Does It Matter How I Pay?

Introduction

There seemingly are lots of new ways to make payments today. New apps for smart phones, new peer-to-peer payment networks, new currencies, and new ledger systems offer to meet the needs of U.S. consumers and businesses in ways that legacy payment methods do not. Many of these new ways to pay have improved end-user experience by providing more convenient or intuitive ways to initiate payments through legacy systems (such as the ability to accept card payments through a device that connects to a phone). In other cases, the underlying payment system through which payments are made is new (such as the ability to pay someone instantly with virtual currency through a distributed ledger system).

It does matter how you pay; however, the part that matters—from a legal perspective—is not the means of initiation (i.e., payment via mobile app) or infrastructure (i.e., blockchain), but rather who is providing the payment service to the payor and payee and the characteristics of the payment service.

This article’s focus is how payment-system and consumer-protection laws apply (or do not apply) to some of the new ways to pay. It should be noted that there are other important legal and regulatory frameworks that apply to payments, such as financial privacy, cyber and information security, Bank Secrecy Act/anti-money laundering, and economic sanctions, all of which are beyond the scope of this article.

The Legal Framework for Payments

One’s legal rights and responsibilities as a payor or payee for noncash payments are determined by payment-system laws—statutory, regulatory, and contractual. For example, if a payor instructs payment for $100, but through error or fraud the payee is instead paid $1,000, payment-system laws will determine who among the various parties to the payment takes the loss for the extra $900 received by the payee. When consumers are a payor or payee, certain statutory and regulatory consumer-protection laws may also apply to the payment.

Payment-System Laws

With respect to payment-system laws, it should come as no surprise that different laws apply to different types of payments. At the state level, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Articles 3 and 4 serve as the foundational laws for checks, and UCC Article 4A establishes the laws for wholesale wire transfers. These state laws generally may be supplemented or varied by agreement of the parties involved, or by clearinghouse or funds transfer system rule. For example, banks and image clearinghouses generally adopt the Electronic Check Clearing House Organization Rules (ECCHO Rules) to modify and supplement rights and responsibilities under the UCC to address issues unique to the interbank exchange of check images. Note, however, that the ability to vary the UCC by agreement or by clearinghouse or funds transfer system rule is not unlimited. For one thing, the UCC obligation to act in good faith may not be waived.

There is no statutory framework that serves as the basis for exchange of electronic debits through the Automated Clearing House (ACH) system, although commercial credits fall under UCC 4A. Banks rely on the Operating Rules of the National Automated Clearing House Association (NACHA), as adopted into ACH operator rules, both to establish the framework for the debits and to supplement the UCC 4A framework for commercial credits.

It is important to note that the scope of the laws and rules governing traditional noncash payment mechanisms—funds transfers, ACH, and checks—includes bank customers and banks, but does not necessarily contemplate or apply to nonbanks that serve as intermediaries to payors and payees or payments that are made through nonbank networks. Thus, the funds transfer process, under article 4A and the Federal Reserve’s Regulation J, begins with an instruction by an originator to its bank to pay or to cause another bank to pay a beneficiary, and the funds transfer ends when a bank for the beneficiary accepts an instruction to pay its customer. Likewise, the check collection process under article 4 and the Federal Reserve’s Regulations J and CC begins when an item is deposited with a depository bank, and typically ends when the payor bank pays the item. Similarly, under NACHA’s rules, an ACH payment begins with an authorization provided by a customer of a bank, is initiated to an ACH operator by a sending bank, and ends when the receiving bank has received and settled for the payment.

As further discussed below, this means that payment-system laws will not completely address—or may not address at all—issues that may arise for payors and payees whose payments do not begin and end at a bank.

Consumer-Protection Laws

With respect to consumer-protection laws, the primary federal laws in the payments area are: (i) the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) and its implementing regulation, Regulation E, for consumer payments made via debit cards, ACH, payroll cards, prepaid accounts, and other consumer electronic funds transfers (discussed further below); and (ii) the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and its implementing regulation, Regulation Z, for consumer payments via credit cards. These federal laws and regulations establish certain baseline consumer protections, such as disclosures, periodic statements, and most relevant to this article, limitation of liability for unauthorized payments and error-resolution requirements. These consumer protections generally cannot be varied by agreement.

Historically, the payments laws and consumer-protection laws described above provide mutually exclusive legal frameworks governing consumer funds transfers. In particular, the scope of article 4A by its own terms (Section 4A-108) generally excludes from its coverage funds transfers, any part of which is governed by EFTA. In turn, EFTA and Regulation E govern consumer funds transfers—specifically, “electronic fund transfers,” which include essentially any electronic transfer of funds to or from a consumer account, but excludes funds transfers sent by a financial institution on behalf of a consumer through a wholesale payment system (that is, a funds transfer system that is not designed primarily to transfer funds on behalf of consumers), such as a wire transfer system—as a result, those transfers would be covered by article 4A. In recent years, however, most state legislatures have taken steps to amend article 4A to permit some overlap with EFTA with respect to certain remittance transfers that became covered by EFTA and Regulation E as a result of the Dodd Frank Act.

In addition, federal consumer-protection laws historically were tied to payments made to or from consumer accounts held at banks. However, Regulation E’s remittance-transfer provisions apply to remittance-transfer providers that are both banks and nonbanks. Similarly, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) finalized a new rule in early October that applies Regulation E’s disclosure, periodic statement, limitation of liability, and error-resolution requirements to prepaid accounts, regardless of whether the prepaid account is held by a bank or a nonbank. Specifically, the revised regulation defines a prepaid account to include a variety of payment products, including general purpose prepaid cards and nonbank payment services, such as digital wallets and payment networks, that involve an account that is either issued on a prepaid basis or capable of holding consumer funds. The new provisions become effective April 1, 2018 (although the CFPB also recently announced its decision to revisit certain substantive issues in the rule), and will cover many, but not all, nonbank payment services. Among the payment services that will fall outside the rule are those that only facilitate payments, but do not require consumers to have accounts with the service provider.

For payment services provided by nonbanks that fall outside the CFPB’s prepaid rule and remittance transfer rule, a consumer’s rights and responsibilities as a payor or payee primarily will be determined by the contractual terms that apply to the payment service. However, the consumer may have Regulation E protections for parts of a nonbank payment if the nonbank payment involves funds transfers to or from the consumer’s bank or prepaid account.

Some Examples

The scenarios below illustrate how a payor’s legal rights and responsibilities may vary depending upon whose payment service the payor uses.

Hypothetical 1: Person-to-Person Payment

CoolPay is a nonbank payment service that provides CoolPay accounts to its users and enables them to send funds to each other through its service. CoolPay makes payments in two ways. If a payor-user has funds in his or her CoolPay account, CoolPay will pay the payee through a book transfer: i.e., a debit entry to the payor’s CoolPay account and a credit entry to the payee’s Cool-Pay account. If a payor-user does not have funds in his or her account, CoolPay will initiate an ACH debit to the payor-user’s bank account and then credit the payee-user’s CoolPay account once CoolPay’s bank account is credited for the ACH debit it sent to the payor-user’s bank account.

Jane and George are CoolPay users. Jane uses CoolPay to send George $100 for his birthday. Although Jane is a CoolPay user, she does not keep funds in her CoolPay account. Hence, to effectuate the payment, CoolPay instructs its bank, Bank A, to send an ACH debit for $100 to Jane’s bank, Bank B. Once Bank A receives settlement from Bank B for the ACH debit, it credits CoolPay’s bank account. CoolPay then credits George’s CoolPay account for $100. What if CoolPay makes a mistake and credits Ted’s CoolPay account rather than George’s?

Given that CoolPay provides a payment service that enables consumers to hold funds in CoolPay accounts, CoolPay will be subject to the new prepaid account requirements of Regulation E, including its disclosure and error-resolution requirements, when it goes into effect. The rule will require CoolPay to: (i) disclose to Jane that she has error-resolution rights; and (ii) investigate the error upon timely notice from Jane that her bank account has been debited, but that George has not received his birthday money. CoolPay generally will be required to investigate and determine whether an error occurred within 10 days of Jane’s notice. If CoolPay determines that an error occurred, it must correct the error within one business day of such determination.

Note that, until the CFPB’s prepaid rule is effective, Jane’s ability to seek redress from CoolPay will be determined by the terms and conditions governing Jane’s use of the CoolPay service or possibly her state’s money transmission laws. It should further be noted that, due to the fact that the debit to Jane’s bank account was in the correct amount, it is unlikely that Jane could have sought redress from her bank for CoolPay’s error because the debit was authorized, in the correct amount, and her bank made no error is transmitting the funds to CoolPay’s account with Bank A.

It is also the case that, if CoolPay acted as only a payment facilitator and did not hold consumer funds in CoolPay accounts, the CFPB’s prepaid rule will not be applicable to Jane’s payment. She would again look to the terms and conditions of CoolPay’s service and her state’s money transmission laws for redress.

Hypothetical 2: Business-to-Business Payment

Company A and Company B are CoolPay users. Company A instructs CoolPay to pay Company B $10,000 via transfer from Company A’s CoolPay account to Company B’s CoolPay account. Company A has sufficient funds credited to its CoolPay account to pay for the transfer without the need to debit Company A’s bank account. Hence, CoolPay debits Company A’s CoolPay account for $10,000. However, CoolPay erroneously credits Company C’s CoolPay account rather than Company B’s CoolPay account.

If CoolPay were a bank, this type of error would be an error in execution. Under article 4A, if Company A’s bank paid a party other than the beneficiary Company A identified in its payment instruction, Company A would be entitled to a refund under article 4A’s money-back guarantee provisions for the amount of the payment. Company A’s bank could seek to recover the amount from Company C, but it would be required to refund Company A regardless of whether it does so. Under article 4A, the bank would not be permitted to vary its obligation to refund Company A by agreement.

In the absence of article 4A, the rights of Company A and CoolPay will be governed by the terms and conditions of CoolPay’s service, other agreements among the parties, and common law. In addition, if CoolPay’s terms are not favorable to Company A, it may find itself in court arguing by analogy to article 4A that CoolPay must provide a refund. If Company A is unable to recover from CoolPay, it may also be able to recover from Company C under CoolPay’s terms or common-law theories, but Company C, its jurisdiction, and a number of other factors will be completely unknown to Company A.

Hypothetical 3: Business-to-Business Payment with Distributed Ledger

Let us add a variation to the previous two examples where CoolPay provided payment services to the payor and payee: What if instead it is simply banks providing those services? Does it matter if those banks, in turn, choose to use a fundamentally new infrastructure, such as blockchain, to settle with each other?

Suppose Company A wishes to pay Company B $10,000 for products that it purchased. Company A has an account with Bank A, and Company B has an account with Bank B. Company A opts to make that $10,000 payment by a funds transfer from its account at Bank A to Company B’s account at Bank B. The funds transfer begins with a debit to Company A’s account on Bank A’s books (funds are withdrawn from the payor’s account), and ends with a credit to Company B’s account on Bank B’s books (funds are deposited into the payee’s account).

Suppose, however, that Bank A and Bank B do not have a direct relationship with each other that enables Bank A to credit an account it holds for Bank B, or for Bank B to debit an account it holds for Bank A. Instead, they choose to use blockchain technology—CoolChain—to clear and settle payment from Bank A to Bank B in real time on their own books. A detailed description of how the banks may use blockchain technology in this way is provided in a March 2016 article by Jessie Cheng and Benjamin Geva. In essence, blockchain technology allows banks with no direct relationship to establish trust and coordinate their actions to settle with each other.

