Protecting Workers When Reopening Small Businesses in the COVID-19 Pandemic

Reopening a business during the pandemic is essential and inevitable, but it will certainly be a daunting process that will require consideration of how workers can be brought on board safely, how customer concerns will be addressed, and how everything can be done in a way that allows the company to survive financially.[1] Larger companies have been investing significant amounts of resources on designing and implementing their reopening plans; however, small businesses don’t have the same resources but still need to address all of the same challenges. In this article, we’re going to take a look at how recommended “big company” strategies can be retooled to meet the needs of your small business clients.

First of all, your clients need to have a reopening plan that takes into legal and regulatory requirements and the specific needs and expectation of their workers. While the owners should be responsible for collecting all the necessary information, creating the plan should be a “family affair” that includes representatives of all of the company’s departments and activities. It is essential to have input from a group of employees who can express the divergent concerns that will inevitably arise in the workforce including views on remote working and scheduling and concerns about preexisting health conditions that increase vulnerability to the virus and caring for family members. For the smallest of businesses, this means everyone can be involved. If that’s not feasible, make sure that the team members are well-connected to other employees and also make sure that there are other means for all employees to provide input and suggestions and submit concerns (e.g., an anonymous hotline).

Each plan will be different; however, reference should be made to guidelines released by federal governmental agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (e.g., CDC Guidance for Businesses and Employers), Occupational Safety and Health Administration and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, state and local governmental bodies, and any industry-specific protocols and guidance issued by nonprofit and inter-governmental organizations such as the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, the Institute for Human Rights & Business and the OECD Centre for Responsible Business Conduct. If one exists, the company should participate in any group of similar businesses that may have been formed to share best practices on how to respond to the virus. This can be particularly valuable for smaller businesses that lack the resources for creating a robust plan on their own, but care must be taken to implement suggestions in a manner that is reasonable given the size of the enterprise.

When developing and implementing the plan, the owners should not only involve you, as their attorney, to explain legal requirements and risks, but also secure guidance from workplace health and safety consultants who can assist on preparing the workplace. The plan needs to cover protecting the workspace and lay out the details of a new workplace that is configured to address and reduce the risks associated with the virus. Among the issues and questions that need to be considered are:

  • The company’s policies regarding telecommuting, including how the company intends to monitor work hours and performance of employees while they are working outside the office
  • Social distancing, personal hygiene, use of masks and other personal protective equipment, reconfiguring workspaces, and cleaning
  • Managing and protecting common workspaces such as elevators and breakrooms
  • Manipulating work schedules to reduce crowding in the workspace
  • Health checks, which should be done by persons who have been properly trained and based on legal advice regarding the types of information that employers can collect from employees, how that information can be used, and how it should be protected to respect workers’ privacy rights
  • Protecting employees against risks associated with third parties entering the workplace (e.g., providing that the company’s policies apply to all visitors and requiring that outside sanitation teams follow safety protocols)

In addition to protecting the workplace, consideration needs to be given how and when the available worker talents are deployed. Companies need to consider when they will reopen for business and what activities will be required in order to provide the services that will actually be purchased by customers and clients. The answers to these questions will dictate which of your client’s employees are absolutely necessary to conduct business. Once that group has been identified attention can turn to the best way to deploy them. Can some of them work remotely? Can the company offer flexibility in terms of timing to those employees who must be in the facility to carry out their job activities? Are there any known risks associated with likely worker commuting patterns, such as the need to take long trips on public transportation? Which of the employees have special issues that need to be considered, such as the need to care for children and other family members or legally-protected characteristics and conditions such as age or disability? The company needs to be prepared to comply with reasonable requests for accommodations in a consistent manner and assist workers with exercising their rights related to extended leaves and childcare obligations. When making decisions about which workers to bring back, care must be taken not to act in a manner that might be seen as discriminating against particular groups (e.g., women, workers from certain racial or ethnic groups, or people known to have pre-existing health problems).

The company also needs to have a plan in place in advance to respond to news that an employee has symptoms of the virus or that a member of an employee’s family has virus-related health issues that require that the employee take time off from work to assist with care and maintenance of the household. When these types of situations arise, the company must act carefully but compassionately and document the response following consultation with applicable federal and state laws and regulations related to maintaining confidentiality of an employee’s health situation and sick and family leave. The legal requirements for paid sick and family leave need to be understood, particularly exceptions for smaller employers and for certain types of employees; however, employers may decide to offer more generous benefits. Whatever approach is taken, the rules must be clear and transparent so that employees know when they can leave the workplace due to illness and what they can expect from the company in terms of pay, benefits, and criterion for returning to the workplace once the personal health crisis has passed.

Deliberation, communication, patience, flexibility, and compassion are the essential elements for any plan that your small business client has for reopening its workplace during the pandemic. Trust is essential during this whole process, and company leaders need to be committed to transparency and consistently communicating with workers, customers, and others impacted by the company’s decisions and operations. Assisting clients in reopening in ways that are compliant with laws and voluntary standards of social responsibility is both a challenge and an opportunity for you as a business counselor. Small business owners have been devastated by the economic and social impact of the pandemic and many have understandably lost faith in the ability of their elected officials to provide support and clear guidance.

Business attorneys can play a unique role in filling in the gaps for their clients, serving as advocates for their causes and providing resources that will be valuable to all members of the community. For example, lawyers can collaborate with local bar associations to provide tools and tips for small business owners in the online world such as compiling a list of frequently asked questions and answers for owners accompanied by links to government resources. Now is also the time to visit small business owners in their communities—safely of course—to be sure that the valuable information that you have gets to the people who need it. However, in order to that it is essential that you become and remain informed about developments and there are comprehensive resources available from sources such as Practical Law (Business Reopening and Return to Work Checklist) and FindLaw. This is not something that will simply “disappear”: it is a long-term issue that you will need to integrate into your overall approach to serving you small business clients.


[1] Alan S. Gutterman is the Founding Director of the Sustainable Entrepreneurship Project (www.seproject.org), a California nonprofit public benefit corporation with tax exempt status under IRC section 501(c)(3) formed to teach and support individuals and companies, both startups and mature firms, seeking to create and build sustainable businesses based on purpose, innovation, shared value and respect for people and planet. Alan is also currently a partner of GCA Law Partners LLP in Mountain View, CA and a prolific author of practical guidance and tools for legal and financial professionals, managers, entrepreneurs and investors on topics including sustainable entrepreneurship, leadership and management, business law and transactions, international law and business and technology management. He is the Co-Chair of GP Solo’s Business Law Committee and co-editor and contributing author of several books published by the ABA Business Law Section including The Lawyer’s Corporate Social Responsibility Deskbook, Emerging Companies Guide (3rd Edition) and Business and Human Rights: A Practitioner’s Guide for Legal Professionals (Forthcoming Fall 2020). More information about Alan and his work is available at the Project’s website and his personal website. A longer version of this article was originally published on May 20, 2020 on the website of the Sustainable Entrepreneurship Project (which includes additional information on sources and other resources).

Defining Accurate Credit Reporting Under the CARES Act During the Pandemic

 The credit reporting system is an integral part of the fabric of consumer credit in the United States. Credit scores, derived from data provided to credit reporting agencies, from creditors of all shapes and sizes, dictate whether a consumer can obtain credit and how much that credit will cost. As such, there is a need for the data furnished to be accurate and complete to ensure the integrity of the system. Enter a global pandemic due to the new coronavirus (“COVID-19”) with businesses shuttered around the country. People have been furloughed, laid off, or otherwise left jobless and unable to pay their bills, circumstances that threaten to cripple the US credit market.

Congress acted by passing the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act” or the “Act”), billed in part as a comprehensive COVID-19 relief plan. Recognizing the importance of consumer credit reporting, the CARES Act included provisions which attempt to protect consumer credit if the consumer enters into an “accommodation” with a furnisher of consumer credit data. An “accommodation” is an agreement to defer one or more payments, make partial payments, forebear delinquent amounts, modify a loan or contract, or receive any other assistance or relief granted by a creditor, to a consumer affected by COVID-19 during the “covered period.” The “covered period” is the period beginning on January 31, 2020 and ending 120 days after the national emergency terminates. Different reporting requirements apply, depending on whether the consumer’s credit obligation is current or delinquent when the furnisher makes an accommodation.

For example, if a furnisher makes an accommodation with respect to one or more payments on a consumer’s credit obligation or account when it is not delinquent, and the consumer makes the payments or is not required to make one or more payments under the accommodation, then the furnisher must report the obligation as “current.” When reporting an account as “current,” a furnisher should consider all of the trade line information they furnish reflecting an account as current or delinquent and cannot simply use a special comment code to report a declared disaster or forbearance. If the obligation or account is delinquent before the accommodation (but not yet charged-off), the furnisher must maintain the delinquent status while the accommodation is in effect and, if the consumer brings the obligation or account current during the accommodation period, the furnisher must report it as current.

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB” or the “Bureau”) provided the following example in its guidance: “If at the time of the accommodation the furnisher was reporting the consumer as 30 days past due, during the accommodation the furnisher may not report the account as 60 days past due. If during the accommodation the consumer brings the credit obligation or account current, the furnisher must report the credit obligation as current.” Once an accommodation ends, the furnisher must continue to report the time period covered by the accommodation in accordance with the CARES Act protections. For example, the furnisher may not report a consumer who they reported as current during the accommodation as delinquent post-accommodation if payments were made in accordance with the accommodation plan.

Furnishers, who may already be facing operational challenges as a result of remote work and loss of staffing, could face challenges when trying to comply with the Act. The CFPB responded with a policy statement and Frequently Asked Questions guide, indicating it would provide some “flexibility” in its enforcement approach to help furnishers manage these challenges. However, the CFPB warned furnishers that the Bureau still has an expectation of compliance, and that it would be appropriate to evaluate individually the circumstances of each furnisher and its “good faith” efforts to comply.

All of this regulation and guidance leads to a fundamental question, namely whether the CARES Act provisions on credit reporting truly protects the consumer’s credit, and, perhaps more importantly, the consumer’s credit score. Without question, this CARES Act provision should protect a consumer from having a delinquency show on their credit report when they enter into an accommodation. However, the consumer credit report may use a “special comment code,” which would show the debt being in an accommodation plan, such as payment deferral or forbearance. While the CFPB has emphasized that such a code may not fully satisfy the requirement, as the furnisher should look at other data fields to ensure they show the debt as “current,” there is no restriction from inputting an accurate description of the debtor’s current position with the loan. Such a description may in fact be required in order to fully and accurately show the status of the obligation. These descriptions can, and often will, lead to a decrease in a consumer’s credit score. Even if a decrease does not occur, the coding itself could lead to a consumer’s lack of ability to obtain credit, as some creditors will require a number of payments post forbearance, before they will lend new credit.

So, what should a furnisher do? The furnisher must balance their operational challenges, their staffing, and their desire to provide the best customer service they can with the enhanced reporting requirements required by the CARES Act. The furnisher should establish policies and procedures to ensure accommodation plans are appropriately flagged and thus reported correctly. The furnisher should establish a plan to answer a consumer who asks, “Will this accommodation hurt my credit?” so as to not create a false impression of the overall impact on a consumer’s credit health. Finally, the furnisher should document the steps they have taken to comply, and, just as importantly, the operational or technical roadblocks that could prevent full and absolute compliance. These steps will help furnishers mitigate the risks that may result, including litigation and regulatory action.

Deal Certainty in the Netherlands Despite COVID-19

The Doctrine of Unforeseen Circumstances

The economic impact and uncertainties related to the spread of COVID-19 might put pressure on business agreements, especially M&A transactions nearing signing or closing. It comes as no surprise that actual and potential business repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic have prompted parties to try to walk away from a deal that suddenly appears less appealing than before the pandemic. Aside from force majeure, the most commonly used argument to go back on existing deal terms has been unforeseen circumstances.

In the Netherlands, courts may modify or terminate a contract based on the doctrine of unforeseen circumstances (article 6:258 Dutch Civil Code). In essence, this doctrine contains the following elements:

  • the occurrence of an unforeseen event;
  • as a result of which continuation of the contract in its current form cannot reasonably be expected; and
  • the risk related to the unforeseen event cannot be deemed to be borne by the party relying on the doctrine of unforeseen circumstances.

