Delineating the Implied Covenant and Providing for “Good Faith”

We begin with ULLCA, because the answer to the delineation question appears straightforward under the uniform act. This column quotes from ULLCA (2013), text and comments, but the analysis applies equally to ULLCA (2006), sometimes informally referred to as “RULLCA” or “Re-ULLCA,” and also to ULLCA (1996), the first uniform LLC act.

ULLCA (2013), Section 105(c)(6) states that, while an operating agreement may not “eliminate the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing under Section 409(d),” the agreement “may prescribe the standards, if not manifestly unreasonable, by which the performance of the obligation is to be measured.” The official comment provides several examples, including this one:

EXAMPLE: The operating agreement of a manager-managed LLC gives the manager “sole discretion” to make various decisions. The agreement further provides: “Whenever this agreement requires or permits a manager to make a decision that has the potential to benefit one class of members to the detriment of another class, the manager complies with Section 409(d) of [this act] if the manager makes the decision with:

a. the honest belief that the decision:

i. serves the best interests of the LLC; or
ii. at least does not injure or otherwise disserve those interests; and

b. the reasonable belief that the decision breaches no member’s rights under this agreement.”

This provision “prescribes[s] the standards by which the performance of the [Section 409(d)] obligation is to be measured.”

Under Delaware law, the delineation question requires a different and more complicated analysis. The conceptual answer is “not possible,” but the practical answer is “can do.” Under Delaware law, the implied covenant acts as a special type of “gap filler,” a process of interpolation implied by law: “An implied covenant claim … [asks] what the parties would have agreed to themselves had they considered the issue in their original bargaining positions at the time of contracting.” Gerber v. Enter. Prods. Holdings, LLC, 67 A.3d 400, 418 (Del. 2013) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

By its nature, this approach is invariable. The law supplies the gap-filling methodology, which no agreement has the power to change. For instance, an operating agreement may not provide that “a manager’s act in any manner pertaining to this agreement satisfies the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing if the person asserting a breach of the implied covenant had at the time of contracting reason to know that the agreement could reasonably be interpreted to authorize the act.”

However, a Delaware operating or partnership agreement can reign in the implied covenant by avoiding gaps. Consider the above example from the ULLCA comments, revised as follows:

Whenever this agreement requires or permits a manager to make a decision that has the potential to benefit one class of members to the detriment of another class, the manager complies with Section 409(d) of [this act] the manager’s decision is binding and breaches no duty to the company or its members, if the manager makes the decision with:

a. the honest belief that the decision:

i. serves the best interests of the LLC; or
ii. at least does not injure or otherwise disserve those interests; and

c. the reasonable belief that the decision breaches no member’s rights under this agreement.”

Although “[n]o contract, regardless of how tightly or precisely drafted it may be, can wholly account for every possible contingency,” Allen v. El Paso Pipeline GP Co., L.L.C., No. CIV.A. 7520-VCL, 2014 WL 2819005, at *11 (Del. Ch. June 20, 2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted), opportunistic conduct brings Delaware’s implied covenant into play. The ULLCA example as revised leaves scant, if any, room for such conduct. Thus, while under Delaware law “safe harbor” provisions cannot be upheld, in the language of ULLCA (2013) § 105(c)(6), as “prescrib[ing] the standards …by which the performance of the obligation [of good faith and fair dealing] is to be measured,” safe harbor provisions can render the implied covenant inapposite if carefully drafted and sensibly invoked.

For example, in the author’s opinion, it was not sensible to rely on a Special Approval valuation process that had ignored two assets of the company, which were arguably quite substantial. Gerber v. Enter. Prod. Holdings, LLC, 67 A.3d 400, 422–23 (Del. 2013).

Care is also required when an operating or partnership agreement imposes an express requirement of “good faith.” Left undefined, the phrase is a minefield for parties and a godsend for litigators—as exemplified in Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund v. DV Realty Advisors LLC (“Policemen’s Annuity”). The case arose from a limited partnership agreement that permitted the limited partners to remove the general partner:

without Cause by an affirmative vote or consent of the Limited Partners holding in excess of 75% of the [Limited] Partnership Interests then held by all Limited Partners; provided that consenting Limited Partners in good faith determine that such removal is necessary for the best interest of the [Limited] Partnership.

The agreement did not, however, define the term. Policemen’s Annuity No. CIV.A. 7204-VCN, 2012 WL 3548206 at *12-13 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2012).

Both the Chancery Court and Delaware Supreme Court addressed the definitional omission, but each used a different approach and reached a different definitional conclusion. The Chancery Court, 2012 WL 3548206, at *13, used an a fortiori analysis to resolve the case without actually deciding on a definition:

The conduct of the Limited Partners in this case does not approach the sort of unreasonable conduct that is necessarily undertaken in bad faith. A test is nevertheless required; the Limited Partners’ conduct must be analyzed under some rubric. … The definition prescribed in [Delaware’s Uniform Commercial Code] § 1–201(20) [“honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing”] is at least as broad of a definition of good faith as that applied to contracts at common law, and… the Limited Partners can meet the [the broader] definition…. Thus, the Limited Partners necessarily satisfy Delaware’s common law definition of good faith as applied to contracts, which is the definition of good faith that the Court presumes was adopted in [the limited partnership agreement].

The Delaware Supreme Court flatly rejected the lower’s court methodology, substituting a standard far more easily met. Relying on one of its own decisions, the court held that the limited partners’ “determination will be considered to be in good faith unless the Limited Partners went ‘so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith.’” DV Realty Advisors LLC v. Policemen’s Annuity & Ben. Fund of Chicago, 75 A.3d 101, 110 (Del. 2013) (quoting Brinckerhoff v. Enbridge Energy Co., Inc., 67 A.3d 369, 373 (Del.2013)).

An Oregon case provides another example. U.S. Genes v. Vial, 923 P.2d 1322 (Ore. App. 1996) concerned a contract that expressly required the parties “to engage in good faith and in fair dealing with respect to the other at all times during the term of this agreement.” The contract did not define the “good faith and … fair dealing,” and the trial court decided “to treat the express good faith provision in the contract as equivalent to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is implied in every contract.” The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, stating that that decision was “[t]he source of the court’s error” and holding that the “express and implied covenants of good faith cannot be equated.”

That holding makes good sense; equating the express with the implied would render the express term surplus. However, half a page further in the decision, the appellate court interpreted the express term according to one scholar’s famous gloss on the implied covenant.

The moral of these stories is clear—never use the phrase “good faith” in an operating or partnership agreement without carefully defining the term.

An Interview with Kevin Johnson

 

Kevin Johnson spent nearly 20 years in the banking and financial services industry, so when he went back to law school, he knew exactly what kind of law he wanted to practice and where he wanted to work. He’s now an attorney in the Administrative Law Division of the National Credit Union Administration, with a focus on privacy law. Prior to this, he worked as a banking consultant and served as the Financial Services Director of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in the Birmingham branch.

He’s been very involved with the ABA, serving as the National Chair of the ABA Law Student Division, for which he received the ABA Law Student Division Gold Key Award, in honor of his high degree of service, dedication and leadership.

*     *     *

For many years, you worked in the banking and financial services industry as a consultant. And, prior to that with the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta as a Financial Service Director. What prompted you to go back to school and get a law degree?

I originally worked for commercial banks in various capacities. And, after a number of years I decided to take an opportunity with the Federal Reserve Bank. One of the things that led me to seek a law degree was the fact that I was responsible for operations at the Fed that correlated directly to a number of banking laws and regulations. I found myself always consulting the regulations that guided the Fed in its operations and its philosophical approach to banking and financial services. After a number of years of this, I thought: if you can’t beat them, you might as well join them.

During law school, you worked as an intern at the National Credit Union Administration. Why did you choose this government entity and how were you able to secure a position at such a well-known agency?

It actually came about while I was at an ABA meeting. Someone suggested to me that I apply to the NCUA, which I promptly did. I received a call while I was in class in law school, and they offered me the opportunity to fly up to D.C. and spend the summer working as the only legal intern that year.

What did you like about it, because after law school, you accepted a full-time position at that agency?

I was in my element. I focused my entire law degree and my career on banking and financial services, because I knew that’s what I wanted to do. My intent was always to go back to a financial institution regulator. On my list I had the Fed, the NCUA, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and the FDIC. The NCUA happened to be the one that gave me the opportunity when I came up here for the summer. They gave me lots of very meaningful work. I developed serious relationships with my colleagues, I felt comfortable here, and I was treated as a valued member of the team. That had a lot to do with my making the decision to come back.

You’re currently an attorney in the Office of General Counsel, with a focus on privacy law. Can you expand on what you’re doing in this area of law?

For all federal executive agencies, certain laws and regulations exist in regards to how we collect, maintain, share, protect, and destroy the information that we collect from the public. As you can imagine, a lot of that data is extremely sensitive, from Social Security numbers to banking information, all of the different categories of personally, identifiable information.

I serve my agency as a privacy attorney, helping to build and maintain an effective and efficient privacy program that allows us to continue collecting this information, but also doing so in a way that is compliant with the laws and the regs. And that it’s protected from the increased cyber threats that exist in our environment today.

The crux of my work is basically helping to maintain the privacy program and make sure that we’re compliant with the Privacy Act of 1974, the E-Government Act of 2002, and the whole host of other Office of Management and Budget guidance, presidential directives, and executive orders.

It feels like this would be a constantly shifting landscape. Is that right?

That’s absolutely right. When I started in privacy, our agency as well as the other financial institution regulators, were coming off the financial crisis that kicked off the recession. I was asked if I wanted to become involved with the privacy side of things. I jumped at the chance, because I had already developed a keen interest in privacy, and privacy-related issues. Little did I know that it was going to take off the way it has. It has led to so many different opportunities and a wonderful learning experience.

Prior to being in the administrative law division, you served as a trial attorney at NCUA. What kind of cases did you handle?

I spent a little more than a year in enforcement litigation before I switched over to the admin. law and the privacy area. While I was in enforcement and litigation, I mostly dealt with issues such as financial services prohibitions. Basically that involves working with individuals who, for whatever reason, our agency felt were no longer fit to serve in this particular industry. If you look at our website, and if you filter through the correspondence that comes out of this agency, we regularly report on individuals who, for whatever reason, whether it was wrongdoing or convictions of a certain type, can no longer serve in the financial services industry. I also worked with conservatorships of failing or failed credit unions. I also did some work with the fraud hotline, chasing down issues that came to us, people reporting different things that go on in the credit union system that need our attention.

How has your background in finance helped you as an attorney?

It helped me hit the ground running. It was also one of the major factors that contributed to me being hired at NCUA. The folks here didn’t have to train me on certain aspects of financial services because not only did I have the knowledge, but I had been involved in many issues that we face. As a result, I was able to contribute to the team at a higher level at a much faster pace.

You worked at the Federal Reserve in Atlanta, including serving as the Director of Operations. What stands out for you from that experience?

The leadership aspect of my career blossomed there. It gave me a better understanding of how to lead people, how to lead through change and adversity, how to lead during times when some very important decisions have to be made. I developed and I solidified my management style there. It was a difficult environment to lead in, but at the same time, very rewarding.

What advice would you give to someone who has to lead during a challenging time?

The main thing I took away was that each member of my team is an individual, and different things motivate different people. Before leadership at the Fed, I’d used a blanket approach. I handled everybody pretty much the same way. I didn’t take the time out to really understand or tap into the individuality of each member of my team. At the Fed, I started getting to know each person, understanding what motivates each individual, treating each individual in a way that’s beneficial to both the organization and to that person. I was able to get much better results using that approach.

What advice would you give to a young attorney who’s just starting out?

I’m currently mentoring a number of young attorneys. Figure out what your interests are. The quicker you narrow your desired areas of practice, the better off you’ll be, because you’ll be able to focus on developing the expertise in whatever those areas of interest happen to be.

Is it a matter of trying different things?

I don’t know if it is as much trying different things as it is knowing yourself and knowing what makes you tick. My advice comes more from an introspective approach. Know what you’re interested in, know what things make you tick, what things excite you, and then, project outward from that point.

You’ve been very involved with the ABA, including serving as the National Chair of the ABA Law Student Division. What made you want to get involved and how have you benefited?

Before I went back to law school, I realized, of course, that I had been out of school for a while. I considered myself a nontraditional student. So, I was apprehensive about going back to law school after having been out of school for so long. I did some research on the organizations that provided resources to help students like me to reacclimate themselves to full-time study. I came across this organization called the Council on Legal Education Opportunity (CLEO). They take in students who are accepted to law school and they start building a foundation, before you start school.

