Insurtech Regulatory Developments in Latin America

Insurtech companies continue to expand their reach into the Latin America market, particularly in Brazil, Mexico, and Peru. Insurtech, defined as the combination of insurance and technology, develops and leverages new digital tools to optimize the insurance business. Latin America affords an attractive environment for insurtech companies to develop innovative business models including new distribution channels and systems to compare insurance products and provide services to insurance companies. The fact that the insurance industry in Latin America is highly regulated, combined with the absence of regulatory frameworks specific to insurtech, explains, in part, why insurtech has experienced slow growth to date, representing roughly only 6% of all start-up fintech companies in Latin America. Recognizing insurtech’s potential benefits, insurance regulators in Latin America have begun to explore how to facilitate modernization of the insurance sector through the use of new digital technologies without compromising consumer protection. 

Brazil, the leading insurtech market in Latin America, recently offered a regulatory sandbox to a limited number of insurance companies supervised by the Brazil Insurance Superintendent (SUSEP). The sandbox is designed to enable testing of new products and services and to encourage development of new ways to provide traditional insurance services. SUSEP adopted Circular No. 592 on August 26, 2019, authorizing “on demand” insurance policies, thus permitting issuance of policies with flexible terms affording coverages on a monthly, daily, or even hourly basis. These “on demand” insurance policies are sold by digital means, thus allowing insureds to turn coverages on and off. This has opened the door to basic insurance for mobile devices, bikes, motorcycles, and other personal valuables such as smartphones and tablets. These regulatory changes reflect SUSEP’s intent to adapt to the increasing use of smart phones by consumers and to usher in the digital insurance era, which, in turn, hopefully leads to more affordable products.

Although not specific to insurtech, Mexico adopted a law to regulate financial technology companies (Fintech Law) on March 9, 2018. The Fintech Law was designed essentially to promote financial technology models such as crowdfunding or electronic payments, or virtual assets such as bitcoins. While it predates adoption of the USMCA, the Fintech Law suggests that Mexico was anticipating USMCA requirements with respect to the handling and sharing of customer data, prohibiting discrimination against foreign fintech companies. The Fintech Law would also enable Mexican fintech companies to provide services in other countries. The USMCA is designed to enhance and facilitate the offering of insurance services by licensed suppliers, which, in turn, likely would promote the insurtech industry by making it easier for companies to obtain approval for new insurance lines (except personal and compulsory insurance).

The Fintech Law demonstrates that legislators in Mexico may be flexible in devising future regulations to address insurtech in a similar way. Until then, insurtech companies are subject to the existing legal regime, the Law of Insurance Companies and Bonds (Mexican Insurance Law), and Regulations and Circulars issued by the National Commission of Insurance and Bonds (CNSF). Article 214 of the Mexican Insurance Law, for example, specifically permits insurance operations and brokering activities to be provided by electronic means.

Although Peru has not adopted an insurtech law, the Banking and Insurance Superintendent (SBS) has promulgated regulations that address the sale of insurance products by digital means. The Marketing of Insurance Products Regulations, adopted by Resolution SBS No. 1121-2017 (“Marketing Regulations”), allows insurance companies to promote, offer, and sell products by phone, internet, or other distance (i.e., rather than “in person”) systems, including digital marketing through social media. The Marketing Regulations also enable operation of digital insurance policy price comparison systems. Likewise, the Supervision and Control of Insurance Intermediaries Regulations, adopted by Resolution SBS 809-2019, allows insurance brokers to use distance communication systems (i.e., phone, internet, applications) to offer and sell insurance products on prior notice to the SBS. Insurance companies and insurance intermediaries using these digital tools must guarantee that the information provided to prospective policyholders complies with the security, confidentiality, and transparency principles provided in the General Law for the Financial and Insurance Systems and the Organic Law for the Superintendent of Banking and Insurance for the sale of insurance products.

The SBS is working on a proposal to amend the Marketing Regulations to allow the marketing of insurance products through “marketers” or “bancassurance” by traditional or digital means. Marketers are individuals or companies contracted by insurance companies to facilitate the sale of insurance products. By virtue of the marketing agreement between the marketers and the insurance companies, marketers become representatives of the insurance companies in connection with the sale of insurance products.

While insurtech would facilitate growth in the insurance market in numerous countries in Latin America with increasing insurance penetration, such as Colombia, Argentina, Ecuador, Panama, Costa Rica, and Chile, these countries have not yet adopted laws or regulations addressing insurtech. Thus, in these markets, start-up insurtech and technology companies are subject to existing legislation governing insurance companies and insurance intermediaries in connection with their operations. The absence of specific regulations, however, has not prevented companies from venturing into innovative insurance schemes including new distribution channels, price comparison tools, and aggregation methods in these countries. Clearly, legislation is not far behind.

To foster insurtech development, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) has established working groups as platforms for the exchange of information and sharing of experience in this area, but ithas not yet issued recommendations regarding insurtech regulation. IAIS guidelines would undoubtedly encourage regulators to expedite appropriate regulations governing insurtech. This, in turn, would promote and protect this new industry, which is encountering very receptive markets in Latin America.

 

Businesses’ Commitments and Contributions to Racial Justice and Equality

Discrimination on the basis of race is a fundamental human rights issue. The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, and that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set out therein, without distinction of any kind, in particular as to race, color, or national origin. The preamble to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1965 and entered into force in 1969, includes a reaffirmation that discrimination among human beings on the grounds of race, color, or ethnic origin is capable of disturbing peace and security among peoples, and the harmony of persons living side by side even within one and the same state. Article 5 of the ICERD calls on states to undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms within their borders and to guarantee the right of everyone—without distinction as to race, color, or national or ethnic origin—to equality before the law and enjoyment of an expansive portfolio of rights, including, among other things, the right to equal treatment before the tribunals administering justice as well as political rights, in particular rights to participate in elections and equal access to public service. Article 5 also obligates states to protect economic, social, and cultural rights, including the rights to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions of work, to protection against unemployment, to equal pay for equal work, and to just and favorable remuneration.

International human rights standards were originally written by states to create a framework and set of goals for governmental action, and it was often argued that such standards did not apply to the private sector. For many, the obligations of businesses with respect to the subjects covered by international human rights standards were limited to compliance with applicable national laws, even if those laws failed to meet international standards. However, as time has gone by, ideas have changed, albeit slowly, and there is now growing support for the notion that although the primary duty to protect human rights remains with national governments, businesses also have responsibilities to respect human rights in their operations. The preamble to the UDHR imposes duties to promote and respect human rights “on every individual and every organ of society.” In 2011, the UN Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and Guiding Principle 11 provides: “Business enterprises should respect human rights. This means that they should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.” Importantly, the official commentary to the Guiding Principles endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council makes the following clear: “The responsibility to respect human rights is a global standard of expected conduct for all business enterprises wherever they operate . . . . [It] exists over and above compliance with national laws and regulations protecting human rights.” Businesses have also been called upon to contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals established by the UN, such as access to basic services, participation in decision making, full and productive employment/decent work, reducing income inequality, ensuring equal opportunity, promoting peaceful and inclusive societies, providing justice for all, and building effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels.

Unfortunately, despite all of the proclamations described above, as well as specific laws such as the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, the United States and other states have failed to fully implement the ICERD, and racism remains one of the paramount human rights problems and threatens the livelihood and rights of millions of people in the United States and around the world.[1] In her book, Caste: The Origins of Our Discontents, Pulitzer-Prize-winning author Isabel Wilkerson wrote: “Our founding ideals promise liberty and equality for all. Our reality is an enduring racial hierarchy that has persisted for centuries.” She goes on to argue that racism in America is the byproduct of an unseen skeleton: a caste system that for centuries, even after the formal ending of slavery, has placed African Americans at the bottom rank in a societal hierarchy and repeatedly denies them respect, status, honor, attention, privileges, resources, benefit of the doubt, and basic human kindness. For her, the only way to fix the broken American house is to “tear out the plaster, down to the beams, inspect and rebuild the rotting lath” and “recast and reconstruct.”[2]

As is well known by now, the death of George Floyd, a black man, while he was in the custody of the Minneapolis police department on May 25, 2020, set off days of large public demonstrations against racial injustice all around the world, often accompanied by vandalism and looting as well as disproportionate police responses that escalated the tensions. As has often happened in the past when such incidents have occurred, businesses large and small were quick to issue statements through social media expressing their concerns about social justice and supporting the Black Lives Matter movement. Many large and well-known brands made commitments to contribute substantial sums to social justice initiatives and to support minority businesses. However, a law professor who studies economic justice at Emory University complained in The New York Times that: “Most of these corporate statements were put together by the marketing team that was trying not to offend white customers and white employees . . . . It’s complete B.S. It’s performative.”[3]

Others argued that the responses of a number of companies were “hypocritical” and “too little too late,” and pointed to examples of expressions of support for racial justice by large technology companies that appeared to be at odds with prior practices:

  • Facebook being criticized for discrimination against black employees and lack of diversity in the workforce;
  • Amazon calling for an end to “inequitable” treatment of black people, but long being criticized for low pay, poor working conditions, ignoring the complaints of workers (particularly during the course of the COVID-19 pandemic), and providing software to law enforcement agencies that has been misused in the racial profiling of black people (Amazon later announced that it would terminate its contracts with the police); and
  • Google significantly rolling back its diversity and inclusion initiatives to avoid being perceived as anti-conservative.

Floyd’s death, which was quickly followed by the senseless killing of another black man, Rayshard Brooks, by a white police officer, was part of a seemingly endless series of high-profile violent events targeting African Americans (e.g., Ahmaud Arbery, Breonna Taylor, Eric Garner, Trayvon Martin, and others), and occurred during a health pandemic that has been difficult for every American, although there is evidence that the adverse impacts have fallen disproportionately on blacks and other people of color. For example, local government officials reported that job losses in New York City relating to the economic carnage of the pandemic have been much more dramatic among people of color—about one in four of the city’s Asian, Black, and Hispanic workers were unemployed in June 2020, compared with about one in nine white workers.[4] In answer to the longing among large swathes of the country to simply return to “normalcy,” i.e., the ways things were before the health crisis began, protestors and their supporters are signaling that the exclusion and disparity of the past will not be good enough and that the country and its businesses must brace and commit themselves to what will be a difficult but necessary path toward a “new normal” grounded in economic justice. In fact, the president of the American Psychological Association argued:

We are living in a racism pandemic, which is taking a heavy psychological toll on our African American citizens. The health consequences are dire. Racism is associated with a host of psychological consequences, including depression, anxiety and other serious, sometimes debilitating conditions, including post-traumatic stress disorder and substance use disorders. Moreover, the stress caused by racism can contribute to the development of cardiovascular and other physical diseases.

