Annual Survey of Judicial Developments Pertaining to Venture Capital

By the Annual Survey Working Group of the Jurisprudence Subcommittee, Private Equity and Venture Capital Committee, ABA Business Law Section1

The Annual Survey Working Group reports annually on the decisions we believe are the most significant to private equity and venture capital practitioners.2 The decisions selected for this year’s Annual Survey are the following:

1.  Huff Energy Fund, L.P. v. Gershen (shareholders’ agreements and fiduciary duties in the context of dissolution following an asset sale)

2.  Calesa Associates, L.P. v. American Capital, Ltd. (determining when a minority investor is a “controlling stockholder”)

3.  Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Industry Pension Fund (finding of control group liability for portfolio company pension plan obligations)

4.  In re ISN Software Corp. Appraisal Litigation (statutory appraisal of a privately held corporation)

5.  Frederick HSU Living Trust v. ODN Holding Corp. (fiduciary and statutory obligations in connection with preferred stock redemption rights)

1.  HUFF ENERGY FUND, L.P. V. GERSHEN (SHAREHOLDERS’ AGREEMENTS AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN THE CONTEXT OF DISSOLUTION FOLLOWING AN ASSET SALE)

SUMMARY

In this case,3 the Delaware Court of Chancery granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss a complaint brought by The Huff Energy Fund, L.P. (“Huff Energy”), the owner of approximately 40 percent of the outstanding common stock of Longview Energy Company (“Longview”), that challenged the decision of Longview’s board of directors and stockholders to dissolve Longview following a sale of a significant portion of its assets.4 The complaint alleged that Longview and certain members of its board breached a shareholders’ agreement entered into in connection with Huff Energy’s investment in Longview (the “Shareholders’ Agreement”),5 and also that the Longview board breached its fiduciary duties by adopting a plan of dissolution without exploring more favorable alternatives in violation of Revlon6 and as an unreasonable response to a perceived threat in violation of Unocal.7 In coming to its conclusion, the court held that the Shareholders’ Agreement, which required unanimous board approval of certain actions, did not prevent Longview from adopting a plan of dissolution by a majority vote of the board.8 In addition, the court held that neither Revlon nor Unocal applied to the board’s approval of Longview’s dissolution,9 and, even if Revlon or Unocal did apply, the approval of the transaction by a fully informed, uncoerced, and disinterested stockholder majority would shift the standard of review to business judgement under Corwin.10

BACKGROUND

Longview, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Dallas, Texas, was engaged in the exploration and production of oil and gas.11 In 2006, Huff Energy purchased 20 percent of Longview’s outstanding common stock and entered into the Shareholders’ Agreement with Longview.12 Over the next four years, Huff Energy increased its investment in Longview to approximately 40 percent.13 Beginning in 2008, Longview began to pursue a potential liquidity event.14 After declining a prospective asset sale in 2010 and failing to consummate a merger in 2011, Longview retained Parker Whaling, an investment bank specializing in the oil and gas industry, to assist in the process.15 In April 2014, after three years of being unable to find a merger partner for Longview, Parker Whaling found a buyer for its California oil and gas properties and related assets, which generated approximately 90 percent of Longview’s operating revenue (the “California Assets”).16 In September 2014, Longview circulated to the board an agreement for the sale of the California Assets for $43.1 million.17 Concerned about the tax implications of distributing the sale proceeds as a dividend, Huff Energy’s board representative suggested that Longview adopt and distribute the proceeds according to a plan of dissolution.18 In October 2014, oil prices collapsed, which caused the buyer to withdraw from the transaction.19

On May 14, 2015, Longview proposed a new transaction in which Longview would sell the California Assets to White Knight Production, LLC for $28 million and subsequently adopt a plan of dissolution.20 On May 18, 2015, the board met to approve the transaction and the associated proxy statement to be distributed to stockholders to solicit the required stockholder approval.21 During this meeting, Huff Energy first learned that Longview would not be making a distribution to stockholders and would instead retain all net proceeds in light of Longview’s contingent liabilities.22 Although the Longview board proceeded to approve the transaction and the distribution of the proxy statement to stockholders, Huff Energy’s board representative abstained.23 On June 5, 2015, Huff Energy wrote a letter to the Longview board requesting that it rescind its request for approval of the plan of dissolution because Longview’s “withholding of the net proceeds negated any tax burden associated with a distribution” and because of the harmful effects it would have on stockholders, including the elimination of the transferability of shares.24 On June 8, 2015, the board denied Huff Energy’s request and, on June 11, 2015, Longview’s stockholders approved the transaction.25 Huff Energy thereafter commenced an action alleging, among other claims, that Longview breached the Shareholders’ Agreement and the director defendants breached their fiduciary duties by adopting the plan of dissolution.26

ANALYSIS

With respect to the breach of contract claims, Huff Energy argued that Longview violated section 10(b)(iii) of the Shareholders’ Agreement, which required unanimous board approval of “any action or omission that would have a material adverse effect on the rights of any [Longview shareholder], as set forth in” the Shareholders’ Agreement.27 The court rejected Huff Energy’s argument that the Shareholders’ Agreement “set forth” a right of transferability in its right of first offer, and that the board’s adoption of the plan of dissolution had a material adverse effect on this right.28 The court reasoned that the term “set forth” could not reasonably be construed to mean “referenced” in the Shareholders’ Agreement; rather, its only reasonable meaning could be “created by” the Shareholders’ Agreement.29 The court held that, because the Shareholders’ Agreement did not create Huff Energy’s right of transferability in its shares, Longview’s adoption of the plan of dissolution did not violate section 10(b)(iii) of the Shareholders’ Agreement.30

Huff Energy also argued that Longview violated a covenant in the Shareholders’ Agreement, requiring that Longview “shall continue to exist and shall remain in good standing under the laws of its state of incorporation and under the laws of any state in which [it] conducts business.”31 The court rejected Huff Energy’s argument that by approving the dissolution Longview breached the covenant.32 The court noted that a merger in certain forms would have the same effect as a plan of dissolution (i.e., Longview would cease to exist), yet the Shareholders’ Agreement explicitly provided for a merger to be approved by a two-thirds board vote.33 As a result, the court held that, because dissolution was not listed under the Shareholders’ Agreement’s supermajority provisions, it would be reasonable to allow the Longview board to adopt a plan of dissolution by a majority vote.34

Regarding the breach of fiduciary duty claims against the director defendants, the court similarly rejected each of Huff Energy’s arguments.35 First, Huff Energy argued that the director defendants adopted the plan of dissolution to advance their own interests at the expense of Huff Energy and Longview’s other stockholders.36 In particular, Huff Energy alleged that certain directors were motivated by their desire to receive significant severance payments.37 The court rejected this argument, stating that “the possibility of receiving change-in-control benefits pursuant to pre-existing employment agreements does not create a disqualifying interest as a matter of law.”38 The court noted that, in any event, these severance payments were triggered, not by the plan of dissolution, but rather by the preceding asset sale, which was not challenged by Huff Energy.39 The court also rejected Huff Energy’s argument that a majority of the Longview board acted under a disqualifying conflict of interest by virtue of the fact that they formerly and currently served together as directors on other boards, or as a result of the alleged animosity of one of the directors toward Huff Energy.40 The court noted that personal and outside business relationships, without more, are insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of a director’s ability to exercise independent business judgment.41

Second, Huff Energy argued that the dissolution of Longview was a “final stage” transaction, which should have been subject to Revlon enhanced scrutiny.42 The court held that the plan of dissolution did not constitute such a final stage transaction because, following the approval of the plan of dissolution, Longview was to continue to exist for at least three more years while its affairs were wound up, during which time the directors would maintain control over Longview’s non-California assets and continue to owe fiduciary duties to the stockholders.43

Third, Huff Energy argued that the board’s adoption of the plan of dissolution constituted an unreasonable defense under Unocal’s enhanced scrutiny test.44 The court disagreed and noted that the “omnipresent specter” of director entrenchment is not present where a corporation is winding up its affairs in preparation for its liquidation.45 In dicta, the court stated that, even if Huff Energy had pled facts subjecting the transaction to enhanced scrutiny, the Longview stockholders’ approval “cleansed” the transaction, thereby reinstating the business judgment rule.46 The court rejected Huff Energy’s argument that the stockholder vote was not fully informed due to Longview’s failure to disclose in the proxy statement that Huff Energy’s board representative had abstained from the vote and the reasons for his abstention.47 The court reasoned that, because the board’s vote did not require unanimity, the disclosure was immaterial to Longview stockholders in making their decision to approve the transaction.48

CONCLUSION

The decision in this case demonstrates the difficulty a party to a shareholders’ agreement might experience in challenging board or stockholder action in circumstances in which the shareholders’ agreement does not clearly and unambiguously support its veto rights. In particular, the case suggests that matters subject to a party’s veto rights should be specifically enumerated among the matters subject to supermajority vote requirements (rather than being left to more general standards). This case also reinforces a number of other recent Delaware cases that demonstrate the difficulty in bringing fiduciary duty claims in situations in which the challenged board action has been approved by the corporation’s stockholders.

2.  CALESA ASSOCIATES, L.P. V. AMERICAN CAPITAL, LTD. (DETERMINING WHEN A MINORITY INVESTOR IS A “CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDER”)

SUMMARY

In this case,49 the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a private equity investor’s motion to dismiss a breach of fiduciary duty claim challenging a complex transaction between the company and the private equity investor. Although the private equity investor owned only 26 percent of the company at the time of the transaction, the court concluded that it could be a controlling stockholder because of its control and influence over a majority of the board.

BACKGROUND50

Halt Medical, Inc. (“Halt”) is a Delaware corporation that supports and markets a procedure to treat fibroid tumors in women.51 In June 2007, American Capital, Ltd. and its affiliates (“ACAS”)52 invested $8.9 million in Halt. Under the terms of the investment, ACAS was granted two of Halt’s five board seats and a right to block any subsequent pari passu investments in Halt.53

Halt needed additional funds, and in June 2011, ACAS offered to provide $5 million in exchange for a 50 percent interest in Halt.54 Halt’s board of directors declined the offer and instead entered into a short-term loan agreement with a third party secured by Halt’s intellectual property.55 Subsequently, ACAS purchased the short-term note.56 By the fall of 2011, Halt again needed additional funds.57 The board negotiated a potential deal for a $35 million investment at a 15 percent interest rate, subject to ACAS’s waiver of its blocking rights.58 However, ACAS exercised its blocking rights and, as an alternative, offered to loan Halt an additional $20 million at a 22 percent interest rate, with the right to add one director and appoint an additional independent director.59 Halt accepted ACAS’s offer.60

By the fall of 2013, Halt owed ACAS $50 million under a note due at the end of 2013.61 Despite indications that ACAS would extend the note, in September 2013, ACAS demanded repayment in full by December 31, 2013.62 In October 2013, ACAS loaned Halt an additional $3 million to help it operate through the end of 2013 in return for Halt agreeing to a supermajority vote requirement for any Chapter 11 proceeding.63

With the pressure from the impending due date of the $50 million note and its inability to secure financing elsewhere, Halt met with ACAS representatives to negotiate a deal that would allow Halt to be sold to a third party.64 The final agreement provided that ACAS would loan Halt up to $73 million, ACAS’ ownership would increase from 26 percent to almost 66 percent,65 ACAS would get a blanket first priority security interest, the prior outstanding warrants would be cancelled, and a new management incentive plan would be created (allegedly for the benefit of the Halt CEO/director).66 Finally, the transaction documents provided that if Halt was not sold within one year of the transaction, subordinated debt owned by minority stockholders would be converted to equity and preferred stock owned by minority stockholders would be cancelled.67 The minority stockholders received copies of the transaction documents by e-mail and were instructed to sign and return them by the next day.

The plaintiffs in this action are minority stockholders of Halt.68 The plaintiffs alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty, and violations of section 228 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) against ACAS and certain members of the board.69 The plaintiffs’ key contention was that the defendants breached their duty of loyalty by forcing Halt to enter into a deal that diluted the minority stockholders to ACAS’ advantage.70 The defendants’ motion to dismiss was denied.71

ANALYSIS

Breach of Fiduciary Duty. The court first addressed whether the entire fairness standard of review applied because ACAS was a controlling stockholder on both sides of the transaction, and because a majority of the board was interested or lacked independence from a conflicted party.72 Even though ACAS only owned 26 percent of Halt prior to the transaction, the court noted that a stockholder is a controlling stockholder (and hence owes fiduciary duties to other stockholders) if the stockholder owns a majority interest or exercises actual control over the business and affairs of the corporation.73

The court started its analysis with the fact that ACAS’ contractual rights allegedly gave it the ability to control the Halt board by virtue of the ability to block other transactions.74 However, the court determined that the exercise of contractual rights was not sufficient, by itself, to demonstrate control.75 The court next turned to analysis of the individual Halt board members to determine if a majority of the directors were under the actual control and influence of ACAS.76

Because there were seven directors at the time of the transaction, the court focused only on whether four directors (a majority) were beholden to ACAS.77 Simply appointing a director, without more, does not establish actual domination.78 One director, who was an officer of ACAS and who negotiated the transaction on behalf of ACAS, clearly lacked independence.79 Another director, who served on both the ACAS board and the Halt board, also lacked independence.80 A third director who served as president and CEO of another ACAS portfolio company was determined by the court to be conflicted. The court relied on a disclosure in the information statement that stated this director had interests different than the interests of Halt’s stockholders.81 Finally, the court found a fourth director, Halt’s CEO, also to be beholden to ACAS.82

In addition to concluding that the claims against ACAS survived, the court concluded that for the same reasons, plaintiffs’ claims of breach of loyalty against the director defendants also survived.83

Aiding and Abetting a Breach of Fiduciary Duty. In the alternative, the plaintiffs argued that ACAS aided and abetted the director defendants’ breach of fiduciary duty.84 The court noted that if ACAS is ultimately found to be a controlling stockholder, this claim would fail for lack of a defendant who is not a fiduciary.85 However, because that determination would not be made until the record was further developed, the court reserved determination for a later state of the proceedings.86

Miscellaneous Claims. With respect to the claim challenging the validity of the written stockholder consent obtained in lieu of a meeting pursuant to section 228 of the DGCL, the court noted that Delaware law requires strict compliance.87 The court declined to dismiss this claim because several exhibits to the consent form provided to the stockholders were either incomplete, missing, or in draft form.88

CONCLUSION

Making the determination whether a holder of less than a majority of stock is a controlling stockholder is a fact-intensive inquiry. While part of the analysis, the percentage of ownership is not determinative because the court will look to multiple factors (for example, the stockholder’s contractual protections) and will evaluate the board’s independence on a director-by-director basis. This determination can have a significant effect on the outcome of the case because the board’s actions will no longer receive the benefit of the business judgement rule. Instead, the court will review the transaction under the entire fairness standard. The benefit of anticipating this possible review standard is that counsel can help set up a process that will be easier to withstand judicial scrutiny. The process might entail creating a special committee of disinterested and independent directors to negotiate the transaction on behalf of the unaffiliated stockholders and/or subjecting the approval of the transaction to a non-waivable majority-of-the-minority vote.

3.  SUN CAPITAL PARTNERS III, LP V. NEW ENGLAND TEAMSTERS & TRUCKING INDUSTRY PENSION FUND (FINDING OF CONTROL GROUP LIABILITY FOR PORTFOLIO COMPANY PENSION PLAN OBLIGATIONS)

SUMMARY

In this case,89 the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts found that two private equity funds under common management were liable to a multiemployer pension plan for $4.5 million in withdrawal liability incurred by one of the funds’ bankrupt portfolio companies despite the fact that neither fund had the 80 percent ownership interest in the portfolio company required to establish a controlled group between itself and the portfolio company under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).90 Using the “investment plus” test articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in a 2013 decision,91 the district court found that the funds were not merely passive investors in the portfolio company but rather they together constituted an active “trade or business.”92 Furthermore, despite the fact that the two funds were separate legal entities with different investors and disparate portfolio company investments, the district court found that the two funds’ coordinated efforts vis a vis the portfolio company created a notional partnership between the funds under federal common law.93 Together, these findings led the district court to aggregate the funds’ ownership stakes in the portfolio company, thereby establishing the existence of a controlled group under ERISA and causing the funds to be jointly and severally liable for the funding shortfall in the portfolio company’s multiemployer pension plan.94

BACKGROUND

In 2006, two private equity funds (each, a “Fund,” and together, the “Funds”) controlled by Sun Capital Advisors (“Sun Capital”) formed a limited liability company (the “LLC”) in which one Fund held a 70 percent ownership interest and the other Fund held a 30 percent ownership interest.95 The LLC, through a wholly owned subsidiary holding company, acquired all of the stock (the “Acquisition”) of Scott Brass, Inc., a metal coil manufacturer (“Scott Brass”).96 As is customary in the private equity industry, Sun Capital took an active role in the management of Scott Brass, appointing a majority of the Scott Brass board of directors through Sun Capital–affiliated management companies.97 In addition, Scott Brass paid management fees to Sun Capital for advisory services, payments that were used to offset the fees that the Funds would have otherwise owed to their general partners.98

At the time of the Acquisition, Scott Brass was a member of the New England Teamsters & Trucking Industry Pension Fund (the “Pension Fund”), a multiemployer pension plan regulated by ERISA.99 Historically, labor unions have established multiemployer pension plans by way of collective bargaining agreements amongst multiple employers in a particular industry, pooling retirement contributions and benefits and sharing investment risk for the contributing employers’ unionized workforce as a result.100 When a participating member of a multiemployer pension plan stops contributing to the plan (either as a result of bankruptcy or otherwise), ERISA determines that company’s “withdrawal liability,” which is its share of any unfunded vested benefits under the plan.101 By statute, ERISA imposes the calculated withdrawal liability jointly and severally on each “trade or business” that is under “common control” with the withdrawing employer.102

Due to a decline in copper prices, in 2008, Scott Brass filed for bankruptcy, withdrawing from the pension fund as a result.103 At the time of its withdrawal from the pension fund, Scott Brass incurred approximately $4.5 million in withdrawal liability under ERISA.104 The pension fund demanded payment of this liability from the Funds, claiming that the Funds were in an active “trade or business” and had effectively formed a partnership that was under “common control” with Scott Brass.105 As a result, the pension fund concluded that the Funds were jointly and severally liable for the withdrawal liability of Scott Brass under ERISA.106

ANALYSIS

The Funds sued the pension fund in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Funds were not liable for the withdrawal liability of Scott Brass.107 The district court granted summary judgment to the Funds, finding that the Funds were not “trades or businesses” and, accordingly, they could not be held liable for the withdrawal liability of Scott Brass under ERISA.108

The pension fund appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which reversed the district court’s decision.109 In rendering its decision, the court of appeals endorsed a position taken in an earlier 2007 administrative decision, holding that the existence of a “trade or business” can arise from a mere investment for profit plus some additional factors that suggest that the investment is not merely passive.110 Despite not providing any specific guidance regarding the contours of the “investment plus” test, the court of appeals nonetheless found that one of the Funds was a “trade or business” under the “investment plus” test.111 The court remanded the case to the district court in order for it to determine whether the other Fund was also a “trade or business” and to determine whether the Funds were under common control with Scott Brass, such that the entities would be considered a single employer for the purposes of determining their withdrawal liability under ERISA.112

On remand, the district court ruled that both Funds were “trades or businesses” under the “investment plus” test, finding that the Funds were more than mere passive investors in Scott Brass because they received economic benefits related to their investment that an ordinary investor would not normally derive.113 Specifically, the district court focused on the management fees that the Funds’ general partners were entitled to and the fact that these fees could be reduced or eliminated entirely by offsetting them against fees that were paid directly by the Funds’ portfolio companies (such as Scott Brass) to the general partners.114 Similarly, if there were no such fees to offset, they could be carried forward as potential future offsets.115 By virtue of the Funds’ coordinated activities and the Funds’ hands-on involvement with their investment in Scott Brass, the Funds were deemed to be under common control with Scott Brass.116 As a result, the Funds’ ownership interests in Scott Brass were aggregated to satisfy the statutory 80 percent ownership requirement for joint and several withdrawal liability under ERISA.117

In determining the issue of common control, ERISA looks to Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) regulations.118 The Code provides that two or more trades or businesses are under common control if they are members of a “parent-subsidiary” group, which occurs when a parent entity owns 80 percent or more of a subsidiary entity either directly or through a chain of entities.119 The district court stressed that a finding of common control functions to effectively pierce the corporate veil and disregard formal business structures in situations where a single employer might attempt to avoid its withdrawal liability under ERISA.120 In the view of the district court, the Funds’ ownership of Scott Brass, via the intermediate holding company and limited liability company, was not split 70-30.121 Rather, Scott Brass was owned 100 percent by a notional partnership that had been formed by the Funds.122 In its ruling, the district court found that the Funds had established a “partnership in fact” under federal law, despite the facts that (i) each Fund was a separate legal entity; (ii) the Funds filed separate income tax returns, maintained separate bank accounts, and issued separate reports to a largely disparate set of limited partners; (iii) the Funds invested in largely non-overlapping portfolio companies, suggesting that they were not structured to invest in parallel; and (iv) the Funds’ operating agreements expressly disclaimed any intent to form a partnership or joint venture with respect to co-investment activities of the Funds.123

CONCLUSION

The courts’ decisions in Sun Capital cast doubt on the efficacy of oft-used investment structures designed to facilitate active investor involvement in the management of portfolio companies while also avoiding the liabilities of portfolio companies from being ascribed to their investors. Under the Sun Capital decisions, an investment fund may be considered an “active trade or business” under ERISA even if the fund does not receive direct economic benefits from its portfolio company investments.124 Furthermore, an investment fund that individually owns less than 80 percent of a portfolio company may still be subject to ERISA withdrawal liability if a court determines that a partnership-in-fact exists among the fund and other affiliated funds whose aggregate holdings exceed the 80 percent ownership threshold prescribed by ERISA.125 Although the court of appeals’ decision is only binding in the First Circuit and the district court’s decision is only binding in Massachusetts, the holdings in Sun Capital may nonetheless be persuasive authority in courts outside of these jurisdictions. Furthermore, although Sun Capital only addressed the issue of multiemployer plan liabilities under ERISA, it is an open question whether the reasoning of the district court could be extended to liabilities under other types of employee benefit plans.

4.  IN RE ISN SOFTWARE CORP. APPRAISAL LITIGATION (STATUTORY APPRAISAL OF A PRIVATELY HELD CORPORATION)

SUMMARY

In this post-trial appraisal decision,126 the Delaware Court of Chancery held that the fair value of ISN Software Corp. (“ISN”), a privately held company, was $98,783 per share at the time its controlling stockholder cashed out some, but not all, of the stock held by the minority stockholders. The fair value assigned by the court represented a 257 percent increase to the $38,317 per share merger consideration paid by the controlling stockholder in the underlying cash-out transaction.127 In determining fair value, the court relied exclusively on a discounted cash flow (“DCF”) analysis because the controller’s valuation method was unreliable, and neither historical sales of stock nor evaluations of comparable companies and transactions provided reliable indicators of fair value given that ISN was a privately held company whose stock was essentially illiquid.128

BACKGROUND

ISN, a privately held Delaware corporation and a provider of subscription-based online database services, had experienced substantial growth in the years leading up to the merger, serving a variety of industries across more than seventy countries.129 ISN was controlled by its majority stockholder, Bill Addy.130

On January 9, 2013, ISN merged with a wholly owned subsidiary, with ISN continuing as the surviving corporation (the “Merger”).131 Stockholder approval was obtained pursuant to DGCL section 228 by the written consent of Bill Addy and ISN’s CEO, who at that time owned 65.3 percent and 4.9 percent of the company’s stock, respectively.132 The Merger cashed out holders of less than 500 shares (which included petitioner Polaris) for $38,317 per share, while providing that shares held by owners of 500 or more shares (which included petitioner Ad-Venture) remained unchanged and outstanding.133 Bill Addy determined the cash-out merger consideration, without the assistance of a financial advisor, using a valuation created by a third party in 2011, which Addy purportedly adjusted based on his expectations for the company.134

Both Polaris and Ad-Venture submitted demands for appraisal after receipt of the company’s notice of action by written consent and notice of appraisal rights, and they subsequently filed appraisal petitions pursuant to section 262 of the DGCL.135 In February 2016, the court held a five-day trial featuring a battle of financial experts.136 The court issued its post-trial opinion in August 2016.

ANALYSIS

The court preliminarily acknowledged that while it has broad discretion in an appraisal proceeding to consider all relevant factors when determining fair value and the discretion to use the valuation methods it deems appropriate, it must limit its valuation to the firm’s value as a going concern and exclude the speculative elements of value that may arise from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger.137 Each of the three parties, petitioners Polaris and Ad-Venture, and respondent ISN, proffered experts who opined on the fair value using various valuation methods.138 ISN’s expert opined that the fair value of ISN was $29,360 per share (i.e., less than the cash-out merger price), while Polaris’s and Ad-Venture’s experts testified that ISN was worth $230,000 and $222,414 per share, respectively.139 The court decided to rely exclusively on the DCF method, finding other valuation methods to be unreliable for a number of reasons.140 First, the court held that the “guideline public companies” approach was not a reliable method of valuation because ISN had no public competitors and its “alleged industry include[d] various and divergent software platforms.”141 Second, the court concluded that the direct capitalization of cash flow method (“DCCF”)—which assumes that a company will grow in perpetuity at a long-term growth rate—was not a reliable indicator of ISN’s fair value, explaining that the DCCF method is an appropriate valuation tool only when a company “has reached a steady state” or when “no other feasible valuation methods exist,” neither of which was true in ISN’s case.142 Third, the court held that two prior transactions involving the sale of ISN’s stock were unreliable indicators of fair value because ISN was a privately held company with illiquid stock and the evidence at trial indicated that the prior sales were effectuated for liquidity reasons and therefore were not necessarily designed to maximize the sales price.143 Moreover, the court explained that the two past sales of stock were neither shopped to multiple buyers nor priced using complete and accurate information, and each of the prior transactions included incompatible forms of consideration, such as financial options and land, which were difficult to value.144 These factors, according to the court, made the past-transactions analysis an unreliable method of valuation.145

Finding the DCF method to be the only appropriate valuation method but finding each of the experts’ DCF models lacking in certain respects, the court conducted its own DCF analysis deriving various factors from the three experts’ DCF models.146 Observing that each of the three experts utilized a different projection period in their analysis, the court explained that the reliability of a DCF valuation depends on the accuracy of its future cash flow projections and the length of the period used to project those future cash flows.147 With that principle in mind, the court selected the standard five-year projection period used by ISN’s expert instead of the longer projection periods used by the petitioners’ experts, explaining that “projections out more than a few years owe more to hope than reason.”148 Starting with ISN’s DCF model, the court adjusted several inputs and assumptions by, among other things, removing a cash-flow adjustment for incremental working capital because ISN historically operated with a negative working capital balance, and using a cost of equity based solely on the capital asset pricing model and equal to ISN’s weighted average cost of capital because the company did not have long-term debt at the time of the Merger.149 The court then determined that the fair value of ISN’s shares at the time of the Merger was $98,783 per share.150

The court also held that both Polaris and Ad-Venture were entitled to statutory interest.151 The court noted that shortly after Polaris filed its appraisal petition, ISN and Polaris entered into a stipulation under section 262(h) of the DGCL pursuant to which ISN pre-paid $25,000 per share plus interest, thus tolling the running of interest with respect to that amount.152 With respect to the balance, because Polaris was deprived of its stock on the date of the Merger, January 9, 2013, it was entitled to interest from that date.153 The court explained that Ad-Venture was in a slightly different position because the Merger did not technically convert Ad-Venture’s stock.154 Instead, interest would run from the date Ad-Venture perfected its appraisal rights by delivery of its appraisal demand, which was several weeks after the date of the Merger.155

CONCLUSION

The decision in this case provides financial experts and legal advisors with helpful insight into the Court of Chancery’s approach to valuing private companies in a statutory appraisal proceeding. The Court of Chancery is likely to rely heavily, if not exclusively, on the DCF method of valuation when calculating the fair value of a company whose stock does not trade publicly and for which there are no comparable companies and transactions that can serve as reliable indicators of fair value. The opinion also highlights the perils of using a merger to cash out only specified minority holders (for example, holders of less than a fixed number of shares or non-accredited holders) where unreliable methods are used to determine the merger consideration and where holders whose shares would remain unchanged can use the merger as an opportunity to cash out of their otherwise illiquid position.