I attended a program in Atlanta, and was taught legal writing, and reading and analyzing cases, how to organize your materials, and how to read statutes. It was excellent. When I got back to Birmingham after that particular program, I did some research because I was so impressed. I found out that the American Bar Association is one of the major benefactors of CLEO.

From there, I started researching the ABA and, lo and behold, I found out it’s one of the largest professional organizations in the world. I knew I needed to get involved. Then I found out they had a law student division. I made my decision to get involved with the ABA before I even enrolled in law school.

As soon as I enrolled at the University Alabama School of Law, I paid my $25 fee, and I became a member of the ABA as a law student. From that point, I got involved anyway I could as a student. I participated in conference calls. I participated in opportunities to help draft comment letters on certain banking regulations. At that time I was, of course, a member of the Banking Law Committee. I assisted with a lot of those things, and it was just very beneficial for me to work with and to correspond with attorneys who were actually doing what I aspired to do.

Did it help you stay motivated during law school because you saw what was out there?

Absolutely. When I got the opportunity to apply for a CLEO scholarship, sponsored by the ABA Business Law Section, I jumped at the chance. I won the scholarship. Basically, this scholarship provided an opportunity for me to attend the Spring Meeting, where I was assigned two mentors. That’s where I transitioned into hyperdrive, if you will, as far as being involved in the ABA.

You’ve received many awards. Is there one that stands out for you?

Probably the most meaningful is the Gold Key Award from the Law Student Division after I served my year as Chair. That was a really, really huge honor.

What do you do for fun?

My wife and I have five beautiful children. They range in age from 11 all the way down to two and half. We have two-and-a-half-year old twins, so they are my hobby. I do have a son who is a golfer, so I spend a lot of time playing golf and shuttling him around to his golfing activities and tournaments. I did my undergraduate work at University of South Carolina, in Columbia, South Carolina, and I attended law school at the University of Alabama School of Law in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, so there are a lot of SEC sports that happen around our household, centered around those two programs.

Anything else you’d like to add?

My involvement in the American Bar Association has paid off for me in an infinite number of ways. From colleagues and the relationships I’ve developed to the meaningful work that we’ve done within our section and within the association as a whole. I’ve enjoyed the opportunities to mentor other students who are eager to learn and eager to navigate the legal industry. I would recommend it to anyone.

Thank you so much!

Independence Issues in the Entrepreneurial Ecosystem

The Delaware Supreme Court decision in Sandys v. Pincus, 2016 WL 7094027, at *1 (Del. Dec. 5, 2016) (Zynga) has raised questions regarding well-established legal precedent and business practices that are recognized as common in the venture capital and entrepreneurial communities. Although Zynga and other decisions regarding director independence reveal the Delaware judiciary’s focus on certain issues, including close friendships and repeat-player networks, those cases do not suggest a sea change in Delaware law. Zynga does, however, raise the question of whether Delaware courts have identified an ecosystem of entrepreneurialism in which these issues bear unique significance. Some clues might lie in the recent director independence analyses in Rux v. Meyer, C.A. No. 11577-CB (Del. Ch. Nov. 18, 2016) (Sirius XM), Greater Pa. Carpenters’ Pension Fund v. Giancarlo, 135 A.3d 77 (Del. 2016) (Imperva), aff’g C.A. No. 9833-VCP (Del. Ch. Sept. 2, 2015) (Imperva Chancery Decision), and Del. Cty. Empls. Ret. Fund v. Sanchez, 124 A.3d 1017 (Del. 2015) (Sanchez Energy).

The Zynga Litigation

Zynga is a social-gaming technology company that was founded and controlled by Mark Pincus. The Zynga litigation began with a decision by the Zynga board of directors (the Zynga Board) to grant certain directors, including Pincus, exceptions from stock transfer restrictions immediately before releasing negative earnings data that resulted in a sharp drop in the company’s stock price. A Zynga stockholder brought suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery asserting that the Zynga directors had breached their fiduciary duties, and the Zynga Board moved to dismiss for his failure to make a litigation demand under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1. The plaintiff asserted that he should be excused from making demand on the Zynga Board and permitted to institute derivative litigation because a majority of the directors were not independent of Pincus. The litigation was assigned to Chancellor Andre Bouchard as Sandys v. Pincus, 2016 WL 769999 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2016), who found that a majority of the Zynga directors were disinterested and independent of Pincus and, accordingly, held that demand was not excused. The Zynga stockholder appealed the chancellor’s decision to the Delaware Supreme Court.

On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reviewed Chancellor Bouchard’s decision de novo and reached a split decision with a four-justice majority reversing the chancellor’s decision, and Justice Valihura issuing a dissent in favor of affirming the chancellor’s decision. The court’s decision and the dissent repeatedly noted the factual specificity of the litigation stating, “This is a close call.” This repeated word of caution, as well as the court’s repeated admonition of plaintiff-appellant’s counsel for failing to develop the record through investigative tools, might suggest that Zynga is expected to have limited import going forward.

However, the court also explained that its holding—i.e., that the Zynga directors could not consider the litigation demand independently of Pincus’s influence—was based on a “reality” of the court’s findings. The court stated, “But, our courts cannot blind themselves to that reality when considering whether a director on a controlled company board has other ties to the controller beyond her relationship at the controlled company.” (Emphasis added). That “reality include[d] that: Gordon and Doerr are partners at Kleiner Perkins, which controls 9.2% of Zynga’s equity; Kleiner Perkins is also invested in One Kings Lane, a company co-founded by Pincus’s wife; and, Hoffman and Kleiner Perkins are both invested in Shopkick, and Hoffman serves on its board with another Kleiner Perkins partner.” The court concluded, “But, the reality is that firms like Kleiner Perkins compete with others to finance talented entrepreneurs like Pincus, and networks arise of repeat players who cut each other into beneficial roles in various situations.” (Emphasis added).

The “reality” in Zynga comprised both factual findings that certain directors shared an airplane and coinvested in other businesses, and the observation that the Zynga directors operated in, and had substantial interests inextricably linked to, their own ecosystem of close friendships and repeat-players of serial entrepreneurs and sources of private financing. The court explained that this “reality” of personal relationships was “crucial to commerce and most human relations. But, precisely because of the importance of a mutually beneficial ongoing business relationship, it is reasonable to expect that sort of relationship might have a material effect on the parties’ ability to act adversely toward each other.”

The court’s characterization of this “reality” suggests that the pleaded facts were viewed within a broader context. Three other decisions issued in Delaware around the time of Zynga touch on similar issues in the context of director independence, including close personal friendships and repeat-player networks. An examination of the recent director independence analyses in Sirius XM, Imperva, and Sanchez Energy could supply some guidance regarding whether the court has identified a particular community of co-dependent actors and the rules of such an entrepreneurial ecosystem.

Close, Personal Friendships

In Zynga, Pincus and another director co-owned an airplane. The court held that the appropriate inference from such a unique connection was that they shared a “close, personal friendship.” The court observed that, “owning an airplane together is not a common thing”; therefore, the court drew inferences of an “extremely close, personal bond,” a “most important and intimate friends[hip],” a “partnership in a personal asset,” an “expensive co-investment,” “close cooperation,” and “detailed planning indicative of a continuing, close personal friendship.” In fact, it is suggestive of the type of close, personal relationship that, like family ties, one would expect to heavily influence a human’s ability to exercise impartial judgment.

The Delaware Supreme Court also addressed close, personal friendships in Sanchez Energy. In that case, the court reversed Vice Chancellor Glasscock’s decision that a majority of the Sanchez Energy board of directors was independent in its determination to reject a stockholder’s litigation demand. Among its holdings, reached on de novo review, the court concluded that a director was not independent of the Sanchez Energy chairman, who was also the largest stockholder at the company, where the director and the director’s brother earned a substantial proportion of their income. The court found that a buttress to this economic relationship was a “deeper human friendship[] . . . that would have the effect of compromising a director’s independence.” The court found the director to have been “close friends with an interested party for a half century.” The court explained, “Close friendships of that duration are likely considered precious by many people, and are rare. People drift apart for many reasons, and when a close relationship endures for that long, a pleading stage inference arises that it is important to the parties.”

The court in Sanchez Energy suggested that close, personal friendships could support an allegation that a director is not independent for excusal of a litigation demand. This holding was limited by the additional economic relationship and the unusually long duration of the friendship. In Sirius XM, however, Chancellor Bouchard encountered a relationship of shorter duration and a primarily economic basis.

In Sirius XM, Chancellor Bouchard addressed a similar fact in the context of the Sirius XM board’s approval of the company’s repurchase of outstanding shares not owned by its majority stockholder Liberty Media (which was, in turn, controlled by 47-percent stockholder John Malone), and found that a director was not independent for demand excusal due to the duration of his relationship with Malone. The chancellor examined the implications of a two-decade relationship “interwoven with John Malone’s various interests” and held that it raised a reasonable doubt as to director Vogel’s independence from Malone. In similar phrasing as the Supreme Court’s in Zynga, the chancellor stated, “Significant to my finding is the reality that in almost all of the professional dealings between Vogel and John Malone, Vogel was subordinate to and, it is reasonable to infer, dependent on maintaining John Malone’s good graces.” (Emphasis added.) The “reality” in this case was “exemplified by the fact that John Malone held significant stakes in many of the companies where Vogel served as a senior executive or a director and, it is alleged, appointed Vogel to the position of CEO or to the board of several companies.”

Relationships lasting multiple decades could undermine the “presumptive independence” of a director in a demand analysis. The court in Sanchez Energy may have been presented with a truly extraordinary friendship of 50 years, but the chancellor in Sirius XM came to a similar holding on the basis of a relationship lasting less than half that duration and on much less personal terms.

Repeat-Player Networks

The Supreme Court described the tight web of relationships, which might be characterized as an entrepreneurial ecosystem, in Zynga. In Zynga, the Supreme Court found that “Gordon and Doerr are partners at Kleiner Perkins, which controls 9.2% of Zynga’s equity; Kleiner Perkins is also invested in One Kings Lane, a company co-founded by Pincus’s wife; and, Hoffman and Kleiner Perkins are both invested in Shopkick, and Hoffman serves on its board with another Kleiner Perkins partner.” The Supreme Court explained the importance of relationships in this start-up ecosystem: “Of course, the defendants now argue that the relationships among these directors flowed all in one direction and that it is Pincus who is likely beholden to Gordon, Doerr, and Kleiner Perkins for financing. But, the reality is that firms like Kleiner Perkins compete with others to finance talented entrepreneurs like Pincus, and networks arise of repeat players who cut each other into beneficial roles in various situations.” The court further explained, “There is, of course, nothing at all wrong with that. In fact, it is crucial to commerce and most human relations. But, precisely because of the importance of a mutually beneficial ongoing business relationship, it is reasonable to expect that sort of relationship might have a material effect on the parties’ ability to act adversely toward each other.”

The court stated that, although the Zynga directors were sophisticated businesspeople, the “reality” inferred by the court from the entire situation was that their judgment could be clouded by the effects of a decision on their close relationships and future economic prospects. The court stated, “Causing a lawsuit to be brought against another person is no small matter, and is the sort of thing that might plausibly endanger a relationship.”

Zynga has injected the entrepreneurial ecosystem into considerations of director independence, but the concept arose earlier in 2016. In Imperva, the court affirmed Vice Chancellor Parsons’s dismissal of the stockholder’s complaint and did so by an order on the basis of the vice chancellor’s bench ruling. During colloquy at oral argument with plaintiff-appellant’s counsel, however, Chief Justice Strine expressed skepticism regarding a theory of “incest” in the entrepreneurial ecosystem. Greater Pa. Carpenters’ Pension Fund v. Giancarlo, No. 531, 2015 (Del. Mar. 9, 2016) (oral argument) (Imperva Oral Argument) (electronic video recording available at https://livestream.com/DelawareSupremeCourt/events/4944419/videos/114930292). Although comments during oral argument would not carry precedential weight, the fact that they were made by current members of the court and were aligned with the court’s holding to affirm might provide guidance for understanding the current state of Delaware law. The court’s treatment and framing of the issues could also provide some insight into the evolution of the issue. When compared to the court’s decision in Zynga, this shows the narrow margin and factual specificity in the independence analysis.