Related to all this is the reality that almost all of the wealth generated in the stock market during the technology boom that played out in the years before the pandemic flowed to white families, with The New York Times reporting that Federal Reserve data confirms that typical black households had only one-tenth the wealth of typical white households. The evidence is clear that the black community has realized little in the way of tangible benefits from pledges of equity from Corporate America, and that it is time for businesses to finally make a meaningful impact in an environment in which fewer than half of black adults in America have a job (due in part to the devastation to the job market caused by the pandemic), and those black workers that do have jobs make less money than white workers (due to the limited types of jobs usually available to blacks, i.e., low paying service jobs, and the failure of businesses to pay black workers the same amount as white workers for the same work). Exacerbating the crisis is the prediction that 40 percent of black-owned businesses are not expected to survive the pandemic, due mostly to the lack of business credit and personal savings that possibly could keep them afloat until conditions improve.

Darren Walker, president of the Ford Foundation, criticized the traditional and predictable response of companies in the face of racism in an article in The New York Times, saying: “The playbook is: Issue a statement, get a group of African-American leaders on a conference call, apologize and have your corporate foundation make a contribution to the N.A.A.C.P. and the Urban League. . . . That’s not going to work in this crisis.”[5] The same article led with the headline “Corporate America Has Failed Black America” and went on to read: “many of the same companies expressing solidarity have contributed to systemic inequality, targeted the black community with unhealthy products and services, and failed to hire, promote and fairly compensate black men and women.”[6] Writing in the Harvard Business Review, Mark R. Kramer noted that although taking a public position on social media supporting racial justice is laudable, and arguably overdue in many cases, he hopes that the tragedy in Minneapolis leads to actions rather than just words from businesses. According to Kramer, surveys indicate that most Americans want businesses to respond to the unrest by purging racism from the workplace, committing resources to help communities recover from the unrest, and establishing the social, economic, and political conditions necessary for a just society, and he argued that businesses have a duty to act:

We cannot pretend that most major corporations in America—and their shareholders—have not benefited from the structural racism, intentional inequality, and indifference to suffering that is behind the current protests. Corporate America and the Business Roundtable have an obligation to go beyond tweets and quotes by committing to an agenda that will advance racial equity in meaningful ways.

Although there has been sweeping and heated dialogue on the root causes of the economic and social problems confronting people of color and the consequences to society in general, many recall that they have heard a lot of this before, such as during the 1992 protests triggered by the acquittal of four white police officers who brutally beat Rodney King in Los Angeles, and worry that the compassion, anger, and energy will eventually drift away. Meaningful change takes a long time to occur in elected bodies and local police departments, particularly during a time when the country is so divided politically. However, businesses have opportunities to act quickly if they can remain focused on creating and executing solutions within their organizations and business relationships. Although the principal victims of systemic racism are people of color, it is a problem for everyone to the extent that it erodes the fabric of society. Moreover, as one observer in The New York Times noted: “racial injustice and discrimination are forces that corrupt the corporate mission and core values of a corporation.”[7]

Frustrated people in pain are tired of waiting for politicians to act and are looking to the businesses that provide them with jobs, goods, and services to take a leading role in creating a more just society. In the past, businesses have been reluctant to get involved, and the argument was frequently made that market forces would eventually solve race problems facing American companies; however, in an article published in The Economist, Walker dismissed this notion and called such views “naïve and in denial about the hold of racism on our culture, including our business culture.” In the same article, a consultant argued: “It’s utterly unrealistic for anybody to bi-furcate a societal problem . . . it’s also a business issue because business exists in society, with employers, customers, suppliers and stakeholders.”

Business leaders must seize the challenges and opportunities that have gripped society’s attention in the wake of the events of the first half of 2020 by taking a stand and making and fulfilling commitments to action across a broad spectrum of issues and contexts, including embedding equality, diversity, and inclusion in the boardroom, the workforce, and all aspects of organizational culture; achieving financial equity and security; bolstering community engagement; getting involved in the public square through advocacy for racial justice, and reimaging products and services.

Over the next few weeks, we’ll take a deeper look into many of these issues and discuss some of the practical steps that businesses can take to contribute to racial justice and equality and what you, as a business counselor, can do to assist them when they are your clients.


[1] A. Bradley, Human Rights Racism, 32 Harvard Human Rights J. 1 (Spring 2019).

[2] I. Wilkerson, America’s Enduring Caste System, N.Y. Times Mag., July 5, 2020, at 26, 33, 53.

[3] D. Gelles, Corporate America Has Failed Black America, N.Y. Times, June 7, 2020, at BU1.

[4] P. McGeehan, Calamity Looms in New York City Over Job Losses, N.Y. Times, July 7, 2020, at A1, A7.

[5] D. Gelles, supra note 3, at BU1.

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] The great awakening?, Economist, June 13, 2020, at 49.

In God We Trust, All Others Pay Cash Collateral: Can Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Debtors Use Assigned Rents for Business Reorganizations under Ohio Law?

The COVID-19 pandemic has turned nearly every facet of American life on its head, and the long-term social changes it will bring about remain up in the air.* Even after the economy recovers from the disease’s current impact, many employers could permanently enact far-reaching changes to how—and where—people work. As more employers discover that employees can adequately perform their duties remotely, they may reevaluate the need for expensive office space, which could lead to increased Chapter 11 filings by the owners of office buildings, office parks, and single-asset real estate debtors.

Against this backdrop, bankruptcy courts can expect increased litigation over the use of post-petition rents as cash collateral to pay administrative expenses and fund business reorganizations plans. Most commercial landlords have mortgages encumbering the space leased to tenants, and the mortgages typically include an assignment-of-rents clause. A common dispute in Chapter 11 bankruptcies centers around whether the assignment-of-rents clause transfers immediate ownership of rents to the lender or merely gives the lender a security interest in the rents. State law controls the issue. See, e.g., Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1978).

The Sixth Circuit has not considered how bankruptcy courts should treat assigned rents under Ohio law. However, it overruled a bankruptcy court’s treatment of the rents as property of the bankruptcy estate under Michigan law, finding that the debtor’s assignment-of-rents to the lender transferred ownership before the debtor filed its bankruptcy petition. See Town Center Flats v. ECP Commercial, 855 F.3d 721 (6th Cir. 2017). A close review of Ohio state court opinions suggests that similar reasoning may apply to property in Ohio depending on the assignment’s specific language. See, e.g., Banks v. Heritage, 2014-Ohio-991 (12th Dist.). This would effectively bar Chapter 11 debtors in Ohio from using post-petition rents to fund reorganization plans or otherwise utilize the resources during the bankruptcy, and it could drastically limit debtors’ options when those rents represent their only source of revenue.

Bankruptcy Code Provisions Governing Rents as Cash Collateral

With some exceptions, when a business debtor files a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, all of its property becomes part of the bankruptcy estate, including rents earned from its property. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(1), (6), 1115(a). The debtor, acting as the bankruptcy estate’s trustee (the “debtor in possession”), may continue to operate the business, and it can use property of the estate—including unencumbered future rents—in the ordinary course of business without the bankruptcy court’s approval. 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(c)(1), 1108. It can also use unencumbered rents that are property of the estate to pay administrative expenses and to fund its reorganization plans. See, e.g., First Fidelity Bank v. Jason Realty, 59 F.3d 423, 426 (3rd Cir. 1995).

If any entity other than the debtor has an interest in cash or “cash equivalents” earned from the debtor’s pre-petition property, the Bankruptcy Code deems the cash or its equivalents “cash collateral.” See 11 U.S.C. § 363(a). The Code includes post-petition rents earned from mortgaged pre-petition property as cash collateral “to the extent provided in [the] security agreement, except to any extent that the court, after notice and a hearing and based on the equities of the case, orders otherwise.” 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2). The debtor cannot use cash collateral without the lender’s consent unless the bankruptcy court authorizes the use. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(3). If the lender requests, the court must require the debtor to provide the lender with adequate protection to use the cash collateral. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e).

Of course, rents qualify as cash collateral only if they are also property of the bankruptcy estate. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 363(a). Thus, if the debtor transferred ownership of the rents to another entity before it filed the bankruptcy petition, then the rents are not the estate’s property, and the debtor cannot use them as cash collateral regardless of whether it provides the lender adequate protection. See, e.g., Jason Realty, 59 F.3d at 427. In the assignment-of-rents context, the question typically boils down to whether the assignment granted the lender a security interest in the rents or transferred ownership of the rents to the lender. Id.

General Types of Assignment-of-Rents Clauses

Assignments of rents in a commercial mortgage generally take two different forms. See, e.g. In re South Side House, 474 B.R. 391, 402-03 (E.D.N.Y. Bankr. 2012). The mortgage’s granting clause may include language to the effect of “[mortgagor] hereby grants, bargains, sells, and conveys to [lender] all estates, right, title and interest in [property], together with all privileges and appurtenances to the same, and all rents, issues, and profits thereof.” Under this language, the mortgagor conveys the rents to the lender along with the property as security for the mortgage loan, but title to the rents remains with the mortgagor. Id. at 403.

The mortgage—or a separate document executed with the mortgage—may also assign the rents to the lender immediately, and the lender then leases the right to collect and use the rents back to the mortgagor. Id. The lease-back provision ordinarily terminates automatically without any action required by the lender if the mortgagor defaults. Some mortgages include both types of language, i.e., a pledge of the rents as additional security for the debt and an immediate transfer of the rents with a lease-back provision.

The Sixth Circuit’s Assignment-of-Rents Rulings

The Sixth Circuit has not considered whether assigned rents qualify as property of the bankruptcy estate under Ohio law. However, it has considered the issue under Kentucky and Michigan law, reaching different conclusions for each state. See Town Center, 855 F.3d at 724–28; In re Buttermilk Towne Center, 442 B.R. 558, 562–64 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 2010). Applying the Sixth Circuit’s analysis of Kentucky and Michigan law to Ohio state court rulings on assignments of rent suggests that bankruptcy courts applying Ohio law should not treat assigned rents as estate property for absolute assignments that then lease the rents back to the debtor.

In Buttermilk, the owner of a commercial real estate development project that leased space to rent-paying tenants in Kentucky entered into a construction financing agreement with the lender. In connection with the financing agreement, the owner assigned the rents derived from the project to the lender subject to a license allowing the owner to collect and use the rents so long as he did not default on his obligations under the financing agreement.

After defaulting on the agreement, the owner filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy and sought to use the rents as cash collateral. The lender objected, arguing that the bankruptcy court should not treat the rents as property of the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court disagreed, holding that the rents belonged to the estate and constituted cash collateral. It later ruled that a replacement lien on the rents would adequately protect the lender’s security interest. The Sixth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court’s treatment of the rents as estate property, but it reversed the court’s allowance of a replacement lien as adequate protection.