The burden of proof is high. As an example, Dutch courts considered the worldwide financial and economic crisis of 2008 an entrepreneurial risk, which did not justify the modification or termination of business agreements.

COVID-19 and Measures Taken in Response May Constitute an Unforeseen Event

An event qualifies as unforeseen if it has not been taken into account in the contract either expressly or implicitly. In addition, the event must occur after the parties entered into the agreement.

In the Netherlands, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported the first case of COVID-19 on February 27, 2020. On March 11, 2020, the WHO characterized COVID-19 as a pandemic. On March 15, 2020, the Dutch government declared a lock-down to curb the spread of the virus.

There is no general rule on the date up to which the pandemic would still be considered a future event. Similarly, parties can disagree on whether the impact of the pandemic  had been discounted in the contract, either implicitly or explicitly by, for example, inclusion of a material adverse effect clause (MAE). This is a question of contractual and contextual interpretation. In the Netherlands, the literal meaning of a contractual provision is not always decisive. Based on the specific circumstances of the case as put forward by the parties, the court will assess what the parties could reasonably understand a provision to mean and what they could reasonably expect from each other on that basis.

In general, Dutch courts accept that the spread of COVID-19 and the government measures taken in response could qualify as unforeseen circumstances.

Private Equity Firm Ordered to Execute SPA

In one of the first pandemic-related cases, Nordian v. J-Club, the Amsterdam District Court ordered the private equity firm Nordian to proceed with the signing of a share purchase agreement (SPA) and rejected the firm’s argument that it could not be expected to sign in view of the pandemic.

The buyer Nordian was selected through a controlled auction after the firm submitted a binding offer with fully committed financing. Nordian and the sellers entered into a signing protocol on February 28, 2020, which provided for the signing of an SPA in agreed form. The parties were obliged to sign the SPA as soon as Nordian obtained representations and warranties insurance.

On March 19, 2020, after the Dutch government declared a lock-down, Nordian tried to abandon the deal. The sellers brought summary proceedings to secure Nordian’s signing of the SPA.

Nordian cited “unforeseen circumstances” and argued that the sellers could not expect the SPA to be signed in its agreed form in view of the circumstances resulting from the pandemic. The court dismissed this defense. The potential consequences of the pandemic for the target had been discussed between the parties prior to execution of the signing protocol. In the context of this discussion, the purchaser had not opted to negotiate an MAE clause. Through the discussion and the decision not to include an MAE clause, the court found that the parties had taken into account the consequences of the pandemic. Therefore, in this case the pandemic was not an unforeseen event, and Nordian was ordered to sign the SPA.

The Contractual Allocation of Risk and the Pandemic

Another fundamental element of the doctrine of unforeseen circumstances is whether the unforeseen event is such that continuation of the original agreement cannot reasonably be expected. Circumstances that may give rise to judicial intervention include a severe disruption in the balance of the parties’ contractual obligations.

The Principle of Sharing the Pain

In Tennor v. McCourt Global Sports, the Netherlands Commercial Court ruled on the question of whether a break fee was payable despite the pandemic. A letter of intent (LOI) had been signed with respect to the acquisition of a 50-percent stake in an equestrian show-jumping business. The LOI contained a EUR 30 million break fee. The buyer decided not to pursue the transaction and argued that the break fee should be reduced in light of the pandemic.

The NCC noted that the parties had not discussed the impact of the pandemic. However, the LOI included a waiver of claims with respect to the fee. The NCC stated that “the COVID-19 circumstances, at least in the short term, are so exceptional and disruptive that it may be hard to say they were provided for.” The NCC nevertheless saw no need to answer this question and ruled that the pandemic did not make it “unacceptable for the claimant to demand strict performance by the defendant.”

The NCC reached this conclusion based on the principle of sharing the pain. This notion appears in Dutch literature as a possible solution to preserving the contractual balance. The NCC ruled that the break fee—despite the potential impact of the pandemic—should stand: “If the fee were to be reduced in any business downturn, the fee’s purpose—comfort and confidence to get the deal done—would not be accomplished.” Consequently, the allocation of risk provided for by the LOI withstood the pandemic-induced stress test.

Unsuccessful Buyer’s Remorse

A similar decision was reached in Coltavast v. Metroprop (only available in Dutch), which concerned a real estate transaction. Metroprop was supposed to acquire two properties in Coltavast’s real estate portfolio. The transfer was scheduled for March 31, 2020. The sales contract did not cover financing arrangements. Metroprop had difficulty arranging financing and requested that the transfer date be postponed, which Coltavast refused. The matter was brought before a judge in Amsterdam for injunctive relief.

Metroprop argued that it was unable to arrange financing due to the pandemic, and that the value of the properties had decreased as a result of the crisis. In this case, the court accepted the pandemic as an unforeseen circumstance but upheld the contractual allocation of risk. The court ruled that Metroprop—as a professional party—should have been aware of the financing risk and found that Metroprop had failed to act expeditiously with respect to procuring financing for the transaction. The court suspected that this was a case of buyer’s remorse and ordered Metroprop to pay the purchase price and proceed with the transfer.

In Municipality Enschede v. Real Estate Developer (only available in Dutch), a real estate developer tried to renege on its obligation to acquire several plots of land from the municipality of Enschede, citing unforeseen circumstances. The court noted that the pandemic arose after the developer had defaulted under the sales agreement, alluding to the artificial nature of the unforeseen-circumstances defense, and upheld the contractual allocation of risk.

Postponement of Closing Due to the Pandemic

So far, in only one instance did a court allow a minor modification of the contract. In Care v. Vision (only available in Dutch), the court ordered the closing date to be pushed back by two months.

The parties, both specialists in laser eye surgery, signed a sales agreement early March 2020 for the takeover by Vision of Care’s activities. Closing was scheduled for April 1, 2020. On March 17, 2020, the clinics of both parties had to close as part of government measures to contain the spread of the COVID-19 virus. On March 24, 2020, Vision tried to postpone closing by at least six months and renegotiate the sale terms, citing inter alia unforeseen circumstances. Care lodged summary proceedings to enforce the closing of the transaction.

During their negotiations, the parties did not discuss the pandemic, and Vision had not insisted on including an MAE clause in the sale agreement. In the opinion of the court, the pandemic as a whole was not unforeseen at the time of the signing of the agreement; however, the court found that the government measures related to the pandemic were. Noting that Care’s business was mandatorily closed at the time and that Vision was ineligible to receive financial relief from the government, the court ruled that Vision was not reasonably required to close the transaction at the initially scheduled date of April 1, 2020. The court continued, however, that because Care’s clinics had meanwhile reopened and its turnover recovered, Vision could be required to proceed with the closing of the transaction. The court ordered Vision to close the transaction by June 1, 2020. Given that the judgment was dated June 19, 2020, this meant in effect an order to close as soon as possible.

The reference in the court’s reasoning to Care’s recovered turnover after reopening appears to suggest that Vision perhaps could have had successfully avoided the closing if Care’s operations had not bounced back. However, even though the court allowed a minor modification of the SPA, it is unlikely that Vision would have been let off the hook entirely in a more unfavorable recovery scenario.

Conclusion

Deal and business certainty is key. Dutch courts are reluctant to terminate or modify a business contract based on the doctrine of unforeseen circumstances. If the parties discussed the pandemic or if the contract contains an MAE clause, the court will most likely find that the parties have taken the pandemic into account in the contract. In addition, the courts tend to uphold the contractual allocation of risk, despite the impact of the pandemic, and have no patience for buyer’s remorse. The one case in which a court allowed the contract to be modified is likely a one-off exception to the general rule.


This article reflects circumstances through mid-August 2020, when the article was submitted.

Employment Law Red Flags in the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Hiring

While the COVID-19 pandemic has had an effect on almost every aspect of employment, perhaps the biggest change for most employers (and the change that is most likely to have a lasting impact) is the transition of many employees to some form of remote work. Relatedly, many businesses have been forced to recruit and screen job applicants remotely, abandoning traditional in-person interviews and job assessments in favor of virtual meetings and online tools to measure, among other things, cognitive capabilities, emotional intelligence, personality traits, and skill sets. Even prior to the pandemic, many companies were beginning to migrate towards the use of artificial intelligence (“A.I.”) in screening applicants, in hopes that computers would speed up the hiring process, more accurately identify the right candidates for the position, and eliminate human bias and subjectivity in selecting candidates. Whether it was deploying machine learning to identify recruits based on the content of their online profiles, or using algorithms to sort through resumes, or even using face and voice analysis software to assess various competencies and characteristics, A.I. was touted by many companies as a hiring panacea. That drumbeat has only become louder among employers in an environment where live meetings and social interactions have become circumscribed. However, without proper vetting and analysis, these tools can actually introduce bias into the process and expose employers to liability under various federal, state, and local laws. This article explores the ways in which A.I. and machine learning are in use during the screening, interviewing, and hiring process, as well as the complicated (and expanding) legal framework in which these tools must operate, and identifies potential pitfalls for employers seeking to implement these technologies.

COVID-19 Has Accelerated the Move Towards a Work-From-Home Economy

Even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, working from home was becoming an increasingly common practice. According to a 2012 study, the proportion of U.S. employees who primarily work from home nearly doubled from 2000 to 2010.[2] The number of employees regularly working from home grew 173% from 2005 to 2012, and, in 2016, 43% of employees reported working remotely with some frequency. This has been driven by a number of factors, including an increase in jobs that are performed mostly with computers, the improvement of remote work technology, and an increasing number of households with children in which all caregivers are working.

COVID-19 has obviously accelerated this shift to remote working exponentially. During COVID-19, more than 60% of U.S. employees reported that they have been primarily working from home due to the pandemic.[3] Even in cities and states where employers are not required to have non-essential personnel working remotely, many employers have voluntarily made the switch to prevent the potential spread of the virus within the workplace. While it is unlikely that more than one-half of the U.S. workforce will be working from home full time after the pandemic subsides, many employers are anticipating allowing some form of permanent flexibility in the workweek, even in a post-COVID world. A PwC survey of employers showed that 55% anticipated that most of their workers will be working from home at least one day a week following the pandemic.[4]

The current pandemic and the accelerated move towards a flexible workweek create obvious impediments to the interviewing process, as candidates cannot always be brought in for live conversations with existing employees. During the pandemic, employers have replaced some of these live meetings with video conferencing; however, Zoom meetings can remove some of the subtleties that emerge when individuals are face-to-face. One alternative that employers are increasingly exploring is A.I.

Companies Are Increasingly Using A.I. in All Stages of Screening, Interviewing and Hiring

The use of computer processing power in the screening and hiring process is not a new phenomenon. In fact, for several decades, employers and recruiting firms have been using simple text searches to cull through resumes submitted in response to job listings. These text searches have given way to more complex algorithms that do more than search for identified keywords. For example, Ideal, an “A.I.-powered talent screening and matching system,” has the ability to understand and compare experiences across resumes to determine which candidate’s work history more closely matches the requirements of an open position. Some companies, such as LinkedIn Recruiter and ZipRecruiter, bring A.I. into the equation even earlier in the process, searching the social media and public profiles of millions of individuals to determine whether a job posting is even advertised to a particular candidate.

Once a candidate has been identified, A.I., in the form of chat bots, can be used to automatically reach out to that individual and determine whether the person is available to start on the employer’s preferred timeline or whether the individual is open to commuting. Some companies have applicants play neuroscience computer games, which are then analyzed to predict candidates’ cognitive and personality traits.

A.I. is also utilized in the interview process. One tech company, HireVue, started in 2004 as a video interview platform that allowed candidates to record answers to questions and upload them to a database for recruiters to later review and compare to answers from other applicants.[5] Since then, HireVue has integrated A.I. into its platform. It now uses facial and voice recognition software to analyze body language, tone, and other factors to determine whether a candidate exhibits preferred traits.

