known of such matters at the outset. 

In connection with the due diligence process, the parties executed a nondisclosure agreement that contained an anti-reliance clause. In the non-reliance provision, RAA expressly agreed to the following: 

[RAA] understand[s] and acknowledge[s] that neither [Savage nor any of its representatives] is making any representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of . . . any other information concerning [Savage] provided or prepared by or for [Savage], and . . . [o]nly those representations or warranties that are made to [RAA] in the [purchase agreement] when, as and if it is executed, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as may be specified [in] such [purchase agreement], shall have any legal effect. 

Accordingly, because RAA terminated the negotiations prior to the execution of a definitive agreement, the Court held that the NDA’s anti-reliance clause precluded RAA’s fraud claim because such claim was based solely on extra-contractual representations. Although the Court decided RAA under New York law, its decision confirmed that the result would be the same under Delaware law and specifically noted that “Abry Partners accurately states Delaware law and explains Delaware’s public policy in favor or enforcing contractually binding written disclaimers of reliance on [extra-contractual representations].” By virtue of this decision, the Delaware Supreme Court also extended the rule in Abry Partners to anti-reliance clauses present in other commercial agreements entered into by sophisticated parties, like NDAs. The Court emphasized that the purpose of NDAs and confidentiality agreements is to facilitate due diligence and the negotiation of purchase and sale agreements, and anti-reliance clauses are particularly effective tools to limit the target company’s liability for misrepresentations made during these processes. 

Recent Developments: The Dangers of Imprecise Drafting

Recent Delaware cases have provided further insight into the Delaware courts’ approach to determining the scope of anti-reliance clauses. The general rule of Abry Partners remains unchanged. Nonetheless, these decisions demonstrate the increased level of scrutiny the Delaware courts will use to determine whether an anti-reliance clause operates to bar the particular fraud claims alleged by the plaintiff. In these cases, the Delaware Court of Chancery rejected motions to dismiss fraud claims arising out of equity purchase agreements, finding that, notwithstanding the inclusion of broad anti-reliance clauses, such agreements specifically left open the possibility that certain fraud claims could be based on extra-contractual statements. Parties drafting and negotiating agreements containing anti-reliance clauses should take care to avoid the drafting missteps exemplified by these most recent decisions. 

In Anvil Holding Corp. v. Iron Acquisition Co., Inc., 2013 WL 2249655 (Del. Ch. May 17, 2013), the Court of Chancery reiterated the holdings of Abry Partners and RAA, but suggested, in dicta, that a broad fraud carve-out could operate to nullify the intended effects of anti-reliance clauses. In this case, Indigo Holding Company, Inc., and Iron Acquisition Corp. purchased the outstanding securities of Iron Data Solutions, LLC. After the purchase, the buyers brought suit alleging that they had been defrauded by the sellers. Specifically, the buyers alleged that certain of the sellers, who were also members of the management team, were aware that the acquired company’s most important customer intended to change the pricing mechanism in its contract with the company and that such sellers deliberately withheld this information. As a result, the buyers claimed that the sellers breached a key representation in the purchase agreement and that the sellers knew the representation was false when made. The buyers based their claims on both the representations and warranties made within the purchase agreement and extra-contractual statements made prior to its execution. 

With respect to the buyers’ claims based on extra-contractual statements, the sellers initially relied only on two provisions of the purchase agreement – a disclaimer by the sellers as to the making of any express or implied warranties except as set forth in the purchase agreement and a typical integration clause. Although the purchase agreement contained a specific anti-reliance clause, pursuant to which the buyers represented that the sellers made no representations or warranties other than those expressly set forth in the purchase agreement, the sellers did not include reference to this provision in their briefs, and the court declined to consider arguments based on the anti-reliance clause. Relying on Abry Partners, the court found that the buyers did not disclaim reliance on extra-contractual statements, and as a result, the buyers were not precluded from pursuing a fraud claim based thereon. In the court’s view, the sellers’ disclaimer, together with the integration clause, did not create the “double liar” problem where allowing the buyers to prevail on their fraud claim would sanction the buyers own fraudulent conduct in having falsely asserted that they would not rely on extra-contractual representations. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the court also observed that the parties agreed in the purchase agreement to “reserve all rights with respect to” claims based on fraud or the bad faith of any party. The court concluded that this language provided further evidence that the parties intended to permit reliance on extra-contractual representations in establishing post-closing fraud claims. 

Although the sellers’ arguments regarding the anti-reliance disclaimer were deemed waived for purposes of the motion to dismiss, the court noted, in dicta, that even if the court had considered the anti-reliance language in making its decision, the outcome may not have differed. In this regard, the court pointed to the broad fraud carve-out and cited the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Airborne Health, Inc. v. Squid Soap, LP, 984 A.2d 126, 141 (Del. 2009). In Airborne, the Delaware Supreme Court held that when drafters specifically preserve the right to assert fraud claims, the agreement must specify whether the carve-out applies only to claims based on written representations within the agreement, as the court will not infer such a limitation. 