On the rent ownership issue, the panel relied on an earlier Sixth Circuit ruling discussing Kentucky law and holding that “the entire tenor and affect of an instrument pledging rents” in Kentucky “is that such a pledge is deemed secondary security, with the lien continuing as an inchoate right which will be and must be perfected or consummated by . . . some definite action looking toward possession and subjection.” The panel noted that the lender could not provide any Kentucky law contradicting the Sixth Circuit’s previous discussion, and it held that “[e]ven if the assignment gave [the lender] a right to possess the rents pre-petition, the assignment . . . did not give [the lender] an absolute ownership of the rents.”

More recently, the Sixth Circuit interpreted Michigan law to reverse a bankruptcy court’s ruling that included assigned rents in the bankruptcy estate. See Town Center, 855 F.3d at 728. In Town Center, a company owned a large residential complex that it built with a construction loan. The company secured the loan with a mortgage and an assignment of rents. Under the assignment, the company “irrevocably, absolutely, and unconditionally [agreed to] transfer, sell, assign, pledge, and convey” the rents to the lender. The agreement also “grant[ed] a license to [the company] to collect and retain rents until an event of default, at which point the license would ‘automatically terminate without notice to [the company].’”

After the company defaulted on the loan, the lender filed a foreclosure action in state court, and the company filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. The lender moved to prohibit the company from using post-petition rents on the grounds that they were not property of the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, ruling that the rents qualified as cash collateral and requiring the company to provide adequate protection to the lender. The Sixth Circuit reversed, interpreting the contract language to have assigned the lender ownership of the rents.

The Sixth Circuit began by analyzing Michigan law on assignment of rents, which had traditionally forbade mortgage assignment-of-rents clauses until the state legislature enacted a law specifically allowing them. Noting that “Michigan courts generally discuss assignments of rents under [the applicable statute] as ownership transfers,” the Sixth Circuit discussed two appellate-level Michigan opinions holding that “the assignor loses any right to collect the rents after the assignee has perfected its rights [under the statute] following an event of default.” The court therefore held that the rents belonged to the lender, and the bankruptcy court wrongly considered them property of the estate, despite also recognizing that the ruling limited single-asset real estate debtors’ options under Chapter 11.

As noted, the Sixth Circuit has not addressed the assignment-of-rents issue under Ohio law. State courts in Ohio appear to treat general assignments of rents included in the mortgage’s granting clause differently from assignments that immediately transfer ownership and lease the rents back to the mortgagor. Compare, e.g., Hutchinson v. Straub, 64 Ohio St. 413 (1901) with Banks v. Heritage, 2014-Ohio-991. Accordingly, bankruptcy courts applying Ohio law should arrive at different results depending on the specific type of assignment-of-rents clause.

Ohio Law on General Rent Assignments in the Granting Clause

Ohio courts interpreting mortgages that convey rents as additional security in the granting clause mostly hold that mortgagors retain ownership of the rents until the lender takes possession of the property or otherwise asserts its rights to the rents. See, e.g., In re Pfleiderer, 123 B.R. 768, 769–70 (N.D. Ohio Bankr. 1987). In Ohio, rents are not included in the mortgage unless specifically pledged, and the lender must still take some action to exert control over the rents even when the mortgage specifically pledges them. Id. (quoting 69 O. Jur. 3d Mortgages § 151 (1986)).

In Hutchinson, the debtor gave her lender a mortgage conveying property to secure the debt “and all the rents, issues and profits thereof.” In state court insolvency proceedings, the plaintiff took assignment of the property for the benefit of creditors, and it collected rents from the property during a land sale action in the probate court. After the sale, the trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay the rents to the lender to satisfy the mortgage rather than the unsecured creditors. The plaintiff appealed, and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed.

The court rejected the plaintiff’s position that the lender had no right to the rents because it never took actual possession of the property or sought to have a receiver appointed as plausible but unsound. The court acknowledged the traditional rule that “the mortgagor has the right to receive as his own the rents of real estate so long as he remains in possession,” but it found that “the [debtor] in this case yielded possession to one who took the property burdened with the duty to administer it for the benefit of creditors.” The court further noted that although lenders ordinarily seek a receiver to enforce their right to the rents, the pending probate action precluded the lender from doing so, and the assignee for the benefit of creditors served the same function of a receiver. See also In re Cordesman-Rechtin, 66 Ohio App. 25, 27–28 (1st Dist. 1940) (discussing Hutchinson and distinguishing cases where the mortgage did not assign rents). Accordingly, the court upheld the trial court’s order requiring the plaintiff to pay the rents it collected to the lender.

Ohio courts interpreting Hutchinson confirm that its rule applies regardless of whether a separate legal proceeding prevents the lender from seeking to appoint a receiver. See Perin v. N-Ren, CA87-09-014, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 2089 *10 (12th Dist. May 31, 1988). In Perin, a farmer sold land to a purchaser, who gave the farmer a mortgage pledging “rents, issues and profits” to secure the purchase price. The purchaser then agreed with a third party to allow him to grow tobacco on the land in exchange for a portion of the proceeds from the tobacco. The purchaser filed bankruptcy after defaulting on her mortgage to the farmer, and the farmer secured permission from the bankruptcy court to proceed with foreclosure.

Although the foreclosure remained pending, the farmer obtained a preliminary injunction preventing the third-party tobacco grower from paying the proceeds of the tobacco sales to the purchaser, but she did not seek a receiver. After the foreclosure sale, the trial court found that the tobacco proceeds constituted rents, and it ordered them paid to the farmer. The purchaser appealed, and the appellate court affirmed.

The court rejected the purchaser’s argument that the farmer had no right to the rents because she never had a receiver appointed. It found that even though nothing prevented the farmer from seeking a receiver, the Ohio Supreme Court’s ruling in Hutchinson still controlled. Noting that “[r]eceivership is not the only process by which a court can take control of mortgaged property,” it held that “[a] mortgagee of real property is entitled to the rents and profits of the mortgaged premises when he takes actual possession of the property, when possession is taken on his behalf by a receiver, or when he demands such possession.” The court determined that the farmer’s motion for a temporary injunction “was an act compatible with the right she claimed [to the rents] and equivalent to a demand for possession.”

 Ohio Law on Immediate Rent Assignments with Lease-Back Provisions

In contrast to these rulings, Ohio courts have construed assignments that immediately transfer the rents to the lender differently. See, e.g., Banks, 2014-Ohio-991, ¶¶ 22–24. In Banks, mobile home residents brought a class action against the management company that owned three separate mobile home parks. The lender for one of the parks intervened and had a receiver appointed to collect the residents’ rents after the management company defaulted on its mortgage loan for one the parks. The lender subsequently accepted a deed in lieu of foreclosure. When the lender sought the rents the receiver collected, the trial court refused, finding that the deed in lieu of foreclosure satisfied the lender’s mortgage loan. The appellate court reversed.

Under the language in the assignment of rents, the management company conveyed “all right, title and interest of [the company] . . . together with . . . all rents, receipts, revenues, income, and profits which may now or hereafter be or become due.” (Emphasis removed.) The agreement further provided that “[t]his Assignment is absolute and is effective immediately,” but it allowed the management company to “receive, collect, and enjoy the rents” until “a default has occurred, and has not been cured.” (Emphasis removed.) Upon default, the lender could “at its option, without notice to [the management company], receive and collect all such rents . . . as long as such default or defaults shall exist.” (Emphasis removed.)

Construing this language, the appellate court found that the rents “became the exclusive property of [the lender] upon [the mortgage company’s] default.” Accordingly, given that the lender “owned the funds that were held by the receiver pursuant to the Assignment of Rents agreement, the deed in lieu of foreclosure did not release [the lender]’s ownership interest in such funds.” The court therefore ordered the receiver to turn over the rents it had collected since its appointment, which was all the funds at issue in the case, because the rents “were the property of [the lender].” See also U.S. Bank v. Gotham King Fee Owner, 2013-Ohio-1983, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.) (mortgagor not entitled to notice of receiver’s changes to leases because “its license in the rents and leases automatically terminated upon default”).

Effectuating the terms of more specific assignment-of-rents clauses over general language from the mortgage’s granting clause also conforms to well-established contract rules recognized in Ohio. Ohio courts consistently treat the more specific terms of a contract as controlling over the more general terms. See, e.g., Vanderink v. Vanderink, 2018-Ohio-3328, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.); Pierce Point Cinema v. Perin-Tyler, 2012-Ohio-5008, ¶ 17 (12th Dist.). Thus, the more specific assignment terms immediately transferring the rents and leasing them back to the mortgagor should control over any more general terms pledging rents as additional security.

Even if the more specific terms did not control, Ohio—like most states—construes contracts as a whole and gives effect to all of their terms if possible. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Corporate Circle, 103 Ohio App. 3d 93, 98 (8th Dist.). Mortgage-granting clauses typically grant the mortgagor’s rights in the property to the lender along with any profits or rents flowing from the property. Assigning the rents subject to a lease-back provision does not invalidate that language in the granting clause. It simply removes the right to collect and use the rents from the “bundle of sticks” the mortgagor conveyed to secure the debt. After the assignment, that right belongs to the lender, who leases it back to the mortgagor with a lease that automatically terminates if the mortgagor defaults. Interpreting the mortgage to only pledge the rents as additional security would improperly read the more specific assignment-of-rents term out of the mortgage altogether.

Harmonizing Ohio’s Assignment-of-Rents Caselaw

Reading these cases together suggests that Ohio law treats three different assignment-of-rents scenarios differently. In the first scenario, the mortgage contains no pledge of rents or separate assignment-of-rents clause. There, the rents still follow title to the property, but the lender would not have a right to rents while a foreclosure action remained pending and the mortgagor still had a right to redeem. See Commercial Bank v. Woodville, 126 Ohio St. 587, 592 (1933). The same rule may follow if the lender took legal possession of the property through ejectment. Id. at 591 (“the right to rents . . . follows the legal title and right to possession”) (internal quotations omitted).

Notably, this line of reasoning also conforms to longstanding Ohio mortgage foreclosure law. In Ohio, title to the property as between the mortgagor and the lender passes to the lender upon default, but title as between the mortgagor and the rest of the world remains with the mortgagor until the lender completes a foreclosure action or takes possession through ejectment. See, e.g., Hausman v. City of Dayton, 73 Ohio St. 3d 671, 675–76 (1995). Inasmuch as rents arise from title between the mortgagor and its tenants, not between the mortgagor and the lender, the title giving rise to the rents remains with the mortgagor until the lender either forecloses or ejects.

In the second scenario, the mortgage specifically pledges the rents as additional security for the debt, but it has no separate assignment immediately transferring the rents to the lender. There, the lender has rights to the rents before foreclosing the mortgagor’s redemption rights, but it must have a receiver appointed or take some other action to exert dominion over the rents. See, e.g., Perin, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 2089 *10. Inasmuch as at least one Ohio court holds that a lender “is entitled to the rents and profits of the mortgaged premises . . . when he demands [ ] possession,” a simple demand letter to the mortgagor could suffice to meet this requirement. Id.