In Imperva, Shlomo Kramer was described as a “serial entrepreneur and investor who has had unparalleled success founding and backing data security startups.” The other directors (mostly affiliated with venture capital firms) were alleged to be nonindependent with respect to a decision on whether to permit Kramer to take an alleged corporate opportunity that Kramer wanted for himself because of their repeated investments with Kramer. The chief justice and plaintiff-appellant’s counsel then considered the ramifications of a director’s decision to act adversely toward Kramer.

CHIEF JUSTICE STRINE: I understand. . . . You now have incest. Here’s news; business happens because of relationships. That’s not a good or bad thing. It’s actually a good thing. Human beings form networks. It’s good. Silicon Valley is big. By the way, you know how many former CEOs and former entrepreneurs there are in Silicon Valley? How many cases are there in Silicon Valley where someone had an idea for a company and found themselves on the outs and the so-called angel investors have picked a new CEO? . . . So people in the incestuous family, some people get kicked out of the party, right?

MR. WEINBERGER: Right, but for various reasons. So if the question here is whether any of these individuals experience it. But the question; and I believe this comes from this court’s opinion in Beam. Would these individuals experience a detriment, a detriment by acting adversely to Mr. Kramer, and the answer has to be “yes.”

This colloquy is instructive for its further examination of the issues that were later central to the court’s decision in Zynga, including the allegedly “incestuous” relationships and motivations involved in the entrepreneurial ecosystem.

The chief justice and counsel then continued their colloquy by outlining issues that featured prominently in the Zynga opinion and may be expected to factor into Delaware courts’ independence analyses:

MR. WEINBERGER: Krausz is probably the best example. He is the exemplar. He explains precisely how this works. He’s the partner at U.S. Venture Partners, and he explains in his own words. In 2013, Fortune Magazine asked him about an investment he made alongside Kramer in a company started or founded or co-founded by one of Kramer’s co-founders in Imperva, Mr. Boodaei. And the journalist asked him: How did you hear about this investment in Trusteer? This is a company sold in 2013 to IBM for over $700 million dollars. And Krausz explains it. He says, well, we were investors in Check Point; that’s Kramer’s first startup. He says we invested in Imperva, next Kramer startup. And then he says and I’m quoting, “I’m still on the board of Imperva with Shlomo Kramer. And another Imperva co-founder is Mickey Boodaei who co-founded Trusteer, so I knew both of them.” And then skipping ahead one line to his next quote, “So Shlomo invested in Trusteer’s Series A, and we came in on the Series B as the company’s only BC investor.” So, in other words, because Krausz knows Kramer, has invested in his company, sits on the Imperva board with him, has a strong professional relationship with him, is in this inner ring, he was able to get in on yet another successful investment related to the serial entrepreneur and angel investor, Shlomo Kramer. And that’s the value of the relationship with Kramer, rather. That is why a venture capitalist or a Venture Capital Firm that makes many, many investments, many, if not most, of which will be written off and seeks these outside returns cannot make an objective business decision with respect to Mr. Kramer.

CHIEF JUSTICE STRINE: I get it. So it tends on—you’re saying that periodically their sense is they pay off Kramer by doing unfair things. And that they realize that, overall, they’ve got to just sort of take one for the team and that’s why they’re different than other investors? Because the other thing would be, they invest with Kramer because they think he was a good fiduciary and he runs good businesses. They want to get money out of their investments. They would stop investing with Kramer if he was, you know, not treating them or other investors well. They have a lot of money at stake. What you’re now turning it into is if somebody—if a business person establishes credibility in raising companies then the people who give their equity capital to those ventures, even without any other connection, the fact that they’ve done it more than once renders them, instead of good monitors, because they have a deep equity investment, non-independent?

MR. WEINBERGER: But it’s not just once or twice.

CHIEF JUSTICE STRINE: I understand. . . . You now have incest. Here’s news; business happens because of relationships. That’s not a good or bad thing. It’s actually a good thing. Human beings form networks. It’s good. Silicon Valley is big. By the way, you know how many former CEOs and former entrepreneurs there are in Silicon Valley? . . .

MR. WEINBERGER: . . . Krausz can’t call up his broker and say, “I really like the management of this team, this management team at the company, buy me in on the Series B.” These are private investments. There are very limited opportunities. This is a specific space within this incestuous Silicon Valley and venture capital community, and I don’t mean to keep using the word incestuous, but it’s critical, and context is critical, Your Honor. . . . But just to get back to the thickness of the relationship with Mr. Kramer because these relationships, they absolutely have to be substantial. Just making one or two investments, that doesn’t destroy the director’s impartiality. So we look at the individual circumstances of these people. The people who are venture capitalists, work for venture capital firms, the nature of their business. What is the nature of their business? They’re making the highest-risk investments in pursuit of the highest returns. And these opportunities are very limited. These are private companies. And we allege in the complaint that the opportunities are even fewer now since there’s so much capital. And then you look at Mr. Kramer. What does he provide to these people? He is in this inner ring. He has the access to the best investment. He provides the access, as Mr. Krausz explains. He explains what the value of, as Mr. Kramer says about Ms. Gouw, being his collaborator is. His go-to investor for security is. A member of his team is. And he has the Midas touch. I mean they’re investing in companies, startups, unproven, unknowns. Kramer is the known. So are those facts alone—do those facts alone establish materiality? No. But you look at the repeated pattern of these investors or their firms again and again and again investing in or alongside Mr. Kramer. And we have well-pleaded allegations that these firms have made money in the past with them, at the pleading stage. And we allege stockholdings with Imperva. We allege prices at which these firms would have sold their shares in the company, but at the pleading stage. If you get on the ground floor of a startup investment that ends up hitting it big, becoming a public company, the reasonable inference is that the firm did very well.

CHIEF JUSTICE STRINE: And then the reasonable inference later on, the default position is, because somebody you invested with was a good fiduciary and business person, that when you invest your money substantially in the future and you take on the position as a fiduciary yourself, you will sell out your trust and your own equity position in order to periodically make unfair payments to him so you can take the good with the bad? . . . You get to a specific transaction. Shlomo Kramer wants to do something. He’s been a good guy in the past, made us a lot of money as equity investors. We now have to take it. . . . We got to give Shlomo what he wants now because in the future he’ll be good to us again. This is the periodic bribe for the price of being on the Shlomo team. That’s your theory, right?

(Emphasis added).

The court’s decision to affirm on the basis of Vice Chancellor Parsons’s decision without its own commentary suggests that the court did not agree with plaintiff-appellant’s “theory.” It is also worth placing this finding in the context of the court’s decision: even if the court had held that director Krauz was not independent, the vice chancellor’s decision would not necessarily be reversed because a majority of the Imperva board of directors was independent.

In Imperva, the stockholder-plaintiff also pointed at a specific form of evidence that allegedly demonstrated one director’s entanglement in the entrepreneurial ecosystem. The plaintiff asserted that the website of a director’s new business, showing her with Kramer, was evidence of a repeat-player network that undermined her independence for demand excusal. That director’s website included an endorsement from Kramer which read, “The instant we . . . partnered with [Gouw] as one of our first investors, I knew I had a collaborator I wanted on my team long term. She has a very deep understanding of data security. She gets how mobile and cloud are transforming our business and offers incisive, measured advice to help us make smart moves. We . . . are thrilled she continues to be on our board after our IPO. She is our go to investor for security.” Imperva Chancery Decision at 30. Plaintiff’s counsel argued to the Supreme Court:

MR. WEINBERGER: Look at someone like Gouw who runs a brand-new firm—a brand-new firm that she started in 2014. The very first investment she is on, the very first Series A her firm Aspect Ventures makes, is with Kramer. And Kramer is on her website saying this person is my collaborator. She is my go-to investor for security. She’s a member of my team long term. You know, Kramer is an obscure figure. I’m sure, to us. Certainly is to me. I don’t invest in data security. But if you’re—so let’s take an analogy, but keeping with Venture Capital. Someone like Ms. Gouw, say she’s not operating a data security. She is operating in social media. And Mark Zuckerberg is quoted on her website saying, this person is my collaborator. She’s my go-to investor. She’s a member of my team long term. What more valuable endorsement could a person in that space have? That is communicating to investors the next Facebook. This firm’s in on it. My new firm, we have access to that. We have access to this resource. If you’re an entrepreneur, invest with me. Mark Zuckerberg is going to be part of the network. And that’s what this endorsement from Kramer communicates to potential investors and Aspect Ventures of this new firm, entrepreneurs who are potentially looking to invest with Ms. Gouw and her venture capital firm. Can she make an objective business decision to act contrary to his interest in the specific context? And the answer, we would submit, is “no.”

Imperva Oral Argument at 17:46 (emphasis added).

This argument arose at the end of the plaintiff-appellant’s colloquy with the court and did not receive a direct response from the court. The chief justice’s earlier skepticism and the court’s order affirming on the basis of the vice chancellor’s decision suggest, however, that the court did not view this director’s advertisement of herself as a “member of [Kramer’s] team long term” as evidence of her lack of independence.

When Vice Chancellor Parsons considered this point in the Imperva Chancery Decision, it also failed to find traction regarding the director’s independence. The vice chancellor held (and the Supreme Court affirmed) that the allegation regarding the website endorsement was conclusory, describing the allegations that director (Gouw) lacked independence from Kramer “because aggressively pursuing plaintiff’s claims would jeopardize her chance to participate in what could be Kramer’s next multi-billion-dollar deal relating to a securities start-up. In other words, Gouw’s preferred position in Kramer’s inner circle is extremely valuable.” The vice chancellor held, “On its face, this endorsement of Gouw highlights her professional relationship with Imperva as an expert investor and director, rather than a close personal relationship between Gouw and Kramer, as evidenced by the repeated use of first-person plural pronouns ‘we’ and ‘our.’ In other words, Gouw’s use of the endorsement on her website is meant to communicate to other entrepreneurs her professional strength as an investor in and director of data security start-ups.” On this basis and the further finding “that other entities like Trulia and athenahealth have recognized Gouw’s business acumen and talent also counsels against giving too much importance to Kramer’s endorsement,” Vice Chancellor Parsons found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated Gouw to have lacked independence.

In Sirius XM, however, Chancellor Bouchard addressed a similar fact in the context of the Sirius XM board’s approval of the company’s repurchase of outstanding shares not owned by its majority stockholder Liberty Media (which was, in turn, controlled by 47-percent stockholder John Malone), and found that the director was not independent for demand excusal. The chancellor considered whether Mooney could not be independent from John Malone because Mooney “now runs a consulting business, the success of which is dependent upon his good relationships with his former business partners.” As in Imperva, director Mooney was alleged to have a website advertising “his demonstrated comprehensive winning corporate strategies for companies including Virgin Media and Sirius XM” and that the consulting company “is currently Mooney’s only employer (and therefore chief source of income).” Chancellor Bouchard held, “Being conscious of the significant influence John Malone wields in the media industry and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor, I find that plaintiff has satisfied that standard as to Mooney’s independence based on the factual allegations I’ve discussed.”

Although it will be a close, fact-specific decision in each case, an Internet advertisement of repeat-players, such as Shlomo Kramer or John Malone, may be construed—at least under pleading-stage standards of review—as a sign of membership in a network that comes with line-cutting privileges for “beneficial roles in various situations.” Directors and counsel should be aware that these images are not merely a framed photograph intended to impress clients when they visit a private office space, but a public presentation, and that they are searchable and discoverable by clients as well as plaintiffs and their counsel.

Takeaways

Chancellor Bouchard’s comments regarding Sirius XM directors’ relationships with Malone and the Zynga court’s view on the entrepreneurial ecosystem show a similar focus on the “reality” of those relationships. That broadly contextual approach may suggest that the Delaware judiciary will view allegations as couched in relevant business norms and industry practices, which is shorthanded as “reality.” The uniqueness of this “reality” in the entrepreneurial ecosystem may also have driven the analysis of Zynga director independence. However, the overlap between Malone’s conglomerate businesses and the entrepreneurial ecosystem are not exact, and the similarities to more typical businesses that depend on networks and diversification could suggest a broader application of Zynga going forward. Because personal friendships and overlapping business relationships are relatively common themes, however, corporate practitioners should be cognizant of the Delaware judiciary’s focus on these connections and the fact-driven “reality” of directors’ independence outside of the entrepreneurial ecosystem.