Two weeks following Anvil, the Court of Chancery declined to dismiss a fraudulent concealment claim in another case, finding that the anti-reliance clause in the purchase agreement did not clearly disclaim reliance on pre-signing omissions by the sellers. In TransDigm Inc. v. Alcoa Global Fasteners, Inc., 2013 WL 2326881 (Del. Ch. May 29, 2013), the underlying purchase agreement contained an anti-reliance clause, but the provision only disclaimed reliance on extra-contractual representations, and was silent as to the disclaimer of reliance on extra-contractual omissions. 

The dispute in TransDigm arose out of the acquisition of Linread Ltd. During the course of due diligence, the buyer inquired as to the relationships between Linread and its customers, the most important of which was Airbus. The indirect owner of Linread’s equity advised the buyer that there were no disputes or requests for price re-negotiations, notwithstanding the fact that at that time, the seller allegedly had information to the contrary. Following the execution of the purchase agreement, the buyer learned that Airbus expressed dissatisfaction with certain Linread products and that the seller’s CEO verbally offered Airbus a 5 percent discount, which was scheduled to commence following the consummation of the acquisition by the buyer. The buyer also learned that at a meeting that took place shortly before the execution of the purchase agreement, Airbus advised Linread that it was considering moving 50 percent of its business to a European competitor. In light of the foregoing, the buyer brought claims for, among other things, fraudulent concealment. 

The seller, relying exclusively on the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in RAA, premised its arguments in favor of its motion to dismiss on the purchase agreement’s express anti-reliance clause. That provision stated, in pertinent part: 

[B]uyer has undertaken such investigation and has been provided with and has evaluated such documents and information as it has deemed necessary to enable it to make an informed decision with respect to the execution, delivery and performance of this Agreement and the transactions contemplated hereby. Buyer agrees to accept the [equity] without reliance upon any express or implied representations or warranties of any nature, whether in writing, orally or otherwise, made by or on behalf of or imputed to [the seller] or any of its affiliates, except as expressly set forth in [the purchase agreement]. 

The buyer argued, however, that its claim was not based on extra-contractual representations, but rather on the intentional and active concealment of material facts by the seller. In particular, the buyer alleged that it reasonably and justifiably relied on the lack of a negative response to its inquiries as to Linread’s business relationship with Airbus in making its decision to purchase Linread. 

Denying the seller’s motion to dismiss, the court distinguished the facts in TransDigm from RAA, pointing out that under the instant facts, the buyer did not agree that the seller was making no representations as to the “accuracy and completeness” of the information provided. The buyer likewise did not disclaim reliance on extra-contractual omissions. In so holding, the court noted that the buyer reasonably could have relied on the assumption that the seller was not actively concealing information that was responsive to inquiries made with respect to Linread’s customers. The court further observed that the two cases discussed in detail in RAA both involved challenges to agreements that contained language expressly disclaiming reliance on both extra-contractual representations and omissions. See Great Lakes Chemical Corp. v. Pharmacia Corp., 788 A.2d 544, 552 (Del. Ch. 2001) (stating that the buyer represented, among other things, that “[e]ach of [the sellers] expressly disclaims any and all liability that may be based on such information or errors therein or omissions therefrom”); In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders Litig., 789 A.3d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001) (noting that the buyer represented, among other things, that none of the sellers “shall have any liability whatsoever to us or our [r]epresentatives relating to or resulting from the use of [certain materials] or any errors therein or omissions therefrom”). 

Conclusion

Following the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in Abry Partners and its subsequent confirmation by the Delaware Supreme Court in RAA, drafters of commercial agreements between sophisticated parties governed by Delaware law could be confident that clearly drafted anti-reliance clauses that disclaimed reliance on statements made outside of the agreement would be enforced by the Delaware courts and would limit the buyer’s ability to bring fraud claims based on extra-contractual representations. While neither Anvil nor TransDigm modify the holdings of those earlier decisions, these cases are important insofar as they offer helpful guidance to practitioners on the drafting of anti-reliance clauses. 

The Court of Chancery’s decision in Anvil demonstrates the possible unintended consequences of a broad reservation by the parties of the right to bring fraud claims. Although sellers of equity or assets may intend to insulate themselves from post-closing claims for fraudulent misrepresentations through the inclusion of carefully drafted anti-reliance clauses, the insertion of language preserving the parties’ rights to bring fraud claims could negate such efforts. Accordingly, to the extent that sellers are unable to negotiate around the broad reservation of rights in respect of fraud, practitioners representing the selling parties should seek to include language limiting the right to bring fraud claims to claims based on the representations and warranties expressly set forth in the purchase agreement. 

The TransDigm decision, on the other hand, reflects the need for vigilance in the drafting of anti-reliance language. Provisions that disclaim reliance only as to representations made outside of the purchase agreement may be insufficient to avoid claims for fraudulent concealment. To the extent the parties intend to preclude all claims based on extra-contractual statements and omissions, anti-reliance disclaimers should also include express disclaimers of reliance on the “accuracy and completeness” of the information provided and the omission of material facts outside of the agreement.