Does the fact that the banks in the funds transfer opt to use CoolChain, rather than a traditional funds transfer system like CHIPS or Fedwire, to transact with each other in this way mean that the payment is outside the scope of article 4A? Not necessarily. Article 4A focuses on the type of entities involved, not the means by which they transact with each other. The primary focus of article 4A is the “funds transfer,” the transfer of bank credit from the payor to the payee. The hypothetical above—where Company A transmits an instruction to its bank, Bank A, to pay or cause another bank to pay Company B—falls within article 4A’s definition of “funds transfer” in section 4A-104. This remains so even where Bank A and Bank B happen to choose to use CoolChain or any other blockchain technology to settle with each other. That transfer is still a series of transactions, beginning with Company A’s payment order (Company A’s instructions to Bank A to pay or cause another bank, like Bank B, to pay a fixed amount of money to Company B) made for the purpose of making payment to Company B, the beneficiary of the order. Thus, Bank A’s and Bank B’s choice to use CoolChain to settle with each other would not remove the transfer from the ambit of article 4A.

Although article 4A can be read to apply to a funds transfer involving blockchain rails as a general matter, the application of the technology varies from blockchain to blockchain, and each implementation must be analyzed to determine whether or precisely how certain of its concepts map onto an article 4A framework. Thus, might the legacy article 4A concepts of “funds transfer system” apply to a network of banks that all use CoolChain and together agree to a certain set of payment rules governing their interbank rights and obligations? As described above, one could interpret section 4A-105(a)(5)’s definition of “funds transfer system” and its official commentary to say “yes,” even though the official commentary has not been updated to specifically recognize emerging systems that fundamentally differ from legacy payment rails. The same may not be true of another blockchain rail.

Conclusion

The robust competition for payment services in the United States offers consumers and businesses many ways to pay. However, the legal framework that applies to payments, and that ultimately determines the rights and responsibilities of consumers and businesses when they make and receive payments, is dependent upon a combination of whether the payments begin and end at a bank and, for consumers, the characteristics of the payment service.

Update to Primer on Canadian Foreign Investment Rules

In an April 2016 article in Business Law Today, we provided a primer on foreign investment regulation in Canada, an important issue in Canadian cross-border M&A transactions. Foreign investment primarily is regulated through the Investment Canada Act (ICA) and its regulations (although some sectors like banking have separate rules, and other statutes regulating foreign investment may also apply). In the ensuing year, a number of significant changes have occurred or have been announced by the Canadian federal government and are addressed below. It should be noted that this article discusses the ICA and its regulations generally and does not discuss a number of exceptions and nuances affecting its application, including the regime applicable to investments by foreign state-owned enterprises. All currency conversions in this article are made as of March 28, 2017.

Review Thresholds

As explained in the April 2016 article, under the ICA, the acquisition of control of a Canadian business by a nonCanadian triggers either a (usually pre-closing) review or a (usually post-closing) notification process. The review process generally is triggered if the value of the Canadian business exceeds an applicable threshold, which can vary on a number of factors.

As part of its 2016 Fall Economic Statement, other than for investments by foreign state-owned (or influenced) enterprises (SOEs), the Canadian government committed to increasing the threshold applicable to a direct acquisition of a Canadian business by nationals of World Trade Organization (WTO) member states, which would include a U.S. company ultimately controlled by U.S. nationals. This threshold for review has changed significantly over the last few years, shifting even more transactions into the notification process and thereby reducing ICA compliance costs. In March 2015, this threshold was changed, from one based on the book value of assets of the Canadian business, to a threshold based on the “enterprise value” of the Canadian business, and a planned increase schedule was set out. In its 2016 Fall Economic Statement and again in its 2017 budget, the Canadian government committed to increasing this threshold even more quickly than originally planned, as shown in the table below.

Applicable Period

March 2015 Amendments

2016 Fall Economic Statement and 2017 Federal Budget Proposal

April 24, 2015 to April 23, 2017

Enterprise Value of C$600million (approximately US$448 million)

N/A

April 24, 2017 to April 23, 2019

Enterprise Value of C$800 million (approximately US$597 million)

Enterprise Value of C$1 billion1 (approximately US$747 million)

April 24, 2019 to December 31, 2020

Enterprise Value of C$1 billion (approximately US$747 million)

Indexed annually to GDP growth2

January 1, 2021

Indexed annually to GDP growth

 

  1. Upon enactment of budget implementation legislation, anticipated in the spring or fall of 2017.
  2. On a date to be determined (likely January 1, 2019).

The Canadian government also is in the process of implementing the recently negotiated Canada and European Union (EU) Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), which will increase the threshold for nationals of EU member states. Once in force, CETA will increase the enterprise threshold for nationals of EU member states to C$1.5 billion (approximately US$1.12 billion). A number of countries, including the United States and Mexico, have trade agreements with Canada that contain most-favored-nation protection, with the result that nationals of these countries will also benefit from this substantially increased enterprise value threshold. The legislation in Canada to implement the CETA currently is expected to be in force as early as late June 2017.

An indirect acquisition of a Canadian business (i.e., through the acquisition of its foreign corporate parent) by nationals of WTO-member states, including the United States, with limited exceptions, are exempt from review.

An important exception to these rules on direct and indirect acquisitions remains where the Canadian business is engaged, even if only partially, in the activities of a “cultural business.” A direct acquisition of a cultural business continues to be subject to review where the book value of the Canadian business’ assets exceeds C$5 million (approximately US$3.7 million), and an indirect acquisition of a cultural business continues to be subject to review where the book value of such assets exceeds C$50 million (approximately US$37 million), although in the case of the latter, the review may be done post-transaction and therefore is not an impediment to closing.

Some Clarity on National Security Review

As explained in the April 2016 article, the national security review process allows the Canadian government to review investments where it has “reasonable grounds to believe” that the investment “could be injurious to national security.” Any investment in Canada by a non-Canadian investor can trigger this process regardless of: (i) whether it is reviewable or notifiable according to the rules above; (ii) whether by a U.S. or other investor; (iii) whether it is for the establishment of a new Canadian business, the acquisition of control of a Canadian business, or the acquisition of a minority interest in a Canadian business; and (iv) the dollar value of the transaction. This means that a minority investment in a Canadian business, regardless of its size, could trigger a national security review. This process is, to a certain extent, the Canadian equivalent to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) regulations.

The concept of “could be injurious to national security” is not defined in the ICA or its regulations and, until recently, the Canadian government did not provide any guidance on what it considered “could be injurious to national security” (other than certain statistics on the frequency and outcomes of national security reviews). On December 19, 2016, the Canadian government delivered on a promise, made in the previously noted 2016 Fall Economic Statement, to make the national security review process more transparent by publishing Guidelines on the National Security Review of Investments (the Guidelines), which identify the following nine, nonexhaustive factors that will be taken into account in determining whether foreign investments could be injurious to national security: (i) the potential effects of the investment on Canada’s defense capabilities and interests; (ii) the potential effects of the investment on the transfer of sensitive technology or know-how outside of Canada; (iii) the involvement in the research, manufacture, or sale of goods/technology relating to certain controlled goods noted in the Defence Production Act, including firearms, military training equipment, certain types of aircraft, weaponry and defense systems, etc.; (iv) the potential impact of the investment on the security of Canada’s critical infrastructure, meaning the processes, systems, facilities, technologies, networks, assets, and services essential to the health, safety, security, or economic well-being of Canadians and the effective functioning of government; (v) the potential impact of the investment on the supply of critical goods and services to Canadians, or the supply of goods and services to the Canadian government; (vi) the potential of the investment to enable foreign surveillance or espionage; (vii) the potential of the investment to hinder current or future intelligence or law enforcement operations; (viii) the potential impact of the investment on Canada’s international interests, including foreign relationships; and (ix) the potential of the investment to involve or facilitate the activities of illicit actors, such as terrorists, terrorist organizations, or organized crime.

The Canadian government’s 2017 budget also announced an intention to require the publication of an annual report on the administration of the ICA’s national security.

The Guidelines also provide recommendations for dealing with national security. For example, the ICA contains no formal preclearance mechanism, which is a significant distinction between the Canadian national security regime and the CFIUS regime. To address this issue, the Guidelines recommend that foreign investors file their ICA notifications “early” and prior to the deadlines set out by statute, even though this is not required by law, particularly in cases where the assessment factors described above may be present. By doing such a filing on a preclosing basis and waiting for 45 days to elapse following the filing of such notification, if no action is taken, the investor can proceed with closing knowing that the period within which a national security review could be ordered has expired. Note, however, that this “early filing option” is not available unless an investment triggers a notification (or economic review) requirement. Where no notification (or review) is required (for example, the acquisition of minority interest in a Canadian business where there is no acquisition of control by the non-Canadian investor within the meaning of the ICA), the 45-day period for triggering the national review process runs from implementation of the investment, which precludes the early filing option for obtaining comfort. Nevertheless, early engagement with the government may still be beneficial in securing meaningful comfort from the government. Such engagement allows the government an opportunity to examine the investment and to ask questions of the investor, which, even absent explicit pronouncement from the government, may allow the investor to make meaningful inferences about the government’s assessment of whether the investment would be injurious to national security.

Conclusion

The proposed change to the ICA’s enterprise value thresholds will result in fewer transactions subject to review, and the Guidelines provide additional clarity on national security review. Understanding the ICA’s regulation of foreign investment is important because sanctions can include fines and even a reversal of the transaction (although the authors are not aware of this remedy ever having been used by the Canadian government). It is also important to consult with a Canadian legal advisor, given that many other federal and provincial laws can affect the implementation of an M&A transaction.

Colman v. Theranos, Inc.: Expanding the Reach of California Securities Law Claims to Indirect Purchasers in Private Companies

Until the 1930s, securities purchasers looked solely to state securities laws—so-called Blue Sky Laws—for protection against securities fraud. That all changed after the Crash of 1929, when the federal securities laws were enacted and came to dominate the field in the ensuing decades. But state securities laws have made a bit of comeback in recent years, and an April 2017 decision out of a California federal court may continue to fuel their rise. Colman v. Theranos, Inc. The Theranos court found that indirect purchasers of securities—those who invest in a fund that in turn purchases securities from a company—can sue that company. The decision raises a number of important questions for both issuers of securities—especially large private companies—and the many funds that buy directly into them.

A brief review of the facts will set the stage. Theranos is a privately held life sciences company recently thrust into the national spotlight over questions about the legitimacy of its business. Plaintiffs in the case had invested money in two different private funds expressly formed to invest in the company. One fund acquired stock directly from Theranos; the other acquired its stock on the secondary market. Plaintiffs’ purchases came amid a publicity campaign about Theranos that, allegedly, was designed to raise capital from private investors, including plaintiffs. After news broke questioning the viability of Theranos’s technology, the indirect purchaser plaintiffs sued the company for fraud, asserting securities claims under various provisions of California law.

Ruling on Theranos’s motion to dismiss, Magistrate Judge Nathanael Cousins of the Northern District of California held that the indirect purchasers had standing to sue under California law. In pertinent part, the California provisions at issue make it unlawful for “a broker-dealer or other person selling or offering” a security to willfully make, “directly or indirectly,” a false or misleading statement “for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security.” Unlike most of the federal securities laws, notably Section 10(b), this statute does not require a plaintiff to prove actual reliance; rather, a plaintiff need only prove that defendant intended the plaintiff to rely on his statement. And, now, if the Theranos court’s ruling is accepted by other courts, the statute also will not require “privity,” or a buy-sell relationship, between indirect purchasers and the issuing company. Defendants unsuccessfully pressed the court to impose such a requirement, but the court disagreed, noting the statute “focuses on the actions of the seller of the securities, not the relationship between seller and buyer.”