In the third scenario, the mortgage—or a separate contemporaneous document—immediately assigns the rents to the lender and leases them back to the mortgagor with the lease to expire upon default without additional action needed from the lender. There, the lender owns the rents immediately upon default without needing to foreclose or eject, seek appointment of a receiver, or take any other action to exert dominion over the rents. See, e.g., Banks, 2014-Ohio-991, ¶ 22; Gotham, 2013-Ohio-1983, ¶ 19. Cf. GLIC Real Estate v. Bicentennial Plaza, 2012-Ohio-2269, ¶ 26 (10th Dist.) (refusing to extend the general rule that courts treat a conveyance made for security as a mortgage to an assignment of leases that transferred immediate ownership).

Importantly, a receiver collected the rents at issue in both the Banks and Gotham cases cited above, which could support the position that lenders must still take possession or appoint a receiver before owning the rents, notwithstanding the specific contract language to the contrary. However, Banks and Gotham did not treat the receiver as the determinative fact. Instead, both relied on Ohio contract law and specifically held that the rents became the lender’s property when the mortgagor defaulted. See Banks, 2014-Ohio-991, ¶ 22 (“Pursuant to [the contract], the funds became the exclusive property of [the lender] upon [the mortgagor]’s default on the promissory note.”); Gotham, 2013-Ohio-1983, 19 (mortgagor “lost any interest it had in the leases and rents” when its license to the rents “terminated automatically upon default”).

Ohio’s Assignment-of-Rents Case Law in the Chapter 11 Context

Applying this law in the context of a Chapter 11 debtor’s ability to use rents for reorganization should yield different results for each scenario. In the first scenario, bankruptcy courts should allow debtors to use the rents without court authorization regardless of whether the lender consents. Title to the property that produced the rents belonged to the debtor when it filed the bankruptcy petition, and the rents are not provided for “by [the] security agreement” under Ohio law because the debtors did not specifically pledge them as additional security. Thus, they belong to the bankruptcy estate and are not cash collateral. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(1), 552(b)(2).

In the second scenario, bankruptcy courts applying Ohio law should treat the rents as part of the bankruptcy estate and the lender’s cash collateral, unless the lender successfully had a receiver appointed or made a demand for the rents before the debtor filed the bankruptcy petition. The debtor conveyed the rents in the mortgage as additional security for the debt, but it continues to own the rents until the lender has a receiver appointed or takes other appropriate action. See, e.g., Perin, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 2089 *10. However, if the lender took such action before the debtor filed the petition, the court should not treat the rents as property of the estate under Ohio law because the debtor no longer owned them when it filed the petition. Id. at *7.

In the third scenario, bankruptcy courts applying Ohio law should treat the rents as belonging to the lender and therefore not property of the bankruptcy estate, regardless of whether the lender had a receiver appointed or took any other action to exercise control over the rents. The debtor assigned the rents to the lender immediately upon executing the mortgage, and its only remaining interest in the rents consisted of the lender’s lease back to the debtor. See, e.g., Banks, 2014-Ohio-991, ¶ 22. That lease expired upon default, and the debtor therefore held no interest in the rents when it filed the bankruptcy petition. Id.

This reasoning should hold under Town Center and Buttermilk, regardless of Ohio’s status as a so-called lien theory state. The Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Town Center rested on its determination that Michigan law “allow[ed] for assignments of rents to be transfers of ownership once the statutory steps for perfection have been completed.” Town Center, 855 F.3d at 726. Accordingly, given that the court read the mortgage language as “assign[ing] the rents to the maximum extent permitted by Michigan law,” it held that the debtor transferred ownership of the rents. In contrast, the court specifically noted in Buttermilk that the lender could “not present[ ] any Kentucky case law that contradict[ed]” its earlier ruling that assignments of rents under Kentucky law constituted only “secondary security” the lender must perfect by taking “some definite action looking toward possession and subjection.” (Internal quotations omitted.)

Like Kentucky, Ohio case law recognizes a general rule that treats assignments of rents in the granting clause as additional security requiring the lender to take some action to perfect before acquiring ownership. See, e.g., Hutchinson, 64 Ohio St. at 415–17. However, like Michigan, Ohio case law also allows assignments of rents to constitute immediate transfers of ownership depending on the language in the mortgage contract. See, e.g., Banks, 2014-Ohio-991, ¶ 22; Gotham, 2013-Ohio-1983, ¶ 19; GLIC Real Estate, 2012-Ohio-2269, ¶ 26. Thus, applying the Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Town Center, the more specific language in immediate assignments with lease back provisions should control, and bankruptcy courts should not consider the rents estate property.

Conclusion

Many Ohio bankruptcy courts treat assigned rents as cash collateral even when the contract language immediately transfers the rents and leases them back to the debtor. Yet, a close review of Ohio case law read with Sixth Circuit precedent may call that practice into question. As bankruptcy filings increase from owners of commercial office property, parties can expect to litigate these issues more, and some Chapter 11 debtors may find themselves without cash collateral to pay expenses and fund reorganization.


This article is not intended as and should not be considered legal advice.

Access to Justice in Light of COVID-19: Benefits, Burdens and Lessons

Introduction

Delivering on the promises of the rule of law has been and will continue to be a great challenge during the COVID-19 pandemic and in its aftermath. As the world struggles to adapt to the evolving immediate consequences of this public health crisis, lawyers should be mindful of long-term consequences when providing legal advice and representation. This requires reflection on previous crises, a willingness to learn from the current pandemic, and use of acquired knowledge to navigate and prepare for comparable disruptions in the future. Business lawyers in particular should gain an understanding of how the pandemic affects their clients, the courts in which claims are brought by and against their clients, and the impact it has on lawyers in general.

 Impact on Middle Market and Small Businesses

The rapidly evolving COVID-19 pandemic disrupted the economy at a global level. Small businesses took the hardest hit. As businesses reopen to the public, social distancing restrictions and demand shifts are expected to shutter many more small businesses. Virtually every business is forced to confront a host of hard questions about how to survive and conduct business in the midst of the pandemic.

In response, the government, at different levels, implemented various relief programs, such as the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”), to address some of the hardships created by this unprecedented pandemic. The PPP did not accomplish its stated goal for many small businesses due to its complexity and accompanying uncertainty around the forgiveness process. Small businesses may not have the financial resources to learn and keep up with the quick-changing rules of the PPP program. As the pandemic continues to evolve, businesses face new business and legal challenges. Merely creating new relief programs for small businesses is not enough. Business owners need to understand what the programs offer and how to navigate and access such programs. Pro bono legal aid services remain a key solution to this ongoing problem.

Impact on Courts

Additionally, the pandemic poses significant challenges—and opportunities—for increasing access to justice. The federal and state judiciary systems have been forced to operate in unprecedented ways to maintain essential services. In many jurisdictions, physical access to the courts has been curtailed or suspended completely, making it difficult for individuals to seek legal assistance. Courts now routinely use telephonic and videoconferencing services to move dockets forward and will continue to adjust and implement new procedures and technology as the crisis evolves. There is still uncertainty, however, about whether such measures can (1) effectively substitute for in person proceedings long-term or (2) increase or decrease access to justice.

 Impact on Lawyers and Law Firms

Cases and deals are being delayed, causing law firms to make tough decisions. In hopes of withstanding the devastation brought by the pandemic, law firms have made pay cuts and layoffs, shortened summer programs, and delayed start dates for incoming associates. Despite the added stress these decisions cause, lawyers have been forced to step up and develop creative solutions for clients’ demands during these unprecedented times. Most of these solutions rely on innovative technology to meet the requirements of clients and their businesses. However, this creativity does not come without risk. Lawyers must be certain to maintain their ethical obligations, including maintaining confidentiality, professionalism, and competence. These obligations are increasingly difficult to meet given the new challenges that stay-at-home orders bring. Parents may be distracted by the responsibility to teach and care for their children, while roommates may struggle to maintain client confidentiality in their close living quarters. These new stressors add to the already demanding requirements of the legal profession, where mental illness is seen in large numbers. Lawyers should be mindful of these consequences and take steps to ensure both their physical and mental health.

Lessons from the Pandemic

There are lessons we can learn that are not new but do require more attention during times such as this pandemic.

  • It is necessary to make plans and decisions, but when events are rapidly evolving, it is helpful to think of plans as working hypotheses rather than as final decisions.
  • There is added value in flexible policies and procedures.
  • It is important to be aware of and take steps to mitigate cognitive bias.
  • Quantification is a double-edged sword, to be used carefully.
  • Clear and prompt communication makes a difference.
  • As you make changes, it is helpful to identify what intangible benefits you might be losing and how important they are (or are not) and decide whether you want to try to mitigate the loss.
  • Pro bono legal representation is a way to make a meaningful difference in someone’s life.

Conclusion

Maintaining an understanding of our clients, courts, and ourselves will help foster innovative ideas and practical solutions to clients’ evolving demands. It is important to be flexible and open to change, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic when the world and its laws are changing every day. Although we have limited access to each other due to social distancing requirements, we must be cognizant of the new norm and ensure that we are doing our part to increase access to justice during this global health crisis.

COVID-19 is Not Color-Blind: Assessing the Legal and Equity Impact on Diverse Communities

“Do not get lost in a sea of despair. Be hopeful, be optimistic. Our struggle is not the struggle of a day, a week, a month, or a year, it is the struggle of a lifetime. Never, ever be afraid to make some noise and get in good trouble, necessary trouble.”

-John Robert Lewis 


On September 23, 2020, an esteemed panel discussed how the COVID-19 pandemic is exposing and exacerbating existing social and economic inequalities affecting racial and ethnic minority groups in America, including higher infection and death rates, decreased access to adequate healthcare, increased educational achievement gaps, and higher rates of job losses. This panel included Chris Brummer, Professor and Faculty Director of the Institute of International Economics Law at Georgetown Law; Dave Clunie, Executive Director at Black Economic Alliance; Patrice Ficklin, Fair Lending Director at the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; Jenn Jones, Chief of Membership & Policy at the National Consumer Reinvestment Coalition; Robin Nunn, Partner at Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP; Anthony Sharett, EVP, Chief Legal and Compliance Officer, and Corporate Secretary at Meta Financial Group and MetaBank; and Odette Williamson, Director of the National Consumer Law Center’s Racial Justice & Equal Economic Opportunity Initiative. ABA Business Law Section members can watch the panel for free CLE credit here.


The confluence of the current global health emergency, the economic crisis, and the Black Lives Matter protests has underscored the major inequalities that persist today. The demonstrably unjust treatment of Black and brown communities has shown Americans that insufficient progress has been made since the civil rights movement. The recent passing of two civil rights icons—Congressman John Lewis and Rev. C.T. Vivian—has caused many of us to reflect on the magnitude of their accomplishments and how much more there is to be done.