5.  FREDERICK HSU LIVING TRUST V. ODN HOLDING CORP. (FIDUCIARY AND STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH PREFERRED STOCK REDEMPTION RIGHTS)

INTRODUCTION

In this case,156 the Delaware Court of Chancery held on a motion to dismiss that it was reasonably conceivable that a corporation’s controlling stockholder, directors, and officers breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty by engaging in a de facto liquidation of the corporation to maximize the redemption value of the controller’s preferred stock.157 In so holding, the court clarified that “the fiduciary principle does not protect special preferences or rights” of preferred stockholders, but rather requires “that decision makers focus on promoting the value of the undifferentiated equity in the aggregate” by focusing on the maximization of a corporation’s value over the long term, even in the presence of a redemption right.158

BACKGROUND

In 2008, affiliates of Oak Hill Capital Partners (“Oak Hill”) invested $150 million in preferred stock of ODN Holding Corporation (“ODN”).159 The preferred stock carried a mandatory redemption right exercisable by Oak Hill in February 2013 “out of funds legally available.”160 If ODN did not have legally available funds, ODN was required to raise funds for additional redemptions as “determined by [ODN]’s Board of Directors in good faith and consistent with its fiduciary duties.”161 As part of its investment, Oak Hill appointed two of its partners to ODN’s board.162 In 2009, Oak Hill purchased a block of ODN common stock, giving it voting control of ODN and an additional board designee.163

In mid-2011, ODN began stockpiling cash for the redemption.164 In January 2012, ODN sold two of its four business lines for $15.4 million, despite having acquired only a part of those businesses for $46.5 million in 2007.165 In May 2012, ODN’s compensation committee approved bonuses for certain ODN officers, which were contingent on the redemption of $75 million of Oak Hill’s preferred stock.166 In August 2012, the board formed a special committee, consisting of two outside directors, to negotiate the terms of the upcoming redemption of Oak Hill’s preferred stock.167 The special committee tasked the officers who were party to the bonus agreements with determining how much cash ODN required to operate.168 The officers concluded that ODN needed $10 million to continue operating, freeing $40 million for the redemption.169

However, Oak Hill recommended that ODN make a partial payment of $45 million.170 In exchange, Oak Hill agreed to defer further redemption payments, subject to a unilateral right to cancel the deferral.171 In response, ODN revised its estimate of the amount of cash that ODN required to operate to $2 million, and the special committee and ODN board approved a $45 million redemption.172

In May 2014, ODN sold the business line constituting its main source of revenue.173 On June 4, 2014, the ODN board re-established the special committee to oversee another redemption of Oak Hill’s preferred stock and to recommend ODN’s restructuring.174 As a result, the board approved a sale of the “crown jewel” of ODN’s sole remaining business line for $600,000, over $16 million less than what ODN had paid to acquire the business in 2010.175 Thereafter, the special committee and the board approved a $40 million redemption of Oak Hill’s preferred stock, which triggered the officers’ bonus payments.176 In 2015, ODN’s revenues fell to $11 million from $141 million just four years prior, representing a 92 percent decline.177

Plaintiff, an ODN common stockholder, filed suit on March 15, 2016.178 Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety.179

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the redemptions violated section 160 of the DGCL (requiring that redemptions not impair capital) and the common law (prohibiting redemptions that render a corporation insolvent); that the board, certain officers, and Oak Hill breached their fiduciary duties; that Oak Hill aided and abetted the board’s breach; and that Oak Hill and certain officers were unjustly enriched.180

The court dismissed plaintiff’s statutory and common law claims regarding the redemptions.181 Specifically, the court found that the ODN board was not required to treat the preferred stock as a current liability for purposes of calculating surplus under section 160 of the DGCL, as claimed by plaintiff, because preferred stock is equity, not debt.182 Furthermore, the court found that because the redemptions did not render ODN balance-sheet insolvent, unable to pay its bills when due, or without sufficient resources to operate for the foreseeable future, the redemptions did not violate the common law.183

Next, the court held that plaintiff stated a claim that all but one of the ODN directors violated their duties of loyalty by stockpiling cash, selling off businesses, and using the proceeds to redeem the preferred stock.184 The court explained that the ODN board owed a fiduciary duty to “the stockholders in the aggregate in their capacity as residual claimants, which means the undifferentiated equity as a collective, without regard to any special rights.”185 Furthermore, the court held that “the fiduciary relationship requires that the directors act prudently, loyally, and in good faith to maximize the value of the corporation over the long-term for the benefit of the providers of presumptively permanent equity capital.”186 Specifically, here “the fact that a corporation is bound by its valid contractual obligations does not mean that a board does not owe fiduciary duties when considering how to handle those contractual obligations.”187

The court found that entire fairness was the applicable standard of review because, based on the pleadings, a majority of the board was neither disinterested nor independent.188 First, the court found that the Oak Hill designees were not independent or disinterested because they owed fiduciary duties to both ODN and Oak Hill, and when Oak Hill sought to exercise its redemption right, their interests conflicted.189 Next, the court found the CEO director to be interested because she was employed at ODN (which was controlled by Oak Hill) and stood to benefit from the redemptions pursuant to her bonus agreement.190 Finally, the court found that ODN’s outside directors were interested in and/or lacked independence with respect to the redemption because they furthered Oak Hill’s interests by approving the bonus agreements for ODN’s officers, failing to effectively negotiate with Oak Hill, recommending the redemption on Oak Hill’s terms, and causing the sale of ODN’s crown jewel.191

In applying the entire fairness standard, the court held that the complaint supported a reasonable inference that the price was unfair because ODN divested its assets at substantial discounts.192 The court also held that the complaint supported a reasonable inference that the process was unfair, citing both the board’s use of bonus agreements to incentivize ODN’s officers to favor divestitures and the forced timing of the divestitures themselves, which contributed to the low prices obtained in the sales.193 Therefore, the court found at the pleading stage that it was reasonably conceivable that by stockpiling funds through divestitures instead of managing ODN with a view toward long-term value generation, the directors engaged in unfair transactions in breach of their duties of loyalty to the undifferentiated equity.194

The court also held that plaintiff stated a claim that ODN’s officers breached their fiduciary duties by, inter alia, adjusting their estimate of ODN’s necessary cash for operations to fund Oak Hill’s redemption and generating a business plan that resulted in the sale of ODN’s crown jewel.195 Next, the court held that plaintiff stated claims that Oak Hill breached its fiduciary duties as a controller and aided and abetted the board’s breach by causing ODN to engage in divestitures to stockpile cash to fund the redemption of Oak Hill’s preferred stock.196 Finally, the court held that plaintiff stated a claim that Oak Hill and the officers who received bonuses in connection with the redemptions were unjustly enriched in the transactions.197 Accordingly, the court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s fiduciary duty, aiding, and abetting and unjust enrichment claims but granted the motion with respect to plaintiff’s statutory and common law claims.198

CONCLUSION

Mandatory redemption provisions are not uncommon.199 This case impacts the value of mandatory redemption provisions as an exit method because, according to the court, issuers will be under neither a contractual nor an equitable obligation to deviate from growth-oriented business plans or liquidate assets in order to fund redemption obligations, and indeed such actions may constitute a breach of the board’s duty to maximize long-term value for the benefit of the common stockholders.200

For venture-capital-backed corporations, the court’s decision indicates that directors owe fiduciary duties to the undifferentiated equity holders to maximize the company’s value over the long term even in the presence of a redemption right.201 Indeed, the court recognized that “a board of directors may choose to breach [a contractual obligation] if the benefits . . . exceed the costs.”202 Therefore, a board should not treat a preferred stockholder who has exercised a redemption right as “a creditor with an enforceable lien on the corporation’s assets.”203

For venture capital and private equity firms, the decision provides guidance to ensure that redemption rights remain a favorable exit option. In its analysis, the court noted that the preferred stock did not pay a cumulative dividend, which would have had the effect of steadily increasing the liquidation preference and redemption price, and thus reducing the prospect that the corporation would generate value for the undifferentiated equity over the long term. The court indicated that in such a case the common stock may be “functionally worthless” if the company could never realistically generate a sufficient return to pay off the preferred stock and yield value for the common stockholders.204 Firms might consider coupling a mandatory redemption right with a cumulative dividend provision to avoid the circumvention of their redemption rights or structuring their investments using a pure debt structure.205

_____________

1. Thomas A. Mullen of Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP and Lisa R. Stark of K&L Gates LLP cochair the Working Group and the Jurisprudence Subcommittee. Contributors of written summaries in this year’s survey, in addition to Mr. Mullen and Ms. Stark, are Lisa Murison from Edmunds, Matthew Brodsky from Stradling Yocca Carlson & Rauth, Scott R. Bleier of Morse Barnes-Brown Pendleton, S. Scott Parel and Sacha Jamal from Sidley Austin LLP, Taylor Bartholomew of K&L Gates LLP, and Christopher G. Browne of Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP.

2. To be included in the survey, cases must meet the following criteria: (a) the decision must address either a preferred stock financing or a change in control of a company that had previously issued preferred stock; (b) the court must (i) interpret preferred stock terms, (ii) interpret a statute pertaining to a preferred stock financing, (iii) address a breach of fiduciary duty claim brought in the context of a transaction described in (a) above; or (c) the decision must involve a company that has been funded primarily by private investors.

3. Huff Energy Fund L.P. v. Gershen, C.A. No. 1116-VCS, 2016 WL 5462958 (Del. Ch. 2016) [hereinafter Huff Energy].

4. Id. at *1–2.

5. Id. at *1.

6. Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 174 (Del. 1986).

7. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).

8. Huff Energy, 2016 WL 5462958, at *8–11.

9. Id. at *14–15.

10. Id. at *11–16 (citing Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015)).

11. Id. at *1–2.

12. Id. at *2.

13. Id. at *3.

14. Id.

15. Id.

16. Id.

17. Id.

18. Id.

19. Id. at *4.

20. Id.

21. Id.

22. Id.

23. Id.

24. Id. at *4–5.

25. Id. at *1, *5.

26. Id. at *6.

27. Id. at *8.

28. Id.

29. Id. at *9.

30. Id.

31. Id.

32. Id. at *10.

33. Id.

34. Id.

35. Id. at *11–16.

36. Id. at *11.

37. Id.

38. Id.

39. Id.

40. Id. at *12.

41. Id.

42. Id. at *13.

43. Id.

44. Id. at *14.

45. Id.

46. Id. at *15.

47. Id.

48. Id.

49. Calesa Assocs., L.P. v. Am. Capital, Ltd., C.A. No. 10557-VCG, 2016 WL 770251 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2016).

50. Because this case is decided on a motion to dismiss, facts (and reasonable inferences) pled by the plaintiffs are accepted as true. See id. at *8. If this case goes to trial, the facts could turn out to be different.

51. Id. at *1.

52. For ease of discussion, the distinction between the private equity firm and its affiliates is ignored.

53. Id. at *3.

54. Id. at *1.

55. Id. at *4.

56. Id.

57. Id.

58. Id.

59. Id.

60. Id.

61. Id.

62. Id.

63. Id.

64. Id. at *5.

65. Id. at *6–7.

66. Id. at *5.

67. Id.

68. Id. at *2.

69. Id. at *1.

70. See id.

71. Id. at *15.

72. Id. at *9.

73. Id. at *10.

74. Id.

75. Id.

76. Id.

77. Id. at *11.

78. Id.

79. Id.

80. Id.

81. Id. at *12.

82. Id.

83. Id.

84. Id. at *13.

85. Id.

86. Id.

87. Id. at *14.

88. Id.

89. Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 172 F. Supp. 3d 447 (D. Mass. 2016) [hereinafter Sun Capital III].

90. See generally id.

91. Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 143 (1st Cir. 2013) [hereinafter Sun Capital II].

92. Sun Capital III, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 466.

93. Id. at 462–66.

94. Id. at 467.

95. Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 903 F. Supp. 2d 107, 111 (D. Mass. 2012) [hereinafter Sun Capital I], aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013).

96. Id.

97. Id. at 117.

98. See Sun Capital II, 724 F.3d at 143; Sun Capital III, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 454.

99. Sun Capital I, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 111–12.

100. See PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION PLANS: REPORT TO CONGRESS REQUIRED BY THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006, at 1 (2013).

101. Sun Capital I, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 109.

102. Id. at 113.

103. Id. at 111.

104. Id.

105. Id.

106. Id.

107. Id. at 112.

108. Id. at 118.

109. Sun Capital II, 724 F.3d at 148–49.

110. Id. at 141.

111. Id.

112. Id. at 148–49.

113. Sun Capital III, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 457–58.

114. See id. at 454–58.

115. Id.

116. Id. at 466.

117. See id. at 467.

118. See id. at 458–59.

119. Id. at 458.

120. See id. at 458–59.

121. See id. at 462–66.

122. See id.

123. Id.

124. See id. at 457–58.

125. See id. at 462–66.

126. In re ISN Software Corp. Appraisal Litig., C.A. No. 8388-VCG, 2016 WL 4275388 (Del. Ch. Aug. 11, 2016).

127. See id. at *2–3.

128. Id. at *1.

129. Id.

130. Id.

131. Id. at *2.

132. Id.

133. Id. at *2 n.15.

134. Id. at *2.

135. Id.

136. Id. at *3.

137. Id.

138. Id.

139. Id. at *3–4.

140. Id.

141. Id. at *4.

142. Id.

143. Id. at *4–5.

144. Id.

145. Id. at *5.

146. Id. at *5–6.

147. Id. at *5.

148. Id.

149. Id. at *6.

150. Id. at *7.

151. Id.

152. Id. at *3, *7.

153. Id. at *7.

154. Id.

155. Id. at *2, *7.

156. Frederick Hsu Living Trust v. ODN Holding Corp., C.A. No. 12108-VCL, 2017 WL 1437308 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2017, corrected Apr. 24, 2017).

157. See id. at *1.

158. Id. at *22.

159. Id.

160. Id. at *3.

161. Id. at *4.

162. Id.

163. Id. at *5.

164. Id.

165. Id.

166. Id. at *6.

167. Id.

168. Id.

169. Id.

170. Id. at *7.

171. Id.

172. Id.

173. Id.

174. Id.

175. Id. at *9.

176. Id.

177. Id.

178. Id. at *10.

179. Id.

180. Id.

181. Id. at *12.

182. Id.

183. Id. at *15.

184. Id.

185. Id. at *17.

186. Id. at *18.

187. Id. at *24.

188. Id. at *27.

189. Id. at *27–29.

190. Id. at *30.

191. Id. at *31–33.

192. Id. at *35.

193. Id. at *36.

194. See id. at *35–36.

195. Id. at *39.

196. Id. at *40–42.

197. Id. at *42–43.

198. Id. at *44.

199. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1815, 1865 n.200 (2013) (noting that in an “EDGAR-based survey of recent preferred issues, 14% of the registered issues had mandatory redemption provisions and 36% of the unregistered issues had mandatory redemption provisions”).

200. See Frederick Hsu Living Trust, 2017 WL 1437308, at *1, *24–25.

201. See id. at *35.

202. Id. at *24.

203. Id. at *32.

204. See id. at *35–36.

205. See id. at *35 (“The Preferred Stock was effectively trapped capital, and [ODN] could have used that capital for the benefit of the residual claimants.”).

The Incredibly Compelling Case to Rethink Records Retention in 2018 and Beyond

Introduction

I have spent nearly all my career helping companies figure out how to manage information. Over the years, I have found when looking closely enough at any organization that managing data is the corporate equivalent of making sausage. Maybe that gives sausage making a bad name, but it amounts to more stuff from various sources, the identity of which is suspect, and it is all mixed together.

In the information space, having information is very different than managing it, and most companies are not managing information effectively in large part because the rules they use are no longer ready for prime time. It is like a dude in a leisure suit ready for disco dancing is jettisoned into a mosh pit in 2018. Managing information in 2018 with retention rules constructed decades ago no longer works.

Not long ago, the entire information universe was in paper form, relatively small, and managed exclusively by people. Rules directing employees what to keep, where to store it (on-site or off-site in banker’s boxes), and for how long was an easy task. Each employee maybe filled up a box or two a year and applied a simple rule to each box.

Today, the first problem with managing information is knowing all that exists, which is difficult because there are ever-growing piles of structured and unstructured data in endless file formats in many storage locations, including the Cloud. Getting a handle on what information exists for the average large company today is all but impossible with literally billions of files. “Bigness” has become a real issue and will continue to confound as the pile continues to grow unfettered.

Further complicating matters is the increasing number of competing interests in the way information should be appropriately used and properly retained. For example, Big Data professionals want to keep as much information for long periods of time because they don’t know what information will prove useful when using analytics tools to answer business questions. On the other hand, the EU’s General Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR), which takes effect in May 2018, “requires ensuring that the period for which the personal data are stored is limited to a strict minimum.” GDPR doesn’t specifically dictate exact periods, but demands a recalibrating of retention to push the period shorter where retention of such data is “not essential for the purposes for which it was collected.” If an organization has not built a process to rework retention through a GDPR lens, they must hustle because that train is right around the bend.

Confounding matters further is the reality that over the past two decades, business has come to be conducted in completely new and different ways, which makes information management even tougher. We regularly enter contracts using e-mail, modify them with a text message, and breach them in social media. Business is now casual and immediate. Using new communications and social technologies augments business in significant ways, which is directly related to more laws and regulations dictating how organizations manage information and the consequences for failing to do it right. For most of our clients, there may be thousands of laws and regulations dictating how information is managed to properly address storage, retention, destruction, privacy, and security. It is like the perfect information-mismanagement storm—more information in more places and formats, perhaps outside the control of the company, with greater risk of mismanagement and more laws dictating how to manage it. The answer to managing information in 2018 and beyond can’t be the policy equivalent of a guy in a lime green polyester suit from the 70s as its tired and outclassed for today’s problem. So, here are a few Rules to help guide your organization into 2020.

12 Rules to Help Fix Records Retention and Wrangle the Information Piles

Rule 1: Simpler Retention Built for Technology

In the old days of retention, there likely were 500–1,000 different retention categories for a typical company. That is a nonstarter today, given the speed of business and volume of data that must be managed on the fly against a growing number of laws and company policies. If employees had to apply that large a number of rules, they would develop a work-around or simply find a catch-all rule in which to put everything. When simplifying companies’ retention schedules today, we expect to cut the number of rules by 80 percent and build the rules at a higher level. Such simplification promotes retention because fewer, more intuitive rules can be more readily applied by employees and technology alike.

Rule 2: Different Storage Locations for Records and Nonrecords

Designate different environments as either record or nonrecord (those having no long-term business or legal value). What that does is ensure that if an environment is designated as nonrecord, the entirety of its contents goes away permanently after a specified period of time. The period of retention should be long enough to allow employees to do their jobs so they don’t move information elsewhere, creating a greater discovery headache in the event of litigation. Thereafter, all predictable nonrecords should be purged in the ordinary course of business.

Rule 3: Take Employees Out of the Center of the Universe

My firm conducted a survey on information management a few years back and we learned some interesting insights about employees’ ability to classify information. In short, employees are bad at it. Furthermore, they not only don’t like to do it, but they also won’t do it. And that was when the pile was smaller and the problem way more manageable. Take employees out of the equation and start to find ways for technology or one person in a business unit to apply the rules while keeping the average employee free from doing any classifying.

Rule 4: Manage from the Top, Not the Bottom

When information is classified, each item is reviewed against the retention rules. That is “bottom up” classification in that each individual data file must be classified. If the exercise is to apply the right rule, and employees are bad at classification, then perhaps there is another way to classify. That way is top down, or taking a macro view of information.

This can be done by applying one retention rule to any environment or a chunk of business content within a job function; for example, accounts receivable may have one or two rules instead of 20. All information with a business function may fit in a rule, making its application easier and more predictably correct.

Similarly, applying one retention rule to an entire environment, if possible, ensures all the information is retained the same length of time. It may not work for all environments but should be considered. If an individual document or communication must continue to be retained for some reason, the retention rules can shift the burden to the employee in that rare situation to move the one file out of the environment for continued retention.

Rule 5: Seek Reasonableness, Not Perfection

Many organizations get caught up in trying to make the records retention process “perfect.” They seek to make the inventory process cover all records in every business unit and do exhaustive federal, state, and local legal research in every jurisdiction in which the company has presence or may do business, etc. In a perfect world, all of that is good. However, the records retention schedule development and update process can be very expensive and time consuming. A better approach is seeking to be good enough given an organization’s size and nature of business.

Rule 6: Eliminate Complicated Retention Triggers

Retention works by creating a rule that is applied to information when it is created or received that is often “triggered” upon the happening of a future event, like the end of an investigation, the termination of a contract, or the end of employment, etc. The event trigger begins the running of the retention clock so that the records are kept for the right period.

Companies should aim to remove as many event triggers as possible and replace them with straight retention periods. For example, assume a company wanted to eliminate event triggers from investigations (which might be the length of the investigation plus five years), and it knows from past experience that investigations typically conclude within two years of commencement but never longer than three years. Instead of keeping the retention rule as event-based, which makes it difficult for people and technology to manage, the company could make the rule a straight eight years (three for the longest investigation plus five years after). This may not be perfect and may not work in all cases, but companies should strive to do it as often as possible.

Rule 7: Go International by Building Exceptions

A U.S. company that wants to ensure that retention is addressed across the globe will find it a complex and expensive task, which could include an exhaustive records inventory in every facility and legal research in every jurisdiction. Although feasible, it is unnecessarily expensive and time-consuming, and so we opt for building an exception process, which takes a U.S. schedule and pushes it across the globe and documents the exceptions. That way a company ends up with a global schedule that is good enough and gets it done “faster, better, and cheaper.”

Rule 8: Rules Must Be Absolute—Neither Maximum nor Minimum

Companies often express retention rules in terms of the minimum amount of time or the maximum amount of time a record should be retained. Neither works because it creates a situation where every employee interprets what the rule should be, resulting in no predictability or consistency.

Rule 9: Resist Permanent Retention Where Possible

When companies do not know what appropriate retention is for a class of records, they sometimes state retention periods as being “permanent.” Such a designation adds to the information footprint and may not be necessary. There are very few records that must be retained permanently, and an effort should be made to resist the temptation unless the law requires it.

Rule 10: Include Operational Value in the Schedule

Creating retention rules is a little science and a little art. Final periods of retention should incorporate legal requirements, legal considerations (like statutes of limitation), and business needs. If a company is considering its business needs for continued access to a type of record, such input should be documented in the records retention schedule.

Rules 11: One Rule with Few Exceptions

Most employees think their information is unique; however, company retention policy should resist the pressure to make special rules for different business units unless absolutely necessary, or the schedule will get out of control and be difficult to manage.

Rule 12: Just Do It

Records retention is neither sexy nor fun. Given that a prudently created schedule is an organization’s license to clean house, make sure it is reasonable, documented, supported, and utilized. If retention is broken, just fix it because in its current state, it’s probably more a liability than anything else.

Conclusion

In recent years, there has been a push to keep everything forever due to a fallacious belief that storage is cheap. Although the cost of storage per terabyte has been declining a little, that is entirely dwarfed by the growth in information volumes. The real cost is going up. Even if that were not the case, information-security and privacy risks are greatly reduced by keeping less information. In addition, access and retrievability is enhanced by having a smaller information footprint, and following records retention rules is the only legally defensible way to clean house and not worry. This increasingly means fixing a broken records retention process. For most organizations, records retention is not top of mind, but business efficiencies, cost savings, risk mitigation, and better compliance are all driven by better information management, and now is the time to take control. Tomorrow the pile will be bigger and a problem tougher to tackle.

The Revised Uniform Unclaimed Property Act Is an Improvement, but Constitutional Defects Should Be Addressed before Approval

In the summer of 2016, the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) adopted a revised Uniform Unclaimed Property Act (the 2016 Act). The 2016 Act is, in a number of respects, a better product than both the 1981 and 1995 versions; unfortunately, the 2016 Act left intact and expanded a number of highly controversial—and likely unconstitutional—provisions from the prior Acts. In particular, the 2016 Act expands states’ jurisdiction to escheat unclaimed property inconsistent with federal common law. The 2016 Act purports to alter, rather than defer to, the debtor-creditor relationship, which is contrary to both federal law and the basic purpose of unclaimed property laws to return missing property to the rightful owner. The 2016 Act also lacks adequate constitutional safeguards for securities owners, whose property can be escheated and liquidated without proper notice after a relatively short period of time. For these and other reasons discussed herein, the Unclaimed Property Subcommittee of the Tax Committee of the Business Law Section voted to urge the American Bar Association to reject the 2016 Act if presented before the House of Delegates in its current form.