The Pros and Cons of A.I. in Hiring

The technology companies developing these A.I. tools tout their ability to help recruiters and HR departments quickly sift through mountains of applicants and more efficiently identify qualified candidates from the outset. Companies might receive thousands of applications for a single job posting, leaving HR departments little choice but to find some way to cut down the number of resumes that have to be reviewed, or alternatively to speed-read resumes trying to weed out unqualified candidates. The use of an A.I. system could ensure that every resume is at least screened. Some A.I. services can also save time by analyzing publicly available data such as social media profiles, resumes, and other text-based data submitted by the applicant, eliminating the need for additional assessments.

Proponents of this technology also argue that A.I. systems can be fairer and more thorough than human recruiters can—some systems can consider upwards of 20 factors in each application in fractions of a second, and these automated systems can apply the same analysis to every applicant, whether it is the first resume reviewed for a position or the five hundredth. While human recruiters or interviewers might be impacted by whether they are having a particularly busy day or whether they were sleep-deprived the night before, facial and voice recognition software analyzes every candidate the same way. A.I. also, theoretically, can be used to avoid the unconscious preferences and biases of human recruiters by stripping out information relating to, among other things, name, age, and gender, all of which can color a person’s analysis of an applicant’s qualifications.

Those who are more cautious about the use of A.I. in recruiting point out that the systems are only as good as the programmers who write the algorithm and “feed the machine.” If an A.I. tool is fed resumes of people who have previously been hired by the company, and the recruiting departments making those hiring decisions harbored subconscious biases and preferences, those biases and preferences could be inherited by the A.I. tool. This could have effects that range from the bizarre—such as the resume screening company whose algorithm determined that the factors most indicative of job performance were having the name Jared and playing high school lacrosse[6]—to the more nefarious. Amazon reportedly scrapped an internally developed recruiting tool after it discovered that the algorithm was disfavoring resumes that included the word “women’s,” (for example, if a resume included information about the applicant’s participation on a college’s women’s ice hockey team) and candidates who graduated from two all-women’s colleges.[7] This occurred because the algorithm had been fed resumes from applicants who had previously been hired by Amazon, and those hires were overwhelmingly male.

Unintentional discrimination could also seep into A.I. systems in less direct ways. An algorithm trained to prefer employees within a certain commuting distance might result in applicants from poorer areas being disadvantaged. Even as recently as 2019, top facial recognition systems were shown to misidentify female black faces ten times more frequently than female white faces.[8] This suggests that A.I. programs might have issues analyzing the facial expressions of black applicants. Differences in speech patterns and vocabulary that correlate with race or ethnicity could complicate automated voice analysis. These are not biases that are being intentionally programmed into A.I. software, but they could nonetheless result in certain groups of applicants being unfairly disadvantaged, which opens employers up to potential claims under various anti-discrimination laws.

Use of A.I. Creates Potential Risks under Existing Employment Laws

Like any other recruiting or hiring practice, the use of A.I. systems to screen and interview candidates implicates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), a federal law that protects employees and applicants against discrimination based on certain specified characteristics such as race, color, national origin, sex, and religion, as well as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Both Title VII and the ADEA prohibit discrimination based on disparate treatment and/or disparate impact. While a claim of disparate treatment—i.e., intentional discrimination—might seem odd when talking about use of a computer program that by its nature necessarily lacks a discriminatory motive or intent, courts have upheld claims of disparate treatment based on allegations of unconscious or implicit bias.[9] As discussed above, unconscious bias can manifest in an A.I. system because of its programming and training. Thus, a court could find that an employer faces the same liability for a program exhibiting the unconscious bias of its programmer as it would if the programmer had made the hiring decision him or herself, based on that bias.

Alternatively, an employer could face a Title VII or ADEA disparate impact claim if use of a particular A.I.-driven program or algorithm adversely impacts members of a protected class, such as the female applicants who were being disfavored by Amazon’s recruiting tool. Courts analyzing such a claim could turn to a seminal line of cases that dealt with employers’ use of standardized tests in the application and promotion process. In its opinions in Griggs v. Duke Power Company[10] and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody[11], the Supreme Court established that if such tests are shown to have a disparate impact on protected groups of employees, employers must establish that the tests are both job-related and represent a reasonable measure of job performance. Courts could apply the same reasoning to A.I. programs and algorithms, whereby employers may be forced to establish how the factors considered by the programs relate to the specific job requirements for the position at issue. In some cases, such as analysis of relevant experience in a resume, an employer might be able to make such a showing easily. In cases where facial recognition software is prioritizing candidates who made eye contact during an automated interview, job-relatedness might be more difficult to establish. In addition, even if an employer shows that the A.I. tool is considering job-related factors, applicants could still succeed on a disparate impact claim by pointing to the existence of a less discriminatory practice that could serve the same job-related business interest.

An A.I.-hiring practice could also implicate the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) if an algorithm discerns an applicant’s physical disability, mental health, or clinical diagnosis, all of which are forbidden inquiries in pre-employment candidate assessments. The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 broadened the statutory definition of “disability,” increasing the scope of individuals whom the ADA protects. Similarly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has issued guidance qualifying the expanded list of personality disorders identified in the psychiatric literature as protected mental impairments.[12] Consequently, the ADA may protect applicants who have significant concentration or communication problems, both of which A.I.-technology may identify as a disqualifying characteristic for employment.

The potential for A.I. recruiting practices to violate existing employment statutes is not hypothetical. In fact, the EEOC has already investigated at least two instances of alleged A.I. bias, and has made clear that employers using A.I. hiring practices could face liability for any unintended discrimination.[13] Furthermore, in September 2018, three U.S. Senators requested that the EEOC develop guidelines for employers’ use of facial analysis technologies to ensure they do not violate anti-discrimination laws.[14] Though the EEOC has not yet responded to the Senators’ request, the Commission’s recent enforcement activities demonstrate its focus on the growing use of new technologies. For example, the EEOC, in 2017, found reasonable cause to believe an employer violated the ADEA by advertising on Facebook for a position within its company and “limiting the audience for their advertisement to younger applicants.”[15]

In addition to laws focusing on discrimination, the use of certain A.I. recruiting tools could implicate state biometric laws. Illinois,[16] Texas,[17] and Washington[18] have laws regulating the collection of biometric identifiers including scans of hands, fingers, voices, faces, irises, and retinas. The laws generally require that businesses collecting biometric identifiers specify how they safeguard, handle, store, and destroy the data they collect, and provide individuals with prior notice and consent, including notice of how exactly the data will be collected and used. Furthermore, New York, California, Washington, and Arkansas have recently amended their existing state laws to include biometric data in the definition of protected personal information. To the extent that employers use facial or voice recognition software to analyze applicants’ video interviews, they may have to develop policies to ensure that their storage and use of that data complies with applicable state laws. Furthermore, the nature of an online application process means that employers may end up inadvertently collecting biometric data from individuals who reside outside of the states in which the company normally operates, which could expose the employer to additional legal requirements of which it might not be aware.

Many States Are Now Focused on Protecting Job Applicants Regarding the Use of A.I. in Hiring

While A.I. in recruiting is not regulated on a federal level, Illinois recently enacted a first-of-its-kind law called the Artificial Intelligence Video Interview Act. Effective January 1, 2020, the law imposes strict limitations on employers who use A.I. to analyze candidate video interviews.[19] Under the Act, employers must: a) notify applicants that A.I. will be used in their video interviews; b) obtain consent to use A.I. in each candidate’s evaluation; c) explain to applicants how the A.I. works and what characteristics the A.I. will track in relation to their fitness for the position; d) limit sharing of the video interview to those who have the requisite expertise to evaluate the candidate; and e) comply with an applicant’s request to destroy his or her video within 30 days.

New York currently is considering legislation to limit the discriminatory use of A.I. technology. If passed, the new law would prohibit the sale of “automated employment decision tools” unless the tools’ developers first conducted anti-bias audits to assess the tools’ predicted compliance with the provisions of Section 8-107 of the New York City Code, which sets forth the city’s employment discrimination laws, and prohibits, among other things, employment practices that disparately impact protected applicants or workers.[20] New Jersey and Washington state legislators introduced similar legislation in 2019.

Furthermore, beginning in 2018, New York, Vermont, and Alabama created task forces to begin studying the development and use of A.I. technologies. The states directed the task forces to assess the A.I.-tools for various benchmarks like discriminatory impact, fairness, accountability, and transparency, and to develop best practices for A.I. usage. These efforts to examine A.I. tools in depth could foreshadow upcoming state regulation of A.I.-driven pre-employment tools.

States legislatures are not the only ones scrutinizing A.I. usage in recruiting. Senate and House Congressional legislators introduced the Algorithmic Accountability Act (“AAA”) in April 2019.[21] The proposed AAA is the first federal law aimed at regulating the use of algorithms by private companies, and would task the Federal Trade Commission with creating regulations that require major employers to assess their A.I. tools for accuracy, fairness, bias, discrimination, privacy, and security and to implement timely corrections. As drafted, the AAA only applies to companies with revenues in excess of $50 million per year, that possess information relating to at least one million people or devices, or that act as data brokers who buy and sell consumer data. Commentators have stated that the proposed act provides clear notice that Congress believes A.I. should be regulated, and will step in.[22]

What Employers Should Be Aware of When Considering Using A.I. in Hiring

Just as COVID-19 has accelerated the transition of many employers to flexible work schedules, the nationwide move to more regular work-from-home arrangements is likely to accelerate the adoption of A.I. tools in the recruiting, interviewing, and hiring process. To the extent that employers are considering using such tools, either in-house or through a recruiting company, there are certain issues of which they should be cognizant:

  • Employers should know the factors being considered by the program or algorithm. In much the same way that employers carefully develop and identify non-discriminatory and non-biased factors and considerations that are important to their traditional hiring decisions, they need to be equally as diligent in developing and modifying (where appropriate) the inputs that are fed into their recruiting programs and algorithms used to screen and evaluate potential candidates and applicants. Not only will this enhance the likelihood of recruiting success, but it will give employers the opportunity to assess whether the factors are, in fact, job-related, which is a lynchpin criterion under many employment laws.
  • Employers should consider auditing automated tools on a regular basis. One of the main selling points for machine learning tools is that they can adapt on their own to feedback from the person making employment decisions, theoretically leading to better results the longer they are used. The downside of this constant adaptation is that employers cannot rely on an initial analysis of whether the program is returning results that may disadvantage one group or another. Employers should consider regularly auditing the results produced by these tools to ensure that the programs are not inadvertently “learning” illegal or improper lessons from the information that is input. Self-critical analysis of both the inputs and outputs is essential to minimize liability risk under the employment laws.
  • Outsourcing does not eliminate risk to employers. Not all employers have the capability of internally developing A.I. tools for recruiting—many likely contract with outside vendors to handle parts of the recruiting process, particularly the initial vetting of applicants and/or the advertising to specific potential candidates. Using such an arrangement, however, does not exempt the employer from liability if the vendor is using tools that discriminate against protected groups. Similar to requests for salary history and background checks, employers may be held liable for violations of employment laws by recruiting companies. As such, employers—through appropriate contract language—should require their recruiters, or others acting on their behalf, to comply with all existing employment laws in connection with the screening and hiring of job applicants.

[1] Summer Associates Rund Khayyat and Kate Waterman assisted in the drafting of this article.

[2] Mateyka, Petr J., Melanie Rapino, and Liana Christin Landivar, ‘‘Home-Based Workers in the United States: 2010,’’ U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, 2012.

[3] See https://news.gallup.com/poll/306695/workers-discovering-affinity-remote-work.aspx.

[4] See https://www.pwc.com/us/en/library/covid-19/us-remote-work-survey.html.

[5] See https://www.businessinsider.com/hirevue-ai-powered-job-interview-platform-2017-8.

[6] See https://qz.com/1427621/companies-are-on-the-hook-if-their-hiring-algorithms-are-biased/.

[7] See https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-automation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-women-idUSKCN1MK08G.

[8] See https://www.wired.com/story/best-algorithms-struggle-recognize-black-faces-equally/.

[9] See e. g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-266, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563-565, 50 L.Ed.2d 450; see also Kimble v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 690 F. Supp. 2d 765, 778 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (holding plaintiff established prima facie discrimination case by relying on evidence of employer’s implicit bias).