So, did the court get it right? The answer is both yes and no, with a bit of history explaining why. The California statute at issue was modeled after and closely resembles Section 9 of the Securities Act of 1934, which was specifically aimed at prohibiting the manipulative market conduct prevalent in the 1920s. As numerous state and federal courts have noted, including those in California, “market manipulation” is a term of art that covers some artifice or scheme where a defendant enters the market and alters the natural forces of supply and demand. Some of that fraudulent conduct—such as a “wash sale,” where the defendant buys and sells from himself to create the appearance of demand, or a “matched order,” where he buys and sells to co-conspirators for similar purposes—involves trading that occurs solely between one or more co-conspirators. The court is thus right that privity is not universally required; if it were, a defendant trading solely with himself or his scheming confederates could never be liable.

But the court’s analysis failed to see the full picture. Like Section 9, the California statute at issue was never intended to reach false or misleading oral or written statements like those Theranos made to the market. Rather, it is focused on specific schemes, in the market, that artificially alter the natural forces of supply and demand. Nowhere is Theranos alleged to have engaged in any such conduct. The result, then, is to allow an indirect purchaser to repackage a traditional misstatements case—which does require privity under California law—into a manipulative conduct case that does not. Courts have rejected this strategy for years.

The consequences of this approach are potentially far reaching for private companies and the funds that invest in them. For private companies, the decision poses concerns about raising money from institutional investors and publicly traded companies, which have become a significant source of financing. The court’s ruling could give disappointed investors in those entities standing to sue the private companies in which they invest. Since the universe of those investors under the reasoning of Theranos is much broader than those who participate in private offerings—and since those investors may only be able to rely on general statements in the public domain—the court’s ruling raises the possibility that retail investors could sue private companies without ever having directly invested in them.

For private funds that invest in private companies, the decision also raises a number of serious questions, especially as to who controls claims that belong to the fund. For instance, what recourse, if any, does a fund and its other investors have if they believe a lawsuit is frivolous or would distract management and thereby harm their investment? Without an express waiver of the indirect purchasers’ claims, it would seem very little. And would an investor further down the investment chain, say in a fund-of-funds, also have standing to bring a claim against the private company? The court seemed to take comfort that the universe of potential plaintiffs was limited to those the company “intended” to defraud. But drawing the line based on something so subjective provides little comfort to companies and the funds that invest in them.

It is worth emphasizing that there are ways to read the court’s ruling as limited to its unique set of facts. The funds at issue were set up for the express purpose of investing in Theranos stock, not to invest in multiple securities. What’s more, Theranos has been accused of misrepresenting the viability of its business as a whole, something different in kind and degree from an allegedly misleading statement about a discrete event or fact. Nor is it clear that the indirect purchasers had been provided any documents upon which to base their indirect investment in Theranos.

If limited to these facts, the court’s decision could be understood. But if future courts look beyond the facts to the general proposition for which Theranos stands—that indirect purchasers may sue a private company for plain vanilla securities fraud without having to prove privity—the prominence of state securities laws like those in California may only grow.

Delineating the Implied Covenant and Providing for “Good Faith”

We begin with ULLCA, because the answer to the delineation question appears straightforward under the uniform act. This column quotes from ULLCA (2013), text and comments, but the analysis applies equally to ULLCA (2006), sometimes informally referred to as “RULLCA” or “Re-ULLCA,” and also to ULLCA (1996), the first uniform LLC act.

ULLCA (2013), Section 105(c)(6) states that, while an operating agreement may not “eliminate the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing under Section 409(d),” the agreement “may prescribe the standards, if not manifestly unreasonable, by which the performance of the obligation is to be measured.” The official comment provides several examples, including this one:

EXAMPLE: The operating agreement of a manager-managed LLC gives the manager “sole discretion” to make various decisions. The agreement further provides: “Whenever this agreement requires or permits a manager to make a decision that has the potential to benefit one class of members to the detriment of another class, the manager complies with Section 409(d) of [this act] if the manager makes the decision with:

a. the honest belief that the decision:

i. serves the best interests of the LLC; or
ii. at least does not injure or otherwise disserve those interests; and

b. the reasonable belief that the decision breaches no member’s rights under this agreement.”

This provision “prescribes[s] the standards by which the performance of the [Section 409(d)] obligation is to be measured.”

Under Delaware law, the delineation question requires a different and more complicated analysis. The conceptual answer is “not possible,” but the practical answer is “can do.” Under Delaware law, the implied covenant acts as a special type of “gap filler,” a process of interpolation implied by law: “An implied covenant claim … [asks] what the parties would have agreed to themselves had they considered the issue in their original bargaining positions at the time of contracting.” Gerber v. Enter. Prods. Holdings, LLC, 67 A.3d 400, 418 (Del. 2013) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

By its nature, this approach is invariable. The law supplies the gap-filling methodology, which no agreement has the power to change. For instance, an operating agreement may not provide that “a manager’s act in any manner pertaining to this agreement satisfies the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing if the person asserting a breach of the implied covenant had at the time of contracting reason to know that the agreement could reasonably be interpreted to authorize the act.”

However, a Delaware operating or partnership agreement can reign in the implied covenant by avoiding gaps. Consider the above example from the ULLCA comments, revised as follows:

Whenever this agreement requires or permits a manager to make a decision that has the potential to benefit one class of members to the detriment of another class, the manager complies with Section 409(d) of [this act] the manager’s decision is binding and breaches no duty to the company or its members, if the manager makes the decision with:

a. the honest belief that the decision:

i. serves the best interests of the LLC; or
ii. at least does not injure or otherwise disserve those interests; and

c. the reasonable belief that the decision breaches no member’s rights under this agreement.”

Although “[n]o contract, regardless of how tightly or precisely drafted it may be, can wholly account for every possible contingency,” Allen v. El Paso Pipeline GP Co., L.L.C., No. CIV.A. 7520-VCL, 2014 WL 2819005, at *11 (Del. Ch. June 20, 2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted), opportunistic conduct brings Delaware’s implied covenant into play. The ULLCA example as revised leaves scant, if any, room for such conduct. Thus, while under Delaware law “safe harbor” provisions cannot be upheld, in the language of ULLCA (2013) § 105(c)(6), as “prescrib[ing] the standards …by which the performance of the obligation [of good faith and fair dealing] is to be measured,” safe harbor provisions can render the implied covenant inapposite if carefully drafted and sensibly invoked.

For example, in the author’s opinion, it was not sensible to rely on a Special Approval valuation process that had ignored two assets of the company, which were arguably quite substantial. Gerber v. Enter. Prod. Holdings, LLC, 67 A.3d 400, 422–23 (Del. 2013).

Care is also required when an operating or partnership agreement imposes an express requirement of “good faith.” Left undefined, the phrase is a minefield for parties and a godsend for litigators—as exemplified in Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund v. DV Realty Advisors LLC (“Policemen’s Annuity”). The case arose from a limited partnership agreement that permitted the limited partners to remove the general partner:

without Cause by an affirmative vote or consent of the Limited Partners holding in excess of 75% of the [Limited] Partnership Interests then held by all Limited Partners; provided that consenting Limited Partners in good faith determine that such removal is necessary for the best interest of the [Limited] Partnership.

The agreement did not, however, define the term. Policemen’s Annuity No. CIV.A. 7204-VCN, 2012 WL 3548206 at *12-13 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2012).

Both the Chancery Court and Delaware Supreme Court addressed the definitional omission, but each used a different approach and reached a different definitional conclusion. The Chancery Court, 2012 WL 3548206, at *13, used an a fortiori analysis to resolve the case without actually deciding on a definition:

The conduct of the Limited Partners in this case does not approach the sort of unreasonable conduct that is necessarily undertaken in bad faith. A test is nevertheless required; the Limited Partners’ conduct must be analyzed under some rubric. … The definition prescribed in [Delaware’s Uniform Commercial Code] § 1–201(20) [“honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing”] is at least as broad of a definition of good faith as that applied to contracts at common law, and… the Limited Partners can meet the [the broader] definition…. Thus, the Limited Partners necessarily satisfy Delaware’s common law definition of good faith as applied to contracts, which is the definition of good faith that the Court presumes was adopted in [the limited partnership agreement].

The Delaware Supreme Court flatly rejected the lower’s court methodology, substituting a standard far more easily met. Relying on one of its own decisions, the court held that the limited partners’ “determination will be considered to be in good faith unless the Limited Partners went ‘so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith.’” DV Realty Advisors LLC v. Policemen’s Annuity & Ben. Fund of Chicago, 75 A.3d 101, 110 (Del. 2013) (quoting Brinckerhoff v. Enbridge Energy Co., Inc., 67 A.3d 369, 373 (Del.2013)).

An Oregon case provides another example. U.S. Genes v. Vial, 923 P.2d 1322 (Ore. App. 1996) concerned a contract that expressly required the parties “to engage in good faith and in fair dealing with respect to the other at all times during the term of this agreement.” The contract did not define the “good faith and … fair dealing,” and the trial court decided “to treat the express good faith provision in the contract as equivalent to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is implied in every contract.” The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, stating that that decision was “[t]he source of the court’s error” and holding that the “express and implied covenants of good faith cannot be equated.”

That holding makes good sense; equating the express with the implied would render the express term surplus. However, half a page further in the decision, the appellate court interpreted the express term according to one scholar’s famous gloss on the implied covenant.

The moral of these stories is clear—never use the phrase “good faith” in an operating or partnership agreement without carefully defining the term.

An Interview with Kevin Johnson

 

Kevin Johnson spent nearly 20 years in the banking and financial services industry, so when he went back to law school, he knew exactly what kind of law he wanted to practice and where he wanted to work. He’s now an attorney in the Administrative Law Division of the National Credit Union Administration, with a focus on privacy law. Prior to this, he worked as a banking consultant and served as the Financial Services Director of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in the Birmingham branch.

He’s been very involved with the ABA, serving as the National Chair of the ABA Law Student Division, for which he received the ABA Law Student Division Gold Key Award, in honor of his high degree of service, dedication and leadership.

*     *     *

For many years, you worked in the banking and financial services industry as a consultant. And, prior to that with the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta as a Financial Service Director. What prompted you to go back to school and get a law degree?

I originally worked for commercial banks in various capacities. And, after a number of years I decided to take an opportunity with the Federal Reserve Bank. One of the things that led me to seek a law degree was the fact that I was responsible for operations at the Fed that correlated directly to a number of banking laws and regulations. I found myself always consulting the regulations that guided the Fed in its operations and its philosophical approach to banking and financial services. After a number of years of this, I thought: if you can’t beat them, you might as well join them.

During law school, you worked as an intern at the National Credit Union Administration. Why did you choose this government entity and how were you able to secure a position at such a well-known agency?

It actually came about while I was at an ABA meeting. Someone suggested to me that I apply to the NCUA, which I promptly did. I received a call while I was in class in law school, and they offered me the opportunity to fly up to D.C. and spend the summer working as the only legal intern that year.

What did you like about it, because after law school, you accepted a full-time position at that agency?

I was in my element. I focused my entire law degree and my career on banking and financial services, because I knew that’s what I wanted to do. My intent was always to go back to a financial institution regulator. On my list I had the Fed, the NCUA, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and the FDIC. The NCUA happened to be the one that gave me the opportunity when I came up here for the summer. They gave me lots of very meaningful work. I developed serious relationships with my colleagues, I felt comfortable here, and I was treated as a valued member of the team. That had a lot to do with my making the decision to come back.

You’re currently an attorney in the Office of General Counsel, with a focus on privacy law. Can you expand on what you’re doing in this area of law?

For all federal executive agencies, certain laws and regulations exist in regards to how we collect, maintain, share, protect, and destroy the information that we collect from the public. As you can imagine, a lot of that data is extremely sensitive, from Social Security numbers to banking information, all of the different categories of personally, identifiable information.

I serve my agency as a privacy attorney, helping to build and maintain an effective and efficient privacy program that allows us to continue collecting this information, but also doing so in a way that is compliant with the laws and the regs. And that it’s protected from the increased cyber threats that exist in our environment today.