The 2016 Act Violates Federal Common-Law Rules Limiting States’ Jurisdiction to Escheat Unclaimed Intangible Property

In Texas v. New Jersey,[1] the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the fundamental question of when a state has the right and power to escheat unclaimed intangible property. The court noted that for tangible property, “it has always been the unquestioned rule in all jurisdictions that only the State in which the property is located may escheat.”[2] Intangible property has no physical situs, however, and thus initially created uncertainty as to which state had the right to escheat or take custody of such property. The Supreme Court had made clear in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania[3] that a holder of unclaimed intangible property could not, under the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution, be subject to the possible conflicting liabilities caused by two or more states seeking to escheat the same intangible property. Until Texas, however, there was no clear rule establishing which state had the right to escheat unclaimed intangible property in any particular case.

The court in Texas established two rules intended to settle “once and for all” whether a particular state has jurisdiction to escheat unclaimed intangible property. The court recognized that unclaimed intangible property is an unsatisfied “debt” that is owed by the debtor to the creditor.[4] Reasoning that a debt is the property of the creditor, the court established a “primary rule” that “the right and power to escheat the debt should be accorded to the State of the creditor’s last known address as shown by the debtor’s books and records.”[5] The court then established a “secondary rule,” which permits the state of domicile of the debtor to escheat the property if (1) the last known address of the owner of the property is unknown; or (2) the owner’s “last known address is in a State which does not provide for escheat of the property.”[6] The court reaffirmed these rules in Pennsylvania v. New York and applied them strictly to require escheat of unclaimed money orders to Western Union’s state of domicile (or state of last known address, if Western Union had such records), rather than the state in which the money orders were sold.[7]

The primary and secondary rules constitute federal common law that cannot be superseded by any state.[8] Furthermore, these rules have been held to apply not only in the context of interstate disputes, but also in controversies between states and potential holders of unclaimed property. For example, in Am. Petrofina Co. of Tex. v. Nance,[9] the court declared an Oklahoma escheat statute invalid “because it is inconsistent with the federal common law set forth in Texas v. New Jersey.”[10] The court held that “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision in Texas v. New Jersey may be relied upon to prevent state officials from enforcing a state law in conflict with the Texas v. New Jersey scheme for escheat or custodial taking of unclaimed property.”[11] The Tenth Circuit affirmed, stating, “the district court’s reasoning is in accord with our views.”[12] The Third Circuit reached the same conclusion in N.J. Retail Merchants Ass’n v. Sidamon-Eristoff.[13]

The Third Circuit recently revisited this issue in Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Sec’y of Finance,[14] expressly holding that “we disagree with [the district court’s] conclusion that private parties cannot invoke federal common law to challenge a state’s authority to escheat property.”[15] The court analyzed the issue in detail, explaining that “the reasoning of the Texas cases is directly applicable to disputes between a private individual and a state” because the federal common law rules “were created not merely to reduce conflicts between states, but also to protect individuals.”[16] The court stated, “without a private cause of action, the Texas trilogy’s protections of property against escheatment would, in many instances, become a dead letter.”[17] The court warned that “[d]enying a private right of action would leave property holders largely at the mercy of state governments for the vindication of their rights” and “would make it easier for states outside of the line of priority to escheat property and would require the Supreme Court to exercise or delegate its original jurisdiction in a greater number of cases, undermining one of the chief benefits of the rules of priority.”[18] The court also noted that “[m]aking private rights contingent on state action would likewise undermine the Supreme Court’s goal of national uniformity, because whether an individual is protected would depend on whether a state brings suit to contest escheatment of the property.”[19] The court concluded that “the Supreme Court’s desire for a uniform and consistent approach to escheatment disputes indicates that a private right of action is fully appropriate.”[20] Finally, the court noted, “allowing private parties to sue also provides secondary benefits that serve the public interest. In protecting their own interests, private parties may also be aiding states in the maintenance of their sovereignty.”[21]

Furthermore, the Marathon court unequivocally held that “the two states allowed to escheat under the priority rules of the Texas cases are the only states that can do so.”[22] The court further elaborated that “[c]onstructed as federal common law, that order of priority gives first place to the state where the property owner was last known to reside. If that residence cannot be identified or if that state has disclaimed its interest in escheating the property, second in line for the opportunity to escheat is the state where the holder of the abandoned property is incorporated. Any other state is preempted by federal common law from escheating the property.”[23] Several lower court cases have reached the same conclusion.[24]

The 2016 Act, like the 1981 and 1995 Acts, deviates from these rules in several important respects.

The “Tertiary Rule”

First, in addition to the primary and secondary rules, the 2016 Act includes a tertiary rule, which grants the right to escheat to the state in which the transaction giving rise to the property occurred, if the property was not escheated under the primary or secondary rules.[25] This rule is problematic for several reasons:

  • First, in Texas, the Supreme Court was primarily concerned with crafting priority rules that would “unambiguously and definitely resolve disputes among states regarding the right to escheat abandoned property.”[26] In other words, the court intended the primary and secondary rules to be the sole bases under which states may take custody of unclaimed property. If a state were permitted to adopt a tertiary rule, then different states could easily adopt conflicting tertiary rules.[27] This would ultimately result in an interstate dispute of the sort the court expressly sought to avoid. The possibility of such additional rules would also undermine the Supreme Court’s focus on ease of administration, which was another important objective of the court in creating these rules.
  • Second, in crafting the primary and secondary rules, the court stated that it wanted to avoid “[t]he uncertainty of any test which would require us in effect either to decide each escheat case on the basis of its particular facts or to devise new rules of law to apply to ever-developing new categories of facts.”[28] On this basis, the Texas court then specifically rejected a transaction-based custody rule like that in the 2016 Act, which would allow a state to take custody of unclaimed property based on where the transaction giving rise to the property occurred.[29] Subsequently, in Pennsylvania v. New York,[30] the court again rejected a transaction-based custody rule proposed by Pennsylvania with respect to unclaimed money orders.
  • Third, in Delaware v. New York,[31] the court recognized that a state’s power to escheat is derived from the principle of sovereignty. However, if the tertiary rule were enforceable, it would allow the transaction state to infringe on the sovereign authority of other states.[32] Specifically, the tertiary rule would force a holder that is incorporated in a state that does not escheat the property at issue to turn over such property to the tertiary state, which “would give states the right to override other states’ sovereign decisions regarding the exercise of custodial escheat.”[33] The “ability to escheat necessarily entails the ability not to escheat,” and “[t]o say otherwise could force a state to escheat against its will, leading to a result inconsistent with the basic principle of sovereignty.”[34]

The constitutionality of the tertiary rule was specifically addressed by the Third Circuit in N.J. Retail Merchs. Ass’n et al. v. Sidamon-Eristoff.[35] In that case, the court concluded that the tertiary rule “would stand as an obstacle to executing the purposes of the federal law” and, thus, that the plaintiffs had satisfied their burden of showing that the tertiary rule was “likely preempted under Texas, Pennsylvania, and Delaware.”[36] The Third Circuit’s decision affirmed the lower district court’s opinion, which similarly concluded that under the federal priority rules, “there is no room for a third priority position.”[37] “If the secondary-rule state does not escheat,” the court held, “the buck stops there.”[38]

The 2016 Act, in apparent recognition that the tertiary rule is problematic, does not apply such rule if the holder’s state of domicile “specifically exempts” the property in question.[39] For example, if the holder is domiciled in a state that exempts gift cards from escheat, the holder need not be concerned with a state attempting to escheat gift cards on the basis that the cards were sold in the state. As a practical matter, this change is an improvement in that it reduces the number of instances in which the tertiary rule will apply. However, it does not address the key constitutional defect of that rule, which is that any tertiary rule, no matter how narrowly crafted, contravenes Texas and is thus preempted. Furthermore, as a practical matter, states often do not “specifically exempt” property from escheat, but nonetheless may not actually escheat such property. For example, a number of states repealed provisions requiring the escheat of gift cards in recognition that such escheat violates basic principles of unclaimed property law (discussed further below), but did not expressly exempt gift cards from escheat by statute. There is no constitutional or policy rationale for permitting the transaction state to escheat the property in this instance, but not where the state has “specifically exempted” the property from escheat.

Foreign-Owned Property

Like the 1981 and 1995 Acts, the 2016 Act also permits the state of domicile of the holder to escheat property if the last known address of the owner is located in a foreign country.[40] Similar to the tertiary rule, however, the Supreme Court has not permitted the holder’s state of domicile to escheat property belonging to an owner residing in a foreign country. To the contrary, the court expressly stated in Texas that the state of domicile of the holder has the right to escheat only where the last known address of the owner of the property is unknown or “is in a State which does not provide for escheat of the property.”[41] Accordingly, just as with the tertiary rule, a new rule providing for escheat of foreign property likewise goes beyond Texas and therefore is preempted. Indeed, as noted above, the Third Circuit reached the same conclusion in a different context in Marathon, expressly holding that “[c]onstructed as federal common law, that order of priority gives first place to the state where the property owner was last known to reside. If that residence cannot be identified or if that state has disclaimed its interest in escheating the property, second in line for the opportunity to escheat is the state where the holder of the abandoned property is incorporated. Any other state is preempted by federal common law from escheating the property.”[42]

Accordingly, the 2016 Act’s provisions requiring escheat of foreign-owned property are likely unconstitutional on this basis alone. Moreover, the escheat of foreign-owned property also raises serious constitutional concerns under the foreign affairs doctrine[43] and the commerce clause.[44] In Zschernig v. Miller,[45] for example, the Supreme Court invalidated an Oregon statute because it had more than “some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries” and posed a “great potential for disruption and embarrassment” of the nation’s foreign relations.[46] The statute in question barred a nonresident alien from acquiring property of an Oregon decedent by testamentary disposition, and required that the property be escheated to Oregon unless the nonresident could show that his country of origin would grant reciprocal rights to a U.S. citizen and that his government would not confiscate the inherited property.[47] Similarly, in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,[48] the Supreme Court held that Los Angeles County was prohibited by the commerce clause from imposing a fairly apportioned property tax on shipping containers owned by foreign companies that were physically located within the county. The court recognized that special considerations beyond those that govern the regulation of property owned by U.S. citizens come into play when states seek to regulate property owned by foreign citizens, even when that property is physically used in the United States because “[f]oreign commerce is preeminently a matter of national concern.” The court emphasized the “overriding concern” that “the Federal Government must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.”[49] The court wanted to avoid international disputes and potential retaliation by foreign countries.[50] These same concerns apply in the escheat context, particularly where the property is not just escheated but liquidated (as in the case of securities). Indeed, if merely taxing foreign-owned property is unconstitutional, then it follows that entirely depriving an owner of such property should similarly be unconstitutional. The escheat by states of foreign-owned property also prevents the federal government from “speak[ing] with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.”[51] Notwithstanding the ULC’s goals, state unclaimed property laws are anything but uniform in that the states have variously adopted different versions of the Uniform Act, deviated from the Uniform Acts in significant ways, or adopted unique unclaimed property laws.[52] This is hardly part of the “uniform system or plan” required by law.[53]

The escheat of foreign-owned property also may conflict with U.S. treaties with foreign countries, foreign laws, due process, and other international legal standards. Indeed, the foreign country in which the owner is located has a greater interest in regulating the unclaimed property belonging to its citizens than the U.S. state where the holder of the property is domiciled. This is in accordance with the escheat rules developed in Texas, which reflect the traditional view of escheat as an exercise of sovereignty over person and property owned by persons and the common-law concept of mobilia sequuntur personam, and which recognize that the state of address of the owner has a superior interest of the state of domicile of the holder.

As with the tertiary rule, the 2016 Act makes some effort to soften its provisions applicable to foreign-owned property, providing that escheat is permitted only by the holder’s state of domicile if the foreign country “does not provide for custodial taking of the property” (whatever that means) or the property is “specifically exempt from custodial taking” under the laws of the foreign country.[54] The official commentary to the 2016 Act admits, however, that Texas did not permit such escheat, which under the rationale of the federal appellate courts that have addressed the issue means that such escheat is impermissible. Indeed, if the foreign country does not require the escheat of the property (but also does not “specifically exempt” it), the 2016 Act’s provision would “override” the foreign country’s “sovereign decisions regarding the exercise of custodial escheat.”[55] As noted above, the “ability to escheat necessarily entails the ability not to escheat,” and “[t]o say otherwise could force a state to escheat against its will, leading to a result inconsistent with the basic principle of sovereignty.”[56]

The commentary to the 2016 Act further tries to justify the escheat of foreign-owned property by offering the conclusory assertion that “the rationale used by the Court in [Zschernig v. Miller] is neither controlling nor compelling in the context of unclaimed property.” But the court’s reasoning in Zschernig should apply here. In that case, the Supreme Court invalidated an Oregon statute because it had more than “some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries” and posed a “great potential for disruption and embarrassment” of the nation’s foreign relations.[57] The Oregon statute required the state to evaluate foreign laws to determine whether the foreign citizen’s country of origin would grant reciprocal rights and would not confiscate the inherited property.[58] The 2016 Act similarly requires an evaluation of a foreign country’s laws to determine if such laws “provide for escheat” or “specifically exempt” the property at issue from escheat. A state’s confiscation of supposedly unclaimed property creates a significant “potential for disruption and embarrassment” of the nation’s foreign relations, particularly where the state is not merely acting in a custodial capacity but is liquidating the property and causing the owner to lose property rights as a result. Foreigners own over $6 trillion in U.S. corporate stock, and states escheat hundreds of millions (if not billions) of dollars of such stock per year.[59] It strains credibility to suggest that the appropriation of foreign property on such a massive scale does not have the potential to significantly impact foreign investors and relations.

The official commentary does not address the fact that the escheat of foreign-owned property conflicts with the commerce clause by regulating commercial relations with foreign countries.

Other Jurisdictional Problems

The 2016 Act also deviates from the Texas rules in other significant ways. For example, it permits a state to escheat property if the holder of the property does not have a record of the owner’s address or identity, but “the administrator has determined” by other means that the last-known address of the owner is in the state.[60] In Texas, however, the court held that under the primary rule, “each item of property . . . is subject to escheat only by the State of the last known address of the creditor, as shown by the debtor’s books and records.”[61] Accordingly, the court’s decision in Texas does not appear to support the use by a state of extrinsic evidence of the owner’s address to establish an obligation of the holder under the primary rule. To the contrary, as noted above, one of the key objectives of the court in creating the federal common-law rules was to establish rules that are simple and easy to administer.[62] In particular, the court chose the primary rule because it “involves a factual issue simple and easy to resolve, and leaves no legal issue to be decided.”[63] The court explained that “by using a standard of last known address, rather than technical legal concepts of residence and domicile, administration and application of escheat laws should be simplified.”[64] The court’s goals of simplicity and ease of administration would be served by applying the primary rule based solely on the holder’s records. The court’s decision in Texas seems to be reasonably clear on this point, given the court stated that “since our inquiry here is not concerned with the technical domicile of the creditor, and since ease of administration is important where many small sums of money are involved, the address on the records of the debtor, which in most cases will be the only one available, should be the only relevant last-known address.[65]

The 2016 Act, like the 1981 and 1995 Acts, also includes language that arguably permits a holder’s state of domicile to assert unclaimed property jurisdiction over property that is not subject to escheat by the state of the last known address of the owner, an issue not expressly addressed by the court in Texas but which is inconsistent with the sovereign authority of the primary state to determine not to exercise its right to escheat the property. To the extent that the Texas decision was unclear on this point, the court’s later decisions in Pennsylvania and Delaware appeared to clarify that the secondary rule can apply only if there is no record of the owner’s address or the primary state “does not provide for escheat of intangibles”[66] or “does not provide for escheat”[67] at all. These subsequent articulations of the federal common-law rules suggest that the court’s intent was to allow the holder’s state of domicile to escheat the property if the first-priority state has not adopted an escheat law applicable to intangible property in general, and not that the court was intending to allow the holder’s state of domicile to escheat property exempted by the primary state. Indeed, the Third Circuit later recognized that “[w]hen fashioning the priority rules, the Supreme Court did not intend [to] . . . give states the right to override other states’ sovereign decisions regarding the exercise of custodial escheat.”[68] The full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution[69] would also apparently require the second-priority state to give full recognition to the first-priority state’s sovereign right not to escheat the exempted property. The full faith and credit clause expresses “a unifying principle . . . looking toward maximum enforcement in each state of the obligations and rights created or recognized by the statutes of sister states,”[70] and “preserve[s] rights acquired or confirmed under the public acts and judicial proceedings of one state by requiring recognition of their validity in others.”[71]

The 2016 Act’s provision is an improvement over that in the 1981 and 1995 Acts because it prohibits the state of domicile from escheating property that is “specifically exempted” from escheat by the state in which the owner is located. However, as discussed with respect to the tertiary rule and the provision applicable to foreign-owned property, although this clarification is helpful from a practical perspective where the property is specifically exempted, it does not remedy the constitutional defect. The federal common-law rules appear to prohibit these types of alternative claims outright, even if they are “watered down” from those in the 1981 and 1995 Acts.

The 2016 Act also includes a new provision defining the last-known address of the owner for purposes of establishing state jurisdiction to escheat to mean “any description, code, or other indication of the location of the apparent owner which identifies the state, even if the description, code, or indication of location is not sufficient to direct the delivery of first-class United States mail to the apparent owner.”[72] The 2016 Act provides that “[i]f the United States postal zip code associated with the apparent owner is for a post office located in this state, this state is deemed to be the state of the last-known address of the apparent owner unless other records associated with the apparent owner specifically identify the physical address of the apparent owner to be in another state.”[73] By contrast, the 1981 Act defined “last known address” to mean “a description of the location of the apparent owner sufficient for the purpose of the delivery of mail.” The 1995 Act was silent on the qualifying address issue. The official commentary to the 2016 Act justifies the change as follows:

the policy underlying the rules establishing priority among contending states is that unclaimed property should be held by the administrator of the state where the owner is most likely to look for it, which is the state in which the owner resided, i.e., had his or her ‘last known address’, if that state can be determined. It follows that limiting the first priority only to states determined by having an address suitable for mailing frustrates that policy when the owner’s state of last known address can be determined another way.

This explanation makes a certain amount of practical sense. However, in Texas, the court did not define the term “address,” and thus it would seem that the court intended the ordinary meaning of the term to apply.[74] The ordinary meaning of the term “address” has been defined to be a mailing address.[75] It would therefore appear that the 2016 Act’s definition of “address,” although perhaps justifiable from a policy perspective, may be preempted by the federal common law jurisdictional escheat rules. Indeed, as the Supreme Court cautioned in Pennsylvania, “to vary the application of the Texas rule according to the adequacy of the debtor’s records would require this Court to do precisely what we said should be avoided—that is, ‘to decide each escheat case on the basis of its particular facts or to devise new rules of law to apply to ever-developing new categories of facts.”[76] Including a provision that is likely superseded by federal law will invite both interstate disputes and disputes between holders and states. As things currently stand, 17 states still define “last known address” to be a description of the owner’s location sufficient for the purpose of delivery of mail.[77] Only eight states have adopted the definition from the 2016 Act or a similar definition.[78]

The 2016 Act Continues to Violate the Fundamental Principle in State Unclaimed Property Laws That the State’s Right to Escheat Is Derived from the Owner’s Right to Claim the Property

In Delaware v. New York,[79] the Supreme Court clarified that the federal common-law rules established in Texas “cannot be severed from the law that creates the underlying creditor-debtor relationships.” Thus, “[i]n framing a State’s power of escheat, we must first look to the law that creates property and binds persons to honor property rights.”[80] Put more simply: “the holder’s legal obligations not only defined the escheatable property at issue, but also carefully identified the relevant ‘debtors’ and ‘creditors.’”[81] Accordingly, a state’s right to escheat is defined by the legal obligation that is owed by the debtor to the unknown or absent creditor, and the debtor—and not any other person—has the legal obligation to comply with any applicable unclaimed property laws.

Accordingly, Delaware stands for the common-sense principle that the state can only escheat property that is actually owed to the creditor or owner. Indeed, if this were not true, then the state would be escheating property from someone who does not owe it for the purpose of giving it to someone to whom it does not belong. The principle that the state’s rights are derived from those of the absentee creditor, and thus limited to property actually owed to that creditor, has become known as the principle of derivative rights or as the “derivative rights doctrine.”[82] Numerous courts have embraced this doctrine.[83]

The court in Delaware clarified that in determining whether a state has the right to escheat unclaimed property, the first step is to “determine the precise debtor-creditor relationship as defined by the law that creates the property at issue.”[84] Accordingly, the court found that the “holder” of unclaimed property with the potential obligation to report and remit such property to the state is the “debtor” or the “obligor.” As the court stated: “[f]unds held by a debtor become subject to escheat because the debtor has no interest in the funds.”[85] Conversely, if a person does have an interest in the property the state seeks to escheat, then the person is not the legal debtor, and so cannot be the “holder” and cannot have an obligation to escheat the property.

The court’s analysis and conclusion is consistent with the age-old axiom that escheat is a right of succession, pursuant to which the state takes custody of property owed to another person who has failed to claim that property. Indeed, citing the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Christianson v. King County,[86] one federal district court more explicitly summarized the derivative rights principle as follows:

The United States Supreme Court has distinctly held that the right of escheat is a right of succession, rather that [sic] an independent claim to the property escheated. The result of that is this: ‘The State’s right is purely derivative; it takes only the interest of the unknown or absentee owner.’[87]

The 2016 Act deviates from the federal common law principle of derivative rights—i.e., that the holder’s unclaimed property obligation must be based on “the precise debtor-creditor relationship as defined by the law that creates the property at issue”[88]—in several important respects.

Perhaps most importantly, the 2016 Act, like the 1981 and 1995 Acts, includes a so-called antilimitations provision, which provides that:

Expiration, before, on, or after the effective date of this [act], of a period of limitation on an owner’s right to receive or recover property, whether specified by contract, statute, or court order, does not prevent the property from being presumed abandoned or affect the duty of a holder under this [act] to file a report or pay or deliver property to the administrator.[89]

These antilimitations provisions were expanded from those in the 1954 and 1966 Acts to include “contractual” limitations. Thus, these revised provisions purport to override contractual restrictions on an owner’s right to claim property—even if those restrictions are valid and enforceable under applicable laws governing the debtor-creditor relationship. These provisions purport to change the underlying debtor-creditor relationship, rather than defer to it, in direct contravention of Delaware v. New York.

States have argued that the Supreme Court’s 1948 decision in Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Moore[90] somehow overrides Delaware (decided 45 years later) and permits states to ignore contractual conditions that may prevent the property from being owed. However, Connecticut Mutual involved the narrow issue of whether New York’s escheat statute applicable to life insurance proceeds violated the contract clause of the U.S. Constitution. It did not address the derivative rights principle other than to suggest that a state cannot constitutionally alter substantive contract conditions existing between the parties.

The law at issue in Connecticut Mutual permitted escheat of unpaid life insurance proceeds owed under preexisting policies even without satisfying the insurance policy conditions requiring proof of death and surrender of the policy. The insurance companies argued that these contract conditions served a substantive purpose—they were intended to provide information from which the companies could establish defenses to their obligation to pay. Consequently, the companies argued that New York’s attempt to require an insurance company to pay the policy proceeds to the state without satisfaction of these conditions materially changed the terms of its contracts with policyholders, and therefore substantially impaired the contracts in violation of the contract clause. In rejecting this argument, the court stated that the “enforced variations from the policy provisions” were not unconstitutional because otherwise “the insurance companies would retain moneys contracted to be paid on condition and which normally they would have been required to pay.”[91] In explaining its holding, the court stated:

When the state undertakes the protection of abandoned property claims, it would be beyond a reasonable requirement to compel the state to comply with conditions that may be proper as between the contracting parties. The state is acting as a conservator, not as a party to a contract.[92]

Nevertheless, the court did not hold that a state may simply ignore all contract conditions that exist between a debtor and creditor, and thereby claim as property an amount that is not owed. To the contrary, the court pointed out that the New York Court of Appeals had construed the escheat law to leave “open to the insurance companies all defenses except the statute of limitations, noncompliance with policy provisions calling for proof of death or of other designated contingency, and failure to surrender a policy on making a claim.”[93]

Strikingly, none of the potential defenses cited by the court or the insurers was that the insured had not actually died. Thus, all of the parties and the court assumed that the insurers would have had actual knowledge of death before escheating—the standard later adopted in the 1981 Act. Given that the court did not place on the insurers any obligation to affirmatively determine whether insureds had died, such an assumption would have been quite reasonable. Therefore, the “proof of death” in question was the merely formalistic substantiation required by the policies. Indeed, given the highly restricted ability at that time to affirmatively determine deaths, insurers would have had no ability to escheat without having actual knowledge of death, which in most cases could arise only by having been provided with some reliable notice of the death, even if not in the exact form required by the policy and the insurance laws of the state.

In other words, the court addressed only formalistic contract conditions on property that was already classified as “abandoned” by the unclaimed property statute and “which normally [the insurance companies] would have been required to pay.”[94] The court specifically recognized that nonformalistic conditions may be raised as defenses to escheat if those conditions have not been satisfied.[95] Connecticut Mutual would therefore not support a state escheat law that provides that the state need not satisfy a substantive condition of ownership. Indeed, in distinguishing the Connecticut Mutual decision, one court stated that the Supreme Court excused compliance with contract conditions “which only go to formalism of interest, such as proof of death . . . but it is nevertheless held to compliance with matters that deal with substantive determination of ownership.”[96] Furthermore, a number of courts have subsequently denied state claims to property where the purported owner of the property had not satisfied certain conditions to claim the property.[97]

More importantly, even if a state could adopt escheat laws that would override other, more substantive conditions without violating the contract clause, that does not mean that such laws would not violate the federal common-law rules set forth in Delaware v. New York, the takings clause, substantive due process, or other laws. These issues were never considered by the Connecticut Mutual court; thus, that decision does not stand for the proposition that such escheat laws are valid. Indeed, the Delaware court, citing Connecticut Mutual, stated:

Unless we define the terms “creditor” and “debtor” according to positive law, we might “permit intangible property rights to be cut off or adversely affected by state action . . . in a forum having no continuing relationship to any of the parties to the proceedings.” Pennsylvania at 213. Cf. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 549–550, 92 L. Ed. 863, 68 S. Ct. 682 (1948) (upholding New York’s escheat of unclaimed insurance benefits only “as to policies issued for delivery in New York upon the lives of persons then resident therein where the insured continues to be a resident and the beneficiary is a resident at . . . maturity”). Texas and Pennsylvania avoided this conundrum by resolving escheat disputes according to the law that creates debtor creditor relationships; only a state with a clear connection to the creditor or the debtor may escheat.[98]

Given the court’s emphatic requirement in Delaware that a debtor-creditor relationship exist under the positive law of the state, the court would not have cited Connecticut Mutual if that case stood for the broad proposition that states are not bound by contractual contingencies. Delaware v. New York does not allow the state to create a debtor-creditor relationship where none exists, and neither does Connecticut Mutual.[99]

The 2016 Act (like the 1981 and 1995 Acts before it) also attempts to justify the contractual antilimitations provisions by citing three so-called private escheat cases. Each of these cases involved unusual factual situations in which the courts found that the holders of unclaimed property had unilaterally taken actions designed specifically to circumvent state unclaimed property laws by cutting off the rights of owners after a specified period of time.[100] The private escheat actions are in stark contrast to most time-based contractual limitations provisions entered into between sophisticated business entities, which are entered into for valid business reasons, such as to provide certainty to the parties. Furthermore, all of the private escheat cases predate Delaware v. New York; thus, none of them considered the restraints imposed by federal common law on the state’s jurisdiction to escheat.