[10] 401 U.S. 424 (1971).

[11] 422 U.S. 405 (1975).

[12] Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Enforcement Guidance on the ADA and Psychiatric Disabilities, (1997), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/‌enforcement-guidance-ada-and-psychiatric-disabilities.

[13] U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Press Release: Use of Big Data Has Implications for Equal Employment Opportunity, Panel Tells EEOC (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/10-13-16.cfm.

[14] Senators Kamala Harris, Patty Murray, Elizabeth Warren, Letter to the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, https://www.scribd.com/embeds/388920670/content#from_embed.

[15] See Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. T-Mobile US Inc., 5:17-CV-07232 (N.D. Cal. 2017); see also Mindy Weinstein, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Determination Letters, available at https://www.onlineagediscrimination.com/‌sites/default/files/documents/eeoc-determinations.pdf.

[16] Ill. Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq. (2008).

[17] TX Bus. & Com. Code §503.001 (2009).

[18] Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §19.375.020 (2017) (prohibiting companies from entering biometric data into a database without prior notice and consent).

[19] 820 ILL. Comp. Stat. Ann. 42/1.

[20] Int 1894-2020 (N.Y. 2020).

[21] H.R.2231, 116th Cong. (2019); S. 1108, 116th Cong. (2019).

[22] See, e.g., Starner Tom, AI can Deliver Recruiting Rewards, but at What Legal Risk?, Human Resource Executive, Dec. 31 2019, https://hrexecutive.com/ai-can-deliver-recruiting-rewards-but-at-what-legal-risk/.

GPT-3: An AI That Makes Cars, Not Wrenches, and What It Means for the Legal Profession

One doesn’t have to dig too deep into legal organizations to find AI skeptics. AI is getting tremendous attention and significant venture capital, but AI tools frequently underwhelm in the trenches. Here are a few reasons why that is and why I believe GPT-3, a beta version of which was recently released by the OpenAI Foundation, might be a game-changer in legal and other knowledge-focused organizations.

GPT-3 is getting a lot of oxygen lately because of its size, scope, and capabilities. However, it should be recognized that a significant amount of that attention is due to its association with Elon Musk. The OpenAI Foundation, which created GPT-3, was founded by heavy hitters Musk and Sam Altman and is supported by Mark Benioff, Peter Thiel, and Microsoft, among others. Arthur C. Clarke once observed that great innovations happen after everyone stops laughing. Musk has made the world stop laughing in so many ambitious areas that the world is inclined to give a project in which he’s had a hand a second look. GPT-3 is getting the benefit of that spotlight. I suggest, however, that the attention might be warranted on its merits.

Why Some AI-Based Tools Have Struggled in the Legal Profession and How GPT-3 Might Be Different

1. Not Every Problem Is a Nail

It is said that when you’re a hammer, every problem is a nail. The networks and algorithms that power AI are quite good at drawing correlations across enormous data sets that would not be obvious to humans. One of my favorite examples of this is a loan-underwriting AI that determined that the charge level of the battery on your phone at the time of application is correlated to your underwriting risk. Who knows why that is? A human would not have surmised that connection. Those things are not rationally related, just statistically related.

This capability makes AI tools good at grouping like things together to facilitate users finding them based upon revealed correlations. Consequently, many AI applications are some variant of finding stuff better. It is what they do well. However, “finding stuff” is not a first-order problem in legal organizations. It is merely a means to an end.

The “end” in legal organizations is a document of some kind. Documents are their widget—the thing legal teams build. Finding information that is relevant to creating a document is helpful. Actually producing that document, though, is far more helpful.

Producing documents, it turns out, is something GPT-3 does very well. That is at the heart of its distinction from many other AI tools – its ability to produce sophisticated documents. At its core, GPT-3 is a text-prediction engine. It is designed to accept as input a string of text and from that input predict, from a statistical analysis of everything it has ingested, what text should come next. That process can be repeated recursively, so from a simple text string an entire document can be generated.

It does this through statistics and algebra, more or less. GPT-3 has read, essentially, everything—at least all substantive publicly available documents in huge portions of the internet, which at this point in history represents a material segment of all expressed human knowledge. Accordingly, it can predict, given some input of text, what text is statistically likely to come next. You can feed it a few lines, and it predicts the next. Moreover, early testers claim that you can instruct GPT-3 to write in a certain voice. Your document can be created in the voice of Hemingway, Shakespeare, or Barack Obama. Pretty cool stuff.

I think this is the breakthrough for legal organizations. GPT-3 isn’t just finding stuff for you; GPT-3 is making stuff for you. Certainly, other AI products add value—it’s not trivial that we have something that makes wrenches—but it’s another thing entirely that if you sell cars, you have something that makes a car.

2. With Data Sets, Sometimes the Juice Isn’t Worth the Squeeze

Most enterprises that have implemented AI tools confront the training dataset problem. Algorithms that were designed with enormous datasets depend upon such large datasets in operation. When such tools come out of the lab and into the enterprise, assembling the appropriate dataset is often a gating factor.

The issue in legal organizations is one of scale and effort. The volume of documents in most legal organizations, even large ones, are nowhere near the numbers for which AI tools were designed. In addition, vetting and assembling such datasets and authenticating a product’s performance after training on such collections can be extremely time consuming. In areas such as contract intelligence, tools that are trained on large, publicly available data, such as the SEC’s EDGAR database, can be an exception to this problem. These tend to work out-of-the-box on an organization’s contracts, which tend to be similar to the large public dataset. However, absent this predelivery training, it is frequently found that creating and monitoring the dataset is a bar to success in an organization.

GPT-3, however, has been pretrained on billions of substantive documents from large collections of publicly available documents. Given that GPT-3 is pretrained with a vast dataset, it is functional out-of-the-box for the purpose of generating documents. Early research suggests that it can be hyper-tuned on an organization’s own data, but it doesn’t have to be. This solves the primary challenge for business users in getting out of the gate with some AI tools.

3. Thinking Isn’t as Important as Doing

One criticism that has been levied upon GPT-3 is that it does not “reason” as humans do, so on occasion its output is absurd. That’s an accurate criticism, and the public conversation about GPT-3 is not short of humorous examples.

GTP-3 is a statistical engine, without the reasoning ability of humans or the yet-to-be-created “strong AI.” People frequently ask whether an AI will pass the Turing Test (meaning would it fool a human into thinking he or she were interacting with another human). Although that is a useful shorthand for measuring an AI’s reasoning ability compared to humans, it doesn’t say much about its usefulness. In knowledge organizations where creating documents is a central activity, usefulness is judged by a tool’s ability to do that task, not its ability to fool someone about the source. For that purpose, GPT-3 appears to be well-suited. Although the absurd output that GPT-3 sometimes creates can be fun to see, the wrong turns are pretty obvious and unlikely to escape even cursory review. Most of us can probably point to some pretty absurd output from humans, too, but it’s hardly a reason to dismiss them as participants in the ecosystem.

What GPT-3 does is create stuff, rapidly, based upon a significant chunk of human knowledge. For all that doing, perhaps its lack of thinking can be forgiven.

Applications for GPT-3 Worth Exploring in Legal Organizations

Given that GPT-3 is good at generating documents, it’s easy to imagine applications of this technology in legal organizations. Almost any task that is document-oriented (except, presumably, those where the unique facts overwhelm all other aspects of the document) are good candidates. Here are a few that we will be exploring with our corporate legal department clients, which I suspect are representative of those that will make sense for other organizations:

  • Powering intake systems. In our work with corporate legal departments, a common problem is managing the interaction between business units and the legal department. The requester wants prompt, accurate help. The legal department wants to provide that help while complying with headcount and bandwidth constraints. One aspect of the intake process can be providing immediate answers to common questions. GPT-3 can be part of that solution by providing contextual answers (rather than selecting from an inventory of stock answers like typical bots) as well as creating first drafts of documents. GPT-3’s ability to create answers and documents on the fly can enable chat and intake systems that users find useful rather than off-putting.
  • Document creation. Creating first-pass documents based on what has been done before is not only powerful, it’s what humans already do. Early in my legal practice, a senior partner once told me, “We created a set of documents in the Garden of Eden and have just been modifying them ever since.” GPT-3’s garden is much larger; it can include your collection plus everything else. In addition, it analyzes 175 billion parameters, so it makes statistically valid decisions incredibly fast. One can imagine GPT-3 being part of the process that creates initial drafts of legal memoranda, contracts, policy manuals, HR documents, RFPs, and audit responses, among other things commonly created by finding and patching together prior versions of these documents by people.

Where We Go From Here

GPT-3 is not the only helpful AI tool at our disposal; however, it does represent a transition from making the raw materials of end products to making end products themselves. For legal organizations and other knowledge workers, that is a material change. In addition, the enormous dataset upon which it is pretrained removes one of the barriers to experimentation and implementation. GPT-3 has its limits, but frequently the first limit is our imaginations. In the case of GPT-3, stretching our imaginations might serve us well.

My company specializes in understanding what business capabilities can be enabled by all the cool new tech coming into the world. We believe that GPT-3 provides some new tools of value in a legal department’s arsenal and will be focused on assessing practical, impactful solutions, hopefully making better legal organizations in the process—once the world stops laughing, of course.

ISS Releases 2020 Global Benchmark Policy Survey Results

On September 24, 2020, Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. (ISS) released the results of its 2020 Global Benchmark Policy Survey. This survey aims to solicit broad feedback from institutional investors, corporate executives, board members, and other interested constituencies on potential areas of policy change for 2021 and beyond. Key takeaways from the survey include:

COVID-19 Pandemic Response

  • ISS’s policy guidance issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic: 62% of investor respondents and 87% of non-investor respondents indicated that ISS should carry this or similar guidance into 2021 and continue to apply flexible approaches where warranted through at least the 2021 main proxy seasons.
  • Annual meeting formats: Absent continuing COVID-19 pandemic health and social restrictions, almost 80% of investor respondents chose “hybrid” (combined online and physical) shareholder meetings, whereas 42% of non-investor respondents indicated a preference for in-person meetings, with virtual meetings used only when there is a compelling reason (such as pandemic restrictions).
  • Expectations regarding executive compensation adjustments: 70% of investor respondents indicated that the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact on the economy, employees, customers, and communities and the role of government-sponsored loans and other benefits must be considered by boards, must be incorporated thoughtfully into compensation decisions to adjust pay and performance expectations, and should be clearly disclosed to shareholders. 53% of non-investor respondents indicated that the COVID-19 pandemic is different from previous market downturns and many boards and compensation committees will need flexibility to make decisions regarding reasonable adjustments to performance expectations and related changes to executive compensation.
  • Short-term/annual incentive programs: 51% of investor respondents and 54% of non-investor respondents indicated that both (1) making mid-year changes to annual incentive metrics, performance targets and/or measurement periods to reflect the changed economic realities; and (2) suspending the annual incentive program and instead making one-time awards based on committee discretion could be reasonable company responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, depending on circumstances and the justification provided.

Sustainability and Climate Change

  • Director accountability to assess and mitigate climate change risk: Investor respondents indicated the following actions are appropriate for shareholders to take with respect to a company they consider to not be effectively reporting on or addressing its climate change risk: (1) engage with the board and company management about their concerns (92%); (2) consider support for shareholder proposals seeking increased disclosure related to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions or other climate-related measures (87%); and (3) consider support for shareholder proposals seeking establishment of specific targets for reduction of GHG emissions, possibly including targets for reducing the carbon footprint associated with the company’s products and services (84%). 93% of non-investor respondents favored engagement with the board and company management as the most appropriate action, while other possible actions received significantly less support, and 75% of investor respondents indicated that they would consider a vote against directors who are deemed to be responsible for poor climate change risk management.
  • United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals framework: 44% of investor respondents and 49% of non-investor respondents indicated that the framework is an effective way for companies to measure environmental and social risks and to commit to improving environmental and social disclosures and actions.