On a more granular level, directors and their counsel should be cognizant of the tangible evidence of these connections that may be produced in litigation. As visible manifestations of a relationship, a shared airplane or web-based endorsement may carry outsized evidentiary weight comparable to meaningful intangibles, such as several decades of close friendship or a career’s worth of economic sustenance. In that regard, the Zynga court made clear that its decision—like most litigation involving analysis of director independence—was factually specific and a “close call.” When read along with Imperva, we can see that the law in this area is evolving slowly and has not disturbed the central tenet of Delaware law, which ensures deference to board decisions made by a clearly independent majority of directors.

Inadvertent Disclosure—Traps Await the Unwary

Assume the following hypothetical:

You are a senior partner at a large international law firm, headquartered in a major metropolitan city. Suddenly, there comes an urgent knock on the door of your corner office. One of the firm’s brightest young associates, upon your wave, comes bursting in and shouts out: “I have incredible news! The other side in our bet-the-company case has produced to us some ‘smoking gun’ documents which will turn the tide of the litigation!” Upon your questioning of the young lawyer, she tells you (i) the “smoking gun” documents reflect privileged communications between the opponent’s board of directors and the company’s attorneys, and (ii) that the materials were undoubtedly produced by mistake. She also tells you that she has looked into the applicable rule of professional responsibility (Rule 4.4(b)), and all that is required is the following: “A lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the document was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.”

What should you, the senior partner, do? Does it depend on the jurisdiction in which you sit? Does it depend on things beyond what the ethics rules say? Does it depend on the court in which the litigation is being waged? Why is one prominent legal academic who called Rule 4.4(b) a “model of clarity” so wrong? The answers to these (and other) questions follow below.

The first question you need to ask yourself is: where am I? Many states do not follow ABA Model Rule 4.4(b). For example, a number of states require that you: (i) stop reading the document; (ii) notify the sender; and (iii) abide by the sender’s instructions. Other states require something less than those three steps. And while some states do in fact follow the ABA Model Rule, still other states have no Rule 4.4(b) at all. This disparate kettle of fish tees up an ethical quandary for any lawyer who has clients beyond just the four corners of the state in which she is licensed: how does she comply with these very different ethical obligations vis-à-vis inadvertent disclosure?

But let us assume you are in a jurisdiction that tracks ABA Model Rule 4.4(b) verbatim (e.g., New York). One thing the young associate did not mention (and perhaps has not read) are the Comments to Rule 4.4(b). And even though the Comments “are intended as guides for interpretation” only (and “the text of each Rule is authoritative”), two key Comments to Rule 4.4(b) have hidden in them two huge red flags. In the fourth sentence of Comment 2, the Rule drafters wrote the following:

Although this Rule does not require that the lawyer refrain from reading or continuing to read the document, a lawyer who reads or continues to read a document that contains privileged or confidential information may be subject to court-imposed sanctions, including disqualification and evidence-preclusion. (emphasis added)

And in the third sentence of Comment 3, the Rule drafters wrote the following:

[S]ubstantive law or procedural rules may require a lawyer to refrain from reading an inadvertently sent document, or to return the document to the sender, or both. (emphasis added)

Thus, if all you read is the “authoritative” Rule, but not the red-flagged Comments, you (the unsuspecting, but rule-compliant) senior partner might be “ethical,” but you could be facing some pretty unhappy consequences for blithely following this “model of clarity” Rule. And this is especially so, given that you are dealing with privileged materials inadvertently produced.

A few years ago, the legal powers that be (with the assistance of Congress) made some changes to protect lawyers who are imperfect in dealing with the production of privileged material. First, the Federal Rules Advising Committee adopted Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(5) (and analogs to it in Rules 16, 33, 34, and 37); and Congress thereafter adopted Rule 502 (b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The rules codify that an “inadvertent disclosure” of privileged material does not operate as a waiver so long as (i) the privilege holder took “reasonable steps to prevent disclosure”; and (ii) the privilege holder took “reasonable steps to rectify the error.” Whether this “reasonableness” approach has led to the promised land is unclear; for example, “reasonableness” appears to be in the eye of the judicial beholder. Compare Rhodes Industries, Inc. v. Building Materials Corp. of America, 254 F.R.D. 216 (E.D. Pa. 2008) with Sitterson v. Evergreen School District of 114, 196 P.3d 735 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) with Mt. Hanley Ins. Co. v. Felman Prod. Inc., 2010 WL 1990555 (S.D. W. Va. May 18, 2010) with Edelen v. Campbell Soup Co., 265 F.R.D. 676 (N.D. Ga. 2010). And the claw-back safe haven provided by F.R.E. 502(d) has not appeared to have had much effect in obviating the risks of the “reasonableness” standard. See Spicker v. Quest Cherokee, 2009 WL 2168892 (D. Kan. 2009); see also J. Rosans, “6 Years In, Why Haven’t FRE 502(d) Orders Caught On?” Law360 (July 24, 2014).

As part of these reforms, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(5) puts specific obligations onto the receiving lawyer once she is made aware of the production of privileged information: (i) she “must promptly return, sequester, or destroy” the material(s); (ii) she “must not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved”; and (iii) she “must take reasonable steps to retrieve the information if the [receiving] party disclosed it before being notified.” (Interestingly, these requirements are similar to what the ABA prescribed prior to the promulgation of Rule 4.4(b). See ABA Formal Opinions 92-368 & 94-382.) About half of the states have imposed similar obligations on litigating lawyers in their jurisdictions. One that has not is New York State, which does not have the same or similar obligations in the Civil Practice Law and Rules. So New York litigators in New York federal courts would seem to have very different responsibilities with regard to inadvertent production than they would in New York State courts. And Virginia licensed attorneys also have their hands full. According to that state’s Standing Committee on Legal Ethics, an attorney who receives privileged materials inadvertently is not ethically obligated to return the materials to the sender, if “the confidential information [was] received in the discovery phrase of litigation,” rather than “[o]utside of the discovery process.” See Opinion 1871 (July 24, 2013).

In addition, the above-mentioned federal and state protocols have left some open issues for all lawyers governed thereby. For example, does the receiving lawyer have an affirmative obligation to notify the sender, or may she wait until she is “notified” of the inadvertent disclosure? And can the receiving attorney read the inadvertently produced material and/or share it with her client? Finally, what about privileged or confidential information that is overheard? (None of these rules seem to cover that scenario.)

Given the complexity and over-lay of different (but related) concepts, it is perhaps not surprising that courts, in sorting out the various protocols, have not been uniform in their approach to dealing with inadvertent disclosure. Compare Lipin v. Bender, 597 N.Y.S. 2d 390 (1st Dept. 1993) (disqualification of attorney) with MNT Sales, LLC v. Acme Television Holdings, LLC, Index No. 602156/2009, NYLJ, p. 42, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. April 29, 2010) (use of material barred at trial) with Rico v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 171 P. 3d 1092 (Cal. 2007) (attorneys and experts disqualified) with Merits Incentive LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 262 P. 3d 720 (Nev. 2011) (disqualification of attorney not ordered).

To help flesh out many of the foregoing points a bit more, a very recent judicial decision is instructive. In Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc., No. 1:15cv0057, 2017 BL 395 (W.D. Va. Feb. 2, 2017), a federal magistrate judge denied plaintiff’s motion to disqualify defense counsel. The litigation arose out of a dispute about insurance coverage relating to a funeral home’s fire. An employee for the insurance company put the entire case file (which included privileged materials) on an unprotected file-sharing site (which had no password protection), and then emailed a link to the site to the company’s outside investigator. Defense counsel issued a subpoena to the investigator, and its production in response included the e-mail listing the link. Defense counsel (i) first accessed the case file, and (ii) later produced the case file back to the insurer; the latter of which led to the motion to disqualify, as well as to motion practice on whether the insurer could claim a non-waiver under F.R.E. 502(b).

With respect to the Rule 502(b) issue, the magistrate judge focused (as highlighted above) on the “reasonableness” of the insurance company’s actions to protect the privileged materials. Based upon “material facts… not in dispute,” the magistrate judge determined there was “no evidence… that any precautions were taken to prevent this disclosure.” (emphasis by the court) By making the case file “accessible to anyone with access to the internet,” with no password protection, the insurance company failed the most basic tenet of “reasonableness”; as the magistrate judge concluded: “It is hard to imagine an act that would be more contrary to protecting the confidentiality of information than to post the information to the world wide web.” (The magistrate judge also ruled that there was a waiver of any attorney work product on similar grounds.)

Turning to the disqualification motion, the magistrate judge then ruled that the actions of defense counsel were improper under federal and Virginia procedural rules, as well as under operative Virginia ethics opinions (including Opinion 1871). Given that the e-mail link to the file-sharing site had a prominent “Confidentiality Notice” (which included this language: “This e-mail contains information that is privileged and confidential, and subject to legal restrictions and penalties regarding its unauthorized disclosure or other use.”), defense counsel (i) should have contacted plaintiff’s counsel about its access to the case file, and (ii) should have sought the court’s guidance as to whether there had been a waiver of applicable protections, before making use of the information. [All defense counsel had done was to call the Virginia State Bar Ethics Hotline for advice, action which, in the words of the magistrate judge, “belie[d] any claim that they believed that their receipt and use of the materials… was proper under the circumstances.”]

As to a sanction, the magistrate judge ruled that disqualification would be pointless, since “based on the court’s ruling on waiver, substitute counsel would have access to the same information.” As such, she found that “the more reasonable sanction is that defense counsel should bear the cost of the parties in obtaining the court’s ruling on the matter.”

Conclusion

In light of all of the foregoing, a number of concerned folks have suggested that the ethics gurus should go back and articulate a better (and more transparent) set of standards to govern how to handle inadvertent disclosure. But there has been significant pushback to that suggestion—on the ground that such a step “would be a step backwards.” According to one commentator, “[a] profoundly important argument for limiting the scope of lawyers’ ethical obligations in these situations is the unfairness of making the ‘innocent’ lawyers who receive such communications potentially subject to professional discipline in situations” not of their making; according to this pushback argument, “vagueness is preferable to… any broader rule.” See A. Davis, “Inadvertent Disclosure—Regrettable Confusion,” New York Law Journal (November 7, 2011).

Who is right in this debate? Who knows. What I do know is that, at present, inadvertent disclosure is one tricky and sticky wicket for any lawyer who gets caught up in it unaware.

Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana: Title VII Prohibits Sexual Orientation Discrimination

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits employers from discriminating against employees and job applicants based on five traits, including sex. Since 1994 Congress has often been urged to recognize sexual orientation as a protected trait, as several state laws do, but it has not done so. But on April 4, 2017, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held en banc that Title VII outlaws sexual orientation discrimination. Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana. The court did so not by creating a sixth protected trait, but by ruling that sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination. Hively puts the Seventh Circuit squarely at odds with nine other circuits.

The word sex in Title VII has undergone quite a metamorphosis in 53 years. It was put in the original bill by a congressman who thought Congress would balk and kill the bill, but his amendment was approved without comment. Since then, with no legislative history to aid them, courts have had to discern the word’s meaning on their own. Early on they saw it as embracing only biological differences between women and men. But in the 1980’s, they adopted a broader, gender-based view; under it, sex includes socio-sexual roles and behavioral expressions such as masculinity and femininity. Courts also recognized sexual harassment as sex discrimination.

The next step was to view discrimination based on nonconformity with gender norms as sex discrimination, which the Supreme Court took in Price Waterhouse, Inc. v. Hopkins (1989). Nine years later, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., held that Title VII reaches same-sex discrimination. Congress may not have had this in mind in 1964, the court said, but on its face the words “discriminate because of sex” in the act do not embrace only the opposite sex.

After Oncale, gay and lesbian employees who were harassed by coworkers seized on it and Price Waterhouse to get around the fact that sexual orientation is not a protected class. With increasing success, they urged courts to hold that even if one is homosexual, to harass that person because they don’t act, dress, or talk like members of their sex typically do is sex stereotyping. After that, courts were put to the hair-splitting task of discerning the motive for harassment: if it resulted from a belief that the target was gay there was no Title VII claim, but if it stemmed from perceived gender nonconformity a cause of action did exist.

In Hively, the court said that it was time to stop the legal gymnastics and to say flat out that sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination. To treat people differently because they prefer their sex to the other is the epitome of gender stereotyping, which is illegal under the rationales of Price Waterhouse and Oncale.

Concurring, Judge Posner tweaked the majority for claiming that it was carrying those decisions to their logical end. Better to say that courts may adapt statutory language to meet the felt needs of the time and be done with it. Predictably, the dissent argued that courts overstep their bounds if they usurp the legislative role, especially when Congress has a 23-year record of rejecting efforts to do what the majority did.