In limited recognition of the derivative rights principle, the 2016 Act includes narrow, optional exemptions for gift cards, store credits, and other similar obligations to provide merchandise or services rather than cash.[101] Yet, even these narrow—and optional—exemptions appear to be merely a nod to political reality and do not adequately take account the fundamental constitutional issue that the state’s rights are based on the underlying debtor-creditor relationship; therefore, if cash is not owed to the creditor, the state should be constitutionally barred from demanding the escheatment of cash from the holder.[102]

It is worth noting the 2016 Act does contain one helpful clarification regarding the definition of “holder,” which is consistent with Delaware. The official comments to the Act provide that:

In most instances, there should be only one holder of obligations for unclaimed property purposes—the exception being where there are multiple obligors directly liable on a specific obligation, such as co-borrowers on a loan. In circumstances where more than one party potentially meets the definition of holder, the party which is primarily obligated to the owner should be treated as the holder for purposes of application of unclaimed property laws. See, e.g., Clymer v. Summit Bancorp, 792 A.2d 396 (NJ 2002) (issuer of bonds, not trustee in possession of funds to be used to pay bondholders and having contractual obligation to issue such payments, is the holder for purposes of determining applicable dormancy period). Where one party has a direct legal obligation to the owner of the property, and another party has possession of funds associated with the property and an obligation to hold it for the account of, or to pay or deliver it to, the owner solely by virtue of a contractual relationship with the party who is directly obligated to the owner, but who has not assumed direct liability to the owner, it is the party who is directly obligated to the owner who is the holder for purposes of the act. For example, the issuer of stock or bonds, and not a third party transfer agent or paying agent contracted by the issuer, would, in such circumstances, be the holder of the obligation and any unclaimed dividends on the stock or interest on the bonds. On the other hand, where a party contractually assumes direct liability to the owner for an obligation and is in possession of the funds associated with such obligation, the assuming party becomes the applicable holder for purposes of application of unclaimed property obligations.

This language still leaves some ambiguity where a party contractually assumes direct liability to the owner, but is not in possession of the funds. Presumably, in that situation, the “holder” is still the obligor, consistent with Delaware, rather than the person in possession of property, but it would have been preferable if the 2016 Act had made that clear.

The 2016 Act Includes Some Improvements to Better Protect Securities Owners, but Does Not Go Far Enough to Satisfy Constitutional Requirements

The 2016 Act provides that the dormancy period for securities for abandonment purposes is not triggered until mail sent to the owner has been returned as undeliverable.[103] This is commonly referred to as a Returned by Post Office (RPO) dormancy standard and has already been adopted by many (but certainly not all) states. Unlike the 1995 Act, this new RPO rule applies to all securities, not just nondividend-paying securities or securities enrolled in a dividend reinvestment account. This new rule is consistent with federal securities regulations promulgated in 1997 by the Securities and Exchange Commission,[104] which were enacted specifically to protect security holders from having their shares escheated by requiring transfer agents, brokers, and dealers to exercise reasonable care to attempt to locate “lost security holders.”[105] For this purpose, the regulation defines a “lost security holder” to mean a security holder to whom mail has been sent at the address of record and returned as undeliverable and for whom the transfer agent, broker, or dealer has not received information regarding the security holder’s new address. The RPO rule is consistent with this regulation because under this rule, the securities will not be escheated until mail has been returned as undeliverable and the issuer of the securities (or other party) has conducted the requisite due diligence under federal law to try to locate the missing owner.

The 2016 Act also includes new notice provisions to owners of escheated securities. Specifically, the revised Act provides that the state must send written notice by first-class mail to the apparent owner and must maintain an electronically searchable website or database accessible by the public which contains the names reported to the administrator of all apparent owners for whom property is being held by the administrator.[106] These provisions are generally an improvement over those in the 1981 and 1995 Acts; however, although such notice may satisfy constitutional requirements for certain types of escheated property, it is likely still constitutionally inadequate to permit liquidation of securities. First, the 2016 Act is conspicuously silent as to when such notice must be sent. Even the 1981 Act required notice to be published within the year following the year of escheat (although the 1981 Act was deficient in not requiring notice by mail and other means except by newspaper publication, which was almost certainly constitutionally inadequate[107]). Second, the 2016 Act does not require the notice to inform the owner that the state will liquidate the securities, and thus fails to apprise the owner of the potential harm that could result from the escheatment of the securities. Third, the 2016 Act requires the notice to be sent to an address that is already presumed to be invalid because the securities are reported as unclaimed after the holder’s mail to the last known address is returned undeliverable. The Supreme Court has held that to satisfy due process, “[t]he means employed [for the notice] must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.”[108] Thus, “notice required will vary with circumstances and conditions.”[109] A notice process that is a “mere gesture” is not due process.[110]

To satisfy due process, therefore, the state must undertake further analysis of the type of reasonable action appropriate to attempt to locate the owner of unclaimed securities to provide notice of the impending sale of the owner’s property. Indeed, in Jones v. Flowers, the court expressly held that “when mailed notice of a tax sale is returned unclaimed, the State must take additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to the property owner before selling his property, if it is practicable to do so.[111] The court explained that it did not think that “a person who actually desired to inform a real property owner of an impending tax sale of a house he owns would do nothing when a certified letter sent to the owner is returned unclaimed,” and “failure to follow up would be unreasonable, despite the fact that the letters were reasonably calculated to reach their intended recipients when delivered to the postman.”[112] The court’s other rulings further support the conclusion that further notice is required if the regular mailing is known to be ineffective or if it would be unreasonable not to do so based on the other facts and circumstances involved.[113] Indeed, in a recent concurring opinion issued by Justice Alito (joined by Justice Thomas) in the U.S. Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Taylor v. Yee,[114] Justice Alito made clear that the constitutional issue of adequate notice before seizing private property is an “important” one. Justice Alito stated that “[w]hen a State is required to give notice, it must do so through processes ‘reasonably calculated’ to reach the interested party—here, the property owner.” Furthermore, Justice Alito specifically suggested that states should take advantage of changes in technology that make it easier to locate owners and return their property to them. Accordingly, we believe that the states should be required to utilize other records available to them, such as tax and real estate records, motor vehicle registration databases, the State Vital Statistics database, the U.S. Postal Service’s National Change of Address database, and other publicly available databases such as Accurint or Google to try to locate the missing owner and reunite him or her with the escheated securities.[115] Such actions should be taken well before the securities are liquidated.

The escheat and liquidation provisions in the 2016 Act likely do not satisfy substantive due process and takings concerns. The 2016 Act prohibits the state from selling the owner’s securities within the first three years following the remittance of dormant securities, and requires the owner be “made whole” if the state liquidates the securities during the three years following this “no liquidation” period—thus effectively providing six years of protection. At the same time, the 2016 Act shortens the dormancy period in the 1995 Act from five years to three years. Thus, whereas the 1995 Act provided a total of eight years of protection, the 2016 Act provides a total of nine years of protection. To be sure, every year counts, and so the 2016 Act is at least moving in the right direction.

However, that does not mean there is no taking. To the contrary, a state’s escheat and liquidation of securities is a physical appropriation of property giving rise to a per se “taking” because the owner loses the entire “bundle” of rights in the securities.[116] When a government “physically takes possession of an interest in property,” it has a “categorical duty to compensate the former owner,” regardless of whether it takes the entire property or merely a portion thereof.”[117] The government “is required to pay for that share no matter how small.”[118] Thus, the issue is how much compensation must be paid by the state. There is scant case law involving takings of securities; however, in United States v. Miller,[119] the Supreme Court held that “[t]he owner is to be put in as good [a] position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been taken.” In addition, in Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States,[120] the court specifically held that where the state seized land belonging to an owner, but the owner was not compensated until after the taking, the amount of just compensation to be paid to the owner was not limited to the value of the land at the time of the taking. Thus, any failure of the state to make an owner whole appears to contravene Seaboard, regardless of when the owner comes forward.[121] Indeed, New York—which has a significant state interest in escheating securities—has adopted a permanent “make whole” provision for this reason.

States have argued that the escheat and liquidation of securities (or any property) does not constitute a taking based on Texaco, Inc. v. Short,[122] in which the court held there was no taking where the former owner had abandoned his property and therefore “retain[ed] no interest for which he may claim compensation.”[123] But this argument confuses “unclaimed” property with “abandoned” property. Modern custodial escheat laws do not involve abandoned property at all, as was the case in Texaco. They involve property that is merely “unclaimed” by the owner often because it has been temporarily forgotten, as opposed to “abandoned” property, which normally indicates an affirmative intent to relinquish rights in the property (or at the very least, a substantial lack of contact with the property such that it would be reasonable to presume the owner had intended to abandon it). That is why the Uniform Acts provide for much shorter dormancy periods for unclaimed property than for older laws involving property that was actually abandoned. One cannot reasonably contend that a person has relinquished all property rights in his or her securities simply because one has not affirmatively accessed his or her account for three, five, or even nine years. Indeed, in Texaco, the state law at issue assumed mineral interests were abandoned after those property rights were left unused by the owner for 22 years.

Furthermore, the court made clear that “[w]e need not decide today whether the State may indulge in a similar assumption in cases in which the statutory period of nonuse is shorter than that involved here, or in which the interest affected is such that concepts of ‘use’ or ‘nonuse’ have little meaning.”[124] Securities are passive assets such that “concepts of ‘use’ or ‘nonuse’ have little meaning,” and no regular activity is expected. Thus, it is unclear that the court would sanction even a 22-year period for the escheat and liquidation of securities, particularly given the proliferation of target-date mutual funds, buy-and-hold strategies, and other investments or practices that encourage the investor not to touch the securities for decades. Indeed, in Cerajeski v. Zoeller,[125] the Seventh Circuit specifically expressed that a three-year dormancy period for interest “present[s] a serious question whether it is consistent with the requirement in the Fourteenth Amendment that property not be taken without due process of law.”

Accordingly, the 2016 Act ultimately confuses the distinction between property that is merely “unclaimed” and not “abandoned.” The short dormancy period in the Act is consistent with the concept of unclaimed property, but the state’s ability to liquidate securities without recourse is more consistent with the concept of abandoned property. If a state wants to be able to liquidate securities and not make the owner whole, it must adopt a sufficiently long dormancy period after which it is reasonable to presume that the securities are in fact abandoned and the owner has relinquished his or her rights. Alternatively, if the state does not liquidate the securities (or is willing to make the owner whole), a shorter dormancy period may be reasonable.

The 2016 Act’s Provisions Permitting the Use of Contingent-Fee Audit Firms Also Raise Significant Constitutional Concerns

The 2016 Act expressly permits states to use a third-party audit firm that is compensated on a contingent-fee basis. The official commentary explains that “while use of contingent fee auditors can be viewed as controversial, state administrators contend these auditors are necessary for audits to be undertaken.”[126] The 2016 Act does, however, include some minor limitations on the use of such auditors. The official commentary summarized these provisions as follows:

this section limits any actual conflict of interest, or the appearance of conflict of interest, between the administrator and the contractor conducting the examination by precluding the administrator from contracting with related persons, and requiring that such third party auditing contracts be awarded on a competitive bid basis. This provision mandates that a person who is to undergo an examination or be audited by a third party contractor be given unredacted copies of the contract.

These provisions avoid the core issue, however, which is whether the use of contingent-fee auditors violates due process or public policy.

Since the early 20th century, the Supreme Court has held in Tumey v. Ohio[127] that there is a violation of due process by a system that permits a person to be fined by someone who has direct pecuniary interest in the fine that is imposed. Although the Supreme Court has never considered the validity of using private contingent-fee audit firms, other courts have found that the use of such firms violates due process or public policy. For example, in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Parsons,[128] the Georgia Supreme Court held that a contract to use a contingent-fee tax audit firm was void, reasoning that:

The power to tax rests exclusively with the government. . . . In the exercise of that power, the government by necessity acts through its agents. However, this necessity does not require nor authorize the creation of a contractual relationship by which the agent contingently shares in a percentage of the tax collected, and we hold that such an agreement offends public policy. The people’s entitlement to fair and impartial tax assessments lies at the heart of our system, and, indeed, was a basic principle upon which this country was founded. Fairness and impartiality are threatened where a private organization has a financial stake in the amount of tax collected as a result of the assessment it recommends.

The Wyoming Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in MacDougall v. Board of Land Commissioners of the State of Wyoming.[129] The court reasoned as follows:

No rule of law can be sound which encourages officials to neglect their duty. If state officials, charged with the collection of money due to the state under contract, were permitted to act merely perfunctorily, fail to ascertain the amount due, and in a month or a year or other time, were allowed to hire experts at large expense to do what they themselves should have done, they might deprive the state of large amounts of money, which could, by their own proper efforts made at the time, have been easily saved. Not alone would this encourage neglect of duty on their part, which is against public policy, but it might easily open wide the door to fraud, which cannot be countenanced.[130]

In Yankee Gas Co. v. City of Meriden,[131] the Connecticut Superior Court, relying on Tumey, held that a city’s agreement with a contract audit firm violated due process where the firm was compensated based on a percentage of the additional tax collected as a result of the audits. The court held that “the risk of a due process violation is inherent” when the person determining the tax liability has “a direct financial interest in the amount of tax assessed.”[132]

To be sure, there are also a number of cases that have reached the opposite result, upholding the use of contingent-fee tax audit arrangements. For example, in Appeal of Philip Morris U.S.A.,[133] the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a contingent-fee tax auditor’s contract with a local county did not violate public policy. Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld a contingent-fee “tax ferret” arrangement (in which the firm is hired to identify taxpayers that have a high probability of underreporting taxes) in Dillon Stores v. Lovelady.[134]

These cases cannot easily be reconciled, and the due process and public policy concerns are magnified in the case of unclaimed property audits, which are almost always conducted on a multistate basis (often involving over 30 states at once). Thus, to withstand scrutiny, it appears that the administrator must, at a minimum, exercise oversight and control over the contractor and must make all material decisions regarding the potential liability of the putative holder. As a practical matter, this may prove difficult in that many state administrators currently lack the necessary expertise in unclaimed property matters, and thus give substantial deference to the contract audit firm. Although it is understandable for the states to operate in this manner, it is this type of deference that is precisely the problem.

A recent case, Temple-Inland, Inc. v. Cook,[135] would appear to present a textbook example of what can go wrong where an audit is conducted by a private firm on a contingent-fee basis. That case involved the issue of whether Delaware’s audit practices, including its methods for estimating unclaimed property liability, were unconstitutional. The court concluded that during the course of Temple-Inland’s audit, Delaware and its audit firm “engaged in a game of ‘gotcha’ that shocks the conscience” sufficient to violate Temple-Inland’s substantive due process rights because Delaware:

(i) waited 22 years to audit [Temple-Inland]; (ii) exploited loopholes in the statute of limitations; (iii) never properly notified holders regarding the need to maintain unclaimed property records longer than is standard; (iv) failed to articulate any legitimate state interest in retroactively applying Section 1155 except to raise revenue; (v) employed a method of estimation where characteristics that favored liability were replicated across the whole, but characteristics that reduced liability were ignored; and (viii) [sic] subjected [Temple-Inland] to multiple liability.[136]

The Temple-Inland decision rejected Delaware’s audit practice of estimating unclaimed property owed to Delaware in years for which the holder lacks complete records based on unclaimed property owed by Temple-Inland to persons in all states in the base years. The court held that such a methodology “is contrary to the fundamental principle of estimation,”[137] which requires both the existence and the characteristics of property from the base years to be extrapolated into the reach-back years. The court then made abundantly clear that “[i]f the property in base years shows an address in another state, then the characteristic of that property has to be extrapolated into the reach back years.”[138] Delaware’s methodology was therefore invalid because it “created significantly misleading results” by not replicating the “characteristics and qualities of the property within the sample . . . across the whole.”[139] Put more simply, Delaware was improperly trying to escheat vastly much more property through the use of estimation than it would have received had the holder reported the property in the first place. The court also held Delaware’s “purported reasons for applying [the estimation statute] retroactively [i.e., to raise revenue] do not withstand scrutiny.”[140] The court explained that “unclaimed property laws were never intended to be a tax mechanism whereby states can raise revenue as needed for the general welfare.”[141] Thus, “[s]tates violate substantive due process if the sole purpose of enacting an unclaimed property law is to raise revenue.”[142]

Of course, some of this improper behavior may have been the fault of the state itself, rather than its auditor, because Delaware is notorious for assessing huge sums against companies that conduct little or no business in the state.[143] On the other hand, the two are perhaps inextricably linked, with the audit firm earning over $200 million from its contingent-fee arrangement with Delaware over the course of a decade, and providing lucrative retirement deals for several former high-level unclaimed property officials, including the Delaware State Escheator himself and a Deputy Attorney General.[144]

In any event, it appears that a court will soon weigh in regarding the validity of a contingent-fee multistate unclaimed property audit arrangement. In Plains All American Pipeline, L.P. v. Cook et al.,[145] the Third Circuit recently held that the use of a contingent-fee auditor in such an audit raises significant due process concerns, given the financial stake that the auditor has in the outcome of the audit, and has remanded the case to the district court to address that issue on the merits.

The 2016 Act Does Include Certain Improvements Compared to the 1981 Act and 1995 Acts

It should be noted that, notwithstanding these constitutional infirmities, the 2016 Act does include some notable improvements as compared to the 1981 and 1995 Acts. Perhaps the most substantial improvement is the statute of limitations provision. The 2016 Act restores the 10-year statute of limitations from the 1981 Act and provides for a five-year statute of limitations if the holder has filed a nonfraudulent report with the administrator.[146] There are several benefits to this bifurcated approach. First, it encourages businesses to file nonfraudulent returns so that they can trigger the earlier statute of limitations. By contrast, under the 1981 Act’s rule, the statute of limitations is the same (10 years), regardless of whether a return is filed. This creates a disincentive to file a return. Another benefit of this bifurcated approach is that it encourages states to review returns and issue assessments against delinquent holders more promptly. This will serve the primary goal of these laws in returning property to the rightful owner.

The 2016 Act also includes an optional administrative appeals procedure for the first time; however, the procedure merely provides that a putative holder may initiate a proceeding under the state’s administrative procedures act for review of the administrator’s audit determination in an audit.[147]

Conclusion

State unclaimed property laws have been trending in the wrong direction for over 30 years in that such laws have been greatly expanded in unconstitutional ways for the purpose of generating revenue for states at the expense of both owners and putative holders of unclaimed property. The 2016 Act—while containing some notable improvements from the 1981 and 1995 Acts—does little to reverse this alarming trend and continues to include provisions that are likely unconstitutional. Accordingly, we urge the American Bar Association not to endorse the 2016 Act until these constitutional infirmities are adequately addressed.

[1]              379 U.S. 674, 678 (1965).

[2]             Id. at 677.

[3]              368 U.S. 71, 75 (1961).

[4]              Texas, 379 U.S. at 680.

[5]              Id. at 680–81.

[6]              Id. at 682.

[7]              Pennsylvania v. New York, 407 U.S. 206 (1972). Congress later adopted a federal statute which provides that money orders and traveler’s checks are escheatable to (1) the state in which such instruments are sold, if the holder has a record of such information; or (2) the state of principal place of business of the holder, if it lacks such a record. 12 U.S.C. § 2503. This is the only exception that has been adopted to the jurisdictional rules established by the court in Texas.

[8]              See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105–6 (1972), later opinion, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (characterizing the decision in Texas v. New Jersey as an example of federal common law); Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 500 (1993) (“no state may supersede” these rules); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990); Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 314 (1955) (“States can no more override . . . [federal] judicial rules validly fashioned than they can override Acts of Congress.”).

[9]              697 F. Supp. 1183, 1190 (W.D. Okla. 1986), aff’d, 859 F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1988).

[10]             Id. at 1190.

[11]             Id. at 1187.

[12]             Am. Petrofina Co., 859 F.2d at 842.

[13]             669 F.3d 374 (2012).

[14]             2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 24437 (3d Cir. 2017).

[15]             Id. at *3.

[16]             Id. at *23.

[17]             Id. at *25.

[18]             Id. at *26.

[19]             Id.

[20]             Id.

[21]             Id.

[22]             Id. at *19 (emphasis in original).

[23]             Id. at *2 (emphasis added).

[24]             See, e.g., Nellius v. Tampax, Inc., 394 A.2d 233 (Del. Ch. 1978); State ex rel. Higgins v. SourceGas, LLC, No. CIVAN11C07193MMJCCLD, 2012 WL 1721783 (Del. Super. Ct. May 15, 2012); State ex rel. French v. Card Compliant, LLC, 2015 Del. Super. LEXIS 1069, at *6 (Nov. 23, 2015); Temple-Inland, Inc. v. Cook, 192 F. Supp. 3d 527 (D. Del. 2016). A few recent federal district court cases in Delaware have reached the opposite result, but those cases were superseded by the Third Circuit’s opinions in N.J. Retail Merchs. Ass’n and Marathon Petroleum, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130358 (D. Del. Sept. 23, 2016); Office Depot, Inc. v. Cook, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30210 (D. Del. Mar. 3, 2017); State ex rel. French v. Card Compliant, LLC et al., Civ. Action No. 14-688-GMS (Dec. 10, 2014) (Judge Sleet’s later decision in Temple-Inland, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 3d 527, also indicates that he has changed his mind on this issue).

[25]             2016 Act, § 305. See also 1981 Act, § 3(6); 1995 Act, § 4(6).

[26]             N.J. Retail Merchs. Ass’n et al. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 374, 394 (3rd Cir. 2012). The Supreme Court stated that it wanted to “settle the question” of which state will be entitled to escheat unclaimed property in any given circumstance. Texas, 379 U.S. at 677.

[27]             The risk of competing claims is amplified when considering the location of an intangible transaction where the debtor, creditor, and controlling law may be located in multiple jurisdictions.

[28]             Texas, 379 U.S. at 679.

[29]             The court held that “uncertainties” would result “if we were to attempt in each case to determine the State in which the debt was created and allow it to escheat. Any rule leaving so much for decision on a case-by-case basis should not be adopted unless none is available which is more certain and yet still fair.” Id. at 680. Determining the state in which the transaction occurred is particularly problematic for e-commerce or telephone transactions, which often involve parties in multiple states.

[30]             407 U.S. 206 (1972).

[31]             507 U.S. 490, 503 (1993).

[32]             N.J. Retail Merchs. Ass’n, 669 F.3d at 374.

[33]             Id. at 395.

[34]             Id.

[35]             669 F.3d 374.

[36]             Id. at 396.

[37]             N.J. Retail Merchs. Ass’n et al. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 755 F. Supp. 2d 556 (D.N.J. 2010).

[38]             Id.

[39]             2016 Act, § 305.

[40]             Id. at § 304. See also 1981 Act, §§ 3, 36; 1995 Act, §§ 4, 26.

[41]             Texas, 379 U.S. at 682 (emphasis added).

[42]             Marathon Petro. Corp., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 24437, at *2 (emphasis added).

[43]             The U.S. Constitution vests foreign affairs powers exclusively in the federal government rather than the states. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889); see also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942); Bowman v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 482 (1888); U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 3; art. II, §2, cl. 2; art. 1, §10, cl. 1–3.

[44]             U.S. Const., art. 1, §8, cl. 3 (Congress, rather than the states, shall have the sole and exclusive power to regulate commerce “with foreign Nations . . . .”); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 493 (1904) (Congress’s power over foreign commerce is “exclusive and absolute”).

[45]             389 U.S. 429 (1968).

[46]             Id. at 435.

[47]             Id. at 430.

[48]             441 U.S. 444 (1979).

[49]             Id. at 449 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 470 (1976)).

[50]             Id. at 450–51.

[51]             Id. at 449.

[52]             All states have adopted some form of unclaimed property law, so the possibility that no state law governs has virtually disappeared with the possible exception of a few remote nonstate territories or possessions of the United States.

[53]             Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 457.

[54]             2016 Act, § 304.

[55]             N.J. Retail Merchs. Ass’n, 669 F.3d at 395.

[56]             Id.

[57]             Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 435.

[58]             Id. at 430.

[59]             U.S. Long-Term Securities Held by Foreign Residents, available at http://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/slt2d.txt.

[60]             2016 Act, § 302(2). See also 1981 Act, § 3(3); 1995 Act, § 4(3).

[61]             Texas, 379 U.S. at 681–82 (emphasis added).

[62]             Id. at 683.

[63]             Id. at 681.

[64]             Id. at 681. In Texas v. New Jersey, the court had also rejected other jurisdictional escheat rules proposed by states on the basis that such rules would require a case-by-case analysis that would inevitably be subject to dispute. The court wanted to avoid “[t]he uncertainty of any test which would require us in effect either to decide each escheat case on the basis of its particular facts or to devise new rules of law to apply to ever-developing new categories of facts.” Id. at 679. See also Nellius, 394 A.2d at 233, in which the Delaware Chancery Court interpreted the Supreme Court’s decisions in Texas v. New Jersey and Pennsylvania v. New York as requiring that, even if the records of the holder were proven to be inaccurate, those records would still be determinative for purposes of applying the primary rule.

[65]             Texas, 379 U.S. at 682, n.11 (emphasis added).

[66]             Pennsylvania, 407 U.S. at 210–11.

[67]             Delaware, 507 U.S. at 500, 504, 507 (stating that the second-priority rule applies if “the creditor’s last known address is in a State whose laws do not provide for escheat” or “the laws of the creditor’s State do not provide for escheat” or the “creditor’s State does not provide for escheat”). See also Pennsylvania, 407 U.S. at 212 (stating that the second-priority rule applies if the address “was located in a State not providing for escheat”).

[68]             N.J. Retail Merchs. Ass’n, 669 F.3d at 395.

[69]             U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.