This country’s well-documented history of exclusionary policies has infected every sphere of our lives, legitimizing racism and creating structural barriers to equity. For instance, residential redlining, which was promoted by the Federal Housing Administration’s official policies, has led to persistent residential segregation. The implications of segregation are devastating and self-reinforcing: less access to good jobs, greater concentration of poverty and crime, underfunded public schools, lower levels of homeownership, poor housing quality, and increased risk of illness or death.

The ramifications of institutionalized racism and segregation returned to the headlines as COVID-19 has taken a disproportionate toll on minorities. As of the date of this article’s composition, there have been 6,343,62 confirmed cases of COVID-19 with 190,262 deaths in the United States.[1] According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, there is increasing evidence that minority groups are disproportionately affected by the pandemic. While the fatality rate among white Americans rose only 9%, the fatality rate among Asian Americans, Black Americans, and Hispanics rose 30%, and the fatality rate of Native Americans rose more than 20%.[2] Financially, the pandemic’s toll may prove insurmountable for many minority families and communities. The ever-expanding wealth gap will impact Black families most as they have significantly less wealth to help protect them from the devastating effects of an economic crisis, let alone the ability to pass assets down to future generations. Due to the compounding effects of society’s treatment of our Black communities, “the median wealth for Black families in 2016 was an astonishing $3,557—about 2% of the median wealth owned by white families, which owned nearly $147,000 in the same year.”[3]

The stubborn persistence of these inequities requires renewed efforts and commitment. Our panel will discuss the role of existing legislation and what more can be done. The current legal landscape includes the Civil Rights Act, which sought to end segregation in public places, banned employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin,[4] and became the archetype legislation for subsequent anti-discrimination laws that now permeate the financial landscape; the Fair Housing Act, which prohibits discrimination in the sale, rental, and financing of dwellings because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, and disability;[5] the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, which prohibits credit discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, or for receiving public assistance;[6] and the Community Reinvestment Act, which requires federal financial supervisory agencies to encourage financial institutions to help meet the credit needs of the communities in which they do business, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods.[7]

Also at play is the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (“HUD”) new rule addressing disparate impact. In August 2019, HUD published a Proposed Rule seeking to amend the agency’s interpretation of the Fair Housing Act’s disparate impact standard. While HUD stated that the new rule was intended to better reflect the Supreme Court’s 2015 ruling in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,[8] many business executives, civil rights groups, and legal practitioners believe that the proposed rule is a step backwards, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to prove unintentional discrimination. Despite this opposition, HUD finalized the new disparate impact rule on September 4, 2020.[9]

The disparities are abundantly clear, and now is time to recommit to social justice and do more.


This article is the result of the authors’ independent research and does not necessarily represent the views of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, the United States, or Simmonds & Narita LLP


[1] WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, World Health Org., https://covid19.who.int/region/amro/country/us (last visited Sept. 11, 2020).

[2] As U.S. Deaths Mount, Virus Takes Outsize Toll on Minorities, Associated Press, https://www.modernhealthcare.com/safety-quality/us-deaths-mount-virus-takes-outsize-toll-minorities (last visited Aug. 27, 2020) (compared with an average over the last five years).

[3] Alissa Kline, How Banks Aim to Close Racial Wealth Gap: More Minorities in Leadership, Am. Banker, Jul. 12, 2020, https://www.americanbanker.com/news/how-banks-aim-to-close-racial-wealth-gap-more-minorities-in-leadership.

[4] See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.

[5] See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq.

[6] See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 et seq.

[7] See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901 et seq.

[8] HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 42854 (Proposed Aug. 19, 2019).

[9] HUD Finalizes Rule to Align ‘Disparate Impact’ Rule with Court Ruling, ABA Banking Journal, https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2020/09/hud-finalizes-rule-to-align-disparate-impact-rule-with-court-ruling/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2020).

Alternative Litigation Finance: Leveraging Legal Analytics to Navigate the World’s Largest Unstructured Data Set

Interested in this article? Consider attending these upcoming events at the ABA Business Law Section Virtual Section Annual Meeting, Monday, Sept. 21–Friday, Sept 25 (Information and Registration HERE.)

·Legal Analytics Program: Measuring Outside Counsel by the Numbers, Thursday, September 24, 9:00AM–10:30AM

·Legal Analytics Committee Meeting, Friday, September 25, 9:00AM–11:00AM CST


Did you know that you can make money investing in other people’s lawsuits?

Over the last decade, alternative litigation finance (ALF)[1]—the “funding of litigation activities by entities other than the parties themselves”—has taken off in the United States, with capital pouring in from “income-starved” investors seeking strong returns largely uncorrelated to public markets.

Despite ALF’s growth and institutionalization, for some, the space remains controversial. Detractors like the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform argue that it “increases the probability that meritless claims will be brought.” Supporters counter that investors have zero incentive to finance spurious cases and, to the contrary, can provide an important market-sorting function by allocating funds to resource-constrained parties’ meritorious claims while eschewing unviable matters.

In a sense, ALF hits on a core tension underlying our legal system. From a normative perspective, litigation is a system to right wrongs and promote fairness. Yet, descriptively, it is also a vast industry characterized by complex incentives and well-resourced “repeat players,” creating a dynamic that can exacerbate structural inequities.

For lawyers, ALF presents unique challenges implicating both professional responsibilities as well as practical commercial considerations. To help provide guidance, on August 4, 2020, the ABA’s House of Delegates adopted the American Bar Association Best Practices for Third-Party Litigation Funding (Best Practices). The report “surveys the types of alternative litigation funding and proposes best practices to be consulted and factors to be considered by attorneys seeking to explore or utilize litigation funding in dynamic regulatory, judicial, and arbitral environments.”

What Is Alternative Litigation Finance?

The Best Practices report notes that “[a] single narrow definition . . . cannot encompass the range of funding activities that may arise” with respect to ALF, but at its core it “is a form of distributing risk.” In that regard, ALF is not unlike contingent-fee arrangements, which for many plaintiffs represents the primary alternative for pursuing claims.

In 1897, Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that “[w]hen we study law we are not studying a mystery but a well-known profession. . . . The object of our study, then, is prediction.” In finance terms, this implies that litigation, and thus ALF, is not a matter of Knightian uncertainty (suggesting unquantifiable outcomes) but is fundamentally subject to risk (a set of unknown, but ultimately calculable, outcomes).

Indeed, commercial clients typically come to lawyers with questions best answered in the form of a number: How much can we win (or lose)? What are the odds? How long will it take?

Legal analytics provides the tools for answering such questions, whereas litigation finance offers a vehicle for transferring the now-quantified legal risk to the parties best suited to bear it. Unsurprisingly, the Artificial Lawyer has observed at least four partnerships between legal prediction startups and litigation funders.

ALF transaction structures are complex and vary widely, though the core approach is transferring financial exposure to legal risk while minimizing basis and ensuring strict adherence to the rules of professional responsibility in respect of case control and otherwise.

The diagram below presents a simplified example of an ALF deal structure:

The transaction above basically works as follows: (1) a newly created special purpose vehicle (SPV) sells shares to an ALF firm; (2) the SPV uses the capital to purchase exposure to a company’s legal claims (effectively taking them off the cedant’s balance sheet) in exchange for a security interest in the proceeds; (3) using capital from the SPV, the company pursues the litigation; and (4) if successful, the company and ALF firm share in any eventual recovery.

Computationally, though at a highly simplified level, one could think of the expected value of a litigation claim as:

E [Vclaim] ~ = [(p*A) – C] / (1+r)T

where “p” is the probability of an award or settlement, “A” is the amount, “C” is the cost of litigation, “T” is the expected duration, and “r” is the applicable discount rate.

ALF Market

The Best Practices report provides a broad survey of the ALF market, finding that in recent years “[t]he frequency of funding, the diversity of types of funding, and the number of funders have increased,” along with the capital dedicated to the space. Further, “[p]erhaps most importantly, the forms of dispute financing have expanded significantly, raising challenging questions about how ‘third-party funder’ or ‘third-party funding’ should be defined,” as an International Council for Commercial Arbitration report noted.

The diagram below summarizes the different ALF types discussed in the Best Practices report through a taxonomy based on the structure of the litigation funder’s financial exposure to the underlying legal risk:

Broadly, the funding types can be grouped between those offering direct exposure to case outcomes and litigation-related credit, where the funder does not necessarily share in the upside, but may have some floor on their exposure through recourse, collateral, or guarantees, such as with respect to law firm loans.

Importantly, first category of outcomes-tied ALF represents the vast majority of the market. At the same time, based on conversations with market participants, the “preferred or hurdle rate” structure, denoted by the red-dotted box, is the most common return structure in the market today.

The key distinction in the above framework is not the use of funds, which are innately litigation related, but the nature of the capital provider’s exposure to the underlying legal asset and potential corresponding implications in respect of case control and the parties’ broader incentives.

ALF Returns and Performance

Based on performance figures, it is not difficult to see why ALF is “booming,” as Businessweek put it. Many ALF funds have reported net internal rates of return exceeding 30 percent, whereas some players, like IMF Bentham (rebranded as Omni Bridgeway), have delivered closer to 60 percent, according to a Bloomberg report. Furthermore, ALF is commonly understood to be largely uncorrelated to broader public markets, making it even more attractive from a portfolio construction perspective.

Unfortunately, due to ALF transactions being both private and generally highly illiquid, it is next to impossible to perfectly capture this dynamic empirically. With that caveat, the table below presents one—admittedly, imperfect—approach based on market prices through 2016 for publicly-listed ALF vehicles: Burford, IMF Bentham (Omni Bridgeway) and Juridica. As shown below, the Beta, or level of market exposure against the S&P 500—typically around 1 for most companies and 1.118 for Apple as shown below—is near 0 for the ALF funds.

Consequently, all three ALF firms displayed significant excess returns relative to predictions based on the CAPM model.

Report Recommendations

In part due to ALF’s complexity, the Best Practices report does “not take a position on a number of litigation funding issues” and generally eschews a prescriptive posture. Rather, the report seeks to provide certain broad-based principles “common to all types of funding.” These principles emphasize thorough documentation of the funding arrangement, as well as adherence to the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility—namely, ensuring “that the client remains in control of the case.”

Some of its key takeaways are as follows:

  • Any litigation funding arrangement should be in writing.
  • The litigation funding arrangement should assure that the client remains in control of the case.
  • The written document should address what happens to the funding arrangement if, down the road, the client and the funder disagree on litigation strategy or goals.
  • Given that the propriety and the discoverability of litigation funding arrangements are unsettled questions in many jurisdictions (and may differ across contexts within those jurisdictions), (emphasis added).

Discoverability of ALF arrangements has presented a particular point of contention and uncertainty in that “[c]ourts currently are of differing views on whether the fact of third-party funding and the details need to be disclosed to the other side or are proper issues for discovery.” Thus, the report “identifies these issues but does not take a position on whether such disclosure should occur,” although it warns attorneys of the possibility and advises that they plan accordingly.


[1] ALF is also commonly referred to as “legal funding,” “third-party litigation finance,” and certain other terms. For relative simplicity and consistency with the Best Practices report, this article uses the ALF acronym.