Auditors and Audit Committees

  • Auditor evaluation: 88% of investor respondents indicated significant audit controversies as the most relevant factor (other than the relative level of non-audit services and fees compared to audit-related services and fees) to the evaluation of auditor independence and performance, whereas 67% of non-investor respondents indicated significance/frequency of material restatements as most relevant.
  • Audit committee evaluation: 93% of investor respondents indicated that significant controversies relating to financial reporting, financial controls, or audit should be a top consideration by shareholders when evaluating a company’s audit committee, whereas 97% of non-investor respondents chose skills and experience of audit committee members.

Board Composition

  • Racial and ethnic diversity:
    • 73% of investor respondents and 36% of non-investor respondents indicated that all boards should disclose corporate board members’ self-identified race and/or ethnicity.
    • 61% of investor respondents indicated that boards should aim to reflect the company’s customer base and the broader societies in which they operate by including directors drawn from racial and ethnic minority groups. 53% of non-investors indicated that while board diversity with respect to race and ethnicity is desirable, expectations may reasonably differ based on many factors, for example local laws, company size, geographic location, and other factors.
    • 85% of investor respondents and 92% of non-investor respondents favored engagement with a company’s board and management team to encourage the inclusion of racial and ethnically diverse directors.
  • Independent board chair: 85% of investors indicated that an independent board chair is their preferred corporate model, while 48% of non-investor respondents indicated that there was no single preferred model for board leadership.

The Current Environment Needs Leadership: Coaching Can Help Lawyers Lead

The world is rapidly changing and so is the legal profession. The term “VUCA,” meaning Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous, was coined in the military and has been adopted to describe business conditions in rapidly changing markets. Today, we are witnessing VUCA on steroids.

Change requires leadership. Although lawyers often hold leadership positions in our society, they have not been taught to lead.[1] Some leaders may be born with innate leadership capabilities, but there is evidence that leadership skills rooted in change and transformation can be taught.[2]

Law schools increasingly have begun teaching about leadership and consider it to be a fundamental lawyering skill. In 2018, the Association of American Law Schools (AALS), the field’s professional academy, created the Section on Leadership. How can practicing lawyers who graduated prior to these recent changes embrace leadership? One way is through leadership coaching.

What Is Leadership Coaching in Law?

Leadership coaching is a tool that supports the development of leadership as a core legal competency, building on critical thinking skills and supporting lawyers’ analytical creativity, well-being, and capacity. It is a distinct form of coaching based on a confidential relationship with a trained professional coach who helps a lawyer enhance his or her performance. To be clear, we use the term “leadership coaching” here instead of “executive coaching” because executive coaching originates in the business world, and lawyers might not be executives.

Working with a leadership coach can help attorneys not only learn what is required to lead effectively, but also how to implement those skills in practice and incorporate them into their work. Leadership coaching offers an opportunity for lawyers to manage change (both internally and externally), consider best practices, explore and adopt new approaches, and address mindsets and/or behaviors that may no longer serve their interests. Through coaching, attorneys can gain a new perspective and reframe issues, which often generates creative solutions and helps identify what gets in the way of accomplishing their goals.

When businesses first began to adopt coaching as a human resource tool decades ago, it was often perceived as remedial—a way to “fix” a poor-performing employee or as an exit strategy. Soon, however, executive coaching became identified as a way to help business leaders “up their game,” analogous to professional athletes. Today, it is estimated that 60 percent of Fortune 500 CEOs have coaches.[3]

The legal field has been slower to adopt coaching than other analytic professions that attract smart, linear thinkers, such as engineers and business and finance professionals. Although becoming more common over the last several years, the use of leadership coaching remains less prominent within the legal profession than in the business world.

As lawyers who are also professionally trained leadership executive coaches, we have coached a wide array of lawyers, from law firm partners currently in leadership roles and those identified as rising leaders, to lawyers serving as in-house counsel, in government agencies, and leading nonprofit organizations, to attorneys in business, management, and policy roles. We have seen similar themes reflected among many lawyers’ leadership goals. Those themes include:

  • motivating and incentivizing;
  • delegating the way a task is accomplished;
  • providing and receiving constructive feedback;
  • evaluating and supporting performance;
  • supervising, training, and accountability;
  • managing workplace conflicts;
  • mentoring and sponsoring effectively;
  • diversity, equity, and inclusion; and
  • retention and replacement.

All of these skills are required for successful leadership.

The Challenges of Law Practice

In almost any field, leadership is at the core of getting things done. A great idea is just that unless it’s acted upon. Moving from thought to scalable action requires generally more than one person and often a team. To get from strategy to operations, from planning to implementation, and from policy to practice requires not just intellectual capacity but leadership acumen.

Billed as a “learned” profession, lawyers pride themselves on their intellect and sometimes scoff at “management”—a core component of leadership—as busy work or an administrative chore to be avoided that does not require real skill and that is separate from their “real” work. The fact that success in private practice is measured by billable hours and the size of a portable book of business exacerbates those tendencies, but lawyers who work in-house, in government, or in public policy often display similar attitudes.

Businesses, law firms, government agencies, and nonprofits all depend upon leaders who can successfully manage complex systems, adapt to internal and external changes they cannot control, and inspire other people to take responsibility. Such challenges often push smart, talented attorneys—who are used to being successful in their work—outside of their comfort zones.

This lack of comfort with leadership and strategy is evident in lawyers’ interactions with their clients. General counsel and their teams are expected to go beyond managing risk to actively support their company’s strategy, but in a recent survey only 55 percent of CEOs responded that their chief lawyer acted as a strategic business partner and was considered a valued member of the company’s leadership team.[4]

How Do Leadership Coaches Help Their Lawyer Clients?

Even highly intelligent and accomplished attorneys do not typically sprout new skills overnight. Without judgment and in a confidential environment, a leadership coach works with lawyers individually to help them more accurately understand how they are perceived, experiment with different approaches, provide feedback, offer resources, and help tailor a model they can own.

Typically engaged to work over a period of months, a leadership coach helps lawyers identify what they want to change or what success might look like in a particular area—questions lawyers are not often asked to consider. A leadership coach can then help them articulate specific goals for professional growth and development, identify an action plan, and hold them accountable for making progress over time.

The definition of “good leadership” varies but consistently includes nuanced judgment and emotional intelligence (EQ).[5] Indeed, numerous studies site EQ as the factor that sets CEOs apart from their peers who demonstrate similar technical skills, accomplishments, and knowledge.[6] Dismissed by some as “soft skills,” the term proves to be a misnomer in that it frequently proves much harder to learn, particularly for linear thinkers who pride themselves on their expertise and intellect.

Leadership coaching is ideally suited to help an individual develop EQ. Leadership coaches regularly help clients become more self-aware, recognize “blind spots” in how their behaviors and comments impact others, and develop a broader range of tools to more effectively accomplish their objectives.

Coaching Produces Higher ROI in Professional and Leadership Development

Pressed with client demands, lawyers are often quick to ask what the return on investment (ROI) is for any time devoted to professional or leadership development. Knowledge alone is insufficient to produce high ROI. Following even a well-received development program, most participants are likely to proceed with “business as usual” once they return to their desks.

Rather than presenting a one-size-fits-all set of best practices to a group, a leadership coach can help curate models, frameworks, and practices that are likely to be a good fit not only for a specific situation, but also a specific lawyer. Whether part of or separate from a professional development program, leadership coaching involves lawyers trying out new approaches and practices, gathering data on what works for them, and developing new tools to more effectively produce desired outcomes.

Leadership coaching within the legal profession provides an opportunity—in ways that training programs cannot—for attorneys to develop the skills they need to step up and lead effectively. Lawyers without such skills typically remain sidelined from decision making, called in at the last minute to ensure compliance rather than develop strategy, or left to “wing it” in leadership roles with lower odds of success.

Why Is Leadership Coaching Particularly Important for Lawyers Now?

A new world is emerging, and lawyers will no doubt help to craft it. A worldwide health pandemic and the ripped scab of systemic racism in the murder of yet another victim in a long line of police killings of unarmed Black people have rocked the globe. Widespread unrest continues in the midst of uncertainty around elections, a growing economic crisis, and unemployment rates not seen since the Great Depression.

All of these events illuminate the importance of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI). Simply put, diversity requires representation of people from different backgrounds—age, class, ethnicity, gender and gender identity, race, physical ability, sexual orientation, political beliefs, and beyond. Indeed, an expansive form of leadership, termed intersectional leadership, embraces diversity in all of its forms.[7]

Beyond reflecting diversity, inclusive environments value participants, enabling a sense of institutional belonging and access.[8] A metaphor is apt: diversity is being invited to the party; inclusion is being asked to dance.[9] Equity is a hallmark of the environment within the dance hall that allows inclusion to thrive.

Unfortunately, law firms, businesses, and many other institutions have long struggled with issues of DEI without measurable success. Leadership coaching can help lawyers move into positions of power to address DEI and develop new strategies to improve that record.

Creating and managing an inclusive workplace is a leadership skill. Developing cultural competence and consciousness, envisioning what success looks like, examining how behaviors support or undermine those goals, trying new approaches, and soliciting feedback to assess impact are all coaching strategies that produce improved outcomes.

In the shift to a post-pandemic world, change will accelerate across generations as millennials and Gen Z integrate systems and structures designed by Baby Boomers and Gen X. Broader dissemination of leadership coaching throughout the legal profession can help equip lawyers at all levels to lead effectively and develop a society of greater access and belonging.


[1] See Deborah Rhode, Lawyers as Leaders (1st ed. 2013)

[2] See generally Herb Rubenstein, Leadership for Lawyers 153–83 (2d ed. 2008).

[3] What Is leadership Coaching?, NEXT LEVEL LEADERSHIP COACHING, http://www.nextlevelleadershipcoaching.com/what-is-leadership-coaching/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2020); see generally Roland B. Smith & Paul Bennett Marrow, The Changing Nature of Leadership in Law Firms, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. 33, 37 (Sept. 2008).

[4] Phillip Bantz, CEOs Wish Their General Counsels Were Better Business Partners, Corporate Counsel,  Aug. 10, 2020.

[5] See Stephen P. Gallagher, Coaching in the Law Firm Setting, 55 Prac. Law 35, 39 (2009).

[6] See generally Lawrence R. Richard, Personality Matters, 60 Or. St. B. Bull. 37, 40 (1999) (citing Daniel Goleman’s work on EQ and his book Working with Emotional Intelligence, which focuses on the role emotional intelligence plays in the workplace and argues that EQ factors account for over “90 percent” of leaders success).

[7] See Anthony C. Thompson, Stepping Up to the Challenge of Leadership on Race, 48 Hofstra L. Rev. 735, 740 (2020); see also Anthony C Thompson, Dangerous Leaders: How and Why Lawyers Must Be Taught to Lead (1st ed. 2018).

[8] Leah Teague, Elizabeth Fraley & Stephen Rispoli, Fundamentals of Lawyer Leadership (Wolters Kluwer, forthcoming, 2021).

[9] Janet H Cho, Diversity is being invited to the party; inclusion is being asked to dance, Verna Myers tells Cleveland Bar, Cleveland.com (Updated Jan 11, 2019; Posted May 25, 2016).

 

Insurtech Regulatory Developments in Latin America

Insurtech companies continue to expand their reach into the Latin America market, particularly in Brazil, Mexico, and Peru. Insurtech, defined as the combination of insurance and technology, develops and leverages new digital tools to optimize the insurance business. Latin America affords an attractive environment for insurtech companies to develop innovative business models including new distribution channels and systems to compare insurance products and provide services to insurance companies. The fact that the insurance industry in Latin America is highly regulated, combined with the absence of regulatory frameworks specific to insurtech, explains, in part, why insurtech has experienced slow growth to date, representing roughly only 6% of all start-up fintech companies in Latin America. Recognizing insurtech’s potential benefits, insurance regulators in Latin America have begun to explore how to facilitate modernization of the insurance sector through the use of new digital technologies without compromising consumer protection. 