[70]             Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 (1951).

[71]             Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201, 246 (1941).

[72]             2016 Act, § 301(1).

[73]             Id. at § 301(2).

[74]             See, e.g., Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 43 (1979) (“[U]nless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”); Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580–81 (1975) (same); Cottier v. City of Martin, 604 F.3d 553, 567 (8th Cir. 2010) (court considered the ordinary meaning of terms in interpreting case law).

[75]             See, e.g., State v. Knudson, 174 P.3d 469 (Mont. 2007) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of “address” as the “[p]lace where mail or other communications will reach [a] person. . . . Generally a place of business or residence; though it need not be.” Black’s Law Dictionary 38 (6th ed., West 1990)); Bank of America, N.A. v. Bridgwater Condos, LLC, 2011 WL 5866932 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) (noting that Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) defines the word “address” to mean “[t]he place where mail or other communication is sent” and holding that such “definition is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term”); In re Application of County Collector, 826 N.E.2d 951, 954, 956–57 (Ill. Ct. App. 2005) (“The common and ordinary meaning of the term address . . . clearly contemplates a number and street address. No reasonable argument can be made that the conventional meaning of ‘address’ does not encompass a number and street name. This clearly is the plain and ordinary meaning of the term ‘address.’”); Hoot v. Brewer, 640 S.W.2d 758, 764–65 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (dissenting op.) (“I can not conceive of an address as employed in the ordinary course of usage, as being complete and meaningful, that gives only a house number or post office box number, and omitting all reference to a city.”).

[76]             Pennsylvania, 407 U.S. at 213 (emphasis added).

[77]             See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-13-102(8); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 3-56a(8); D.C. Code § 41-102(12); Ga. Code Ann. § 44-12-192(11); Idaho Sess. Laws § 14-501(11); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 58-3934(i); Mich. Comp. Laws § 567.222(l); N.H. Rev. Stat. § 471-C:1.XII; Okla. Stat. § 651.10; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 98.302(9); R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-21.1-1(11); S.C. Code Ann. § 27-18-20(11); S.D. Codified Laws § 43-41B-1(11); Utah Code Ann. § 67-4a-102(19); Wash. Rev. Code § 63.29.010(13); Wis. Stat. § 177.01(11); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-24-102(a)(xi).

[78]             Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 1139(a) (“a description, code, or other indication of the location of the owner on the holder’s books and records which identifies the state of the last-known address of the owner”) (eff. Feb. 2, 2017); Fla. Stat. § 717.101(15) (“a description of the location of the apparent owner sufficient for the purpose of the delivery of mail. For the purposes of identifying, reporting, and remitting property to the department which is presumed to be unclaimed, ‘last known address’ includes any partial description of the location of the apparent owner sufficient to establish the apparent owner was a resident of this state at the time of last contact with the apparent owner or at the time the property became due and payable”); Ill. Pub. Act 100-0022, § 15-301 (eff. Jan. 1. 2018; Illinois’s prior unclaimed property law did not contain a definition); Ind. Code § 32-34-1-10(a) (“a description indicating that the apparent owner was located within Indiana, regardless of whether the description is sufficient to direct the delivery of mail”); N.J. Admin. Code 17:18-1.2 (“a description of the location of the apparent owner sufficient for the purpose of determining which state has the right to escheat the abandoned property and the zip code of the apparent owner’s (creditor’s) last known address is sufficient”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-29-116 (eff. July 1, 2017); Utah Code Ann. § 67-4a-301 (eff. May 9, 2017); Va. Code Ann. § 55-210.2 (“a description of the location of the apparent owner sufficient to identify the state of residence of the apparent owner for the purpose of the delivery of mail”).

[79]             507 U.S. 490, 503 (1993).

[80]             Id. at 501–02.

[81]             Id. at 503.

[82]             Some courts have carved out a narrow exception to this principle where the creditor’s claim against the debtor is barred by the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Travelers Express Co. v. Utah, 732 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah 1987) (explaining that “the rights of the State are derivative from the rights of the owners of the abandoned property. That statement is true as to the substance of the State’s claim. However, procedural requirements, such as the statute of limitations, should not bar the State.”). On the other hand, other courts have reached the opposite result. See, e.g., Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 481 P.2d 556, 558 (Wash. 1971) (“The state’s rights under the act are derivative and it succeeds, subject to the act’s provisions, to whatever rights the owner of the abandoned property may have. If the owner may proceed against the holder of the abandoned property and legally obtain that property, then the state may also effectively enforce that same claim against the holder. If, however, the holder of the property possesses the valid defense of the bar of the statute of limitations, then that holder may successfully assert that bar against either the owner or the state, which stands in the position of the owner. The rights of the state are not independent of the rights of the owner and are therefore no greater than those of the person to whose rights it succeeds.”).

[83]             See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Knight, 291 N.E.2d 40, 44 (Ill. App. 1972), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 804 (1973) (noting that “the rights of the State are derivative from the rights of the owner, and…the State has no greater right than that of the payee owner”); Cole v. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 549 So. 2d 1301, 1303–04 (Miss. 1989) (“The State Treasurer agrees and the Companies concur that the Treasurer acquires his rights by and through the owners of the abandoned property. This conclusion is based on the custodial nature of the Uniform Act under which the courts have consistently held that the rights of the State are indeed derivative from the rights of the owners of abandoned property. . . .”); In the Matter of November 8, 1996 Determination of the State of New Jersey Department of the Treasury, Unclaimed Property Office, 706 A.2d 1177, 1180 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. 1998), aff’d, 722 A.2d 536 (N.J. 1999) (“The implication of [the] cases [applying the derivative rights doctrine] is that the [Unclaimed Property] Act cannot, and therefore presumably was not intended to, impose an obligation different from the obligation undertaken to the original owner of the intangible property which it covers.”); State v. United States Steel Corp., 126 A.2d 168, 173 (N.J. 1956) (“Limitations operate not against the State per se, but against the basic claim of the unknown owner. If, by virtue of limitations, the owner can obtain nothing, the State is under like disability. This is the derivative consequence, long recognized in the law of escheat. The right of action to escheat or to obtain custody of unclaimed property is not derivative; but what may be obtained by exercise of the right is dependent upon the integrity of the underlying obligation.”); State v. Elizabethtown Water Co., 191 A.2d 457, 458 (N.J. 1963) (affirming that the state had no right to escheat funds resulting from unrefunded deposits made by developers where the utility had the contractual right to keep any unrefunded deposits, noting that “the State’s claims are nonetheless derivative and certainly no broader than the developers’ claims); State v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 153 A.2d 691, 699–700 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1959), aff’d per curiam, 157 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1960) (holding that the state had no right to escheat the value of unredeemed trading stamps when the contractual terms required a minimum quantity for redemption, noting that the “State’s rights are no greater than that of each stamp holder” and “entirely derivative”); Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Cranston, 252 Cal. App. 2d 208, 211 (1967) (“The Controller’s rights under the act are derivative. He succeeds, subject to the act’s provisions, to whatever rights the owners of the abandoned property may have.”); Blue Cross of N. Cal. v. Cory, 120 Cal. App. 3d 723 (1981) (holding that “the Controller’s rights under the UPL are ‘derivative,’ and that he accordingly succeeds to whatever rights the owner of unclaimed property may have and no more”); State v. Standard Oil Co., 74 A.2d 565, 573 (1950), aff’d, 341 U.S. 428 (1951) (“The State’s right is purely derivative: it takes only the interest of the unknown or absentee owner.”); Bank of Am. v. Cory, 164 Cal. App. 3d 66, 74–75 (1985) (“With those objectives in mind, we find the derivative rights theory . . . helpful in determining if a statute of limitations is applicable to an action to enforce compliance with the UPL. . . . ‘The Controller’s rights under the act are derivative. He succeeds, subject to the act’s provisions, to whatever rights the owners of the abandoned property may have.’”) (internal citations omitted); Barker v. Leggett, 102 F. Supp. 642, 644–45 (W.D. Mo. 1951), appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 900 (1952), reh’g denied, 342 U.S. 931 (1952) (“‘The state as the ultimate owner is in effect the ultimate heir.’ The United States Supreme Court has distinctly held that the right of escheat is a right of succession, rather tha[n] an independent claim to the property escheated. The result of that is this: ‘The State’s right is purely derivative; it takes only the interest of the unknown or absentee owner.’”) (internal citations omitted); State ex rel. Marsh v. Neb. State Bd. of Agric., 350 N.W.2d 535, 539 (Neb. 1984) (“Both parties agree that the State’s rights under the UDUPA are strictly derivative, and therefore the uniform act is distinct from escheat laws and the State acquires no greater property right than the owner. The State may assert the rights of the owners, but it has only a custodial interest in property delivered to it under the act.”); State v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 101 A.2d 598, 609 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 1953) (“[T]he State’s right is wholly ‘derivative’ of the right of the owner.”); In re Steins Old Harlem Casino Co., 138 F. Supp. 661, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (“The state’s right of escheat is the right of an ultimate heir; it does not assert a separate claim to the fund but stands in the shoes of those so-called unknown creditors who are deemed to have abandoned their claims. Such creditors, by diligence, can cut off the rights of other claimants, and the state, standing in their shoes, has the same right.”); Petition of Abrams, 512 N.Y.S.2d 962, 968 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (“The State, in asserting the right of escheat, stands in the shoes of the rightful claimants, and is entitled to reclaim the funds as abandoned property.”); S.C. Tax Comm’n v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 221 S.E.2d 522, 524 (S.C. 1975) (“The Commission’s rights under the act are derivative. It succeeds, subject to the act, to the rights of the abandoned property’s owners. It takes only the interest of the absent or unknown owner.”); Presley v. Memphis, 769 S.W.2d 221, 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (“The state acts under the statute to protect the rights of the property owners. Any rights and obligations of the state in the property are derivative of the rights of the owners of the property.”); Melton v. Texas, 993 S.W.2d 95, 102 (Tex. 1999) (“Once property is presumed abandoned, the comptroller assumes responsibility for it and essentially steps into the shoes of the absent owner.”) (internal citations omitted); State v. Texas Elec. Serv. Co., 488 S.W.2d 878, 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (“[T]he State of Texas has no greater right to enforce payment of claims through an escheat proceeding under Article 3272a than was possessed by the owner of the claim.”); State v. Tex. Osage Royalty Pool, Inc., 394 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (adopting “the elementary rule that the State cannot acquire by escheat property or rights which were not possessed at the time of the escheat by the unknown or absent owners of such property or rights”); S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. State, 380 S.W.2d 123, 126 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (“[T]he State in escheating such claims did not acquire any better or greater right to enforce the claims than was possessed by the former owners. The State cannot acquire by escheat property or rights which were not possessed at the time of escheat by the unknown or absentee owners of such property or rights.”); State Dep’t of Revenue v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 694 P.2d 7, 11 (Wash. 1985) (“[T]he State’s right is purely derivative and therefore no greater than the owner’s”).

[84]             Delaware, 507 U.S. at 499.

[85]             Id. at 502 (emphasis added).

[86]             239 U.S. 356, 370 (1915).

[87]             Barker v. Leggett, 102 F. Supp. 642, 644–45 (W.D. Mo. 1951). See also Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U.S. 256 (1896) (escheat involves the regulation of succession to property).

[88]             Delaware, 507 U.S. at 499.

[89]             2016 Act, § 610(a). See also 1981 Act, § 29(a); 1995 Act, § 19(a).

[90]             333 U.S. 541 (1948).

[91]             Id. at 546.

[92]             Id. at 547.

[93]             Id. at 545.

[94]             Id. at 546.

[95]             Connecticut Mutual thus did not hold that states can disregard the contractual “due proof of death” requirement in all circumstances. It held only that requiring the reporting of life insurance benefits at the limiting age, or when the insurer has received some notice of death (presumably from, for example, a beneficiary or funeral home), does not impair the contracts in a constitutionally problematic way. In contrast, legislation that eliminates any requirement of notice and requires insurers to affirmatively seek out deaths substantially impairs preexisting contracts—it shifts the burden of establishing death entirely from the beneficiary to the insurer, and thus fundamentally alters the parties’ bargain, a result the court in Connecticut Mutual never contemplated. The 2016 Act is problematic in this respect because it includes provisions that require insurance companies to attempt to validate deaths of insureds if the state identifies the insured as potentially deceased using the Social Security Death Master File.

[96]             Kane v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., Ct. of Common Pleas, Op. at 21 (Jan. 20, 1976).

[97]             See, e.g., State v. Elizabethtown Water Co., 191 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1963) (holding that New Jersey had no right to escheat funds resulting from unrefunded deposits for water utility main construction based on the contract terms among the parties, and noting that “the State’s claims are nonetheless derivative and certainly no broader than the [owners’] claims.”); State v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 153 A.2d 691 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1959), aff’d per curiam, 157 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1960) (holding that the state had no right to escheat the value of unredeemed trading stamps when the contractual terms required a person to obtain a minimum quantity of stamps before they could be redeemed for cash, and the state could not show such minimum quantity was held by any particular owner); Or. Racing Comm’n, 411 P.2d at 63 (holding that an unpresented pari-mutuel ticket that was payable on demand was not “payable or distributable” because the ticket did not become “due” until it was presented).

[98]             Delaware, 507 U.S. at 504.

[99]             Permitting the state to use its escheat laws to override substantive contract conditions also creates significant problems under the full faith and credit clause. For example, consider a contract that is entered into between two parties, and which is expressly agreed to be governed by the laws of a particular state. The governing-law state may be completely different than the state that has the right and jurisdiction to escheat any unclaimed property arising out of that contract. Thus, if the laws of the state governing the contract permit the parties to impose certain conditions between themselves, then any escheat laws of another state that do not respect such conditions will not be giving full faith and credit to the laws of the governing-law state. This effectively allows states to use their escheat laws to “trump” the debtor-creditor laws of other states, which is not permitted by the full faith and credit clause because the state whose laws govern the debtor-creditor relationship has a substantially greater connection than the state whose unclaimed property laws apply to the property at issue. Allstate v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981) (where there is a conflict between the laws of different states, the full faith and credit clause requires deference to the state with the most significant contacts to the controversy); Nev. v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936). Furthermore, if the state that governs the contract is the same as the escheat state, another constitutional problem is created in that the state’s escheat laws then may effectively “amend” the state’s debtor-creditor laws in violation of the single-subject provision of the state’s own constitution. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Swoap, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1187, 1196 (1985) (invalidating a budget bill that would have imposed new substantive rules in the Family Planning Act that did not exist under such law); Cal. Labor Fed’n v. Occupational Safety & Health Standards. Bd., 5 Cal. App. 4th 985, 994–95 (1992) (invalidating a budget bill that would have effectively amended the attorney’s fee provisions under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1021.5, creating “substantive conditions that nowhere appear in existing law.”).

[100]           See, e.g., State v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 178 A.2d 329 (N.J. 1962), in which the holder amended its certificate of incorporation to provide that any dividends that remained unclaimed for a period of three years would revert back to it after New Jersey had enacted an unclaimed property law permitting New Jersey to escheat unclaimed dividends after five years. The New Jersey Supreme Court stated that “[e]scheat of unclaimed dividends serves the important public need of providing revenue to be utilized for the common good.” Id. at 336. The court also concluded that a company such as Jefferson Lake that incorporates in New Jersey becomes subject to this public policy, and thus the “[a]lteration of a charter for the avowed purpose of defeating a relevant aspect of the sovereign’s declared public policy cannot achieve judicial approval.” Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on a number of cases holding that a corporation’s charter or bylaws that conflicts with the state’s public policy is void. Thus, because the holder’s charter was amended for the express purpose of avoiding the escheat laws, the court held that the amendment was invalid. See also Screen Actors Guild, Inc. v. Cory, 154 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Cal. App. 1979) (the holder similarly amended its bylaws to provide that unclaimed residuals revert back to the holder after six years); People v. Marshall Field & Co., 404 N.E.2d 368 (Ill. App. 1980) (the holder unilaterally amended the terms of its gift certificates to expire them prior to the dormancy period under Illinois’s unclaimed property laws).

[101]           2016 Act, § 102(24)(C) (including exemptions for “game-related digital content” and “loyalty cards”).

[102]           For example, the optional gift card exemption does not apply to gift cards that expire, which may be a legitimate policy decision to encourage retailers not to use expiration dates, but cannot be justified under escheat principles. In addition, the 2016 Act created additional constitutional concerns by providing that if a state does elect to escheat gift cards, the amount escheatable is cash equal to the unredeemed gift card balance, rather than cash equal to 60 percent of the unredeemed card balance, which was the rule adopted in the 1995 Act to recognize that merchandise and services are sold by retailers at a profit, and that escheatment of the full 100 percent of the card balance would deprive the retailer of its anticipated profits—arguably a violation of the takings clause of the U.S. Constitution. The 2016 Act also included a new penalty that is imposed on “a holder [that] enters into a contract or other arrangement for the purpose of evading an obligation under this [act].” See 2016 Act, § 1205. This was apparently targeted at retailers that set up special-purpose entities (or contract with third parties) to issue gift cards, where the special-purpose entity (or third party) is located in a state that exempts gift cards from escheat (as many large retailers have set up such arrangements). However, companies should be free to structure their affairs in a manner that minimizes escheat liabilities, just as they can structure themselves to reduce tax or other regulatory burdens. This sort of provision appears to allow one state (that decides not to exempt gift cards) to punish a retailer that legitimately relies on an exemption adopted by another state.

[103]           Id. § 208.

[104]           17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ad-17.

[105]           See Lost Securityholders, 1996 WL 475798 (SEC Release No. 37595 Aug. 22, 1996) (expressing concern with the risk that property of lost security holders “is at risk of being deemed abandoned under state escheat laws”).

[106]           2016 Act, § 503.

[107]           See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950) (“But when notice is a person’s due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process. The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The reasonableness, and hence the constitutional validity, of any chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is, in itself, reasonably certain to inform those affected. . . . It would be idle to pretend that publication alone, as prescribed here, is a reliable means of acquainting interested parties of the fact that their rights are before the courts. It is not an accident that the greater number of cases reaching this Court on the question of adequacy of notice have been concerned with actions founded on process constructively served through local newspapers. Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper, and, if he makes his home outside the area of the newspaper’s normal circulation, the odds that the information will never reach him are large indeed.”); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798, 800 (1983) (holding that more than publication notice is required and “notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any party . . . if its name and address are reasonably ascertainable.”).

[108]           Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.

[109]           Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 227 (2006).

[110]           Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.

[111]           Jones, 547 U.S. at 225 (emphasis added).

[112]           Id. at 229.

[113]           See, e.g., Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 40 (1972); Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141, 146–47 (1956).

[114]           780 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 929 (Feb. 29, 2016).

[115]           Interestingly, the states have recently become more aggressive in asserting in audits that holders be required to utilize such databases, but have been reluctant to agree to use these resources themselves.

[116]           See Horne v. Dep’t of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2015) (the physical appropriation of personal property is perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an owner’s property interest, depriving the owner of “the rights to possess, use and dispose” of the property).

[117]           Tahoe–Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002).

[118]           Id.

[119]           317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943).

[120]           261 U.S. 299 (1923).

[121]           See also Cerajeksi v. Zoeller, 735 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2013) (ruling Indiana’s failure to pay interest on income-earning bank account was an unconstitutional taking because title of the property did not vest in the state). But cf. Turnacliff v. Westly, 546 F.3d 1113, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 2008) (assuming, arguendo, the owner has a right to interest earned by escheated property, the court ruled that “no further compensation is due . . . because when the Estate abandoned its property, it forfeited any right to interest earned on that property” because “the Estate did not challenge the escheat, per se, of its property to the State”).

[122]           454 U.S. 516, 516 (1982).

[123]           Id. at 530.

[124]           Id. at 519 n.28.

[125]           735 F.3d 577, 582 (7th Cir. 2013).

[126]           It is certainly questionable whether contingent-fee auditors are necessary. A number of states, including California and New York, regularly conduct their own audits. Delaware generally uses contingent-fee auditors, but its voluntary disclosure program—which is essentially a managed audit—is conducted by the state and a private law firm that is compensated on an hourly basis. Most states similarly have voluntary disclosure programs that are run in-house. In any single audit, a contingent-fee auditor may make sense in that it limits the state’s risk that the cost of an audit may outweigh its benefits, but the states audit dozens, if not hundreds, of companies each year, and collectively the states almost certainly pay out more in fees to contingent-fee auditors than they would to employees to conduct these audits directly. http://www.delawareonline.com/story/firststatepolitics/2015/01/22/senate-abandoned-property/22176233/ (contingent-fee audit firm paid over $200 million by a single state over the course of a decade). In theory, contingent-fee auditors should also be more efficient, but that has not been borne out in practice because unclaimed property audits regularly take three to eight years to complete. In the authors’ experience, the audits or VDAs conducted by the states themselves have generally been much more efficient.

[127]           273 U.S. 510 (1927).

[128]           401 S.E.2d 4 (1991).

[129]           49 P.2d 663 (Wyo. 1935).

[130]           Id. at 667, 669.

[131]           No. X07-CV960072560S (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001).

[132]           Id. at 32–33.

[133]           436 S.E.2d 828 (1993).

[134]           Temple-Inland, Inc. v. Cook, 192 F. Supp. 3d 527 (D. Del. 2016).

[135]           Id. at 549.

[136]           Id. at 550.

[137]           Id.

[138]           Id. (emphasis added).

[139]           Id. at 547.

[140]           Id. at 548.

[141]           Id. at 28.

[142]           Id.

[143]           Temple–Inland, 2016 WL 3536710, at *2 (noting that unclaimed property has now become “Delaware’s third largest revenue source, making it a ‘vital element’ in the State’s operating budget.”). Indeed, from 2000–2017, Delaware has escheated over $7.3 billion, but has returned less than 10 percent of that amount to owners.

[144]           http://www.delawareonline.com/story/firststatepolitics/2015/01/22/senate-abandoned-property/22176233/.

[145]           No. 16-3631 (3d Cir. Aug. 9, 2017).

[146]           2016 Act, § 610(b).

[147]           Id. at § 1103.


A longer version of this article is anticipated to be published in the Summer 2018 version of The Business Lawyer.

Recent Trends in Enforcement of Intercreditor Agreements and Agreements Among Lenders in Bankruptcy

Over the last several decades, the enforcement of intercreditor agreements (ICAs) that purport to affect voting rights and the right to receive payments of cash or other property in respect of secured claims have played an increasingly prominent role in bankruptcy cases. Although the Bankruptcy Code provides that “subordination agreement[s]” are enforceable in bankruptcy to the same extent such agreements are enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law, the handling of creditor disputes regarding such agreements has been inconsistent.1

Both ICAs and agreements among lenders (AALs) purport to alter the rights of junior-lien creditors or subordinated creditors in a bankruptcy of their common debtors. For example, such agreements often include waivers of the right to object to bankruptcy sales, voting restrictions on plans of reorganization, and waivers of rights to object to debtor-in-possession financing and use of cash collateral. ICAs in secured transactions are generally among creditor groups that hold different tranches or classes of debt, each secured by separate but identical liens and acknowledged and agreed to by the applicable borrowers or issuers. AALs, by contrast, typically are agreements solely among the lenders under a single secured credit facility and its agent. The borrower is not party to the AAL and grants a single lien to the agent for the lenders to secure all of their obligations under the credit facility. The borrower discharges its obligations by paying required payments to the agent under the credit facility. The AAL then determines how those payments are divided among the lenders.

Bankruptcy courts have treated ICAs and AALs inconsistently. Some courts have enforced these agreements in accordance with their terms, others have invalidated provisions in these agreements,2 and still others have enforced agreements only to the extent that they provide the best outcome for the debtor’s estate. A recent trend in the case law has been to enforce ICA and AAL provisions altering creditors’ rights in bankruptcy only to the extent there is clear and unambiguous language in the agreement altering such rights. In this article, we examine three recent leading cases: Energy Future Holdings (EFH),3 Momentive,4 and RadioShack.5 These cases addressed whether the bankruptcy court was the proper forum for intercreditor disputes (including threshold jurisdictional issues for AALs), the ability of junior creditors to object to a sale supported by senior creditors, and whether an agreement providing only for lien subordination restricts a junior creditor’s ability to receive distributions under a plan of reorganization.

Proper Forum for Intercreditor Disputes

A threshold issue in cases involving ICAs or AALs is whether bankruptcy-related intercreditor disputes (including the right to approve or object to sales, cash collateral, and financing motions; vote on plans of reorganization; and receive and retain proceeds distributed by the debtor) should be decided by the bankruptcy court or another federal or state court. In both EFH and Momentive, intercreditor disputes originated in state court but were transferred to the respective bankruptcy courts administering the debtors’ cases. In both cases, the bankruptcy courts held that the intercreditor disputes were “core proceedings” relating to the administration of the debtors’ estates and were therefore within the scope of the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction.

Energy Future Holdings is an electric utility company with its business operations divided into two silos: a regulated electrical utility (the so-called E side) and a nonregulated, electricity-generating and commodity risk-management and trading entity (TCEH, or the so called T side). The intercreditor dispute arose on the T side and was among T-side first-lien creditors regarding whether certain payments and distributions were subject to an application-of-payments provision governing sales or other dispositions of their collateral. TCEH’s first-lien debt included $1.8 billion in 11.5 percent senior secured notes (the holders of such notes, the Noteholders), approximately $22.6 billion of bank debt, and outstanding debt under certain swap and hedge agreements (the holders of bank, hedge, and swap debt together, the Non-Noteholders).6

The Noteholders initially filed suit to resolve a dispute over the allocation of certain adequate protection payments and eventual plan distributions in New York state court. The Non-Noteholders removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York and moved to transfer the case to the Delaware bankruptcy court.7 The Noteholders sought to have the matter remanded back to state court. The district court granted the motion to transfer to the bankruptcy court, reasoning that the dispute would not exist but for the bankruptcy proceeding and cash collateral order providing for adequate protection payments, and that the dispute will affect the allocation of estate funds, which is a core bankruptcy function.

Momentive is a silicone and quartz manufacturer. At the time of its bankruptcy, its capital structure had first-, 1.5-, and second-lien secured debt, as well as additional unsecured debt.8 The lenders negotiated an ICA that provided lien subordination of the second-lien noteholders’ liens in the common collateral (as defined in the ICA). After Momentive declared bankruptcy, the second-lien creditors entered into a plan support agreement (PSA) with the debtors that provided the basis for the debtors’ proposed plan. Under the PSA, the first- and 1.5-lien noteholders would receive face value of their debt, but would not receive a make-whole premium, while approximately $1.3 billion in second-lien debt would be equitized.9 In the event that the first- and 1.5-lien noteholders voted to reject the plan of reorganization, they would receive new notes at below-market interest rates on account of their secured claims,10 whereas the second lien noteholders would receive new equity in the reorganized debtor.