What’s in store in the future? Although Hively applies only in Wisconsin, Illinois, and Indiana, any en banc ruling, even one as controversial as this one will be, carries weight. It could be persuasive in some circuits that have ruled differently, especially as these are panel decisions. Several circuits have already been asked to take up this issue en banc.

That said, it is worth stressing that although the circuits have uniformly held that gender stereotyping is sex discrimination, nine are aligned against Hively. For all, or even most, to alter their position is hardly foreseeable, especially as each hung its hat on Congress’s inaction in this area. As well, although the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has read Title VII as Hively did since 2015, how long it will do so under this administration is an open question. For it to go the other way would take wind out of the sails of the majority’s position.

Because there is a circuit split, the Supreme Court may weigh in. If it does and Justice Gorsuch remains the newest member, it could divide 4–4 with Justice Kennedy in the middle. Then the question would be which Kennedy shows up, the conservative or the author of so many pro-gay-rights rulings. It’s a close question, but in the end my money is on the proposition that what Congress has done in this area—or, more aptly, not done—would be decisive for him.

Allergan Fine Is a Reminder of the Obligation to Disclose White-Knight Negotiations Following an Unsolicited Tender Offer

In January 2017, Allergan Inc. agreed with the SEC that it would pay a $15 million fine for failing to disclose, in its Schedule 14D-9 response to the unsolicited tender offer for the company by Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, that Allergan was engaged in negotiations for possible “white-knight” transactions in the months following Valeant’s offer. The director of the SEC’s New York Regional Office set forth in a press release that Allergan had “failed to fully and timely disclose information about potential merger transactions it was negotiating behind the scenes in response to the Valeant bid.”

Allergan’s Schedule 14D-9 filing. In the Schedule 14D-9 filed by Allergan in response to Valeant’s unsolicited, public takeover bid, Allergan: (i) set forth that the Valeant bid was inadequate; (ii) recommended that its shareholders not tender their shares into the offer; and (iii) set forth that it “is not now undertaking or engaged in any negotiations in response to the [Tender] Offer that relate to or could result in a merger or other extraordinary transaction.”

The SEC’s objections to Allergan’s Schedule 14D-9 disclosure. The SEC had the following objections with respect to Allergan’s disclosures in its Schedule 14D-9:

  • No disclosure of discussions with “Company A.” The Schedule 14D-9 was filed in June 2014. Thereafter, Allergan engaged in negotiations with Company A in August and September 2014 for a possible acquisition of Company A. The acquisition would have complicated Valeant’s offer by making Allergan a significantly larger company. The negotiations were terminated by Company A after it conducted due diligence on Allergan. The negotiations with Company A were never publicly disclosed.
  • No disclosure of discussions with Actavis plc until the merger agreement was signed. On October 4, 2014, the respective CEOs of Allergan and Actavis discussed a potential acquisition of Allergan by Actavis. The Actavis CEO proposed that Actavis would pay $185–$200 per Allergan share. A series of conversations ensued through October, with Allergan insisting that the price had to be higher than $200, and Actavis making increasing price proposals. On November 3, Allergan disclosed that it had been approached by a party about a possible transaction, but provided no other information. On November 5, Allergan and Actavis entered into a confidentiality and standstill agreement, and Allergan permitted Actavis to conduct due diligence. The parties at that time understood that Actavis was proposing $210–$215 per share and that Allergan wanted more than $215. On November 6, Allergan disclosed that it was “in discussions” concerning a possible merger that “may lead to negotiations.” On November 17, Allergan and Actavis announced that they had signed a merger agreement at a price of $219 per share of Allergan. Importantly, as was noted in the SEC Order, after rumors about merger discussions with Actavis came to the SEC staff’s attention, the staff warned Allergan on September 23 that “to the extent that [Allergan] was engaged in merger negotiations, Schedule 14D-9 required those negotiations to be disclosed.” Thereafter, the SEC staff had made repeated requests to Allergan to make timely disclosure of any ongoing discussions.

Key Points

Companies generally do not have an affirmative obligation to disclose white-knight discussions. Companies engaged in discussions or negotiations with respect to a possible transaction generally do not have a disclosure obligation. However, a disclosure obligation arises under the following circumstances:

  • Schedule 14D-9 filing is required. If a tender offer is received by a company, it has an obligation to disclose, in the Schedule 14D-9 that is required to be filed in response to the tender offer, discussions or negotiations conducted in response to the tender offer.
  • Inconsistent past statements must be corrected. In the case of a company receiving a bid that is not a tender offer, the company has an obligation to disclose such discussions or negotiations if the company has made inconsistent statements in the past that must be corrected—that is, affirmative statements made in the past that the company is not in discussions about a merger.
  • Agreement has been reached on all material deal points. In some cases, an obligation to disclose discussions or negotiations may arise when all of the material deal points for a transaction have been agreed upon between the company and the other party.

Allergan’s disclosure obligation arose because it had received a tender offer. Disclosure issues arose for Allergan only because it was subject to the Schedule 14D-9 rules. The Schedule 14D-9 rules applied only because Allergan had become subject to a tender offer. In the case of a tender offer for a company, Item 7 of Schedule 14D-9 requires that the company disclose “negotiations” that are conducted “in response to [the] tender [offer]” and that relate to an “extraordinary transaction” (including a merger or acquisition). Rule 14D-9(c) requires that the company amend the Schedule if any material change occurs.

Practical considerations with respect to Schedule 14D-9 disclosure of negotiations. Schedule 14D-9 does not require disclosure of discussions with respect to a possible transaction unless they rise to the level of “negotiations.” When discussions become “negotiations” depends on the facts and circumstances, including, for example, whether there has been back-and-forth between the parties on price of a nature that suggests that a deal has been, or is very close to having been, reached. Generally, a company prefers to engage in a process that does not lead to its being required to make early disclosure of possible white-knight discussions. Premature disclosure could result in the company becoming irretrievably “in play” before it has made a final decision about selling the company; could lead to a potential white knight losing interest in a transaction; and/or could require disclosure, as an update, that would not otherwise have been required.

The following potentially distinguishing features of the Allergan situation may have influenced the outcome:

  • SEC disclosure warnings. As noted, the SEC set forth in its Order that Allergan had failed to make timely disclosure “despite repeated requests” from the SEC staff that it make “appropriate disclosures.”
  • Extensive pricing discussions within a narrow range. Unlike the typical case where price discussions occur in a very short timeframe just prior to execution of the merger agreement, it appears in the Allergan-Actavis discussions that there was extensive back-and-forth on price well in advance of execution of the merger agreement. Moreover, those discussions were within a relatively narrow range, suggesting that real negotiations had taken place.
  • Lengthy process, with unusual level of shareholder engagement. The lengthy duration of Allergan’s process, extending over many months, made leaks and rumors about the process more likely. Further, the extensive engagement with shareholders—by both Allergan on the one hand, and Valeant and its shareholder activist co-bidder on the other hand—in connection with proxy contests on various issues relating to Valeant’s bid increased the visibility of the process to the shareholders, the market, and the SEC, perhaps heightening the disclosure issues.

What Constitutes a Security and Requirements Relating to the Offer and Sales of Securities and Exemptions From Registration Associated Therewith

Many people don’t realize that every offer and sale of a security is required to either be (a) registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); or (b) subject to an exemption from registration under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the Securities Act), under federal securities laws (“Small Business and the SEC”—a guide for small businesses on raising capital and complying with the federal securities laws). That requirement applies to the sale of securities to multiple high net worth individuals, the sale of a security to one person in a private transaction, the sale of a security to a family member and all offers and sales of securities of public and private companies, including organizations with only two or three persons. Furthermore, that requirement applies to an offer of a security which is ultimately rejected by a potential purchaser (SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 328 (1946)). Notwithstanding the requirements described above, a significant number of offers and sales may be exempt from registration under the Securities Act as described in greater detail below.

In order to understand the registration or exemption requirements set forth above, one must first understand the definition of a “security.”

Definition of Security

Under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act, the term “security” is defined as

any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a “security,” or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.

That definition is not meant to encompass everything that may be a “security” though, as the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that the definition of “security” is “quite broad” (Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555-556 (1982)) and meant to include “the many types of instruments that, in our commercial world, fall within the ordinary concept of a security” (H.R.Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1933)).

Clearly though the offer and sale of stock, bonds, debentures, ownership interests in limited liability companies and most notes with a maturity date over nine months are considered “securities” (Section 3(a)(3) of the Securities Act).

Registration Process

In order to register a security under the Securities Act, a company must file a registration statement with the SEC. Typically the type of registration statement used for an initial public offering will be a Form S-1 Registration Statement (Form S-1). A Form S-1 includes two parts (Part I and Part II). Part I is the prospectus, the legal offering or “selling” document. In the prospectus, the “issuer” of the securities must describe in the prospectus important facts about its business operations, financial condition, results of operations, risk factors, and management. It must also include audited financial statements. The prospectus must be delivered to everyone who buys the securities, as well as anyone who is made an offer to purchase the securities. Part II contains additional information that an issuer does not have to deliver to investors but must file with the SEC, such as copies of material contracts, signatures of management and other representations.

Once an issuer files a registration statement with the SEC, SEC staff examines the registration statement for compliance with pre-established disclosure requirements set forth in the form of registration statement (i.e., in Form S-1 itself) and in Regulation S-K, but does not evaluate the merits of the securities offering or determine whether the securities offered are “good” investments or appropriate for a particular type of investor. Individual investors are required to make their own evaluation of the offering terms based on their own facts, circumstances and risk tolerance.

The SEC generally provides any comments or questions it has on the registration statement within 30 days after the filing date of the registration statement. The issuer then responds to the questions and comments and amends the filing to address issues raised. The SEC may then have additional comments or questions and the process repeats itself until the SEC advises that the issuer has cleared all of its comments and the registration statement can be declared “effective.” Once the offering is declared “effective” the offering described in the registration statement can proceed as a registered transaction. Additionally, once the registration statement is declared “effective” the issuer is subject to the reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the Exchange Act), which requires the filing of annual reports on Form 10-K, quarterly reports on Form 10-Q and current reports (for disclosure of certain material transactions which occur between the filing date of quarterly and annual reports) on Form 8-K. These filing obligations continue until the issuer falls below certain minimum record shareholder thresholds, subject to the requirements of the Exchange Act.

Exemptions From Registration

Instead of registering the initial offer and sale of securities under the Securities Act, a company can rely on an exemption from registration to avoid such registration requirements. Some of the most widely used federal offering exemptions are summarized below:

Section 4(a)(2) Exemption

Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act exempts from registration “transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.” To qualify for this exemption, which is sometimes referred to as the “private placement” exemption, purchasers of securities must:

  • either have sufficient knowledge and experience in finance and business matters in order to be considered a “sophisticated investor” (i.e., be able to evaluate the risks and merits of the specific investment), or be able to bear the investment’s economic risk;
  • have access to the type of information normally provided in a prospectus in a registered offering under the Securities Act (for example, include similar information as would be required under Part I of Form S-1 described above); and
  • agree to take the securities for long-term investment without a view to distribute the securities to the public, except pursuant to the applicable rules of the Securities Act relating to the resale thereof (including Rule 144 described below).

Additionally, except in a Rule 506(c) offering, described below, no general solicitation or advertising is allowed in connection with a Section 4(a)(2) offering.

If a company offers securities to even one person who does not meet the necessary conditions of a Section 4(a)(2) offering, the entire offering may be in violation of the Securities Act.

While the specific compliance with a Section 4(a)(2) exemption is somewhat open to interpretation, Rule 506(b) provides objective standards that can be relied upon to ensure that the requirements of Section 4(a)(2) are met.

Rule 506

Rule 506(b) of the Securities Act allows companies to raise an unlimited amount of money in private offerings if certain requirements of Rule 506(b) are met. Those requirements include prohibiting the use of general solicitation or advertising to market the securities; allowing the sale of securities to an unlimited number of “accredited investors” (described below); making knowledgeable persons available to answer questions of prospective purchasers; and requiring that investors receive “restricted” securities, i.e., securities which include a legend making clear that no sales of the securities can be made absent an exemption from registration (like Rule 144 as described below) or the registration of such securities under the Securities Act. Alternatively, if the company includes a private placement offering document which sets forth substantially all of the information that would be required in a registration statement under the Securities Act (including audited financial statements), a Rule 506(b) offering can be made to up to 35 non-“accredited investors.”