The crux of my work is basically helping to maintain the privacy program and make sure that we’re compliant with the Privacy Act of 1974, the E-Government Act of 2002, and the whole host of other Office of Management and Budget guidance, presidential directives, and executive orders.

It feels like this would be a constantly shifting landscape. Is that right?

That’s absolutely right. When I started in privacy, our agency as well as the other financial institution regulators, were coming off the financial crisis that kicked off the recession. I was asked if I wanted to become involved with the privacy side of things. I jumped at the chance, because I had already developed a keen interest in privacy, and privacy-related issues. Little did I know that it was going to take off the way it has. It has led to so many different opportunities and a wonderful learning experience.

Prior to being in the administrative law division, you served as a trial attorney at NCUA. What kind of cases did you handle?

I spent a little more than a year in enforcement litigation before I switched over to the admin. law and the privacy area. While I was in enforcement and litigation, I mostly dealt with issues such as financial services prohibitions. Basically that involves working with individuals who, for whatever reason, our agency felt were no longer fit to serve in this particular industry. If you look at our website, and if you filter through the correspondence that comes out of this agency, we regularly report on individuals who, for whatever reason, whether it was wrongdoing or convictions of a certain type, can no longer serve in the financial services industry. I also worked with conservatorships of failing or failed credit unions. I also did some work with the fraud hotline, chasing down issues that came to us, people reporting different things that go on in the credit union system that need our attention.

How has your background in finance helped you as an attorney?

It helped me hit the ground running. It was also one of the major factors that contributed to me being hired at NCUA. The folks here didn’t have to train me on certain aspects of financial services because not only did I have the knowledge, but I had been involved in many issues that we face. As a result, I was able to contribute to the team at a higher level at a much faster pace.

You worked at the Federal Reserve in Atlanta, including serving as the Director of Operations. What stands out for you from that experience?

The leadership aspect of my career blossomed there. It gave me a better understanding of how to lead people, how to lead through change and adversity, how to lead during times when some very important decisions have to be made. I developed and I solidified my management style there. It was a difficult environment to lead in, but at the same time, very rewarding.

What advice would you give to someone who has to lead during a challenging time?

The main thing I took away was that each member of my team is an individual, and different things motivate different people. Before leadership at the Fed, I’d used a blanket approach. I handled everybody pretty much the same way. I didn’t take the time out to really understand or tap into the individuality of each member of my team. At the Fed, I started getting to know each person, understanding what motivates each individual, treating each individual in a way that’s beneficial to both the organization and to that person. I was able to get much better results using that approach.

What advice would you give to a young attorney who’s just starting out?

I’m currently mentoring a number of young attorneys. Figure out what your interests are. The quicker you narrow your desired areas of practice, the better off you’ll be, because you’ll be able to focus on developing the expertise in whatever those areas of interest happen to be.

Is it a matter of trying different things?

I don’t know if it is as much trying different things as it is knowing yourself and knowing what makes you tick. My advice comes more from an introspective approach. Know what you’re interested in, know what things make you tick, what things excite you, and then, project outward from that point.

You’ve been very involved with the ABA, including serving as the National Chair of the ABA Law Student Division. What made you want to get involved and how have you benefited?

Before I went back to law school, I realized, of course, that I had been out of school for a while. I considered myself a nontraditional student. So, I was apprehensive about going back to law school after having been out of school for so long. I did some research on the organizations that provided resources to help students like me to reacclimate themselves to full-time study. I came across this organization called the Council on Legal Education Opportunity (CLEO). They take in students who are accepted to law school and they start building a foundation, before you start school.

I attended a program in Atlanta, and was taught legal writing, and reading and analyzing cases, how to organize your materials, and how to read statutes. It was excellent. When I got back to Birmingham after that particular program, I did some research because I was so impressed. I found out that the American Bar Association is one of the major benefactors of CLEO.

From there, I started researching the ABA and, lo and behold, I found out it’s one of the largest professional organizations in the world. I knew I needed to get involved. Then I found out they had a law student division. I made my decision to get involved with the ABA before I even enrolled in law school.

As soon as I enrolled at the University Alabama School of Law, I paid my $25 fee, and I became a member of the ABA as a law student. From that point, I got involved anyway I could as a student. I participated in conference calls. I participated in opportunities to help draft comment letters on certain banking regulations. At that time I was, of course, a member of the Banking Law Committee. I assisted with a lot of those things, and it was just very beneficial for me to work with and to correspond with attorneys who were actually doing what I aspired to do.

Did it help you stay motivated during law school because you saw what was out there?

Absolutely. When I got the opportunity to apply for a CLEO scholarship, sponsored by the ABA Business Law Section, I jumped at the chance. I won the scholarship. Basically, this scholarship provided an opportunity for me to attend the Spring Meeting, where I was assigned two mentors. That’s where I transitioned into hyperdrive, if you will, as far as being involved in the ABA.

You’ve received many awards. Is there one that stands out for you?

Probably the most meaningful is the Gold Key Award from the Law Student Division after I served my year as Chair. That was a really, really huge honor.

What do you do for fun?

My wife and I have five beautiful children. They range in age from 11 all the way down to two and half. We have two-and-a-half-year old twins, so they are my hobby. I do have a son who is a golfer, so I spend a lot of time playing golf and shuttling him around to his golfing activities and tournaments. I did my undergraduate work at University of South Carolina, in Columbia, South Carolina, and I attended law school at the University of Alabama School of Law in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, so there are a lot of SEC sports that happen around our household, centered around those two programs.

Anything else you’d like to add?

My involvement in the American Bar Association has paid off for me in an infinite number of ways. From colleagues and the relationships I’ve developed to the meaningful work that we’ve done within our section and within the association as a whole. I’ve enjoyed the opportunities to mentor other students who are eager to learn and eager to navigate the legal industry. I would recommend it to anyone.

Thank you so much!

Independence Issues in the Entrepreneurial Ecosystem

The Delaware Supreme Court decision in Sandys v. Pincus, 2016 WL 7094027, at *1 (Del. Dec. 5, 2016) (Zynga) has raised questions regarding well-established legal precedent and business practices that are recognized as common in the venture capital and entrepreneurial communities. Although Zynga and other decisions regarding director independence reveal the Delaware judiciary’s focus on certain issues, including close friendships and repeat-player networks, those cases do not suggest a sea change in Delaware law. Zynga does, however, raise the question of whether Delaware courts have identified an ecosystem of entrepreneurialism in which these issues bear unique significance. Some clues might lie in the recent director independence analyses in Rux v. Meyer, C.A. No. 11577-CB (Del. Ch. Nov. 18, 2016) (Sirius XM), Greater Pa. Carpenters’ Pension Fund v. Giancarlo, 135 A.3d 77 (Del. 2016) (Imperva), aff’g C.A. No. 9833-VCP (Del. Ch. Sept. 2, 2015) (Imperva Chancery Decision), and Del. Cty. Empls. Ret. Fund v. Sanchez, 124 A.3d 1017 (Del. 2015) (Sanchez Energy).

The Zynga Litigation

Zynga is a social-gaming technology company that was founded and controlled by Mark Pincus. The Zynga litigation began with a decision by the Zynga board of directors (the Zynga Board) to grant certain directors, including Pincus, exceptions from stock transfer restrictions immediately before releasing negative earnings data that resulted in a sharp drop in the company’s stock price. A Zynga stockholder brought suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery asserting that the Zynga directors had breached their fiduciary duties, and the Zynga Board moved to dismiss for his failure to make a litigation demand under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1. The plaintiff asserted that he should be excused from making demand on the Zynga Board and permitted to institute derivative litigation because a majority of the directors were not independent of Pincus. The litigation was assigned to Chancellor Andre Bouchard as Sandys v. Pincus, 2016 WL 769999 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2016), who found that a majority of the Zynga directors were disinterested and independent of Pincus and, accordingly, held that demand was not excused. The Zynga stockholder appealed the chancellor’s decision to the Delaware Supreme Court.

On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reviewed Chancellor Bouchard’s decision de novo and reached a split decision with a four-justice majority reversing the chancellor’s decision, and Justice Valihura issuing a dissent in favor of affirming the chancellor’s decision. The court’s decision and the dissent repeatedly noted the factual specificity of the litigation stating, “This is a close call.” This repeated word of caution, as well as the court’s repeated admonition of plaintiff-appellant’s counsel for failing to develop the record through investigative tools, might suggest that Zynga is expected to have limited import going forward.

However, the court also explained that its holding—i.e., that the Zynga directors could not consider the litigation demand independently of Pincus’s influence—was based on a “reality” of the court’s findings. The court stated, “But, our courts cannot blind themselves to that reality when considering whether a director on a controlled company board has other ties to the controller beyond her relationship at the controlled company.” (Emphasis added). That “reality include[d] that: Gordon and Doerr are partners at Kleiner Perkins, which controls 9.2% of Zynga’s equity; Kleiner Perkins is also invested in One Kings Lane, a company co-founded by Pincus’s wife; and, Hoffman and Kleiner Perkins are both invested in Shopkick, and Hoffman serves on its board with another Kleiner Perkins partner.” The court concluded, “But, the reality is that firms like Kleiner Perkins compete with others to finance talented entrepreneurs like Pincus, and networks arise of repeat players who cut each other into beneficial roles in various situations.” (Emphasis added).

The “reality” in Zynga comprised both factual findings that certain directors shared an airplane and coinvested in other businesses, and the observation that the Zynga directors operated in, and had substantial interests inextricably linked to, their own ecosystem of close friendships and repeat-players of serial entrepreneurs and sources of private financing. The court explained that this “reality” of personal relationships was “crucial to commerce and most human relations. But, precisely because of the importance of a mutually beneficial ongoing business relationship, it is reasonable to expect that sort of relationship might have a material effect on the parties’ ability to act adversely toward each other.”

The court’s characterization of this “reality” suggests that the pleaded facts were viewed within a broader context. Three other decisions issued in Delaware around the time of Zynga touch on similar issues in the context of director independence, including close personal friendships and repeat-player networks. An examination of the recent director independence analyses in Sirius XM, Imperva, and Sanchez Energy could supply some guidance regarding whether the court has identified a particular community of co-dependent actors and the rules of such an entrepreneurial ecosystem.

Close, Personal Friendships

In Zynga, Pincus and another director co-owned an airplane. The court held that the appropriate inference from such a unique connection was that they shared a “close, personal friendship.” The court observed that, “owning an airplane together is not a common thing”; therefore, the court drew inferences of an “extremely close, personal bond,” a “most important and intimate friends[hip],” a “partnership in a personal asset,” an “expensive co-investment,” “close cooperation,” and “detailed planning indicative of a continuing, close personal friendship.” In fact, it is suggestive of the type of close, personal relationship that, like family ties, one would expect to heavily influence a human’s ability to exercise impartial judgment.

The Delaware Supreme Court also addressed close, personal friendships in Sanchez Energy. In that case, the court reversed Vice Chancellor Glasscock’s decision that a majority of the Sanchez Energy board of directors was independent in its determination to reject a stockholder’s litigation demand. Among its holdings, reached on de novo review, the court concluded that a director was not independent of the Sanchez Energy chairman, who was also the largest stockholder at the company, where the director and the director’s brother earned a substantial proportion of their income. The court found that a buttress to this economic relationship was a “deeper human friendship[] . . . that would have the effect of compromising a director’s independence.” The court found the director to have been “close friends with an interested party for a half century.” The court explained, “Close friendships of that duration are likely considered precious by many people, and are rare. People drift apart for many reasons, and when a close relationship endures for that long, a pleading stage inference arises that it is important to the parties.”

The court in Sanchez Energy suggested that close, personal friendships could support an allegation that a director is not independent for excusal of a litigation demand. This holding was limited by the additional economic relationship and the unusually long duration of the friendship. In Sirius XM, however, Chancellor Bouchard encountered a relationship of shorter duration and a primarily economic basis.