Similar to the result in EFH, the first-lien and 1.5-lien noteholders filed suit in New York state court, and the second-lien noteholders removed the matter to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, which automatically referred the case to the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court denied the senior creditors’ motion to remand back to state court.

As demonstrated by these two cases, although dissenting creditors may prefer to initiate litigation in an alternate forum, these disputes are more likely than not to end up in bankruptcy courts if the disputes are viewed as core proceedings inextricably tied to the administration of the debtors’ cases.11

Interpreting Sale-Related AAL Provisions

RadioShack, by contrast, yielded more mixed results when it came to the bankruptcy court’s willingness to resolve AAL-related disputes. Nevertheless, this was the first case we are aware of where a bankruptcy court addressed, at least implicitly, the enforceability of AALs in bankruptcy.12 Although an AAL would likely be considered a subordination agreement for the purposes of section 510(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, debtors are not parties to AALs, which led to arguments that the AAL should be considered outside the scope of the property of the debtor’s estate as “an agreement that does not impact the debtors and [has] nothing to do with the debtors’ estates”13 and therefore is beyond the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction.

RadioShack, a chain of electronics stores, had a complex capital structure at the time it filed for bankruptcy. RadioShack had two main groups of secured lenders: an asset-based, or ABL, lender group under a revolving credit facility, and a term loan lender group. The ABL and term loan had crossing liens and a split collateral structure, with lien subordination between the ABL and term loan governed by an ICA.14 The ABL and term loan were further divided into multiple tranches, with subordination among each of these tranches of debt governed by separate AALs. The ABL was divided into a first-out group, which was comprised of a number of hedge funds, and a last-out lender, which was an affiliate of Standard General L.P. (Standard General). For the term loan lender group, an affiliate of Cerberus Capital Management LP (Cerberus) was the first-out lender, and an affiliate of Salus Capital Partners LLC (Salus) was the last-out lender.

Standard General, acting as the stalking horse bidder, had offered to buy approximately half of RadioShack’s stores through a credit bid. Cerberus, the first-out term loan lender, initially objected to the sale but then withdrew its objection. Salus wanted to put in a competing credit bid and objected to the sale, an action Cerberus alleged was in violation of section 14(c) of the term loan AAL,15 which prevented last-out lenders from objecting to a sale on any grounds that could only be asserted by a secured creditor if the first-out lenders consented to the sale. Certain ABL lenders also objected to the sale for other reasons.

Judge Shannon of the Delaware bankruptcy court interpreted the provisions of the AAL in the RadioShack dispute, reasoning that the AAL pertained to the “treatment of a secured creditor” and, in doing so, implicitly recognized the enforceability of AALs in bankruptcy. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court allowed Cerberus to enforce the AAL to block Salus’s objections to the sale. This should provide some comfort to lenders party to AALs that their negotiated rights will be respected by bankruptcy courts to the same extent they would be under an ICA.

Plan Distributions and Lien Subordination Agreements

As mentioned above, ICAs and AALs can provide for either lien subordination or claim subordination. Under a lien subordination agreement, to the extent that there is value derived from agreed-upon collateral, the senior lender is paid first, up to the extent of its secured claim. If there are insufficient proceeds from this collateral, the senior lender would be entitled to a pro rata share of any remaining assets the borrower may have, along with other under-secured and unsecured creditors. Payment subordination, by contrast, is a more fundamental form of subordination where the senior lender’s right to payment is agreed to be superior to the junior creditor’s right to payment.

In Momentive and EFH, the courts were presented with subordination agreements that provided for lien subordination, rather than payment subordination. In both cases, these agreements were interpreted to not restrict plan distributions (e.g., equity of the reorganized debtor) because such distributions did not constitute common collateral or proceeds of collateral as defined in the applicable ICA.

In Momentive, the first- and 1.5-lien noteholders alleged that the second-lien noteholders had breached section 4.2 of the ICA, which provided the payment waterfall for the disposition of collateral or the proceeds of collateral, by retaining 100 percent of the common stock of the reorganized debtor when the more senior lien holders had not been paid in full. They argued that the stock of the reorganized debtor would be either common collateral or proceeds, as defined by section 9-102(a)(64) of the New York U.C.C.

The bankruptcy court concluded that the new equity of the reorganized debtor did not constitute “common collateral” as defined in the ICA because none of the lenders had “a lien on that stock” or the parent company’s current stock. In addition, the stock did not qualify as “proceeds” of the collateral as defined by section 9-102(a)(64) of the New York U.C.C. because the new equity is not something a current secured party’s existing lien would attach to—the new equity is distributed on account of the second-lien lenders’ secured claims, not the proceeds of the debtors’ assets. The court also noted that there had been no economic event to alter the nature of the assets, which is necessary to give rise to proceeds.

The issue in EFH was similar, namely whether adequate protection payments and plan distributions were distributions of collateral and/or proceeds of collateral such that the waterfall provisions of the ICA governed their allocation.16

The proposed plan of reorganization (the First Plan) called for first-lien creditors to receive common equity in the reorganized TCEH, cash, new TCEH debt, and certain other rights (the Plan Distributions), as well as the extinguishing of the first-lien creditor’s liens. The first-lien Non-Noteholders argued that Plan Distributions and adequate protection payments were not “collateral” or “proceeds” of collateral as defined in the ICA or security documents and, as a result, should be allocated on a pro rata basis as of the petition date among the first-lien creditors in accordance with the size of each class of creditors’ claims. In resolving this issue, the bankruptcy court built upon the reasoning set forth in Momentive.

In March 2016, Judge Sontchi of the Delaware bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the Non-Noteholders and held that the Petition Date Allocation Method advanced by the lower-interest-rate Non-Noteholders should be adopted. In his ruling, Judge Sontchi stressed that for the Noteholders to succeed in their proposed Post-petition Interest Allocation Method, they must show that each element of section 4.1 of the ICA, “Application of Proceeds,” is met. Otherwise, the ICA would be inapplicable to the scenario at hand.17

The court held that Plan Distributions and adequate protection payments did not constitute collateral or proceeds of collateral and, therefore, failed to meet the elements of section 4.1 of the ICA. Accordingly, because no other provision of the ICA applied to plan distributions and adequate protection payments, the court held that these payments should be allocated among the first-lien creditors on a pro rata basis based on the amounts owed as of the petition date.

The Noteholders asserted that the plan distributions constituted “collateral” because under the spin-off transaction contemplated by the plan, the first-lien creditors’ collateral would be “sold” to reorganized TCEH in exchange for reorganized common stock, along with other proceeds. However, the court did not find this argument persuasive and, adopting the reasoning in Momentive, held that the first-lien creditor did not have a lien on the new common stock issued as part of the debt-for-equity swap in the plan; therefore, to consider the new stock received under the plan as proceeds of collateral would improperly add to the first-lien creditors’ collateral. Specifically, in addressing whether the proposed spinoff transaction was a “sale or other disposition” of collateral, Judge Sontchi concluded in further reliance on Momentive that the plan gave no indication that reorganized TCEH was “purchasing” the collateral, nor that reorganized TCEH was a third-party purchaser, noting the absence of any “‘economic event’ that would create that sort of relationship.”

Alternatively, the Noteholders asserted that the Plan Distributions were proceeds of collateral. The court did not find this argument persuasive, noting that the language of the security agreement limited proceeds to (i) any consideration received from the sale/disposition of assets, (ii) value received by the debtor as a consequence of possessing the collateral, or (iii) insurance proceeds, none of which apply to the Plan Distributions.18 Further, the court held that adequate protection payments were not collateral as argued by the Noteholders, but rather constituted a protection against diminution in value of collateral.19

Ultimately, the First Plan did not go effective; accordingly, TCEH presented an amended plan (the New Plan), which was subsequently confirmed by the bankruptcy court and consummated in October 2016. Based on asserted distinctions between the First Plan and the subsequently confirmed New Plan, the Noteholders also asked the bankruptcy court to vacate portions of its prior ruling.

In denying the Noteholders’ motion to vacate, Judge Sontchi again adopted the reasoning in Momentive, ruling that the transactions contemplated by the New Plan were created “solely for tax purposes”20 and did not involve a sale or disposition of “collateral.” Accordingly, creditors receiving stock in a reorganized TCEH in exchange for their claims were not receiving their collateral or “proceeds of collateral.”21

Conclusion

Bankruptcy courts are increasingly willing to interpret ICAs and AALs and apply the plain language of these agreements to the facts of the case. Creditors should be cognizant of the fact that even if they may prefer to initiate litigation in an alternate forum, these disputes are typically viewed as core proceedings and will likely end up in bankruptcy court. This is especially notable because bankruptcy courts are courts of equity, and judges often take a pragmatic approach to these disputes. Moreover, senior creditors appear to continue to bear the risk of agreements that do not limit junior creditors’ rights in bankruptcy using clear and unambiguous language.

1     See 11 U.S.C. § 510(a).

2      For example, some courts have found assignments of a junior creditor’s right to vote on a chapter 11 plan of reorganization to be unenforceable. See, e.g., In re 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 246 B.R. 325, 331 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000) (“Subordination . . . affects the order of priority of payment of claims in bankruptcy, but not the transfer for voting rights.”); In re SW Hotel Venture LLC, 460 B.R. 4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011) (finding assignment voting rights in subordination agreement to be unenforceable), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 479 B.R. 210 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, 748 F.3d 393 (1st Cir. 2014).

3      In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 546 B.R. 566 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016).

4      In re MPM Silicones, LLC, 518 B.R. 740 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014).

5      In re RadioShack Corp., Case No. 15-10197 (Bankr. D. Del.).

6      These obligations were secured by liens on substantially all of TCEH’s assets and proceeds thereof, and the relationship among the first-lien lenders with respect to the shared collateral was governed by an ICA.

7      Specifically, section 2.1 of the ICA provided that the scope and rank of the first-lien creditors’ property rights in the collateral and proceeds thereof was pari passu among the Noteholders and Non-Noteholders, “except as otherwise provided in Section 4.1.” In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 546 B.R. 566, 571 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016). Section 4.1 set forth the waterfall for dispositions of collateral or proceeds of collateral received in connection with the sale or other disposition of such collateral or proceeds and contained a provision for payment of all amounts “then due and payable.” Id. at 572. In its simplest form, the dispute was whether the waterfall applied and, if so, whether post-petition interest at the contract rate was “due and payable.”

8      In re MPM Silicones, LLC, No. 7:14-cv-07471, slip op. at 3–6 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2015).

9      An additional $380 million in senior subordinated notes would be eliminated without receiving any distribution under the plan.

10     Under the so-called cramdown provisions of the bankruptcy code, the bankruptcy court determined that the treatment of the Noteholders’ claims complied with the code because such holders would retain their liens and receive an interest rate sufficient to provide for “deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property.” 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii).

11     But see In re TCI 2 Holdings, LLC, 428 B.R. 117 (Bankr. D. N.J. 2010) (confirming “cramdown” plan of reorganization proposed by second-lien creditors over objection of first-lien creditors despite allegations that plan violated proceeds of collateral and adequate protection provisions of ICA, and holding that even if violation occurred, it would not impede confirmation of plan that complied with bankruptcy code).

12    The parties in RadioShack consented to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to hear their AAL dispute.

13     Hr’g Tr. at 64:8–9 (Mar. 26, 2015).

14    In this structure, the ABL lenders have a first lien on working capital assets and a second lien on fixed or long-term assets. The term lenders have a first lien on fixed or long-term assets and a second lien on working capital assets.

15    Specifically, section 14(c) of the term loan AAL provided that no last-out lender (i.e., Salus) “shall object to or oppose any such sale . . . on any grounds that only may be asserted by [a secured lender] if [Cerberus] . . . has consented to such sale.” See Exhibit A to Statement of Cerberus Lenders in Support of Sale to General Wireless, Inc., In re RadioShack Corp., Case No. 15-10197 (BLS), Docket No. 1551-1, at 16 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 26, 2015).

16    As background, among the first-lien creditors, the Noteholders had the highest interest rate and argued accordingly for the accrual of post-petition interest (the Post-petition Interest Allocation Method), regardless of whether such post-petition interest was allowed or allowable as part of their claim against the debtors, such that the Noteholders would have received a larger share of the payments. The Non-Noteholder disagreed, arguing that the distributions should be allocated on a pro rata basis based on the amounts owed as of the petition date (the Petition Date Allocation Method).

17    The Application of Proceeds elements were as follows: (i) Collateral or any proceeds of Collateral are to be distributed to the First Lien Creditors; (ii) the Collateral must be “received” by the Collateral Agent; (iii) the Collateral or the proceeds of Collateral must have resulted from a sale or other disposition of, or collection on, such Collateral; and (iv) the sale, disposition, or collection must have resulted from the exercise of remedies under the Security Documents. If any of these initial requirements were not met, the adequate protection payments and the plan distributions would be distributed outside of the ICA pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy court orders, and the plan.

18     The security agreement’s definition of “proceeds” was limited as follows:

[as such] term defined in Article 9 of the UCC and, in any event, shall include with respect to any Grantor, any consideration received from the sale, exchange, license, lease or other disposition of any asset or property that constitutes Collateral, any value received as a consequence of the possession of any Collateral and any payment received from any insurer or other Person or entity as a result of the destruction, loss, theft, damage or other involuntary conversion of whatever nature of any asset or property that constitutes Collateral, and shall include (a) all cash and negotiable instruments received by or held on behalf of the Collateral Agent, (b) any claim of any Grantor against any third party for [claims dealing with Licenses, Trademarks, and Copyright] . . . and (c) any and all other amounts from time to time paid or payable under or in connection with any of the Collateral.

See In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 546 B.R. at 580 (quoting Security Agreement, § 1(d)).

19     After the court’s March 2016 ruling, the Noteholders filed an appeal of the decisions.

20     In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 566 B.R. 669, 684 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017).

21     Id. at 686–87. After the court’s April 2017 ruling, the Noteholders filed an appeal of the decisions, which has been consolidated with the Noteholders’ appeal of the March 2016 ruling, and the consolidated appeal is pending before the Delaware district court.

Federal Deregulation Opens the Door for State-Level Threats to Auto Finance

A major legal transition is underway in the world of auto finance. As national regulators step back and federal law retreats, state regulators are stepping up. Changing market conditions are laying kindling for the regulatory and litigation fires to come. As a result, the auto finance industry may soon face serious legal threats from varied state regulators, particularly state attorneys general (AG individually or AGs collectively), many of whom appear poised to act.

These trends hearken back to the mortgage loan calamity triggered by bad credit and securitized loans. When millions of mortgages failed in 2008–2011, state regulators jumped to the fore, resulting in epic regulation and litigation. Although the conditions in the auto finance market appear considerably less severe than those that drove the mortgage meltdown, the latter’s history contains valuable lessons. Among the most important is one frequently forgotten: to beware of complacency founded on Washingtonian sound bites. As it has already done in other spheres, the federal government may indeed scale back its regulatory concern for the auto finance field. However, so long as state AGs stand ready to scrutinize or sue, every business’s net regulatory risk remains substantial. In, many AGs are already closely watching auto finance, sharpening their knives. To counter this looming threat, attorneys advising auto finance lawyers should help their clients embrace basic but proven methods to mitigate or even avoid regulatory attention if—or rather when—another financial bubble bursts.

I.  The Current Landscape

A. The Feds Retreat

Federal regulators and federal law are in retreat, as the recent travails of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or Bureau) show.

On November 1, 2017, a resolution passed by Congress and signed by President Donald J. Trump officially revoked the CFPB’s arbitration rule. Proposed in July 2017, this rule would have banned class-action waivers in arbitration provisions for covered entities. Less than six months later, this prized initiative of the CFPB’s first director, Richard Cordray (Cordray), has been quashed by Washington’s new leadership.

A second setback came soon on its heels. On March 21, 2013, the Bureau issued Bulletin 2013-02, a nonbinding document that targeted dealer markups using “disparate impact” discrimination theories. Deemed advisory, the bulletin had nonetheless become a sore subject in the auto lending industry; many indirect lenders denounced as unfair the CFPB’s determination to penalize them for unintentional purported discrimination by auto dealers, while many questioned the methodology for determining disparate impact. In March 2017, Senator Pat Toomey (R-PA) asked the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Congress’s investigative wing, to determine whether the financial guidance issued in Bulletin 2013-02 qualified as a “rule.” On December 6, 2017, the GAO issued its findings in which it determined that the bulletin qualified as a rule subject to congressional review. This finding nullified the bulletin pending its submission to Congress.

Even before the GAO’s ruling, however, the CFPB appeared to be taking a step back from further dealing with indirect auto lending. At the end of 2016, the Bureau listed its fair-lending priorities, including redlining, mortgage and student loan servicing, and small-business lending, but said nothing regarding the automobile industry. The CFPB in another statement indicated that it would rely less on enforcement in pursuing its fair-lending goals. To many, this omission signaled the CFPB’s desire to reduce its attention to the auto finance industry.

The CFPB’s aggressive tactics endured perhaps its most dramatic setback when Director Cordray announced his early departure on November 15, 2017, and President Trump named Mick Mulvaney, director of the Office of Management and Budget, as the CFPB’s interim director. This appointment has not come without controversy, given that the Senate Democrats contend that the proper head of the Bureau is Leandra English, the deputy director appointed by Cordray. In recent weeks, a federal judge denied English’s request for a temporary restraining order preventing Mulvaney from taking the helm of the Bureau. The uncertainty surrounding the Bureau’s leadership could paralyze much of its operations.

A further sign that the Bureau may scale back its enforcement actions came near the end of the year when it announced that it was withdrawing its request to conduct a survey of individuals related to debt collection disclosures. Although the CFPB has long promised a new rule addressing debt collection, this move calls into question whether its new director wants to deprioritize the rule or even scrap rulemaking altogether.

As the CFPB’s regulatory reach has waned, so has that of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The auto finance industry has awaited over a year the result in ACA International v. Federal Communications Commission, currently pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. The case centers on the FCC’s aggressive interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), a major thorn in the side of auto finance. The D.C. Circuit may strike down the FCC’s previous construction of the TCPA, one made by regulators appointed by President Obama. Regardless, under President Trump, commissioners with a deregulatory bent now control the FCC, as evidenced by the recent reversal of the net neutrality rule by the current majority. Considering this agency’s exclusive authority to issue rules under, and make definitive interpretations of, the TCPA, the FCC will likely take a step back in the years to come.

Although not all federal regulators have been quiet, as seen by the Federal Trade Commission’s recent settlements with auto dealers, federal deregulation is the unmistakable rule of the day.

B.  State Regulators’ Forward Momentum

1. New Plans and Old Patterns

State officials have essentially announced their intent to actively patrol the regulatory gaps created by the federal government’s pullback. Soon after President Trump’s election, Maria T. Vullo, superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial Services, reaffirmed her agency’s intent to oversee banks and other financial institutions. New Mexico’s AG, Hector H. Balderas, Jr., just as loudly directed his aides to identify areas where new federal policies enacted could harm New Mexico. Even where silence has reigned, much has been intimated. A former AG of Maryland has already referred to the “enhanced role in protecting consumers moving forward” likely to be assumed by state AGs. Chris Jankowski, a Republican strategist, agreed with this assessment and observed to the New York Times: “State attorneys general are now more permanent pieces on the chessboard of national policy development and implementation. And they are not mere pawns.” Even more AGs have privately revealed plans to redouble their efforts within the consumer protection arena, including the auto finance field.

Another sign of this increasing activity came on December 12, 2017, when a group of 17 state AGs issued a strongly worded letter to President Trump, promising “unwavering support for the mission of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau” and efforts “to vigorously enforce consumer protection laws regardless of changes to the Bureau’s leadership or agenda.” Expressing concerns regarding President Trump’s appointment of Director Mick Mulvaney, the AGs noted that they “retain broad authority to investigate and prosecute those individuals or companies that deceive, scam, or otherwise harm consumers. If incoming CFPB leadership prevents the agency’s professional staff from aggressively pursuing consumer abuse and financial misconduct, we will redouble our efforts at the state level to root out such misconduct and hold those responsible to account.” Led by New York’s AG Eric Schneiderman, the coalition includes AGs from California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington.

The December 12th letter promises a new wave of state enforcement of consumer regulations following the election of President Trump. These states are taking advantage of a little-known provision of the 2010 Dodd-Frank law, which created the CFPB and gives state AGs the authority to enforce the agency’s rules and its broad ban on “unfair, deceptive and abusive” practices beyond state lines. For example, Pennsylvania’s AG Jack Shapiro has been quickly building up his own consumer finance unit since taking office in January. The Pennsylvania unit is staffed with more than a dozen attorneys and led by a former senior CFPB attorney. “We’re demonstrating a capacity to handle these big, complex, consumer financial protection cases,” Shapiro told Reuters, adding that AGs from both parties have asked how they can “mimic our efforts.”

In Washington, AG Bob Ferguson has similarly enlarged his consumer finance division to 27 attorneys, compared to 11 attorneys in place four years ago. Similarly, California’s AG Xavier Becerra has promised to “carry the torch and build on [former CFPB] Director Cordray’s good work to protect and empower consumers.” “Regardless of what President Trump and the CFPB do moving forward,” said Virginia AG Mark R. Herring, “my fellow attorneys general and I remain committed to fighting to protect consumers across the country, and we will not waver from that commitment.” Herring, like many of his counterparts across the country, has also reorganized and expanded his state consumer protection organization since the election of President Trump.

In addition, there have been open discussions in state AG meetings about the need to form a mortgage-crisis-like multistate taskforce to focus on the auto lending and servicing market, particularly the subprime market. A number of AGs often will come together to investigate a company for alleged violations of state law. These investigations originated in the mid-1990s when the states first joined forces to regulate the tobacco industry, not through legislation, but through investigation and regulatory enforcement. Although the federal government was not involved, the states effected significant change in the tobacco industry and its economics through a massive, industry-wide settlement. Multistate investigations usually involve a group of anywhere from a dozen states to a coalition of all U.S. jurisdictions, overseen by an executive committee comprised of the key states who constitute the driving force for that particular investigation. Although discussions between the AGs and their targets occasionally splinter into individualized litigation, the negotiation of a joint consent order or assurance of voluntary compliance, coupled with a monetary payment to the plaintiff states, more commonly occurs.

Multistates often lead to high-dollar, high-profile settlements, with states having collected many billions of dollars in the past few years. For instance, early 2017 saw a $586 million multistate settlement with Western Union to resolve allegations that the company permitted fraudulent transfers. New York has been especially active in the multistate space. In August 2016, it announced a $100 million multistate settlement with Barclays related to allegations that the bank artificially manipulated interest rates. Soon thereafter, New York AG Schneiderman announced a $714 million settlement with Bank of New York Mellon over fraudulent foreign exchange practices. The auto industry has not been immune to this force either, as varied state coalitions entered into settlements with Toyota for $29 million, as well as Hyundai and Kia for $41.2 million.

2. Examples

Four specific state actions may be harbingers of the future for auto finance.

In June 2017, Florida AG Pam Bondi announced a settlement with a Jacksonville car dealership, its financing arm, and its president regarding allegations that the dealership engaged in misleading business and sales practices. The consent agreement required the dealership to provide over $5 million in debt forgiveness to affected consumers.

In September 2017, Massachusetts AG Healey filed a complaint accusing JD Byrider, a used car dealership, of utilizing predatory practices in its sale of allegedly defective vehicles. According to the Commonwealth’s pleading, JD Byrider sold allegedly defective vehicles with high-cost loans to Massachusetts consumers under the “JD Byrider Program,” which bundled the vehicle sale, financing, and repair in one transaction. Healey’s office contended that JD Byrider failed to inform its customer that it priced its cars at more than double their retail value to force consumers to finance their purchase at an annual percentage rate of 19.95 percent, regardless of their credit qualifications.

Finally, New York’s AG Schneiderman announced two settlements with motor vehicle dealer groups in 2017. The settlements provided over $900,000 in restitution to approximately 6,400 consumers in the state and required the dealers to pay $135,000 in penalties and costs to the state itself for the unlawful sale of credit repair and identity-theft protection services to consumers who bought or leased vehicles. According to Schneiderman, the dealerships unlawfully sold “after-sale” credit repair and identity-theft protection services that considerably increased a vehicle’s purchase price. Consumers, Schneiderman asserted, unknowingly purchased these services, many having been led to believe that these services were free.

3. Tea Leaves

Despite Republican leadership in Washington, state AGs retain powerful tools at their disposal to help fill any void left by scaled-back federal enforcement: the ability to enforce rules previously promulgated by the CFPB; to enforce the federal Unfair, Deceptive and Abusive Acts and Practices (UDAAP) authority; and to use their own state Unfair and Deceptive Acts or Practices (UDAP) authority for consumer protection. In the legal sphere, they will continue to sue and seek individual settlements in the auto space, a sure fingerprint of their high degree of interest in and focus on the market, and will persist in considering the possibility of concerted investigations of purported violations of state consumer protection law by auto lenders.

All the while, AGs known for their regulatory activity will likely cultivate their longstanding connections with their state’s plaintiffs’ bar. As many consumer-facing companies know, state AG investigations often go hand-in-hand with class-action litigation and often concern the same claims. Many members of the plaintiffs’ bar watch for AG investigations; likewise, many members of state AG offices monitor significant consumer class action litigation.

A final portend came toward the year’s end. In October 2017, the National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) issued a report highlighting the mark-ups in add-on products during automobile sales, specifically GAP insurance and window etching. Because this report probably landed on the desks of every AG in the nation, its ripple effects could be felt for the next few years, both in consumer class litigation and investigatory actions.

This is the future that awaits the auto finance industry: increasingly active AGs, acting cooperatively, either triggering or building upon individual plaintiffs’ own suits.

II. Market Conditions

A. The Bubble Surfaces

The automobile holds a special place in this nation’s mythology and its people’s daily lives. This consumer good simultaneously serves as the primary means of transportation, essential to the survival and sustenance of countless U.S. families. Sales figures attest to its outsized role: after suffering dramatic declines during the Great Recession, U.S. vehicle sales have grown by greater increments for seven consecutive years and reached a record of $17.55 million in 2016.

The data as to the originations, outstanding balances, and delinquency rates of today’s auto loans tell the tale: as the total volume of auto loans has swelled, their terms have become longer and longer, and delinquencies have inched upwards. In terms of origination, auto loans to subprime borrowers, frequently defined as borrowers with credit scores of 660 or lower, nearly doubled from 2009 to 2014. Specifically, the percentage of used car loans that franchise auto dealers made to subprime borrowers increased from 17 percent to 25.4 percent, and new sales to subprime borrowers increased to 14 percent in 2014, comparable to prior highs in 2006 and 2007. Although lending to borrowers with lower credit scores did not expand in 2017, subprime auto lending, which all but vanished during the recession years, has now regained much of its market share.