Brazil, the leading insurtech market in Latin America, recently offered a regulatory sandbox to a limited number of insurance companies supervised by the Brazil Insurance Superintendent (SUSEP). The sandbox is designed to enable testing of new products and services and to encourage development of new ways to provide traditional insurance services. SUSEP adopted Circular No. 592 on August 26, 2019, authorizing “on demand” insurance policies, thus permitting issuance of policies with flexible terms affording coverages on a monthly, daily, or even hourly basis. These “on demand” insurance policies are sold by digital means, thus allowing insureds to turn coverages on and off. This has opened the door to basic insurance for mobile devices, bikes, motorcycles, and other personal valuables such as smartphones and tablets. These regulatory changes reflect SUSEP’s intent to adapt to the increasing use of smart phones by consumers and to usher in the digital insurance era, which, in turn, hopefully leads to more affordable products.

Although not specific to insurtech, Mexico adopted a law to regulate financial technology companies (Fintech Law) on March 9, 2018. The Fintech Law was designed essentially to promote financial technology models such as crowdfunding or electronic payments, or virtual assets such as bitcoins. While it predates adoption of the USMCA, the Fintech Law suggests that Mexico was anticipating USMCA requirements with respect to the handling and sharing of customer data, prohibiting discrimination against foreign fintech companies. The Fintech Law would also enable Mexican fintech companies to provide services in other countries. The USMCA is designed to enhance and facilitate the offering of insurance services by licensed suppliers, which, in turn, likely would promote the insurtech industry by making it easier for companies to obtain approval for new insurance lines (except personal and compulsory insurance).

The Fintech Law demonstrates that legislators in Mexico may be flexible in devising future regulations to address insurtech in a similar way. Until then, insurtech companies are subject to the existing legal regime, the Law of Insurance Companies and Bonds (Mexican Insurance Law), and Regulations and Circulars issued by the National Commission of Insurance and Bonds (CNSF). Article 214 of the Mexican Insurance Law, for example, specifically permits insurance operations and brokering activities to be provided by electronic means.

Although Peru has not adopted an insurtech law, the Banking and Insurance Superintendent (SBS) has promulgated regulations that address the sale of insurance products by digital means. The Marketing of Insurance Products Regulations, adopted by Resolution SBS No. 1121-2017 (“Marketing Regulations”), allows insurance companies to promote, offer, and sell products by phone, internet, or other distance (i.e., rather than “in person”) systems, including digital marketing through social media. The Marketing Regulations also enable operation of digital insurance policy price comparison systems. Likewise, the Supervision and Control of Insurance Intermediaries Regulations, adopted by Resolution SBS 809-2019, allows insurance brokers to use distance communication systems (i.e., phone, internet, applications) to offer and sell insurance products on prior notice to the SBS. Insurance companies and insurance intermediaries using these digital tools must guarantee that the information provided to prospective policyholders complies with the security, confidentiality, and transparency principles provided in the General Law for the Financial and Insurance Systems and the Organic Law for the Superintendent of Banking and Insurance for the sale of insurance products.

The SBS is working on a proposal to amend the Marketing Regulations to allow the marketing of insurance products through “marketers” or “bancassurance” by traditional or digital means. Marketers are individuals or companies contracted by insurance companies to facilitate the sale of insurance products. By virtue of the marketing agreement between the marketers and the insurance companies, marketers become representatives of the insurance companies in connection with the sale of insurance products.

While insurtech would facilitate growth in the insurance market in numerous countries in Latin America with increasing insurance penetration, such as Colombia, Argentina, Ecuador, Panama, Costa Rica, and Chile, these countries have not yet adopted laws or regulations addressing insurtech. Thus, in these markets, start-up insurtech and technology companies are subject to existing legislation governing insurance companies and insurance intermediaries in connection with their operations. The absence of specific regulations, however, has not prevented companies from venturing into innovative insurance schemes including new distribution channels, price comparison tools, and aggregation methods in these countries. Clearly, legislation is not far behind.

To foster insurtech development, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) has established working groups as platforms for the exchange of information and sharing of experience in this area, but ithas not yet issued recommendations regarding insurtech regulation. IAIS guidelines would undoubtedly encourage regulators to expedite appropriate regulations governing insurtech. This, in turn, would promote and protect this new industry, which is encountering very receptive markets in Latin America.

 

Businesses’ Commitments and Contributions to Racial Justice and Equality

Discrimination on the basis of race is a fundamental human rights issue. The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, and that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set out therein, without distinction of any kind, in particular as to race, color, or national origin. The preamble to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1965 and entered into force in 1969, includes a reaffirmation that discrimination among human beings on the grounds of race, color, or ethnic origin is capable of disturbing peace and security among peoples, and the harmony of persons living side by side even within one and the same state. Article 5 of the ICERD calls on states to undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms within their borders and to guarantee the right of everyone—without distinction as to race, color, or national or ethnic origin—to equality before the law and enjoyment of an expansive portfolio of rights, including, among other things, the right to equal treatment before the tribunals administering justice as well as political rights, in particular rights to participate in elections and equal access to public service. Article 5 also obligates states to protect economic, social, and cultural rights, including the rights to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions of work, to protection against unemployment, to equal pay for equal work, and to just and favorable remuneration.

International human rights standards were originally written by states to create a framework and set of goals for governmental action, and it was often argued that such standards did not apply to the private sector. For many, the obligations of businesses with respect to the subjects covered by international human rights standards were limited to compliance with applicable national laws, even if those laws failed to meet international standards. However, as time has gone by, ideas have changed, albeit slowly, and there is now growing support for the notion that although the primary duty to protect human rights remains with national governments, businesses also have responsibilities to respect human rights in their operations. The preamble to the UDHR imposes duties to promote and respect human rights “on every individual and every organ of society.” In 2011, the UN Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and Guiding Principle 11 provides: “Business enterprises should respect human rights. This means that they should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.” Importantly, the official commentary to the Guiding Principles endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council makes the following clear: “The responsibility to respect human rights is a global standard of expected conduct for all business enterprises wherever they operate . . . . [It] exists over and above compliance with national laws and regulations protecting human rights.” Businesses have also been called upon to contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals established by the UN, such as access to basic services, participation in decision making, full and productive employment/decent work, reducing income inequality, ensuring equal opportunity, promoting peaceful and inclusive societies, providing justice for all, and building effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels.

Unfortunately, despite all of the proclamations described above, as well as specific laws such as the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, the United States and other states have failed to fully implement the ICERD, and racism remains one of the paramount human rights problems and threatens the livelihood and rights of millions of people in the United States and around the world.[1] In her book, Caste: The Origins of Our Discontents, Pulitzer-Prize-winning author Isabel Wilkerson wrote: “Our founding ideals promise liberty and equality for all. Our reality is an enduring racial hierarchy that has persisted for centuries.” She goes on to argue that racism in America is the byproduct of an unseen skeleton: a caste system that for centuries, even after the formal ending of slavery, has placed African Americans at the bottom rank in a societal hierarchy and repeatedly denies them respect, status, honor, attention, privileges, resources, benefit of the doubt, and basic human kindness. For her, the only way to fix the broken American house is to “tear out the plaster, down to the beams, inspect and rebuild the rotting lath” and “recast and reconstruct.”[2]

As is well known by now, the death of George Floyd, a black man, while he was in the custody of the Minneapolis police department on May 25, 2020, set off days of large public demonstrations against racial injustice all around the world, often accompanied by vandalism and looting as well as disproportionate police responses that escalated the tensions. As has often happened in the past when such incidents have occurred, businesses large and small were quick to issue statements through social media expressing their concerns about social justice and supporting the Black Lives Matter movement. Many large and well-known brands made commitments to contribute substantial sums to social justice initiatives and to support minority businesses. However, a law professor who studies economic justice at Emory University complained in The New York Times that: “Most of these corporate statements were put together by the marketing team that was trying not to offend white customers and white employees . . . . It’s complete B.S. It’s performative.”[3]

Others argued that the responses of a number of companies were “hypocritical” and “too little too late,” and pointed to examples of expressions of support for racial justice by large technology companies that appeared to be at odds with prior practices:

  • Facebook being criticized for discrimination against black employees and lack of diversity in the workforce;
  • Amazon calling for an end to “inequitable” treatment of black people, but long being criticized for low pay, poor working conditions, ignoring the complaints of workers (particularly during the course of the COVID-19 pandemic), and providing software to law enforcement agencies that has been misused in the racial profiling of black people (Amazon later announced that it would terminate its contracts with the police); and
  • Google significantly rolling back its diversity and inclusion initiatives to avoid being perceived as anti-conservative.

Floyd’s death, which was quickly followed by the senseless killing of another black man, Rayshard Brooks, by a white police officer, was part of a seemingly endless series of high-profile violent events targeting African Americans (e.g., Ahmaud Arbery, Breonna Taylor, Eric Garner, Trayvon Martin, and others), and occurred during a health pandemic that has been difficult for every American, although there is evidence that the adverse impacts have fallen disproportionately on blacks and other people of color. For example, local government officials reported that job losses in New York City relating to the economic carnage of the pandemic have been much more dramatic among people of color—about one in four of the city’s Asian, Black, and Hispanic workers were unemployed in June 2020, compared with about one in nine white workers.[4] In answer to the longing among large swathes of the country to simply return to “normalcy,” i.e., the ways things were before the health crisis began, protestors and their supporters are signaling that the exclusion and disparity of the past will not be good enough and that the country and its businesses must brace and commit themselves to what will be a difficult but necessary path toward a “new normal” grounded in economic justice. In fact, the president of the American Psychological Association argued:

We are living in a racism pandemic, which is taking a heavy psychological toll on our African American citizens. The health consequences are dire. Racism is associated with a host of psychological consequences, including depression, anxiety and other serious, sometimes debilitating conditions, including post-traumatic stress disorder and substance use disorders. Moreover, the stress caused by racism can contribute to the development of cardiovascular and other physical diseases.

Related to all this is the reality that almost all of the wealth generated in the stock market during the technology boom that played out in the years before the pandemic flowed to white families, with The New York Times reporting that Federal Reserve data confirms that typical black households had only one-tenth the wealth of typical white households. The evidence is clear that the black community has realized little in the way of tangible benefits from pledges of equity from Corporate America, and that it is time for businesses to finally make a meaningful impact in an environment in which fewer than half of black adults in America have a job (due in part to the devastation to the job market caused by the pandemic), and those black workers that do have jobs make less money than white workers (due to the limited types of jobs usually available to blacks, i.e., low paying service jobs, and the failure of businesses to pay black workers the same amount as white workers for the same work). Exacerbating the crisis is the prediction that 40 percent of black-owned businesses are not expected to survive the pandemic, due mostly to the lack of business credit and personal savings that possibly could keep them afloat until conditions improve.

Darren Walker, president of the Ford Foundation, criticized the traditional and predictable response of companies in the face of racism in an article in The New York Times, saying: “The playbook is: Issue a statement, get a group of African-American leaders on a conference call, apologize and have your corporate foundation make a contribution to the N.A.A.C.P. and the Urban League. . . . That’s not going to work in this crisis.”[5] The same article led with the headline “Corporate America Has Failed Black America” and went on to read: “many of the same companies expressing solidarity have contributed to systemic inequality, targeted the black community with unhealthy products and services, and failed to hire, promote and fairly compensate black men and women.”[6] Writing in the Harvard Business Review, Mark R. Kramer noted that although taking a public position on social media supporting racial justice is laudable, and arguably overdue in many cases, he hopes that the tragedy in Minneapolis leads to actions rather than just words from businesses. According to Kramer, surveys indicate that most Americans want businesses to respond to the unrest by purging racism from the workplace, committing resources to help communities recover from the unrest, and establishing the social, economic, and political conditions necessary for a just society, and he argued that businesses have a duty to act:

We cannot pretend that most major corporations in America—and their shareholders—have not benefited from the structural racism, intentional inequality, and indifference to suffering that is behind the current protests. Corporate America and the Business Roundtable have an obligation to go beyond tweets and quotes by committing to an agenda that will advance racial equity in meaningful ways.