In Sirius XM, Chancellor Bouchard addressed a similar fact in the context of the Sirius XM board’s approval of the company’s repurchase of outstanding shares not owned by its majority stockholder Liberty Media (which was, in turn, controlled by 47-percent stockholder John Malone), and found that a director was not independent for demand excusal due to the duration of his relationship with Malone. The chancellor examined the implications of a two-decade relationship “interwoven with John Malone’s various interests” and held that it raised a reasonable doubt as to director Vogel’s independence from Malone. In similar phrasing as the Supreme Court’s in Zynga, the chancellor stated, “Significant to my finding is the reality that in almost all of the professional dealings between Vogel and John Malone, Vogel was subordinate to and, it is reasonable to infer, dependent on maintaining John Malone’s good graces.” (Emphasis added.) The “reality” in this case was “exemplified by the fact that John Malone held significant stakes in many of the companies where Vogel served as a senior executive or a director and, it is alleged, appointed Vogel to the position of CEO or to the board of several companies.”

Relationships lasting multiple decades could undermine the “presumptive independence” of a director in a demand analysis. The court in Sanchez Energy may have been presented with a truly extraordinary friendship of 50 years, but the chancellor in Sirius XM came to a similar holding on the basis of a relationship lasting less than half that duration and on much less personal terms.

Repeat-Player Networks

The Supreme Court described the tight web of relationships, which might be characterized as an entrepreneurial ecosystem, in Zynga. In Zynga, the Supreme Court found that “Gordon and Doerr are partners at Kleiner Perkins, which controls 9.2% of Zynga’s equity; Kleiner Perkins is also invested in One Kings Lane, a company co-founded by Pincus’s wife; and, Hoffman and Kleiner Perkins are both invested in Shopkick, and Hoffman serves on its board with another Kleiner Perkins partner.” The Supreme Court explained the importance of relationships in this start-up ecosystem: “Of course, the defendants now argue that the relationships among these directors flowed all in one direction and that it is Pincus who is likely beholden to Gordon, Doerr, and Kleiner Perkins for financing. But, the reality is that firms like Kleiner Perkins compete with others to finance talented entrepreneurs like Pincus, and networks arise of repeat players who cut each other into beneficial roles in various situations.” The court further explained, “There is, of course, nothing at all wrong with that. In fact, it is crucial to commerce and most human relations. But, precisely because of the importance of a mutually beneficial ongoing business relationship, it is reasonable to expect that sort of relationship might have a material effect on the parties’ ability to act adversely toward each other.”

The court stated that, although the Zynga directors were sophisticated businesspeople, the “reality” inferred by the court from the entire situation was that their judgment could be clouded by the effects of a decision on their close relationships and future economic prospects. The court stated, “Causing a lawsuit to be brought against another person is no small matter, and is the sort of thing that might plausibly endanger a relationship.”

Zynga has injected the entrepreneurial ecosystem into considerations of director independence, but the concept arose earlier in 2016. In Imperva, the court affirmed Vice Chancellor Parsons’s dismissal of the stockholder’s complaint and did so by an order on the basis of the vice chancellor’s bench ruling. During colloquy at oral argument with plaintiff-appellant’s counsel, however, Chief Justice Strine expressed skepticism regarding a theory of “incest” in the entrepreneurial ecosystem. Greater Pa. Carpenters’ Pension Fund v. Giancarlo, No. 531, 2015 (Del. Mar. 9, 2016) (oral argument) (Imperva Oral Argument) (electronic video recording available at https://livestream.com/DelawareSupremeCourt/events/4944419/videos/114930292). Although comments during oral argument would not carry precedential weight, the fact that they were made by current members of the court and were aligned with the court’s holding to affirm might provide guidance for understanding the current state of Delaware law. The court’s treatment and framing of the issues could also provide some insight into the evolution of the issue. When compared to the court’s decision in Zynga, this shows the narrow margin and factual specificity in the independence analysis.

In Imperva, Shlomo Kramer was described as a “serial entrepreneur and investor who has had unparalleled success founding and backing data security startups.” The other directors (mostly affiliated with venture capital firms) were alleged to be nonindependent with respect to a decision on whether to permit Kramer to take an alleged corporate opportunity that Kramer wanted for himself because of their repeated investments with Kramer. The chief justice and plaintiff-appellant’s counsel then considered the ramifications of a director’s decision to act adversely toward Kramer.

CHIEF JUSTICE STRINE: I understand. . . . You now have incest. Here’s news; business happens because of relationships. That’s not a good or bad thing. It’s actually a good thing. Human beings form networks. It’s good. Silicon Valley is big. By the way, you know how many former CEOs and former entrepreneurs there are in Silicon Valley? How many cases are there in Silicon Valley where someone had an idea for a company and found themselves on the outs and the so-called angel investors have picked a new CEO? . . . So people in the incestuous family, some people get kicked out of the party, right?

MR. WEINBERGER: Right, but for various reasons. So if the question here is whether any of these individuals experience it. But the question; and I believe this comes from this court’s opinion in Beam. Would these individuals experience a detriment, a detriment by acting adversely to Mr. Kramer, and the answer has to be “yes.”

This colloquy is instructive for its further examination of the issues that were later central to the court’s decision in Zynga, including the allegedly “incestuous” relationships and motivations involved in the entrepreneurial ecosystem.

The chief justice and counsel then continued their colloquy by outlining issues that featured prominently in the Zynga opinion and may be expected to factor into Delaware courts’ independence analyses:

MR. WEINBERGER: Krausz is probably the best example. He is the exemplar. He explains precisely how this works. He’s the partner at U.S. Venture Partners, and he explains in his own words. In 2013, Fortune Magazine asked him about an investment he made alongside Kramer in a company started or founded or co-founded by one of Kramer’s co-founders in Imperva, Mr. Boodaei. And the journalist asked him: How did you hear about this investment in Trusteer? This is a company sold in 2013 to IBM for over $700 million dollars. And Krausz explains it. He says, well, we were investors in Check Point; that’s Kramer’s first startup. He says we invested in Imperva, next Kramer startup. And then he says and I’m quoting, “I’m still on the board of Imperva with Shlomo Kramer. And another Imperva co-founder is Mickey Boodaei who co-founded Trusteer, so I knew both of them.” And then skipping ahead one line to his next quote, “So Shlomo invested in Trusteer’s Series A, and we came in on the Series B as the company’s only BC investor.” So, in other words, because Krausz knows Kramer, has invested in his company, sits on the Imperva board with him, has a strong professional relationship with him, is in this inner ring, he was able to get in on yet another successful investment related to the serial entrepreneur and angel investor, Shlomo Kramer. And that’s the value of the relationship with Kramer, rather. That is why a venture capitalist or a Venture Capital Firm that makes many, many investments, many, if not most, of which will be written off and seeks these outside returns cannot make an objective business decision with respect to Mr. Kramer.

CHIEF JUSTICE STRINE: I get it. So it tends on—you’re saying that periodically their sense is they pay off Kramer by doing unfair things. And that they realize that, overall, they’ve got to just sort of take one for the team and that’s why they’re different than other investors? Because the other thing would be, they invest with Kramer because they think he was a good fiduciary and he runs good businesses. They want to get money out of their investments. They would stop investing with Kramer if he was, you know, not treating them or other investors well. They have a lot of money at stake. What you’re now turning it into is if somebody—if a business person establishes credibility in raising companies then the people who give their equity capital to those ventures, even without any other connection, the fact that they’ve done it more than once renders them, instead of good monitors, because they have a deep equity investment, non-independent?

MR. WEINBERGER: But it’s not just once or twice.

CHIEF JUSTICE STRINE: I understand. . . . You now have incest. Here’s news; business happens because of relationships. That’s not a good or bad thing. It’s actually a good thing. Human beings form networks. It’s good. Silicon Valley is big. By the way, you know how many former CEOs and former entrepreneurs there are in Silicon Valley? . . .

MR. WEINBERGER: . . . Krausz can’t call up his broker and say, “I really like the management of this team, this management team at the company, buy me in on the Series B.” These are private investments. There are very limited opportunities. This is a specific space within this incestuous Silicon Valley and venture capital community, and I don’t mean to keep using the word incestuous, but it’s critical, and context is critical, Your Honor. . . . But just to get back to the thickness of the relationship with Mr. Kramer because these relationships, they absolutely have to be substantial. Just making one or two investments, that doesn’t destroy the director’s impartiality. So we look at the individual circumstances of these people. The people who are venture capitalists, work for venture capital firms, the nature of their business. What is the nature of their business? They’re making the highest-risk investments in pursuit of the highest returns. And these opportunities are very limited. These are private companies. And we allege in the complaint that the opportunities are even fewer now since there’s so much capital. And then you look at Mr. Kramer. What does he provide to these people? He is in this inner ring. He has the access to the best investment. He provides the access, as Mr. Krausz explains. He explains what the value of, as Mr. Kramer says about Ms. Gouw, being his collaborator is. His go-to investor for security is. A member of his team is. And he has the Midas touch. I mean they’re investing in companies, startups, unproven, unknowns. Kramer is the known. So are those facts alone—do those facts alone establish materiality? No. But you look at the repeated pattern of these investors or their firms again and again and again investing in or alongside Mr. Kramer. And we have well-pleaded allegations that these firms have made money in the past with them, at the pleading stage. And we allege stockholdings with Imperva. We allege prices at which these firms would have sold their shares in the company, but at the pleading stage. If you get on the ground floor of a startup investment that ends up hitting it big, becoming a public company, the reasonable inference is that the firm did very well.

CHIEF JUSTICE STRINE: And then the reasonable inference later on, the default position is, because somebody you invested with was a good fiduciary and business person, that when you invest your money substantially in the future and you take on the position as a fiduciary yourself, you will sell out your trust and your own equity position in order to periodically make unfair payments to him so you can take the good with the bad? . . . You get to a specific transaction. Shlomo Kramer wants to do something. He’s been a good guy in the past, made us a lot of money as equity investors. We now have to take it. . . . We got to give Shlomo what he wants now because in the future he’ll be good to us again. This is the periodic bribe for the price of being on the Shlomo team. That’s your theory, right?

(Emphasis added).

The court’s decision to affirm on the basis of Vice Chancellor Parsons’s decision without its own commentary suggests that the court did not agree with plaintiff-appellant’s “theory.” It is also worth placing this finding in the context of the court’s decision: even if the court had held that director Krauz was not independent, the vice chancellor’s decision would not necessarily be reversed because a majority of the Imperva board of directors was independent.

In Imperva, the stockholder-plaintiff also pointed at a specific form of evidence that allegedly demonstrated one director’s entanglement in the entrepreneurial ecosystem. The plaintiff asserted that the website of a director’s new business, showing her with Kramer, was evidence of a repeat-player network that undermined her independence for demand excusal. That director’s website included an endorsement from Kramer which read, “The instant we . . . partnered with [Gouw] as one of our first investors, I knew I had a collaborator I wanted on my team long term. She has a very deep understanding of data security. She gets how mobile and cloud are transforming our business and offers incisive, measured advice to help us make smart moves. We . . . are thrilled she continues to be on our board after our IPO. She is our go to investor for security.” Imperva Chancery Decision at 30. Plaintiff’s counsel argued to the Supreme Court:

MR. WEINBERGER: Look at someone like Gouw who runs a brand-new firm—a brand-new firm that she started in 2014. The very first investment she is on, the very first Series A her firm Aspect Ventures makes, is with Kramer. And Kramer is on her website saying this person is my collaborator. She is my go-to investor for security. She’s a member of my team long term. You know, Kramer is an obscure figure. I’m sure, to us. Certainly is to me. I don’t invest in data security. But if you’re—so let’s take an analogy, but keeping with Venture Capital. Someone like Ms. Gouw, say she’s not operating a data security. She is operating in social media. And Mark Zuckerberg is quoted on her website saying, this person is my collaborator. She’s my go-to investor. She’s a member of my team long term. What more valuable endorsement could a person in that space have? That is communicating to investors the next Facebook. This firm’s in on it. My new firm, we have access to that. We have access to this resource. If you’re an entrepreneur, invest with me. Mark Zuckerberg is going to be part of the network. And that’s what this endorsement from Kramer communicates to potential investors and Aspect Ventures of this new firm, entrepreneurs who are potentially looking to invest with Ms. Gouw and her venture capital firm. Can she make an objective business decision to act contrary to his interest in the specific context? And the answer, we would submit, is “no.”