The SEC requires companies to file a Form D within 15 days of the first sale under Rule 506, which requires the disclosure of certain information regarding the offering, securities to be sold thereunder and management.

Under Rule 506(c), a company can broadly solicit and generally advertise the offering, but still be deemed to be undertaking a private offering within Section 4(a)(2) if all of the other requirements of Regulation D are met in the event: (a) the investors in the offering are all “accredited investors” (i.e., no non-“accredited investors” are allowed to participate in a Rule 506(c) offering); and (b) the company has taken reasonable steps to verify that its investors are “accredited investors,” which could include reviewing documentation, such as W-2s, tax returns, bank and brokerage statements, credit reports, and the like—which is a greater burden to meet versus the requirement for a Rule 506(b) offering that allows companies to rely on the self-certification of investors and potential investors that they are “accredited.”

“Accredited investors” under Rule 501(a) of the Securities Act include any individual that earned income that exceeded $200,000 (or $300,000 together with a spouse) in each of the prior two years, and reasonably expects the same for the current year, or has a net worth over $1 million, either alone or together with a spouse (excluding the value of the person’s primary residence); certain entities such as a bank, insurance company, registered investment company, business development company, or small business investment company; partnerships, corporations and nonprofits, which generally are required to have assets in excess of $5 million or have equity owners that are all “accredited investors”; and any trust, with total assets in excess of $5 million, not formed to specifically purchase the subject securities, whose purchase is directed by a sophisticated person.

Revised Regulation A

Regulation A is an exemption from registration for public offerings made by non-reporting companies, provided that offerings made pursuant to this exemption share many characteristics with registered offerings. In March 2015, in order to implement Section 401 of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, the SEC amended Regulation A by creating two offering tiers: Tier 1, for offerings of up to $20 million in a 12-month period (which require less disclosures and no on-going reporting requirements compared to Tier 2 offerings); and Tier 2, for offerings of up to $50 million in a 12-month period (which requires that companies file annual, semiannual, and current reports with the SEC on an ongoing basis). For offerings of up to $20 million, companies can elect to proceed under the requirements for either Tier 1 or Tier 2. There are certain basic requirements applicable to both Tier 1 and Tier 2 offerings, including company eligibility requirements, bad actor disqualification provisions and other matters. Additional requirements apply to Tier 2 offerings, including limitations on the amount of money a non-accredited investor may invest in a Tier 2 offering, requirements for audited financial statements and the filing of ongoing reports (as referenced above).

Securities in a Regulation A offering can be offered publicly, using general solicitation and advertising, and can be sold to purchasers irrespective of their status as “accredited investors,” subject to certain limitations on the amount that non-“accredited investors” can invest under Tier 2 offerings. Securities sold in a Regulation A offering are not considered “restricted securities” (i.e., securities that must be held by purchasers for a certain period of time before they may be resold) for purposes of aftermarket resales. The SEC must issue a “notice of qualification” before any sales pursuant to a Regulation A offering (made on Form 1-A) can proceed, which requires that the SEC review the offering documents and results, in many cases, in the staff of the SEC providing questions and comments requiring amendments to a company’s offering documents, similar to the process of obtaining “effectiveness” of a Form S-1 filing as described above.

Crowdfunding

Crowdfunding allows companies to raise funding through a large number of small transactions. Under the JOBS Act crowdfunding provisions, companies are limited to raising $1 million in any 12-month period. Companies cannot crowdfund on their own, but are required to engage an intermediary that is either a registered broker-dealer or registered with the SEC and FINRA. These intermediaries are subject to a number of requirements including limiting the amount that can be invested based on an investor net worth. The only companies eligible for crowdfunding are companies that are non-Exchange Act reporting companies.

Resales of Restricted Securities

Assuming restricted securities are acquired pursuant to one of the private offering exemptions from registration described above, those securities are not freely tradable and can only be sold pursuant to an effective resale registration statement filed by the issuer or pursuant to a resale exemption from registration under the Securities Act. The main resale exemption used for the resale of restricted securities is Rule 144. Rule 144 provides an exemption that permits the resale of restricted securities if a number of conditions are met, including requiring that the holder of the securities paid the full acquisition price of such securities at least six months prior to any sale, assuming the issuer is a reporting company under the Exchange Act and is current in its filings and at least one year prior to any sale in the event the issuer is not a reporting company or not current in its filings, and provided that certain other requirements for resale are met not described herein. Rule 144 may also require a notice filing with the SEC prior to any sale of securities, may limit the amount of securities that can be sold at one time and may restrict the manner of sale, depending on whether the security holder is an “affiliate” of the issuer. An “affiliate” is a person that, directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with, the issuer, and generally includes officers, directors and those persons who hold 10 percent or more of an issuer’s securities.

Conclusion

The process of complying with the rules and regulations relating to the offer and sale of securities is complicated and no exception from compliance with the federal securities laws is provided for small transactions or transactions involving family members. Instead, each and every offer and sale of a security is required to either be (a) registered with the SEC; or (b) exempt from registration under the Securities Act. As such, a competent securities attorney should always be contacted prior to any offer or sale of securities to determine and confirm that all applicable rules and requirements are being followed. Failure to comply with the rules and regulations of the Securities Act can lead to an issuer (and in some cases its officers and directors) being subject to civil and criminal penalties and fines and can further create rescission rights for investors in the non-compliant offering.

It should also be noted that the above discussion is only a summary of applicable rules and requirements and is for informational purposes only. Finally, the above only discusses federal securities laws and issues and readers should keep in mind that often times the offer and sale of a security is governed by not only federal law, but also state law, and that each state has their own offering and sale requirements, notice and filing requirements and offering rules, all of which should be confirmed prior to proceeding with the offer or sale of any securities.

Ten Rules Every Lawyer—and Client—Should Know about Taxes on Legal Settlements

Lawyers and clients resolve disputes all the time, usually with an exchange of money and a release. Almost any time money changes hands, there are tax issues for both sides, coming up in a surprising number of ways. Perhaps your car was rear-ended while stopped at a red light, your contractor did shoddy work on your condo, you were unfairly fired, or someone did you wrong and, as a result, you are collecting a settlement payment or judgment. As it relates to taxes, the first question in any of these situations is whether the settlement payment or judgment is taxable income, and the answer usually is “yes.” The tax treatment in these situations can vary enormously, however, depending on how you were damaged, how the case was resolved, how payment was made, how IRS Forms 1099 were issued, and other variables. Here are 10 rules lawyers and clients should know about the taxation of settlements.

1. Settlements and Judgments Are Taxed the Same

The same tax rules apply whether you are paid to settle a case (even if your dispute only reached the letter-writing phase) or win a judgment. Despite this similarity, however, you will almost always have more flexibility to reduce taxes if a case settles rather than goes to judgment. If you are audited, you must show what the case was about, and what you were seeking in your claims. Consider the settlement agreement, the complaint, how payments were made to resolve the case, IRS Forms 1099 (or W-2), etc. You can influence how your recovery is taxed by how you deal with these issues.

2. Taxes Depend on the “Origin of the Claim”

Settlements and judgments are taxed according to the matter for which the plaintiff was seeking recovery (the origin of the claim). If you are suing a competing business for lost profits, a settlement or judgment will be considered lost profits taxed as ordinary income. If you are laid off at work and sue for discrimination seeking wages and severance, you will be taxed on your settlement or judgment as having received wages.

In fact, your former employer probably will withhold income and employment taxes on all (or part of) your settlement, even if you have not worked there for years. On the other hand, if you sue for damage to your condo by a negligent building contractor, your damages usually will not be considered income. Instead, the recovery may be treated as a reduction in the purchase price of the condo. That favorable rule means you might have no tax to pay on the money you collect. These rules are full of exceptions and nuances, however, so be careful. Perhaps the biggest exception of all applies to recoveries for personal physical injuries (see rule 3).

3. Recoveries for Personal Physical Injuries and Physical Sickness Are Tax-Free

This is a really important rule that causes almost unending confusion with lawyers and their clients. If you sue for personal physical injuries resulting from, for example, a slip and fall or car accident, your compensatory damages should be tax-free. That may seem odd if, because if you could not work after your injuries, you are seeking lost wages. However, a specific section of the tax code—section 104—shields damages for personal physical injuries and physical sickness.

Note the “physical” requirement. Before 1996, “personal” injury damages included emotional distress, defamation, and many other legal injuries and were tax-free. Since 1996, however, your injury also must be “physical” to give rise to tax-free money. Unfortunately, neither the IRS nor Congress has made clear what that means. The IRS has determined generally that you must have visible harm (cuts or bruises) for your injuries to be “physical.” This observable bodily harm standard generally means that, if you sue for intentional infliction of emotional distress, your recovery is taxed.

Likewise, if you sue your employer for sexual harassment involving rude comments or even fondling, that also is not physical enough for the IRS. Some courts have disagreed, however, and the U.S. Tax Court in particular has allowed some employment lawsuits complete or partial tax-free treatment where the employee developed a physical sickness from the employer’s conduct or where a pre-existing illness was exacerbated. Taxpayers routinely argue in U.S. Tax Court that their damages are sufficiently physical to be tax-free, and although standards are getting a little easier, the IRS usually wins these cases. In many cases a tax-savvy settlement agreement could have improved the plaintiff’s tax chances.

4. Symptoms of Emotional Distress Are Not “Physical”

Tax law draws a distinction between money you receive for physical symptoms of emotional distress (like headaches and stomachaches) and physical injuries or sickness. Here again, these lines are not clear. For example, if in settling an employment dispute, suppose that you receive an extra $50,000 because your employer gave you an ulcer. Is an ulcer considered “physical” or is it merely a symptom of your emotional distress?

Many plaintiffs end up taking aggressive positions on their tax returns by claiming that damages of this nature are tax-free. Yet that can be a losing battle if the defendant issues an IRS Form 1099 for the entire settlement. That means it can behoove you to try to come to an agreement with the defendant about the tax issues, and there is nothing improper about doing so. There are wide variations in tax reporting and multiple players are often involved in litigation (e.g., the parties, their insurance companies, and their attorneys); thus, neglecting to nail all this down in the settlement agreement can be foolish. You may have to pay for outside tax experts, but you will almost always save considerable money later by spending a little at this critical moment. Otherwise, you might end up surprised with Forms 1099 you receive the year after your case settles. At that point, you will not have a choice about reporting the payments on your tax return.

5. Medical Expenses Are Tax-Free

Even if your injuries are purely emotional, payments for medical expenses are tax-free, and what constitutes “medical expenses” is surprisingly liberal. For example, payments to a psychiatrist or counselor qualify, as do payments to a chiropractor or physical therapist. Many nontraditional treatments count as well.

However, if you have previously deducted the medical expenses and are reimbursed when your suit settles in a subsequent year, you may have to pay tax on them. Blame the “tax benefit” rule, which provides that, if you previously claimed a deduction for an amount that produced a tax benefit to you (meaning it reduced the amount of tax you paid), you must pay tax on that amount if you recover it in a subsequent year. The opposite is also true. If you deducted an amount in a previous year, and that deduction produced no tax benefit to you, then you can exclude the recovery of that amount in a later year from your gross income.

6. Allocating Damages Can Save Taxes

Most legal disputes involve multiple issues, but even if your dispute relates to one course of conduct, there is a good chance the total settlement amount will involve multiple categories of damages. It usually is best for the plaintiff and defendant to agree on what is paid and its tax treatment. Such agreements are not binding on the IRS or the courts in later tax disputes, but they are rarely ignored. As a practical matter, what the parties put down in the agreement often is followed.

For all of these reasons, it is more realistic—and more likely to be respected by the IRS and other taxing authorities—if you divide up the total and allocate it across multiple categories. If you are settling an employment suit, there might be some wages (with withholding of taxes and reported on a Form W-2); some nonwage emotional distress damages (taxable, but not wages, so reported on a Form 1099); some reimbursed business expenses (usually nontaxable, unless the employee had deducted them); some pension or fringe benefit payments (usually nontaxable); and so on. There may even be some payment allocable to personal physical injuries or physical sickness (nontaxable, so no Form 1099), although this subject is controversial (see rules 3 and 4).

7. Look for Capital Gain Instead of Ordinary Income

Outside the realm of suits for physical injuries or physical sickness, just about everything is income; however, that does not answer the question of how it will be taxed. If your suit is about damage to your house or your factory, the resulting settlement may be treated as capital gain. Long-term capital gain is taxed at a lower rate (15 percent or 20 percent, plus the 3.8% Obamacare tax, not 39.6 percent) and is therefore much better than ordinary income.