During these years, the outstanding balances on all these loans have multiplied. In the third quarter of 2014, subprime borrowers held 39 percent, roughly $337 billion, of such loans compared to $304 billion and $255 billion in 2013 and 2012, respectively. A drop followed, but in the third quarter of 2017, auto loan balances once more increased by another $23 billion, with outstanding balances on subprime auto debt again nearing $300 billion. Holding a disproportionate share of subprime auto debt, auto finance companies currently hold more than $200 billion of such loans, double their 2011 holdings.

This upward trajectory has been matched by a noticeable ascent—if so far modest and manageable—in the general delinquency rate. For auto finance companies, this rate, already higher than the one enjoyed by conventional banks, has risen by more than two percentage points since 2004. In 2017’s first quarter, the percentage of auto loans that were over 90 days delinquent rose to 3.82 percent from 3.52 percent one year earlier, the highest level in four years. By November 2017, it reached four percent. Notably, the worsening in the delinquency rate of subprime auto loans appears most pronounced, as more than six million Americans were at least 90 days late on their auto loan repayment in 2016’s last quarter. Although the balances of subprime loans may be somewhat smaller on average, “the increased level of distress associated with subprime loan delinquencies,” the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has noted, “is of significant concern, and likely to have ongoing consequences for affected households.”

Finally, many investors are now “getting into auto loans because they have the money,” even as auto lenders have shown a revived willingness to assume greater risk. As both trends have accelerated, lenders have bundled more and more loans and created more and more securities marketed to investors and backed by the stream of payments owed by each loan’s original borrower (asset-backed securities or ABS). By late 2016, $97 billion in auto loans, with subprime loans constituting 41 percent of this total, had been securitized.

B. A Recent Parallel

One need not look too far back to find a parallel for this auto finance environment: the subprime mortgage market. Some contend that the mortgage crisis began in 2001 when the U.S. housing industry experienced an abrupt increase in the value of real estate assets to a point where consumer income to support the increase in value simply did not exist for many people. This so-called housing bubble was partly traceable to credit underwriting practices: with lenders looking beyond traditional measures of creditworthiness, a critical mass of loans went to subprime borrowers who proved unable to make their mortgage payments and subsequently defaulted on their loans. As these loans were securitized, the borrowers’ default led to massive losses in the value of the assets held by countless entities in national and international secondary markets. In 2008, the International Monetary Fund estimated that the subprime crisis led to losses totaling $945 billion in the United States alone.

On the heels of these steep losses, lenders, servicers, and owners faced a regulatory and litigation firestorm. Emblematic of the disaster was a $25 billion settlement reached in 2012 between state and federal regulators and the five largest mortgage servicers for alleged misdeeds in efforts to collect on those mortgages. Although the U.S. Department of Justice stood first in line, by all accounts the driving force of the settlement was the 49 state AGs who joined forces against the servicers.

III. Advising Clients to Plan Ahead

This is not to suggest that the situation facing the auto finance industry compares in terms of size and severity to that faced by the mortgage market in 2007 and 2008. The labor market shows low levels of unemployment, delinquency levels remain manageable, and the amount of credit outstanding is much smaller. However, historical parallels and recent state AG comments and common practices point to the distinct possibility that the auto finance industry will soon confront a mortgage-crisis-style legal environment in more than a handful of states. As a result, the question becomes how to best advise auto finance clients to minimize the risk.

Once a company finds itself in the regulatory crosshairs of a major multistate investigation, it is often too late to save money or face. The leverage and pressure that a multistate can bring to bear can make the facts and law secondary to the objectives of the state regulators. As such, the key to survival rests on one preventative action: avoid any invitation to the party in the first place. Well-known within their local communities if not the nation at large, the largest players live with a target on their back, which comes with the territory. Although the targets of a multistate can appear from the outside almost random, the reality reveals otherwise. Given clients’ mere size, their footprint, and presence, correlated to the likelihood of such scrutiny, attorneys for such entities must commit themselves to a single goal: advising any potentially impacted companies on how to establish a good reputation among regulators. Simply put, companies earn negative attention later by how they choose to act now, and a prepared attorney can steer his or her clients down a far less litigious (and expensive) path.

A four-point program, focusing on the basics, follows:

  1. Develop a plan. First, a smart company must plan to allay any risk of a potential firestorm. It should, for example, establish clear lines of authority for any decision making regarding a governmental inquiry, however minor, and ensure open communication (as well as encouraging cooperation) among key marketing, legal, and operations figures with actual, meaningful power, clearly demarcated. In short, no company should be unable to respond, confidently and knowingly, at a moment’s notice to a particular inquiry. Although omniscience cannot be expected, a piqued regulator or wary plaintiff should rarely encounter either persistent silence or bewildered mumbling.
  2. Build Regulatory Good Will with Respect and Responsiveness. History underscores the importance of positive relationships with state regulators. When such watchdogs come calling for routine examinations or to transmit a consumer complaint, a company must treat them with utmost respect and responsiveness to the extent consistent with any pendent legal concerns and dangers. Even if information must be withheld, such regard—and a good-faith explanation—may prompt a resolution or at least reduce possible acrimony. Most AGs are, after all, political actors who seek to provide dividends for their constituents and do not likely relish the prospect of open combat and uncertain rewards in the most common cases.
  3. Aggressively Resolve Complaints. History also teaches that a good way to avoid attention and to foster regulatory good will lies in an aggressive complaint management program. Many companies have written complaint management programs; lawyers can help develop policies for these programs targeted toward the achievement of aggressive resolution for most protests. Unresolved regulatory and consumer complaints remain likely to cause trouble. An unresolved complainant is a consumer who may be in search of a lawyer, and an unresolved complaint may cause a regulator to decide that the company cannot be trusted to police or manage itself.
  4. Focus on Key Areas of Technical Legal Compliance. Perhaps most importantly, the past reveals a central truth: the fundamental gripes of regulators often are not legal concerns. In the mortgage cases, for instance, regulators reacted to understandable consumer distress induced by unexpected foreclosures. Although it was not illegal to foreclose on a loan, regulators seized on technical noncompliance with one or more aspects of the myriad consumer protection laws, and used those errors as the casus belli—the formal stated reason for hostilities. To avoid this fate, a smart company must put in place the elements of compliance that a regulator would expect to see and scrub processes and documents for technical compliance, particularly those that are consumer facing.

No one can predict the future with 100-percent confidence. Regulatory trends may shift, and the economics of the auto finance industry can change without warning; however, those who fail to learn from history can be doomed to repeat it. The mortgage experience indicates that the worst can happen. Attorneys advising auto finance companies can do two things. First, message the risk internally and note the nature of the risk. Second, develop strategies to mitigate those risks. By understanding and anticipating the risks of state investigation, attorneys can prepare their clients to navigate the uncertain landscape facing auto finance companies.

Making Pass-Throughs Great Again

In case you have been in a coma, major tax changes to the Internal Revenue Code were passed in December 2017 (see Pub. L. 115-97 (115th Cong., 1st Sess.)) (hereinafter H.R. 1). Those changes make it much more attractive (from a tax perspective) to arrange one’s affairs like a business owner.

Broadly speaking, the new tax law changed the landscape so that many business owners will now benefit from dramatically lower tax rates (e.g., the corporate rate has not been this low since 1939). Nevertheless, to take full advantage of the massive tax cuts, careful attention must be paid to match the appropriate entity type with the underlying business. In the professional services context, H.R. 1 may lead to some business reorganizations. When the stars align, one attractive entity type is the cooperative. Cooperative owners face fewer hurdles to obtaining a tax cut than every other business entity type, but governance challenges may outweigh the tax benefit.

What’s All This About a Pass-Through?

First, let us understand the changes. C corporations pay entity-level tax, whereas S corporations, partnerships, and other “pass-through” entities do not pay entity-level tax (at the federal level). In addition, for the last 30 years, individual income tax rates have generally been lower than corporate income tax rates. Therefore, there has been a strong incentive to use pass-through forms of business ownership to avoid two layers of tax and to pay a lower overall rate of tax. About 15 years ago, the introduction of a lower rate of tax on “qualified dividends” (which include many domestic corporate dividends) made corporate ownership less expensive, but did not eliminate the two layers of tax.

H.R. 1 dropped the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent. Meanwhile, the highest rate for individuals is now 37 percent, down from 39.6 percent, with the qualified dividend rate at 15 percent for many taxpayers. Hence, the dual rates applied to corporate income combined (21 percent at the corporation level and 15 percent on the dividend to shareholders, for a total of 36 percent) are lower than the highest individual income tax rate. Does this mean that all those businesses that organized as pass-through entities (and settled for one layer of tax over two) are possibly worse off than they would be if they had organized as corporations?

H.R. 1 section 11011 creates new section 199A of the Internal Revenue Code, aimed at lowering the individual rate on pass-through income. Section 199A is 10 pages long, and it is complex. Nevertheless, section 199A is designed around an idea that is easy to understand—namely, to avoid incentivizing incorporation over other business forms, section 199A is meant to bring the pass-through rate down so that the total tax paid by a business owner is roughly the same whether the business is organized as a corporation or a pass-through.

A Few Details, Please

Next, let us look at the mechanics of the pass-through change. Section 199A is a “below the line” itemized deduction. That means section 199A will not reduce an individual’s adjusted gross income, but will reduce the amount of taxable income in a particular year. In addition, section 199A applies to taxpayers other than a C corporation. This means that an individual sole proprietor may take advantage of the “pass-through” deduction without forming a new entity.

Section 199A is designed to exempt 20 percent of ordinary income from a pass-through trade or business from income tax. Yet because it is a tax provision, it has to be more complex. So there are phase-ins and phase-outs; defined terms; calculations; reference to other sections in the Internal Revenue Code—basically a turkey with all the trimmings for a tax nerd (and an absolute nightmare for any normal person).

The absolute basics are as follows:

  1. For all single taxpayers with less than $157,000 in taxable income (or married taxpayers with less than $315,000 in taxable income): if the taxpayer quit his or her job, started Consulting LLC, and charged his or her old employer a consulting fee, the taxpayer would be able to exempt 20 percent of his or her income from federal income tax.
  2. For all single taxpayers with more than $207,000 in taxable income (or married taxpayers with more than $415,000 in taxable income): this trick continues to work only if the taxpayer’s trade is not on a list of “specified service trade or business” as defined in section 199A(d)(2). The list includes businesses generally characterized as professional service firms, such as doctors, law firms, accounting firms, financial services, and consulting firms. (Engineering and architecture firms are expressly excluded from the definition of a “specified service trade or business,” presumably because their lobbyists are betters than ours.)
  3. Where a taxpayer’s profession is a “specified service trade or business” and he or she makes more than $207,000 or $415,000 (if married): section 199A does not apply. That is, if you are a lawyer making over $415,000, you have the pleasure of paying a higher rate of tax than your architect or engineer clients.
  4. Unlike payments from other pass-through entities, “patronage dividends” from cooperative corporations are not subject to the restrictions and limitations discussed above. Hence, if our taxpayer forms a cooperative with his or her fellow colleagues instead of a single member LLC, the taxpayer may be able to exempt 20 percent of his or her income, regardless of profession or income amount.

Those basics are subject to some strong caveats, namely:

  1. The taxpayer cannot take a deduction for “the trade or business of performing services as an employee” under section 199A(d)(1)(B). Hence, the relationship between the taxpayer and his or her former employer must meaningfully change.
  2. The reduction in income tax will be partially offset by an increase in self-employment tax of 7.65 percent on the first $128,400 (in 2018). Other pre-tax employee benefits (such as health care) would now be paid post-tax by the self-employed taxpayer and subject to itemized deduction limitations.
  3. Existing state law and/or professional ethics rules may restrict the ability of professional services taxpayers to practice to certain entity types (e.g., California does not allow an LLC to render legal services, and laws governing cooperatives vary drastically from state to state).
  4. Judicial doctrines and factors employed by the IRS to look to the substance rather than the form of a situation may catch out even careful taxpayers.
  5. Section 199A is complex, and the summary above is a very simplified version. Consult a tax colleague in conjunction with any planning.

Give Me an Example or Four

With an understanding of the basic concepts, let us lastly consider four examples: a sole-proprietor barber, an associate attorney, a real estate executive, and an artist.

First, the barber. Suppose singleton Calvin the barber is a sole proprietor and has no employees. He leases a building and offsets his risk with insurance. He reports his income and expenses on Schedule C. After expenses, Calvin makes $50,000 per year. Good news for Calvin. Although his business has no employees and few assets, he is below the $157,500 threshold, and his services are not as an employee but as a barber. Assuming the barbershop is Calvin’s only source of income, he will get to exclude $10,000 from his taxable income (20 percent of the $50,000 business income).

Second, the associate attorney. Suppose engaged attorney Rachel intends to begin work at law firm Pearson Specter in New York with an annual salary of $180,000 on January 2, 2018. If Rachel works as an employee, her marginal income tax rate will top out at 32 percent, but if Rachel instead convinces Pearson Spector to hire Rachel LLC (her legal services entity) and Rachel otherwise avoids “employee” status, she will be able to take advantage of section 199A, although somewhat limited due to the phase out for “specified service trade or business” over $157,500 (the calculation is complicated, but in this example, Rachel would take a 45-percent section 199A deduction, which means she would exclude nine percent of her income (45% x 20%, or $16,200). If Rachel happens to marry a well-mannered prince with no income, she will be able to file a joint return, and the phase-out for “specified service trade or business” will not apply until the couple reaches $315,000 in taxable income. In that case, Rachel will exclude $36,000 from her taxable income (20 percent of the $180,000 LLC income).

Third, the real estate professional. Suppose real estate salesman Fred has been selling units of a building in SoHo for his employer. Fred, an employee, expects to make $450,000 from his employer this year. As an employee, his marginal income tax rate on $450,000 will top out at 35 percent, so Fred gets an idea. He offers to continue to sell units in SoHo as Fred LLC, rather than as an employee. Because real estate is not a “specified service trade or business,” Fred is entitled to the section 199A deduction. However, due to restrictions on the section 199A deduction, Fred will be limited to acquisition value of the LLC’s qualified property and to W-2 wages paid to employees.

Finally, consider the struggling artist. Artist Georgia is upset because artists are included in the definition of “specified service trade or business.” Hence, despite the fact that she has worked hard to build a successful business model around her art, she is unable to take advantage of section 199A because of the “specified service trade or business” provisions, but if Georgia were to form a cooperative corporation with her fellow artists and structure the payments so that she only received “patronage dividends,” Georgia would be able to fully take advantage of section 199A. This appears to be the case even if her income is above the threshold amounts, and even though her trade or business is a “specified service trade or business.” In exchange for a 20-percent tax break, Georgia must put up with one-member, one-vote governance and “patronage dividend” rules. Nevertheless, it might be worth the tax savings.

Conclusion

H.R. 1 brings with it many changes to the Internal Revenue Code. In general, this is legislation that benefits business owners. As many employees will find themselves paying lower taxes than their bosses, questions of equity cannot be far behind. If and when employees have an opportunity to negotiate with their employers, restructuring employment may be the next frontier. Forget fringe benefits; turning employees into an independent contractor relationship with an employee-owned pass-through is the biggest gift an employer can give. The employee gets to exempt 20 percent of income from federal tax; other than transaction costs, the employer is not seriously inconvenienced. Seems like a win-win-lose, where only Treasury loses out.

Effect of 2017 Tax Reform on Choice of Business Entity

Tax reform enacted at the end of 2017 made C corporations much more attractive from the standpoint of annual income taxes than S corporations, partnerships, or sole proprietorships (collectively, pass-throughs). Or did it? And how about the consequences of transferring one’s business by sale to third parties or through estate planning tools?

C corporations now have a flat, 21-percent federal income tax rate. Even personal service corporations use the new low rate. This contrasts with the top federal income-tax bracket of 37 percent for pass-through income, which may be reduced to 29.6 percent by way of a 20-percent deduction for qualified business income—if and to the extent that one’s pass-through qualifies for the deduction. Partners and sole proprietors in lower income-tax brackets face 15.3-percent self-employment tax, and those in the highest brackets may pay 3.8-percent self-employment tax or net investment income tax. S corporation owners who work in the business must report compensation income to the extent of the lesser of cash they receive or “reasonable compensation,” and in 2017 the IRS explained to its agents how to keep taxpayers out of tax court when the IRS reclassifies distributions as compensation. Any amounts classified as wages are not eligible for the 20-percent deduction.

However, lower C corporation tax rates must be tempered by the taxation of distributions as dividends. A shareholder in the top bracket pays 23.8-percent federal income tax on qualified dividends, considering net investment income tax. Add state income tax, and the double taxation involved in declaring dividends each year can make C corporations unattractive.

If one lives in a state imposing five-percent income tax, here is a comparison of effective annual tax burdens, considering all of the above factors:

 

Individual in Top Bracket

Individual in Modest Bracket

Distributing 100% of Corporate Net Income After Income Tax

47.3%

40.8%

Distributing 50% of Corporate Net Income After Income Tax

36.7%

33.4%

Distributing None of Corporate Net Income After Income Tax

26.0%

26.0%

S Corporation, Partnership, or Sole Proprietorship

34.6%–45.8%

27.4%–46.2%

Although one can quibble over the assumptions used to generate the rates this chart uses, it demonstrates that a C corporation really produces superior annual income tax results only if it reinvests the lion’s share of its income.

Suppose, seeing this, one says, “I don’t care about taking annual distributions from the business. My goal is to build up the business by reinvesting earnings and selling it at some point.” Reinvested earnings add to the basis of one’s partnership interest or S corporation stock, but they do not add to the basis of one’s C corporation stock. Although one will not incur the annual tax pain of taking distributions, one will feel it on the back end when selling. However, some C corporation owners will be able to avoid the gain either by dying and getting a basis step-up, or by the IRC section 1202 exclusion. Generally, the IRC section 1202 exclusion applies to stock that the corporation issued to the taxpayer (or was issued to the donor or decedent who transferred the stock to the taxpayer) if the corporation was never an S corporation, and the corporations’ activities were always among those approved by IRC section 1202 (which does not include professionals).

Suppose a pass-through converts to a C corporation. If the entity used the cash method of accounting for tax purposes and averages over $25 million in gross receipts, it may be required to convert to the accrual method and pick up income on its accounts receivable, unless it qualifies for an exception. Furthermore, if an S corporation converts to a C corporation, it must wait five years before making an S election.

An S corporation that converts might consider taking steps to preserve the ability to distribute its accumulated adjustment account (AAA) (its reinvested earnings taxed to its shareholders that can be distributed tax-free):

  • Cash distributions made in the first C corporation taxable year after revoking the S election can use AAA instead of counting as dividends.
  • After that first year, some AAA may be able to be used if the shareholders are the same as when the S election was revoked.
  • If an S corporation converts to a C corporation, its AAA is wiped out and must start over if it later makes an S election. Before revoking the S election, consider undergoing a IRC section 368(a)(1)(F) tax-free reorganization in which a new parent takes on the existing corporation’s S status and AAA; then the existing corporation becomes a C corporation. If the old entity wants to revert to S corporation taxation, it can elect to be a qualified subchapter S subsidiary—an entity that is disregarding from its parent.

Suppose the political climate changes in Washington, D.C. again and corporate tax rates increase. After five years, the C corporation could make an S election. However, the conversion may be taxable:

  • Any assets with value in excess of basis that are sold within five years after making the S election are taxed at not only the shareholder level, but also the corporate level. If the C corporation uses the cash method, any accounts receivable would get hit with this double tax, so it might want to change to accrual before making the S election. The corporation might consider selling other assets before the conversion.
  • If the corporation uses LIFO inventory, recapture would be taxed.

Suppose the taxpayer decides to stay put as a pass-through. How does the new IRC section 199A deduction for qualified business income (QBI) work? It applies only to qualified income from a qualified trade or business. This has several components.

First, the business cannot be a specified service trade or business (SSB). An SSB is any trade or business other than certain businesses that (a) do not qualify for the IRC section 1202 exclusion from capital gain on the sale of C corporation stock, or (b) involve the performance of services that consist of investing and investment management, trading, or dealing in securities, partnership interests, or commodities. The businesses mentioned in (a) are any trade or business involving the performance of services in the fields of health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial science, performing arts, consulting, athletics, financial services, brokerage services, or any other trade or business where the principal asset of such trade or business is the reputation or skill of one or more of its employees (except that engineering and architecture are not blacklisted like the others are). The businesses mentioned in (a) are not blacklisted if the taxpayer’s taxable income is below certain limits.

Second, income as an employee of the qualified business, guaranteed payments that a partner receives for services rendered to the partnership, and similar payments do not qualify. A partner who receives only a distributive share of profits benefits more than an employee-shareholder of an S corporation. Suppose, before considering the owner’s compensation, a business has $300,000 of QBI, reasonable compensation is $200,000, and distributions to the owner are at least $200,000. If the business is an S corporation, then the $200,000 wages the S corporation pays its owner will reduce the QBI from $300,000 down to $100,000. If the owner were a sole proprietor or a partner paid only though his or her share of profits, QBI would be $300,000.

Third, the deduction is the lesser of (a) 20 percent of QBI, or (b) the greater of (i) 50 percent of wages paid or (ii) the sum of 25 percent of wages paid and 2.5 percent of the unadjusted basis of qualified property. The limitation in (ii) does not apply if the taxpayer’s taxable income is below certain limits. In addition, although adding the qualified property was intended to benefit real estate, note that real activity must qualify as a trade or business. Taxpayers receiving rent through triple-net leases should consider whether their rental activity qualifies as a trade or business.

As mentioned above, having taxable income below certain levels helps one avoid certain limitations to the QBI deduction. For a married person filing jointly, taxable income (ignoring the QBI deduction) no more than $315,000 obtains the full benefits, which phase out over that level until fully phased out at $415,000. For other taxpayers, the amounts are $157,500 and $207,500, respectively.

Moving beyond the QBI deduction, any type of business can benefit from bonus depreciation, which allows most tangible personal property (equipment, etc.) to be 100 percent written off in the year of purchase if placed in service after September 27, 2017, and before January 1, 2023.

Businesses should also consider their debt equity structure. Suppose an owner loans to his or her business (other than a sole proprietorship). A taxpayer in the top bracket would pay 40-percent federal tax (37 percent plus 3.8 percent net investment income tax) on interest income, whereas the business’ federal benefit would be only 21 percent if a C corporation or 29.6 percent for a pass-through with a full 20-percent QBI deduction. IRC section 163(j) also may limit deductions for business interest and applies to more businesses due to 2017 tax reforms.

This article attempts to highlight some of the many issues raised by 2017 tax reform. Feel free to e-mail the author for details supporting the statements made.

A Blueprint for Family Business Succession Planning

When the owners of a family business ask their attorney to advise them with business succession planning, counsel should begin with an outline that summarizes the entire process but that divides it into distinct projects that progress toward construction of a comprehensive succession plan. With the clients’ help, counsel can then refine the outline to more accurately reflect their circumstances, needs, expectations, and vision. This “blueprint” for the succession planning process will make the process more efficient, more effective, less stressful, and more rewarding for the clients.

The Case for Family Business Succession Planning

The most recent PWC U.S. Family Business Survey (2016) concludes that inattention to succession planning is a substantial problem for many family businesses in the United States. The authors of the PWC Survey found that owners of 69 percent of the family businesses surveyed expected ownership of the business to continue in the next generation, but only 23 percent had a robust, documented business succession plan.

The authors of the PWC survey call this finding “worrisome” and contend that serious problems such as the following can arise if a family business does not have a formal succession plan in place when owners cease to maintain control:

  • next-generation family members may be reluctant, unprepared, or unable to lead;
  • family members and other stakeholders may not support the choice for successor leadership; and
  • the business may not have enough liquidity to support transition of ownership within the family.

The authors of the PWC survey correctly suggest that many succession problems can be avoided or mitigated if family businesses plan for succession, rather than wait until “the last minute, when options may be more limited.” “Regardless of when a business thinks a changing of the guard will take place,” they conclude, “it’s important to always have a plan ready for that eventuality, since unforeseen circumstances can cause a sudden need for new leadership.”

The PWC survey results and its authors’ conclusions will ring true for attorneys who have experience working with family businesses. The chronic failure of family businesses to engage in formal succession planning is at odds with their tendency to focus on long-term performance better than businesses that are not family owned. In the 2012 Harvard Business Review article, “What You Can Learn from Family Business”, authors Kachaner, Stalk, Jr., and Bloch assert that “[e]xecutives of family businesses often invest with a 10- or 20-year horizon, concentrating on what they can do now to benefit the next generation.” These same family businesses, however, often have no real plan for how the next generation will realize those benefits as successor owners and leaders.

To be fair, one reason why so many family businesses do not engage in proper succession planning is because it is difficult and complex. Family business succession planning must take account of countless unknown future circumstances and current facts that are continuously changing and interacting, including business factors like the economy, the regulatory environment, and the state of the market in which the business operates, as well as family factors like family dynamics and the changing skills, maturity, career objectives, economic needs, and health status of individual family members.

Under these circumstances of pervasive uncertainty and complexity, it is understandably difficult for family business owners to comprehend how they could construct a proper business succession plan. However, if their attorney can provide them with an organized, logical, step-by-step outline for succession planning, they may be much more likely to begin the process and eventually develop the kind of “robust, written” succession plan that the authors of the PWC survey and other family business advisors advocate.

The Blueprint for Family Business Succession Planning

Attorneys can use much of the text of this article to create their own outline for family business succession planning. The section on each project includes commentary that provides a description of the project and an explanation of legal concepts and other substantive factors that may affect how the clients make decisions about the project. Although the projects are arranged in sequential order, they should be considered concurrently. The substance of the projects are interrelated; therefore, the clients should make decisions about each project with a solid understanding of how they intend to address projects that appear later in the outline.

One important prefatory piece of business: For the purpose of this article, the term “clients” is used broadly to include collective decision makers for the business and family. However, for each family business succession planning engagement, it is important to establish an understanding, in writing, about which parties counsel represents (and which parties counsel does not represent). For example, the attorney might choose to represent the business (or more accurately, some or all of the companies owned by the family) and/or the senior generation of owners (or some of them). If the attorney represents more than one party, he or she should obtain conflict waivers and joint representation agreements as necessary. The attorney should also ensure that the parties the attorney does not represent understand that the attorney does not represent them and that they should consider obtaining the advice of independent counsel before signing documents that the attorney has drafted as part of the business succession plan.