Imperva Oral Argument at 17:46 (emphasis added).

This argument arose at the end of the plaintiff-appellant’s colloquy with the court and did not receive a direct response from the court. The chief justice’s earlier skepticism and the court’s order affirming on the basis of the vice chancellor’s decision suggest, however, that the court did not view this director’s advertisement of herself as a “member of [Kramer’s] team long term” as evidence of her lack of independence.

When Vice Chancellor Parsons considered this point in the Imperva Chancery Decision, it also failed to find traction regarding the director’s independence. The vice chancellor held (and the Supreme Court affirmed) that the allegation regarding the website endorsement was conclusory, describing the allegations that director (Gouw) lacked independence from Kramer “because aggressively pursuing plaintiff’s claims would jeopardize her chance to participate in what could be Kramer’s next multi-billion-dollar deal relating to a securities start-up. In other words, Gouw’s preferred position in Kramer’s inner circle is extremely valuable.” The vice chancellor held, “On its face, this endorsement of Gouw highlights her professional relationship with Imperva as an expert investor and director, rather than a close personal relationship between Gouw and Kramer, as evidenced by the repeated use of first-person plural pronouns ‘we’ and ‘our.’ In other words, Gouw’s use of the endorsement on her website is meant to communicate to other entrepreneurs her professional strength as an investor in and director of data security start-ups.” On this basis and the further finding “that other entities like Trulia and athenahealth have recognized Gouw’s business acumen and talent also counsels against giving too much importance to Kramer’s endorsement,” Vice Chancellor Parsons found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated Gouw to have lacked independence.

In Sirius XM, however, Chancellor Bouchard addressed a similar fact in the context of the Sirius XM board’s approval of the company’s repurchase of outstanding shares not owned by its majority stockholder Liberty Media (which was, in turn, controlled by 47-percent stockholder John Malone), and found that the director was not independent for demand excusal. The chancellor considered whether Mooney could not be independent from John Malone because Mooney “now runs a consulting business, the success of which is dependent upon his good relationships with his former business partners.” As in Imperva, director Mooney was alleged to have a website advertising “his demonstrated comprehensive winning corporate strategies for companies including Virgin Media and Sirius XM” and that the consulting company “is currently Mooney’s only employer (and therefore chief source of income).” Chancellor Bouchard held, “Being conscious of the significant influence John Malone wields in the media industry and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor, I find that plaintiff has satisfied that standard as to Mooney’s independence based on the factual allegations I’ve discussed.”

Although it will be a close, fact-specific decision in each case, an Internet advertisement of repeat-players, such as Shlomo Kramer or John Malone, may be construed—at least under pleading-stage standards of review—as a sign of membership in a network that comes with line-cutting privileges for “beneficial roles in various situations.” Directors and counsel should be aware that these images are not merely a framed photograph intended to impress clients when they visit a private office space, but a public presentation, and that they are searchable and discoverable by clients as well as plaintiffs and their counsel.

Takeaways

Chancellor Bouchard’s comments regarding Sirius XM directors’ relationships with Malone and the Zynga court’s view on the entrepreneurial ecosystem show a similar focus on the “reality” of those relationships. That broadly contextual approach may suggest that the Delaware judiciary will view allegations as couched in relevant business norms and industry practices, which is shorthanded as “reality.” The uniqueness of this “reality” in the entrepreneurial ecosystem may also have driven the analysis of Zynga director independence. However, the overlap between Malone’s conglomerate businesses and the entrepreneurial ecosystem are not exact, and the similarities to more typical businesses that depend on networks and diversification could suggest a broader application of Zynga going forward. Because personal friendships and overlapping business relationships are relatively common themes, however, corporate practitioners should be cognizant of the Delaware judiciary’s focus on these connections and the fact-driven “reality” of directors’ independence outside of the entrepreneurial ecosystem.

On a more granular level, directors and their counsel should be cognizant of the tangible evidence of these connections that may be produced in litigation. As visible manifestations of a relationship, a shared airplane or web-based endorsement may carry outsized evidentiary weight comparable to meaningful intangibles, such as several decades of close friendship or a career’s worth of economic sustenance. In that regard, the Zynga court made clear that its decision—like most litigation involving analysis of director independence—was factually specific and a “close call.” When read along with Imperva, we can see that the law in this area is evolving slowly and has not disturbed the central tenet of Delaware law, which ensures deference to board decisions made by a clearly independent majority of directors.

Inadvertent Disclosure—Traps Await the Unwary

Assume the following hypothetical:

You are a senior partner at a large international law firm, headquartered in a major metropolitan city. Suddenly, there comes an urgent knock on the door of your corner office. One of the firm’s brightest young associates, upon your wave, comes bursting in and shouts out: “I have incredible news! The other side in our bet-the-company case has produced to us some ‘smoking gun’ documents which will turn the tide of the litigation!” Upon your questioning of the young lawyer, she tells you (i) the “smoking gun” documents reflect privileged communications between the opponent’s board of directors and the company’s attorneys, and (ii) that the materials were undoubtedly produced by mistake. She also tells you that she has looked into the applicable rule of professional responsibility (Rule 4.4(b)), and all that is required is the following: “A lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the document was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.”

What should you, the senior partner, do? Does it depend on the jurisdiction in which you sit? Does it depend on things beyond what the ethics rules say? Does it depend on the court in which the litigation is being waged? Why is one prominent legal academic who called Rule 4.4(b) a “model of clarity” so wrong? The answers to these (and other) questions follow below.

The first question you need to ask yourself is: where am I? Many states do not follow ABA Model Rule 4.4(b). For example, a number of states require that you: (i) stop reading the document; (ii) notify the sender; and (iii) abide by the sender’s instructions. Other states require something less than those three steps. And while some states do in fact follow the ABA Model Rule, still other states have no Rule 4.4(b) at all. This disparate kettle of fish tees up an ethical quandary for any lawyer who has clients beyond just the four corners of the state in which she is licensed: how does she comply with these very different ethical obligations vis-à-vis inadvertent disclosure?

But let us assume you are in a jurisdiction that tracks ABA Model Rule 4.4(b) verbatim (e.g., New York). One thing the young associate did not mention (and perhaps has not read) are the Comments to Rule 4.4(b). And even though the Comments “are intended as guides for interpretation” only (and “the text of each Rule is authoritative”), two key Comments to Rule 4.4(b) have hidden in them two huge red flags. In the fourth sentence of Comment 2, the Rule drafters wrote the following:

Although this Rule does not require that the lawyer refrain from reading or continuing to read the document, a lawyer who reads or continues to read a document that contains privileged or confidential information may be subject to court-imposed sanctions, including disqualification and evidence-preclusion. (emphasis added)

And in the third sentence of Comment 3, the Rule drafters wrote the following:

[S]ubstantive law or procedural rules may require a lawyer to refrain from reading an inadvertently sent document, or to return the document to the sender, or both. (emphasis added)

Thus, if all you read is the “authoritative” Rule, but not the red-flagged Comments, you (the unsuspecting, but rule-compliant) senior partner might be “ethical,” but you could be facing some pretty unhappy consequences for blithely following this “model of clarity” Rule. And this is especially so, given that you are dealing with privileged materials inadvertently produced.

A few years ago, the legal powers that be (with the assistance of Congress) made some changes to protect lawyers who are imperfect in dealing with the production of privileged material. First, the Federal Rules Advising Committee adopted Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(5) (and analogs to it in Rules 16, 33, 34, and 37); and Congress thereafter adopted Rule 502 (b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The rules codify that an “inadvertent disclosure” of privileged material does not operate as a waiver so long as (i) the privilege holder took “reasonable steps to prevent disclosure”; and (ii) the privilege holder took “reasonable steps to rectify the error.” Whether this “reasonableness” approach has led to the promised land is unclear; for example, “reasonableness” appears to be in the eye of the judicial beholder. Compare Rhodes Industries, Inc. v. Building Materials Corp. of America, 254 F.R.D. 216 (E.D. Pa. 2008) with Sitterson v. Evergreen School District of 114, 196 P.3d 735 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) with Mt. Hanley Ins. Co. v. Felman Prod. Inc., 2010 WL 1990555 (S.D. W. Va. May 18, 2010) with Edelen v. Campbell Soup Co., 265 F.R.D. 676 (N.D. Ga. 2010). And the claw-back safe haven provided by F.R.E. 502(d) has not appeared to have had much effect in obviating the risks of the “reasonableness” standard. See Spicker v. Quest Cherokee, 2009 WL 2168892 (D. Kan. 2009); see also J. Rosans, “6 Years In, Why Haven’t FRE 502(d) Orders Caught On?” Law360 (July 24, 2014).

As part of these reforms, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(5) puts specific obligations onto the receiving lawyer once she is made aware of the production of privileged information: (i) she “must promptly return, sequester, or destroy” the material(s); (ii) she “must not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved”; and (iii) she “must take reasonable steps to retrieve the information if the [receiving] party disclosed it before being notified.” (Interestingly, these requirements are similar to what the ABA prescribed prior to the promulgation of Rule 4.4(b). See ABA Formal Opinions 92-368 & 94-382.) About half of the states have imposed similar obligations on litigating lawyers in their jurisdictions. One that has not is New York State, which does not have the same or similar obligations in the Civil Practice Law and Rules. So New York litigators in New York federal courts would seem to have very different responsibilities with regard to inadvertent production than they would in New York State courts. And Virginia licensed attorneys also have their hands full. According to that state’s Standing Committee on Legal Ethics, an attorney who receives privileged materials inadvertently is not ethically obligated to return the materials to the sender, if “the confidential information [was] received in the discovery phrase of litigation,” rather than “[o]utside of the discovery process.” See Opinion 1871 (July 24, 2013).

In addition, the above-mentioned federal and state protocols have left some open issues for all lawyers governed thereby. For example, does the receiving lawyer have an affirmative obligation to notify the sender, or may she wait until she is “notified” of the inadvertent disclosure? And can the receiving attorney read the inadvertently produced material and/or share it with her client? Finally, what about privileged or confidential information that is overheard? (None of these rules seem to cover that scenario.)

Given the complexity and over-lay of different (but related) concepts, it is perhaps not surprising that courts, in sorting out the various protocols, have not been uniform in their approach to dealing with inadvertent disclosure. Compare Lipin v. Bender, 597 N.Y.S. 2d 390 (1st Dept. 1993) (disqualification of attorney) with MNT Sales, LLC v. Acme Television Holdings, LLC, Index No. 602156/2009, NYLJ, p. 42, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. April 29, 2010) (use of material barred at trial) with Rico v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 171 P. 3d 1092 (Cal. 2007) (attorneys and experts disqualified) with Merits Incentive LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 262 P. 3d 720 (Nev. 2011) (disqualification of attorney not ordered).