Apart from the tax-rate preference, your tax basis may be relevant as well. This generally is your original purchase price, increased by any improvements you have made and decreased by depreciation, if any. In some cases, your settlement may be treated as a recovery of basis, not income.

A good example is harm to a capital asset, such as your house or your factory. If the defendant damaged it and you collect damages, you may be able to simply reduce your basis rather than report gain. Some settlements are treated like sales; therefore, again, you may be able to claim your basis. In fact, there are many circumstances in which the ordinary income versus capital gain distinction can be raised, so be sensitive to it. For example, some patent cases can produce capital gain, not ordinary income. The tax rate spread can be nearly 20 percent.

8. Attorney’s Fees Can Be a Trap

Whether you pay your attorney hourly or on a contingent-fee basis, legal fees will impact your net recovery and your taxes. If you are the plaintiff and use a contingent-fee lawyer, you usually will be treated (for tax purposes) as receiving 100 percent of the money recovered by you and your attorney. This is so even if the defendant pays your lawyer the contingent fee directly.

If your case is fully nontaxable (e.g., an auto accident in which you are physically injured), that should cause no tax problems. Yet if your recovery is taxable, the type of deduction you can claim for the legal fees can vary materially. This trap occurs frequently. Suppose you settle a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress against your neighbor for $100,000, and your lawyer keeps 40 percent, or $40,000.

You might think that you would have $60,000 of income. Instead, you will have $100,000 of income, followed by a $40,000 miscellaneous itemized deduction. That means you will be subject to numerous limitations that can whittle your deduction down to nothing. For alternative minimum tax (AMT) purposes, you get no tax deduction for the fees. That is why many clients say they are paying tax on money (the attorney’s fees) they never received.

Notably, not all attorney’s fees face such harsh tax treatment. If the lawsuit concerns the plaintiff’s trade or business, the legal fees are a business expense. Those legal fees are “above the line” (a better deduction). Moreover, if your case involves claims against your employer, or involves certain whistleblower claims, there is an above-the-line deduction for legal fees. That means you deduct those legal fees before you reach the adjusted gross income (AGI) line on the front of your 1040. An above-the-line deduction prevents the problems related to miscellaneous itemized deductions taken after your AGI has been calculated. Outside of employment and certain whistleblower claims or claims involving your trade or business, however, be careful: there are sometimes ways of circumventing these attorney’s fees rules, but you need sophisticated tax help before your case settles to do it.

9. Punitive Damages and Interest Are Always Taxable

Punitive damages and interest are always taxable, even if your injuries are 100 percent physical. Suppose you are injured in a car crash and receive $50,000 in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages. The $50,000 is tax-free, but the $5 million is fully taxable. Moreover, you might have trouble deducting your attorney’s fees (see rule 8).

The same occurs with interest. You might receive a tax-free settlement or judgment, but prejudgment or postjudgment interest is always taxable. As with punitive damages, taxable interest can produce attorney’s fees deduction problems. These rules can make it more attractive (from a tax viewpoint) to settle your case rather than have it go to judgment.

Return to the situation above, in which you receive $50,000 in compensatory (tax-free) damages, plus $5 million in punitive damages. Can you settle instead for $2 million that is all tax-free? It depends (among other things) on whether the judgment is final or on appeal. It also depends on what issues are up on appeal. The facts and procedural posture of your case are important. In some cases, you can be much better off, from a tax viewpoint, taking less money.

10. It Pays to Consider the Defense

Plaintiffs generally are much more worried about tax planning than defendants. Nevertheless, consider the defendant’s perspective as well. A defendant paying a settlement or judgment will always want to deduct it. If the defendant is engaged in a trade or business, doing so rarely will be questioned, given that litigation is a cost of doing business. Even punitive damages are tax deductible by businesses. Only certain government fines cannot be deducted, and even then defendants can sometimes find a way if the fine is in some way compensatory.

Despite these broad deduction rules for businesses, not everyone is so lucky. If the suit is related to investments, the deduction could be restricted to only investment income or face other limitations. If the suit is purely personal, the defendant may get no deduction at all. In some cases, that can extend to attorney’s fees as well.

Defendants can also run up against questions about whether an amount can be immediately deducted or must be capitalized. For example, if a buyer and seller of real estate are embroiled in a dispute, any resulting settlement payment may need to be treated as part of the purchase price and capitalized, not deducted.

Conclusion

Nearly every piece of litigation eventually sprouts tax issues. It is tempting to just bring your dispute to an end and let the tax chips fall where they may. Whether you are a plaintiff, a defendant, or counsel for one, that can be a mistake. Before you resolve the case and sign, consider the tax aspects. Tax withholding, reporting, and tax language that might help you are all worth addressing. You will almost always have to consider these issues at tax return time the following year. You often save yourself money by considering taxes earlier.

Private Planes, Investors, and NASDAQ Rules: Delaware Supreme Court Gives Guidance on Director Independence

Under Delaware law, as under federal law, a corporate stockholder may assert a cause of action derivatively on behalf of a corporation for harms caused to the corporation by its directors and officers. However, a stockholder’s right to bring such a derivative action conflicts with a board of directors’ right to manage the business and affairs of a corporation. Therefore, a stockholder in a Delaware corporation who wishes to bring suit derivatively on behalf of a corporation must either make a demand on the corporation’s board of directors to bring the suit or be prepared to explain in the complaint why such a demand would be futile. Under Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 23.1, a derivative complaint must allege “with particularity” the plaintiff’s efforts to obtain the desired action from the board or must allege, also “with particularity,” “the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.” In most cases, the complaint sets forth the plaintiff’s reasons “for not making the effort,” usually alleging that demand on the board would be futile because a majority of the board members were either interested in the challenged transaction or lacked the required independence from an interested party. A complaint that fails to allege such “demand futility” with particularity will be dismissed under Rule 23.1.

A director who participates on both sides of the challenged transaction, or who obtains a benefit not shared with all stockholders, is interested in the transaction. A director who is financially “beholden to” an interested person, or who has a relationship with an interested person that would affect the director’s ability to exercise independent judgment, lacks independence. Demand on the board is excused, and a stockholder may bring suit derivatively, when a majority of the board members are either interested or lack independence. Many Delaware cases have focused on the types of relationships that render directors not independent.

In a recent case, Sandys v. Pincus, 2016 Del. LEXIS 627 (Del. Dec. 5, 2016), the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Delaware Court of Chancery’s dismissal of a derivative suit based on failure to plead demand futility with particularity. The Court of Chancery found that the facts alleged in the complaint were insufficient to show that a majority of the members of the corporation’s board were either interested in the challenged transaction or lacked independence from an interested person. Four of the five members of the Delaware Supreme Court, sitting en banc, disagreed. The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Leo E. Strine, Jr., further defines the types of relationships that can render directors not independent.

In addition to discussing the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in Sandys v. Pincus, this article will refer to off-the-cuff remarks made by Chief Justice Strine at the Securities Regulation Institute in Coronado, California, on January 23, 2017, regarding Sandys v. Pincus and, more generally, the problems of director independence under Delaware law.

Summary of Facts

The complaint in Sandys v. Pincus alleged that several top managers and directors of Zynga, Inc. traded on inside information, selling 20.3 million shares of Zynga stock at $12 per share, for a total of $236.7 million, shortly before an earnings announcement disclosed information that caused the market price to drop 9.6 percent to $8.52 per share. The complaint also alleged that the insiders were aware at the time of the sale of additional negative information that, when disclosed three months later, caused Zynga’s market price to drop to $3.18 per share, for a total decline of 73.5 percent from the $12 sale price. The complaint asserted claims for breach of fiduciary duty against the insiders who participated in the sale and the directors who approved the sale.

The defendants included Mark Pincus, who was the former CEO, chairman, and controlling stockholder of Zynga, holding 61 percent of the company’s voting power. At the time the complaint was filed, the Zynga board of directors was composed of nine directors, two of whom, Pincus and defendant Reid Hoffman, had participated in the challenged transaction. Another, Don Mattrick, was Zynga’s CEO.

Based on the allegations in the complaint, the Court of Chancery found that at least five of Zynga’s directors—a majority of the board—were not interested in the transaction and were independent of Pincus. The Delaware Supreme Court disagreed as to the independence of three of those five: Ellen Simonoff, William Gordon, and John Doerr. The court found that, in addition to Pincus and Hoffman, who were interested in the transaction, Mattrick (the CEO), was not independent because Pincus, as the controlling stockholder, controlled Mattrick’s livelihood. Therefore, a majority of six of the nine board members were either interested (Pincus and Hoffman) or lacked independence from Pincus (Mattrick, Simonoff, Gordon, and Doerr), demand was excused as futile, and the complaint should not have been dismissed.

Director Simonoff Was Not Independent Because of Co-Ownership of an Airplane With Pincus

The complaint alleged that director Ellen Simonoff, together with her husband, had “an existing business relationship with defendant Pincus as co-owners of a private airplane.” The Delaware Supreme Court found that “the most likely inference” from that alleged fact was that there was “an extremely close, personal bond between Pincus and Simonoff, and between their families.” The court accepted the plaintiff’s argument that “owning an airplane together is not a common thing” and that such co-ownership “suggests that the Pincus and Simonoff families are extremely close to each other and are among each other’s most important and intimate friends.” The court determined that co-ownership of an airplane “is suggestive of the type of very close personal relationship that, like family ties, one would expect to heavily influence a human’s ability to exercise impartial judgment.” The court maintained that the elevated pleading standard in the demand excusal context—“with particularity”—“does not require a plaintiff to plead a detailed calendar of social interaction to prove that directors have a very substantial personal relationship rendering them unable to act independently of each other.” The court thus concluded that the alleged facts were sufficient to support an inference that Simonoff was not independent of Pincus.

Directors Gordon And Doerr Were Not Independent Because of “Mutually Beneficial Business Relations” With Pincus

The complaint alleged that two other directors, William Gordon and John Doerr, were partners at Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, an investment firm that controlled 9.2 percent of Zynga’s equity. Kleiner Perkins also invested in a company cofounded by Pincus’s wife. In addition, Kleiner Perkins and defendant Hoffman (who participated in the challenged transaction along with Pincus) coinvested in another company, Shopkick, Inc., and Hoffman served on Shopkick’s board with another Kleiner Perkins partner. The court accepted the plaintiff’s argument that “Gordon and Doerr have a mutually beneficial network of ongoing business relations with Pincus and Hoffman that they are not likely to risk by causing Zynga to sue them,” and rejected the defendants’ argument that “the relationships among these directors flowed all in one direction and that it is Pincus who is likely beholden to Gordon, Doerr, and Kleiner Perkins for financing.” The court determined that, “precisely because of the importance of a mutually beneficial ongoing business relationship, it is reasonable to expect that sort of relationship might have a material effect on the parties’ ability to act adversely toward each other.”

Gordon and Doerr Were Not Considered Independent under NASDAQ Listing Rules

The court also emphasized the fact that Zynga did not identify Gordon and Doerr as independent directors under the NASDAQ listing rules, although “Zynga did not disclose why its board made this determination.” Although the Delaware standard for director independence “does not perfectly marry with the standards of the stock exchange in all cases,” the NASDAQ criteria “are relevant under Delaware law and likely influenced by our law.” The court listed the relationships that automatically preclude a finding of independence under the NASDAQ rules, concluding that the “bottom line” is that “a director is not independent if she has a ‘relationship which, in the opinion of the Company’s board of directors, would interfere with the exercise of independent judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a director.’” The court determined that Delaware law “is based on the sensible intuition that deference ought to be given to the business judgment of directors whose interests are aligned with those of the company’s stockholders.” Thus, when a board of directors has determined that one of its members has a relationship that would interfere with her judgment in carrying out her responsibilities generally—even more so in the “high-salience context” of Rule 23.1, where the determination of independence “can short-circuit a merits determination of a fiduciary duty claim”—courts should exercise an “understandable skepticism.”

Thus, given their alleged relationship with Pincus and Hoffman and the fact that they were not identified as independent under the NASDAQ rules, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that Gordon and Doerr lacked independence for purposes of demand excusal.