ESG in the Time of COVID: Key Considerations for Investment Fund Managers

Since June 5, 2019, the date on which the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) published its interpretation regarding the standard of conduct for investment advisers under the Advisers Act[1] the world has changed dramatically. On February 3, 2020, Larry Fink, the Founder, Chairman, and CEO of BlackRock Inc., published his open letter to CEOs asserting that climate change “has become a defining factor in companies’ long-term prospects”.[2] The World Health Organization declared COVID-19 as a pandemic on March 11, 2020. The Black Lives Matter movement has gained increased prominence following the death of George Floyd in Minneapolis on May 25, 2020.

The managers of many investment funds have made representations or covenants with respect to the incorporation of environmental, social and governance principles in their investment decisions. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, in the context of ESG, the investment community was focused on climate change, as evidenced in part by Larry Fink’s letter.[3] However, since the start of the current pandemic, that focus has shifted, at least temporarily.[4] The “S” in “ESG” appears to have gained more prominence than the “E” or the “G”.[5]

Registered advisers are fiduciaries under U.S. federal law and owe a duty of care and a duty of loyalty to their clients.[6] The SEC has stated that this fiduciary duty requires an adviser “to adopt the principal’s goals, objectives, or ends”[7] and that an adviser’s duty “follows the contours of the relationship between the adviser and its client, and the adviser and its client may shape that relationship by agreement, provided that there is full and fair disclosure and informed consent.”[8]

Investment fund managers may wish to take the following actions to address ESG in the time of COVID-19:

  • Review Scope of Existing Commitments. As investment fund managers monitor and evaluate their portfolios, they should review any side letters and the governing documents of the funds that they manage, including the limited partnership agreement and the private placement memorandum, to ensure that fund managers understand the scope and extent of their commitments and representations made to investors with respect to ESG.
  • Evaluate Effectiveness of Existing ESG Policies and Procedures. Investment fund managers that have made commitments with respect to ESG should evaluate the manner in which ESG principles are incorporated into investment decisions, the ongoing management of portfolio companies, and the management of the fund manager’s own business (such as the manner in which key employees are recruited and promoted, and the compensation of employees for sick days).
  • Adopt an ESG Policy. Investment fund managers that have not yet adopted an ESG policy may wish to consider doing so as a way of identifying and managing risks not addressed through their existing processes, thereby improving the fund’s ability to weather (and potentially thrive in) the COVID-19 storm. While conventional wisdom has pitted ESG considerations against healthy economic returns, the current pandemic has demonstrated that the two are not mutually exclusive. Funds that have already identified and addressed ESG risks, for example, may find that their portfolio companies are more resilient than those of their peers.[9]
  • Adjust the Investment Strategy. Managers of funds without the benefit of an investment strategy broad enough to include new types of attractive investment opportunities should consider amending the fund’s investment strategy (which would generally require investor consent) or forming a sidecar fund (which may also require investor consent, depending on the terms of the existing fund) for the purpose of pursuing those types of opportunities.
    • Fund managers that wish to pursue this approach should engage with investors early in the process to identify and address any concerns that investors may have with respect to style drift or potential conflicts of interest. Investors may want to know, for example, how conflicts will be managed if two different funds that are managed by the same manager could potentially invest in different parts of the capital stack of the same company.
    • Any fund manager that wishes to form a sidecar fund should be prepared to answer fresh new questions from investors about how the manager will address ESG risks: the investment strategy of the sidecar fund could raise materially different ESG considerations—and result in a materially different risk profile—than that of the existing fund.

These actions will not necessarily ensure the success of an investment fund or result in top-quartile returns. There are sure to be investment funds that are unable to rebound from their losses or that are ultimately unable to produce the returns expected by their investors as a result of the current pandemic. However, at a time when health, safety, and stability are of paramount concern to many institutional investors, among others, an investment fund manager that chooses to disregard its own ESG commitments, or disregard ESG considerations more generally, does so at its own peril.


[1] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers, 17 CFR Part 276 (Release No. IA-5248; File No. S7-07-18) (June 5, 2019).

[2] Laurence Fink, “A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance” (2020).

[3] David Katz and Laura A. McIntosh, “Corporate Governance Update: EESG and the COVID-19 Crisis” (May 31, 2020).

[4] Olivia Raimonde and Hailey Waller, “CEOs Drop Climate Change Talk to Focus on Surviving Covid-19” (July 1, 2020).

[5] See, for example, “Investor Statement on Coronavirus Response”, a statement released by over 300 institutional investors which urges the business community to consider providing paid leave, prioritizing health and safety and maintaining employment, among other things: “the prospect of widespread unemployment will exacerbate the crisis and grave risks to basic social stability and the financial markets”.

[6] Interpretation, supra note 1 at 6-7, citing Amendments to Form ADV, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3060 (July 28, 2010) and Proxy Voting By Investment Advisors, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2106 (Jan. 31, 2003).

[7] Ibid at 7-8.

[8] Ibid at 9.

[9] Jon Hale, “Sustainable Funds Weather the First Quarter Better Than Conventional Funds” (April 3, 2020).

The Reimagining of Business Law Today: A Retrospective, 2017–2020

Almost three years ago, the ABA Business Law Section launched businesslawtoday.org, the Section’s premier digital platform for timely content on business law topics. The launch culminated a two-year project, in which I was part of a task force assigned to “reimagine” the Section’s longstanding print magazine, led by indefatigable former Section chair Chris Rockers. Our project ultimately resulted in a complete overhaul of how the Section sources, distributes, features, and promotes articles and other content from across the Section’s committees, and thanks to the leadership of Chris and the hard work of the other members of the task force, we were able to launch an entirely new BLT website in the late fall of 2017. This is my look back at that project and my tenure as BLT Editor-in-Chief, along with some highlights of how BLT may develop further after I hand the job over to new Editor-in-Chief Lisa Stark this September.

Reimagining… Content Distribution and Organization

Part of the goal in shifting to a web-based format was to bring more content to members more frequently and in new formats. Based on market research and member surveys, we decided to focus on providing shorter articles and topical month-in-brief-pieces that could be edited and posted to the site quickly. And we wanted to do this with a fresh look and feel in an easily navigable format, with plenty of links to related relevant content but without too much clutter. With the help of outside designers and strategy consultants hired for the “Reimagine BLT” project, we tried to focus on members’ user experience to make sure readers would easily find what they were looking for and would have plenty of reasons to frequently revisit the site.

When the site launched in November 2017, these were the key elements of the new BLT:

  • 8 Practice Areas and 36 Topics.

Rather than organizing the site around the Section’s 52 substantive committees and relying on each of them to fill an allocated slot with content, we created 8 larger “Practice Areas.” These serve as general silos in which to gather written articles and other content that has some loose connection or logical relationship but not a uniform source. Each Practice Area is organized into 2 or more Topics, with a total of 36 topics across the website. With this content hierarchy, written pieces from many individual members and multiple committees might end up organized in the same section of the site, increasing the diversity of contributors and perspectives and offering an organizational scheme that is intuitive regardless of a reader’s familiarity with the Section’s committee structure.

  • Heightened Author Recognition.

We wanted to make sure the site would highlight its authors and their contributions in a way that would encourage members to continue to write for BLT and that would invite new authors to contribute. At the end of each article, the site features an author photo and the author’s bio (of whatever desired length) with links to his or her other articles and related content.

  • Month-in-Briefs—Short, Timely, Targeted.

Along with short, non-law-review-format articles on all of BLT’s topics, the site launched with its new “Month-in-Brief” pieces. These are very short and timely alerts about recent cases and legislation in each of the Practice Areas, and they are designed to make sure members always find something timely and useful on the site in each of the areas of law they follow.

  • In Front of the Paywall.

Another important decision made at launch: the website is accessible to all. You don’t have to log in as a Section member in order to access nearly all its content, apart from a handful of reprinted articles from the Section’s academic journal, The Business Lawyer. The purpose was to promote Section content to business law practitioners and others beyond our membership. And with nearly half of web traffic to the site coming from organic search (Google and other search engines) over the last year, it is very likely many new readers are seeing the written work of Business Law Section members through BLT.

  • In Living Color.

Not only did the site launch with a new logo, it added color, images, and design elements to BLT. We wanted to make sure the site was modern, fresh, and lively, and we think the images and design elements of the site add to a lively and engaging experience.

Reimagining… Content Elements

Right away we understood something our consultants warned us about: a good and useful website can’t be static—it will always need corrections, additions, and enhancements. BLT leadership has never been without a long and always-changing wish list of additional elements for the site, although we have realized some of our further goals for augmenting user experience and layering in more types of content. These include:

  • Video

In 2018 we began posting interviews of Section authors, speakers, and members recorded from a BLT stage area within the Section lounge at each BLS Spring and Annual meeting. These video interviews picked up where we left off with the old “Member Spotlight” series, composed of written interviews included periodically in the old BLT magazine. We expanded them to include “Author Spotlight” and “Program Spotlight” interviews, highlighting the work of the Section’s prolific authors and program chairs and speakers. Expect more of these interviews and new types of interviews in the months to come.

  • Business of Law

In 2019 we added a new top-level menu to the site, our new “Business of Law” practice area, with underlying topics Pro Bono, Diversity & Inclusion in the Profession, Professional Development, and Law Practice Management. Since the beginning, many Section members had asked for a place on BLT to post content in these areas, and we were happy to add a place for content that many Section committees and members have written about, and cared deeply about, for a long time.

  • Podcasts

Earlier in 2020 the Business Law Section launched its “To the Extent That…” podcast series, and we quickly made a place on BLT where all Section podcasts can be accessed. Look for more additions in the months to come.

Reimagining… Content Promotion and Marketing

We have also expanded the ways in which BLT can be used as a resource for coordinating, promoting, and advertising the Section’s content and the many webinars and events the Section produces. The home page features promotion of upcoming webinars, which are free for Section members, and the site also now features advertisements for Section books.

Moving into the 2020–2021 bar year, our readers can expect to discover more features and more opportunities to engage with the Business Law Section through BLT. We will offer more video content on the site, more access to podcasts and other audio content through the site, and more ways for our committees, sponsors, and advertisers to connect with our members.

…Even more than we imagined!

By this year’s Virtual Section Annual Meeting, Businesslawtoday.org will have reached important milestones: In the 2019–2020 bar year, we will have distributed more content than ever through BLT: around 175 articles, 350 month-in-briefs, and 20 video interviews went live on BLT.