To help flesh out many of the foregoing points a bit more, a very recent judicial decision is instructive. In Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc., No. 1:15cv0057, 2017 BL 395 (W.D. Va. Feb. 2, 2017), a federal magistrate judge denied plaintiff’s motion to disqualify defense counsel. The litigation arose out of a dispute about insurance coverage relating to a funeral home’s fire. An employee for the insurance company put the entire case file (which included privileged materials) on an unprotected file-sharing site (which had no password protection), and then emailed a link to the site to the company’s outside investigator. Defense counsel issued a subpoena to the investigator, and its production in response included the e-mail listing the link. Defense counsel (i) first accessed the case file, and (ii) later produced the case file back to the insurer; the latter of which led to the motion to disqualify, as well as to motion practice on whether the insurer could claim a non-waiver under F.R.E. 502(b).

With respect to the Rule 502(b) issue, the magistrate judge focused (as highlighted above) on the “reasonableness” of the insurance company’s actions to protect the privileged materials. Based upon “material facts… not in dispute,” the magistrate judge determined there was “no evidence… that any precautions were taken to prevent this disclosure.” (emphasis by the court) By making the case file “accessible to anyone with access to the internet,” with no password protection, the insurance company failed the most basic tenet of “reasonableness”; as the magistrate judge concluded: “It is hard to imagine an act that would be more contrary to protecting the confidentiality of information than to post the information to the world wide web.” (The magistrate judge also ruled that there was a waiver of any attorney work product on similar grounds.)

Turning to the disqualification motion, the magistrate judge then ruled that the actions of defense counsel were improper under federal and Virginia procedural rules, as well as under operative Virginia ethics opinions (including Opinion 1871). Given that the e-mail link to the file-sharing site had a prominent “Confidentiality Notice” (which included this language: “This e-mail contains information that is privileged and confidential, and subject to legal restrictions and penalties regarding its unauthorized disclosure or other use.”), defense counsel (i) should have contacted plaintiff’s counsel about its access to the case file, and (ii) should have sought the court’s guidance as to whether there had been a waiver of applicable protections, before making use of the information. [All defense counsel had done was to call the Virginia State Bar Ethics Hotline for advice, action which, in the words of the magistrate judge, “belie[d] any claim that they believed that their receipt and use of the materials… was proper under the circumstances.”]

As to a sanction, the magistrate judge ruled that disqualification would be pointless, since “based on the court’s ruling on waiver, substitute counsel would have access to the same information.” As such, she found that “the more reasonable sanction is that defense counsel should bear the cost of the parties in obtaining the court’s ruling on the matter.”

Conclusion

In light of all of the foregoing, a number of concerned folks have suggested that the ethics gurus should go back and articulate a better (and more transparent) set of standards to govern how to handle inadvertent disclosure. But there has been significant pushback to that suggestion—on the ground that such a step “would be a step backwards.” According to one commentator, “[a] profoundly important argument for limiting the scope of lawyers’ ethical obligations in these situations is the unfairness of making the ‘innocent’ lawyers who receive such communications potentially subject to professional discipline in situations” not of their making; according to this pushback argument, “vagueness is preferable to… any broader rule.” See A. Davis, “Inadvertent Disclosure—Regrettable Confusion,” New York Law Journal (November 7, 2011).

Who is right in this debate? Who knows. What I do know is that, at present, inadvertent disclosure is one tricky and sticky wicket for any lawyer who gets caught up in it unaware.

Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana: Title VII Prohibits Sexual Orientation Discrimination

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits employers from discriminating against employees and job applicants based on five traits, including sex. Since 1994 Congress has often been urged to recognize sexual orientation as a protected trait, as several state laws do, but it has not done so. But on April 4, 2017, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held en banc that Title VII outlaws sexual orientation discrimination. Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana. The court did so not by creating a sixth protected trait, but by ruling that sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination. Hively puts the Seventh Circuit squarely at odds with nine other circuits.

The word sex in Title VII has undergone quite a metamorphosis in 53 years. It was put in the original bill by a congressman who thought Congress would balk and kill the bill, but his amendment was approved without comment. Since then, with no legislative history to aid them, courts have had to discern the word’s meaning on their own. Early on they saw it as embracing only biological differences between women and men. But in the 1980’s, they adopted a broader, gender-based view; under it, sex includes socio-sexual roles and behavioral expressions such as masculinity and femininity. Courts also recognized sexual harassment as sex discrimination.

The next step was to view discrimination based on nonconformity with gender norms as sex discrimination, which the Supreme Court took in Price Waterhouse, Inc. v. Hopkins (1989). Nine years later, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., held that Title VII reaches same-sex discrimination. Congress may not have had this in mind in 1964, the court said, but on its face the words “discriminate because of sex” in the act do not embrace only the opposite sex.

After Oncale, gay and lesbian employees who were harassed by coworkers seized on it and Price Waterhouse to get around the fact that sexual orientation is not a protected class. With increasing success, they urged courts to hold that even if one is homosexual, to harass that person because they don’t act, dress, or talk like members of their sex typically do is sex stereotyping. After that, courts were put to the hair-splitting task of discerning the motive for harassment: if it resulted from a belief that the target was gay there was no Title VII claim, but if it stemmed from perceived gender nonconformity a cause of action did exist.

In Hively, the court said that it was time to stop the legal gymnastics and to say flat out that sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination. To treat people differently because they prefer their sex to the other is the epitome of gender stereotyping, which is illegal under the rationales of Price Waterhouse and Oncale.

Concurring, Judge Posner tweaked the majority for claiming that it was carrying those decisions to their logical end. Better to say that courts may adapt statutory language to meet the felt needs of the time and be done with it. Predictably, the dissent argued that courts overstep their bounds if they usurp the legislative role, especially when Congress has a 23-year record of rejecting efforts to do what the majority did.

What’s in store in the future? Although Hively applies only in Wisconsin, Illinois, and Indiana, any en banc ruling, even one as controversial as this one will be, carries weight. It could be persuasive in some circuits that have ruled differently, especially as these are panel decisions. Several circuits have already been asked to take up this issue en banc.

That said, it is worth stressing that although the circuits have uniformly held that gender stereotyping is sex discrimination, nine are aligned against Hively. For all, or even most, to alter their position is hardly foreseeable, especially as each hung its hat on Congress’s inaction in this area. As well, although the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has read Title VII as Hively did since 2015, how long it will do so under this administration is an open question. For it to go the other way would take wind out of the sails of the majority’s position.

Because there is a circuit split, the Supreme Court may weigh in. If it does and Justice Gorsuch remains the newest member, it could divide 4–4 with Justice Kennedy in the middle. Then the question would be which Kennedy shows up, the conservative or the author of so many pro-gay-rights rulings. It’s a close question, but in the end my money is on the proposition that what Congress has done in this area—or, more aptly, not done—would be decisive for him.

Allergan Fine Is a Reminder of the Obligation to Disclose White-Knight Negotiations Following an Unsolicited Tender Offer

In January 2017, Allergan Inc. agreed with the SEC that it would pay a $15 million fine for failing to disclose, in its Schedule 14D-9 response to the unsolicited tender offer for the company by Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, that Allergan was engaged in negotiations for possible “white-knight” transactions in the months following Valeant’s offer. The director of the SEC’s New York Regional Office set forth in a press release that Allergan had “failed to fully and timely disclose information about potential merger transactions it was negotiating behind the scenes in response to the Valeant bid.”

Allergan’s Schedule 14D-9 filing. In the Schedule 14D-9 filed by Allergan in response to Valeant’s unsolicited, public takeover bid, Allergan: (i) set forth that the Valeant bid was inadequate; (ii) recommended that its shareholders not tender their shares into the offer; and (iii) set forth that it “is not now undertaking or engaged in any negotiations in response to the [Tender] Offer that relate to or could result in a merger or other extraordinary transaction.”

The SEC’s objections to Allergan’s Schedule 14D-9 disclosure. The SEC had the following objections with respect to Allergan’s disclosures in its Schedule 14D-9:

  • No disclosure of discussions with “Company A.” The Schedule 14D-9 was filed in June 2014. Thereafter, Allergan engaged in negotiations with Company A in August and September 2014 for a possible acquisition of Company A. The acquisition would have complicated Valeant’s offer by making Allergan a significantly larger company. The negotiations were terminated by Company A after it conducted due diligence on Allergan. The negotiations with Company A were never publicly disclosed.
  • No disclosure of discussions with Actavis plc until the merger agreement was signed. On October 4, 2014, the respective CEOs of Allergan and Actavis discussed a potential acquisition of Allergan by Actavis. The Actavis CEO proposed that Actavis would pay $185–$200 per Allergan share. A series of conversations ensued through October, with Allergan insisting that the price had to be higher than $200, and Actavis making increasing price proposals. On November 3, Allergan disclosed that it had been approached by a party about a possible transaction, but provided no other information. On November 5, Allergan and Actavis entered into a confidentiality and standstill agreement, and Allergan permitted Actavis to conduct due diligence. The parties at that time understood that Actavis was proposing $210–$215 per share and that Allergan wanted more than $215. On November 6, Allergan disclosed that it was “in discussions” concerning a possible merger that “may lead to negotiations.” On November 17, Allergan and Actavis announced that they had signed a merger agreement at a price of $219 per share of Allergan. Importantly, as was noted in the SEC Order, after rumors about merger discussions with Actavis came to the SEC staff’s attention, the staff warned Allergan on September 23 that “to the extent that [Allergan] was engaged in merger negotiations, Schedule 14D-9 required those negotiations to be disclosed.” Thereafter, the SEC staff had made repeated requests to Allergan to make timely disclosure of any ongoing discussions.

Key Points

Companies generally do not have an affirmative obligation to disclose white-knight discussions. Companies engaged in discussions or negotiations with respect to a possible transaction generally do not have a disclosure obligation. However, a disclosure obligation arises under the following circumstances:

  • Schedule 14D-9 filing is required. If a tender offer is received by a company, it has an obligation to disclose, in the Schedule 14D-9 that is required to be filed in response to the tender offer, discussions or negotiations conducted in response to the tender offer.
  • Inconsistent past statements must be corrected. In the case of a company receiving a bid that is not a tender offer, the company has an obligation to disclose such discussions or negotiations if the company has made inconsistent statements in the past that must be corrected—that is, affirmative statements made in the past that the company is not in discussions about a merger.
  • Agreement has been reached on all material deal points. In some cases, an obligation to disclose discussions or negotiations may arise when all of the material deal points for a transaction have been agreed upon between the company and the other party.

Allergan’s disclosure obligation arose because it had received a tender offer. Disclosure issues arose for Allergan only because it was subject to the Schedule 14D-9 rules. The Schedule 14D-9 rules applied only because Allergan had become subject to a tender offer. In the case of a tender offer for a company, Item 7 of Schedule 14D-9 requires that the company disclose “negotiations” that are conducted “in response to [the] tender [offer]” and that relate to an “extraordinary transaction” (including a merger or acquisition). Rule 14D-9(c) requires that the company amend the Schedule if any material change occurs.

Practical considerations with respect to Schedule 14D-9 disclosure of negotiations. Schedule 14D-9 does not require disclosure of discussions with respect to a possible transaction unless they rise to the level of “negotiations.” When discussions become “negotiations” depends on the facts and circumstances, including, for example, whether there has been back-and-forth between the parties on price of a nature that suggests that a deal has been, or is very close to having been, reached. Generally, a company prefers to engage in a process that does not lead to its being required to make early disclosure of possible white-knight discussions. Premature disclosure could result in the company becoming irretrievably “in play” before it has made a final decision about selling the company; could lead to a potential white knight losing interest in a transaction; and/or could require disclosure, as an update, that would not otherwise have been required.