Plaintiff Failed To Investigate the Directors’ Independence before Filing Suit

A recurring theme in the Sandys v. Pincus opinion is the plaintiff’s failure to conduct an adequate presuit investigation into the independence of the Zynga board of directors from the company’s controlling stockholder (Pincus). Although the plaintiff did exercise his right as a stockholder to seek books and records from the company regarding the challenged transaction, he did not seek books and records “bearing on the independence of the board.” The court determined that the “tools at hand” for drafting a complaint include not only traditional books-and-records demands, but “the tool provided by the company whose name has become a verb—or another internet search engine.” If the plaintiff had “Googled” the defendants, “he likely would have discovered more information about Simonoff’s relationship with Pincus.” The court noted that, although “an internet search will only have utility if it generates information of a reliable nature,” the court “can take judicial notice that internet searches can generate articles in reputable newspapers and journals, postings on official company websites, and information on university websites that can be the source of reliable information.” The court determined that the plaintiff’s “lack of diligence put the Court of Chancery in a compromised and unfair position . . . and the plaintiff is fortunate that his failure to do a pre-suit investigation has not resulted in dismissal.”

Justice Valihura’s Dissent Emphasizes the Presumption of Director Independence

In an unusual move, Justice Karen Valihura lodged a written dissent to the court’s ruling. She disagreed with the majority on the independence of directors Simonoff, Gordon, and Doerr. In her view, the plaintiff failed to allege facts showing the materiality of Simonoff’s co-ownership of the airplane or of Gordon’s and Doerr’s business relationships with Pincus and Hoffman. She emphasized that, in the demand-futility context, directors are presumed independent and that plaintiffs have the burden to plead facts “with particularity” showing that the alleged relationships were of a “bias-producing” nature.

As to Simonoff, she noted that the complaint alleged only a business relationship between Simonoffs and Pincus and that the only reference to a “close friendship” appeared in an unverified brief that could not be considered on a motion to dismiss based on the pleadings. Quoting Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004), she determined that, “a reasonable inference cannot be made that a particular friendship raises a reasonable doubt ‘without specific factual allegations to support such a conclusion.’” In Beam, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s dismissal of a complaint that contained allegations that a director was a “longtime personal friend” or had a “longstanding personal relationship” with the controlling stockholder, Martha Stewart.

As to Gordon and Doerr, and Zynga’s failure to identify them as independent directors under NASDAQ rules, Justice Valihura reasoned that it is “not difficult to come up with a scenario where a director might be deemed ‘non-independent’ under the NASDAQ rules, or NYSE rules, yet deemed independent for demand futility purposes,” for example, if the designation were due to a relationship with the corporation or an executive other than the controlling stockholder. Given the plaintiff’s pleading burden and failure to explain why Gordon and Doerr were identified as not independent for NASDAQ purposes, Justice Valihura did not believe that the plaintiff was entitled to an inference that Gordon and Doerr were not independent for demand-futility purposes.

Finally, Justice Valihura noted that, “internet searches likely are not, in most cases, an adequate substitute for [books and records] demands made pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 220,” and that the majority “never identifies what information likely would have been discovered.” She noted that, on motions to dismiss, courts are “stuck with the limited factual allegations made by the plaintiff,” and that courts may not take judicial notice of facts outside the pleading unless they are not “subject to reasonable dispute,” and the parties are “given prior notice and an opportunity to challenge judicial notice of that fact.”

Chief Justice Strine’s “Off the Cuff” Comments

On January 23, 2017, Chief Justice Strine, the author of the Sandys v. Pincus opinion, took part in a “conversation” at the Securities Regulation Institute in Coronado, California, where he discussed issues raised by the opinion along with other issues of director independence.

The Chief Justice stated the view that some personal relationships are akin to family relationships and urged courts and boards of directors to “dig in” and not just “check the box” on exchange independence standards. He distinguished cases in which directors serve on other boards together or attend weddings (as in the Delaware Supreme Court’s 2004 Stewart case), which may signal nothing more than a social or economic circle or peer group. Rather, he asked, who owns a plane together? Co-owning an airplane or a boat is “a big deal.” The Chief Justice stressed that boards should give advance consideration to the likelihood of litigation—it happens to every public company—and think, “who are our really independent directors”—the individuals who could be trusted to make a decision about whether to sue a fellow board member.

In addition, the Chief Justice said that, when a deal is anticipated, it is important for a board to switch from routine, “short-form” minutes to “long-form” minutes, and that the board should flag the change and state why it is being made. Boards that launch without explanation into long-form minutes do not look credible because the minutes are “lumpy”—too much on x and nothing on y. That is why short-form, but thoughtful, “contextual” minutes are best and should be maintained in most situations. When there is a reason to start including more detail, the board should state so and state why. According to the Los Angeles-San Francisco Daily Journal, the Chief Justice suggested that it might even be wise to record key meetings to ensure that events are recalled accurately. “I’d much rather have a tape recording of the meeting . . . than to have somebody doing bad minutes or taking bad notes,” Strine said.

According to the Daily Journal, the Chief Justice also urged corporate attorneys to step in while boards are formed to head off director conflicts that can be raised in derivative lawsuits. He said that attorneys must be willing to probe deeply into relationships among directors through their own external research and direct questioning of potential board members. “Uncomfortable questions need to be asked,” Strine said.

Key Takeaways

Beware of “Mutually Beneficial Business Relations” Between Directors and Controlling Stockholders

Traditionally, a director lacks independence from an interested person if the director is “beholden to” the interested person. Under Sandys v. Pincus, the reverse may be true; a director may lack independence because the interested person is beholden to the director. The allegation that the interested person has an obligation to the director can lead to an inference of “mutually beneficial business relations” such that the director is deemed unable to exercise independent judgment and is disabled from considering a presuit demand for board action against the interested person. The key takeaway is that corporate counsel must consider obligations flowing in both directions, and not just obligations that otherwise independent directors owe to controlling stockholders.

Beware of Co-Ownership of Significant Assets Between Directors and Controlling Stockholders

Under Sandys v. Pincus, co-ownership of a significant asset, such as a private airplane or a boat, whether for a business purpose or otherwise, can lead to an inference that a close personal relationship akin to family exists, and that a director in such a relationship is not independent for purposes of demand excusal. The key takeaway is that corporate counsel should inquire about and investigate the existence of co-owned assets in determining whether a board of directors has a majority of truly independent directors.

Directors Who Are Not Independent under Exchange Rules Are Unlikely To Be Found Independent for Demand-Excusal Purposes

The Delaware Supreme Court did not go so far as to say that a director who is not independent under NASDAQ or other exchange rules is per se not independent for demand-excusal purposes, but Sandys v. Pincus strongly suggests that it is unwise to assume otherwise. Under Sandys, a company’s board should consider disclosing the reasons for its determination that a director is not independent under exchange rules, and should be prepared to explain why such a director should be considered independent for demand-excusal purposes. Although plaintiffs have the burden of pleading particular facts that create a reasonable doubt regarding independence, the mere fact that a director is not independent under exchange rules may be sufficient to meet that burden in future cases.

Plaintiffs’ Lawyers Should Seek Books and Records Related To Board Independence

In Sandys, the plaintiff conducted a presuit investigation by seeking corporate books and records related to the challenged transaction. At that time, a majority of the board members had participated in the challenged transaction, so a majority of the board was interested and unable to consider a demand to sue themselves. The plaintiff, assuming that demand was futile under those circumstances, did not seek books and records regarding board independence. However, the composition of the board changed before the complaint was filed so that only two of the nine board members who would have considered a demand at that time—the so-called demand board—had participated in the transaction. As a result, it was a “close call” whether the board was disabled, and the plaintiff was “fortunate” that the dismissal of his complaint under Rule 23.1 was reversed on appeal. The key takeaway for plaintiffs’ lawyers is that they should always seek information about board independence when demanding books and records in prederivative-suit investigations.

Plaintiffs’ Lawyers Should Always “Google” the Members of the Demand Board

In Sandys, the court scolded the plaintiff for his “cursory” presuit investigation into board independence, insisting that the plaintiff “likely would have discovered more information” if he had conducted an Internet search of reliable sources. The court determined that it could “take judicial notice” that such resources “can be the source of reliable information.” Many derivative and class-action complaints over the years have quoted newspaper and magazine articles in alleging corporate wrongdoing. The Delaware Supreme Court suggests in Sandys that plaintiffs can also rely on reputable Internet sources in pleading demand futility.

Authenticating Digital Evidence at Trial

In this digital age, social media, texts, and a variety of other forms of technology have increasingly become evidence, or sought as evidence, in a wide sundry of litigation. How do you ensure that this evidence comes in at trial? This issue can prove daunting to newer practitioners as well as more seasoned practitioners who may not be as knowledgeable as to how to introduce into evidence e-mails, texts, or Facebook posts. Although it may appear more complicated at first glance, the short answer is simple: authentication. As with all other types of evidence, digital evidence must be authenticated in order to be properly introduced at trial. However, authenticating digital evidence can pose some interesting challenges.

As an initial matter, the proffered evidence must first be determined to be relevant. The test for determining relevancy is Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 401, which provides: “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Once the evidence is determined to be relevant, then it must be determined to be authentic.

The authentication standard is the same regardless of whether the evidence is digital or in a more traditional form—that is, FRE 901(a) requires the party proffering the evidence to demonstrate that the evidence is what it is claimed to be. FRE 901(b) sets forth examples of evidence that satisfy the general requirements of FRE 901(a), including, but not limited to, the testimony of a witness with knowledge under FRE 901(b)(1), distinctive characteristics of the item under FRE 901(b)(4), or a comparison by an expert witness under FRE 901(b)(3).

E-mails are now commonly offered as evidence at trial. After first demonstrating that the evidence is relevant pursuant to FRE 401, the attorney proffering this evidence must establish authenticity: Was the e-mail sent to and from the persons as indicated on the e-mail? Here, a witness with personal knowledge may testify as to the e-mail’s authenticity, which typically is the author of the e-mail or a witness who saw the proffered e-mail drafted and/or received by the person the proponent claims drafted/received the e-mail. In addition, if the e-mail has been produced in response to a sufficiently descriptive document request, the production of the e-mail in response may constitute a statement of party-opponent and found to be authenticated under FRE 801(d)(2).

Texts are also becoming increasingly offered as evidence at trial. Typically, evidence of texts is obtained in one of two forms: (1) as screen shots; or (2) as photographs of the text messages. Whether a screen shot or a photograph, it is important that the screen with the text message, the name and/or phone number of the person sending the text message, and the date and time the message was sent are clearly displayed. Text messages can be authenticated by the testimony of a witness with knowledge or by distinctive characteristics of the item, including circumstantial evidence such as the author’s screen name or monikers, customary use of emoji or emoticons, the author’s known phone number, the reference to facts that are specific to the author, or reference to facts that only the author and a small number of other individuals may know.

Social media networks such as Facebook, Linked-In, and the like are now ubiquitous; consequently, social media posts have increasingly become evidence at trial. However, authenticating a social media post generally is more difficult than an e-mail or a text. For example, it is insufficient to simply show that a post was made on a particular person’s webpage; it is generally too easy to create a Facebook page or the like under someone else’s name. In addition, an individual could have gained access to someone else’s social media account. To properly introduce evidence of a social media post at trial, you must first have a printout (or download, if a video) of the webpage that depicts the social media post you seek to introduce as evidence, and the person who printed or downloaded the post must testify that the printouts accurately reflected what was on his or her screen when it was printed or downloaded.

Once that is established, the social media post must be authenticated. This can be done in several ways. Direct witness testimony can be obtained by the purported creator of the post, from someone who saw the post being created, and/or from someone who communicated with the alleged creator of the post through that particular social media network. Testimony can be obtained from the social media network to establish that the alleged creator of the post had exclusive access to the originating computer and the social media account. The subscriber report can also be subpoenaed from the social media network, which can identify all posts made and received as well as any comments, “likes,” “shares,” photographs, etc. As with e-mails and texts, circumstantial evidence may also be used for authentication pursuant to FRE 901(b)(4) if, for example, the post contains references or information relating to family members, a significant other, or co-workers; the writing style of the posts or comments is in the same style (i.e., slang, abbreviations, nicknames, and/or use of emoji/emoticons) the purported author uses; or there are private details about the author’s life or details that are not widely known that are indicated in the post. Finally, do not overlook the option of having the author of the social media post authenticate the post and testify regarding the post in his or her deposition.

In sum, authentication is key to getting digital evidence such as e-mails, texts, and social media posts admitted into evidence, but proper authentication can be a significant hurdle, and this often is a fact-driven issue that will vary from case-to-case.