1. Collecting Information

Before counsel begins to design a family business succession plan, counsel should review copies of current business governing documents, related party contracts, and estate planning documents that might affect governance, ownership, or succession of the business. The clients and their other advisors should help the attorney collect these documents. This process also offers clients an opportunity to get their personal and business records organized and establish procedures for keeping them organized and current. For a list of information to request, see the sidebar entitled “Due Diligence for Family Business Succession Planning.”

2. Valuation

Proper family business succession planning requires a reliable valuation of the stock of the family’s primary business entities and other important business assets when planning commences and throughout the term of family ownership. If the clients do not already have current opinions of value, counsel should help the clients obtain them. This can help the attorney and the clients avoid major mistakes in the planning process that the attorney might otherwise make if working on faulty assumptions of value.

Obtaining a current valuation can help the clients in other ways as well. The evaluation process can reveal information about the strengths and weaknesses of the clients’ business that the clients can use to improve operations and profitability. The valuation professional can also help counsel draft the most appropriate purchase price language in the clients’ buy-sell agreements. Finally, the clients can maintain their relationship with the valuation professional to obtain updated opinions on a regular basis (such as every two years) for the purposes of the clients’ buy-sell agreements and for transfers of ownership interests within the family to implement the succession plan.

3. Business Continuation Plan

If there are key family members who are particularly important to the operations or success of the family business, then early in the succession planning process, counsel should help the clients establish mechanisms to address the disruptions that would be caused by the sudden death or incapacity of one of those key family members. For example, the attorney should ensure that the controlling owner has updated powers of attorney appointing an appropriate person to vote clients’ interest if suddenly rendered incompetent; the attorney should ensure that the controlling owners’ stock designates an appropriate transfer-on-death beneficiary (such as their living trust) to avoid the delay of probate if they die during the succession planning process; and the attorney should ensure that the clients have a plan to replace the chief executive, at least on an interim basis, if he or she unexpectedly exits the business. These are temporary measures that will be replaced or supplemented by more permanent structures and procedures when the clients have made more progress on their succession plan.

4. Restructuring

After counsel reviews the existing business documents and obtains input regarding business valuation, counsel should work with the clients’ accountants to help the clients determine whether the business should be restructured or reorganized. It may be that making changes to the legal structure or tax treatment of the components of a clients’ business will facilitate succession planning. For example, it may be easier to plan transitions of ownership if the primary source of cash flow is taxed as a partnership rather than a C corporation, or if the real estate assets are held in entities that are separate from primary operations. The attorney should work with the clients’ accountants to ensure that any restructuring will be tax efficient (including income taxes and transfer taxes). Counsel must take into account other advantages of restructuring, such as limitations of liability, operational efficiencies, and diversifying ownership opportunities for family members. The attorney should include plans for how new ventures will be added to the structure in the future.

5. Governance and Buy-Sell Structures

Before updating the senior-generation owners’ estate plans with respect to the allocation of ownership among their beneficiaries, and before the senior-generation owners make additional lifetime transfers of ownership interests to members of the junior generation (or trusts for them), counsel should help the clients design the rules that will regulate governance, ownership, and owner exits after control has transitioned down from the senior generation. This includes four topics, which can be addressed in the business’s governing documents and agreements among the owners.

a. Unit Voting

The power to exercise owners’ voting rights primarily includes the power to appoint (or remove) board members and approve (or veto) major transactions. The clients should consider who should have the right to exercise owners’ voting rights. In some cases, voting units can be held in trust, to be voted by a fiduciary or a committee of fiduciaries, or the owners can sign agreements about how they will vote their units on particular issues. Governing documents can also be drafted to increase the scope of actions that require owner approval.

b. Governing Board

Members of a governing board, acting collectively, usually have the following powers: power to appoint and remove top executives and determine their compensation; power to issue dividends; and power to oversee budgets and long-range business planning, risk management, and strategic planning. The clients must decide how the board will be composed and how board members will be elected. Clients should consider the advantages of requiring an independent presence on the board, especially after members of the senior generation exit the business. Under most default rules, each board member is elected by plurality, but it may be desirable to “classify” the board so that each substantial owner can have one or two seats on the board. Governing documents can also be drafted to increase or decrease the amount of actions that the board can authorize without approval of the owners.

c. Executive Authority

Executives and officers have power and responsibility to run the day-to-day business, hire and terminate staff, develop budgets and plans for approval by the board, and sign checks and contracts, including loan agreements (within limits set by the board). While senior-generation owners are alive and competent, their status as patriarchs or matriarchs may naturally enable them to help their children and grandchildren make decisions about executive authority and compensation among family members, but after they are gone, the business’s owners and board must have a way to make decisions about the appointments, titles, duties, and compensation of family members that will be fair and will not disrupt family harmony.

d. Beneficial Ownership

Owners of business equity (which can be referred to as “beneficial owners” when considered apart from the power to vote the ownership interests (discussed above)) have the right to receive profits and appreciation from business operations. (Note: If the owners are also employees, they may receive most of their annual economic return in the form of compensation.) The clients should consider whether nonemployee family members should own shares and whether shares should be held in trust (primarily to protect them from estate taxes and claims of creditors or in the event of divorce). The clients should also decide upon mechanisms for owner exits that are fair to the exiting owners but are not disruptive to the business. The acquisition, ownership, and transfer of ownership interests, including redemptions triggered by retirement or other separation from employment at the business, should be drafted into updated governing documents.

It should be noted that although the business’s governing documents can provide the legal rules by which the business is governed and owned, the clients should also consider developing a family constitution, mission statements, and other policies that will guide decision makers when they apply the legal rules. The business’s legal documents cannot express the spirit and philosophy of the family as effectively as the principles that family members write in plain English and agree together to uphold.

6. Key Contracts

The attorney should help the clients negotiate restatements of key contracts with third parties that should (or must) be updated to be more consistent with business restructuring and anticipated changes of control or ownership. Such contracts include loan facilities and franchise/dealership agreements. The extent to which such contracts cannot be changed may affect decisions about how or when to implement other elements of the business succession plan.

The clients should also consider whether written contracts for related-party transactions would make the succession plan more effective. Such contracts may include the following: leases between the operating business and family-owned entities that hold real estate or equipment used by the operating business; debt instruments for loans from owners to the business; reimbursement/contribution agreements among the business and the owners who have personally guaranteed business debt; and employment agreements for family members who work for the business.

7. Update Senior-Generation Owners’ Estate Plans

The attorney should update the senior-generation owners’ estate planning documents, including wills and revocable trusts, consistent with business restructuring and decisions that the clients have made about future governance structures and ownership rights. Updates should address the following: specific allocation of stock/unit voting rights; specific allocation of beneficial interest in business equity; disposition of other important business and personal assets; specific use of life insurance proceeds; the source of funds needed to pay estate taxes; and the structure, funding, and amount of charitable bequests.

8. Plan for Senior-Generation Owners’ Retirement

Before the senior-generation owners transfer control and substantial equity interests to the junior generation, counsel should work with the senior generation and their financial advisors to help ensure that senior-generation members will have sufficient economic means to support them indefinitely in retirement (or in the event of disability). In particular, counsel must seek means of support, cash flow, and assets for retirement that are not dependent on the success of the next generation of owners of the family business. Although plans like unfunded deferred compensation, private annuities, or seller-financed redemptions may look good on paper, they may place disproportionate risk on members of the senior generation when they are no longer in a position to affect business outcomes.

9. Lifetime Transfers to the Next Generation

Ideally, the senior-generation owners will be able to oversee the transition of leadership and ownership of the family business to the next generation through lifetime transfers, rather than rely on post-mortem contingency planning. Counsel should work with the clients’ accountants to design lifetime transfers that are tax efficient, but the attorney should not sacrifice the financial well-being of the senior generation in a blind rush to redistribute wealth to avoid estate taxes. In most cases, a combination of diverse approaches to estate tax planning can give the clients time to implement a family business succession plan at a pace that makes business sense and is more likely to meet the long-term economic needs of the senior-generation owners and their successors.

Conclusion

Family business succession planning is complicated because it requires the clients to make many difficult decisions out of context. However, by providing the clients with an outline or blueprint of the entire process at the beginning of the representation, and by keeping that outline updated as decisions are made and projects are completed, counsel can make the process more effective, more efficient, and ultimately more successful.

Further, like a blueprint for building a house, the outline provides direction for original construction, but it does not foreclose the possibility of future modification, renovations, or improvements. As the authors of the PWC survey advise, “[O]nce a plan has been put into place, it shouldn’t be treated as a one-time event. Good succession planning involves a series of intentional, well-coordinated, strategic efforts, sustained over time . . . .”


Due Diligence for Family Business Succession Planning

At the start of a new representation with respect to family business succession planning, counsel should identify the clients’ key advisors, including accountants, financial advisors, and insurance agents. The attorney must ask the clients and their advisors for the following documents and information:

    1. Business Governing Documents. For the primary business entity and each, other family-owned entity, the following documents (including amendments):
      1. Articles of Incorporation/Organization
      2. Bylaws
      3. Shareholders’ Agreement/Operating Agreement
      4. Voting Agreements or Voting Trusts
      5. Table of current ownership
    2. Related-Party Contracts.
      1. Leases or other agreements between the business and any other family entity
      2. Any employment contracts with family members
      3. Any deferred compensation or other nonqualified retirement benefit contract between the business and a family member
      4. Any personal guarantees of the business debt
    3. Estate Planning Documents. For the senior-generation owners, the following documents:
      1. Wills
      2. Revocable Trust or Trusts
      3. Irrevocable Trust or Trusts (if any)
      4. Marital Property Agreement (if any)
      5. Powers of Attorney for Health Care
      6. Powers of Attorney for Financial Matters
    4. Business/Asset Valuation.
      1. Most recent formal or informal valuation of the business
      2. Most recent indication of value of business assets (and statement of balance of any mortgage debt)
      3. All substantial loan facilities for business debt and related security documents
    5. Senior-Generation Owner Financials.
      1. Statement of assets and liabilities
      2. Summaries of retirement plan assets and benefits, including Social Security, deferred compensation, and any pensions
      3. All contracts of insurance on the life of any senior-generation owner, including policy owner, beneficiary designations, pledges or assignments, and in-force illustrations
    6. Family Governance Documents.
      1. Family constitution, family mission statement, family employment policy, family counsel charter
      2. Family (charitable) foundation documents, donor advised fund contracts, or other collective charitable giving information

FINRA Delays Required Collateralization of TBAs and Other MBS Forwards

On September 19, 2017, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a proposed rule change to delay until June 2018 the implementation date of certain amendments to FINRA Rule 4210. When the amendments to Rule 4210 are implemented, they will require the collateralization of many forward transactions involving mortgage-backed securities (MBS). The proposed rule change  effectively pushes back the date for compliance with Rule 4210’s collateralization requirements from December 15, 2017, to June 25, 2018.

Before FINRA’s decision to delay the implementation of Rule 4210’s margining requirements, the impending effectiveness of those requirements led market participants to rush to update their documentation for their MBS forward transactions. In its proposed rule change, FINRA stated that industry participants had requested additional time to amend their contractual documentation and to make required systems changes as necessary to come into compliance with amended Rule 4210. FINRA noted that it had received questions regarding the implementation of Rule 4210’s collateralization requirements, had engaged in extensive discussions with industry participants and other regulators, and had made available a set of Frequently Asked Questions to facilitate market participants’ compliance efforts.

When revised Rule 4210 goes into effect, it will require margining of “Covered Agency Transactions,” a term that includes (i) “To Be Announced,” or TBA, transactions in certain securities where the parties agree that the seller will deliver to the buyer securities representing a pool or pools meeting certain criteria, but the specific securities to be delivered at settlement are not specified at the time of execution, for which the difference between the trade date and contractual settlement date is greater than one business day; (ii) “Specified Pool Transactions” in certain securities that are specified at the time of the execution, for which the difference between the trade date and contractual settlement date is greater than one business day; and (iii) transactions in certain collateralized mortgage obligations for which the difference between the trade date and contractual settlement date is greater than three business days.

Rule 4210, when its amendments are implemented, will require differing amounts of margin depending on the types of market participants that are parties to a transaction. For transactions between a FINRA member and an “exempt account,” such as a registered broker-dealer, Rule 4210 in many cases will require the member to collect margin corresponding to changes in mark-to-market value (that is, variation margin). In contrast, in relation to transactions between a FINRA member and other, “non-exempt” accounts, Rule 4210 in many cases will require the member to collect both margin based on changes in mark-to-market value and “maintenance margin,” generally defined as 2 percent of the contract value of the relevant net “long” or net “short” position. As amended, Rule 4210 will in each case place the obligation to collect margin solely on the FINRA member, although it will contain no prohibition on “two-way,” or reciprocal, margining for MBS forwards.

Most market participants have opted to update their documentation for MBS forwards by means of the Master Securities Forward Transaction Agreement published in December 2012 by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association. The Treasury Market Practices Group, an industry group sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, helped to spur the move toward collateralizing such forward transactions starting in 2012, when it recommended margining such transactions to reduce counterparty and systemic risks.

Corporate Governance and Information Gaps: Importance of Internal Reporting for Board Oversight

Introduction

The evolution of corporate governance and board of directors’ responsibilities continues. Recent years’ actions of shareowner activist groups and securities regulators—and reports of shareowner votes in corporate annual meetings thus far in 2017—provide many indications of ongoing growth in public expectations for the roles and performance of corporate boards of directors.

The existence and responsibilities of specialized committees on boards of directors have also continued to evolve. In addition to long-established types of board committees such as the audit, finance, compensation, risk management, and nominating and governance committees, we now see committees being formed to address such issues as science, technology and innovation, cybersecurity, health, safety and security, environment and sustainability, regulatory compliance and public policy, and other contemporary concerns. While these topics are all valid issues to consider in the oversight of today’s corporations, one wonders how many committees one board of directors can effectively administer and support. And how can numerous board committees successfully monitor corporate issues and developments and report on these matters in periodic board meetings?

In the face of growing expectations, further questions arise regarding whether boards today are receiving and utilizing adequate information and support to address their oversight responsibilities. It seems that nearly every week brings another news report about a breakdown in corporate ethics and controls as well as performance failures across a wide range of industries.

Recent events at Volkswagen and the public blowup at a well-known and seemingly successful “new economy” company, Uber, leading to the resignation of its co-founder and CEO, are two notable examples. The total fallout and remedies for these and other performance and governance failures are yet to be fully determined.

Upon reading about each new incident, one is prompted to ask, how could the directors in these companies not have been aware of serious problems? Did something go wrong in communications and information flows that let this happen?

Somehow, somewhere, it seems evident that there must have been some serious gaps in information supplied to the board, or possibly in board understanding and reactions to such information.

A deficiency in information supplied to boards calls into question whether boards today are in fact able to serve as an effective check and balance in the governance of public corporations.

Over the years, courts and eminent legal authorities have repeatedly emphasized the significant responsibilities of boards for oversight of the management of public companies. In the words of former Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey, stockholders should have the right to expect that “the board of directors will actually direct and monitor the management of the company, including strategic business and fundamental structural changes.”

Delaware Supreme Court Chancellor William B. Chandler also noted the significant oversight role of the board in his widely publicized opinion in the Disney Corporation Shareowner derivative suit concerning the hiring, compensation, and firing of Michael Ovitz. Chandler stated, “Delaware law is clear that the business and affairs of a corporation are managed by or under the direction of its board of directors. The business judgment rule serves to protect and promote the role of the board as the ultimate manager of the corporation.”

The “ultimate manager of the corporationthose are very strong words. Some might debate the terminology, preferring instead a phrase like “the ultimate overseer of the corporation.” But whether one uses “ultimate manager” or “ultimate overseer” as a designation, it is clear that a board of directors has significant responsibilities for the welfare of the corporation and its stakeholders.

Serving as an “ultimate manager” or “ultimate overseer” requires appropriate information flows to support that role. While there are different types of information flows, this article will focus on financial information supplied to boards of directors. We will also discuss two types of information gaps —quantity and quality—that can make it difficult for board members to carry out their oversight responsibilities.

Quantity of Information—How much is the right amount? Who decides?

In considering quantity, we must first ask these questions: how much information is needed for an oversight body to perform its functions, especially for a board or a board committee with a critical role in ensuring the welfare of the corporation and the interests of its shareholders? How much information is it realistic to expect a part-time body composed mostly of people from a range of industries, institutions, and professions, that typically meets four to six times a year, to absorb and act upon?

Who decides what data elements will be in the directors’ regular information package supplied for the board’s periodic meetings? And who decides when special circumstances warrant additional information, and what that information should be? How involved are board members in determining and specifying how much information they will receive for various purposes, when, and in what form?

Commonly, when a company is established, the founders and sponsors will work with the initial senior management to lay out a proposed structure for its board, including the board committees that will exist therein and the charters for those committees. The company’s management will develop and offer up what they believe to be an appropriate information package for periodic board meetings. Then as time progresses, board members and board committees will ask for whatever else they think they need to carry out effective oversight.

Issues that may subsequently arise include situations in which different directors may have different views on the amount of information they should receive, creating a need for agenda management, customized information support, or other measures. And changing circumstances, special events, and unexpected conditions may suddenly create a change in the quantity of information needed—as in the case of an unexpected (and possibly unwelcome) tender offer for the company’s stock, or when an unexpected corporate crisis occurs.

A sizeable amount of routine and ongoing financial information to be supplied to boards is mandated by regulators of public companies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the stock exchanges. Beyond these mandates, the issue of optimum quantity and optimum design of board information is to be determined by each organization. In answering the question, board committees today often utilize the services of outside counsel and other advisors to identify the information that they should be requesting to support their oversight obligations. They may also use external service providers to assist in performing assessments of internal board processes on a periodic basis.

Quality of Information Supplied to the Board—Issues in Measuring Financial Performance

A next question is “what kind of information is needed?” In regard to quality of information, one must consider the nature of the information being supplied, what matters are covered, and how understandable the information is. The timeliness of information is also important. On one hand, board members will want to receive information sufficiently in advance of a meeting to review and absorb it properly. On the other hand, sometimes last-minute developments can affect information previously provided, and there will be a need to ensure that directors receive up-to-date information.

Common components of board information include information about an organization’s market and business strategy, risk management, measures of financial and operational performance, control structures, management processes, and human resources issues. All of these components of information are important. In particular, providing the right kind of financial information is an essential part of overseeing a company’s performance and prospects.

The design and use of financial and operational measures can be complex. For a publicly held company, a first obvious requirement for financial information to be supplied to the board is the company’s external financial statements and disclosures reported to investors, for which board review is mandated by securities regulators. These financial statements and disclosures are prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and supplemented by additional information required by regulators. The information mandated by GAAP and regulators is both voluminous and complex.

GAAP financial statements are widely used, important, and necessary, but they are not sufficient to oversee and manage a specific business effectively.

GAAP financial statements are the end product of elaborate and lengthy national and international standards-setting processes that are designed to achieve consensus among professional accountants, investors, and other stakeholders on how best to portray the value and performance of reporting entities across companies and industries. The resulting body of knowledge utilizes a very broad spectrum of concepts, principles, and rules.

GAAP accounting standards represent the eminent thinking and careful deliberation of many experts. The standards are important for broad cross-company use, as they seek to provide a uniform benchmark for external comparisons by investors. Yet despite the rigor underlying their preparation, GAAP financial statements are inadequate for understanding and running a particular business at a particular point in time, because they are static and often complex and inflexible.

Economic theory tells us that the division of labor is specific to an organization at a point in time. Similarly, corporate governance structures and processes, and operational needs and priorities, are specific to a firm at a point in time. The oversight responsibilities of boards of directors constitute an important check and balance in an organization’s ongoing governance structure and operational control system, and such a control system must consider more than GAAP financial statements. Boards require information that is relevant to addressing their oversight responsibilities, and information that is clear and understandable.

Boards regularly receive information provided to them by management. If this information primarily takes the form of GAAP financial data, it is likely that they are not obtaining a full picture of the business. In order to oversee, understand, and run a business effectively, one needs to look at performance measures in addition to GAAP. This need has led to custom-tailored internal financial reporting measures used by management and directors of an enterprise. Such internal reporting can be a flexible system, portraying not only standard recurring measures used by management but also selected aspects of operations of particular importance at one time or another. Internal reporting can make certain adjustments to results to consider unit-controllable results and thereby provide additional context and insight into the performance of both business units and the total company. Internal unit reporting may focus on actual versus budgeted cash flows more than unit gross profit or accounting net income.

Non-GAAP Measures in External Reporting

Because adjusted “Non-GAAP” results can be illuminating and useful to management and directors, some measures may be reported externally to the public and investors, as well as inside the business. However, Non-GAAP measures used in external reporting have at times been challenged by regulators as misleading to investors, on the basis that such measures were portraying only “good news” and/or were obscuring less favorable performance. There is a substantial body of information from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission providing guidance on proper use of Non-GAAP measures in external reporting and also describing SEC enforcement actions for misuse. On the international front, the International Organization of Securities Commissions, a worldwide body of securities regulators in both developed and emerging markets, has also issued pronouncements about Non-GAAP reporting. Entry of “Non-GAAP” in the search boxes on these organization’s websites, www.sec.gov and www.iosco.org, will bring up a host of documents providing guidance about what is and is not considered acceptable for public reporting of such measures.

This article will not attempt to cover the subject on Non-GAAP further beyond making these two statements: (1) Non-GAAP measures have a useful and legitimate place in reporting about a business, both internally and externally, but care must be taken so they do not mislead investors and other users. (2) A company’s board of directors would be well-advised to understand how a company’s Non-GAAP measures are developed and used, and why they are viewed as meaningful in assessing corporate performance. In particular, it is advisable for a board to understand any corporate use of measures that have been challenged by regulators, such as “free cash flow” or “net income excluding the effect of one-time charges,” when used in external reporting to investors. The latter has at times been challenged because the label “one-time” is debatable if such charges have occurred repeatedly, as is sometimes the case with restructuring charges.

Using Internal Reporting Design and Cash Flow Monitoring to Understand and Manage Effectively

Ideally, an organization’s internal reporting should identify and illuminate the relevant elements of financial and operational performance that are important to the company’s success. A good design for internal reporting can also be used to encourage the behaviors and actions that contribute to company success. However, there is an important caveat to be observed when using internal reporting for performance incentive purposes: a design for internal reporting and incentives that fails to consider risks that exist and controls that need to be present can have disastrous consequences.

The design of a company’s internal reporting system to managers and directors is inherently unique to each company. Guidance can be gleaned from benchmarking and understanding the approaches used in peer companies and others and from business publications, but ultimately each company must find its own best design to assess and understand performance. And a best design often needs revision over time, in light of changing needs and circumstances.

Cash Flow Monitoring—A Key Measure of Performance

An important part of performance measurement that sometimes receives insufficient attention in internal reporting to a company’s board of directors is cash flow monitoring. Cash flows are the lifeblood of a business. Not for nothing do we often hear the phrase “cash is king.”

Understanding how to interpret cash flows and monitoring cash closely is essential for overseeing and managing a business. Whether a business is a large, multinational, mega-billion-dollar corporation, a mid-size public or private company or partnership, or a small owner and founder-run enterprise, failure to track and manage cash flows effectively can seriously disrupt or even bankrupt a company. Cash flows can be effectively measured in a timely manner, and a comparison of budgeted to actual receipts and disbursements can often give a much clearer financial picture than reported revenues and expenses and net income on a GAAP income statement. Discussions on the causes of cash flow variances can uncover problems and opportunities without need for approximations or adjustments. The cash flows either did or did not occur within the particular time period.

Operational and capital cash flows are concrete results not easily subject to manipulation. Thus, they can serve as a safeguard against efforts to manipulate income through revisions in accruals or reclassifications of operating expenses to capital expenditures. They also can avoid misunderstanding of results that include unbudgeted one-time charges or have been adjusted to exclude such charges. Accurate cash flow information can also help to highlight possible weaknesses in controls and negative developments not readily apparent in income statement measures, as in a case where a strong corporate emphasis on customer sales growth, combined with a relaxing of the company’s product financing and credit-granting controls, may be increasing risk to an unacceptable level, for example.

Company CFOs, treasurers and controllers should work together to devise appropriate internal processes and teams for budgeting and measuring cash flows and analyzing anomalies – and for explaining cash flow information to the board in an understandable manner. Relevant board committees such as the Finance Committee, Audit Committee, and Nominating and Governance Committee will have a significant interest in receiving such information in their check-and-balance and governance roles. Internal audit and the external auditor may also provide input to enhance controls and accuracy.

Cash flow information can be very complex; for example, the Statement of Cash Flows that is presented in GAAP is viewed by some as arcane and difficult to understand. However, through effective internal measurement and reporting, companies can develop effective methods for presenting cash flow data and interpreting it for the board. For a more detailed discussion on cash flow monitoring and reporting, including a model for presenting such data, the reader is referred to an earlier article on this subject by one of the authors—see “Cash Flow Monitoring as a Governance Tool” in THE CORPORATE BOARD, March/April 2010.

Corporate and Director Obligations for Public Reporting and Disclosure

Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the later Dodd-Frank Act, many obligations have been created for public company reporting to investors, and also for board of directors’ review of such reporting. Extensive and explicit documentation of such requirements exists in regulatory pronouncements and business and professional publications. Less explicitly defined are the requirements pertaining to board review of financial information that could influence an investor’s decision to buy or sell stock in a company—what is termed “material information” by the SEC and other regulators– as that information arises. For example, what are the obligations of a director who becomes aware of material information in board meeting discussions that the company’s executives do not feel is yet ready to be disclosed to the public? Consultation with corporate counsel may be needed in such situations.

Appropriate and timely reporting to investors is the direct obligation of a public company’s management. However, board oversight of this important obligation also requires a degree of knowledge about what should be done and when. A detailed discussion of this subject is beyond the scope of this article; however, it is a matter for which directors can request explanations from a company’s CFO, auditors, and general counsel.

Conclusion

Today’s boards of directors live in a time of growing oversight responsibilities and expectations. The likelihood of meeting these expectations can be enhanced if board members have a clear understanding of a company and its financial performance, cash flows, and prospects. Gaps in financial information can undermine a board’s ability to perform its role as an important check and balance in the governance and operation of the company. A well-designed internal reporting system for measuring and reporting financial performance, coupled with vigilant and active board interest, supports board effectiveness in carrying out oversight responsibilities. Well-designed internal financial reporting processes and cash-flow monitoring are important components of an effective board information system.