The following potentially distinguishing features of the Allergan situation may have influenced the outcome:

  • SEC disclosure warnings. As noted, the SEC set forth in its Order that Allergan had failed to make timely disclosure “despite repeated requests” from the SEC staff that it make “appropriate disclosures.”
  • Extensive pricing discussions within a narrow range. Unlike the typical case where price discussions occur in a very short timeframe just prior to execution of the merger agreement, it appears in the Allergan-Actavis discussions that there was extensive back-and-forth on price well in advance of execution of the merger agreement. Moreover, those discussions were within a relatively narrow range, suggesting that real negotiations had taken place.
  • Lengthy process, with unusual level of shareholder engagement. The lengthy duration of Allergan’s process, extending over many months, made leaks and rumors about the process more likely. Further, the extensive engagement with shareholders—by both Allergan on the one hand, and Valeant and its shareholder activist co-bidder on the other hand—in connection with proxy contests on various issues relating to Valeant’s bid increased the visibility of the process to the shareholders, the market, and the SEC, perhaps heightening the disclosure issues.

What Constitutes a Security and Requirements Relating to the Offer and Sales of Securities and Exemptions From Registration Associated Therewith

Many people don’t realize that every offer and sale of a security is required to either be (a) registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); or (b) subject to an exemption from registration under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the Securities Act), under federal securities laws (“Small Business and the SEC”—a guide for small businesses on raising capital and complying with the federal securities laws). That requirement applies to the sale of securities to multiple high net worth individuals, the sale of a security to one person in a private transaction, the sale of a security to a family member and all offers and sales of securities of public and private companies, including organizations with only two or three persons. Furthermore, that requirement applies to an offer of a security which is ultimately rejected by a potential purchaser (SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 328 (1946)). Notwithstanding the requirements described above, a significant number of offers and sales may be exempt from registration under the Securities Act as described in greater detail below.

In order to understand the registration or exemption requirements set forth above, one must first understand the definition of a “security.”

Definition of Security

Under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act, the term “security” is defined as

any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a “security,” or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.

That definition is not meant to encompass everything that may be a “security” though, as the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that the definition of “security” is “quite broad” (Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555-556 (1982)) and meant to include “the many types of instruments that, in our commercial world, fall within the ordinary concept of a security” (H.R.Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1933)).

Clearly though the offer and sale of stock, bonds, debentures, ownership interests in limited liability companies and most notes with a maturity date over nine months are considered “securities” (Section 3(a)(3) of the Securities Act).

Registration Process

In order to register a security under the Securities Act, a company must file a registration statement with the SEC. Typically the type of registration statement used for an initial public offering will be a Form S-1 Registration Statement (Form S-1). A Form S-1 includes two parts (Part I and Part II). Part I is the prospectus, the legal offering or “selling” document. In the prospectus, the “issuer” of the securities must describe in the prospectus important facts about its business operations, financial condition, results of operations, risk factors, and management. It must also include audited financial statements. The prospectus must be delivered to everyone who buys the securities, as well as anyone who is made an offer to purchase the securities. Part II contains additional information that an issuer does not have to deliver to investors but must file with the SEC, such as copies of material contracts, signatures of management and other representations.

Once an issuer files a registration statement with the SEC, SEC staff examines the registration statement for compliance with pre-established disclosure requirements set forth in the form of registration statement (i.e., in Form S-1 itself) and in Regulation S-K, but does not evaluate the merits of the securities offering or determine whether the securities offered are “good” investments or appropriate for a particular type of investor. Individual investors are required to make their own evaluation of the offering terms based on their own facts, circumstances and risk tolerance.

The SEC generally provides any comments or questions it has on the registration statement within 30 days after the filing date of the registration statement. The issuer then responds to the questions and comments and amends the filing to address issues raised. The SEC may then have additional comments or questions and the process repeats itself until the SEC advises that the issuer has cleared all of its comments and the registration statement can be declared “effective.” Once the offering is declared “effective” the offering described in the registration statement can proceed as a registered transaction. Additionally, once the registration statement is declared “effective” the issuer is subject to the reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the Exchange Act), which requires the filing of annual reports on Form 10-K, quarterly reports on Form 10-Q and current reports (for disclosure of certain material transactions which occur between the filing date of quarterly and annual reports) on Form 8-K. These filing obligations continue until the issuer falls below certain minimum record shareholder thresholds, subject to the requirements of the Exchange Act.

Exemptions From Registration

Instead of registering the initial offer and sale of securities under the Securities Act, a company can rely on an exemption from registration to avoid such registration requirements. Some of the most widely used federal offering exemptions are summarized below:

Section 4(a)(2) Exemption

Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act exempts from registration “transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.” To qualify for this exemption, which is sometimes referred to as the “private placement” exemption, purchasers of securities must:

  • either have sufficient knowledge and experience in finance and business matters in order to be considered a “sophisticated investor” (i.e., be able to evaluate the risks and merits of the specific investment), or be able to bear the investment’s economic risk;
  • have access to the type of information normally provided in a prospectus in a registered offering under the Securities Act (for example, include similar information as would be required under Part I of Form S-1 described above); and
  • agree to take the securities for long-term investment without a view to distribute the securities to the public, except pursuant to the applicable rules of the Securities Act relating to the resale thereof (including Rule 144 described below).

Additionally, except in a Rule 506(c) offering, described below, no general solicitation or advertising is allowed in connection with a Section 4(a)(2) offering.

If a company offers securities to even one person who does not meet the necessary conditions of a Section 4(a)(2) offering, the entire offering may be in violation of the Securities Act.

While the specific compliance with a Section 4(a)(2) exemption is somewhat open to interpretation, Rule 506(b) provides objective standards that can be relied upon to ensure that the requirements of Section 4(a)(2) are met.

Rule 506

Rule 506(b) of the Securities Act allows companies to raise an unlimited amount of money in private offerings if certain requirements of Rule 506(b) are met. Those requirements include prohibiting the use of general solicitation or advertising to market the securities; allowing the sale of securities to an unlimited number of “accredited investors” (described below); making knowledgeable persons available to answer questions of prospective purchasers; and requiring that investors receive “restricted” securities, i.e., securities which include a legend making clear that no sales of the securities can be made absent an exemption from registration (like Rule 144 as described below) or the registration of such securities under the Securities Act. Alternatively, if the company includes a private placement offering document which sets forth substantially all of the information that would be required in a registration statement under the Securities Act (including audited financial statements), a Rule 506(b) offering can be made to up to 35 non-“accredited investors.”

The SEC requires companies to file a Form D within 15 days of the first sale under Rule 506, which requires the disclosure of certain information regarding the offering, securities to be sold thereunder and management.

Under Rule 506(c), a company can broadly solicit and generally advertise the offering, but still be deemed to be undertaking a private offering within Section 4(a)(2) if all of the other requirements of Regulation D are met in the event: (a) the investors in the offering are all “accredited investors” (i.e., no non-“accredited investors” are allowed to participate in a Rule 506(c) offering); and (b) the company has taken reasonable steps to verify that its investors are “accredited investors,” which could include reviewing documentation, such as W-2s, tax returns, bank and brokerage statements, credit reports, and the like—which is a greater burden to meet versus the requirement for a Rule 506(b) offering that allows companies to rely on the self-certification of investors and potential investors that they are “accredited.”

“Accredited investors” under Rule 501(a) of the Securities Act include any individual that earned income that exceeded $200,000 (or $300,000 together with a spouse) in each of the prior two years, and reasonably expects the same for the current year, or has a net worth over $1 million, either alone or together with a spouse (excluding the value of the person’s primary residence); certain entities such as a bank, insurance company, registered investment company, business development company, or small business investment company; partnerships, corporations and nonprofits, which generally are required to have assets in excess of $5 million or have equity owners that are all “accredited investors”; and any trust, with total assets in excess of $5 million, not formed to specifically purchase the subject securities, whose purchase is directed by a sophisticated person.

Revised Regulation A

Regulation A is an exemption from registration for public offerings made by non-reporting companies, provided that offerings made pursuant to this exemption share many characteristics with registered offerings. In March 2015, in order to implement Section 401 of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, the SEC amended Regulation A by creating two offering tiers: Tier 1, for offerings of up to $20 million in a 12-month period (which require less disclosures and no on-going reporting requirements compared to Tier 2 offerings); and Tier 2, for offerings of up to $50 million in a 12-month period (which requires that companies file annual, semiannual, and current reports with the SEC on an ongoing basis). For offerings of up to $20 million, companies can elect to proceed under the requirements for either Tier 1 or Tier 2. There are certain basic requirements applicable to both Tier 1 and Tier 2 offerings, including company eligibility requirements, bad actor disqualification provisions and other matters. Additional requirements apply to Tier 2 offerings, including limitations on the amount of money a non-accredited investor may invest in a Tier 2 offering, requirements for audited financial statements and the filing of ongoing reports (as referenced above).

Securities in a Regulation A offering can be offered publicly, using general solicitation and advertising, and can be sold to purchasers irrespective of their status as “accredited investors,” subject to certain limitations on the amount that non-“accredited investors” can invest under Tier 2 offerings. Securities sold in a Regulation A offering are not considered “restricted securities” (i.e., securities that must be held by purchasers for a certain period of time before they may be resold) for purposes of aftermarket resales. The SEC must issue a “notice of qualification” before any sales pursuant to a Regulation A offering (made on Form 1-A) can proceed, which requires that the SEC review the offering documents and results, in many cases, in the staff of the SEC providing questions and comments requiring amendments to a company’s offering documents, similar to the process of obtaining “effectiveness” of a Form S-1 filing as described above.

Crowdfunding

Crowdfunding allows companies to raise funding through a large number of small transactions. Under the JOBS Act crowdfunding provisions, companies are limited to raising $1 million in any 12-month period. Companies cannot crowdfund on their own, but are required to engage an intermediary that is either a registered broker-dealer or registered with the SEC and FINRA. These intermediaries are subject to a number of requirements including limiting the amount that can be invested based on an investor net worth. The only companies eligible for crowdfunding are companies that are non-Exchange Act reporting companies.

Resales of Restricted Securities

Assuming restricted securities are acquired pursuant to one of the private offering exemptions from registration described above, those securities are not freely tradable and can only be sold pursuant to an effective resale registration statement filed by the issuer or pursuant to a resale exemption from registration under the Securities Act. The main resale exemption used for the resale of restricted securities is Rule 144. Rule 144 provides an exemption that permits the resale of restricted securities if a number of conditions are met, including requiring that the holder of the securities paid the full acquisition price of such securities at least six months prior to any sale, assuming the issuer is a reporting company under the Exchange Act and is current in its filings and at least one year prior to any sale in the event the issuer is not a reporting company or not current in its filings, and provided that certain other requirements for resale are met not described herein. Rule 144 may also require a notice filing with the SEC prior to any sale of securities, may limit the amount of securities that can be sold at one time and may restrict the manner of sale, depending on whether the security holder is an “affiliate” of the issuer. An “affiliate” is a person that, directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with, the issuer, and generally includes officers, directors and those persons who hold 10 percent or more of an issuer’s securities.

Conclusion

The process of complying with the rules and regulations relating to the offer and sale of securities is complicated and no exception from compliance with the federal securities laws is provided for small transactions or transactions involving family members. Instead, each and every offer and sale of a security is required to either be (a) registered with the SEC; or (b) exempt from registration under the Securities Act. As such, a competent securities attorney should always be contacted prior to any offer or sale of securities to determine and confirm that all applicable rules and requirements are being followed. Failure to comply with the rules and regulations of the Securities Act can lead to an issuer (and in some cases its officers and directors) being subject to civil and criminal penalties and fines and can further create rescission rights for investors in the non-compliant offering.

It should also be noted that the above discussion is only a summary of applicable rules and requirements and is for informational purposes only. Finally, the above only discusses federal securities laws and issues and readers should keep in mind that often times the offer and sale of a security is governed by not only federal law, but also state law, and that each state has their own offering and sale requirements, notice and filing requirements and offering rules, all of which should be confirmed prior to proceeding with the offer or sale of any securities.