With the high volume we have been able to maintain the high quality… but only because of the incredible efforts of our full time dedicated staff and our stellar lineup of incredible volunteers. Huge thanks, kudos, and much appreciation go out to the Business Section’s Content Guru (because he is o-so-much-more than a mere “content guy”) Rick Paszkiet, aka keeper-of-the-slush-pile, aka breakfaster-in-chief. Rick juggles dozens of book projects and brings record-setting numbers of them to the finish line, while keeping his eye on incoming article proposals and managing a deep pile of unsolicited and solicited submissions, from which pieces are periodically selected, tamed, edited, and posted to the site. Meanwhile, double kudos and millions of thanks to fulltime Section BLT editor par excellence, Sarah Claypoole, who has managed the editorial process across the site from day one in a way that looks seamless to the outside and keeps all the glitches, author mishaps, and editorial challenges at bay. And meanwhile, Sarah has developed an uncanny ability to understand and stay on top of the Section’s content creation process across a multitude of committees and personalities, for which she is a tremendous asset to BLT and the Section.

Thank you very much to our Executive and Managing editors who have continued to source our regular month-in-brief pieces… and for the many times you have simply written them yourselves, and to our regular contributors and Contributing Editors. Your work to source, write, edit and simply turn over month-in-brief pieces along with a slew of stellar articles are what makes this site actually work.

As I complete my term as Editor-in-Chief of Business Law Today, I couldn’t be more confident about the coming transition. As of the Business Law Section’s Virtual Section Annual Meeting this September, my vice-editor-in-chief, Lisa Stark, takes over the Editor-in-Chief role. Lisa is an experienced M&A, corporate, and securities lawyer partner with K&L Gates in Wilmington DE, and she is a co-chair of the Jurisprudence Subcommittee of the Private Equity & Venture Capital Committee of the Business Section. Lisa has been a steadfast and indefatigable vice chair and has personally contributed much private equity, partnerships and M&A content to BLT. Thank you, Lisa, for your tremendous contributions to date, and congrats and good luck as you steer things forward.

It’s in the Mail: Issues Concerning Commercial Contracts in a Time of Delayed Mail

The mail is slowing down. Packages and letters that used to arrive in days are in some cases taking weeks. Data suggests that since the beginning of July, on-time rates for delivery of first-class mail has slipped by 10–30 percent depending on the area and region. Although much of the focus of the media’s coverage concerning these delays has centered around the upcoming 2020 election and questions surrounding funding for the United States Postal Service (USPS), such delays can create serious issues concerning parties’ commercial agreements. Despite the fact that unquestionably more and more transactions are completed through the exchange of scanned and emailed documents, mailing requirements in contractual agreements are still common and remain a part of how business gets done. Many attorneys may not have thought about the “mailbox rule” since their contracts class in law school, so it is worth reexamining during this period of postal uncertainty.

The Mailbox Rule

The mailbox rule is a common-law concept of contract law that governs the time at which an offer is considered accepted. Section 63 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that “[u]nless the offer provides otherwise, . . . an acceptance made in a manner and by a medium invited by an offer is operative and completes the manifestation of mutual assent as soon as put out of the offeree’s possession, without regard to whether it ever reaches the offeror . . . .” In other words, an offer is accepted the moment it is placed in the mail. The rule notably excludes option contracts by stipulating “an acceptance under an option contract is not operative until received by the offeror.” Further, although an offer may be revoked at any time prior to acceptance, revocation is typically effective only at the time of receipt, whereas an acceptance is effective upon dispatch.[1]

Issues That May Arise

The Buchbinder Tunick & Co. v. Manhattan Nat’l Life Ins. Co. matter out of New York provides an interesting example of the legal and factual issues that can be at play concerning mailings. The case involved whether an 80-year-old insured in failing health, after falling behind on his insurance payments, timely mailed premium payments to extend his life insurance despite the insurance carrier’s notice of cancelation.

On August 28, Manhattan National Life Insurance Company sent Mr. Buchbinder a letter that it would go on to claim was a reminder that unless he sent payment by August 31, his life insurance policy would be canceled. However, the court rejected the claim that the letter was a reminder based on ambiguous language in the letter that could have been read to extend Mr. Buchbinder’s time to pay for 31 days based off the standard mailing time between New York and Ohio. The court reasoned that because the expected mailing time of the August 28th letter was five days, the letter could not have been intended as a reminder because it would not have been received by the insured until after expiration of his time to make the payment. Accordingly, the court determined the letter was in fact an offer to provide the insured additional time to keep his insurance by making a payment within the next 31 days.

However, after the offer letter, the insurance company’s system autogenerated an additional letter on September 17 canceling the insureds policy for nonpayment. Although the court found that the September 17 letter qualified as a revocation of the prior August 28 offer, on September 24 the insured mailed his premium check, thus accepting the August 28 offer under the mailbox rule. Without a clear answer in the record, the case was remanded to the trial court to answer the factual question of whether the insured received the insurance company’s September 17 revocation, which unlike acceptance of an offer, became effective only upon receipt.

Accordingly, whether the carrier was able to cancel coverage would turn on whether the carrier could prove when it mailed the revocation and, more importantly, when it was received by the insured. Although what ultimately occurred to Mr. Buchbinder’s policy does not appear available in the public record, it is easy to see the uphill battle the insurer would have if this played out in today’s climate. With reports suggesting that as much as 30 percent of first-class mail is delayed, a party may be able to present a compelling case against presuming standard delivery times and that delivery was made by a certain date.

Although things have probably not yet reached a point where courts will bring into question the longstanding doctrine of presumption of regularity, which requires a court to presume a letter or notice that is mailed is received by the addressee, such presumption may become open to attack if conditions worsen. In Republic of Sudan v. Harrison[2], the U.S. Supreme Court found that mail must be sent to a foreign minister’s office in his home country, not the embassy on U.S. soil, to be effective. The Court relied on section 66 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which lays out the standards to ensure that acceptance is actually made upon dispatch. Outside of the “properly addressed” requirement relied on by the Court, section 66 offers insight into “other precautions” that may be relevant in light of recent concerns with the management of USPS:

The other precautions to be taken depend on what is ordinarily observed to insure safe transmission of similar messages. In cases of acceptance by mail, the postal regulations are ordinarily controlling on such matters as the necessity for prepayment of postage. In unusual circumstances, however, as when the mails are stopped by war, reasonable diligence may require more than compliance with postal regulations. Unless the offeror manifests a contrary intention, an acceptance is not effective on dispatch if the offeree knows or has reason to know that it will not reach the offeror.

Accordingly, if the trend of issues with the USPS continues or worsens, arguments may become available that current issues amount to “unusual circumstances” where mailing alone is inadequate.

What To Do?

Although the first answer that comes to mind is to not use the USPS, it is important for businesses to check the specific language in any contract to determine whether a specific method of delivery is required. This is particularly true in the case of insurance agreements, leases, and mortgage contracts, which often contain antiquated boilerplate language. These provisions must be strictly complied with because courts still regularly hold that delivery and notice provisions must be followed in accordance with the specific terms of the agreement.[3]

With that said, there are still some simple steps parties can take to protect themselves:

  • Review your agreements and ensure you understand any method of transmission requirements.
  • Where the agreement provides for methods beyond the USPS, use those methods.
  • Document your mailings: if you are mailing a document that must be sent by first-class mail, additionally send an email providing a copy of the document and memorializing that it was mailed that day.
  • Avoid sending offers and revocations that are not effective until receipt by mail and instead use means of instant communication where available.
  • Ensure new agreements do not limit the means of notice to the USPS and modify existing agreements to allow for alternative means.
  • Expect delays in receiving mailed materials and do not take adverse action until a reasonable time has passed.

Until the issues with the USPS are resolved, attorneys and businesses should take extra precautions to ensure they are protected.


[1] See e.g., Buchbinder Tunick & Co. v. Manhattan Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 219 A.D.2d 463, 466 (1st Dep’t 1995).

[2] Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 139 S. Ct. 1048, 1057 (2019)

[3] See e.g., JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Nellis, 122 N.Y.S.3d 673 (2d Dep’t 2020) (“The plaintiff similarly failed to establish, prima facie, that it mailed a notice of default to the defendant by first-class mail as required by the terms of the mortgage as a condition precedent to acceleration of the loan.”).

Individual Chapter 11 Cases Under New Subchapter V

The Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (SBRA),[1] effective February 19, 2020, has created timely opportunities for individuals to confirm a Chapter 11 plan. Prior to the enactment of this legislation, individuals who did not qualify for Chapter 13, generally because their debts exceeded statutory limits, were forced to use the business reorganization provisions in Chapter 11. These provisions subjected individuals to the cramdown requirements of the absolute priority rule and made it difficult for individual debtors to confirm a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization. Thankfully, however, mere months before the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress passed the SBRA and eliminated the absolute priority rule for qualifying small businesses, which can include individuals.

The absolute priority rule was derived under Chapter X of the Chandler Act, which was the predecessor to the Bankruptcy Code enacted in 1978.[2] Under the Bankruptcy Code, the absolute priority rule generally applies when a class of unsecured creditors did not vote in favor of the plan treatment (cramdown) and required the debtor to pay in full the allowed unsecured claims of the rejecting class if any junior interests, such as equity holders, were retaining their interest.[3] In the case of an individual, the Supreme Court held in Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers[4] that the individual debtor should be regarded as an equity class, junior to unsecured creditors. This made it extremely difficult for an individual to confirm a Chapter 11 plan unless the creditors consented or the creditors were receiving full payment. Alternatively, the debtor could perhaps propose a new value plan to get around the absolute priority rule and retain their interest in their property, but such plans were difficult because the Supreme Court required significant new value and monies’ worth up front, and a promise to provide future labor was not enough to qualify as new value.[5]

Congress confirmed that the absolute priority rule applied to individual debtors through the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).[6] This legislation appeared to make significant changes for individuals in Chapter 11 cases by acknowledging that individuals were subject to the absolute priority rule, but it did provide an exception: “in a case in which the debtor is an individual, the debtor may retain property included in the estate under section 1115 . . . .” Section 1115, in turn, added to property of the estate in an individual Chapter 11 case income the debtor earned post-petition, thus making the individual Chapter 11 case similar to a Chapter 13 case. The big advantage was that there is no debt limit in Chapter 11; thus, the individual could confirm a plan by satisfying the requirements of section 1129(a)(15). This provision permitted a plan to be approved when the debtor paid his or her “projected disposable income” to be accumulated over a 60-month period.

Although insolvency professionals welcomed the new provisions under section 1129(a)(15), the confirmation requirements were still subject to the remaining confirmation requirements under section 1129(a), thus requiring the acceptance of creditors (contrary to Chapter 13), and when that acceptance was not forthcoming, the individual debtor was still subject to the absolute priority rule when a class of unsecured creditors objected to the plan. This would not have been a major obstacle, however, if the exception to the absolute priority rule that was added by BAPCPA had been interpreted broadly. Unfortunately for individual debtors, the failure of Congress to make it clear in any legislative history when BAPCPA was enacted that Congress intended the exception to be interpreted broadly (thus eliminating the absolute priority rule as it applied to individuals) created concerns among the circuit courts that the exception should be interpreted narrowly to only except the debtor’s post-petition income that was added by section 1115.[7] Consequently, in a normal Chapter 11, individual debtors are unable to confirm a plan that allows them to retain their nonexempt property over the objection of unsecured creditors unless such objecting unsecured creditors are paid in full. Alternatively, individual debtors can retain their nonexempt property if they convince the court that they are able to provide “new value” that will circumvent the requirements of the absolute priority rule. Given that the requirements of the new value are rather stringent, this is rarely achieved.