Although there has been sweeping and heated dialogue on the root causes of the economic and social problems confronting people of color and the consequences to society in general, many recall that they have heard a lot of this before, such as during the 1992 protests triggered by the acquittal of four white police officers who brutally beat Rodney King in Los Angeles, and worry that the compassion, anger, and energy will eventually drift away. Meaningful change takes a long time to occur in elected bodies and local police departments, particularly during a time when the country is so divided politically. However, businesses have opportunities to act quickly if they can remain focused on creating and executing solutions within their organizations and business relationships. Although the principal victims of systemic racism are people of color, it is a problem for everyone to the extent that it erodes the fabric of society. Moreover, as one observer in The New York Times noted: “racial injustice and discrimination are forces that corrupt the corporate mission and core values of a corporation.”[7]

Frustrated people in pain are tired of waiting for politicians to act and are looking to the businesses that provide them with jobs, goods, and services to take a leading role in creating a more just society. In the past, businesses have been reluctant to get involved, and the argument was frequently made that market forces would eventually solve race problems facing American companies; however, in an article published in The Economist, Walker dismissed this notion and called such views “naïve and in denial about the hold of racism on our culture, including our business culture.” In the same article, a consultant argued: “It’s utterly unrealistic for anybody to bi-furcate a societal problem . . . it’s also a business issue because business exists in society, with employers, customers, suppliers and stakeholders.”

Business leaders must seize the challenges and opportunities that have gripped society’s attention in the wake of the events of the first half of 2020 by taking a stand and making and fulfilling commitments to action across a broad spectrum of issues and contexts, including embedding equality, diversity, and inclusion in the boardroom, the workforce, and all aspects of organizational culture; achieving financial equity and security; bolstering community engagement; getting involved in the public square through advocacy for racial justice, and reimaging products and services.

Over the next few weeks, we’ll take a deeper look into many of these issues and discuss some of the practical steps that businesses can take to contribute to racial justice and equality and what you, as a business counselor, can do to assist them when they are your clients.


[1] A. Bradley, Human Rights Racism, 32 Harvard Human Rights J. 1 (Spring 2019).

[2] I. Wilkerson, America’s Enduring Caste System, N.Y. Times Mag., July 5, 2020, at 26, 33, 53.

[3] D. Gelles, Corporate America Has Failed Black America, N.Y. Times, June 7, 2020, at BU1.

[4] P. McGeehan, Calamity Looms in New York City Over Job Losses, N.Y. Times, July 7, 2020, at A1, A7.

[5] D. Gelles, supra note 3, at BU1.

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] The great awakening?, Economist, June 13, 2020, at 49.

In God We Trust, All Others Pay Cash Collateral: Can Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Debtors Use Assigned Rents for Business Reorganizations under Ohio Law?

The COVID-19 pandemic has turned nearly every facet of American life on its head, and the long-term social changes it will bring about remain up in the air.* Even after the economy recovers from the disease’s current impact, many employers could permanently enact far-reaching changes to how—and where—people work. As more employers discover that employees can adequately perform their duties remotely, they may reevaluate the need for expensive office space, which could lead to increased Chapter 11 filings by the owners of office buildings, office parks, and single-asset real estate debtors.

Against this backdrop, bankruptcy courts can expect increased litigation over the use of post-petition rents as cash collateral to pay administrative expenses and fund business reorganizations plans. Most commercial landlords have mortgages encumbering the space leased to tenants, and the mortgages typically include an assignment-of-rents clause. A common dispute in Chapter 11 bankruptcies centers around whether the assignment-of-rents clause transfers immediate ownership of rents to the lender or merely gives the lender a security interest in the rents. State law controls the issue. See, e.g., Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1978).

The Sixth Circuit has not considered how bankruptcy courts should treat assigned rents under Ohio law. However, it overruled a bankruptcy court’s treatment of the rents as property of the bankruptcy estate under Michigan law, finding that the debtor’s assignment-of-rents to the lender transferred ownership before the debtor filed its bankruptcy petition. See Town Center Flats v. ECP Commercial, 855 F.3d 721 (6th Cir. 2017). A close review of Ohio state court opinions suggests that similar reasoning may apply to property in Ohio depending on the assignment’s specific language. See, e.g., Banks v. Heritage, 2014-Ohio-991 (12th Dist.). This would effectively bar Chapter 11 debtors in Ohio from using post-petition rents to fund reorganization plans or otherwise utilize the resources during the bankruptcy, and it could drastically limit debtors’ options when those rents represent their only source of revenue.

Bankruptcy Code Provisions Governing Rents as Cash Collateral

With some exceptions, when a business debtor files a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, all of its property becomes part of the bankruptcy estate, including rents earned from its property. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(1), (6), 1115(a). The debtor, acting as the bankruptcy estate’s trustee (the “debtor in possession”), may continue to operate the business, and it can use property of the estate—including unencumbered future rents—in the ordinary course of business without the bankruptcy court’s approval. 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(c)(1), 1108. It can also use unencumbered rents that are property of the estate to pay administrative expenses and to fund its reorganization plans. See, e.g., First Fidelity Bank v. Jason Realty, 59 F.3d 423, 426 (3rd Cir. 1995).

If any entity other than the debtor has an interest in cash or “cash equivalents” earned from the debtor’s pre-petition property, the Bankruptcy Code deems the cash or its equivalents “cash collateral.” See 11 U.S.C. § 363(a). The Code includes post-petition rents earned from mortgaged pre-petition property as cash collateral “to the extent provided in [the] security agreement, except to any extent that the court, after notice and a hearing and based on the equities of the case, orders otherwise.” 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2). The debtor cannot use cash collateral without the lender’s consent unless the bankruptcy court authorizes the use. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(3). If the lender requests, the court must require the debtor to provide the lender with adequate protection to use the cash collateral. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e).

Of course, rents qualify as cash collateral only if they are also property of the bankruptcy estate. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 363(a). Thus, if the debtor transferred ownership of the rents to another entity before it filed the bankruptcy petition, then the rents are not the estate’s property, and the debtor cannot use them as cash collateral regardless of whether it provides the lender adequate protection. See, e.g., Jason Realty, 59 F.3d at 427. In the assignment-of-rents context, the question typically boils down to whether the assignment granted the lender a security interest in the rents or transferred ownership of the rents to the lender. Id.

General Types of Assignment-of-Rents Clauses

Assignments of rents in a commercial mortgage generally take two different forms. See, e.g. In re South Side House, 474 B.R. 391, 402-03 (E.D.N.Y. Bankr. 2012). The mortgage’s granting clause may include language to the effect of “[mortgagor] hereby grants, bargains, sells, and conveys to [lender] all estates, right, title and interest in [property], together with all privileges and appurtenances to the same, and all rents, issues, and profits thereof.” Under this language, the mortgagor conveys the rents to the lender along with the property as security for the mortgage loan, but title to the rents remains with the mortgagor. Id. at 403.

The mortgage—or a separate document executed with the mortgage—may also assign the rents to the lender immediately, and the lender then leases the right to collect and use the rents back to the mortgagor. Id. The lease-back provision ordinarily terminates automatically without any action required by the lender if the mortgagor defaults. Some mortgages include both types of language, i.e., a pledge of the rents as additional security for the debt and an immediate transfer of the rents with a lease-back provision.

The Sixth Circuit’s Assignment-of-Rents Rulings

The Sixth Circuit has not considered whether assigned rents qualify as property of the bankruptcy estate under Ohio law. However, it has considered the issue under Kentucky and Michigan law, reaching different conclusions for each state. See Town Center, 855 F.3d at 724–28; In re Buttermilk Towne Center, 442 B.R. 558, 562–64 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 2010). Applying the Sixth Circuit’s analysis of Kentucky and Michigan law to Ohio state court rulings on assignments of rent suggests that bankruptcy courts applying Ohio law should not treat assigned rents as estate property for absolute assignments that then lease the rents back to the debtor.

In Buttermilk, the owner of a commercial real estate development project that leased space to rent-paying tenants in Kentucky entered into a construction financing agreement with the lender. In connection with the financing agreement, the owner assigned the rents derived from the project to the lender subject to a license allowing the owner to collect and use the rents so long as he did not default on his obligations under the financing agreement.

After defaulting on the agreement, the owner filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy and sought to use the rents as cash collateral. The lender objected, arguing that the bankruptcy court should not treat the rents as property of the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court disagreed, holding that the rents belonged to the estate and constituted cash collateral. It later ruled that a replacement lien on the rents would adequately protect the lender’s security interest. The Sixth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court’s treatment of the rents as estate property, but it reversed the court’s allowance of a replacement lien as adequate protection.

On the rent ownership issue, the panel relied on an earlier Sixth Circuit ruling discussing Kentucky law and holding that “the entire tenor and affect of an instrument pledging rents” in Kentucky “is that such a pledge is deemed secondary security, with the lien continuing as an inchoate right which will be and must be perfected or consummated by . . . some definite action looking toward possession and subjection.” The panel noted that the lender could not provide any Kentucky law contradicting the Sixth Circuit’s previous discussion, and it held that “[e]ven if the assignment gave [the lender] a right to possess the rents pre-petition, the assignment . . . did not give [the lender] an absolute ownership of the rents.”

More recently, the Sixth Circuit interpreted Michigan law to reverse a bankruptcy court’s ruling that included assigned rents in the bankruptcy estate. See Town Center, 855 F.3d at 728. In Town Center, a company owned a large residential complex that it built with a construction loan. The company secured the loan with a mortgage and an assignment of rents. Under the assignment, the company “irrevocably, absolutely, and unconditionally [agreed to] transfer, sell, assign, pledge, and convey” the rents to the lender. The agreement also “grant[ed] a license to [the company] to collect and retain rents until an event of default, at which point the license would ‘automatically terminate without notice to [the company].’”

After the company defaulted on the loan, the lender filed a foreclosure action in state court, and the company filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. The lender moved to prohibit the company from using post-petition rents on the grounds that they were not property of the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, ruling that the rents qualified as cash collateral and requiring the company to provide adequate protection to the lender. The Sixth Circuit reversed, interpreting the contract language to have assigned the lender ownership of the rents.

The Sixth Circuit began by analyzing Michigan law on assignment of rents, which had traditionally forbade mortgage assignment-of-rents clauses until the state legislature enacted a law specifically allowing them. Noting that “Michigan courts generally discuss assignments of rents under [the applicable statute] as ownership transfers,” the Sixth Circuit discussed two appellate-level Michigan opinions holding that “the assignor loses any right to collect the rents after the assignee has perfected its rights [under the statute] following an event of default.” The court therefore held that the rents belonged to the lender, and the bankruptcy court wrongly considered them property of the estate, despite also recognizing that the ruling limited single-asset real estate debtors’ options under Chapter 11.

As noted, the Sixth Circuit has not addressed the assignment-of-rents issue under Ohio law. State courts in Ohio appear to treat general assignments of rents included in the mortgage’s granting clause differently from assignments that immediately transfer ownership and lease the rents back to the mortgagor. Compare, e.g., Hutchinson v. Straub, 64 Ohio St. 413 (1901) with Banks v. Heritage, 2014-Ohio-991. Accordingly, bankruptcy courts applying Ohio law should arrive at different results depending on the specific type of assignment-of-rents clause.

Ohio Law on General Rent Assignments in the Granting Clause

Ohio courts interpreting mortgages that convey rents as additional security in the granting clause mostly hold that mortgagors retain ownership of the rents until the lender takes possession of the property or otherwise asserts its rights to the rents. See, e.g., In re Pfleiderer, 123 B.R. 768, 769–70 (N.D. Ohio Bankr. 1987). In Ohio, rents are not included in the mortgage unless specifically pledged, and the lender must still take some action to exert control over the rents even when the mortgage specifically pledges them. Id. (quoting 69 O. Jur. 3d Mortgages § 151 (1986)).

In Hutchinson, the debtor gave her lender a mortgage conveying property to secure the debt “and all the rents, issues and profits thereof.” In state court insolvency proceedings, the plaintiff took assignment of the property for the benefit of creditors, and it collected rents from the property during a land sale action in the probate court. After the sale, the trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay the rents to the lender to satisfy the mortgage rather than the unsecured creditors. The plaintiff appealed, and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed.