Congress appears to have come to the rescue of individual debtors through the passage of the SBRA. This statute created a new Subchapter V within Chapter 11 that is available to electing small-business debtors who have secured and unsecured debts less than $2,725,625.00. Given that there is no exclusion for individuals, these provisions will apply to individuals, provided that their debts are primarily business debts, they otherwise fit within the debt limits, and they are “engaged in commercial or business activities.”[8] In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress increased the debt limit for Subchapter V cases to $7,500,000.00 for one year, ending March 27, 2021.[9]

Although there are many aspects of the new Subchapter V that are beneficial to an individual debtor, the most significant is the elimination of the absolute priority rule. The new Subchapter V does not include a limitation on equity retaining ownership if a class of allowed unsecured claims votes against the plan. A debtor may confirm a plan over the objection of an unsecured creditor class so long as (1) all “projected disposable income” of the debtor to be received in a three-year period, or such longer period as the court may approve but not to exceed five years, will be applied to the plan, or (2) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan in the three- to five-year period is not less than the “projected disposable income” of the debtor.[10]

Other advantages of Subchapter V to an individual are as follows:

Plan exclusivity. Only the debtor may file a plan in Subchapter V.[11] Thus, there is no exclusivity period that expires after 120 days like a normal Chapter 11 case,[12] or 180 days in the case of a traditional small business.[13]

Reduced administrative expenses. There are no U.S. trustees fees in a Subchapter V case,[14] thus reducing the administrative expenses to the debtor. Further, unless the bankruptcy court orders otherwise, a committee of creditors may not be appointed in a Subchapter V case and the individual debtor will not have to pay the expenses of such committee.[15]

Easier retention of counsel. In a typical Chapter 11, the court will not approve retention of the debtor’s counsel if they are owed any amounts for prebankruptcy services.[16] Subchapter V has a special rule and allows retention of counsel or other professionals so long as the debtor’s prepetition fees do not exceed $10,000.[17] Thus, attorneys who provide services to an individual will still be able to represent the individual in the bankruptcy case even though there are some fees owed when the Subchapter V case is filed.

Modification of certain mortgages on principal residences. The restrictions on modification of a mortgage on the debtor’s residence were modified by Subchapter V to enable the debtor to modify such claims when the proceeds of the relevant mortgage were “used primarily in connection with the small business of the debtor.”[18] Although most mortgages are typically purchase money security interests and would still be prohibited from modification, this unique provision in Subchapter V will allow mortgage modification if the individual debtor had used a majority of the value in the debtor’s home to finance business operations.[19]

Limited post-confirmation plan modifications. Only the debtor may modify a plan after confirmation in Subchapter V.[20] This is a distinct advantage because section 1127(e) permits the trustee, U.S. trustee, or holders of an allowed unsecured claim to seek a modification to increase the amount of payments or extend or reduce the time for payments in a normal individual Chapter 11 case. Limiting plan modification to only the debtor excludes these parties from the threat of increasing plan payments when the debtor’s operations turn out to be more favorable than projected when the plan was confirmed. On the other hand, if the debtor’s projections were too generous, the debtor has the power to seek modification in order to reduce plan payments in a Subchapter V case. This modification right expires upon “substantial consummation”[21] when the plan is a consensual plan approved pursuant to section 1191(a), but can be accomplished at any time after confirmation when the plan is approved over the objection of a class of unsecured creditors pursuant to section 1191(b).

Paying administrative expenses over term of plan. Subchapter V permits the debtor to pay administrative expenses over the life of the plan, provided the plan was approved pursuant to the cramdown provisions of section 1191(b). A plan that is a consensual plan approved under section 1191(a) must provide for the payment of administrative expenses on the effective date of the plan in the same manner as a typical Chapter 11 plan under section 1129(a)(9)(A).[22]

Possibility of early discharge. Subchapter V allows an individual to obtain a discharge on the effective date of the plan, provided the plan was a consensual plan approved under section 1191(a). [23] In a cramdown plan approved under section 1191(b), the debtor’s discharge does not occur until the completion of the plan payments.[24] This latter requirement is similar to the discharge granted under section 1141(d)(5) in a non-Subchapter V Chapter 11 case, subject, however, to the exceptions to dischargeability of certain debts under section 523, which continue to apply to the individual debtor in Subchapter V.[25]

No limitation on cramdown of car loans. Subchapter V does not incorporate the requirements of section 1325(a) (hanging paragraph) that requires a Chapter 13 debtor to pay the full amount of a personal motor vehicle loan incurred within 910 days prior to the bankruptcy filing instead of the value of that collateral that normally is required for a secured claim under section 506(b). This means that the individual in a Subchapter V case will be able to force the vehicle lender to accept payments equal to the value of the vehicle even though the value is less than the full amount of the vehicle loan.

Greater protection of the automatic stay. Subchapter V does not invoke the exceptions to the automatic stay under section 362(n) that applies to a “small business case” that is filed within two years after the confirmation or dismissal of a prior small business case.[26] Thus, an individual in a Subchapter V case may file a second case within two years of the prior case and stay the actions of creditors that were pursuing the debtor.

Although there are many advantages to the Subchapter V for individual debtors, there are certain disadvantages that an individual must consider before heading down this path.

Limitations on eligibility. As previously discussed, there are debt limits for individuals seeking to take advantage of Subchapter V, and not less than 50 percent of the debts at issue must have arisen from the commercial or business activities of the debtor.[27] Furthermore, the debtor must be “engaged in commercial or business activities.” At least one court has ruled that an individual debtor met this requirement because he was “addressing residual business debt” arising from his defunct, closely held companies.[28]

Appointment of Subchapter V trustee. Each Subchapter V case requires the appointment of a trustee.[29] This does not require that the debtor turn over operations to the trustee because the trustee’s duties are similar to a trustee under Chapter 12. The Subchapter V trustee is tasked primarily with assisting the debtor in proposing and confirming a plan as well as making distributions under the plan. The debtor is responsible for the Subchapter V trustee’s fees. When the debtor has proposed a consensual plan, the trustee may be removed upon the substantial consummation of the plan, which generally occurs on or about the effective date of the plan when payments have been initiated to creditors.[30] In a nonconsensual plan, the trustee is responsible for making plan distributions to creditors until the plan is complete. At that time, the trustee will file a final accounting and a final report.

Plan deadlines and other mandatory procedures. A Subchapter V debtor has only 90 days to file a plan. This is a tighter deadline than a typical Chapter 11. Additionally, the court will hold a status conference within 60 days after the order of relief, and two weeks prior to that status conference the debtor must file a notice with the court explaining the debtor’s progress in confirming a consensual plan and providing such other information as the court may require.[31] This cuts in half the timing requirement for filing a plan in a small business case as provided under section 1121(e). A debtor may obtain an extension of the plan filing deadline, but the grounds for such an extension are limited under the statute to circumstances beyond the debtor’s control.[32]

Remedies upon plan default. Section 1191(c) requires the plan to provide appropriate remedies to protect the holders of claims in interest in the event that planned payments are not made. The normal requirements under Chapter 11 are merely that the plan is feasible pursuant to section 1129(a)(11), which does not require remedies to protect creditors. The only way to avoid this requirement is to convince the court with certainty that the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan. Meeting such a standard is unlikely unless the plan already proposes a liquidation and more certain distributions to creditors. Any payment plan based on projected disposable income is not likely to have that certainty. The advantage provided to creditors by this provision is that when a plan includes a remedy, the creditor will have good grounds to force the debtor to pursue those remedies in lieu of dismissal of the Chapter 11 case or subsequent new filing of a Chapter 11 case (Chapter 22). It is also likely that courts will not view further reorganization as an adequate remedy, but rather may force a liquidation to protect the interests of creditors.

Despite these burdens on debtors, it is clear the advantages to eligible individuals under Subchapter V, particularly the elimination of the absolute priority rule, will make it substantially easier for individuals to confirm Chapter 11 plans. The plan will not depend on approval of an impaired class, and the debtor may retain assets without paying unsecured claims in full. These benefits, in tandem with the higher debt limits under the CARES Act through March 2021, will likely increase the number of individuals eligible for and taking advantage of the new Subchapter V. No doubt the current economic decline caused by the COVID-19 pandemic will result in a surge of debtors in need of bankruptcy protection. Thus, Subchapter V could not have been enacted at a more opportune time.


[1] Pub. L. No. 116-54, 133 Stat. 1079 (2019).

[2] H.R. Rep. No. 959, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 413 (1978).

[3] 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).

[4] 485 U.S. 197, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988) (case involving an individual farmer).

[5] See Norwest, 485 U.S. at 202–06, 108 S. Ct. at 966–68 (rejecting argument that the “sweat equity” of the farmer after confirmation of the plan was sufficient new value for the farmer to retain his interest in farm).

[6] Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 § 321 (Apr. 20, 2005).

[7] See Zachary v. Calif. Bank & Trust, 811 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2016); In re Ice House America, LLC, 751 F.3d 734 (6th Cir. 2014); In re Lively, 717 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2013); In re Stephens, 704 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2013); In re Maharja, 449 B.R. 484 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011), aff’d , 681 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2012); In re Woodward, 537 B.R. 894 (8th Cir. BAP 2015).

[8] 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D) (defining “small-business debtor”).

[9] CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (Mar. 27, 2020).

[10] 11 U.S.C. § 1191(b), (c).

[11] Id. § 1189(a).

[12] Id. § 1121(d)(2).

[13] Id. § 1121(e).

[14] 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6).

[15] See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102(a)(3), 1181(b).

[16] See id. § 327(a) (authorizing retention of professional persons “that do not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are disinterested persons”); id. § 101(14) (defining “disinterested person” as a person that “is not a creditor”).

[17] Id. § 1195.

[18] Id. § 1190(3).

[19] The recent case of In re Ventura, 2020 WL 1867898 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2020), identified certain factors to consider before allowing modification of a mortgage on a principal residence in Subchapter V.

[20] 11 U.S.C. § 1193.

[21] Id. § 1101(2).

[22] Id. § 1191(e).

[23] Id. § 1192.

[24] Id. § 1181(c).

[25] See id. §§ 523(a), 1141(d), 1181(c), and 1192(2).

[26] Id. § 362(n)(1).

[27] Id. § 101(51D).

[28] See In re Wright, 2020 WL 2193240 (Bankr. D.S.C. Apr. 27, 2020).

[29] Id. § 1183.

[30] Id. § 1101(2).

[31] Id. § 1188(c).

[32] Id. § 1188(b).