The court rejected the plaintiff’s position that the lender had no right to the rents because it never took actual possession of the property or sought to have a receiver appointed as plausible but unsound. The court acknowledged the traditional rule that “the mortgagor has the right to receive as his own the rents of real estate so long as he remains in possession,” but it found that “the [debtor] in this case yielded possession to one who took the property burdened with the duty to administer it for the benefit of creditors.” The court further noted that although lenders ordinarily seek a receiver to enforce their right to the rents, the pending probate action precluded the lender from doing so, and the assignee for the benefit of creditors served the same function of a receiver. See also In re Cordesman-Rechtin, 66 Ohio App. 25, 27–28 (1st Dist. 1940) (discussing Hutchinson and distinguishing cases where the mortgage did not assign rents). Accordingly, the court upheld the trial court’s order requiring the plaintiff to pay the rents it collected to the lender.

Ohio courts interpreting Hutchinson confirm that its rule applies regardless of whether a separate legal proceeding prevents the lender from seeking to appoint a receiver. See Perin v. N-Ren, CA87-09-014, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 2089 *10 (12th Dist. May 31, 1988). In Perin, a farmer sold land to a purchaser, who gave the farmer a mortgage pledging “rents, issues and profits” to secure the purchase price. The purchaser then agreed with a third party to allow him to grow tobacco on the land in exchange for a portion of the proceeds from the tobacco. The purchaser filed bankruptcy after defaulting on her mortgage to the farmer, and the farmer secured permission from the bankruptcy court to proceed with foreclosure.

Although the foreclosure remained pending, the farmer obtained a preliminary injunction preventing the third-party tobacco grower from paying the proceeds of the tobacco sales to the purchaser, but she did not seek a receiver. After the foreclosure sale, the trial court found that the tobacco proceeds constituted rents, and it ordered them paid to the farmer. The purchaser appealed, and the appellate court affirmed.

The court rejected the purchaser’s argument that the farmer had no right to the rents because she never had a receiver appointed. It found that even though nothing prevented the farmer from seeking a receiver, the Ohio Supreme Court’s ruling in Hutchinson still controlled. Noting that “[r]eceivership is not the only process by which a court can take control of mortgaged property,” it held that “[a] mortgagee of real property is entitled to the rents and profits of the mortgaged premises when he takes actual possession of the property, when possession is taken on his behalf by a receiver, or when he demands such possession.” The court determined that the farmer’s motion for a temporary injunction “was an act compatible with the right she claimed [to the rents] and equivalent to a demand for possession.”

 Ohio Law on Immediate Rent Assignments with Lease-Back Provisions

In contrast to these rulings, Ohio courts have construed assignments that immediately transfer the rents to the lender differently. See, e.g., Banks, 2014-Ohio-991, ¶¶ 22–24. In Banks, mobile home residents brought a class action against the management company that owned three separate mobile home parks. The lender for one of the parks intervened and had a receiver appointed to collect the residents’ rents after the management company defaulted on its mortgage loan for one the parks. The lender subsequently accepted a deed in lieu of foreclosure. When the lender sought the rents the receiver collected, the trial court refused, finding that the deed in lieu of foreclosure satisfied the lender’s mortgage loan. The appellate court reversed.

Under the language in the assignment of rents, the management company conveyed “all right, title and interest of [the company] . . . together with . . . all rents, receipts, revenues, income, and profits which may now or hereafter be or become due.” (Emphasis removed.) The agreement further provided that “[t]his Assignment is absolute and is effective immediately,” but it allowed the management company to “receive, collect, and enjoy the rents” until “a default has occurred, and has not been cured.” (Emphasis removed.) Upon default, the lender could “at its option, without notice to [the management company], receive and collect all such rents . . . as long as such default or defaults shall exist.” (Emphasis removed.)

Construing this language, the appellate court found that the rents “became the exclusive property of [the lender] upon [the mortgage company’s] default.” Accordingly, given that the lender “owned the funds that were held by the receiver pursuant to the Assignment of Rents agreement, the deed in lieu of foreclosure did not release [the lender]’s ownership interest in such funds.” The court therefore ordered the receiver to turn over the rents it had collected since its appointment, which was all the funds at issue in the case, because the rents “were the property of [the lender].” See also U.S. Bank v. Gotham King Fee Owner, 2013-Ohio-1983, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.) (mortgagor not entitled to notice of receiver’s changes to leases because “its license in the rents and leases automatically terminated upon default”).

Effectuating the terms of more specific assignment-of-rents clauses over general language from the mortgage’s granting clause also conforms to well-established contract rules recognized in Ohio. Ohio courts consistently treat the more specific terms of a contract as controlling over the more general terms. See, e.g., Vanderink v. Vanderink, 2018-Ohio-3328, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.); Pierce Point Cinema v. Perin-Tyler, 2012-Ohio-5008, ¶ 17 (12th Dist.). Thus, the more specific assignment terms immediately transferring the rents and leasing them back to the mortgagor should control over any more general terms pledging rents as additional security.

Even if the more specific terms did not control, Ohio—like most states—construes contracts as a whole and gives effect to all of their terms if possible. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Corporate Circle, 103 Ohio App. 3d 93, 98 (8th Dist.). Mortgage-granting clauses typically grant the mortgagor’s rights in the property to the lender along with any profits or rents flowing from the property. Assigning the rents subject to a lease-back provision does not invalidate that language in the granting clause. It simply removes the right to collect and use the rents from the “bundle of sticks” the mortgagor conveyed to secure the debt. After the assignment, that right belongs to the lender, who leases it back to the mortgagor with a lease that automatically terminates if the mortgagor defaults. Interpreting the mortgage to only pledge the rents as additional security would improperly read the more specific assignment-of-rents term out of the mortgage altogether.

Harmonizing Ohio’s Assignment-of-Rents Caselaw

Reading these cases together suggests that Ohio law treats three different assignment-of-rents scenarios differently. In the first scenario, the mortgage contains no pledge of rents or separate assignment-of-rents clause. There, the rents still follow title to the property, but the lender would not have a right to rents while a foreclosure action remained pending and the mortgagor still had a right to redeem. See Commercial Bank v. Woodville, 126 Ohio St. 587, 592 (1933). The same rule may follow if the lender took legal possession of the property through ejectment. Id. at 591 (“the right to rents . . . follows the legal title and right to possession”) (internal quotations omitted).

Notably, this line of reasoning also conforms to longstanding Ohio mortgage foreclosure law. In Ohio, title to the property as between the mortgagor and the lender passes to the lender upon default, but title as between the mortgagor and the rest of the world remains with the mortgagor until the lender completes a foreclosure action or takes possession through ejectment. See, e.g., Hausman v. City of Dayton, 73 Ohio St. 3d 671, 675–76 (1995). Inasmuch as rents arise from title between the mortgagor and its tenants, not between the mortgagor and the lender, the title giving rise to the rents remains with the mortgagor until the lender either forecloses or ejects.

In the second scenario, the mortgage specifically pledges the rents as additional security for the debt, but it has no separate assignment immediately transferring the rents to the lender. There, the lender has rights to the rents before foreclosing the mortgagor’s redemption rights, but it must have a receiver appointed or take some other action to exert dominion over the rents. See, e.g., Perin, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 2089 *10. Inasmuch as at least one Ohio court holds that a lender “is entitled to the rents and profits of the mortgaged premises . . . when he demands [ ] possession,” a simple demand letter to the mortgagor could suffice to meet this requirement. Id.

In the third scenario, the mortgage—or a separate contemporaneous document—immediately assigns the rents to the lender and leases them back to the mortgagor with the lease to expire upon default without additional action needed from the lender. There, the lender owns the rents immediately upon default without needing to foreclose or eject, seek appointment of a receiver, or take any other action to exert dominion over the rents. See, e.g., Banks, 2014-Ohio-991, ¶ 22; Gotham, 2013-Ohio-1983, ¶ 19. Cf. GLIC Real Estate v. Bicentennial Plaza, 2012-Ohio-2269, ¶ 26 (10th Dist.) (refusing to extend the general rule that courts treat a conveyance made for security as a mortgage to an assignment of leases that transferred immediate ownership).

Importantly, a receiver collected the rents at issue in both the Banks and Gotham cases cited above, which could support the position that lenders must still take possession or appoint a receiver before owning the rents, notwithstanding the specific contract language to the contrary. However, Banks and Gotham did not treat the receiver as the determinative fact. Instead, both relied on Ohio contract law and specifically held that the rents became the lender’s property when the mortgagor defaulted. See Banks, 2014-Ohio-991, ¶ 22 (“Pursuant to [the contract], the funds became the exclusive property of [the lender] upon [the mortgagor]’s default on the promissory note.”); Gotham, 2013-Ohio-1983, 19 (mortgagor “lost any interest it had in the leases and rents” when its license to the rents “terminated automatically upon default”).

Ohio’s Assignment-of-Rents Case Law in the Chapter 11 Context

Applying this law in the context of a Chapter 11 debtor’s ability to use rents for reorganization should yield different results for each scenario. In the first scenario, bankruptcy courts should allow debtors to use the rents without court authorization regardless of whether the lender consents. Title to the property that produced the rents belonged to the debtor when it filed the bankruptcy petition, and the rents are not provided for “by [the] security agreement” under Ohio law because the debtors did not specifically pledge them as additional security. Thus, they belong to the bankruptcy estate and are not cash collateral. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(1), 552(b)(2).

In the second scenario, bankruptcy courts applying Ohio law should treat the rents as part of the bankruptcy estate and the lender’s cash collateral, unless the lender successfully had a receiver appointed or made a demand for the rents before the debtor filed the bankruptcy petition. The debtor conveyed the rents in the mortgage as additional security for the debt, but it continues to own the rents until the lender has a receiver appointed or takes other appropriate action. See, e.g., Perin, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 2089 *10. However, if the lender took such action before the debtor filed the petition, the court should not treat the rents as property of the estate under Ohio law because the debtor no longer owned them when it filed the petition. Id. at *7.

In the third scenario, bankruptcy courts applying Ohio law should treat the rents as belonging to the lender and therefore not property of the bankruptcy estate, regardless of whether the lender had a receiver appointed or took any other action to exercise control over the rents. The debtor assigned the rents to the lender immediately upon executing the mortgage, and its only remaining interest in the rents consisted of the lender’s lease back to the debtor. See, e.g., Banks, 2014-Ohio-991, ¶ 22. That lease expired upon default, and the debtor therefore held no interest in the rents when it filed the bankruptcy petition. Id.

This reasoning should hold under Town Center and Buttermilk, regardless of Ohio’s status as a so-called lien theory state. The Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Town Center rested on its determination that Michigan law “allow[ed] for assignments of rents to be transfers of ownership once the statutory steps for perfection have been completed.” Town Center, 855 F.3d at 726. Accordingly, given that the court read the mortgage language as “assign[ing] the rents to the maximum extent permitted by Michigan law,” it held that the debtor transferred ownership of the rents. In contrast, the court specifically noted in Buttermilk that the lender could “not present[ ] any Kentucky case law that contradict[ed]” its earlier ruling that assignments of rents under Kentucky law constituted only “secondary security” the lender must perfect by taking “some definite action looking toward possession and subjection.” (Internal quotations omitted.)

Like Kentucky, Ohio case law recognizes a general rule that treats assignments of rents in the granting clause as additional security requiring the lender to take some action to perfect before acquiring ownership. See, e.g., Hutchinson, 64 Ohio St. at 415–17. However, like Michigan, Ohio case law also allows assignments of rents to constitute immediate transfers of ownership depending on the language in the mortgage contract. See, e.g., Banks, 2014-Ohio-991, ¶ 22; Gotham, 2013-Ohio-1983, ¶ 19; GLIC Real Estate, 2012-Ohio-2269, ¶ 26. Thus, applying the Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Town Center, the more specific language in immediate assignments with lease back provisions should control, and bankruptcy courts should not consider the rents estate property.

Conclusion

Many Ohio bankruptcy courts treat assigned rents as cash collateral even when the contract language immediately transfers the rents and leases them back to the debtor. Yet, a close review of Ohio case law read with Sixth Circuit precedent may call that practice into question. As bankruptcy filings increase from owners of commercial office property, parties can expect to litigate these issues more, and some Chapter 11 debtors may find themselves without cash collateral to pay expenses and fund reorganization.


This article is not intended as and should not be considered legal advice.